After Killing the Guy Who Started this War, We Simply Redefine It

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Used to be, when you vanquished your enemy, you declared victory and went home.

Not this time. Just a week after the death of Osama bin Laden–who declared war on the US in 1996–Buck McKeon has renewed his effort to rewrite the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force so as to include our secret wars in Yemen, Pakistan, and wherever else an unchecked President wants it to be. As part of the bargain, McKeon’s GWOT 2.0 would give the President the authority to detain our enemies in this newly-redefined war for the length of the hostilities (otherwise known as “forever”).

Benjamin Wittes has a good analysis of McKeon’s GWOT 2.0 here.

Now, I realize it’s not as simple as declaring victory and going home. In fact, I bet that a new AUMF, which would divorce the President’s super-duper terrorist fighting powers from the territory of Afghanistan, might make him more likely to declare victory in Afghanistan and go home. Moreover, by redefining the GWOT such that we can attach those super-duper powers to, say, Anwar al-Awlaki rather than 9/11, then the President won’t face legal pressure to free indefinite detainees because the war has ended. While it won’t happen yet, if the US were to nab a few more key al Qaeda leaders using the intelligence seized from OBL’s compound, you could make a legitimate argument that it’s time to let the indefinite detainees free.

I’m just betting, but I suspect that’s the direction the Administration’s thinking will head from where it’s currently at, which–according to Josh Gerstein–is undecided.

A White Houses spokesman declined to comment to POLITICO about the administration’s official position on whether the AUMF needs to be reaffirmed or replaced.

However, a senior administration official said Obama aides are split over whether to endorse the idea of updating the use-of-force resolution.

“After ten years, you may need something other than the AUMF,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “As an intellectual policy matter you can make a very good argument for doing that [but] there are divisions.”

It would offer them flexibility in Afghanistan just in time for the electorate to voice its displeasure with our endless wars abroad, while guarding super-duper powers the President has come to apparently cherish.

I realize, too, that we can’t say “we killed OBL, so let’s stop fighting terrorists.” Read more →

Sometimes Notes Get Destroyed, Sometimes They Don’t

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One more point about the case of Mohamed Mohamud, the accused bomber from Oregon. A government filing submitted last month addresses the defense’s requests for notes regarding various interactions Mohamud had with the FBI.  It describes two sets of hand-written notes from a FBI agent(s). The first are the notes an FBI agent took after Mohamud got stopped at the airport last year.

The government has notes of its interview with defendant on June 14, 2010. Those notes are accurately summarized in the report of that interview that has been provided to defendant. The government has compared the agent’s handwritten notes to the final, written report, and there are no variances or discrepancies. The only information that appears in the notes, but not in the report, is a statement made by defendant or one of his parents that he was born in Mogadishu, and the date defendant said he planned to return from Alaska. Thus, the notes should not be produced. The government does not have notes from its second, and only other, interview with defendant that occurred on November 26, 2011.

Those handwritten notes were preserved.

But there was another set of handwritten notes–those documenting the July 30 meet at which a recording device failed. Those notes were not preserved.

Defendant has also asked for notes “purporting to relate to the July 30th meeting.” The contents of the July meeting were summarized by an FBI agent in a typewritten report that was provided to defendant on December 10, 2010. Consistent with his practice in all cases where witness statements were not taken, the agent memorialized his notes in their entirety in typewritten reports for all the meetings between UCEs and defendant and, after doing so, he destroyed his handwritten notes. All of the reports written based on those notes have been provided to the defense. [my emphasis]

Now, it’s not clear that the agent in question is the same (that is, it’s not clear that the same agent chose to destroy just some of his notes); the complaint uses “I” a lot, but does not use “we” in its discussion of the follow-up to the airport stop, and the agent who destroyed his notes is not stationed in Portland. The government explanation–that one interview included a witness statement while the other did not–sort of offers an explanation if the same agent took both sets of notes, though not a logical one. After all, if something happens with the recording in the most important meeting in a case, wouldn’t it make sense for an agent to make an exception to his normal procedure, and keep his notes?

The government admits as much when it talks about making sure remaining records of the meeting are preserved.

Even before the filing of defendant’s motion, the government had taken steps to ensure that any remaining notes or other documentation of the July 30, 2010 meeting were preserved and that the events surrounding the meeting were documented.

If keeping remaining records after a failed recording makes sense after indictment, doesn’t it make sense before indictment, too?

Yet one of the reasons the government objects to an order the defense has proposed limiting FBI agents’ ability to discuss the meeting is that if they’re prohibited from doing that, they won’t be able to provide further reports from the meeting to the defense.

Additionally, the proposed order is problematic because it would prohibit agents from discussing any issue related to the August 3 report, which includes not only details of the meeting but other details of defendant’s initial contact with the agent. The order would also limit the government’s ability to comply with its discovery obligations. For example, the agents who are processing the discovery would be unable to finish any reports related to the July 30 meeting and would be unable to complete the ongoing process of providing defendant with additional discovery related to that meeting.

In other words, the government seems to be saying that the court should not order its employees not to talk about the meeting, because doing so would prevent another person who heard the meeting to complete a report, almost a year after the fact, about the meeting, because she has to talk to others to complete such a report.

Grey-Bearded Osama Watching Videos of His Youth

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The Pentagon has released video found at Osama bin Laden’s home. It shows a grey bearded OBL watching images of a black-bearded OBL engaging in jihad.

The video has to be less than two years old: note the juxtaposition of images of Obama and Osama at :29.

And if this is more recent–that is, if this is an image of OBL watching videos at his compound in Abbottabad–then it should put the claim that OBL lived in a “mansion” to rest.

Can anyone explain what the repeated image of some kind of signal is (it first shows up at :05)?

WH Stenographer: Obama Took Big Risk in Deciding to Go after Bin Laden

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There’s not all that much in this Bob Woodward piece on the raid to get Osama bin Laden that hasn’t already been reported generally elsewhere: just some details about the surveillance leading up to the raid (which I’ll discuss below) and a cute anecdote about how they measured bin Laden’s corpse to make sure it was taller than six feet.

When bin Laden’s corpse was laid out, one of the Navy SEALs was asked to stretch out next to it to compare heights. The SEAL was 6 feet tall. The body was several inches taller.

After the information was relayed to Obama, he turned to his advisers and said: “We donated a $60 million helicopter to this operation. Could we not afford to buy a tape measure?”

So it’s fair, I guess, to take the article’s selected emphasis as the narrative the White House wanted told. And that narrative focuses on what a risky decision it was to approve the raid.

The [phone call between Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and a friend, from which Woodward includes direct quotes] and several other pieces of information, other officials said, gave President Obama the confidence to launch a politically risky mission to capture or kill bin Laden, a decision he took despite dissension among his key national security advisers and varying estimates of the likelihood that bin Laden was in the compound.

To communicate what a difficult decision it was, Woodward provides the competing estimates of the chances that they had really discovered OBL.

Several assessments concluded there was a 60 to 80 percent chance that bin Laden was in the compound. Michael Leiter, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, was much more conservative. During one White House meeting, he put the probability at about 40 percent.

When a participant suggested that was a low chance of success, Leiter said, “Yes, but what we’ve got is 38 percent better than we have ever had before.”

To back that up, Woodward provides details about the limits of the US intelligence. Of note, Woodward describes that the US was never able to positively ID OBL, in spite of the fact that a man–presumably OBL–paced around the compound for an hour or two every day. While Woodward doesn’t say whether the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency was able to get a view of his face (the implication is it was not), he does say that the absence of any information about the size of windows or walls in the compound made it difficult to even measure the height of the pacing man.

So we can take two lessons from the story President Obama’s top advisers leaked to Bob Woodward. First, Obama took a pretty big chance when he ordered SEALs to jump into a compound in the middle of a Pakistani garrison town. And second, if you want to evade our surveillance, keep your battery out of your cell phone until you’re at least 90 minutes away from your stationary location and build that location such that any outside space offers no features to allow the NGA to get a good read on you.

Obama Apparently Was Hoping for a Trifecta

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Qaddafi last Saturday, Osama bin Laden Sunday, and Anwar al-Awlaki on Thursday.

A U.S. drone strike in Yemen Thursday was aimed at killing Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born radical cleric who is suspected of orchestrating terrorist attacks on the U.S, but the missile missed its target, according to Yemeni and U.S. officials.

[snip]

The attempt to kill Mr. Awlaki was the first known U.S. military strike inside Yemen since May 2010, when U.S. missiles mistakenly killed one of Yemen President Abdullah Ali Saleh’s envoys and an unknown number of other people.

Lucky for Obama, batting .333 is still a great average.

Oh–and too bad about all that collateral damage.

Two lessons for Obama: 1) Navy SEALs are far more effective with far fewer mistakes than drones, 2) that adage about celebrities dying in three? It doesn’t actually raise your odds in military strikes.

Maybe We Fought the War Wrong?

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National Journal has a fascinating article comparing the cost-benefit of the war against al Qaeda with that of other wars. It puts the cost of the war at $3 trillion–less than just the defense costs of World War II. But it didn’t bring the same kind of return.

By conservative estimates, bin Laden cost the United States at least $3 trillion over the past 15 years, counting the disruptions he wrought on the domestic economy, the wars and heightened security triggered by the terrorist attacks he engineered, and the direct efforts to hunt him down.What do we have to show for that tab? Two wars that continue to occupy 150,000 troops and tie up a quarter of our defense budget; a bloated homeland-security apparatus that has at times pushed the bounds of civil liberty; soaring oil prices partially attributable to the global war on bin Laden’s terrorist network; and a chunk of our mounting national debt, which threatens to hobble the economy unless lawmakers compromise on an unprecedented deficit-reduction deal.

All of that has not given us, at least not yet, anything close to the social or economic advancements produced by the battles against America’s costliest past enemies.

Just as one example, here’s how it contrasts WWII’s cost-benefit calculus.

World War II defense spending cost $4.4 trillion. At its peak, it sucked up nearly 40 percent of GDP, according to the Congressional Research Service. It was an unprecedented national mobilization, says Chris Hellman, a defense budget analyst at the National Priorities Project. One in 10 Americans—some 12 million people—donned a uniform during the war.

But the payoff was immense. The war machine that revved up to defeat Germany and Japan powered the U.S. out of the Great Depression and into an unparalleled stretch of postwar growth. Jet engines and nuclear power spread into everyday lives. A new global economic order—forged at Bretton Woods, N.H., by the Allies in the waning days of the war—opened a floodgate of benefits through international trade. Returning soldiers dramatically improved the nation’s skills and education level, thanks to the GI Bill, and they produced a baby boom that would vastly expand the workforce.

It’s a perhaps cold way to discuss war, but a fascinating one. (Note, here’s another cost-benefit analysis, one which shows we invest far too much in security theater given the extent of the threat we face.)

Given such analysis, can we perhaps consider the question of whether we fought this war wrong? Just as an example, I perhaps too glibly considered the plight of al Qaeda, which is reportedly now considering derailing trains for an anniversary attack. I was glib primarily because, given our aging rail stock, derailments are a fairly common occurrence even without a terrorist’s involvement. Similarly, I noted the silliness of a big domestic spying effort to find potential threats to pipelines when utilities themselves seem to be ensuring pipelines blow-up.

What if, instead of dumping billions into domestic surveillance, we instead spent some of that on training, but much of that on making our infrastructure much more resilient–resilient to terrorist attacks, but also common decay? What if, rather than encouraging consumers to go deeper in debt to make sure the economy looked good on paper, we had invested to make it more resilient while making the country more self-reliant?

It seems that responding to terrorism in that manner would have had the kind of benefits our other wars had–and would have better prepared us for other tremendous threats, like climate change.

Choo Choo Track Attacks

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I’m bemused by this first report on the intelligence from Osama bin Laden’s compound. Apparently, al Qaeda wants to derail trains.

A new bulletin issued tonight by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security and obtained by ABC News describes the terror organization’s chilling desire to derail a train.

“As of February 2010, al-Qa’ida was allegedly contemplating conducting an operation against trains at an unspecified location in the United States on the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001,” the document reads, using an alternate spelling for bin Laden’s terror group. “As one option, al-Qa’ida was looking into trying to tip a train by tampering with the rails so that the train would fall off the track at either a valley or a bridge.”

With all due respect to the fuckers that brought down the World Trade Center, really? They want to tip a train off a track?

I’m bemused for several reasons. First, it sort of, kind of, refutes the point Jose Rodriguez is clinging to to justify having stopped the investigation of OBL. That is, OBL is still getting terrorist proposals; he’s not just a figurehead.

That said, really? The US is going to get all hot and bothered over a train derailment? When we manage to derail trains through our own declining rail stock all the time? And al Qaeda, the terrorist organization that scored one of the biggest media coups ever by taking down NYC landmarks wants to topple a train in a valley that doesn’t house major media outlets?

Finally, though, I can’t help but relish in the irony. As I noted earlier, our government seems to have a fondness for analogizing al Qaeda with Native Americans, first to Seminoles and then to Apaches. All this time we’ve been playing Cowboys and Indians. Only we totally misunderstood that we’re now dealing with the equivalent of Jesse James and his nineteenth century attacks on trains, not Indians. Al Qaeda and its current “aspirational” attacks has been degraded to the tactics used by Wild West gangsters.

But apparently, we’re still trying to fearmonger over it.

Obama’s DOJ Advocated Lying to Judges in June 2009

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Back in 2006, a bunch of Islamic groups FOIAed the FBI to find out what kind of records the FBI had on them. The FBI blew the request off, so in 2007, the groups sued. When the groups got their data, they complained the FBI had improperly labeled much of the files as outside the scope of their request and in the case of CAIR, clearly not provided all the documents it had. Upon review, Judge Cormac Carney realized the government had lied to him about what was in the documents and the reasons they withheld information. His opinion in response, first written in 2009, was just rewritten in unclassified form and released. It’s a remarkable glimpse into the government’s disdain for separation of powers.

Much of Carney’s ruling responds to a government brief dated June 19, 2009 that remains sealed. But Carney’s ruling makes it pretty clear what the government argued. It suggests the government took Subsection 552(c) of FOIA–which allows the government to withhold information on ongoing criminal investigations, informant identities, or national security–and argued that it permitted the government to lie not only to plaintiffs in a FOIA suit, but also to the judge overseeing the suit.

Subsection (c) thus applies in the rare circumstance in which identifying the basis for withholding information or even disclosing the existence of a record could itself compromise an ongoing criminal investigation, the identity of a confidential informant, or classified foreign intelligence or international terrorism information. Id. In this limited context, the FOIA authorizes an agency to withhold information from a requester without disclosing its basis for doing so. Id. Nothing in Subsection (c), however, allows an agency to withhold information from the Court.

Carney’s ruling goes on to make clear that the government used a 1986 Ed Meese memo interpreting this exemption–stating that the government could tell a FOIA requester that no responsive records exist–and argued that Meese had condoned telling a court that no responsive records exist.

The Government’s policy is to inform a requesting party that there are no records in instances in which the agency determines that “disclosure of the very existence of the records in question ‘could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,’” or “the mere act of invoking Exemption 7(D) in response to a FOIA request tells the requester that somewhere within the records encompassed by the scope of his particular request there is reference to at least one confidential source,” or “the very existence or nonexistence, is itself a classified fact.” Id. at 20–21, 23, 25.

Despite its broad interpretation of the law enforcement exemptions and the new Section 552(c) exclusions, the Attorney General’s Memorandum does not condone lying to the Judiciary. To the contrary, the Attorney General’s Memorandum prohibits such conduct.

And finally, Carney’s ruling makes it clear that the government argued that even filing an in camera filing telling the judge that it had withheld records under this subsection would compromise national security.

Filing an in camera declaration concurrently with its public filings would not have compromised national security, and the Government’s argument to the contrary is simply not credible.

All of which leads to this true, but seemingly outdated, conclusion from Carney.

The Government argues that there are times when the interests of national security require the Government to mislead the Court. The Court strongly disagrees. The Government’s duty of honesty to the Court can never be excused, no matter what the circumstance. The Court is charged with the humbling task of defending the Constitution and ensuring that the Government does not falsely accuse people, needlessly invade their privacy or wrongfully deprive them of their liberty. The Court simply cannot perform this important task if the Government lies to it. Deception perverts justice. Truth always promotes it.

Now, aside from the fact that this ruling makes it clear that the Obama DOJ wrote a filing in June 2009 that advocated lying to judges, the suit is interesting for several reasons. As EFF notes, the revelation that the FBI lied on this FOIA response may suggest it has done so in other FOIA suits. And who know? We know Obama’s DOJ submitted several versions of revised declarations in the al-Haramain case in 2009; so it’s possible they were advocating lying to judges in that case, too.

But it’s also interesting for what it says about the underlying case. As I noted, the most obviously incomplete response that led to this suit came in the case of CAIR and Hussam Ayloush, the Executive Director of CAIR in LA. Originally, the FBI gave them a single document each, which was simply not credible given the amount of FBI surveillance of CAIR that had already been made clear.

Just as importantly, even as the government told CAIR it had just one document on it, CAIR was getting increasingly involved in a suit representing the Islamic Center of Irvine (that Center was not a party to this FOIA, though the Islamic Centers of San Gabriel Valley and Hawthorne were, and the suit makes it clear the informant reported on eight other mosques in Orange County and that Monteilh was part of a “broader surveillance program”) in a suit regarding an FBI informant’s violations of their civil rights.

An ex-con, Monteilh began working for the FBI in 2003. In 2006, he was asked to infiltrate the popular Islamic Center of Irvine, where he started attending prayers five times a day and donning an Islamic robe.

In May 2007, Monteilh recorded a conversation in a car with two worshipers, in which Monteilh suggested blowing up buildings. In the tape, one man agrees with Monteilh. But a few days after the conversation, the two worshipers contacted the Los Angeles chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations and reported Monteilh as a potential terrorist. Other worshippers told mosque leaders that they were scared of Monteilh and felt as though he was trying to entrap them. In June 2007, the mosque obtained a restraining order against the informant.

His relationship with the FBI deteriorated shortly afterwards and, after threatening to go public, Monteilh says he signed a non-disclosure agreement in exchange for $25,000. In December 2007, Monteilh was arrested on a grand-theft charge and went to jail for 16 months.

Monteilh’s role as an informant was exposed in February 2009. Cormac Carney is the judge assigned to this suit.

In other words, back in 2007 when the government was withholding information on informants from CAIR and a bunch of southern California Islamic Centers, another Islamic Center and CAIR were exposing the offensive actions of what would turn out to be a FBI informant. And by the time the government claimed it could lie to Judge Carney in 2009, details of Monteilh’s informant activities were already becoming clear. And by the time Judge Carney ended his revised opinion last month with the sentence,

By disclosing that there are other documents that are responsive to Plaintiffs’ request, Plaintiffs will not learn anything they do not already know.

Groups affiliated with the plaintiffs in the FOIA case had already submitted a complaint to Carney laying out the type of information the FBI used an informant in one Islamic group to collect and stating that the FBI told the informant that “every mosque in the area” was under surveillance.

Not only did the government claim it could lie to Article III judges. It did so to hide information that was already being exposed as improper.

Update: I’ve reread the complaint on the informant, and note that they discovered Monteilh through the arrest of Ahmed Niazi in February 2009. (See PDF 42-43) At his bail hearing, the FBI testified to information collected via a confidential informant, who was Monteilh. But what’s particularly interesting is that when Monteilh was trying to elicit comments about violence, he did so with Niazi, who reported them to the cops and Hussam Ayloush. Ayloush reported him to the FBI. So Ayloush is actually named in this suit.

Also note: the reason Carney is presiding in the Monteilh suit is because it was determined to be a related case. The FBI subsequently tried to have this case transferred to the judge in Monteilh’s suit against the FBI, but the judge in that case declined.

And about that Nuclear Hellstorm Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Promised if Osama bin Laden Was Killed?

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When the WikiLeaks Gitmo Files were first released last week, the Telegraph’s top headline warned of a “nuclear hellstorm” if Osama bin Laden were captured or killed.

One of the terrorist group’s most senior figures warned that al-Qaeda had obtained and hidden a nuclear bomb in Europe that would be detonated if Osama bin Laden was killed or captured.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the al-Qaeda mastermind currently facing trial in America over the 9/11 atrocities, was involved in a range of plans including attacks on US nuclear plants and a “nuclear hellstorm” plot in America.

[snip]

According to the US WikiLeaks files, a Libyan detainee, Abu Al-Libi, “has knowledge of al-Qaeda possibly possessing a nuclear bomb”. Al-Libi, the operational chief of al-Qaeda and a close associate of Osama bin Laden before his detention, allegedly knew the location of a nuclear bomb in Europe that would be detonated if bin Laden were killed or captured.

That headline was based on two details from the Gitmo files. First, this passage from Abu Faraj al-Libi’s Detainee Assessment Brief:

(S//NF) Detainee has knowledge of al-Qaida possibly possessing a nuclear bomb. Al-Qaida associate Sharif al-Masri stated in June or July 2004, upon encountering difficulties in moving the nuclear bomb, detainee commented if al-Qaida was able to move the bomb, al-Qaida would find operatives to use it. However, detainee told Sharif al-Masri that al-Qaida currently had no operatives in the US. The operatives would be Europeans of Arab or Asian descent. The device was reportedly located in Europe.40 Sharif al-Masri reported detainee would know about the bomb and its exact location.41 Sharif al-Masri believes if UBL were to be captured or killed, the bomb would be detonated in the US, detainee would be one of those able to give the order.42

And this single line from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s DAB.

(U) Detainee told his interrogators that al-Qaida had planned to create a “nuclear hell storm” in America.

Now, the reference to al-Libi is of particular interest given accounts of how we found Osama bin Laden, as I have laid out here. I think it likely that al-Libi was the source of the information on the courier(s) that ultimately led to OBL’s compound.

That said, note the intelligence in that passage. The first sentence claims, uncritically, that al-Libi “has knowledge of al-Qaida possibly possessing a nuclear bomb”–though the use of the word “possibly” suggests some doubt. And the remaining 6 sentences of that paragraph are cited to Sharif al-Masri, not al-Libi himself. (Note, CNN appears to have gotten this utterly and completely wrong in this article.)

Al-Masri was detained in 2004 and reports from his interrogation–with the news on WMD–were leaked. As of 2006, his whereabouts remained unknown; I’m checking to see if his whereabouts are still unknown. [Update: His whereabouts were still unknown in March 2008, h/t Jeff Kaye.] [Update: Andy Worthington confirms that al-Masri is one of the detainees who has disappeared; he was never in Gitmo.] (Remember, too, that the Bradbury memos were written to retroactively authorize torture committed in this 2004 time period.)

But none of the reporting on nukes in al-Libi’s file comes from al-Libi himself, and it notes that “detainee ha[d] neither confirmed nor denied” … “knowledge of an al-Qaida nuclear device” by September 10, 2008.

Does the fact that he had neither confirmed nor denied the allegation a full 3 years after being captured mean we never asked?

The KSM intelligence is of even sketchier provenance. KSM’s DAB cites WorldNetDaily (!) as the source.

69 Al-Qaida warning- WorldnetDaily.com 17 -Sep-06, Al-Qaida warns Muslims: Time to get out of U.S. Afghan terror commander hints at a big attack on N.Y. and Washington.

Not only should the WND source raise questions, but reading the article reveals there is only one mention of KSM, and it has nothing to do with what he told his interrogators.

And all of this is more suspect considering Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri claimed he told his torturers that Osama bin Laden had a nuclear bomb, but later recanted the claim.

Usama bin Laden having a nuclear bomb. [REDACTED]. Then they used to laugh. Then they used to tell me you need to admit to those information. So I used to invent some of the stuff for them to say Usama bin laden had a, had a nuclear bomb. And they use to laugh and they were very happy. They were extremely happy because of the news. Then after that I told them, listen. He has no bomb. [my emphasis]

Al-Nashiri’s Gitmo file makes no claim he knew anything about al Qaeda and nukes.

In other words, when we tortured prisoners–and all of the detainees to whom this claim can be traced were in CIA custody–we asked them to tell us al Qaeda had nukes.

So I’m guessing the Telegraph’s big headline is not keeping our national security experts up at night.

Update: Titled changed. After all, KSM promised hellstorm, according to WND, if OBL was captured or killed.

Apaches, Seminoles, and al Qaeda

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As I noted several weeks ago (and as Carol Rosenberg has reported in depth), the government pissed off the Seminole tribe earlier this year by claiming that Seminoles defending themselves in territory held by the Spanish during the early 19th century fought like al Qaeda (and not, for example, American rebels using guerrilla tactics).

Further, not only was the Seminole belligerency unlawful, but, much like modern-day al Qaeda, the very way in which the Seminoles waged war against U.S. targets itself violated the customs and usages of war.

But it turns out that’s not the only analogy our government has made between Native American tribes defending themselves and al Qaeda. According to Chuck Todd, the code name we used for Osama bin Laden was Geronimo. (h/t zunguzungu)

How did special forces relay the news to commanders that OBL was dead? Code name was “Geronimo”; call came in as “Geronimo is KIA”

Of course, presumably he got that name during the Administration of the grandson of the guy alleged to have stolen Geronimo’s skull as a Skull and Bones prank, not under Obama.

Still, for the sake of the legitimacy of our fight against terrorists–and for the sake of some historical humility and shame–don’t you think it’s time we stop analogizing al Qaeda to tribes that were defending their homeland against our imperialism?