Torture Is Counterproductive To Interrogation Results!

/123 Comments/in , /by

As Fatster noted, there is a new report out from Pamela Hess of the AP relating the conclusions of a paper, published in the scientific journal Trends in Cognitive Science: Science and Society, by Irish professor and researcher Shane O’Mara, on the deleterious effects of the procedures employed by the Bush Administration torture program:

The CIA’s harsh interrogation program likely damaged the brain and memory functions of terrorist suspects, diminishing their physical ability to provide the detailed information the spy agency sought, according to a new scientific paper.

The paper scrutinizes the harsh techniques used by the CIA under the Bush administration through the lens of neurobiology. Researchers concluded that the harsh methods were biologically counterproductive to eliciting quality information because prolonged stress harms the brain’s ability to retain and recall information.

Gee, who could have expected? Read the whole article, it is worth it and not that long. I applaud Professor O’Mara for doing the work and publishing the paper (if anyone is able to find a copy on the net, please leave a link in comments). But the basic conclusions have been known maxims in the interrogation field for a very long time in one form or another. Take this quote from the article for instance:

He warned that this could lead to brain lobe disorders, making the prisoners vulnerable to confabulation – in this case, the pathological production of false memories based on suggestions from an interrogator. Those false memories mix with true information in the interrogation, making it difficult to distinguish between what is real and what is fabricated.

This root concept and knowledge as to suggestibility and contamination of information gleaned from subjects has been around for a couple of decades as anybody familiar with the work of Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson is aware. Heck the very basics of suggestibility, and problems associated therewith, are even alluded to in the seminal law enforcement interrogation treatises of Inbau, Reid and Buckley Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, the first volume of which was published in the 60s.

And therein lies the problem. Where has the media been on this? Dr. O’Mara’s paper, again to be heavily applauded for apparently specifically addressing the Bush torture modalities and resultant physiological effects, may be new; but the insanity of the use by the Bush Administration of those modalities, for the purpose claimed, has been crystal clear all along. The people advocating these programs had to be willfully, wantonly and intentionally ignorant of Read more →

Mowhoush and al-Jamadi

/33 Comments/in /by

In an article reporting the former DCIs’ attempt to shut down the torture investigation, the WaPo provides a few more details on the direction of that investigation. It reports that John Durham will be reviewing just a few cases, including the deaths of Iraqis Abed Hamed Mowhoush and Manadel al-Jamadi.

Two other detainee cases were among those that drew significant law enforcement attention: the death by suffocation of Iraqi Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush in November 2003, after which an Army officer was convicted; and the death the same month of Manadel al-Jamadi at Abu Ghraib prison, in the custody of the CIA, where he was placed after being beaten by Navy SEALs. One SEAL was charged with a crime, and he later won an acquittal.

It also describes one of the reasons these cases are being investigated again–because there was some disagreement over whether to indict the cases.

The Justice Department review in the Eastern District of Virginia decision several years ago was conducted by some of the office’s top prosecutors.

One official involved in the review said there was “absolutely no pressure from DOJ” to decide the cases in a certain direction. “There was absolutely none of that, and if I had seen that I would have been very offended by it,” the official said.

[snip]

The [Office of Public Responsibility] report, which is undergoing declassification review, does not point to problems with attorneys in the Eastern District of Virginia, two sources said, but it does explore differences of opinion within the working group that examined the detainee allegations over how to proceed on the few cases that were “close calls.” In a small number of instances, career lawyers disagreed about whether the evidence was sufficient to seek indictment and ultimately win in court. Some of those issues were assessed — as is normally the case — by political appointees, including Paul J. McNulty, the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia who was nominated to serve as deputy attorney general in October 2005. There are no allegations that cases were rejected for improper political reasons.

As it happens, the CIA released some of its own internal discussions on the Mowhoush and al-Janabi killings in response to earlier FOIAs. This set of documents, for example, includes a number of emailed public reports of the investigations. Read more →

CIA OIG’s Wild Parsing about What Was “Depicted” on the Torture Tapes

/49 Comments/in , /by

I wanted to point out a somewhat weedy detail about how the CIA IG Report describes the torture investigation as compared to how the CIA’s Office of Inspector General described that investigation in court filings last year.

As you’ll recall, after the CIA admitted to the destruction of the torture tapes in 2007, the ACLU filed to hold the CIA in contempt for not having revealed the existence of the torture tapes earlier in their torture document FOIA. In response, the OIG submitted a filing and a declaration describing why they hadn’t revealed the existence of the tapes.

The filing explained that CIA had no obligation to search its operational files in response to the ACLU’s FOIA unless those files had been the subject of an investigation.

Moreover, the videotapes were not responsive to Plaintiffs’ FOIA requests because the activities depicted on the videotapes were not the subject of a CIA OIG investigation of allegations of impropriety in Iraq, or any other investigation conducted by CIA OIG. Under the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act (“CIA Information Act”), the CIA’s operational records are exempt from search or review in response to FOIA requests unless an exception to the Act applies. One exception is where the records requested are the specific subject matter of an investigation by CIA OIG into allegations of impropriety or illegality in the conduct of an intelligence activity. 50 U.S.C. § 431(c)(3). Here, CIA OIG did not conduct an investigation into allegations of impropriety or illegality relating to the interrogations on the videotapes prior to their destruction. Therefore, the tapes were exempt from search and review in response to Plaintiffs’ FOIA requests up to the time of their destruction. [my emphasis]

And the declaration went on to make certain claims about the relationship between the CIA IG investigation and the subject matter of the torture tapes.

In January 2003, OIG initiated a special review of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program. This review was intended to evaluate CIA detention and interrogation activities, and was not initiated in response to an allegation of wrongdoing.

[snip]

At no time prior to the destruction of the tapes in 2005 did OIG initiate a separate investigation into the interrogations depicted on the videotapes.

Read more →

Poppy Bush Not Joining Other DCIs Opposing Investigation of W Bush’s Torture

/113 Comments/in /by

There are a number of fascinating details in this letter from seven former living CIA Directors opposing DOJ’s torture investigation–starting with the fact that Poppy is one of just two three living CIA heads who didn’t sign (the others are Carter’s Stansfield Turner and close Poppy ally Robert Gates who, as Secretary of Defense, also has to weigh how our torture puts service men and women at risk). (h/t Ambinder)

Michael Hayden
Porter Goss
George Tenet
John Deutch
R. James Woolsey
William Webster
James R. Schlesinger

But that’s not all.

Note that these men are asking the President to intervene in a DOJ investigation.

We respectfully urge you to exercise your authority to reverse Attorney General Holder’s August 24 decision to re-open the criminal investigation of CIA interrogations that took place following the attacks of September 11.

They’re not asking Obama to pardon those CIA officers under investigation, which would be a proper request of the President; they’re asking Obama to spike an investigation the Attorney General has deemed necessary. They are, in short, asking for legal process to be set aside for, ultimately, a political decision.

And they’re making that request by appealing to an investigation conducted under a prior Attorney General–Alberto Gonzales–still (as far as we know) under investigation for politicizing DOJ.

The post-September 11 interrogations for which the Attorney General is opening an inquiry were investigated four years ago by career prosecutors.

They’re further making that request by appealing to a US Attorney–Paul McNulty–also involved in that politicization.

Career prosecutors under the supervision of the US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that one prosecution (of a CIA contractor) was warranted.

So they pile up political interference on top of political interference. Now, these former DCIs repeat the term "career prosecutor" four times. And it may well be the case that–unlike some other cases under Alberto Gonzales–there was no interference here.  But they ignore one of the precipitating causes for the investigation being reopened: The Office of Public Responsibility’s finding that there was serious misconduct involved with the referrals in these cases (the DCIs say there were fewer than 20).

It has been known that the Justice Department ethics report had criticized the authors of the legal opinions and, in some cases, would recommend referrals to local bar associations for discipline.

But the internal inquiry also examined how the opinions were carried out and how referrals of possible violations were made — a process that led ethics investigators to find misconduct serious enough to warrant renewed criminal investigation. 

Read more →

Jonathan Fredman on Approvals

/41 Comments/in /by

As you probably recall, there was a Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting at Gitmo on October 2, 2002 (the minutes for it start on page 219 of this PDF). At the meeting, Jonathan Fredman, then the Counterterrorism Center’s top lawyer, famously said, "If the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong."

More interesting (for my present purposes, anyway) are his comments about how the CIA got approval for torture. First, he claims that the US did not sign Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture because the 8th Amendment covers that already.

Fredman: The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up on the second part, because of the 8th amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), but we did sign the part about torture. This gives us more license to use more controversial techniques.

It’s a bizarre argument to make, not just because it’s false, but because at other times the CIA and DOJ rationalized ignoring Article 16, they focused on the 5th Amendment, not the 8th.

Later, Fredman has a conversation about what approval process DOD might use to be able to use torture.

[GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief Dave] Becker: Would we get blanket approval or would it be case by case?

Fredman: The CIA makes the call internally on most of the types of techniques found in the BSCT paper, and this discussion. Significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ.

[Director for Intelligence (J-2)] LTC Phifer: Who approves ours? The CG? SOUTCOM CG?

Fredman: Does the Geneva Convention apply? The CIA rallied for it not to.

Phifer: Can we get DOJ opinion about these topics on paper?

LTC Diane Beaver: Will it go from DOJ to DOD?

Phifer: Can we get to see a CIA request to use advanced aggressive techniques?

Fredman: Yes, but we can’t provide you with a copy. 

As you know, I’ve been tracking the way that Jim Haynes and David Addington parsed answers about when they saw the Bybee Two memo, describing the torture techniques approved for Abu Zubaydah; Addington even seemed to be dodging questions about whether or not he showed anyone at Gitmo the memo. And this exchange seems to suggest CTC was willing to share its DOJ backup with Gitmo officers.

Mind you, this meeting took place a week after Addington and Haynes went on their Gitmo field trip and the context seems to suggest that Phifer, at least, has not seen the Bybee Two memo. Read more →

Haynes’ Multiple Choice Memos

/38 Comments/in /by

Back in May, I wrote a post observing that when David Addington testified before the House Judiciary Committee, he seemed to be carefully choosing which August 1, 2002 Bybee Memo he answered questions about. For example, when Debbie Wasserman Schultz asks Addington whether he discussed torture methods described in the memo the Committee had been discussing (by context, the Bybee One memo), he response that that memo didn’t discuss torture methods.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. On any of the trips, did you discuss interrogation methods that were directly referenced in the memo that we have been discussing here for this hearing?

Mr. ADDINGTON. I am not sure I remember this memo having methods discussed in it, frankly. [my emphasis]

So he never answers a much more interesting question–whether he shared the Bybee Two memo–which did list torture methods–with those at Gitmo.

Curiously, Jim Haynes seems to be doing the same in the Questions for the Record following up on his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

36. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, do you recall when you received the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum from Jay Bybee to Attorney General Gonzales regarding the legality of interrogation methods?

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall precisely when I received a copy of the August 1, 2002 opinion interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. Too much time has passed and I have now seen the memo in so many contexts that I can no longer be certain when I saw it for the first time. I cannot even recall whether I simply read the opinion al some point or whether I received a copy of the opinion and, if so, who transmitted the copy. I did, eventually, get a copy of that opinion, but I do not remember when I first got it.

From the context, Hillary may have referred to the Bybee One memo (the one equating torture with organ failure) using a description more apt for the Bybee Two memo (since the latter discussed the legality of interrogation methods).

But regardless of what Hillary meant to ask, Haynes crafts his answer to answer the question he wants to answer. She asks about the memo describing interrogation methods (which would be Bybee Two); he responds about the memo interpreting the statute (which would by Bybee One). 

Someone really ought to ask these thugs these same questions about the Bybee Two memo.

Bybee: No Written Advice Provided to Any Agency Prior to August 1, 2002

/62 Comments/in /by

 When Jay Bybee responded to written questions from Carl Levin about the torture authorizations in October 2008 (at a time when the Office of Professional Responsibility investigation was well-advanced, if not done), he made the following assertion.

While Judge Bybee said that he did not recall "any written advice provided to any governmental agency prior to August 1, 2002, on the meaning of the standards of conduct required for interrogation under the federal anti-torture statute or on specific interrogation methods," the August 1, 2002 memos were not the only occasion on which DOJ provided legal advice on the CIA’s interrogation program.

That’s interesting, because we know that on July 13, 2002, John Yoo wrote John Rizzo a letter in which he mapped out how to avoid prosecution for torture. He wrote:

This letter is in response to your inquiry at our meeting today [not attended by Bybee] about what is necessary to establish the crime of torture, as set forth in 18 USC 2340 et seq. The elements of the crime of torture are: (1) the torture occurred outside the United State; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant’s custody or physical control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause severe mental or physical pain or suffering; and (5) the act inflicted severe mental or physical pain or suffering.

[snip]

Moreover, to establish that an individual has acted with the specific intent to inflict severe mental pain or suffering, an individual must act with specific intent, i.e., with the express purpose, [sic] of causing prolonged mental harm in order for the use of any of the predicate acts to constitute torture. Specific intent can be negated by a showing of good faith.

Now, it’s possible that Bybee did not consider this "written advice," but it sure seems to address the topic at hand (and note, Bybee did not say "opinion," but only "written advice"). It’s possible he lied–though I would imagine his answers to Levin very closely matched the answers he gave to OPR to what would presumably be remarkably similar questions.

Just as likely, I think Bybee may not have known about this letter.  On June 22, 2004, the day OLC withdrew the Bybee One memo, John Rizzo faxed the letter (including the fax cover sheet Yoo originally used) back to Daniel Levin. That either suggests Rizzo was trying to remind Levin of the meeting on July 13, 2002 (which Levin had attended as FBI Chief of Staff). Read more →

The July 2002 Torture Training Session

/84 Comments/in /by

As I suggested, I’m working on a narrative of the known torture approvals. As part of that, I wanted to look at the approvals the CIA claimed were in place in early July, 2002–before the first known OLC opinion relating specifically to torture.

The Senate Armed Services Committee Report describes a training session JPRA conducted for CIA officers headed to Afghanistan and elsewhere on July 1-2, 2002 (we know it’s CIA because it later quotes Jonathan Fredman, then the Counterterrorism Center’s top lawyer). The training covered a range of torture techniques–apparently including some, like water dousing, not later approved by OLC for use with Abu Zubaydah.

In advance ofthe training, JPRA developed a two day lesson for [redacted] covering the "full spectrum [of] exploitation," including both explanations and demonstrations of physical pressures that were approved for use at JPRA’s SERE school. 149 At the time, JPRA-approved techniques included body slaps, face slaps, hooding, stress positions, walling, immersion in water, stripping, isolation, and sleep deprivation, among others. 150

At the training, instructors demonstrated waterboarding, even though they weren’t qualified by SERE guidelines to do so.

In addition to explaining and demonstrating the physical pressures used at SERE school, the JPRA personnel also provided instruction on waterboarding.

[snip]

None of the JPRA personnel who provided the assistance had ever conducted waterboarding and would not have been qualified to do so at SERE school.

That’s the range of torture techniques trained at the session. And here’s what two CIA lawyers instructed participants with regard to the legality of using those techniques.

The July 16, 2002 after action memo stated that two agency legal personnel were also present for the training. 157 According to the memo, [redacted] personnel "requested and were granted time to present the legal limits of physiological and psychological pressures that were acceptable at the present time." 158 The after action memo described the legal briefing:

Their 30-40 [minute] brief was very supportive. Basically, [redacted] were told they could use all forms of psychological pressure discussed and all of the physiological pressures with the exception of the ‘water board.’ They were advised that should they feel the need to use the water board, they would need prior approval. They were also briefed on the ramifications for participating in torture, which under international law is defined as a ‘capital crime’ and could result in a death sentence if convicted. An eye opener to say the least. 159

Read more →

The JPRA Memo Described the “Improvised” Techniques Later Used

/53 Comments/in /by

Remember this post, in which I argued that a JPRA memo sent to DOD (and probably to CIA and OLC) on July 26, 2002, was probably the description of torture for which OLC gave an oral authorization on that same day? Now that we’ve seen the CIA’s IG Report and many of the documents requesting approval for "new" torture techniques, it’s clear that this document not only described waterboarding as it was practiced, but also a number of other other torture techniques integrated in the program.

Here’s how the SASC Report described the contents of this memo.

On July 26, 2002, JPRA completed a second memorandum with three attachments to respond to the additional questions from the General Counsel’s office. The memo stated that "JPRA has arguably developed into the DoD’s experts on exploitation and as such, has developed a number of physical pressures to increase the psychological and physical stress on students …"

In the memo, JPRA informed the General Counsel’s office that it had already "assist[ed] in the training of interrogator/exploiters from other governmental agencies charged with OEF exploitation of enemy detainees."190 The memo also stated:

Within JPRA’s evolving curriculum to train interrogators/exploiters many interrogation approaches are taught along with corresponding options for physical pressures to enhance the psychological setting for detainee interrogation. Several of the techniques highlighted (Atch 1) as training tools in JPRA courses, used by other SERE schools, and used historically may be very effective in inducing learned helplessness and ‘breaking’ the OEF detainees’ will to resist."

The first attachment to the July 26,2002 memo was ”Physical Pressures used in Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees."192 That attachment included a list of techniques used to train students at SERE school to resist interrogation. The list included techniques such as the facial slap, walling, the abdomen slap, use of water, the attention grasp, and stress positions. 193 The first attachment also listed techniques used by some of the service SERE schools, such as use of smoke, shaking and manhandling, cramped confinement, immersion in water or wetting down, and waterboarding.

Read more →

About KSM’s Lies

/54 Comments/in /by

I’ve been meaning to return to this post for some time.  But with the torture apologists teeing up for another attempt at self-justification and with Ali Soufan’s recent op-ed, now is as good a time as any.

As I suggested in that earlier post, in March 2003, the CIA subjected Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to brutal torture, including waterboarding him 183 times. Then, after that month of torture concluded, they did an assessment of what he had told him.

And the CIA itself, after torturing KSM for a month, concluded he had lied (this is from footnote 4, Chapter 7 of the 9/11 Report).

In an assessment of KSM’s reporting, the CIA concluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part" of KSM’s resistance efforts. For example, in response to questions about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, KSM provided the less than satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip code to open new email accounts. CIA report, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammed’s Threat Reporting–Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," April 3, 2003, pp 4-5.[my emphasis]

Compare that to what Cheney’s hagiographer’s source now claims:

"Almost all of the good information came from waterboarding and the other EITs," says a former senior U.S. intelligence official. "Once they broke, they broke for good. And then they talked forever."

Hayes’ article is (plausibly or not) entirely sourced to former and current CIA officials; presumably, they’ve seen this report. They know that as soon as CIA finished waterboarding KSM, they judged that he was lying particularly about anything that would expose US operations. Yet they are out still trying to claim information KSM gave them after that point–in July and September and the following years–was tied directly to the waterboarding they did before they concluded KSM was lying to them. 

And while we’re on the subject of lying, let’s return to what KSM has said he lied about while being tortured during his 2007 Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

… I make up stories just location UBL. Where is he? I don’t know. Then he torture me. Then I said yes, he is in this area of this is al Qaida which I don’t him.

So in addition to the information about US operatives that CIA believed KSM was lying about while he was being tortured, KSM himself maintains he lied about where Osama bin Laden was.

Read more →