Goss and Harman's July 13, 2004 Briefing on the IG Report

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The Ghost Detainee FOIA (for more background see here, here, and here) also has a Memorandum for the Record from CIA’s briefing for Porter Goss and Jane Harman on the CIA’s IG Report on July 13, 2004.

The MFR is interesting for the details it gives of how Harman and Goss responded to news of the CIA IG Report–and with it, news of the abuses of the torture program.

None of the detainees who died had been subjected to enhanced interrogation

The MFR transcribes a claim from CIA IG John Helgerson that “none of the detainees who had died had been subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.”

Helgerson must be playing word games here, because by the time he states this Habibullah and Dilawar had died from a combination of sleep deprivation and stress positions and other abuse. Manadel al-Janabi had been crucified by stress position during interrogation.

So what Helgerson must mean is that none of the High Value Detainees died during torture; others who were tortured did die.

Confirming previously redacted details of the IG Report

The MFR confirms two things we already knew about the CIA IG Report, but which had been redacted when the report came out last year. First, there was IG John Helgerson’s concerns about whether the program violated the Convention Against Torture:

The IG indicated that the 1 August memo did not address Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. AThe article 16that [sic] required signatory Sstates [sic] to prevent in any territory subject to their jurisdiction acts of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of punishment not amounting to torture. The question was whether CIA’s use of the enhanced techniques would transgress U.S. obligations under Article 16.

The MFR also spells out the IG’s concerns about the torture program as practiced.

The IG indicated he was also bothered in that the DOJ 1 August document did not address interrogations as we carried them out.

From here, Helgerson’s briefing goes into detainee deaths and waterboarding–and from there into a discussion of problems in the guidance sent out over cables.

[Helgerson] said that three people had been interrogated with the waterboard. On one, the IG felt it had been used excessively, beyond what the IG thought was the agreement with DOJ. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) got 183 applications [redacted] The IG indicated the guidance in cables sent to the field evolved over time and that the guidance did not get to everybody who was involved in debriefing interrogations.

Aside from the impression the IG report gives that Helgerson also found Abu Zubaydah’s waterboarding excessive (not least because officials at Langley ordered up another sessions after he was already compliant), I wonder whether he claims that the waterboarding itself, or the torture program more generally, got out of hand because the cables started going crazy?

Jane Harman still looking for a Presidential Finding

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Bybee’s Lawyer: Bybee Distracted from Torture Memo because Protecting Cheney’s Energy Task Force

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I’ll have more on Maureen Mahoney’s first response on behalf of Jay Bybee to the OPR report later today. But I wanted to draw attention to a footnote she includes to–apparently–explain that Jay Bybee was a very busy man at the time when he was supposed to be overseeing John Yoo’s attempts to legalize torture in the summer of 2002. (This is on PDF page 19)

Judge Bybee’s role in reviewing the memo began in earnest around mid-July, roughly two weeks before he signed them.5

5 During the summer of 2002, in addition to his work on national security issues, Judge Bybee, as head of OLC, was also heavily involved in a number of other difficult and pressing legal matters. Of particular note, Judge Bybee was engaged in the district court litigation in Walker v. Cheney, No. 02-340 (DD.C.). The attorneys in that case were working closely with the Department’s Civil Division and the Solicitor General’s Office. The legal issues involved in the case were peculiarly within Judge Bybee’s expertise because his scholarly research had been cited as authority by both sides. See Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation a/Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 Yale L.J. 51 (1994).

Walker v. Cheney, of course, is the suit the GAO took against Cheney’s office to try to force it to turn over documents relating to his Energy Task Force. After District Court Judge John Bates ruled against GAO in December 2002, it ended one of the more important efforts to subject Cheney’s office to Congressional oversight. Furthermore, this effort must be regarded as Cheney’s first attempt to assert that his was a Fourth Branch, exempt from oversight but also executive regulation.

How interesting, then, that Mahoney highlighted Bybee’s role in helping Cheney succeed in winning this suit to argue that Jay Bybee was doing what he should have been doing in summer 2002.

Pat Roberts' "10 Reasons Right Off" Not to Exercise Oversight Over Torture

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Practically the first thing Pat Roberts did after he became Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee was to back down off nascent efforts Bob Graham had made as SSCI Chair to exercise real oversight over the torture program. That’s one of the most important details revealed in the Memo for the Record [big PDF] of the briefing Pat Roberts received on the torture program on February 4, 2003. (For more background on this FOIA dump see this post; for the evidence in it that Michael Hayden knowingly lied to Congress see this post.)

Roberts’ “ten reasons right off” not to exercise oversight over torture program

In addition to Roberts’ accession to the destruction of the torture tapes, he appears to have spiked an effort, started by Bob Graham (who had been SSCI Chair), to exercise more oversight over the torture program.

Roberts’ [redacted; staffer?] asked me whether I had “taken up the line” the Committee’s, actually Senator Graham’s, late November request to undertake its own “assessment” of the enhanced interrogation. I [Stan Moskowitz, head of Congressional Affairs] explained to Senator Roberts the dialogue I had had with [redacted], and our responce [sic] that we would not support reading another staffer into the program nor allow any staffer to review the interrogations in real time or visit the clandestine site where the interrogations were taking place. Quickly, the Senator interjected that he saw no reason for the Committee to pursue such a request and could think of “ten reasons right off why it is a terrible idea” for the Committee to do any such thing as had been proposed. Turning to [redacted], he asked whether they thought otherwise and they indicated that they agreed with the Senator. [my emphasis]

And so it was that Pat Roberts, in one of his first actions as SSCI Chair, squelched an effort that might have prevented the torture program from metastasizing across our counter-terrorist (and Iraqi) efforts.

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Michael Hayden Lied to SSCI on April 12, 2007

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The latest Ghost Detainee FOIA materials [long pdf] (for a general overview see this post) prove that Michael Hayden lied to the Senate on April 12, 2007.

One of the things included in this packet is a heavily redacted transcript of Hayden’s classified briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee (SSCI) on April 12, 2007. There’s a lot that is dubious in this briefing, but these five paragraphs are key:

While FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques, all of those involved were mindful that the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks were still at large and, according to available intelligence reportedly, were actively working to attack the US Homeland again. CIA also knew from its intelligence holdings that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could help us track down al-Qa’ida leaders and prevent attacks. As a result, CIA began to develop its own interrogation program, keeping in mind at all times that any new interrogation techniques must comply with US law and US international obligations under the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

A handful of techniques were developed for potential use; these techniques are effective, safe, and do not violate applicable US laws or treaty obligations. In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. As stated by the President in his speech on 6 September 2006, “It became clear that he (Abu Zubaydah) had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures … the procedures were tough, and thy were safe, and lawful, and necessary.”

Prior to using any new technique on Abu Zubaydah, CIA sought and obtained from the Department of Justice an opinion confirming that none of these new techniques violated US statutes prohibiting torture or US obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture.

As CIA’s efforts to implement these authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation procedures.

After the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa’ida. [my emphasis]

There’s plenty to dispute in this statement.We know FBI had success in gathering information from Abu Zubaydah. We know CIA turned out to be wrong about the purported troves of information Abu Zubaydah had. We know that Mitchell and Jessen had already been engaged to develop their torture program before CIA declared traditional interrogation to be unusable. We know OLC really didn’t consider whether CIA’s torture program violated CAT for the Bybee Memos.  It is indefensible to argue that Abu Zubaydah “became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa’ida” given that only 10 pieces of intelligence from Abu Zubaydah proved useful enough to appear in the 9/11 report.

By April 12, 2007, Michael Hayden had to have known that. But I can’t prove that.

It’s even harder to fathom that he didn’t know his assertion that “In August 2002, CIA began using these [torture] techniques” to be false. Or his claim that “prior to using any new technique on Abu Zubaydah, CIA sought and obtained … an opinion confirming that none of these new techniques violated [the law and treaty obligations].” After all, even if he didn’t review the cables and the FBI discussions making it clear that the torture started long before August 1, in February 2007, Hayden received the ICRC report making it clear that Abu Zubaydah’s torture began weeks, not months, after he was captured.

But who knows? Maybe CIA kept Hayden completely in the dark about the many falsehoods he was telling Congress. Maybe he really didn’t know that CIA tortured for a few months (reportedly, with the okay from the White House), and only then got the written approval from OLC.

But this assertion … this assertion we know Michael Hayden knew to be false.

As CIA’s efforts to implement these authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation procedures.

That’s because the day before Hayden testified at the SSCI hearing, in a memo addressed to him entitled “Information for 12 April SSCI Hearing,” CIA laid out all the briefings they had done on torture and rendition. Read more →

Ghost Detainee FOIA Release

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In the midst of all the excitement over the OPR release, there’s an equally revealing FOIA release in CCR and Amnesty International’s Ghost Detainee FOIA. I will do very detailed posts on each of the Memoranda for the Record included in this release. But here’s a general overview of what is included in the release:

A list of written Congressional Notifications

While many of these are redacted, a number of them show when Congress learned about key issues. For example:

10/03/01: Delegation of Authority. This may refer to the Presidential Finding signed on September 17, 2001, authorizing the CIA to capture and detain al Qaeda personnel.

4/15/02: Capture of Abu Zubaydah. It took them over two weeks to inform Congress that they had captured AZ. The delay is interesting, among other reasons, because we know that CIA had already started to push FBI out of the interrogation process (even though FBI was making progress) and, more importantly, John Yoo started the opinion to authorize torture four days before this point, on April 11. They had already decided they were going to torture Abu Zubaydah before they officially informed Congress they had captured him (which was weeks after it had already been reported). So this was an opportunity when CIA should have told Congress they were going to get into the torture business, but did not.

11/22/02: Key al-Qa’ida Operative al-Nashiri in Custody: The OPR report makes it clear that we got al-Nashiri in custody on November 15. We waterboarded him 12 days later, so roughly November 27. Yet Congress still had not been briefed that CIA was using waterboarding on detainees. As with the earlier Abu Zubaydah notice, this was another point when CIA should have, but did not, tell Congress they were in the process of torturing someone.

4/1/05: Detention History, Claims of Links to Iraq, and Recantations.This presumably would have focused on Ibn Sheikh al-Libi’s claim, under torture, that he knew of ties between al Qaeda and Iraq. I’m curious why CIA chose this date to let Congress know about that?

More CIA briefing lists

There appear to be two separate versions of briefings CIA did for Congress here (one is titled “Interrogation Briefings to the Hill” and the other is described as listing rendition briefings in the cover letter). Note these are not the same as the list CIA made available last year. Rather, these seem to be the underlying lists which had already been partly debunked by the time CIA released its new list lasat year (this appears to have been collected for Michael Hayden in anticipation of his April 12, 2007 SSCI hearing, at which he would publicly admit CIA had engaged in torture).

Some comments:

These new lists start earlier than last year’s list; the second one (with the redacted title) even begins before 9/11. Since the topic on these may refer to renditions, it is possible the second list (with redacted title) pertains to renditions. Also note the reference on March 7, 2006 that makes a distinction between “detainees” and someone else (ghost prisoners?).

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The Inherent Conflict Of Interest With DOJ's OPR And David Margolis

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Who watches the watchers? Always a valid question; today I want to look at the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility and its conduct in the investigation of United States governmental attorneys, specifically within the Office of Legal Counsel, involved in the Bush/Cheney torture program. Aside from the facts and conclusions (discussion underway here, here and here), the report is notable for the process producing it, namely the DOJ investigating itself and, not so shockingly, exculpating itself. This will be the first in a series of more specific posts on this blog discussing the multiple, and severe, conflict of interest issues inherent in the OPR Report.

The first, and most obvious, issue of conflict with OPR is that it places evaluation and resolution of ethical complaints against DOJ attorneys in the hands of the DOJ. The power to determine whether there is any impropriety is solely within the hands of those supervising and/or ultimately responsible for the impropriety. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a, OPR reports directly to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General. A vested interest if there ever was one.

Most governmental agencies have independent Inspectors General which operate independently of the agency leadership, have jurisdiction of the entire agency including legal counsel, and thus have credibility as somewhat neutral and detached evaluators and voices. Not so the DOJ, who has arrogated upon themselves the sole right to sit in judgment of themselves. This action to grab the exclusive authority for themselves and exclude the independent IG was first accomplished by Attorney General Order 1931-94 dated November 8, 1994 subsequently codified into the Code of Federal Regulations and reinforced through section 308 of the 2002 Department of Justice Reauthorization Act. Just in time for the war on terror legal shenanigans!

Glenn Fine, the DOJ IG has given Congressional testimony to the US Senate regarding the inherent conflict:

Second, the current limitation on the DOJ OIG’s jurisdiction prevents the OIG – which by statute operates independent of the agency – from investigating an entire class of misconduct allegations involving DOJ attorneys’ actions, and instead assigns this responsibility to OPR, which is not statutorily independent and reports directly to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. In effect, the limitation on the OIG’s jurisdiction creates a conflict of interest and contravenes the rationale for establishing independent Inspectors General throughout the government. It also permits an Attorney General to assign an investigation that raises questions about his conduct or the conduct of his senior staff to OPR, an entity that reports to and is supervised by the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General and that lacks the insulation and independence guaranteed by the IG Act.

This concern is not merely hypothetical. Recently, the Attorney General directed Read more →

The Emails the Bush Lawyers Were So Worried About

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As I noted yesterday (though I got the details slightly wrong), the OPR report revealed that a number of John Yoo and Patrick Philbin’s emails had been deleted (and that Goldsmith’s had been deleted but were subsequently recovered).

OLC initially provided us with a relatively small number of emails, files, and draft documents. After it became apparent, during the course of our review, that relevant documents were missing, we requested and were given direct access to the email and computer records of Yoo, Philbin, Bybee, and Goldsmith. However, we were told that most of Yoo’s email records had been deleted and were not recoverable. Philbin’s email records from July 2002 through August 5, 2002 – the time period in which the. Bybee. Memo was completed and the Classified Bybee Memo (discussed below) was created – had also been deleted and were reportedly not recoverable. Although we were initially advised that Goldsmith’s records had been deleted, we were later told that they had been recovered and we were given access to them.

That’s particularly interesting, because several times in the year-long lead up to the release of the report, we’ve seen reports that Bush Administration members were squirmy about the number of emails OPR had gotten. Michael Isikoff first reported concern from Bush lawyers that OPR got emails from the memo contributors last February.

OPR investigators focused on whether the memo’s authors deliberately slanted their legal advice to provide the White House with the conclusions it wanted, according to three former Bush lawyers who asked not to be identified discussing an ongoing probe. One of the lawyers said he was stunned to discover how much material the investigators had gathered, including internal e-mails and multiple drafts that allowed OPR to reconstruct how the memos were crafted.

I wondered whether reappearing emails was of particular concern to those trying to cover up Bush crimes here. Then there was the remarkably bad NYT story from June 6, 2009, that not only revealed the presence of the emails and included the damning Comey ones, but spun them just as Steven Bradbury would have liked them, as an attack on Comey rather than what they were, an indictment of the drafting process.

All of this anxiety about emails could just be an expression of Bradbury’s worries (retrospectively, it looks much more likely than it already did that he was the source of the emails and the spin to the NYT).

If so, though, that’s particularly interesting since we know that OPR originally got a very limited batch of emails from Steven Bradbury (this was in 2004, before he would write his own torture memos).

On August 31,2004, Bradbury gave OPR copies of unclassified documents relating to the Bybee Memo, including email and documents from the computer hard drives and files of the former OLC attorneys who worked on the project.

But reports of the anxiety about emails are all the more interesting given the emails that are included in the report. Perhaps the most damning example is the email in which Yoo refers to Abu Zubaydah as “Boo Boo” (which Spencer reported on Friday):

On July 30,2002, Yoo asked [Koester] by email, “[D]o we know if Boo boo is allergic to certain insects?” [Koester] responded,”No idea, but I’ll check with [redacted].

In addition, email evidence provided the basis for [Special thanks, again, to burnt for making searchable copies of these reports that made compiling this list much easier]:

  • The start date of the Bybee One drafting process, April 11, 2002
  • Timing or summaries of key meetings, including some with Alberto Gonzales
  • Yoo’s comments on drafts sent to Jennifer Koester, his side-kick in the writing process
  • Details of Bybee’s involvement in the drafting process
  • Proof that Yoo didn’t intend to write the Commander-in-Chief or possible defenses before his July 16, 2002 meeting with Gonzales (and probably David Addington and/or Tim Flanigan)
  • Evidence that Yoo consulted with a university law professor on common law defenses (the second draft, but not the first and final, shows that this was a university professor)
  • Indication that Yoo and Koester didn’t start the Bybee Two (Techniques) memo until July 25, 2002 or later
  • Details on the pressure the White House was putting on Yoo to get the memos done
  • Details of who received the opinions including–a fact that Yoo later denied–DOD
  • Complaints Koester received from DOD’s Working Group that the Yoo Memo was too extreme
  • Proof that both Michael Chertoff and John Yoo told CIA’s Inspector General they would wait to investigate alleged crimes until he was done with his investigation
  • Goldsmith’s opinions about the Bybee One Memo, including his judgment that it constituted a “blank check”
  • Comey’s emails documenting his concerns about the May 10, 2005 Combined Memo and his belief that Bradbury was responding to White House pressure because he wanted the AAG position

In other words, the emails provide a key piece of evidence that the White House was responsible for the way in which the Bybee One memo served as a blank check, as well as the pressure the White House put on the lawyers as they were drafting the memos.

The emails put the White House squarely in the drafting process.

But that’s all with most emails from John Yoo and Patrick Philbin still disappeared.

It sort of makes you all the more curious about what was in the Yoo and Philbin emails that got deleted, huh?

OPR Working Thread Two

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Happy Saturday.

OPR Report Second Draft

I will be starting with the Second Draft of the OPR memo. As before I will use the PDF page numbers, not the printed page numbers

PDF 6: OPR interviewed John Bellinger between the first draft (December 2008) and second draft (March 2009).

PDF 7: The first draft claimed that OPR didn’t get the Combined memo until 2007. The second draft says they saw it in 2005, along with the Techniques memo.

PDF8: Bradbury said he didn’t show OPR the CAT memo bc it didn’t replace either of the Bybee memos; he claimed that was the entire scope of the OPR investigation.

PDF 8-9: The Second draft (written after receiving Mukasey’s comments) notes that Mukasey had reviewed the Bradbury memos and found them legal. It is followed by a paragraph noting that Obama issued an order stating no one coudl rely on OLC guidelines from before his term.

PDF 10: Second draft notes that it did not rely on legal commentary or comments from other DOJ employees. Seems like Mukasey beat them up for letting Goldsmith or Comey’s opinions matter.

PDF 11: Second draft withdrew recommendation to review Bradbury memos, saying that the Obama EO withdrawing everything made further review unnecessary.

PDF 12: Second draft makes a point of saying that Bybee didn’t leave dept until March 28, 2003 (the first said he left right away). This may have relevance for the Yoo Memo.

PDF 12: Second draft notes that

PDF 16: Footnote 14 is changed to say that CIA had neither oral or written approval to use torture when it started; draft one had just said this was before the August 1 memo.

PDF 20: There is a longer redaction after the techniqes list in the second draft. Also note the explanation of Bellinger’s discussion with Yoo now has a redacted half-paragraph. This is significant since Bellinger was interviewed between the two drafts. Also note that part of footnote 18 is redacted in the later draft, though from the spacing it appears to be the unredacted passage from the first draft explaining that oo did not know why Bellinger told him to avoid telling State. Presumably in the contect of the other Bellinger discussion, it is now too sensitive?

PDF 21: THere’s a medium sized paragraph in the second draft that doesn’t appear in the first, which seems to come from Bellinger. Bellinger notes that Yoo was under a great deal of pressure on this memo, and also says that over time there was significant pressure to rule that the program was legal and could be continued (this seems to refer to Bradbury’s timing). In any case, it seems to relate to pressure from the WH.

PDF 23: there is a much longer redaction in the description of the meeting talking about starting the opinion. Again, this must come from Bellinger.

PDF 26: Second draft adds a paragraph stating that Yoo said he was not under time pressure, except maybe at the end after they decide to do Bybee Two.

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OPR Report Working Thread

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A great way to spend a Friday night–reading this with all my friends!

I’m working on the First Draft.

PDF 8: when OPR first asked for emails, they were told that Yoo’s and Philbin’s had been deleted. They later got those emails.

PDF 9: Rizzo refused to meet with OPR until after his confirmation hearing in 2007.

PDF 10: The people who refused to be interviewed:

  • At least 3 CTC lawyers
  • Ashcroft
  • Addington
  • Flanigan

PDF10: There WAS no classified annex to Bush’s July 2007 EO on torture–just Bradbury’s memo accompanying it. But that was supposed to be the WH writing down its policy guidance for torture!

PDF11: They didn’t tell OPR about the Combined and CAT memos until 2007. OPR first got them AUgust 29, 2007.

PDF11: “we cannot say with certainty that the documents provided to us by the CIA included all the relevant documents.”

PDF12: Is the redaction in the middle of the page where they explain why they don’t think Bradbury screwed up? (Actually, they seem to punt with a paragraph on PDF13 arguing for more review.)

PDF 14: Did we know that the OLC memo on warrantless wiretap referred to in the footnote was withdrawn/ Or is that the Fourth Amendment one?

PDF 15 and 16 must include descriptions of CIA’s background in interrogation–things like MKULTRA. It also must include at least one paragraph showing CIA should have know the legal restrictions on torture (perhaps earlier guidelines prohibiting it after they “closed down” the SOA program.

PDF17: Note: there’s no mention of Binyam Mohamed’s torture, which we know started at the same time or before Abu Zubaydah’s.

PDF18: Note the footnote–this report takes the DOJ IG report as proof that they were torturing before they had the memo.

PDF 20: Note the reference to diapers (something Spencer has written a lot on). Then there are redactions that don’t explain where the diapers went.

PDF21: THere’s a 12th technique that they are hiding. Is it the use of drugs?

PDF22: Bellinger told Yoo not to tell State about the torture. I guess he was not the hero on torture he has made himself out to be. Also note–there were MORE people briefed on torture at the beginning than were briefed on Cheney’s illegal wiretap program.

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Dick and the Naked Senator: Waterboarding BFFs

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Breaking! (Not) Dick Cheney loves him some waterboarding.

KARL: If you have somebody in custody like Abdulmutallab, after just trying to blow up an airliner, and you think he has information on another attack, I mean, do you think that those enhanced interrogation techniques should have been — should have been used? I mean, would you — do you think that he should have been, for instance, subject to everything, including waterboarding?

CHENEY: Well, I think the — the professionals need to make that judgment. We’ve got people in — we had in our administration — I’m sure they’re still there — many of them were career personnel — who are expects in this subject. And they are the ones that you ought to turn somebody like Abdulmutallab over to, let them be the judge of whether or not he’s prepared to cooperate and how they can best achieve his cooperation.

KARL: But you believe they should have had the option of everything up to and including waterboarding?

CHENEY: I think you ought to have all of those capabilities on the table. Now, President Obama has taken them off the table. He announced when he came in last year that they would never use anything other than the U.S. Army manual, which doesn’t include those techniques. I think that’s a mistake.

Rather than focusing on Cheney’s restatement of his love for torture, I’d like to use the outrage about Cheney’s calm embrace of waterboarding (again) to recall two other data points.

First, the guy Massachusetts just elected to replace Teddy Kennedy? He is just as big a fan of waterboarding as Dick Cheney.

State Senator Scott Brown, the Republican candidate for US Senate, endorsed yesterday the use of enhanced interrogation techniques – including the practice of simulated drowning known as waterboarding – in questioning terror suspects.

[snip]

Brown, in response to a question, told reporters that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 23, the Nigerian accused of trying to blow up a passenger jet en route to Detroit on Christmas Day, should be treated as an enemy combatant, taken to the US detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, interrogated “pursuant to our rules of engagement and laws of war,’’ and not be treated as a civilian criminal suspect. Brown asserted that waterboarding does not constitute torture, but he did not specifically say Abdulmutallab should be subjected to waterboarding.

“I don’t support torture; the United States does not support torture,’’ Brown, a military lawyer in the Massachusetts National Guard, told reporters.

Yes, it’s bad that the war criminal who set up our torture system continues to push torture on the Sunday shows. But don’t forget that Senator Scott Brown, a JAG in MA’s National Guard with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, has several years of legislating ahead of him, and he supports torture just as proudly as Dick Cheney.

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