Helgerson and Cheney

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It’s going to be a busy day for me, but one thing I’m hoping to do is nick down to Borders (hey, this branch is unionized, and Borders is local to Ann Arbor) to buy Jane Mayer’s new book. If for no other reason then to find out more about the meeting between John Helgerson, the CIA Inspector General, and Dick Cheney.

One of the lingering mysteries in Washington has been what happened to the CIA internal probe into homicides involving the program. You note that CIA Inspector General (IG) John Helgerson undertook a study and initially concluded, just as the Red Cross and most legal authorities in the United States and around the world, that the program was illegal and raised serious war crimes issues. Helgerson was summoned repeatedly to meet privately with Vice President Cheney, the man who provided the impetus for the program, and it appears as a result of these meetings the IG’s report was simply shut down. Would those probes have brought into question the Justice Department’s specific approval of torture techniques used by the CIA–approval that involved not just John Yoo, but much more specifically Michael Chertoff and Alice Fisher, the two figures who ran the criminal division?

The fact that John Helgerson—the inspector general at the CIA who is supposed to act as an independent watchdog—was called in by Cheney to discuss his tough report in 2004 is definitely surprising news. Asked for comment, Helgerson through the CIA spokesman denied he felt pressured in any way by Cheney. But others I interviewed have described the IG’s office to me as extremely politicized. They have also suggested it was very unusual that the Vice President interjected himself into the work of the IG. Fred Hitz, who had the same post in previous administrations, told me that no vice president had ever met with him. He thought it highly unusual.

Helgerson’s 2004 report had been described to me as very disturbing, the size of two Manhattan phone books, and full of terrible descriptions of mistreatment. The confirmation that Helgerson was called in to talk with Cheney about it proves that–as early as then–the Vice President’s office was fully aware that there were allegations of serious wrongdoing in The Program.

We know that in addition, the IG investigated several alleged homicides involving CIA detainees, and that Helgerson’s office forwarded several to the Justice Department for further consideration and potential prosecution. Read more →

“The Waterboard”

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The ACLU has a bunch of new documents on water-boarding posted–including a very heavily redacted draft of the 2004 CIA OIG report on the CIA’s interrogation methods. The report is interesting for three reasons:

  • The way they refer to water-boarding
  • The timing
  • The rationale

The Waterboard

One of the very few things they’ve left unredacted (in all these heavily redacted documents) are the references to water-boarding. But they don’t use it as a verb, "to water-board." Rather, they almost always refer to it as "the waterboard."

The water board technique

interrogators administered [redacted] the waterboard to Al-Nashiri

interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Sheykh Mohammad

Cables indicate that interrogators [redacted] applied the waterboard technique to Khalid Sheykh Mohammad

waterboard session of Abu Zubaydah

waterboard on Abu Zubaydah

The waterboard has been used on three detainees: Aby Zubaydah, Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Sheykh Mohammad

I don’t know why this bugs me so much, but it does. It really emphasizes the clinical and bureaucratic nature of this practices, and pretends that human beings are not the ones inflicting it.

The Timing

The ACLU refers to this as a "draft document," though there is nothing on what is visible on the cover page to suggest this wasn’t a final draft–so we can’t be sure whether the date on the report is the date when it was finally released.

Still, I find the date worthy of note: May 7, 2004. Read more →

The CIA OIG Made Five Criminal Referrals During Its Investigation of CIA Interrogation Techniques

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In January 2003, the CIA’s Inspector General started an investigation into the Agency’s interrogation techniques. It wasn’t–they claim–in response to any specific allegation of torture.

In January 2003, OIG initiated a special review of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program. This review was intended to evaluate CIA detention and interrogation activities, and was not initiated in response to an allegation of wrongdoing. [my emphasis]

The CIA OIG finalized their report on the investigation in May 2004. Over the course of the investigation, CIA’s OIG referred five cases to the Criminal Division of DOJ.

[Alice Fisher] said she recalled there was an investigation based on a CIA referral that may have related to detainee treatment or interrogation techniques, and that she became aware of some facts relating to CIA interrogations. She did not say when DOJ received the CIA referral, though she noted that it was sometime “later." [Later than the late 2002-early 2003 time frame of a debate about al-Qahtani.] Documents reflect a total of five referrals by the CIA OIG to DOJ. These referrals were made between February 6, 2003 and March 30, 2004.

Here is the CIA’s description of why they refer cases to DOJ pursuant to a CIA OIG investigation.

If OIG has a reasonable basis to believe a federal crime may have been committed, the IG reports the information to the Attorney General.

In other words, over the course of its investigation into the CIA’s detainee treatment and interrogation methods, the CIA Office of Inspector General developed reasonable basis to believe that five incidents relating to detainee treatment and interrogation they had reviewed constituted a federal crime.

This is important, among other reasons, because in the same month CIA’s OIG submitted its report, the CIA discussed with the White House destroying tapes–reviewed over the course of the OIG investigation–of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri being water-boarded. Even before the CIA water-boarded Abu Zubaydah, an FBI interrogator reported, he witnessed activities he believed constituted "borderline torture." A year later, after the CIA OIG submitted a report that presumably described five events the CIA OIG believed to constitute a federal crime, the CIA ultimately destroyed the tapes of those Abu Zubaydah interrogations.

Fitz on Firing

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In their Questions for the Record submitted after he testified, HJC managed to ask Patrick Fitzgerald one obvious question they didn’t manage to ask when he testified at their hearing on Special Counsels (h/t MadDog). What would have happened–or would happen to John Durham, investigating the torture tapes destruction–if a Special Counsel got fired during the course of the investigation? Actually, in the QFRs Fitzgerald got asked about 5 different versions of the question, only one of which elicited a really useful answer (at least as it might reflect on John Durham’s investigation):

13. If you had been fired as a U.S. Attorney, what impact would that have had on the CIA leak investigation? What impact would that have had on your appointment as Special Counsel?

During my tenure, this question did not present itself. It is not clear to me what the legal implications would have been had I been relieved of command as United States Attorney while serving as Special Counsel. (This might be an issue that should be specifically addressed if there is a delegation of power to a sitting United States Attorney in the future as it is entirely possible that a United States Attorney could be asked to resign after a change in administration.) It would appear that unless the United States Attorney were specifically retained in some other capacit (such as a Special Assistant United States Attorney), he or she could no longer serve as a Special Counsel who was employed by the Department of Justice and whose authority had been delegated by the Attorney General. It would be possible that a new appointment could be made for such a former United States Attorney which would provide that he or she would serve as a Special Counsel from outside the Department of Justice pursuant to the appropriate regulations.

Had I been relieved of command as United States Attorney while conducting the CIA leak investigation, even if a legal basis were established for me to continue as Special Counsel or in some other proper capacity, I would nevertheless have had to determine whether it would be appropriate for me to continue representing the government under all of the circumstances. Read more →

Kyl Agrees to IG Reform–but Sustains DOJ Lawyer’s Protection

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POGO has a review of the Senate bill passed Wednesday that will strengthen the independence of the nation’s Inspectors Generals. As it describes, John Kyl was able to water down some of the key provisions of the bill, but it does make some improvements. As someone who has struggled to find IG reports buried in DHS’ and DOD’s websites, for example, I’m particularly fond of this one:

All IG websites must be clearly and directly accessible from their agencies’ home pages, and IG reports must be posted within 3 working days of release.

No longer can agencies hide bad news by making the IG reports inaccessible.

I’m particularly intrigued, however, by one of the provisions that Kyl struck from the bill–a move to give DOJ’s IG authority to investigate the lawyers at DOJ.

Finally, Kyl’s amendment did away with Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine’s most cherished desire: that he be granted authority to investigate Justice lawyers accused of engaging in professional misconduct. Such allegations–as distinct from questions of fraud or abuse–are currently handled by the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and Kyl, in a masterpiece of faint praise, announced that "there is no evidence that this Office’s reviews are anything less than adequate."

I’ve done posts on this here and here. The issue is important because, when Alberto Gonzales was attempting to spike any real investigation into the OLC authorization of the warrantless wiretap program and of the USA purge, he attempted to give OPR–and not OIG–the exclusive investigative authority. Recently, too, OIG had to refuse to investigate Yoo’s torture memos because it doesn’t have the mandate to conduct such investigations. As Glenn Fine explained the problem in testimony before the Senate:

Unlike all other OIGs throughout the federal government who can investigate misconduct within their entire agencies, the DOJ OIG does not have complete jurisdiction throughout the DOJ. Rather, the DOJ OIG can investigate misconduct throughout DOJ with one notable exception: the OIG does not have the authority to investigate allegations against DOJ attorneys acting in their capacity as lawyers – litigating, investigating, and providing legal advice – including such allegations against the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and other senior Department lawyers. Instead, the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) has been assigned jurisdiction to investigate such allegations.

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CIA And Bushco Have A Rather Large Criminal Obstruction Problem: The Torture Tapes Come Home To Roost

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By now, the story of the CIA’s destruction of the "torture tapes" is well known. Although the problems with the CIA, and every other portion of the Bush Administration, maintaining custody and control of evidentiary video and audio tapes is literally almost a running bad joke, the capstone revelation came with a December 6, 2007 New York Times article by Mark Mazzetti. Mazzetti’s article detailed the willful destruction by the CIA of videotapes directly exhibiting the use by US Agents of "extreme interrogation techniques" on detainees Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.

To refresh your recollection of the entire sequence of events on the Torture Tapes, here is a remarkably complete timeline. For the instant consideration, the critical event is the evidence supplied to date by the Bush Administration, and most significantly the CIA, on their rationale for the destruction of the Zubaydah and al-Nashiri tapes. The initial statement of the position and defense of the CIA is contained in CIA Director Michael Hayden’s message to the body of his agency, which indicates:

…CIA videotaped interrogations, and destroyed the tapes in 2005. I understand that the Agency did so only after it was determined they were no longer of intelligence value and not relevant to any internal, legislative, or judicial inquiries–including the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.

The official position has been further refined by testimony of CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo and the pseudo-proffer of Jose Rodriquez via his attorney Bob Bennett. We also know that, at a minimum, four White House lawyers were involved in discussion of the proposed destruction of the tapes. The most recent evidence of the government’s position is contained in sworn statements by CIA officials made in mid-April in the Rashid Abdullah case, again positing nothing but good faith and lack of knowledge of any compelling reason to preserve the tapes.

However, yesterday, an insufficiently noticed page A-16 story by Dan Eggen in the Washington Post, appears to put the lie to the defenses the Administration has posited to date and raise serious issues in relation to intentional, malicious destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice. The Post article relates information gleaned from recent CIA/Administration filings in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed last June. From the Post:

The CIA concluded that criminal, administrative or civil investigations stemming from harsh interrogation tactics were "virtually inevitable," leading the agency to seek legal support from the Justice Department, according to a CIA official’s statement in court documents filed yesterday.

The CIA said it had identified more than 7,000 pages of classified Read more →

Torture Tape Investigation in HPSCI

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Last week we learned that John Durham asked a computer forensics expert to contribute to a legal declaration pertaining to whether or not the CIA Inspector General had–or had ever had–evidence pertaining to the interrogations of two Gitmo detainees.

Today we learn that two of the people involved in the Torture Tape destruction are current high-raking Administration officials.

The [HPSCI] panel interviewed two “current, high-level government officials” in April, according to a congressional official, who declined to name the officials.

Both [Intelligence] panels have interviewed CIA Director Michael V. Hayden. 

It’s not clear whether this passage means that Hayden (who just resigned from the military) is one of the two "current, high-level government officials" or not–he’d certainly qualify.

But that leaves another "current, high-level government official." This is significant because several of the key players (like Jose Rodriguez, who remains under subpoena from HPSCI) are former officials. Two notable exceptions are John Rizzo, who works in CIA’s General Counsel office, and John Helgerson, CIA’s Inspector General. We also know that John Negroponte, currently at State, wrote a memo pertaining to the Torture Tapes when he was DNI. Finally, there’s always everyone’s favorite current high-level government official involved with the torture tapes, David Addington.

But I’m not holding my breath.

I’m just as intrigued by the news that Crazy Pete Hoekstra and Silvestre Reyes have gotten into a spat over this investigation.

The House investigation has been riven by partisan disputes. In January, Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the panel’s ranking Republican, publicly took issue with Democrats over issuing a subpoena for Rodriguez, selecting witnesses and other aspects of the investigation. Democrats have maintained that they have been responsive to Republican input.

A spokesman for Hoekstra declined to comment Tuesday.

As I have said repeatedly, one of the people spinning hard to dissociate himself from the Torture Tape destruction is Porter Goss, who was head of the CIA when the Torture Tape was destroyed, and who received Negroponte’s warning not to destroy the Torture Tape. I’ve long worried that an HPSCI investigation, handled badly, would work the same way Lee Hamilton and Dick Cheney’s HPSCI investigation into Iran-Contra did–to immunize key players from prosecution. In particular, I’ve worried about Pete Hoekstra attempting to protect his former colleague, Porter Goss, from any incrimination.

So I consider it a good sign that Crazy Pete has his knickers in a twist about the investigation. 

A Peek into the Torture Tape Investigation

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As the NYT and AP have reported, the CIA says none of its records were responsive to the Court order in the Hani Abdullah case.

A records search by the Central Intelligence Agency has found no evidence that the agency violated a judge’s order when, in 2005, it destroyed videotapes that showed harsh interrogations, the C.I.A. said in a court declaration this week.

Since the CIA is still reviewing its records, though, that declaration may or may not be conclusive.

But the CIA’s declaration is far more interesting for what it says about John Durham’s Torture Tape investigation than what it says about Hani Abdullah’s civil suit against George Bush. Comparing the two declarations submitted in response to Abdullah’s suit with an earlier declaration the CIA submitted in response to the ACLU’s FOIA suggests that John Durham may have reason to suspect that some records pertaining to the torture tapes were destroyed in the Office of Inspector General.

First of all, consider who wrote the two declarations submitted Wednesday by the CIA. First, there’s Robert Dietz, who conducted a general search of the CIA’s operational files. Here’s how Dietz describes his expertise in this matter:

I am the senior councilor to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I joined the CIA in Autumn of 2006. Although I am a lawyer by training, I am not serving in a legal capacity and I am not part of the Office of General Counsel. In my position, I report to the Director of the CIA and receive assignments from him. For example, I have chaired an Agency Accountability Board, and I have recently concluded a management review of the Office of the Inspector General. In December 2007, in connection with the public disclosure that the CIA had destroyed certain videotapes, the Director asked me to chair the so-called Tapes Coordination Group ("TCG"). This Group’s assignment is to respond to requests for information from Acting United States Attorney John Durham, specially appointed prosecutor investigating the destruction of the tapes, and similar requests by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Dietz is not a lifetime CIA employee. Rather, he appears to have come in when Michael Hayden took over as Director. That means he had nothing to do with the destruction of the torture tapes. But it also likely means he’s a Hayden loyalist, there to protect Hayden.

Most interesting, Dietz reveals he was in charge of the "management review of the Office of the Inspector General." I find that interesting, not least, because the spat between OIG and Hayden (or rather, and the rest of the CIA) relates to OIG’s report finding CIA’s interrogation methods constituted cruel and inhuman treatment.

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Remember the Torture Tapes?

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Just about everyone is talking about ABC’s confirmation of what we already knew: the torture was approved–in excruciating detail–by the most senior members of the Bush Administration.

In dozens of top-secret talks and meetings in the White House, the most senior Bush administration officials discussed and approved specific details of how high-value al Qaeda suspects would be interrogated by the Central Intelligence Agency, sources tell ABC News.

The so-called Principals who participated in the meetings also approved the use of "combined" interrogation techniques — using different techniques during interrogations, instead of using one method at a time — on terrorist suspects who proved difficult to break, sources said.

Highly placed sources said a handful of top advisers signed off on how the CIA would interrogate top al Qaeda suspects — whether they would be slapped, pushed, deprived of sleep or subjected to simulated drowning, called waterboarding.

The high-level discussions about these "enhanced interrogation techniques" were so detailed, these sources said, some of the interrogation sessions were almost choreographed — down to the number of times CIA agents could use a specific tactic.

The advisers were members of the National Security Council’s Principals Committee, a select group of senior officials who met frequently to advise President Bush on issues of national security policy.

At the time, the Principals Committee included Vice President Cheney, former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as CIA Director George Tenet and Attorney General John Ashcroft.

Now, the article is actually incredibly vague about which of the high-value detainees the Principals discussed interrogating. For example, it suggests that Abu Zubaydah’s torture was planned by the Principals. But then–where elsewhere it asserts that all of the Principals approved the torture–it backs off that claim specifically with regards to Zubaydah.

But after Zubaydah recovered from his wounds at a secret CIA prison in Thailand, he was uncooperative.

[snip]

The CIA wanted to use more aggressive — and physical — methods to get information.

The agency briefed high-level officials in the National Security Council’s Principals Committee, led by then-National Security Advisor Rice and including then-Attorney General Ashcroft, which then signed off on the plan, sources said. It is unclear whether anyone on the committee objected to the CIA’s plans for Zubaydah.

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The Pointy End of a Dull Spear

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The NYT has a fascinating profile of Jose Rodriguez–the guy who ordered the destruction of the CIA torture tapes. This anecdote conveys the kind of guy we’re dealing with:

Not long after the tapes were destroyed, Mr. Goss held a management retreat for top agency officials meant in part to soothe tensions among the agency’s dueling branches. There the deputy director for intelligence — the head of analysis — complained openly about the arrogance of the clandestine branch and said undercover officers thought they could get away with anything.

That was too much for Mr. Rodriguez. He stood up in the room, according to one participant in the meeting, and shouted in coarse language that the analysis chief should “wake up and smell the coffee,” because undercover officers were at the “pointy end of the spear.”

The clandestine branch, Mr. Rodriguez was making it clear, would do what it wanted.

While the profile doesn’t offer much new in the story of the torture tapes (though it does provide a more compelling case that Goss couldn’t control Rodriguez than I’ve previously seen), I’m most interested that Rodriguez apparently prevented any accountability for those who conducted the pathetically incompetent kidnapping of Abu Omar.

It would become known inside the Central Intelligence Agency as “the Italian job,” a snide movie reference to the bungling performance of an agency team that snatched a radical Muslim cleric from the streets of Milan in 2003 and flew him to Egypt — a case that led to criminal charges in Italy against 26 Americans.

Porter J. Goss, the C.I.A. director in 2005 when embarrassing news reports about the operation broke, asked the agency’s independent inspector general to start a review of amateurish tradecraft in the case, like operatives staying in five-star hotels and using traceable credit cards and cellphones.

But Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., now the central figure in a controversy over destroyed C.I.A. interrogation tapes, fought back. A blunt-spoken Puerto Rico native and former head of the agency’s Latin America division, he had been selected by Mr. Goss months earlier to head the agency’s troubled clandestine branch. Mr. Rodriguez told his boss that no inspector general review would be necessary — his service would investigate itself.

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