Let me start by saying that I’m all in favor of DOJ releasing the information it has on Anwar al-Awlaki. I’m not complaining that they have released it. I’m just puzzling through why they have treated it as they have thus far. In this post, I’m going to review how the government came to tell one story at Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s trial last year, and another one–one that implicates Awlaki–last Friday. In a follow-up post, I’m going to explore why DOJ has refused to lay out the case they have against Awlaki before (including last October).
DOJ Hid Awlaki in October
As I have noted, when DOJ made its opening argument in Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s trial on October 11, 2011, prosecutor Jonathan Tukel said that Abdulmutallab told the FBI on Christmas Day 2009 that a guy named Abu Tarak had ordered him to attack the US.
And Abu-Tarak gave him the direction.
Remember, I said there were only three parts to the plan, he had to blow up a plane, it had to be a U.S. airliner and it had to take place over U.S. soil. Abu-Tarak reported that way, make sure it’s a U.S. aircraft, make sure it takes place over the United States.
And then the defendant told the FBI that on approximately December 6 or 7 he received the bomb from Abu-Tarak in Yemen. [my emphasis]
In the narrative they released last Friday, they said Awlaki gave that order.
Although Awlaki gave defendant operational flexibility, Awlaki instructed defendant that the only requirements were that the attack be on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over U.S. soil. [my emphasis]
Now, the explanation I’ve gotten is that Abu Tarak is Awlaki, or rather, that Abu Tarak is an alias for Awlaki.
But assuming that explanation is correct (I’m not entirely convinced), it still permits several possibilities:
- Abdulmutallab just made the name up in an effort to hide Awlaki–and, as we’ll see below–bomb-maker Ibrahim al Asiri’s role (but the FBI described Abdulmutallab as bragging about his ties to Awlaki and al Qaeda in his first interrogation)
- The government already knew Abu Tarak was an alias Awlaki used (which doesn’t seem to be the case, since early reporting says Awlaki blessed the op, but didn’t say he was the cleric who ordered it)
- Abdulmutallab later told the FBI that Abu Tarak was Awlaki’s alias
- Abdulmutallab never confirmed Abu Tarak was an alias for Awlaki, but in later interrogations said that Awlaki had given the order to strike the US and therefore the government concluded that Abu Tarak must be an alias
(Here are two more of the most comprehensive stories based significantly on Abdulmutallab’s initial confession to give more of a sense of what they knew from Abdulmutallab’s first confession, on which Tukel’s opening was based.)
Dr. Simon Perry’s statement seems to rule out some of those possibilities, given that, even after reading redacted versions of 18 or 19 of Abdulmutallab’s interrogation reports, Perry treats Abu Tarak and Awlaki as different people: he describes Abu Tarak as someone besides Awlaki who significantly influenced Abdulmutallab.
Aulaqi was not the only influential fundamentalist in UFAM’s life. While residing at Abu Tarak’s residence in Sana, Yemen he was mainly confined to his residence and discouraged from any communication with the outside world (phone, email). During this period, UFAM spoke regularly with Abu Tarak and three other individuals who visited him daily, speaking with them about Jihad and martyrdom. [my emphasis]
Given Perry’s apparent understanding that Abu Tarak and Awlaki are different people, either Abdulmutallab never clearly said that Abu Tarak and Awlaki were the same person, any statement he made to that effect was redacted in the copies Perry read, or Perry wasn’t given the interrogation where Abdulmutallab made such a statement.(Note, however, that the only reference Perry makes to Abu Tarak cites the Christmas Day confession, so it’s possible Abdulmutallab never mentioned him again.)
With all that in mind, let’s review how Tukel told the story about Abu Tarak at the trial but is now telling a story about Awlaki at sentencing.
DOJ committed in August not to use information from “plea bargains”
Back in August, Abdulmutallab tried to mount a defense by making all of his confessions, one way or another, inadmissible. He wanted his initial confession thrown out because he had not received a Miranda warning, he wanted statements he made at UM Hospital thrown out because he was drugged up, and he wanted the statements he made while at Milan (pronounced My-Lan) Prison–all of them–excluded because they were made as part of a plea negotiation.
Defendant ABDULMUTALLAB met with government agents on numerous occasions at the Milan Correctional Facility. The government intended to obtain incriminating statements from Defendant regarding the alleged incident on December 25, 2009. In addition, the government engaged in plea negotiations with the Defendant during the meetings.
Before the meetings began, the government agents verbally agreed that they would not use any statements Defendant made, against him. Defendant relied on the government’s representation – as officers of the court – and made incriminating statements. See United States v. Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (the government can grant the defendant varying degrees of immunity in an informal agreement). Allowing the government to use these statements at trial will violate the government’s agreement with Defendant.
In response to this motion, the government said it would not use any of these statements “at trial,” so the judge should deny his motion as moot, which she did.
Defendant also filed a separate motion to suppress statements made to agents on other dates. R.59: Motion to Suppress Statements Made to Government Agents at the Milan Correctional Facility. The government will not seek to offer those statements at trial either, and therefore that motion should be denied as moot.
So basically, the government committed, on August 26, 2011, not to use anything Abdulmutallab said while at Milan during “the trial.” Read more →