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SCOTUS Usurps Congressional Power

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Posts in this series.

In the previous post in this series I described the thesis of Jamal Greene’s How Rights Went Wrong. He says the Bill of Rights was designed to protect the power of states against intrusion by the newly created federal government. Chapter 1 provides evidence to support his conclusion. My original plan was to go over the evidence he cites. Instead, I have a different bit of evidence.

SCOTUS didn’t mention the Bill of Rights when it listed the rights of citizens of the United States in any of the seminal cases construing the Reconstruction Amendments.

The issue of individual rights under the 14th Amendment came before SCOTUS in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), which I discussed here. The majority says that there is a difference between the rights which Americans have as citizens of the United States on one hand, and the rights they have as citizens of a state on the other.

The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original instrument was accepted shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the true danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and concentrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined resistance to the General Government.

Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added largely to the number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government.

But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the State with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of property [sic] was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation.

So what does the majority say are the rights of citizens of the United States? Very few, all of which are set out in the main body of the Constitution. The majority cites several older cases, and describes each of them as saying that the rights we claim come from our status as citizens of a state.

But neither the majority nor any of the older cases point to the Bill of Rights as a source of our rights as citizens of the US. None of them say that as citizens of the United States we have a right to a jury trial, or to freedom of speech, or any other right in the Bill of Rights.

In that section of The Slaughterhouse Cases the Court says the opposite. It says that the 14th Amendment does not change the principle that our rights come from our status as citizens of a state.

As we saw in earlier posts on the Second Founding, subsequent decisions of SCOTUS including United States v. Cruikshank  and The Civil Rights Cases take the same position, and strike down all of the remedial legislation enacted by Congress under the 14th Amendment to give civil liberties to all citizens including Black people. These cases led us to Plessy v. Ferguson. All of them stand for the proposition that the Reconstruction Amendments do not grant rights to U.S. citizens, and that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant such rights.

Congress gave up trying, and nothing happened to repair the damage of slavery or bring an end to Jim Crow segregation for 70 years.

Discussion

1. SCOTUS ignores America history and its own precedents when it puts itself in charge of our rights. It wasn’t that way in 1792, and it wasn’t that way in the late 1800s. That whole thing was invented in the 20th Century as SCOTUS began to say that the provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to individuals through the Due Process Clause. The concept of due process has a legal definition, and this isn’t it. We now call it “substantive due process,” and I have never understood how it’s supposed to work. Clarence Thomas agrees, calling substantive due process a “legal fiction” in  MacDonald v. City of Chicago, Thomas J. concurring.

Here’s the Wikipedia entry on substantive due process.  I’m not sure I agree with it completely, particularly the pre-Civil War material. Here’s another which seems closer to what I remember from law school.

2. So where do our rights come from? In early cases under the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court says that our rights come from the states. Rights might be found in a state constitution, or in statutes enacted by state legislatures. That means there is no agreed set of rights held by all of us. It means that there is nothing significant to the idea of being a citizen of the U.S. It also means that we have to go from state to state amending laws and constitutions to protect our liberty.

In this post, I pointed to Hannah Arendt’s view of rights. She thinks that rights only exist among people living in societies that are based on equality as citiznes. In those societies rights arise from a mutual guarantee. We give each other rights, and agree to enforcement mechanisms; and we benefit by having the same rights. That certainly doesn’t point to courts as the source of rights. It points to founding documents, and to the legislature. The courts and the executive branch serve only as enforcement mechanisms.

Each of the Reconstruction Amendments expressly empowers Congress to pass legislation to enforce them. This is a power given to Congress, not to SCOTUS. The idea that SCOTUS gets to overrule the exercise of expressly authorized power by Congress is not in the Constitution or any amendment.

I note in passing that the argument in Shelby County v. Holder, striking down a critical part of the Voting Rights Act, is the dignity of the states. That’s a term cited by John Roberts, a long-time foe of the Voting Rights Act and other legislation broadening democratic rights. Dignity is very important when it comes to states limiting the right to vote, says Roberts.

In Trump v. United States, the right-wingers granted the President almost total immunity in the exercise of official duties. It said in essence that citizens can’t hold Presidents accountable civilly or criminally, and it hamstrung any enforcement that might not have been foreclosed.

That’s how we should treat Congressional actions, including legislation and investigation related to its powers under the Constitution. That’s how we get our rights. We petition Congress for rights, and if granted, they are ours without regard to what five unelected zealots scribble.

The Supreme Court Has Always Been Terrible

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Index to posts in this series

The Civil Rights Cases

The Slaughterhouse Cases and US v. Cruikshank are preludes to the final gutting of the Reconstruction Amendments in The Civil Rights Cases, decided in 1883. Earlier bills aimed at insuring the full citizenship of Black people were struck down by the Supreme Court but Congress kept trying, passing another Civil Rights Act in 1875.

The new law required all businesses to serve people equally regardless of race or prior condition of servitude. The Civil Rights Cases are a consolidated group of cases brought by Black people to enforce their right stay in a hotel, to visit a theater, to sit in the dress circle of a theater, and for Black women to ride in the Ladies Car on a railroad. The Court struck down the law on the same grounds as cases linked above. I have two further observations.

1. Writing for the majority, Joseph Bradley writes:

We have … felt, in all its force, the weight of authority which always invests a law that Congress deems itself competent to pass. But the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon this court, and we are bound to exercise it according to the best lights we have.

Bradley doesn’t say who threw the “responsibility of an independent judgment” onto him. He uses the passive voice to hide it. We know it can only come from the minds of the members of the Court. He also knew he could get away with this outrageous assertion of power. By 1883 Congress was controlled by the Democrats, then the part of White Supremacy, so they didn’t care. The presidency, then at a low ebb in power, was irrelevant.

The lives and liberty of Black people didn’t count, and nothing was left of the Reconstruction Amendments.

2. To add insult to injury Bradley offered this argument.

When a man has emerged from slavery, and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens, yet no one at that time thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.

The Supreme Court had struck down that “beneficent legislation”. Bradley knew about the Colfax Massacre. He knew the army had been sent in to stop murderous groups like the KKK. He know about lynchings, rapes, robberies, and mob violence. He knew that states refused to protect Black citizens, and that Congress was trying to fill the gap. He knew full well the intent of the Reconstruction Amendments was to enable the federal government to protect Black Citizens. He just didn’t care.

Bradley would fit right in with the MAGA SCOTUS of today.

Our Current SCOTUS Doesn’t Care About The Consequences of Its Decisions

Three examples will suffice.

Gun Case. Here’s a section of the oral argument in Macdonald v. City of Chicago.

… BREYER: You’re saying they can have — no matter what, that the City just can’t have guns even if they’re saving hundreds of lives — they can’t ban them.

….

… SCALIA: There’s a lot of statistical disagreement on whether the Miranda rule saves lives or not, whether it results in the release of dangerous people who have confessed to their crime, but the confession can’t be used. We don’t — we don’t resolve questions like that on the basis of statistics, do we?

Miranda is not analogous, and the intellectual fraud Scalia knew it. The statistics the odious Scalia is talking about are real dead and injured people. Like this child. Scalia doesn’t care about these murders or what guns and gun violence do to our society. He thinks his views of the intent of the Founders are more important. He thinks the Founders would sacrifice thousands of dead people for the right to waltz around with an AR-15.

The OSHA Rule. Here’s a snippet from oral argument on the OSHA Covid vaxx or test rule.

… ROBERTS: No, it’s not so much that OSHA has less power. It’s that the idea that this is specific to particular agencies really doesn’t hold much water when you’re picking them off one by –one by one.

I think maybe it should be analyzed more broadly as this is, in effect, an effort to cover the waterfront. I’m not saying it’s a bad thing.

But I don’t know that we should try to find, okay, what specific thing can we find to say, oh, this is covered by OSHA? What specific thing can we find to say that this is covered by the hospitals? What specific thing can we find to say, oh, no, we’re doing this because this is a federal contractor?

It seems to me that the more and more mandates that pop up in different agencies, it’s fair –I wonder if it’s not fair for us to look at the Court as a general exercise of power by the federal government and then ask the questions of, well, why doesn’t Congress have a say in this, and why don’t the –why doesn’t this be the primary responsibility of the states?

Roberts is saying it’s suspicious that Biden (and Trump before him) marshaled all government agencies to deal with the pandemic. He’s going to decide how the government can respond, no matter what the statutes say, and as Elizabeth Prelogar, the Solicitor General responds, he could just read the statute. But you won’t see Roberts taking any blame for the people who died, or spent days or weeks in intensive care, or got long Covid, because of his decision. For him, that’s just statistics. He doesn’t care.

Abortion. In Dobbs v. Jackson Whole Women’s Health Alito says SCOTUS doesn’t have to follow precedent, meaning Roe v. Wade, in part because no one can prove they rely on it. Reliance requires proof that one is planning in advance based on the precedent. No one plans to get pregnant then get an abortion. Presto, no reliance. There’s more, and it just gets more cruel.

Alito ignores the actual effect of Roe v. Wade: that women and their families can control their own lives, that their lives are valuable. The abstract idea that states should have a say in women’s lives is more important than an unknown number of deaths, thousands of dangerous pregnancies, and loss of dignity as citizens. Alito doesn’t care.

Conclusion

The Constitution doesn’t give SCOTUS the final say on our rights. It doesn’t say SCOTUS has the unrestrained power to throw out laws and rules created by the elected branches. That’s all invented by SCOTUS itself, taking power and control away from democratically-elected officials.

The Fox News Six would repeat every decision of the Reconstruction Era Supreme Court. They follow in the footsteps of people who don’t care.

The Major Questions Metadoctrine and The Slaughterhouse Cases

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In my last post I show how US v. Cruikshank (1876) and The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) affect our gun control crisis. In this post I look at the connection between The Slaughterhouse Cases and Biden v. Nebraska, the recent case striking down Biden’s student loan reduction plan.

The Slaughterhouse Cases

I discuss The Slaughterhouse Cases here. The Supreme Court could have decided them strictly on the basis of the police power. The appellant butchers argued that the untrammeled right to earn a living was a right protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. That’s obviously not true. The Court later takes up the purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments, and there’s nothing to support the Appellants’ argument.

But Samuel Miller, who wrote the majority opinion, explains that he and the other members of the Court have thought it over, and “ we now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that, we have neither the inclination nor the right to go.”

One of the advisory opinions that follow is that the Reconstruction Amendments were not intended to change the balance of powers between the federal and state governments. Miller justifies this by saying that if Congress wants to make an significant change the balance of powers between the states and the US, it has to do so in language acceptable to the Supreme Court.

Earlier in the opinion, MIller said that the Reconstruction Amendments were intended to insure that Black people had a full range of rights, just like White people. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enact laws to secure that right. So at the very least, the Reconstruction Amendments change the relations between state and US governments enough to permit the US to protect the rights of Black people. It’s hard to imagine clearer language, and Miller doesn’t even hint at one.

Furthermore, by the time of The Slaughterhouse Cases Congress had enacted two civil rights laws and three enforcement acts. This effectively is a declaration of Congress’ understanding of its power, and that of the President. Miller ignores the views of the other two branches. Only the opinion of five members of the Supreme Court counts. The Supreme Court is the unelected final authority in our democracy.

So, we have three points from The Slaughterhouse Cases:

1. If the Supreme Court majority wants to issue a ruling in a case, it will do so, regardless of precedents it might have established.

2. If Congress wants to accomplish a major change in our government it must figure out some language that even the Supreme Court is afraid to reject, but likely that’s impossible.

3. SCOTUS is supreme; it ignores the other two branches if it chooses.

Biden v. Nebraska

Majority Opinion. John Roberts’ majority opinion addresses the standing of the Appellants. Most of them don’t have standing, but no matter, because Roberts asserts that Missouri does and one is plenty. The basis for Missouri’s standing is that it had created MOHELA, an independent nonprofit governmental corporation, which owns and services student loans. MOHELA refused to participate in the lawsuit (I wonder why) but the Missouri AG claims that Missouri can sue in its place. He says MOHELA would lose an estimated $44 million in fees for loan servicing. None of that would ever go to Missouri, ever, but so what?

Roberts and the Fox News Six say MOHELA is an “instrumentality” of Missouri, the instrumentality might lose money which is an injury sufficient for standing, and that’s good enough. What he means is that standing is available because he wants to rule on the merits. Just like in The Slaughterhouse Cases.

In her dissent Elena Kagan explains that standing rules arise from the Constitutional requirement that SCOTUS only has jurisdiction of actual controversies. If a plaintiff isn’t injured, there is no standing.

It still contravenes a bedrock principle of standing law—that a plaintiff cannot ride on someone else’s injury. Missouri is doing just that in relying on injuries to the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA), a legally and financially independent public corporation. And that means the Court, by deciding this case, exercises authority it does not have.

On the merits, Roberts addresses the statutory power granted to the executive branch to waive or modify any provision of the student loan program in the event of a national emergency. He explains that “waive” doesn’t mean waive, and that “modify” doesn’t mean modify, if the change is big. A lot of money is a big change. He doesn’t even hint at the words Congress should have used to get its way.

He says his opinion is supported by what he grandiosely calls the Major Questions Doctrine, because there’s a lot of money at stake. I call it the Major Questions Metadoctrine, or MQM, for reasons that will appear.

Barrett’s Concurrence. Amy Coney Barret, who clerked for the odious Antonin Scalia, styles herself a textualist. She wants us to know that the MQM is very good, so she writes a concurring opinion. Most of is is technical legal stuff about canons of interpretation. Two points are worth mentioning.

1. Barrett cites a 2010 law journal article by John f. Manning, a Harvard Law professor: Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution. You don’t have to read past the abstract to find out what Manning thinks:

This Essay argues that such clear statement rules rest on the mistaken premise that the Constitution contains freestanding values that can be meaningfully identified and enforced apart from the specific terms of the clauses from which the Court derives them.

Barrett ignores this point entirely. The MQM is supposed to be a clear statement rule. There are a number of these, mostly directed to structural constitutional issues like federalism. The Slaughterhouse Cases could be seen as an application of a clear statement rule, if it weren’t so obviously unnecessary and wrong.

In Biden v. Nebraska the MQM is applied to enforce Congressional control over the purse. But as Barrett herself shows, that isn’t in the Constitution. In her view, this purpose is an emanation from the Appropriations Clause. The power of the purse is a judicial trope, already once removed from the text of the Constitution. The MQM is a further step from the Constitution. Thus, a metadoctrine.

2. Barrett offers a hypothetical to explain her view.

Consider a parent who hires a babysitter to watch her young children over the weekend. As she walks out the door, the parent hands the babysitter her credit card and says: “Make sure the kids have fun.” Emboldened, the babysitter takes the kids on a road trip to an amusement park, where they spend two days on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel. Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with the parent’s instruction?

This is a laughable hypothetical. The Biden Administration didn’t just decide for funsies to reduce student debt. There was an economic catastrophe caused by a pandemic that killed a million Americans and sickened tens of millions.

The correct hypothetical is not a trip to a theme park, but a trip to the emergency room paid with the credit card.

This is shoddy work, but it’s all we an expect from rigid ideologues. It’s also an ugly parallel with the Reconstruction Era Supreme Court.

Conclusion

The parallels to The Slaughterhouse Cases are, I hope, obvious.

1. SCOTUS will ignore every restriction on its use of power if five members want to.

2. There is no statutory language clear enough if five (or more) members of SCOTUS don’t like the policy.

3. SCOTUS is very supreme.

Cruikshank, Gun Control, And Bad Rulings

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Index to posts in this series

We’ve looked at two early cases interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments, The Slaughterhouse Cases and US v. Cruikshank. These cases are still in force, and have done massive damage, to Black people especially and others who hoped to gain their rightful freedom; to the balance of power among the three branches of government; and to our jurisprudence. Recent 2nd Amendment cases are good examples of this damage.

Gun control

Recapitulation of the old cases. In The Slaughterhouse Cases the Supreme Court analyzes §1 of the 14th Amendment (text below). The second sentence bars states from abridging the privileges or immunities of “citizens of the United States”. The Court says this provision applies only to the tiny number of privileges or immunities that attach to people solely as citizens of the US. It doesn’t apply to their rights as citizens of a specific state.

The Court says that the !4th Amendment doesn’t change the relationship between state and federal governments. 83 US 77-78. It’s a negative argument: such a monumental change must be in very clear language, and this isn’t clear enough to suit the Court.

In Cruikshank, the Court examines the rights which the defendants allegedly illegally conspired to violate. One is the right to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose. Here is the Cruikshank Court’s entire discussion of that issue.

The right there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose.’ This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called, in The City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, the ‘powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more properly called internal police,’ ‘not surrendered or restrained’ by the Constituton of the United States.

Citing several older cases, the Court says that the 2nd Amendment does not guarantee the right to keep and bear arms; all it does is bar the US from infringing on that right. It says that states can regulate the ownership of arms as part of their police power.

To summarize:
1. The 14th Amendment didn’t change the power relations between the state and federal governments.
2. Rights not specific to the Constitution are solely the domain of the states under their police power.
3. The 2nd Amendment does not grant any rights to anyone. It merely prohibits the US from infringing the right to bear arms.
4. Any important change in the laws or Constitution must be clear enough to suit the Supreme Court.

Current cases. Eventually the Supreme Court started applying the Bill of Rights to the states using the Due Process Clause. By the time Heller v. Dist. of Columbia was decided, most of the Bill of Rights had become more or less applicable to the states.

In Heller Scalia cites Cruikshank approvingly. He writes: “States, we said, were free to restrict or protect the right under their police powers.” He completely ignores the holding of Cruikshank and several older cases that the only function of the 2nd Amendment is to prohibit the US from infringing the right, as well as the holding that the right does not arise from the Constitution. He simply imposes his own textualist reading of the 2nd Amendment as if it were written today instead of 240 years ago.

A few years later in Macdonald v. City of Chicago Alito put SCOTUS in charge of controling state power over guns. The Seventh Circuit had upheld Chicago’s gun regulations, relying in part on Cruikshank. Alito says the issue is: “… whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated in the concept of due process,” an issue not considered by the lower courts. Cruikshank isn’t applicable because it only considered the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Alito gives a short history of cases applying the Due Process Clause to the Bill of Rights starting with this: “The constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War fundamentally altered our country’s federal system.” He doesn’t tell us what that change is, or how it applies to guns.

He cites Heller for the proposition that the 2nd Amendment creates a right to bear arms. Then he announces that the right to and bear arms is covered by the Due Process Clause. There isn’t really an explanation for this. Alito just says it’s, like, you know, fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty, amirite, for every American to carry a gun for “self-defense”. Like this guy.

Then in Bruen, Clarence Thomas says that the only allowable limits on the the right to keep and bear arms are those the states imposed prior to either 1789 or 1868. Whatever that right was, the states obviously regulated it under their police powers, but Thomas doen’t even mention Cruikshank and The Slaughterhouse Cases. I guess Macdonald says it was unconstitutional for states to regulate guns after the ratification of the 14th Amendment, even though they had that right under Cruikshank and used it for 130 years.

Conclusion. The end result is that we can only regulate guns if five members of the NRA Court permit it. And now we learn that Bruen didn’t slake the blood lust of Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh. They want to flood the country with ghost guns.

Why Not Overrule Those Old Cases?

I think one reason SCOTUS doesn’t overrule Cruikshank and The Slaughterhouse Cases is that it would change our understanding of our dual sovereignty system. In The Slaughterhouse Cases the Court said that a broad interpretation of the 14th Amendment “…would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment.” Of course SCOTUS is already doing that, as in gun regulation cases.

But if we dropped the pretense that the states are the dominant power in deciding the rights of citizens, SCOTUS would lose one of its go-to arguments against federal laws it doesn’t like. Dobbs, for example, says that the right to abortion should be decided by the states. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act offends the dignity of the states (no, really), according to Shelby County v. Holder. And in NFIB v. Sebelius, SCOTUS says that the US can’t pressure the states to provide Medicaid to all their citizens, who, I note, are also citizens of the US, because state dignity is so important to suffering people.

There’s another possibility. The right-wing six simply don’t care about any of the traditional pillars of jurisprudence, such as stability, deference to the other branches, institutional reputation, and procedural constraints on power. And they’re careless. They don’t even try to be coherent or to clean up the loose ends of precedent that held for 150 years, or to create workable rules. See part IIIB of Breyer’s dissent in Heller and the dangers to society created by Bruen, as in the Rahimi case.

It’s bad enough that we’re goverened by five or six unelected lawyers. It’s worse that tbese second-rate people do such shoddy work.

———————
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Slaughterhouse Cases

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Index to posts in this series

Chapter 4 of The Second Founding by Eric Foner lays out the campaign of the Supreme Court to strangle (my word) the Reconstruction Amendments. The last chapter is the requisite effort to show how things can get better.

I think there’s more to be gained by reading the main decisions on the Reconstruction Amendments, so I’m going to depart from Foner’s text at this point. I think we will see that SCOTUS today uses the same tactics to strike down laws and ignore precedent. I’ll start with The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 US 36 (1873). The syllabus takes up the first 20 pages; the opinion begins at 57.

Facts. The butchers of New Orleans were scattered across the city. They brought animals for slaughter from the river and train stations to their shops, and threw the offal and scraps into the Mississippi. This was a public nuisance and a health issue.

Louisiana passed a law creating a special corporation charged with building landings and railroad connections to a new set of slaughterhouses in a single location outside the city. The law gave the corporation an exclusive license, required the corporation to lease space to all comers (including Black butchers) for slaughtering operations, set price limits, and required space for a medical officer to check animals and meat for disease, among other things.

Holding. The Supreme Court upheld the statute in a 5-4 decision. The principle ground of the majority opinion is that the law was within the police power of the State. The police power is a legal term describing the power of the state to secure the “the health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society”, as the dissent puts it. P. 87.

This case could have been decided solely on traditional police power lines, even if the Louisiana law was too broad. But the Court felt it should write about the Reconstruction Amendments, which were a significant part of appellate argument. So the Court ignored the principle of Constitutional Avoidance, the idea that a case should not be decided on constitutional grounds if some other ground is dispositive.

The discussion of the Reconstruction Amendments begins on P. 66. Samuel J. Miller, a Lincoln appointee, gives a brief history of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments. He writes that the purpose of these amendments was to secure

… the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. P. 71.

The Court goes on to say that the amendments apply to everyone, but to construe them fairly the Court has to consider their “pervading spirit” and the evils to be remedied, and their purpose. This is what Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson is talking about in Allen v. Milligan, the Voting Rights Act case from this last term, and in SFFA v. Harvard, the affirmative action case.

Miller then discusses the 13th Amendment at length. Then he turns to the 14th Amendment.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

Miller explains that this clause was intended to overrule Dred Scott. Then he says:

… the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established.

….

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. P. 73-4.

The second sentence of §1 says:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

This means, Miller says, that the US can make laws affecting the privileges or immunities a person holds as a citizen of the US, and can protect those rights from state interference. But the 14th Amendment doesn’t give the Federal government the power to control or create the rights granted a state gives to its citizens.

There are very few privileges or immunities of citizens of the US. They are in the text of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights if the Supreme Courts finds they are. They include protection against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, and protection on the high seas, and not much else.

What are the privileges or immunities of citizens of states? Miller says they encompass “… nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted.” P. 76. The sole point of the 14th Amendment is to guarantee that all such rights granted to citizens of the state are granted to all citizens within its jurisdiction equally.

Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States that, whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction. P. 77.

Miller claims that other construction would enable the federal government to control the exercise of the power of the state to make laws they think best, and set the Supreme Court up as the ultimate arbiter of the powers of states to pass laws. That would change the entire theory of government in this country. It that was the goal, the drafters of the 14th Amendment would have to use “… language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.” P. 78.

Miller says that the states can enact any law they like, so long as the laws don’t discriminate against Black people as a class. P. 81. He doubts that the 14th Amendment could ever apply to anyone besides Black people.

The opinion concludes with a reminder that the Founders were worried about federal encroachment on state power, and claims that the Supreme Court “…has always held with a steady and an even hand the balance between State and Federal power….”. P. 82.

Discussion

1. This case shows the disaster that can arise when SCOTUS gives advisory opinions. There is a huge middle ground between Miller’s cramped reading of the 14th Amendment and the Appellant’s broad view. The opinion establishes a powerful limiting principle: that the purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments is to secure and protect the Freedmen and Black people. It would meant that the federal government can intervene to prohibit actual discrimination against Black people, and generally everybody, but it can’t intervene just because it doesn’t agree with the state’s decisions about privileges and immunities equally applicable to all citizens. That was a perfectly likely outcome in a proper case, a case where a state, for example, barred Black people from testifying against White people.

2. The Appellants were trying to stop state regulation of their businesses. They claim they have an
unfettered right to do business wherever and however they see fit, and that the 14th Amendment protects their exercise of that right. They didn’t win this case, but the idea persisted, and a form of it eventually was adopted by the Supreme Court, as seen in cases like Lochner v. New York.

3. There’s a tendency today to say that SCOTUS, a once-respected institution, has suddenly collapsed in a mixture of partisanship and hubris. Maybe we should ask when that wasn’t the case.