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“Reasonable Persons:” Trump’s Recusal Stunt Flops

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Yesterday, Judge Tanya Chutkan denied Trump’s motion for her recusal.

Chutkan’s order was judicious, clinical, and never once responded to the ridiculous claims John Lauro made in his bid to remove a Black woman judge. In other words, it is a model of judicial temperament, and so will hold up under any appeal.

For example, rather than laying out how much video she had seen implicating Trump in the violence and lawlessness of January 6, Chutkan simply corrected the error Trump’s lawyers had made when they falsely claimed she had seen no video on which to base her comments in Chrstine Priola’s sentencing, and so (they insinuated) had formed opinions based on what she had seen on the news.

The statements at issue here were based on intrajudicial sources. They arose not, as the defense speculates, from watching the news, Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal, ECF No. 58 at 4 (“Reply”), but from the sentencing proceedings in United States v. Palmer and United States v Priola. The statements directly reflected facts proffered and arguments made by those defendants. And the court specifically identified the intrajudicial sources that informed its statements.

[snip]

The court also expressly based its statements in Priola’s sentencing on the video evidence presented earlier in the hearing. Priola Sentencing Tr. at 11– 14, 29. Priola. The statements directly reflected facts proffered and arguments made by those defendants. And the court specifically identified the intrajudicial sources that informed its statements.

Here’s the proof, from the sentencing transcript Trump’s attorneys cited themselves, that prosecutors entered the video that Trump’s lawyers claimed they couldn’t find into evidence.

As we’ve discussed, I would like to play seven video clips which the government feels are the best evidence of the defendant’s conduct that day. The clips total about ten minutes. Each was an exhibit to the government’s sentencing memorandum. Before I play each clip, I’ll just preview a little bit about what each clip shows.

[Introduction of each of 6 videos, including notation that the videos were played.]

THE COURT: There’s no Exhibit 6. Is that right?

MS. ZIMMERMAN: No. That was a mistake, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Video played.)

[snip]

Does the Court have any questions about any of the videos?

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

Having established that the comments about which Trump complained arose in the course of her role as a judge, Chutkan described that she was obligated to directly address the bids that Robert Palmer and Christine Priola made for a downward departure because they were not as culpable as Trump.

To begin, the court’s statements reflect its obligation to acknowledge Palmer and Priola’s mitigation arguments on the record. As already noted, both defendants sought a lower sentence on the grounds that their culpability for the January 6 attack was lesser than that of others whom they considered to be the attack’s instigators, and so it would be unfair for them to receive a full sentence while those other people were not prosecuted. See supra Section III.A. The court was legally bound to not only privately consider those arguments, but also to publicly assess them. By statute, every judge must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 3553(c). For every sentence, the court must demonstrate that it “has considered the parties’ arguments,” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), including a defendant’s arguments that their case involves mitigating factors that should result in a lower sentence, United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That is what the court did in those two cases. A reasonable person—aware of the statutory requirement that the court address the defendant’s arguments and state its reasons for its sentence—would understand that in making the statements contested here, the court was not issuing vague declarations about third parties’ potential guilt in a hypothetical future case; instead, it was fulfilling its duty to expressly evaluate the defendants’ arguments that their sentences should be reduced because other individuals whom they believed were associated with the events of January 6 had not been prosecuted.

While Chutkan’s comment about what a “reasonable person” should know given sentencing obligations might be a dig at Trump’s lawyers’ claimed ignorance of this basic fact, it nevertheless adopts the standard for recusal: not what a defense attorney feigning ignorance might argue, but instead what a reasonable person might understand.

Chutkan similarly noted that Trump’s team had to adopt a “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” in order to interpret her factual statements as if they necessarily addressed Trump himself.

But the court expressly declined to state who, if anyone, it thought should still face charges. It is the defense, not the court, who has assumed that the Defendant belongs in that undefined group. Likewise, for the sentencing hearing in Priola, the defense purports to detect an “inescapable” message in what the court did not say: that “President Trump is free, but should not be.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The court did state that the former President was free at the time of Priola’s sentence—an undisputed fact upon which Priola had relied for her mitigation argument—but it went no further. To extrapolate an announcement of Defendant’s guilt from the court’s silence is to adopt a “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” perspective rather than a reasonable one. Nixon, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 148.

Again, this opinion should be rock solid in the face of appeal, even if it won’t impress those of “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” disposition.

This opinion addresses what reasonable people should understand and believe. It certainly won’t persuade Trump’s groupies, because they are not reasonable people. But it soundly addresses the standard for recusal and the actual evidence before Chutkan.

John Lauro’s False Claims about Assaults “at the Behest” of Donald Trump

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As I predicted, John Lauro misrepresented the timing of prosecutors’ request for a limited gag on Trump’s violent speech. Lauro presents his response as if DOJ first asked to limit Trump’s violent speech on September 15 in docket entry 57, and not (in sealed form, to which Trump objected, on September 5) at docket 47.

President Trump respectfully submits this response in opposition to the prosecution’s motion to impose unconstitutional prior restraints on President Trump’s political speech. (the “Motion,” Doc. 57, seeking the “Proposed Gag Order,” Doc. 57-2).

Here’s the handy dandy annotated docket I did so NYT journalists could understand the true timing (even if they didn’t note their corrections once they did belatedly understand it).

One reason Lauro’s manufactured misrepresentation about the timing of the motion — September 5 versus September 15 — matters is because he’s now falsely suggesting that DOJ only issued this request after Biden got a bunch of bad polling data.

At bottom, the Proposed Gag Order is nothing more than an obvious attempt by the Biden Administration to unlawfully silence its most prominent political opponent, who has now taken a commanding lead in the polls. Indeed, this very Motion came on the heels of adverse polling for President Biden.

To be sure, Lauro must recognize what rank bullshit this claim is, given that he doesn’t cite the polling in question (which probably is meant to invoke the outlier WaPo poll of this week). This is designed to work for the Federalist and Fox set, not for Judge Chutkan.

But the timing matters for another reason.

Probably because Lauro wants to set up a future argument balancing election-related speech against defendant-related restrictions, he suggests DOJ is doing this primarily to silence criticism of Jack Smith, and not to protect witnesses, prosecutors, and Judge Chutkan herself.

[T]he prosecution complains that President Trump’s political statements “undermine confidence in the criminal justice system,” which it asserts somehow justifies the Proposed Gag Order. Motion at 2, 6, 8, 15. The prosecution cites no authority in support of this bizarre claim. Nor can it. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “speech critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.”). This includes criticism of the Court and the Special Counsel.

When Lauro finally gets around to dealing with the violent threats Trump has issued, he ignores the bulk of the examples DOJ provided, instead focusing exclusively on the one Trump’s team had already addressed.

[N]o witness has suggested that he or she will not testify because of anything President Trump has said. To the contrary, witnesses appear eager to share their expected testimony with the media and will undoubtedly testify at a potential trial, if called to do so.7 Nor has any witness suggested that President Trump’s protected statements have “influenc[ed] [his or her] testimony,” as the prosecution baselessly suggests. Motion at 15.

This is entirely unsurprising, as President Trump has never called for any improper or unlawful action. Quite the opposite, the prosecution’s cited posts show that President Trump intends to redress the unfairness of this proceeding through legitimate means. This includes, for example, filing motions with the Court—a form of relief that President Trump has every right to pursue and talk about. This is a far cry from the type of “true threat” the prosecution would need to show to justify a prior restraint. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).8

Unable to identify any instance where President Trump uttered any threat, the prosecution points to others, claiming President Trump “knows that when he publicly attacks individuals and institutions, he inspires others to perpetrate threats and harassment against his targets.” Motion at 3. Again, the prosecution offers no evidence of any causal connection between his speech and the alleged unlawful acts of others to support this meritless claim.

7 Two “potential witnesses” the prosecution does not want President Trump speaking about, for example, are former Attorney General Bill Barr and former Vice President Mike Pence. Both have written books about their tenure with President Trump and the latter is currently running for president. See, e.g., Geoff Bennett, Bill Barr: Trump Committed a “Grave Wrongdoing” in Jan. 6 Case, PBS NEWSHOUR, Aug. 3, 2023. Neither shies away from a hearty public debate with President Trump. Both were at the very top of government and it is absurd to think that they would be intimidated by social media posts. Others the prosecution identifies as “harassed,” are likewise current and former government officials who have made politics, for all its discord and discourse, a large part of their lives.

8 The prosecution once again cites President Trump’s August 4, 2023, Truth Social post; however, as previously explained, Doc. 14 at 7–8 n.8, that post did not concern this case. See Nick Robertson, Trump campaign defends threatening social media posts as free speech, The Hill (August 5, 2023) (quoting a Trump campaign statement that “[t]he Truth post cited is the definition of political speech, and was in response to the RINO, China-loving, dishonest special interest groups and Super PACs, like the ones funded by the Koch brothers and the Club for No Growth.”).

In today’s environment, this Court could easily take judicial notice that “[t]he language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact,” Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citations omitted), and even “very crude [or] offensive method[s] of stating a political opposition” are not true threats. Id.

Finally, the prosecution raised (and President Trump addressed), this same post in connection with its motion for a protective order. Doc. 14 at 7–8 n.8. Despite having ample opportunity to dispute President Trump’s explanation, including in a reply brief, Doc. 15, and at oral argument, Doc. 29, the prosecution chose not to do so. Now, the prosecution once again tries to revive this debunked position in support of its Motion. The Court should accord such unpersuasive arguments no weight. [my emphasis]

Lauro ignores the multiple cases, cited in prosecutors’ filing, where people told Trump directly that his incitement had ratcheted up threats against people like Jeff Duncan, Chris Krebs, and Ruby Freeman. He ignores prosecutors’ citation of Trump bragging about the way his followers respond to Trump.

As he acknowledged in a televised town hall on May 10, 2023, his supporters listen to him “like no one else.”

Perhaps more importantly, Lauro ignores something he has already ignored, in his reply to his own motion to recuse Tanya Chutkan.

As I noted, by filing a motion to recuse based off things Judge Chutkan said when January 6 defendants blamed Trump for their actions, Trump invited prosecutors to lay out the many more times defendants had done just that. Not only did prosecutors provide eight other examples where defendants already sentenced by Chutkan blamed Trump for their actions, DOJ laid out something that Robert Palmer said of his own actions on January 6: That he went to the Capitol “at the behest” of Trump and took action to prevent the certification of the vote because of the false claims Trump had made.

On December 17, 2021, the Court sentenced Robert Scott Palmer, an individual who, on January 6, 2021, after attending the former president’s remarks at the Ellipse and while wearing a “Florida for Trump” hat, “threw a wooden plank at” police officers; “sprayed the contents of a fire extinguisher at the officers until it was empty, and then threw the fire extinguisher” at them; and “assaulted another group of law enforcement officers with a 4-5 foot pole,” which he threw “like a spear at the officers.” United States v. Palmer, 21-cr-328, ECF 30, at 10, 2 (Govt. Sentencing Mem.); id., ECF No. 23, at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Statement of Offense). Palmer was charged with, and pled guilty to, assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers using a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b). Id., ECF No. 24 at 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Plea Agreement).

In a sentencing memorandum filed before his hearing, Palmer’s attorney asserted that he had gone to the Capitol “at the behest of” the defendant and had been convinced by individuals, including the defendant, that the election was fraudulent and that Palmer needed to take action to stop the presidential transition. Id., ECF No. 31 at 8 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.). [my emphasis]

John Lauro is lying when he claims that there is “no evidence of any causal connection between his speech and the alleged unlawful acts of others.” Lauro himself elicited that evidence. And the evidence is that, according to Robert Palmer, because of the false claims Trump and others told about the election, Palmer went to the Capitol on January 6 “at the behest of” Donald Trump, and serially assaulted several cops.

Trump’s reply ignored the substance of Palmer’s claims; it even dropped all mention of the Palmer case. Trump thereby left uncontested DOJ’s representation of Palmer’s claim that he did what he did “at the behest” of Trump.

Thus far, in the case against Trump, DOJ has been rather reserved about the dockets and dockets full of evidence that rioters believed they had been ordered by Trump to do what they did. The indictment itself shows that Trump’s several days of pressure — including his 2:24PM tweet — resulted in direct threats from rioters to Pence.

111. At 2:24 p.m., after advisors had left the Defendant alone in his dining room, the Defendant issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!”

112. One minute later, at 2:25 p.m., the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.

113. At the Capitol, throughout the afternoon, members of the crowd chanted, “Hang Mike Pence!”; “Where is Pence? Bring him out!”; and “Traitor Pence!”

Yet, DOJ has not made it anywhere explicit that evidence in the case of dozens, if not hundreds, of Jnauary 6 defendants make it clear that these threats to Pence arose directly from Trump’s statements. And in their motion for a gag order, DOJ did not tie the threats against Pence Trump elicited on January 6 to one he has made recently that they included in the motion.

But because John Lauro made it an issue in his recusal motion, DOJ has provided crystal clear evidence of one case where someone believed he was taking action — violent assaults against cops — “at the behest of Trump.”

John Lauro wanted it this way — he wanted to create the false illusion that whatever gag Chutkan might impose came only after he accused her of being a biased Black Woman. But in the process, he himself elicited proof that Trump’s statements to lead directly to violence.

On Recusal, Give Trump the Evidentiary Hearing He Demands!

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There are a number of fairly insane claims made in Trump’s reply seeking Judge Tanya Chutkan’s recusal.

Trump scolds that an impartial judge should express no opinion.

2 Consistent with the presumption of innocence and due process, an impartial court would ordinarily avoid stating any opinion regarding a third party’s guilt or innocence until that party has received an opportunity to present a defense. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

But that is precisely what Chutkan did when she said she “I have my opinions, but they are not relevant:” she didn’t express her opinion. By Trump’s own definition, Chutkan is an impartial judge!

Trump makes a very narrow argument that the eight additional defendants Chutkan sentenced who attributed their actions to Trump, mentioned by the prosecution, did not say Trump directed them to engage in violence, enter the Capitol, or interfere with the proceedings (I included that footnote in this post).

1 None of the excerpts cited in footnote 1 of the Response claim that President Trump directed or encouraged anyone to enter the Capitol, undertake violence, or interfere with proceedings at the Capitol. Of course, no such evidence exists. The defendants in these other cases obviously sought to explain the circumstances of their conduct, but that had no relevance to whether President Trump should be charged. That issue was never before the Court prior to this case. Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion—and the very one that the prosecution consciously avoids—is that Judge Chutkan formed her disqualifying opinions from information outside of the courtroom.

Even ignoring that several of them did say Trump told them to go to the Capitol, that’s a distraction. As prosecutors have shown, one of the two defendants that Trump himself raised, Robert Palmer, literally said that he went to the Capitol “at the behest” of Trump, where — because he had been persuaded by Trump and others he needed to prevent the transition of power — he proceeded to serially assault cops. Trump simply ignores that one of the two cases he himself raised did precisely that.

But the most batshit claim — one that I hope backfires wildly — is the claim that when Judge Chutkan said, “I’ve seen video” during the Christine Priola sentencing, there was no video in evidence before her.

Similarly, Judge Chutkan’s statement that President Trump “remains free to this day,” Motion, Ex. A at 29:17–30:3, had no factual or legal relevance to the matter before her. That conclusion was formed, according to Judge Chutkan, based upon unspecified “videotapes” and “footage” that the prosecution has not established were in evidence and appear not to be. Id. (“I see the videotapes. I see the footage of the flags and the signs that people were carrying and the hats they were wearing and the garb.”). But even if they were in the record of the Priola case, they could hardly support a conclusion that President Trump should be charged.

In addition to the sentencing memo DOJ submitted for Priola, they formally noticed the following videos:

1. Government Exhibit 1 is a video approximately 26 seconds in length that shows the crowd behind the barricades on the east side of the Capitol. People in the crowd can be heard chanting, “Stop the steal.” Priola’s sign can be seen in the crowd.

2. Government Exhibit 2 is a video approximately 1 minute and 23 seconds in length that shows the rioters outside the East Rotunda (Columbus) doors, including some rioters reacting to pepper gas. Priola and her sign can be seen while she is standing about 15- 20 feet from the entrance. People in the crowd can be heard chanting, “USA, USA.”1

3. Government Exhibit 3 is a video approximately 3 minutes in length that shows rioters outside the East Rotunda doors attempting to enter the Capitol building. Priola’s sign can be seen in the crowd outside. The video also shows the doors being forced open from the inside and Priola (now inside the building) talking to another rioter on camera and walking down the corridor. People in the crowd can be heard chanting, “Who’s our President? Trump!”; yelling, “Tear it down”; and later chanting, “Defend your Constitution. Defend your liberty.”

4. Government Exhibit 4 is a video approximately 26 seconds in length that shows the breach of the East Rotunda doors. Priola’s sign can be seen outside the building through the open doors.

5. Government Exhibit 5 is a video approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds in length that shows the rioters breaching the East Rotunda doors. Priola can be seen with her sign soon after she enters the building.

6. Government Exhibit 72 is a video approximately 1 minutes and 28 seconds in length that shows the rioters, including Priola, walking down the east corridor inside the Capitol Building. It also shows Priola holding her sign up to one of the windows and tapping on the glass to get the attentions of rioters outside. Rioters can be heard chanting, “Defend your Constitution. Defend your liberty.” and “Who’s house? Our house.”

7. Government Exhibit 8 is a video approximately 14 seconds in length that shows rioters, including Priola, on the Senate Chamber floor. Priola can be seen and heard talking on her cell phone.

1 The government’s sentencing memorandum incorrectly stated that the crowd could be heard chanting “Stop the steal” and “Who’s our President? Trump!” during this video. ECF No. 56 at 10. [my emphasis]

More importantly, there’s all the other video Chutkan had seen by October 28, 2022.

Do you know how insane it is for someone to tell Judge Tanya Chutkan that by October 28, 2022, the date of Priola’s sentencing, she had not seen video evidence on which she could form an opinion about how central Trump was to January 6? Do you have any idea how many hundreds of hours of video DC judges like Chutkan, pertaining to Priola in Chutkan’s case, but also pertaining to the series of assault defendants whose detention proceedings she had presided over and defendants sentenced before Priola, had seen by that point?

Trump made the argument that by October 28, 2022, Judge Tanya Chutkan had not seen sufficient evidence about January 6 to form an opinion about Trump’s role in the attack. If I were Judge Chutkan, I’d order the hearing Trump claims he wants, refuse to waive his appearance, and force him, his attorneys, and the journalists only beginning to pay attention to January 6 because Trump has been charged to review the video of the attack she had sat through by October 2022.

As one example, Chutkan presided over several spectacular assault cases, including one where a former Marine who had attended the TCF Center mob in Detroit after the election brought his hockey stick to the Capitol and used it to beat a cop, one of the many spectacularly brutal assaults that happened that day.

Trump claims that during the year and a half of January 6 cases she had presided over by October 28, 2022, Chutkan had not seen any evidence from which she could form an opinion about the event. By all means, let’s put the evidence she had seen in the record.

By Asking for Tanya Chutkan’s Recusal, Trump Invited a Lesson in His Centrality to January 6

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Trump’s motion for Tanya Chutkan to recuse was not designed to work. Rather, it was designed as a messaging vehicle, to establish the basis for Trump to claim that a Black Judge was biased against him so he can better use it to discredit rule of law and as a campaign and fundraising vehicle.

Because Trump’s motion was primarily a messaging vehicle, the — legally apt — messaging with which DOJ responded is of some interest.

Invited to do so by Trump, DOJ laid out how central Trump is to the thousand other January 6 prosecutions.

Invited to do so by Trump, for example, DOJ provided eight other times — in addition to the cases of Robert Palmer and Christine Priola cited in the recusal motion — where defendants before Judge Chutkan have implicated Trump in their actions.

This Court, like all courts in this District, has presided over dozens of criminal cases related to January 6. And this Court, like all courts in this District, gained knowledge about the events of January 6 and insight about the persons charged based on its daily administration of those cases. For instance, the Court learned that numerous individuals charged with January 6 crimes attempted to minimize their actions and spread blame to others, including to defendant Trump and to the mob that each rioter joined at the Capitol. Indeed, the Court regularly heard variations of such arguments from other defendants, in the form of sentencing memoranda and allocutions, before similar claims were made by the defendants in the two sentencing hearings on which the defendant bases his claim of bias.1

1 See United States v. Bauer, 21-cr-49, ECF No. 38 at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.) (arguing that Bauer “only decided to turn from the Ellipse and head towards the Capitol when then-President Trump directed the crowd to proceed in that direction” and then followed the group); United States v. Hemenway, 21-cr-49, ECF No. 39 at 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.) (arguing that Hemenway decided “to take part in the political rally on the Ellipse” and got “caught up in the group mentality of the crowd that entered the Capitol”); United States v. Bissey, 21-cr-165, ECF No. 29 at 17 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2021) (Sentencing Tr.) (defense attorney arguing that Bissey had minimal role on January 6 and “did not come to D.C. with any intention other than supporting her president”); United States v. Miller, 21-cr-226, ECF No. 52 at 4 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.) (arguing that “[Miller] had absolutely no expectation or desire to overthrow the government. Rather, she was supporting the President in what he claimed were legitimate efforts to claim victory in the Presidential election.”); United States v. Perretta, 21-cr-539, ECF No. 55 at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2022) (Def. Sentencing Mem.) (arguing that Perretta “attended the ‘Save America’ political rally, where then-President Trump encouraged listeners to march to the Capitol to make their voices heard” and then went to the Capitol with thousands of other individuals from the Ellipse); United States v. Ehmke, 21-cr-29, ECF No. 30 at 2-5, 8-9 (D.D.C. May 6, 2022) (Def. Sentencing Mem.) (arguing that Ehmke had a minor role and that others, “including the former president, the rally’s organizers and speakers, and other nefarious, organized groups . . . arguably bear much greater responsibility”); United States v. Ponder, 21-cr-259, ECF No. 58 at 21-22 (D.D.C. Jul. 26, 2022) (Sentencing Tr.) (Ponder asserting that he marched from Ellipse to Capitol “with the intentions on a peaceful protest. However, things had spiraled out of control” and he “got caught up in it.”); United States v. Cortez, 21-cr-317, ECF No. 80 at 38 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (Sentencing Tr.) (defense attorney arguing that Cortez was “being told these things by the president, you need to save your country, and he’s trying to do something right”). [my emphasis]

Again, these are just defendants Judge Chutkan has already sentenced. The footnote conveys how routine it is for defendants, before every single DC judge, to blame Trump for their role in assaulting the Capitol.

Invited to do so by Trump, DOJ laid out how Christine Priola wore Trump merch as she surged through the East door alongside the Oath Keepers and Joe Biggs, and then helped occupy the Senate floor on January 6.

On October 28, 2022, the Court sentenced Christine Priola, who on January 6, 2021, surged with other rioters into the Capitol and onto the Senate floor, “carrying a large sign reading, ‘WE THE PEOPLE TAKE BACK OUR COUNTRY’ on one side and ‘THE CHILDREN CRY OUT FOR JUSTICE’ on the other,” United States v. Priola, 22-cr-242, ECF No. 65 at 3 (D.D.C. July 26, 2022) (Statement of Offense), and wearing pants with the phrase, “MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN,” id., ECF No. 56 at 13, 16 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2022) (Govt. Sentencing Mem.). Priola was charged with, and pled guilty to, obstructing an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Id., ECF No. 66 at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2023) (Sentencing Tr.)

In her sentencing memorandum, Priola, too, laid the groundwork for spreading the blame to others, noting that “[a]fter the presidential election, Donald Trump . . . and his inner circle began spreading the word that the election was ‘stolen’ from him by Democrats and others,” with claims “made on media sources, as well as by the President himself, that the election system had been corrupted and that the integrity of the election should be questioned.” Id., ECF No. 57 at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2022) (Def. Sentencing Mem.). Priola’s sentencing memorandum then sought leniency for Priola in part because she “played no role of importance” at the Capitol, and had she not been there, “there wouldn’t be one change in what transpired.” Id. at 14.

At her sentencing hearing, Priola likewise explained that, at the time of her criminal conduct, she believed that the election had been stolen and that “certain politicians or groups have, like, taken over things that maybe weren’t supposed to be.” Id., ECF No. 66 at 26 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2023) (Sentencing Tr.). [my emphasis]

Because Priola raised Trump in her sentencing submission, DOJ explained, binding precedent required Chutkan to respond to it.

Similarly, on Trump’s invitation, DOJ laid out how Palmer claimed he went to the Capitol “at the behest of” Trump where, while wearing a Florida for Trump hat, he serially assaulted cops defending the Capitol.

On December 17, 2021, the Court sentenced Robert Scott Palmer, an individual who, on January 6, 2021, after attending the former president’s remarks at the Ellipse and while wearing a “Florida for Trump” hat, “threw a wooden plank at” police officers; “sprayed the contents of a fire extinguisher at the officers until it was empty, and then threw the fire extinguisher” at them; and “assaulted another group of law enforcement officers with a 4-5 foot pole,” which he threw “like a spear at the officers.” United States v. Palmer, 21-cr-328, ECF 30, at 10, 2 (Govt. Sentencing Mem.); id., ECF No. 23, at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Statement of Offense). Palmer was charged with, and pled guilty to, assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers using a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b). Id., ECF No. 24 at 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Plea Agreement).

In a sentencing memorandum filed before his hearing, Palmer’s attorney asserted that he had gone to the Capitol “at the behest of” the defendant and had been convinced by individuals, including the defendant, that the election was fraudulent and that Palmer needed to take action to stop the presidential transition. Id., ECF No. 31 at 8 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.). Two paragraphs later in the memorandum, Palmer’s attorney argued that the Court should, as a mitigating factor, “consider that the riot almost surely would not have occurred but for the financing and organization that was conducted by persons unconnected to Mr. Palmer who will likely never be held responsible for their relevant conduct.” See id. at 8-9. [my emphasis]

Because Palmer blamed Trump for his actions in his sentencing package, DOJ explained, binding precedent required Chutkan to respond to it.

Even before it laid out how the claims of defendants obligated Chutkan to address their claims that Trump caused them to do what they did, DOJ laid out the precedents that apply to intrajudicial comments about related cases, a much higher standard for recusal than the precedents Trump invoked. At Trump’s invitation, then, DOJ cited Watergate, where the DC Circuit did not find that Judge John Sirica should have recused from the Haldeman trial because he had, during the burglars’ trial, correctly judged that the conspiracy extended well beyond those men.

[T]he Supreme Court has held that where a recusal motion rests on statements made in a judicial setting and reflect “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,” recusal will be warranted “only in the rarest circumstances” where the comments “display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. After all, “opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings” are “normal and proper,” and “not subject to deprecatory characterization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice.’” Id. at 551; see Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The high bar set by Liteky for predispositional recusals makes good sense. If it were otherwise—if strong views on a matter were disqualifying—then a judge would hardly have the freedom to be a judge.”).

This higher standard applies equally when a court’s intrajudicial statements were made in separate proceedings, including proceedings in which the defendant was not a party. The D.C. Circuit made this clear in its decision in United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). There, defendants sought recusal of the judge presiding over numerous, separate Watergate-related matters, in part based on statements the judge had made during an earlier, separate trial in which, among other things, he “expressed a belief that criminal liability extended beyond the seven persons there charged.” Id. at 131-32 & n.293. The Circuit found that recusal was not warranted because the grounds for the claim were “judicial acts” including “prior judicial rulings . . . or the exercise of related judicial functions.” Id. at 133-34. The Circuit further stated that the “disabling prejudice” necessary for recusal “cannot be extracted from dignified though persistent judicial efforts to bring everyone responsible for Watergate to book.” Id.

At Trump’s invitation, DOJ likened the January 6 rioters to Watergate burglars directed by those trying to help the President retain power.

And, at Trump’s invitation, DOJ recalled a more recent DC Circuit opinion finding that far stronger intrajudicial statements also did not require recusal. At Trump’s invitation, DOJ recalled how Trump’s people had started selling out the country even before being sworn in.

On the other side of the ledger are countless cases in which recusal based on judicial comments was deemed unwarranted—even based on comments that, unlike this Court’s comments on which the defendant bases his motion, directly criticize a defendant. For instance, recently in this District, a judge told a defendant at a hearing, “Arguably, you sold your country out. . . . I’m not hiding my disgust, my disdain for this criminal offense.” In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (per curiam). The D.C. Circuit found that these statements did not meet the Liteky test, stating, “the District Judge was not simply holding forth on his opinions; rather, each of the statements to which Petitioner objects was plainly made in the course of formal judicial proceedings over which he presided—not in some other context.”

Trump wants his January 6 trial to be messaging and fundraising vehicle.

But that may serve as little more than an invitation for DOJ to lay out just how deeply implicated he is in the entire assault on the Capitol.

Todd Blanche Confuses Aileen Cannon’s Prior Trump Reversal with Tanya Chutkan’s Individualized Guilt

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John Lauro is the Trump lawyer who submitted and signed the motion for recusal in Trump’s January 6 case, and so virtually all commentators are attributing the motion to him. But Todd Blanche also appears on the document.

That means one of Trump’s lawyers from the stolen documents case, in which Aileen Cannon — confirmed in the period after Trump lost the election and cozy with Leonard Leo — chose not to recuse herself after a blistering reversal over her earlier decision to butt in last summer, in which Aileen Cannon has done nothing (nothing public, at least) to preserve the Sixth Amendment rights of Trump’s co-defendants, but has instead served the interests of the Trump-paid lawyers representing them, has remained silent about any conflict in that case but signed onto a claim of conflict with Tanya Chutkan.

There is an overwhelming public interest in ensuring the perceived fairness of these proceedings. In a highly charged political season, naturally all Americans, and in fact, the entire world, are observing these proceedings closely. Only if this trial is administered by a judge who appears entirely impartial could the public ever accept the outcome as justice.

Todd Blanche’s willingness to sign onto this motion only underscores the bad faith of it.

The substance of the claimed conflict is remarkably thin: In the sentencing hearings of Robert Palmer and Christine Priola, Chutkan said something about those who planned the riot. Between the two hearings — the first in December 2021 and the second in October 2022 — Trump’s lawyers claim they show that Chutkan has already formed an opinion about Trump’s guilt, even while they acknowledge that Chutkan’s language addresses claims of incitement with which Trump has not been charged.

These are cherry picks. From Palmer’s for example, Trump’s lawyers found a line in which Chutkan said she had opinions about whether those who planned the riot should be charged, even while she said her opinions are not relevant.

He went to the Capitol because, despite election results which were clear-cut, despite the fact that multiple court challenges all over the country had rejected every single one of the challenges to the election, Mr. Palmer didn’t like the result. He didn’t like the result, and he didn’t want the transition of power to take place because his guy lost. And it is true, Mr. Palmer — you have made a very good point, one that has been made before — that the people who exhorted you and encouraged you and rallied you to go and take action and to fight have not been charged. That is not this court’s position. I don’t charge anybody. I don’t negotiate plea offers. I don’t make charging decisions. I sentence people who have pleaded guilty or have been convicted. The issue of who has or has not been charged is not before me. I don’t have any influence on that. I have my opinions, but they are not relevant.

***

So you have a point, that the people who may be the people who planned this and funded it and encouraged it haven’t been charged, but that’s not a reason for you to get a lower sentence.

This is a colloquy that goes on in many January 6 sentencing hearings, because many defendants — up to and including Enrique Tarrio and Joe Biggs — like to blame Trump for their woes. After that happens, whatever judge is presiding, whether appointed by a Republican or Democrat, notes that people are still responsible for their own actions.

This is, in fact, a pretty mild version, even among some Republican appointees.

But Trump’s team ignored Judge Chutkan’s more general commentary about how everyone should treat others with more humanity.

I feel certain that if people would expose themselves to a variety of opinions and sources of information, we might not have had January 6th. But people get very siloed and listen to an echo chamber of information and opinion, and you get a very warped view of what’s really going on in the world; and that may be part of it, but in doing so, you fail to see other people as human beings. And that is one of the things I see here as a judge, is there is a failure to acknowledge other people’s humanity.

From the Priola sentencing, Trump’s lawyers focused on Chutkan’s observation that the person to whom rioters were loyal remained free.

[T]he people who mobbed that Capitol were there in fealty, in loyalty, to one man — not to the Constitution, of which most of the people who come before me seem woefully ignorant; not to the ideals of this country; and not to the principles of democracy. It’s a blind loyalty to one person who, by the way, remains free to this day.

This is remarkably thin gruel on which to hang a claim that Chutkan is biased against Trump but not Trump appointed Judges Dabney Friedrich or Tim Kelly, who’ve engaged in similar colloquies.

And it seems tactical. It was coming at some point, but Trump’s team has, after remaining silent for 42 days after this case was assigned to Chutkan, suddenly asked her to assess her own biases in expedited fashion, before ruling on the pending motion about Trump’s own threats against Judge Chutkan and others.

Additionally, given the overriding public interest in ensuring the appearance of fairness in this proceeding, President Trump requests the Court consider this Motion on an expedited basis and, pending resolution, withhold rulings on any other pending motion.

This is a tactical and cynical motion. And Todd Blanche’s participation in it makes it crystal clear that Trump doesn’t give a flying rat’s ass about the bias of Cannon or any appearance of bias they can wring out of Chutkan’s prior comments.

Rather, they’re doing this to claim that her future attempts to preserve the integrity of this proceeding — including to minimize death threats from Trump’s own supporters — instead itself evinces bias on her part.

Update: Here’s the full Priola sentencing transcript.

The Comings and Goings of Insurrection

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I suppose I should have warned you all I’d be on a bit of a holiday for two weeks, and so would have little detailed coverage of Trump’s various travails. This will just be a quick update.

The two big developments from yesterday were the status hearing in Trump’s case — where Judge Tanya Chutkan set a May 4, 2024 trial date — and the Mark Meadows removal hearing in Georgia, where he took the stand for a number of hours.

In the former, Trump’s attorney John Lauro engaged in a good deal of theatrics, wailing about how a man’s life is at stake and laying the groundwork for an appeal on assistance of counsel grounds (which would be after the trial). In the wake of that, Trump claimed he was going to appeal the trial date, which he can’t do.

It seems. to be lost on people that these arguments not only serve the normal legal purposes, in which case some of Lauro’s theatrics were over the top. But a lot of them are for the benefit of Trump’s cult. They need to believe both that he’s in control and that his return to the presidency is inevitable.

As noted, in Georgia Meadows took the stand for hours. Keep an eye out for Anna Bowers’ report over on Lawfare, which she promises will be “excruciatingly detailed.” In her Twitter account, however, it sounded like prosecutors made a bunch of good legal points about the scope of electoral duties. Judge Steve Jones sounds like he focused on the exclusion of the President from electoral duties reserved to the states. But he apparently also noted that the bar for removal is quite low.

There are two issues at stake for Meadows — first removal, but then a bid to dismiss the case. The former is more likely to happen than the latter.

Finally, unless anyone objects, on September 8, Judge McBurney will release the report from the Special Grand Jury in Georgia.

Trump Complains that He Filed So Many Voluminous Frivolous Lawsuits

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As noted, DOJ used a reply to Trump’s bid for a 2026 trial to debunk some, though not all, of his misrepresentations in it.

But they also used it to describe some of what was included in around 11.8 million pages of discovery so far. And it turns out that one reason why there’s so much, in terms of page count, is because Trump filed so many frivolous lawsuits after the 2020 election.

Here’s what the filing says was included in discovery so far:

  • Files from Trump or entities associated with him (3 million in first batch and 120,000 in the second)
  • Files from NARA that Trump’s attorneys have already reviewed
  • Trump’s Tweets and Truth Social posts
  • Court filings from his frivolous lawsuits
  • The January 6 Committee Report and backup (~1 million)
  • All emails from Secret Service custodians from requested time period (3.1 million)

That leaves roughly 4 million pages of other stuff, much of which likely comes from his alleged co-conspirators and other associates.

So it’s probably not just his own frivolous lawsuits, but also Sidney Powell’s frivolous lawsuits, and Rudy’s voluminous lies.

I, Too, Got Hoodwinked by Donald Trump’s Demands to Be Tried Like a Seditionist

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I’m about to write a post about what, per the DOJ, the discovery in Trump January 6 case is like.

But first, I have to confess.

When I read Trump’s own pitch for a trial in 2026, I missed one of his more clever deceits. It’s this one:

Indeed, the median time from commencement to termination for a jury-tried § 371 charge is 29.4 months—many times longer than the government’s proposal schedule. 12 (And this reflects only the median, meaning half of all such cases take more time based on individualized assessments of discovery volume, complexity, and similar concerns.)

12 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table D-10: U.S. District Courts–Median Time Intervals From Commencement to Termination for Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2022, at 2, jb_d10_0930.2022.pdf (uscourts.gov). [my emphasis]

To be sure, I should have been alerted to the deceit by this paragraph, in the same section.

Likewise, this Court regularly allows far more time than the government proposes, even in cases involving protests at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. See, e.g., United States v. Foy, No. 21- cr-0108 (28 months from indictment to stipulated bench trial on 4-page indictment); United States v. Nordean, et al, No. 21-cr-0175 (TJK) (21 months); United States v. Crowl, et al, No. 21-cr-0028 (APM) (23 months); United States v. Kuehne, et al, Case No. 21-cr-160 (29 months); United States v. Hostetter, et al, Case No. 21-cr-0392 (RCL) (24 months). [my emphasis]

Trump was calling now-convicted seditionists — and other militia members accused of attacking our democracy — “protestors”!!!!

My only excuse is that I read it in the middle of the night and figured I’d deal with it–as I intend to–once the government replied, which they now have.

One reason I’m so angry that I didn’t see this particular lie, though, is because I’ve pointed out what a blindspot this is among TV lawyers and insipid NYT columnists who like to blather about the investigation taking too long.

Everything got held up by COVID, not just the January 6 investigation. The first felony trial for Jan6ers was delayed until March 2022, partly because of COVID backlogs, and partly because of discovery challenges.

Only after that did Trump stall everything with frivolous Executive Privilege claims in the wake of SCOTUS upholding Judge Chutkan’s own ruling on the topic (another complaint Trump raised in his motion almost no one called out).

It turns out, as DOJ explained in a filing today, that Donald Trump was using the delays in the January 6 investigation necessitated by COVID to claim he shouldn’t be tried for January 6 until he gets a shot at being President again.

The defendant’s references to Section 371 statistics and January 6th cases overlook important underlying facts and context. See ECF No. 30 at 12. First, the defendant cites the median time from commencement to termination for jury trials of Section 371 charges—29.4 months—without explaining that this median time runs through the completion of sentencing, not the beginning of trial. That means that it includes the time required for jury selection, trial, verdict, and several months (or more) afterward before sentencing and final judgment. See https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d10_0930.2022.pdf. The question here is when it is appropriate to start trial in this case, and statistics regarding the length of time from indictment to sentencing in other Section 371 cases have no bearing on that decision

Second, the data cited by the defendant spans October 2021 through September 2022, when federal courts were pulling out of a backlog caused by COVID-19 closures. During that period, only 22 cases went to trial nationwide. This small and skewed sample provides no help to the Court in deciding an appropriate trial date.

The defendant’s listed January 6th cases also omit important details and context. He fails to mention, for instance, that in one case he cites, disposition was delayed because of, among other reasons, litigation over pre-trial detention, a superseding indictment, and plea negotiations. See United States v. Foy, 21-cr-108, ECF No. 55, Superseding Indictment (11/10/21); 2/7/22 Minute Entry (setting jury trial for 9/19/22); ECF No. 67, Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Vacate Trial Date (for, among other reasons, plea negotiations). All of the defendant’s other cited cases included multiple co-defendants—as many as seventeen. See United States v. Crowl, et al., 21- cr-28 at ECF No. 328, Fifth Superseding Indictment. The Court should set these inapposite comparisons aside when weighing the individual factors here under the Speedy Trial Act.

Trump was cherry picking data skewed by the catastrophe that might have been mitigated had his own COVID response been less irresponsible. He was cherry picking from among the other January 6 defendants (some adjudged seditionists), some of whose trials established precedents for his own.

Donald Trump argued that his trial, all by himself, should take as long as the Proud Boy leaders and other charged militia defendants, even without the COVID delays. He’s demanding that his trial take as long as it could if Jack Smith chose to try him for the whole kit and kaboodle, in which he might be guilty, but of which he is not yet charged.

And I fell for it.

Beryl Howell Scoffs That We Think We Know Anything about the Trump Investigations

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On February 16, CNN published a story describing that there were eight sealed grand jury matters in the twin investigations into Trump. In addition to the not-yet filed Mike Pence challenge to his own testimony, it named seven other sealed proceedings:

  • The crime-fraud ruling pertaining to Evan Corcoran
  • DOJ’s bid to hold Trump in contempt for failing to turn over all stolen documents in his possession
  • Trump’s Executive Privilege claim with Greg Jacob and Marc Short
  • Trump’s Executive Privilege claim with the two Pats, Cipollone and Philbin
  • Scott Perry’s Speech and Debate challenge to the warrant for his phone
  • The privilege fight over Jeffrey Clark, John Eastman, Ken Klukowski, and one other person’s content
  • The order compelling Kash Patel to testify

Just over a week later, on February 24, Xitter’s lawyers would include that story in package of media articles it claimed — in its reply brief to vacate the gag order — showed that DOJ didn’t need to keep the warrant for Trump’s Xitter account sealed any longer.

That story about how little we knew of sealed grand jury proceedings became part of yet another sealed grand jury proceeding in the investigation into Donald Trump.

The reply motion itself made a bunch of claims about how much was known about the investigation, with more links to news articles.

3 Mr. Trump may be unique in this regard for this investigative step. Because he was announced as a principal subject of investigation and because the public reporting has focused on investigative actions directed at him, he may have a unique level of knowledge about investigative actions regarding him—even relative to other investigations of him that were conducted with far less public awareness.

4 The news articles Twitter cited its initial motion are attached here as Exhibit A. The articles cited in this Reply are attached as Exhibit B.

5 Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump Subpoenaed in Jan. 6 Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2023), available at [link redacted]

6 Maggie Haberman & Glenn Thrush, Pence Gets Subpoena From Special Counsel in Jan. 6 Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2023), available at [link redacted]

7 C. Ryan Barber & Sadie Gurman, Mark Meadows, Trump’s Last Chief of Staff, Subpoenaed by Grand Jury, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 15, 2023), available at [link redacted]

8 C. Ryan Barber & Alex Leary, Trump Lawyers Appeared Before Grand Jury as Part of Classified-Documents Probe, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2023), available at [link redacted]

9 Katelyn Polantz et al., Special counsel is locked in at least 8 secret court battles in Trump investigations, CNN (Feb. 16, 2023), available at [link redacted]

10 C. Ryan Barber & Alex Leary, Trump Lawyers Appeared Before Grand Jury as Part of Classified-Documents Probe, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2023).

11 Jim Small, GOP Arizona legislators, including leaders of the house and senate, subpoenaed to testify in special counsel probe of Trump, Arizona Mirror (Feb. 17, 2023), available at [link redacted]

That February 24 package was actually the second package of news articles Xitter cited or linked to support its argument that revealing the warrant wouldn’t help Trump because so much of the investigation had been publicly reported; it cited a bunch in the initial motion to vacate, too.

First, the Department of Justice’s criminal investigation into former President Trump and his potential role in the efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election and the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol, has been public for several months prior to the issuance of this Warrant. Specifically, the news media has reported extensively that presidential advisors, including White House counsel and senior staff, have been subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury investigating those events. See e.g., Casey Gannon et al., Former Trump White House Counsel and His Deputy Testify to Jan. 6 Criminal Grand Jury, CNN (Dec. 2, 2022), available at [link redacted] First on CNN: Top Trump Advisor Stephen Miller Testifies to January 6 Federal Grand Jury, CNN (Nov. 29, 2022), available at [links redacted]; Bart Jansen, Justice Department Subpoenas Dozens of Trump Aides in Apparent Escalation of Investigation, According to Reports, USA Today (Sept. 12, 2022),  available at [link redacted]; Kyle Cheney, Two Top Pence Aides Appear Before Jan. 6 Grand Jury, POLITICO (Jul. 25, 2022), available at [link redacted].

[snip]

It is also well known that, as part of its investigation, the Department of Justice is closely examining the private communications of people within the scope of its investigation, including the former president’s aides and allies. Indeed, the Department of Justice has obtained search warrants for electronic devices of numerous close associates of former President Trump. See e.g., Steve Benen, DOJ Seizes Team Trump Phones as Part of Intensifying Jan. 6 Probe, MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2022), available at [link redacted]; Ella Lee, Pennsylvania Rep. Scott Perry, a Trump Ally, Says FBI Agents Seized His Cellphone, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2022), available at [link redacted]; Scott Gleeson, MyPillow CEO, Trump Ally Mike Lindell Says FBI Issued Subpoena, Seized Phone at a Hardee ‘s, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2022), available at [link redacted]; Alan Feuer & Adam Goldman, Federal Agents Seized Phone of John Eastman, Key Figure in Jan. 6 Plan, N.Y. Times (Jun. 27, 2022), available at [link redacted]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has also executed a search warrant at the home of a Trump ally to seize electronic devices. See e.g. Alan Feuer at al., Federal Authorities Search Home of Trump Justice Dept. Official, N.Y. Times (Jun 23, 2022), available at [link redacted].

Then it included those articles as an appendix in its opposition to show cause to hold it in contempt.

Over and over again, Xitter argued that the media coverage of the investigation provided a thorough understanding of the steps taken so far in the investigation.

It was an argument that then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell, deep into presiding over her second and third investigations — that we know of! — into Donald Trump found wildly unpersuasive.

She and AUSA Gregory Bernstein discussed it at some length in the February 7 hearing on the warrant.

At first, she asked how much Xitter really knew so she could figure out whether Xitter had refused to respond to a warrant thinking that no one would protect Trump’s privileges — thinking that somehow Judge Howell, deep into presiding over her second and third investigation of Donald Trump, had ignored those sensitivities.

Howell: I need to be clear about what Twitter has  seen of the warrant package. I don’t know how many of you at Twitter’s table have ever been prosecutors; but you know the warrant is a very thin little part — important part, critical part, it is a court order — a thin part of a warrant package. I am not clear from this record what Twitter has seen and what it hasn’t. It doesn’t know very much at all, although it thinks it does, about the government’s investigation; but it certainly doesn’t know, I don’t think, very much about the warrant that I signed and all of its parts. But I need to be clear about what it does and doesn’t know about that.

[snip]

THE COURT: ALL right. Now let’s turn to the warrant package. Okay.

So the warrant package consisted of an incredibly lengthy affidavit, the warrant itself. The warrant itself had Attachment A, property to be searched; it had Attachment B, particular things to be searched; and Attachment B had different parts.

Now, certainly, Twitter hasn’t seen the application part of the package; it hasn’t seen the affidavit part of the package. Is that right?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That’s correct?

MR. BERNSTEIN: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly, Twitter has seen the warrant and Attachment A; is that correct?

MR. BERNSTEIN: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And out of Attachment B, has Twitter seen any part other than Part 1?

MR. BERNSTEIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that’s sort of what I thought, but I wanted to make sure.

So Twitter, as it sits here, has zero idea and zero affirmation about whatever filter protocol or procedure there is attached to this warrant in terms of processing any warrant returns; is that correct?

MR. BERNSTEIN: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if they know, it’s not from the government.

MR. BERNSTEIN: I’m sorry. Can you repeat the question, Your Honor?

THE COURT: They wouldn’t know from the government.

MR. BERNSTEIN: They would not know from the government, Your Honor, that’s correct.

THE COURT: ALL right. So to the extent that Twitter is standing here, as I understand their position, trying to protect any privilege of the account user with this solution of providing prior notice to the account user, they are taking no account because they can’t — because they haven’t seen it and they don’t know anything about any filter protocol that might be attached to this warrant.

MR. BERNSTEIN: That’s correct, Your Honor. They do not know about any Filter protocol that could or could not be attached to the warrant.

THE COURT: Got it. Okay.

I just want to make it clear, when providers step in here and take up my time on what should be a simple processing of a warrant, exactly how much in the dark they are. Okay.

But then she returned to the question — and the first of Xitter’s two big packets of articles on the investigation — when trying to ascertain whether Xitter had any basis to claim that revealing the warrant wouldn’t alter the balance of the public knowledge on the investigation.

THE COURT: Okay. So Twitter, in its opposition, had, like, I don’t know, I counted like pages of an exhibit of all these press reports about the special counsel investigation; I didn’t look at it in detail.

But, in sum, Twitter’s argument is: Hey, the government’s interest in maintaining the NDO isn’t compelling because look at all this press. Lots of people know about this investigation going on. The Attorney General has an order on the DOJ website saying: I have appointed the special counsel to look at the following issues.

Twitter goes on to say that the press has been doing its job, thankfully. And so, as a consequence, we all know that, you know, the government, in aggressively pursuing this investigation, has been looking at the communications of a number of people.

So it sums up by saying: It strains credulity to believe that the incremental disclosures of this warrant could somehow alter the current balance of public knowledge in any meaningful way so as to cause harm to the investigation.

So just like Twitter doesn’t know much about the warrant here at all, and has only seen a small sliver of the entire warrant package, do you think that it strains credulity to believe the incremental disclosure of this order would somehow alter the current balance of public knowledge in any meaningful way?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Absolutely not, Your Honor.

There is an incredible difference between the public knowing about the existence of the investigation and the account holder in this case knowing about a concrete, investigative step that the government has taken.

And, again, I have to be careful about what I say in this setting because I don’t want to disclose information that’s covered by 6(e) or that otherwise would compromise the investigation. With that said, Your Honor, I think when Your Honor gets our ex parte filing with respect to the NDO, I think Your Honor will wholeheartedly reject the assertion that it strains credulity to think that there could be serious adverse consequences from the President finding out about this search warrant.

Howell and Bernstein returned to the question a short time later, when Bernstein said, “they don’t know anything” but where making “confident factual assertions without knowing the actual facts of the investigation.”

Howell: So do you want to respond to that? — to Twitter’s comment that there is no reason to believe notification would suddenly cause Trump or potential confederates to destroy evidence, intimidate witnesses, or to flee prosecution, or are you waiting on that for an ex parte submission?

MR. BERNSTEIN: We are waiting. But I can give Your Honor two responses in the meantime.

First, they don’t know anything. I mean, they know some stuff. They know what they have read in the newspapers. But they’re making these confident factual assertions without knowing the actual facts of the investigation.

Number two, they have cited a number of news articles. They seem to have a robust understanding of what is in the public record. They seem to be ignoring the fact that there is an entirely separate public investigation into the former President for doing just that, for taking obstructive efforts with respect to NARA’s request to retrieve classified documents, and then the government — the grand jury’s request to subpoena classified documents  from the former President, and the steps that he took to obstruct those efforts. So there will be considerably more detail about the basis for the NDO when we brief this issue.

For now, though, the assertion that they’re making, one, is not based on any factual foundation that they could possibly be aware of; and then, second, to the extent that they are able to ascertain details from the public record, they seem to be ignoring those details.

Xitter had no factual foundation to make the confident assertions about the investigation, an AUSA who had been involved in crafting the warrant explained.

DOJ repeated that argument in its opposition to Xitter’s motion to vacate the order of contempt.

Twitter offers (Twitter’s Mem. 8–14) two unpersuasive arguments to the contrary. First, Twitter contends (id. at 8–12) that because some aspects of the investigation are publicly known, it “strains credulity to believe” that providing the Warrant to the former president will “alter the current balance of public knowledge in any meaningful way” because such a disclosure would be merely “incremental.” Id. at 11. That contention is flawed in several respects. Although the investigation’s existence is no longer secret, it does not follow that the specific ongoing investigative steps the Government is pursuing are therefore publicly known. Many of the media accounts that Twitter cites (id. at 8–10) attempt to fill in gaps based on discrete pieces of information or courthouse sightings of witnesses.4 Whatever the effect of those accounts on the “current balance of public knowledge,” id. at 11, they provide nowhere close to the detail supplied in the Warrant. Providing the Warrant to the former president at this point in the investigation would thus far exceed some mere “incremental” step in informing the former president, as described in the ex parte submission.

4 The same is true of the 80 pages of articles and other documents that Twitter submitted as an exhibit to its opposition to the Government’s Motion to Show Cause. See Twitter’s Opposition to Government’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause, Exhibit B (filed Feb. 6, 2023).

At the same time as we were having very public, ugly battles about what TV lawyers were sure they knew about the investigation, Beryl Howell and Gregory Bernstein were scoffing at the idea that anyone would have a thorough understanding of the investigation based off what witnesses shared with the press or what journalists spied from staking out Prettyman Courthouse.

While Politico sussed out that WilmerHale was involved in a high level fight with Jack Smith’s team when the lawyers came back for an appellate hearing in May, no one knew way back in early February that the pitched battle was already, at that point, several weeks in progress.

Neither Politico nor CNN — the two best outlets for staking out the courthouse — knew their own work had been cited as proof that the public knew all there was to know about the investigation, only to have Beryl Howell scoff at the idea.

No one knew that Jack Smith had obtained Trump’s Xitter account. And even after seeing 500 pages from the fight over that warrant, no one yet knows precisely what they were looking for.

I take that back.

After Judge Tanya Chutkan crafted a protective order last week, Trump got his first batch of discovery. And here’s what he described learning about the investigation, in his bid to delay the January 6 trial until April 2026.

It, among other things, interviewed and subpoenaed hundreds of witnesses, executed over 40 search warrants, and compiled information from countless individual sources. The government included some, but not all, of these materials in a massive, 8.5-terabyte initial production, totaling over 11.5 million pages, together with native files, recordings, and other electronic data not amenable to pagination. [my emphasis]

We’ve spent the last two weeks entranced by a single warrant, making grand conclusions about what Xitter — which also knew nothing — was emphasizing to win a legal battle.

We know of perhaps ten other warrants, if Jack Smith is sharing the warrants for Trump’s co-conspirators and close aides (though he doesn’t have a Fourth Amendment interest in any of those warrants).

  1. Rudy’s devices (likely a warrant served on the FBI in NY)
  2. Ken Klukowski’s Google account
  3. Jeffrey Clark’s Outlook account
  4. Jeffrey Clark’s Google account
  5. Jeffrey Clark’s phone
  6. The fourth account from an as-yet unidentified non-lawyer
  7. John Eastman’s Chapman University emails
  8. John Eastman’s phone
  9. Boris Epshteyn’s phone
  10. Mike Roman’s phone

We know of subpoenas targeting Sidney Powell. We know nothing — literally nothing — about the investigation targeting Ken Cheseboro, one of Trump’s unindicted co-conspirators (except that investigators would have been very interested to learn why he was tailing Alex Jones during the attack on the Capitol, filming him on his phone).

We know of subpoenas obtaining information from NARA. We know of other phones that were seized — like Scott Perry’s and some of the key fake electors and Owen Shroyer — but those present sensitivities that make it less likely they would get shared with Trump, that they would be among the 40 warrants he knows about but we don’t.

We can assume that DOJ obtained warrants for every little last shred of cloud content available from Trump and his co-conspirators, long before they would have started seizing phones.

We can be sure that Trump’s Xitter file would be the last to be seized, not the first. The filings themselves cite how Trump and his associates use Xitter, which DOJ would have learned by seizing those associates’ Xitter accounts first.

Donald Trump is looking at forty warrants and we only know of one with his name on it, and even there we have no idea what DOJ was really after.

I’d say that Beryl Howell was right to scoff at Xitter’s lawyers, at us, for our confident statements about the investigation.

Citing Trump’s Executive Privilege Stalling, DOJ Asks for January Trial

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DOJ has proposed that Trump’s January 6 trial should start on January 2, 2024.

In addition to citing repeatedly from the things John Lauro has said on the Sunday shows, it cites Trump’s Executive Privilege claims at least two — and almost certainly three — times.

First, it cited the DC Circuit upholding Judge Chutkan’s own decision that the Archives could hand over Trump’s materials to the January 6 Committee.

The D.C. Circuit has determined that “[t]here is direct linkage between [the defendant] and the events of [January 6, 2021],” which it described as “the single most deadly attack on the Capitol by domestic forces in the history of the United States.” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1350, 212 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2022)

Then, it cited Trump’s initial Executive Privilege challenge to J6C’s request.

The defendant has been aware of— and has responded forcefully in opposition to—certain relevant information made public through hearings and the report written by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. See, e.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump to Hon. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Oct. 13, 2022).

Finally, it cites first contact with prosecutors in the case in June 2022, which probably was the initial challenge to the testimony of Greg Jacob and Marc Short.

Furthermore, the defendant and his counsel have long been aware of details of the Government’s investigation leading to his indictment, having had first contact with Government counsel in June 2022.

Trump says he can’t go on trial before the election because under the Speedy Trial Act, he’ll need more time. DOJ notes that STA also protects the interest of the public.

And then it notes that Trump has been delaying this investigation in various ways since October 2022.

Update: Technically, I may be wrong about the letter to Bennie Thompson. It is not cited in Trump’s lawsuit against Thompson at all, even though it was sent on the same day as Thompson moved to obtain Trump’s records.