The EPA’s History of William Reilly
I was going to go clean the house and forget about the BP disaster for a few hours. But then I saw the EPA files on William Reilly, the Republican Obama appointed to co-chair his BP Disaster “Looking Forward” Commission.
From the EPA’s institutional perspective, he sounds like a nice guy: a Republican conservationist of the sort that went the way of the NE Republican. Here’s a fairly interesting policy piece from him.
But I wanted to highlight just a few parts of EPA’s institutional history of Reilly for what they say about Obama and this commission.
First, there’s the description of Reilly as a broker of compromise.
Reilly’s proclivity for drawing people together will not just be directed outward, toward the regulated community: it can also be expected to bring new cohesion to the internal operations of EPA.
[snip]
Reilly’s personal style–gentlemanly and soft-spoken–makes him the ideal mediator, effective at bridging differences even when antagonisms are intensely felt and there seems to be no common ground for agreement.
[snip]
In recent years, Reilly has scored successes with his efforts to secure dialogue and cooperation among frequently polarized business and environmental leaders. One such widely applauded breakthrough occurred in November 1988 when 25 previously warring environmentalists, industrialists, and developers made a public commitment to a “no net loss” goal for U.S. wetlands, a resource heretofore subject to dangerously rapid depletion. These same people, so harmonious by late 1988, had scarcely been on speaking terms when Reilly first coaxed them to convene for a meeting in July 1987.
This is a guy with Obama’s instinct for the mushy middle, right there between corporations and environmentalists.
Perhaps most telling, though, are the lessons in a report for President Poppy Bush on the Exxon Valdez spill completed under Reilly and then-Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner’s guidance two months after the spill (that’s a picture of Reilly at the cleanup site–the picture above is Reilly at the Kuwait oil fires during Poppy Bush’s Saddam war). I expect he’ll write something similar for Obama’s commission six months from now.
- Preparedness must be strengthened. Exxon was not prepared for a spill of this magnitude–nor were Alyeska, the State of Alaska, or the federal government. It is clear that the planning for and response to the Exxon Valdez incident was unequal to the task. Contingency planning in the future needs to incorporate realistic worst-case scenarios and to include adequate equipment and personnel to handle major spills. Adequate training in the techniques and limitations of oil spill removal is critical to the success of contingency planning. Organizational responsibilities must be clear, and personnel must be knowledgeable about their roles. Realistic exercises that fully test the response system must be undertaken regularly. The National Response Team is conducting a study of the adequacy of oil spill contingency plans throughout the country under the leadership of the Coast Guard.
- Response capabilities must be enhanced to reduce environmental risk. Oil spills–even small ones–are difficult to clean up. Oil recovery rates are low. Both public and private research are needed to improve cleanup technology. Research should focus on mechanical, chemical, and biological means of combating oil spills. Decision-making processes for determining what technology to use should be streamlined, and strategies for the protection of natural resources need to be rethought.
- Some oil spills may be inevitable. Oil is a vital resource that is inherently dangerous to use and transport. We therefore must balance environmental risks with the nation’s energy requirements. The nation must recognize that there is no fail-safe prevention, preparedness, or response system. Technology and human organization can reduce the chance of accidents and mitigate their effects, but may not stop them from happening. This awareness makes it imperative that we work harder to establish environmental safeguards that reduce the risks associated with oil production and transportation. The infrequency of major oil spills in recent years contributed to the complacency that exacerbated the effect of the Exxon Valdez spill.
- Legislation on liability and compensation is needed. The Exxon Valdez incident has highlighted many problems associated with liability and compensation when an oil spill occurs. Comprehensive U.S. oil spill liability and compensation legislation is necessary as soon as possible to address these concerns.
- Read more →