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Like Taylor Taranto, Trump Tries to Excuse Threats by Invoking the First Amendment

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The government responded to Trump’s motion to stay Judge Tanya Chutkan’s gag order.

As many people note, it cites the new threats Trump has made — against Judge Arthur Engoron’s clerk (for which the judge fined Trump $10,000 yesterday), against Mark Meadows — since Chutkan temporarily stayed her own order. DOJ used those examples to show that as soon as Chutkan stayed her own gag, Trump resumed his normal incitement.

I find two footnotes raising things that happened months ago more telling. First, a footnote describing the Trump supporter charged with making death threats against Judge Chutkan herself, along with Sheila Jackson Lee, presented as yet another example of how Trump’s attacks lead to credible threats.

Such risks are far from speculative here, the Court found, given uncontradicted facts submitted by the Government showing that when the defendant “has singled out certain people in public statements in the past,” it has “led to them being threatened and harassed.” ECF No. 103 at 66-67.1

1 Shortly after being assigned to the case, the Court itself received a racist death threat explicitly tied to the Court’s role in presiding over the defendant’s case. See United States v. Shry, No. 4:23-cr-413, ECF No. 1 at 3 (Criminal Complaint) (S.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2023) (caller stating, among other things, “‘If Trump doesn’t get elected in 2024, we are coming to kill you, so tread lightly, b***h. . . . You will be targeted personally, publicly, your family, all of it.’”). This incident, like many of the others the Government cited, was widely publicized and surely well known to the defendant.

And then, a footnote describing how Jan6er Taylor Taranto, a Navy veteran with long-standing mental health issues, invoked the First Amendment after he responded to Trump’s publication of Barack Obama’s DC address by stalking the former President’s Kalorama neighborhood in a van with (locked) weapons.

7 The Government’s submissions, while extensive, did not purport to be a comprehensive account of every occasion when the defendant’s public targeting of perceived adversaries has resulted in threats, harassment, or intimidation. The public record is replete with other examples. See, e.g., United States v. Taranto, No. 1:23-cr-229, ECF No. 27 at 4-6 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2023) (affirming detention order for Taranto and explaining that, after “‘former President Trump posted what he claimed was the address of Former President Barack Obama’ on Truth Social,” Taranto— who had previously entered the Capitol on January 6, 2021—reposted the address, along with a separate post stating, “‘See you in hell, Podesta’s and Obama’s’” [sic], and then proceeded, heavily armed, to the area the defendant had identified as President Obama’s address, while livestreaming himself talking about “getting a ‘shot’ and an ‘angle,’” adding, “‘See, First Amendment, just say First Amendment, free speech’”) (quoting Taranto, ECF No. 20).

Here’s more of the Taranto detention memo from which DOJ cited.

Taranto parked his van on the street and began walking around the neighborhood, continuing to film. Taranto made several references to “the Podestas” and stated several times that he was trying to get an interview. Taranto’s continued narration made it clear that he intended to access or enter the private residences of his subjects. For example, Taranto panned the camera to show several sewer grates on the street – calling them “entrance points,” and stating that the grates were an “entrance” to reach “them.” Throughout the video he also stated,

“So if you go down there, there’s obviously tunnels down there. I don’t know how close they’ll get you in terms of access;”

“We’re gonna find a way to the tunnels, underneath their houses;” and,

“We’re looking for tunnel access so we can get the interview, in case they try to weasel their way out. No in or out now! See, First Amendment, just say First Amendment, free speech. Free, it’s free.”

Throughout the video, Taranto repeatedly attempted to couch his actions in terms of “First Amendment” or free speech, as if he believed that simply saying the words, “First Amendment” absolved him from any trespass. When initially approached by Secret Service, Taranto stated, “Hello, just trying to get an angle, for First Amendment, free speech. Thanks. That’s Secret Service, she’s alright.” He also said, “See how it works? Just say, ‘First Amendment.’” Taranto made additional concerning statements during the video including the following statements about getting a “shot”:

“Gotta get the shot, stop at nothing to get the shot. This is where other people come to get the shot;”

“We’re gonna see what we can get, as a shot. If I were them, I’d be watching this, watching my every move;” and,

“This is where everyone goes to get the shot. It’s just me today though. This is an easy way around. Yeah, they can’t stop me from walking through here. Just don’t step foot on the street.”

Regarding getting an “angle,” Taranto states several times, “Let’s see what angles we can get,” and, “Just trying to get an angle, for First Amendment, free speech.” Additional concerning statements included:

“I don’t have any ID, so in case I get detained or something, they’re just going to have to use their cellphone to figure out who I am.”

“So yeah, more than likely, these guys also all hang for treason. See how I said that? You gotta be very safe and careful. Someone warned me.”

“I control the block, we’ve got ‘em surrounded.”

“Oh, is this intimidating? I don’t think so.”

The reference to the threat against Chutkan puts that example into the record before the DC Circuit hears this appeal. DOJ provided the reference to Taranto (Judge Carl Nichols’ affirmation of his detention order post-dates when DOJ initially submitted this motion on September 5) to support this passage, in which DOJ notes that the catalog of past incitement it has presented thus far is in no way comprehensive:

The defendant does not meaningfully dispute the accuracy of any of these findings. Instead, he first argues (ECF No. 110 at 8-10) that they lacked adequate evidentiary support. But the Government’s uncontradicted filings (ECF No. 57 at 2-13; ECF No. 64 at 9-12) documented a long history of targeted tweets as well as a litany of individuals who have described (sometimes in sworn testimony) the repeated and foreseeable effects of his targeting. E.g., ECF No. 57 at 3 (quoting congressional testimony stating, “After the President tweeted at me by name, calling me out the way he did, the threats became much more specific, much more graphic, and included not just me by name but included members of my family by name, their ages, our address, pictures of our home. Just every bit of detail you could imagine. That was what changed with that tweet.”); id. at 5 (quoting congressional testimony stating, “[W]hen someone as powerful as the President of the United States eggs on a mob, that mob will come.”).7 As the Court explained, these citations to public statements and testimony were “[u]ndisputed,” ECF No. 105 at 2, and there was no need to submit the same material as part of an affidavit, ECF No. 103 at 57. Cf. United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that the parties may proceed by proffer at a detention hearing). The factual findings here were adequately supported and readily distinguish this case from Ford. Cf. Ford, 830 F.2d at 597 (noting that the order was issued sua sponte); id. at 603 (Krupansky, J., concurring) (noting the absence of factual findings). And the defendant will not be able to demonstrate that they are clearly erroneous on appeal.

The Chutkan and Taranto examples reinforce the overall point DOJ makes with this filing: Trump has not contested the proof in their original submission that after he targets people, the mob soon follows.

He has simply ignored that evidence.

Indeed, I called John Lauro out for ignoring that evidence in real time.

Lauro ignores the multiple cases, cited in prosecutors’ filing, where people told Trump directly that his incitement had ratcheted up threats against people like Jeff Duncan, Chris Krebs, and Ruby Freeman.

Trump’s lawyers have now established a pattern.

In the recusal fight, prosecutors pointed out that the two sentencing hearings which Trump cited to justify recusal included one, that of Robert Palmer, where a January 6 defendant stated that he went to the Capitol, where he serially assaulted some cops, “at the behest” of Trump because Trump and others had convinced him he had to take action to stop the vote certification. Trump ignored that discussion in his reply.

When Trump complained that Jack Smith improperly claimed that Trump, “fueled . . . an unprecedented assault on the seat of American democracy,” DOJ laid out that, in fact, the indictment did show how Trump riled up the mob, of which this paragraph is just one example:

Finally, on the afternoon of January 6, after “a large and angry crowd—including many individuals whom the [d]efendant had deceived into believing the Vice President could and might change the election results—violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding,” the defendant exploited the disruption in furtherance of his efforts to obstruct the certification, id. at ¶10e.

Trump ignored this reply in his bid for a stay.

Both Trump’s motion to dismiss for absolute immunity and for Constitutional grounds ignore the actual charges and overt acts of which he is accused and instead tell a tale of protected speech. His motion to dismiss on statutory grounds, meanwhile, completely ignores how he mobilized the mob and thereby successfully obstructed the vote certification (which, as noted, DOJ had laid out in this underlying dispute), choosing instead to ask that those allegations be stricken from the indictment and then, assuming that will work, claiming that nothing he did actually did obstruct the vote certification.

That is, in over 130 pages of filings attempting to make his prosecution go away, Trump tried to simply remove all overt acts showing how he sent the mob on January 6 from his indictment, rather than contesting the veracity of those allegations.

As DOJ notes, by appealing this, Trump will have another opportunity to dispute Chutkan’s findings of fact that his attacks do, in fact, result in targeted threats.

The Court’s Order was premised on three well-supported factual findings.6 First, the defendant has a long history of using his social media account and public statements to target perceived adversaries by singling them out and using inflammatory and disparaging language that “vilif[ies] and implicitly encourage[s] violence against” them. ECF No. 103 at 84. Second, when the defendant does so, harassment, threats, and intimidation reliably follow. ECF No. 105 at 2. Third, such harassment, threats, and intimidation “pose a significant and immediate risk that (1) witnesses will be intimidated or otherwise unduly influenced by the prospect of being themselves targeted for harassment or threats; and (2) attorneys, public servants, and other court staff will themselves become targets for threats and harassment.” Id.

6 Although the Court of Appeals will review the propriety and scope of the Order de novo, it will review questions of “historical fact” such as these for clear error. See Thompson v. Hebdon, 7 F.4th 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2021); Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 796 (10th Cir. 2009); Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002).

That’ll provide DOJ yet another opportunity to lay out evidence supporting this formula, and yet another opportunity for Trump to try to ignore it to make it just go away.

“See, First Amendment, just say First Amendment, free speech,” prosecutors cite Taylor Taranto in the footnote, prowling Obama’s neighborhood after having been sent there by a Trump Truth Social post.

There’s no better embodiment of Trump’s formula for violence than a mentally disturbed man invoking the First Amendment — just as Trump does here — even as he stalks someone Trump has invited him to target.

And I’m sure, if asked to on appeal, prosecutors would be all too happy to provide more examples showing how Trump mobilized people like Robert Palmer and Taylor Taranto.

Trump’s Motions to Dismiss Things That Aren’t the Charges Against Him

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Last night, Trump just met the deadline for filing motions to dismiss his January 6 indictment.

I’m going to lay out what he filed. I’ll review them at length in follow-ups. Here’s a handy table to understand them.

Motion to Dismiss on Constitutional Grounds: This 31-page motion cites Mollie “Federalist Faceplant” Hemingway. But it doesn’t actually mention the charges in the indictment. Having not described how his (and his fake electors’) false claims were charged as conspiracy to defraud the government, having not explained how orders to Mike Pence and the incitement of his mob obstructed the vote certification, having not acknowledged efforts to reverse vote counts in the states, Trump then claims he’s being prosecuted for First Amendment protected speech.

In a section that significantly overlaps with his Motion to Dismiss on Absolute Immunity grounds, Trump claims the failed January 6 impeachment prevents him from being tried on substantially different crimes.

Motion to Dismiss on Statutory Grounds: This filing moves to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a claim, a motion similar to dozens if not hundreds that have failed for January 6 defendants.

Trump moves to dimiss the 18 USC 371 charge against him because, he claims, all the lying alleged in the indictment (which he all but concedes was false in the MTD on Constitutional Grounds) didn’t involve deceit. He even argues that because there was “a clear difference in form” in the fake electors submitted to NARA, no deceit (or forgery) was involved!

Interestingly, Trump says that his false statements to Congress under 18 USC 1001 (which, he notes, was not charged) would be exempted as advocacy. This ignores the abundant litigation finding the vote certification to be an official proceeding.

Trump’s challenge to 18 USC 1512(c)(2) largely involves completely misrepresenting the finding of Robertson, which I wrote about here. I don’t think Trump even engages with the “otherwise illegal” standard applied to Thomas Robertson. He definitely doesn’t engage with the standard that right wing judges want to adopt: unlawful personal benefit.

Trump’s attack on 18 USC 241 is particularly curious. In spite of the fact that his own DOJ was taking actions against false election claims online in 2020, he argues there was no court decision, in 2020, saying that it would be illegal (the Douglass Mackey prosecution, charged by a guy who had been one of the Bill Barr’s top deputies, has since done so). More curiously, Trump doesn’t even seem to understand that all his other attempts to prevent Joe Biden votes from being counted are also overt acts that support this prosecution.

Motion to Dismiss for Selective and Vindictive Prosecution: This is mostly a political document. It points to the scant evidence that Joe Biden was behind this prosecution. It claims that this indictment was retaliation for Trump’s complaints about his stolen document indictment. He cites his own attacks on Hunter Biden (citing Congressional press announcements, not any of his own posts, though he does include two of his own other posts on more general attacks), including one that post-dates this indictment (which was charged on August 1).

4 See Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related Concerns, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and U.S. Senate Comm. on Finance (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wpcontent/uploads/imo/media/doc/HSGAC_Finance_Report_FINAL.pdf, at 3.

5 See Second Bank Records Memorandum from the Oversight Committee’s Investigation into the Biden Family’s Influence Peddling and Business Schemes, House of Rep. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability (May 10, 2023), https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2023/05/Bank-Memorandum-5.10.23.pdf, at 5, 9.

6 See Third Bank Records Memorandum from the Oversight Committee’s Investigation into the Biden Family’s Influence Peddling and Business Schemes, House of Rep. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability (Aug. 9, 2023), https://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2023/08/Third-Bank-Records-Memorandum_Redacted.pdf, at 2. [my emphasis]

This ploy is interesting, given the likelihood that Hunter Biden will file a parallel selective prosecution motion.

He also cites two articles showing that Garland didn’t open an investigation into Trump right away as proof that he was unfairly targeted. I suspect Trump may try to call Steve D’Antuono, whose actions are described in one of them (the famous and problematic Carol Leonnig story), to talk about his own resistance to opening the investigation. This motion doesn’t do the least amount of things it’d need to do to actually get a hearing (in part because the evidence all shows the opposite of what Trump claims). But he would have fun if he somehow did get a hearing (and if he does not but Hunter does, he’ll use Hunter’s efforts to renew the demand).

Motion to Strike Inflammatory Allegations: This is an attempt to eliminate the language in the indictment showing how Trump mobilized his mob because he isn’t charged with mobilizing the mob (as DOJ already laid out, that is one of the means by which he obstructed the vote certification). This is likely tactical, an attempt to remove one of the primary means by which he obstructed the vote certification to make his 18 USC 1512(c)(2) argument less flimsy.

Trump’s First Amendment Defense of Mobilizing His Violent Mob

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There’s a move in Trump’s motion for a stay pending appeal of the gag order Judge Tanya Chutkan imposed that deserves more attention.

Trump appealed the gag last Tuesday and requested the stay on Thursday, about which Judge Chutkan ordered additional briefing that same day; we’ll see more briefing about this all week.

MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: Upon consideration of Defendant’s opposed 110 Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Request for Temporary Administrative Stay, and Memorandum in Support, it is hereby ORDERED that the court’s 105 Opinion and Order is administratively STAYED to permit the parties’ briefing and the court’s consideration of Defendant’s Motion. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the government shall file any opposition to Defendant’s Motion by October 25, 2023, and that Defendant shall file any Reply by October 28, 2023.

A substantial portion of the 33-page motion speaks for the First Amendment rights of his mob to hear, respond to, and amplify Trump’s speech. To defend this principle, Trump cites, among other things, the Missouri v. Biden that SCOTUS just agreed to review over the objections of Sam Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch.

Under the First Amendment, violating the rights of a speaker inflicts an equal and reciprocal constitutional injury on the listener. “Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (emphasis added) (collecting many cases); see also, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment”); Missouri v. Biden, — F.4th –, No. 23- 30445, 2023 WL 6425697, at *11 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (holding that the “right to listen is ‘reciprocal’ to the … right to speak” and “constitutes an independent basis” for relief). Thus, injuring President Trump’s ability to speak injures the First Amendment rights of over 100 million Americans who listen to him, respond to him, and amplify his message.

The claim to have 100 million listeners is a bit like calling his NY penthouse 33,000 square feet, insofar as it relies on overlapping numbers, including the 87 million followers he has but does not tweet to on Xitter.

Trump necessarily dedicates a very long footnote to explaining how he has standing to appeal this gag on behalf of his mob.

3 President Trump unquestionably has third-party standing to defend the rights of his audiences in this context. The Supreme Court is “quite forgiving” of third-party standing requirements “[w]ithin the context of the First Amendment.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004). The First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine, for example, relieves the third-party plaintiff of the burden to show the usual “close relationship” and “hindrance” required by the third-party standing doctrine, id.; instead, Article III injury is all that is required. See id.; United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1586 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Litigants raising overbreadth challenges rarely satisfy either requirement [‘close relationship’ and ‘hindrance’], but the Court nevertheless allows third-party standing.”) (citing Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965)); N.J. Bankers Ass’n v. Att’y Gen., 49 F.4th 849, 860 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that “the requirement that an impediment exist to the third party asserting his . . . own rights” does not apply when the challenged government action “substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court”). Further, as the Supreme Court held in Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, it is particularly important to allow third-party standing to vindicate First Amendment interests because “freedoms of expression … are vulnerable to gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments” and must be protected by “the most rigorous procedural safeguards.” 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see also id. at 64 n.6 (upholding the third-party standing of book publishers to assert the rights of distributors because “[t]he distributor … is not likely to sustain sufficient economic injury to induce him to seek judicial vindication of his rights,” whereas the seller has a “greater . . . stake” in vindicating those rights). In addition, the doctrine of third-party standing applies “when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130. Here, the interference and restriction of President Trump’s First Amendment rights “would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights,” id.—i.e., the rights of his audiences to receive, respond to, and amplify his speech.

I think this footnote is suspect, legally and practically. I mean, the notion that Stephen Miller’s NGO for fascism couldn’t vindicate these rights is nonsense. But it is nevertheless telling.

Trump makes that argument even while complaining that Judge Chutkan had to rely on the potential actions of others — that very same mob riled up by the amplified false victimization of Trump — to justify the gag itself.

Unable to justify the Gag Order based on President Trump’s actions, the prosecution pivots to third parties, alleging that unnamed others, outside of President Trump’s control, acted improperly before this case began. Such concerns cannot justify the Gag Order. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that citizens of this country cannot be censored based on a fear of what others might do. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy . . . except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).

[snip]

In entering the Gag Order, the Court relied heavily on the anticipated reactions of unidentified, independent third parties to President Trump’s speech. The Court found that “when Defendant has publicly attacked individuals, including on matters related to this case, those individuals are consequently threatened and harassed.” Id. at 2. But the Court cited no evidence that President Trump’s statements—as distinct from the statements of millions of others—caused such alleged threats or harassment, let alone that the statements were directed to inciting imminent lawless action.

Remember, Trump has repeatedly denied that the indictment accuses him of mobilizing the mob against Congress. Even after DOJ disabused Trump of that fantasy, he is playing coy about the fact that the crime he is alleged to have committed significantly involves riling up a mob to use as a weapon.

Indeed, Trump admits this is the plan to get elected: to rile up the mob again, this time by using this prosecution as a trigger.

The prosecution filed the indictment in this matter on August 1, 2023. Doc. 1. As this case is pending, President Trump continues to campaign for President, and one of his core messages is that the prosecutions against him are part of an unconstitutional strategy to attack and silence the Biden Administration’s chief political rival. To advance this message, President Trump has made many public statements criticizing individuals he believes are wrongly prosecuting him, including President Biden, Attorney General Garland, and Special Prosecutor Jack Smith and his team. This viewpoint—that the prosecution is politically motivated—is one shared by countless Americans.

[snip]

President Trump’s speech in support of his re-election campaign—which is inextricably intertwined with this prosecution and his defense—lies “at the core of our electoral process of the First Amendment freedoms—an area . . . where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“[C]ore political speech” encompasses any “advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint.” “No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than” core political speech.).

Some of this is just cynicism: by claiming all this is political speech, Trump does base his appeal on the most expansive First Amendment precedent. The legal arguments here, some of them, anyway, are not frivolous.

But he’s not wrong about his campaign strategy. The key to Trump’s political success since he was sworn in was to polarize the electorate based off false claims that any investigation of Trump’s crimes is an attack on him and his mob.

And at one point, Trump’s argument admits that this is all an argument about democracy.

The Gag Order’s carve-outs exacerbate the vagueness problems by imposing new layers of confusion upon the Order. Doc. 105, at 3. The carve-outs seem to authorize “criticizing the government generally, including the current administration or the Department of Justice,” but that does not seem to include criticizing the most relevant figure of the Department of Justice, i.e., Jack Smith. Id. The carve-outs supposedly allow President Trump to state “that his prosecution is politically motivated,” but the Gag Order prevents him from “targeting” the specific actors involved in his prosecution, so it prevents him from giving any specific or detailed justification for this claim. Id. Where claiming that the prosecution is politically motivated ends, and “targeting” the prosecutors against President Trump begins, is anyone’s guess. The carve-outs apparently authorize “statements criticizing the platforms or policies of . . . former Vice President Pence,” id., but the “platforms or policies” of candidates like Pence (and Biden) are deeply intertwined with their views on election integrity, with specific reference to the 2020 election. When does criticism of Mike Pence’s “platforms or policies” become a statement “that target[s] . . . the substance of [his] testimony,” id., when questions about the integrity of the 2020 election are “central” to the 2024 Presidential campaign?

Joe Biden (comments about whom this gag does not restrict) is running on democracy. Mike Pence is running on defending the Constitution.

Trump is running on a promise that none of that matters: no election outcome — not that of 2020, not that of 2024 — should be respected, unless he wins.

And the way to ensure that happens, Trump knows, is to guard the right of his mob to amplify and respond to his false claims of victimization.

Buried in DOJ’s Absolute Immunity Response, a Comment on Trump’s Suspected Zenith Crimes

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Earlier this month, Trump’s DC team filed a motion to dismiss his January 6 indictment based on a claim of absolute immunity, an argument that Presidents cannot be prosecuted for things they did while President.

To get a sense of how shoddy Trump’s argument was, you need only compare the number of citations to these cases:

  • Nixon v. Fitzgerald, which found Presidents had absolute immunity against civil lawsuits for things that fall within their official duties
  • US v. Nixon, which found that the same President who had absolute immunity from civil suit could not use Executive Privilege to withhold evidence from a criminal prosecution
  • Trump v. Vance, which held that Trump, while still President, was not immune from a criminal subpoena
  • Thompson v. Trump, in which SCOTUS upheld a DC Circuit Opinion that upheld a Tanya Chutkan opinion that the events of January 6 overcame any Executive Privilege claim Trump might make to withhold documents from Congress, a far higher bar than withholding them from the FBI

Trump’s absolute immunity claim was a shoddy argument, but you never know what this SCOTUS would rubber stamp, even considering its cert denial in Thompson v. Trump and questions about whether Clarence Thomas (who did not recuse in that case, but did in John Eastman’s appeal of a crime-fraud ruling against him) would be shamed into recusing in this one.

Shoddy argument and all, there was never going to be a way to carry out the first-ever prosecution of a former President without defeating an absolute immunity claim.

In general, DOJ’s response is much more adequate than Trump’s motion to the task of laying out one side of an argument that will ultimately be decided by a very partisan Supreme Court. But it is written as the first response in what will be, whatever the outcome, a historic ruling.

Before it spends ten pages addressing Trump’s application of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it spends ten pages laying out the constitutional framework in question. In a section addressing Trump’s claim that his impeachment acquittal on January 6 charges meant he could not be charged for related crimes, DOJ notes that Trump argued at the time, that as a former President, the Senate no longer had jurisdiction to hold an impeachment trial. Then it cites the many Republican Senators who used that stance to justify their own acquittal votes. It notes that the Nixon pardon and the Clinton settlement both presumed potential exposure to prosecution once they became former Presidents.

Out of necessity, the Fitzgerald section adopts an analogy from that precedent to this one: In the same way that Fitzgerald likened the President to prosecutors and judges who enjoy immunity for their official acts, Fitzgerald did not immunize those same prosecutors and judges from other crimes. At a time of increased focus on undeclared gifts that Clarence Thomas has accepted from people with matters before the court and after a Sam Alito interview — with someone who has matters before the court — in which he claimed separation of powers prohibited Congress from weighing in on SCOTUS ethics, DOJ cited the 11th Circuit opinion holding that then-Judge Alcee Hastings could be prosecuted. That is, whatever the outcome of this dispute, it may have implications for judges just as it will for Presidents.

Only after those lengthy sections does DOJ get into the specifics of this case, arguing:

  • By misrepresenting the indictment in a bid to repackage it as acts that fit within the President’s official duties, Trump has not treated the allegations as true, as Motions To Dismiss must do
  • Trump’s use of the Take Care Clause to claim the President’s official duties extend to Congress and the states is not backed by statute
  • Because Trump is accused of conspiring with people outside of the government — unsurprisingly, DOJ ignores the Jeffrey Clark allegations in this passage (CC4), but while it invokes Rudy Giuliani (CC1), John Eastman (CC2), Kenneth Chesebro (CC5), and Boris Epshteyn (CC6), it is curiously silent about the allegations pertaining to Sidney Powell (CC3) — the case as a whole should not be dismissed

In total, DOJ’s more specific arguments take up just six pages of the response. I fear it does not do as much as it could do in distinguishing between the role of President and political candidate, something that will come before SCOTUS — and could get there first — in the civil suits against Trump.

And its commentary on Trump’s attempt to use the Take Care Clause to extend the President’s authority into areas reserved to the states and Congress is, in my opinion, too cursory.

The principal case on which the defendant relies (Mot. 35-36, 38, 43-44) for his expansive conception of the Take Care Clause, In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), cannot bear the weight of his arguments. In Neagle, the Supreme Court held that the Take Care Clause authorized the appointment of a deputy marshal to protect a Supreme Court Justice while traveling on circuit even in the absence of congressional authorization. Id. at 67-68; see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 294 (1892) (describing Neagle’s holding); Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 661 n.3 (Clark, J., concurring) (same). Before reaching that conclusion, the Court in Neagle posed as a rhetorical question—which the defendant cites several times (Mot. 35, 38, 43, 44)—whether the president’s duty under the Take Care Clause is “limited to the enforcement of acts of congress or of treaties of the United States according to their express terms; or does it include the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the constitution?” 135 U.S. at 64. From the undisputed proposition that the president’s powers under Article II are not limited only to laws and treaties, it does not follow, as the defendant seems to imply, that every “right, duty, or obligation[]” under the Constitution is necessarily coterminous with the president’s powers under the Take Care Clause. Under that theory, for example, the president could superintend Congress’s constitutional obligation to keep a journal of its proceedings, U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3, or the judiciary’s duty to adjudicate cases and controversies, U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

The 11th Circuit and then SCOTUS will be facing a similar, albeit better argued, Take Care Clause argument when they review Mark Meadows’ bid to remove his Georgia prosecution. You’d think DOJ could do better — or at the very least note that Trump abdicated all premise of upholding the Take Care Clause during a crucial 187 minutes when his mob was attacking the Capitol.

All that said, I’m as interested in this response for the associated arguments — the seemingly hypothetical ones — such as the one (already noted) that in weighing this argument, the Supreme Court may also have to consider, again, whether they themselves are immune from prosecution for bribery.

It’s not just Clarence Thomas whose actions this fight could implicate.

In two places, DOJ uses hypotheticals to talk about other Presidential actions that might be crimes, rather than focus on the specifics of the case before Judge Chutkan.

For example, DOJ points to the possibility that a President might trade a pardon — a thing of value — as part of a quid pro quo to obtain false testimony or prevent true testimony.

For example, where a statute prohibits engaging in certain conduct for a corrupt purpose, the statute’s mens rea requirement tends to align, rather than conflict, with the president’s Article II duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, which would weigh heavily against the need for immunity. To illustrate, although the president’s power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1872), criminal immunity should not shield the corrupt use of a presidential pardon—which plainly constitutes “anything of value” for purposes of the federal bribery statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)—to induce another person to testify falsely or not to testify at all in a judicial, congressional, or agency proceeding.

Less than five years ago, of course, Roger Stone was telegraphing that prosecutors had offered him leniency if he would testify about dozens of conversations that he had with Trump during the 2016 election. Less than five years ago, the newly cooperative Sidney Powell first asked Trump to hold off on pardoning Mike Flynn, only to welcome a Trump pardon of Flynn while Powell and Flynn plotted ways to steal the election. Less than five years ago, Trump gave a last minute pardon to Steve Bannon, who currently faces four months of prison time because he refused to testify to Congress.

I’m not saying DOJ will revisit these pardons, all of which fit squarely within such a quid pro quo description. I’m noting that if the argument as a whole survives, this part of it may also survive.

The same is true of an even splashier passage. A paragraph describing the implications of Trump’s claim to absolute immunity lays out what some commentators have taken as hyperbolic scenarios of presidential corruption.

The implications of the defendant’s unbounded immunity theory are startling. It would grant absolute immunity from criminal prosecution to a president who accepts a bribe in exchange for a lucrative government contract for a family member; a president who instructs his FBI Director to plant incriminating evidence on a political enemy; a president who orders the National Guard to murder his most prominent critics; or a president who sells nuclear secrets to a foreign adversary. After all, in each of these scenarios, the president could assert that he was simply executing the laws; or communicating with the Department of Justice; or discharging his powers as commander-in-chief; or engaging in foreign diplomacy—and his felonious purposes and motives, as the defendant repeatedly insists, would be completely irrelevant and could never even be aired at trial. In addition to the profoundly troubling implications for the rule of law and the inconsistency with the fundamental principle that no man is above the law, that novel approach to immunity in the criminal context, as explained above, has no basis in law or history.

These seemingly extreme cases of crimes a President might commit, crimes that everyone should agree would face prosecution, include (these are out of order):

  • A President ordering the National Guard to murder his critics
  • A President ordering an FBI agent to plant evidence on his political enemy
  • A bribe paid in exchange for a family member getting a lucrative contract
  • A President selling nuclear secrets to America’s adversaries

Like the pardon discussion above, these hypotheticals — as Commander-in-Chief, with the conduct of foreign policy, with the treatment of classified materials — invoke actions where DOJ typically argues that the President is at the zenith of his power.

We have no reason to believe that Trump ordered the National Guard, specifically, to murder his critics. But we do know that on January 3, 2021, Trump proposed calling out 10,000 members of the National Guard to “protect” his people and facilitate his own march on the Capitol.

And he just cut me off, and he goes, well, we should call in the National Guard.

And then I think it was Max who said something to the effect of, Well, we should only call in the Guard if we expect a problem. And then the President says, no, we should call in the Guard so that there aren’t – so that there isn’t a problem. You know, we need to make sure people are protected.

And he said – he looked over at Max, and I don’t know if somebody was standing behind him or not. He just looked the other way from me and says, you know,  want to call in 10,000 National Guard. And then  opened my folder and wrote down 10,000 National Guard, closed my folder again.

We know that days later Mark Meadows believed the Guard would be present and Proud Boy Charles Donohoe seemed to expect such protection.

Similarly, we don’t know of a specific instance where Trump ordered an FBI agent to plant information on his political enemy. But we do know that as part of a Bill Barr-directed effort to reverse the Mike Flynn prosecution in 2020, misleading dates got added to the notes of Trump’s political enemies, Peter Strzok and Andrew McCabe.

Days after those misleading dates were made public via Sidney Powell, Trump used the misleading dates in a packaged debate attack on Joe Biden.

President Donald J. Trump: (01:02:22)
We’ve caught them all. We’ve got it all on tape. We’ve caught them all. And by the way, you gave the idea for the Logan Act against General Flynn. You better take a look at that, because we caught you in a sense, and President Obama was sitting in the office.

We know of no instance where Trump accepted a bribe in response to which a family member got a US government contract. We do, however, know of an instance where the Trump Administration gave the Saudis something of value — at the least, cover for the execution of Jamal Khashoggi — which everyone seems to believe has a tie to Jared’s lucrative $2 billion contract with the Saudi government.

As to selling nuclear secrets to a foreign adversary? Well, we know Trump had some number of nuclear secrets in his gaudy bathroom and then in his leatherbound box. We have no fucking clue what happened to the secrets that Walt Nauta allegedly withheld from Evan Corcoran’s review that got flown to Bedminster just before a Saudi golf tournament, never to be seen again.

All of which is to say that these edge cases — examples of Presidential misconduct that some commentators have treated as strictly hypothetical — all have near analogues in Trump’s record.

This response is a response about a very specific indictment, an indictment that describes actions Trump took as a candidate, often with those outside government, in ways that usurped the authorities reserved to states and Congress.

But in several points in the filing, DOJ invites review of other potential crimes, crimes conducted at the zenith of Presidential power, but crimes that may — must — otherwise be illegal, if no man is above the law.

Twenty-Five: The Trump Family Member and Other Attorney-Client Delusions

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On January 9, I did a post noting that at least 25 of the known witnesses or subjects of the January 6 investigation into Trump were attorneys.

In a filing yesterday, DOJ said the same thing: At least 25 witnesses, including one member of Trump’s family, withheld testimony or documents based on an attorney-client claim.

During the course of the Government’s investigation, at least 25 witnesses withheld information, communications, and documents based on assertions of the attorney-client privilege under circumstances where the privilege holder appears to be the defendant or his 2020 presidential campaign. These included co-conspirators, former campaign employees, the campaign itself, outside attorneys, a non-attorney intermediary, and even a family member of the defendant.

To be clear, we’re measuring two different things: for example, while the two Pats — Cipollone and Philbin — as well as Mike Pence’s counsel, Greg Jacob, withheld testimony in their first grand jury appearances, that was based at least partly on an Executive Privilege claim, one prosecutors ultimately overcame, not exclusively on their role as White House lawyers.

And I know I missed a bunch of people who invoked attorney-client privilege. For example, Bernie Kerik — who I didn’t count in my list — withheld documents until forced to share them in the Ruby Freeman lawsuit, based on a claim that his work as a researcher was attorney work product. The Georgia indictment alerted me that I had missed accused Trump co-conspirator Robert Cheeley — and there are probably attorneys in all the other swing states I missed too. I didn’t count the campaign itself. I sure as hell didn’t count any family member (I wonder if the big gap in the January 6 indictment where Ivanka should be is there based off a claim she was acting at the direction of Eric Herschmann, though Herschmann seems to have offered far more cooperation than Ivanka did).

However you count it, though, it’s a breathtaking number, one rarely taken into account by the TV lawyers wailing because it took so long to charge Trump.

And charge Trump alone.

That’s something I kept thinking about as I read this filing: Thus far, not even Trump’s alleged co-conspirators — all of whom might make an attorney-client claim (even Mike Roman might be that non-lawyer intermediary, though I think it more likely Boris Ephsteyn is CC6) have been charged.

The government’s argument itself makes a lot of sense. For example, it enumerates that Trump or his attorneys have claimed they’ll rely on an advice of counsel defense at least seven times.

1 Fox News, Aug. 1, 2023, at minute 3:03, available at https://www.foxnews.com/video/6332255292112.

2 CNN, Aug. 1, 2023, at minute 2:20, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GW7Bixvkpc0.

3 NPR All Things Considered, Aug. 2, 2023, available at https://www.npr.org/2023/08/02/1191627739/trump-charges-indictment-attorney-jan-6-probe.

4 Meet the Press (NBC), Aug. 6, 2023, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/meet-press-august-6-2023-n1307001.

5 Face the Nation (CBS), Aug. 6, 2023, at minute 24:11, available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-full-transcript-2023-08-06/.

6 CNN, Aug. 6, 2023, at minute 7:58, available at https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/08/06/sotu-lauro-full.cnn.

7 Donald Trump interview with Tucker Carlson, Aug. 23, 2023, at minute 34:35, available at https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1694513603251241143?lang=en.

The government lays out precedent stating that Trump would have to waive privilege over and share communications that support his advice-of-counsel defense, but also communications over which he and the lawyer are currently shielding behind a privilege claim that would undermine it.

In invoking the advice-of-counsel defense, the defendant waives attorney-client privilege on all communications concerning the defense. See White, 887 F.2d at 270; United States v. Crowder, 325 F. Supp. 3d 131, 137 (D.D.C. 2018). Accordingly, once the defense is invoked, the defendant must disclose to the Government (1) all “communications or evidence” the defendant intends to rely on to establish the defense and (2) any “otherwise-privileged communications” the defendant does “not intend to use at trial, but that are relevant to proving or undermining” it. Crowder, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (emphasis in original). See United States v. Stewart Rhodes, 22- cr-15 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 318 at 2 (quoting Crowder); Dallman, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (waiver is for “information defendant submitted to the attorney on which the attorney’s advice is based, the attorney’s advice relied on by the defendant, and any information that would undermine the defense”); United States v. Hatfield, 2010 WL 183522, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2010) (“This disclosure should include not only those documents which support [defendants’] defense, but also all documents (including attorney-client and attorney work product documents) that might impeach or undermine such a defense.”); United States v. Scali, 2018 WL 461441, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (quoting Hatfield).

Given that Trump would have to identify exhibits on which he would rely for an advice of counsel defense by December 18, the government argues, he should have to also identify the specifics of any advice of counsel defense by that date as well.

Given the potential number of attorneys and breadth of advice involved, the defendant’s notice should describe with particularity the following: (1) the identity of each attorney who provided advice; (2) the specific advice given, including whether the advice was oral or written; (3) the date on which the advice was given; and (4) the information the defendant communicated or caused to be communicated to the attorney concerning the subject matter of the advice, including the date and manner of the communication.

It makes this argument while also noting something that doesn’t, per se, support its case: that DOJ has already told Trump what these 25 people — and it invokes John Eastman, the person most often mentioned in Trump’s public claims of a advice of counsel defense, by caption — have identified in privilege logs.

In addition to having publicly advanced the defense, the defendant knows what information the Government has—and does not have—that might support or undermine the defense. The Government produced in discovery the privilege logs for each witness who withheld material on the basis of a claim of privilege on behalf of the defendant or his campaign, and in some cases the defendant’s campaign was directly involved in discussions regarding privilege during the course of the investigation. In other instances, the Government produced court orders requiring the production of material claimed to be privileged. Compelling the defendant to provide notice, and thereby discovery, would be reciprocal of what the Government already has produced. For example, defense counsel publicly identified one attorney on whose advice the defense intends to rely at trial, and the Government has produced in discovery substantial evidence regarding that attorney and his advice, including relevant search warrant returns.8 Any material relevant to that attorney’s advice that remains shielded by the attorney-client privilege should be produced to the Government at the earliest date to avoid disruption of the trial schedule.

8 That same attorney asserted an attorney-client privilege with the defendant and his campaign to shield material from disclosure to Congress. See Eastman v. Thompson, Case No. 8:22-cv-00099 (C.D. Cal.), ECF No. 260 at 15 (“The evidence clearly supports an attorney-client relationship between President Trump, his campaign, and [plaintiff] during January 4-7, 2021.”). [my emphasis]

Whatever else this motion is — and on its face it makes a lot of sense — it would also provide a means for DOJ to sort through some of the privilege logs it is looking at, and at least in the case of Eastman (if Trump indeed invoked his counsel as a defense) to breach those privilege claims and even obtain communications it does not yet have. Particularly given Clarence Thomas’ recusal on Eastman’s recently rejected cert petition, Eastman might have unidentified communications of particular interest.

Advance notice would also force Trump to rule out relying on the advice of others, like Rudy or Sidney Powell, as a defense, something that might make charges against them more viable.

I don’t imagine that DOJ would add any of Trump’s co-conspirators to his indictment so long as Trump’s trial happened before the election. They could always charge others separately, but so long as Trump had a chance of returning to the presidency, the only reason to do so would be if there were a legitimate hope of flipping the person or if it would make Trump’s alleged crimes more damaging politically. Trump has pardoned his way out of problems in the past and DOJ has to assume he would again, given the opportunity.

But in addition to making a solid case that Judge Chutkan should make Trump declare his intentions in December, this filing also admits that attorney-client privilege claims continue to blind DOJ to some of the universe of related communications pertaining to January 6.

“POTUS is very emotional and in a bad place.” Donald Trump’s Classified Discovery

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As part of Trump’s attempt (with some, albeit thus far limited, success — Judge Chutkan already gave Trump a small extension, and Judge Cannon has halted CIPA deadlines) to stall both his federal prosecutions by complaining about the Classified Information Protection Act, both sides have submitted recent filings that provide some additional details about the classified discovery in his two cases.

Among other things, the filings seem to suggest that Donald Trump was caught storing other documents about US nuclear programs at his beach resort, in addition to the one charged as count 19 of his indictment.

January 6 Election Intelligence

In Trump’s January 6 prosecution, the government’s response to Trump’s bid to delay the CIPA process described the classified evidence Trump’s team had reveiwed in the case this way:

Defense counsel responded that they anticipated review the week of September 25, and later the date was finalized for September 26. Due to the classification levels of certain of the discovery material, the CISO conducted additional read-ins that morning for Mr. Blanche, the Required Attorneys, and the Required Paralegal, and the defense was provided the classified discovery around 10:35 a.m., except for one further controlled document that was provided around 2:30 p.m.

The classified discovery reviewed by the defense consisted of approximately 975 pages of material: (1) a 761-page document obtained from the Department of Defense, the majority of which is not classified;1 (2) an FBI-FD 302 of the classified portion of a witness interview for which the Government already provided a transcript of the unclassified portion, as well as attachments, totaling 52 pages; (3) a 12-page document currently undergoing classification review by the Department of Defense; (4) the 118-page classified transcript the Government described at the CIPA § 2 hearing on August 28; and (5) a further controlled document that is a classified version of a publicly-available document produced in unclassified discovery that contains the same conclusions.2

1 The Government did not include this document in its page estimate at the CIPA § 2 hearing, only later determining that in an abundance of caution the entire document should be produced in classified discovery, even though—as indicated by page and portion markings—the majority of it is not classified. In its cover letter accompanying the classified discovery production, the Government made clear its willingness to discuss producing the unclassified pages and portions in unclassified discovery.

2 See Bates SCO-03668433 through SCO-03668447 (produced to the defense in the first unclassified discovery production on August 11, 2023).

Trump’s reply appears to have described what two of these — item 1 and item 5 (and possibly also item 3, which may have been included as part of item 1) — were.

Item 5 consists of the classified version of the Intelligence Community’s Foreign Threats to the 2020 Election publicly released in March 2021.

The Special Counsel’s Office alleges that the Director of National Intelligence “disabused” President Trump “of the notion that the [USIC’s] findings regarding foreign interference would change the outcome of the election.” (Indictment ¶ 11(c)). The Office points out that these “findings” are set forth in a “publicly-available version of the same document that contains the same ultimate conclusions.” (Opp’n at 12). This is a reference to the unclassified version of the National Intelligence Council’s March 2021 Report titled “Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections” (the “Report”).3

3 The unclassified Report is available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf

Trump is demanding that DOJ provide details of every actual compromise during the 2020 election — things like Iran’s effort to pose as Proud Boys to suppress Democratic votes — in order to support his claim that the classified evidence in this case is more central than it is.

Item 1 appears to include a bunch of materials that Mark Milley had preserved about the fragile state of the country and — even more so — Trump after the attack.

The Special Counsel’s Office has sufficient access to the files of the Department of Defense (“DOD”) to produce to President Trump two documents, totally [sic] approximately 773 pages, that the Office “obtained” from DOD. (Opp’n at 5). It appears, however, that there is a larger set of relevant DOD holdings, which the Office must review and make any necessary productions required by Rule 16, Brady, Giglio, and the Jencks Act.

In November 2021, General Mark Milley told the House’s January 6 Select Committee that “we have a boatload of documentary stuff . . . both classified and unclassified stuff. And I will make sure that you get whatever we have. And it’s a lot.” (Tr. 10).6 In response to a question about a particular document, General Milley volunteered that he had overclassified a large volume of relevant material:

I classified the document at the beginning of this process by telling my staff to gather up all the documents, freeze-frame everything, notes, everything and, you know, classify it. And we actually classified it at a pretty high level, and we put it on JWICS, the top secret stuff. It’s not that the substance is classified. It was I wanted to make sure that this stuff was only going to go people who appropriately needed to see it, like yourselves. We’ll take care of that. We can get this stuff properly processed and unclassified. (Tr. 169).

In addition to the above-referenced classified documents “obtained” from DOD, the Special Counsel’s Office has produced nearly a million pages of documents from the House Select Committee. But it is not clear that those materials include any of the classified documents referenced by General Milley during his testimony, or whether the Office has even reviewed those materials.

6 The transcript is available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-TRANSCRIPTCTRL0000034620/pdf/GPO-J6-TRANSCRIPT-CTRL0000034620.pdf.

What Trump accuses Milley of overclassifying appears to have been, instead, classified to prevent detrimental things said about Trump — including by his Chief of Staff — from being shared publicly. As Milley described to the January 6 Committee. he made a point of preserving all of it because he understood the significance of January 6.

So what I saw unfold on the 6th was disturbing, to say the least, and I think it was an incredible event. And I want to make sure that whatever information I have and I can help you determine facts, atmospherics, opinions, whatever, determine lines of inquiry. In any manner, shape, or form that I or the Joint Staff can help, I want to make sure that we do that, because I think the role of the committee is critical to prevent this from ever happening again.

[snip]

We also have — and I want to make sure that you know that we have and we’ll provide it to you, the Joint Staff — we have a boatload of documentary stuff. I think we provided a bunch of emails, which is good. We have both classified and unclassified stuff. And I will make sure that you get whatever we have. And it’s a lot. We have it in binders.

Immediately following the 6th, I knew the significance, and I asked my staff, freeze all your records, collate them, get them collected up. I had one of the staff, a J7, you 10 know, package it up, inventory it, put it all in binders and 11 all that kind of stuff. So we have that, and you’re welcome to all of it, classified and unclassified. And I want to make sure that everything is properly done for the future. That’s very important to me.

The materials include — again, per Milley’s testimony — commentary from people like Mark Meadows and Christopher Miller about Trump’s state on January 7.

General Milley. So where was I? Oh. Anyway, so general themes: steadiness overseas, constantly watching Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, terrorists. Venezuela, by the way, was another one. So there’s a series of these potential overseas crises. In several of the calls — and my theme was I sounded like a broken record: Steady, breathe through your nose, we’re going to land the — we’re going to 4 land this thing, peaceful transfer of power. That was a constant message of mine. And both Pompeo and Meadows didn’t push back on that at all. It was “roger that” sort of thing.

So, now, there was a couple of calls where, you know, Meadows and/or Pompeo but more Meadows, you know, how is the President doing? Like, Pompeo might say, “How is the President doing,” and Meadows would say, “Well, he’s in a really dark place,” or “he’s” — you know, those kind of words. I’d have to go back to some notes to get the exact phrasing, but that happened a couple different times.

I’m looking for — on this timeline, like, here is one, for example, on the 7th of January, so this is the day after, right? “It’s just us now.” And I can’t remember if it was Pompeo or Meadows that said that, but I didn’t say it. “It’s just us now.” In other words, it’s just the three of us to land this thing. I’m, like, come on, man. This is — there’s millions of people here. But anyway. I’m not trying to be overly dramatic, but these are quotes. “POTUS is very emotional and in a bad place.” Meadows . So that – – that’s an example. Same day, different meeting with Acting SecDef Miller.” POTUS not in a good spot.” Whatever that means.

Ms. Cheney. Uh-huh.

General Milley. You know, these aren’t my words. These are other people’s words. Kellogg, same day, seventh phone call: “Ivanka was a star.” “She’s keeping her father calm.” “Everyone needs to keep a cool head.” So it’s the — you know, it’s comments. These are just phrases, but there’s–

Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

General Milley. there’s conversations like that, and, you know, for me, as the Chairman, I’m, like, hmmm. So all I’m trying to do is watch my piece of the pie. I’m not in charge of anything. I just give advice and just trying to keep it steady.

Ms. Cheney. I know we have to take a break, General Milley, and the camera is not working here, so I can’t see you guys, but are the notes that you’re reading from, are those notes that we have? Are they in the exhibits, or are those notes that we can get if we don’t?

General Milley. No. We can — I can provide them. I’ll swear to it, you know, that kind of thing if I need to do an affidavit on whatever you want.

[Redacted] And I think this is in a classified production.

General Milley. Those notes came from the timeline that I produced to the Joint Staff, essentially.

Ms. Cheney. Yeah.

General Milley. On this timeline, it’s actually classified, but, again, almost all of the substance is it not classified. The document I classified the document at the beginning of this process by telling my staff to gather up all the documents, freeze-frame everything, notes, everything and, you know, classify it. And we actually classified it at a pretty high level, and we put it on JWICS, the top secret stuff. It’s not that the substance is classified. It was I wanted to make sure that this stuff was only going to go people who appropriately needed to see it, like yourselves.

We’ll take care of that. We can get this stuff properly processed and unclassified so that you can have it —

[Redacted] That would be great.

Trump is demanding this stuff under Rule 16 (the defendant’s own statements), Brady (exculpatory evidence), Giglio (deal made with other witnesses), and Jencks Act (statements by potential government witnesses). Trump is asking for all memorializations that Milley or anyone else made of things Trump said — and he’s preparing to claim that that amounts to exculpatory evidence.

And both the review of this memorialization and the court filings happened after Trump threatened to execute Milley on September 22, Trump’s treatment of it — and his claim that Milley overclassified it — can’t be taken in isolation from it, especially given the inclusion of the Iran attack document, which Trump was showing off at Mar-a-Lago even before Milley’s January 6 testimony — in the superseding stolen documents indictment.

That is, having discovered that Milley preserved the crazy things Trump said and the crazy Trump’s most loyal aides said about Trump, Trump wants to make that a centerpiece of his graymail attempt, preparing a claim that the very act of memorializing all this amounts to disloyalty, all while arguing that he needs it to discredit Milley or Meadows or anyone else involved if they testify at trial.

Stolen Documents

In the stolen documents case, classified material is obviously more central to Trump’s alleged crimes and the sensitivity of the materials involved is much greater. Even though there have been some sound educated guesses as to what the charged documents include, it’ll be months before we get real detail at trial.

Nevertheless, the competing claims about classified discovery have provided some new details about the documents charged against Trump — specifically, regarding ten documents that, for two separate reasons, held up reviews by Trump’s lawyers. at the SCIFs in Florida being used for the case.

As Trump laid out in his reply to his bid to delay the trial, at first five, then another four of the documents charged against him were not placed in the SCIF in Miami Trump has been using, because they are so sensitive — though are available in a SCIF in DC. In addition, there was one document that only recently became available in that SCIF.

Nine of the documents charged in the 32 pending § 793(e) counts, as well as “several uncharged documents,” are not available to the defense in this District. (Opp’n at 6).4 The document relating to Count 19 was made available to President Trump for the first time late in the afternoon of October 3, only after counsel left the District following two days of review at the temporary Miami SCIF.

4 As we understand it, documents relating to Counts 6, 22, 26, and 30 have been relocated to the District of Columbia at the request of the documents’ “owners.” (See Opp’n at 6-7 n.4). The documents relating to Counts 5, 9, 17, 20, and 29 are not available to President Trump or counsel at any location.

The one document that only recently became available is the single charged document classified under the Atomic Energy Act — here, marked as FRD or “Formerly Restricted Document.”

  • Document 19: [S/FRD] Undated document concerning nuclear weaponry of the United States; seized in August 8, 2022 search.

As noted here, because it was classified under the Atomic Energy Act, Trump could not declassify it unilaterally, which is undoubtedly why it was charged.

As the government described in its response to this CIPA request on September 27, the presence of one particular charged document and several uncharged documents which required some specific clearance had meant Trump’s lawyers couldn’t get into the SCIF at all, until the Information Security Officer withdrew them, which she or he did on September 26.

The Government has recently been informed that multiple defense counsel for Trump now have the necessary read-ins to review all material in the Government’s September 13 production, with the exception of a single charged document and several uncharged documents requiring a particular clearance that defense counsel do not yet possess. The Government understands that the presence of these documents in the set of discovery available in the defense SCIF in Florida had prevented the defense from gaining access to a safe containing a subset of classified discovery when the defense reviewed the majority of the September 13 production during the week of September 18, 2023. On September 26, at the Government’s request, the CISO removed the documents requiring the particular clearance from the safe so that the remainder of the subset would be fully available to Trump’s counsel.

If, as seems likely, document 19 was the one had to be withdrawn until all lawyers got an additional clearance, it suggests the other uncharged documents were also classified under the AEA. If so, it would mean FBI discovered additional US nuclear documents, potentially included ones that remain restricted, found at Mar-a-Lago but have not been charged.

These are the five that were always given that special handling, treating them as too sensitive to be placed in the SCIF in Miami.

  • Document 5: [TS//[REDACTED]/[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN] Document dated June 2020, concerning nuclear capabilities of a foreign country; seized in August 8, 2022 search.
  • Document 9: [TS//[REDACTED]/[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA] Undated document concerning military attacks by a foreign country; seized in August 8, 2022 search.
  • Document 17: [TS//[REDACTED]/TK/ORCON/IMCON/NOFORN] Document dated January 2020 concerning military capabilities of a foreign country; seized in August 8, 2022 search.
  • Document 20: [TS//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN] Undated document concerning timeline and details of attack in a foreign country; seized in August 8, 2022 search.
  • Document 29: [TS//[REDACTED]//SI/TK//ORCON/NOFORN] Document dated October 18, 2019, concerning military capabilities of a foreign country.

And these are the four that were initially placed in the Miami SCIF, but later withdrawn after a request by the document originators.

  • Document 6: [TS//SPECIAL HANDLING] Document dated June 4, 2020, concerning White House intelligence briefing related to various foreign countries; seized in August 8, 2022 search.
  • Document 22: [TS//[REDACTED]//RSEN/ORCON//NOFORN] Document dated August 2019, concerning military activity of a foreign country; turned over on June 3, 2022.
  • Document 26: [TS//[REDACTED]//ORCON//NOFORN/FISA] Document dated November 7, 2019, concerning military activity of foreign countries and the United States; turned over on June 3, 2022.
  • Document 30: [TS//[REDACTED]//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA] Document dated October 15, 2019, concerning military activity in a foreign country; turned over on June 3, 2022.

Here’s how Jack Smith’s team described these documents.

As noted above, a small collection of highly sensitive and classified materials that Trump retained at the Mar-a-Lago Club are so sensitive that they require special measures (the “special measures documents”), including enhanced security protocols for their transport, review, discussion, and storage. The special measures documents constitute a tiny subset of the total array of classified documents involved, which is itself a small subset of the total discovery produced. From the outset of this case, the SCO and the CISO have been aware of some of the special measures documents, but only recently, the SCO and the CISO learned that others—still constituting a small fraction of the overall discovery—fall into that category as well.

[snip]

To be sure, the extreme sensitivity of the special measures documents that Trump illegally retained at Mar-a-Lago presents logistical issues unique to this case. But the defendants’ allegations that those logistical impediments are the fault of the SCO are wrong. The defendants’ claim that the SCO has failed “to timely remedy the situation,” ECF No. 167 at 2, or “to make very basic arrangements in this District,” id. at 4, proceeds from the false premise that the SCO controls the situation—it does not. Nonetheless, the SCO has also offered to—and did—make a facility available to the defense in Washington, D.C., that can accommodate the review and discussion of all the discovery in this case, including the special measures documents.

What’s interesting about this collection is how they compare and contrast with others of the 32 documents charged.

For example, these documents are not being treated with greater sensitivity because they were subject to Special Handling requirements likely related to contents of the Presidential Daily Briefs; several other charged documents (eg, 1, 2, and 4), in addition to document 6, were subject to Special Handling.

Matt Tait and Brian Greer had speculated that some of these — documents 26, 29, and 30 — might be part of a cluster of related documents, but others that similarly date to October and November 2019 are not being treated with this same special handling.

Most of these documents include special compartments (reflected by the [REDACTED] classification mark(s)), but document 6 does not. That said, all the documents with such redacted compartments are being treated with that special handling. So perhaps the most likely explanation is that document 6 reflects Trump getting briefed on something outside the scope of a formal document, which therefore didn’t have the appropriate compartment marks.

Whatever explains it, someone doesn’t trust these documents to be stored in a SCIF in Miami.

Trump Claims Absolute Immunity

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I’m going to have to come back and explain the obvious holes in Trump’s argument that he has absolute immunity to commit crimes to steal the election.

But here’s the Tl;dr:

He argues that because he was acquitted in his impeachment trial, he cannot be held accountable (even though numerous Senators said they voted as they did knowing he could be held criminally liable).

He’s misreading his claimed citations, especially the amicus DOJ submitted in Blassingame. Here’s that amicus for your comparison. And here’s Amit Mehta’s opinion in Thompson, which the amicus addressed. Here’s a link to Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the civil case clearly about official acts on which Trump primarily relies.

His spinning the scope of the indictment (importantly, to exclude all claim of incitement, which as I noted DOJ just laid out).

The indictment alleges that President Trump took a series of actions that form the basis of its charges. These acts fall into five basic categories. The indictment alleges that President Trump, while he was still President: (1) made public statements about the administration of the federal election, and posted Tweets about the administration of the federal election; (2) communicated with senior Department of Justice (“DOJ”) officials about investigating election fraud and about choosing the leadership of DOJ; (3) communicated with state officials about the administration of the federal election and their exercise of official duties with respect to it; (4) communicated with the Vice President, in his legislative capacity as President of the Senate, and with other Members of Congress about the exercise of their official duties regarding the election certification; and (5) authorized or directed others to organize contingent slates of electors in furtherance of his attempts to convince the Vice President to exercise his official authority in a manner advocated for by President Trump.

And he interprets the Take Care clause to give the President to usurp the power of other parts of government — in this case, Congress and the states.

Third, Thompson’s conclusion that “[t]he President’s Take Care Clause duty … does not extend to government officials over whom he has no power or control,” id. at 78, proves far too much. That formulation entails that the President’s urging the Supreme Court to rule a certain way in a case to which the United States is not a party—for example, in an amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General—is a purely private action outside the “outer perimeter” of Executive responsibility, simply because the President has “no power or control” over Article III judges. Id. That is illogical. Rather, the Take Care duty must extend to exhorting other officials to exercise their responsibilities in a manner consistent with the President’s view of the public good— especially when the issue affects the civil rights of millions of federal voters and addresses a “bedrock function of the United States federal government.” Doc. 1, at 2.

One final thing you’ll note as you read: Trump focuses a lot more attention on issues that are genuinely a close call — his conspiring with Jeffrey Clark — than on his intrusions into Congress’ reserved duties. As noted, he entirely ignores his role in stoking violence.

DOJ’s Theory of Trump’s Mob

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DOJ’s reply on its bid for a gag on Donald Trump has a number of the things you’d expect.

It has a list of the seven people Trump has threatened since the last filing on this, including Trump’s vicious attack on Mark Milley.

With each filing, DOJ just keeps adding to the list of people Trump either incited or targeted.

The government also notes that Trump may have broken the law — or claimed he did, for political benefit — when he claimed to have purchased a Glock.

9 The defendant recently was caught potentially violating his conditions of release, and tried to walk that back in similar fashion. In particular, on September 25, the defendant’s campaign spokesman posted a video of the defendant in the Palmetto State Armory, a Federal Firearms Licensee in Summerville, South Carolina. The video posted by the spokesman showed the defendant holding a Glock pistol with the defendant’s likeness etched into it. The defendant stated, “I’ve got to buy one,” and posed for pictures with the FFL owners. The defendant’s spokesman captioned the video Tweet with the representation that the defendant had purchased the pistol, exclaiming, “President Trump purchases a @GLOCKInc in South Carolina!” The spokesman subsequently deleted the post and retracted his statement, saying that the defendant “did not purchase or take possession of the firearm” (a claim directly contradicted by the video showing the defendant possessing the pistol). See Fox News, Trump campaign walks back claim former president purchased Glock amid questions about legality (Sept. 25, 2023), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-campaign-walks-back-claim-former-presidentpurchased-glock-amid-questions-about-legality (accessed Sept. 26, 2023). Despite his spokesperson’s retraction, the Defendant then re-posted a video of the incident posted by one of his followers with the caption, “MY PRESIDENT Trump just bought a Golden Glock before his rally in South Carolina after being arrested 4 TIMES in a year.”

The defendant either purchased a gun in violation of the law and his conditions of release, or seeks to benefit from his supporters’ mistaken belief that he did so. It would be a separate federal crime, and thus a violation of the defendant’s conditions of release, for him to purchase a gun while this felony indictment is pending. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).

Notably, the government points to 18 USC 922 as its basis to claim it would be illegal for Trump to purchase a gun. His release conditions don’t prohibit him from owning a gun.

Trump won’t be charged on this. Which means it’ll be another thing Hunter Biden will use to show selective prosecution.

But I’m most interested DOJ’s rebuttal to Trump’s claim that Jack Smith improperly connected Trump to January 6 in his press conference announcing the indictment when he said Trump had, “fueled . . . an unprecedented assault on the seat of American democracy.”

The defendant seeks to deflect responsibility for his own prejudicial statements by claiming that the indictment in this case was “false and derogatory” and that the Special Counsel’s brief statement upon its unsealing was prejudicial because it ascribed to the defendant responsibility for the events of January 6, 2021—which, according to the defendant’s opposition, the indictment does not allege. ECF No. 60 at 19-20. The defendant is wrong.

[snip]

[T]he indictment does in fact clearly link the defendant and his actions to the events of January 6. It alleges—and at trial, the Government will prove—the following:

  • The defendant’s criminal conspiracies targeted, in part, the January 6 certification and capitalized “on the widespread mistrust the [d]efendant was creating through pervasive and destabilizing lies about election fraud,” ECF No. 1 at ¶4.
  • In advance of January 6, the defendant “urged his supporters to travel to Washington on the day of the certification proceeding, tweeting, ‘Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!,’” id. at ¶87. He then “set the false expectation that the Vice President had the authority to and might use his ceremonial role at the certification proceeding to reverse the election outcome in [his] favor, id. at ¶96.
  • Then, despite his awareness “that the crowd [ ] on January 6 was going to be ‘angry,’” id. at ¶98, on the morning of January 6, the defendant “decided to single out the Vice President in public remarks,” id. at ¶102, and “repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice President to take the fraudulent actions he had previously refused,” id. at ¶10d.
  • Finally, on the afternoon of January 6, after “a large and angry crowd—including many individuals whom the [d]efendant had deceived into believing the Vice President could and might change the election results—violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding,” the defendant exploited the disruption in furtherance of his efforts to obstruct the certification, id. at ¶10e.

In short, the indictment alleges that the defendant’s actions, including his campaign of knowingly false claims of election fraud, led to the events of January 6.

This is a very neat formula of the things Trump did to stoke the violence. The lies provided foundation for the rally which provided an opportunity to target Pence which provided the cause to send mobs to the Capitol. DOJ has been working on laying out this formula for 26 months. Here they lay it out in a few short paragraphs, one way to read a complex indictment.

More remarkably, it comes as part of a gag request that — while it mentioned Trump’s attacks on Pence after the fact — didn’t focus on Trump’s dangerous targeting of Pence to gin up the mob. The initial gag request looked at all the other lives Trump ruined by targeting them. But it didn’t focus on Pence.

Here, once again in the response to an invitation by Trump to do so, DOJ neatly lays out how Trump’s attacks on Pence were a key tool he used to direct the mob.

“Reasonable Persons:” Trump’s Recusal Stunt Flops

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Yesterday, Judge Tanya Chutkan denied Trump’s motion for her recusal.

Chutkan’s order was judicious, clinical, and never once responded to the ridiculous claims John Lauro made in his bid to remove a Black woman judge. In other words, it is a model of judicial temperament, and so will hold up under any appeal.

For example, rather than laying out how much video she had seen implicating Trump in the violence and lawlessness of January 6, Chutkan simply corrected the error Trump’s lawyers had made when they falsely claimed she had seen no video on which to base her comments in Chrstine Priola’s sentencing, and so (they insinuated) had formed opinions based on what she had seen on the news.

The statements at issue here were based on intrajudicial sources. They arose not, as the defense speculates, from watching the news, Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Recusal, ECF No. 58 at 4 (“Reply”), but from the sentencing proceedings in United States v. Palmer and United States v Priola. The statements directly reflected facts proffered and arguments made by those defendants. And the court specifically identified the intrajudicial sources that informed its statements.

[snip]

The court also expressly based its statements in Priola’s sentencing on the video evidence presented earlier in the hearing. Priola Sentencing Tr. at 11– 14, 29. Priola. The statements directly reflected facts proffered and arguments made by those defendants. And the court specifically identified the intrajudicial sources that informed its statements.

Here’s the proof, from the sentencing transcript Trump’s attorneys cited themselves, that prosecutors entered the video that Trump’s lawyers claimed they couldn’t find into evidence.

As we’ve discussed, I would like to play seven video clips which the government feels are the best evidence of the defendant’s conduct that day. The clips total about ten minutes. Each was an exhibit to the government’s sentencing memorandum. Before I play each clip, I’ll just preview a little bit about what each clip shows.

[Introduction of each of 6 videos, including notation that the videos were played.]

THE COURT: There’s no Exhibit 6. Is that right?

MS. ZIMMERMAN: No. That was a mistake, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Video played.)

[snip]

Does the Court have any questions about any of the videos?

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

Having established that the comments about which Trump complained arose in the course of her role as a judge, Chutkan described that she was obligated to directly address the bids that Robert Palmer and Christine Priola made for a downward departure because they were not as culpable as Trump.

To begin, the court’s statements reflect its obligation to acknowledge Palmer and Priola’s mitigation arguments on the record. As already noted, both defendants sought a lower sentence on the grounds that their culpability for the January 6 attack was lesser than that of others whom they considered to be the attack’s instigators, and so it would be unfair for them to receive a full sentence while those other people were not prosecuted. See supra Section III.A. The court was legally bound to not only privately consider those arguments, but also to publicly assess them. By statute, every judge must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 3553(c). For every sentence, the court must demonstrate that it “has considered the parties’ arguments,” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), including a defendant’s arguments that their case involves mitigating factors that should result in a lower sentence, United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That is what the court did in those two cases. A reasonable person—aware of the statutory requirement that the court address the defendant’s arguments and state its reasons for its sentence—would understand that in making the statements contested here, the court was not issuing vague declarations about third parties’ potential guilt in a hypothetical future case; instead, it was fulfilling its duty to expressly evaluate the defendants’ arguments that their sentences should be reduced because other individuals whom they believed were associated with the events of January 6 had not been prosecuted.

While Chutkan’s comment about what a “reasonable person” should know given sentencing obligations might be a dig at Trump’s lawyers’ claimed ignorance of this basic fact, it nevertheless adopts the standard for recusal: not what a defense attorney feigning ignorance might argue, but instead what a reasonable person might understand.

Chutkan similarly noted that Trump’s team had to adopt a “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” in order to interpret her factual statements as if they necessarily addressed Trump himself.

But the court expressly declined to state who, if anyone, it thought should still face charges. It is the defense, not the court, who has assumed that the Defendant belongs in that undefined group. Likewise, for the sentencing hearing in Priola, the defense purports to detect an “inescapable” message in what the court did not say: that “President Trump is free, but should not be.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The court did state that the former President was free at the time of Priola’s sentence—an undisputed fact upon which Priola had relied for her mitigation argument—but it went no further. To extrapolate an announcement of Defendant’s guilt from the court’s silence is to adopt a “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” perspective rather than a reasonable one. Nixon, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 148.

Again, this opinion should be rock solid in the face of appeal, even if it won’t impress those of “hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious” disposition.

This opinion addresses what reasonable people should understand and believe. It certainly won’t persuade Trump’s groupies, because they are not reasonable people. But it soundly addresses the standard for recusal and the actual evidence before Chutkan.

John Lauro’s False Claims about Assaults “at the Behest” of Donald Trump

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As I predicted, John Lauro misrepresented the timing of prosecutors’ request for a limited gag on Trump’s violent speech. Lauro presents his response as if DOJ first asked to limit Trump’s violent speech on September 15 in docket entry 57, and not (in sealed form, to which Trump objected, on September 5) at docket 47.

President Trump respectfully submits this response in opposition to the prosecution’s motion to impose unconstitutional prior restraints on President Trump’s political speech. (the “Motion,” Doc. 57, seeking the “Proposed Gag Order,” Doc. 57-2).

Here’s the handy dandy annotated docket I did so NYT journalists could understand the true timing (even if they didn’t note their corrections once they did belatedly understand it).

One reason Lauro’s manufactured misrepresentation about the timing of the motion — September 5 versus September 15 — matters is because he’s now falsely suggesting that DOJ only issued this request after Biden got a bunch of bad polling data.

At bottom, the Proposed Gag Order is nothing more than an obvious attempt by the Biden Administration to unlawfully silence its most prominent political opponent, who has now taken a commanding lead in the polls. Indeed, this very Motion came on the heels of adverse polling for President Biden.

To be sure, Lauro must recognize what rank bullshit this claim is, given that he doesn’t cite the polling in question (which probably is meant to invoke the outlier WaPo poll of this week). This is designed to work for the Federalist and Fox set, not for Judge Chutkan.

But the timing matters for another reason.

Probably because Lauro wants to set up a future argument balancing election-related speech against defendant-related restrictions, he suggests DOJ is doing this primarily to silence criticism of Jack Smith, and not to protect witnesses, prosecutors, and Judge Chutkan herself.

[T]he prosecution complains that President Trump’s political statements “undermine confidence in the criminal justice system,” which it asserts somehow justifies the Proposed Gag Order. Motion at 2, 6, 8, 15. The prosecution cites no authority in support of this bizarre claim. Nor can it. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “speech critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.”). This includes criticism of the Court and the Special Counsel.

When Lauro finally gets around to dealing with the violent threats Trump has issued, he ignores the bulk of the examples DOJ provided, instead focusing exclusively on the one Trump’s team had already addressed.

[N]o witness has suggested that he or she will not testify because of anything President Trump has said. To the contrary, witnesses appear eager to share their expected testimony with the media and will undoubtedly testify at a potential trial, if called to do so.7 Nor has any witness suggested that President Trump’s protected statements have “influenc[ed] [his or her] testimony,” as the prosecution baselessly suggests. Motion at 15.

This is entirely unsurprising, as President Trump has never called for any improper or unlawful action. Quite the opposite, the prosecution’s cited posts show that President Trump intends to redress the unfairness of this proceeding through legitimate means. This includes, for example, filing motions with the Court—a form of relief that President Trump has every right to pursue and talk about. This is a far cry from the type of “true threat” the prosecution would need to show to justify a prior restraint. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”).8

Unable to identify any instance where President Trump uttered any threat, the prosecution points to others, claiming President Trump “knows that when he publicly attacks individuals and institutions, he inspires others to perpetrate threats and harassment against his targets.” Motion at 3. Again, the prosecution offers no evidence of any causal connection between his speech and the alleged unlawful acts of others to support this meritless claim.

7 Two “potential witnesses” the prosecution does not want President Trump speaking about, for example, are former Attorney General Bill Barr and former Vice President Mike Pence. Both have written books about their tenure with President Trump and the latter is currently running for president. See, e.g., Geoff Bennett, Bill Barr: Trump Committed a “Grave Wrongdoing” in Jan. 6 Case, PBS NEWSHOUR, Aug. 3, 2023. Neither shies away from a hearty public debate with President Trump. Both were at the very top of government and it is absurd to think that they would be intimidated by social media posts. Others the prosecution identifies as “harassed,” are likewise current and former government officials who have made politics, for all its discord and discourse, a large part of their lives.

8 The prosecution once again cites President Trump’s August 4, 2023, Truth Social post; however, as previously explained, Doc. 14 at 7–8 n.8, that post did not concern this case. See Nick Robertson, Trump campaign defends threatening social media posts as free speech, The Hill (August 5, 2023) (quoting a Trump campaign statement that “[t]he Truth post cited is the definition of political speech, and was in response to the RINO, China-loving, dishonest special interest groups and Super PACs, like the ones funded by the Koch brothers and the Club for No Growth.”).

In today’s environment, this Court could easily take judicial notice that “[t]he language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact,” Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citations omitted), and even “very crude [or] offensive method[s] of stating a political opposition” are not true threats. Id.

Finally, the prosecution raised (and President Trump addressed), this same post in connection with its motion for a protective order. Doc. 14 at 7–8 n.8. Despite having ample opportunity to dispute President Trump’s explanation, including in a reply brief, Doc. 15, and at oral argument, Doc. 29, the prosecution chose not to do so. Now, the prosecution once again tries to revive this debunked position in support of its Motion. The Court should accord such unpersuasive arguments no weight. [my emphasis]

Lauro ignores the multiple cases, cited in prosecutors’ filing, where people told Trump directly that his incitement had ratcheted up threats against people like Jeff Duncan, Chris Krebs, and Ruby Freeman. He ignores prosecutors’ citation of Trump bragging about the way his followers respond to Trump.

As he acknowledged in a televised town hall on May 10, 2023, his supporters listen to him “like no one else.”

Perhaps more importantly, Lauro ignores something he has already ignored, in his reply to his own motion to recuse Tanya Chutkan.

As I noted, by filing a motion to recuse based off things Judge Chutkan said when January 6 defendants blamed Trump for their actions, Trump invited prosecutors to lay out the many more times defendants had done just that. Not only did prosecutors provide eight other examples where defendants already sentenced by Chutkan blamed Trump for their actions, DOJ laid out something that Robert Palmer said of his own actions on January 6: That he went to the Capitol “at the behest” of Trump and took action to prevent the certification of the vote because of the false claims Trump had made.

On December 17, 2021, the Court sentenced Robert Scott Palmer, an individual who, on January 6, 2021, after attending the former president’s remarks at the Ellipse and while wearing a “Florida for Trump” hat, “threw a wooden plank at” police officers; “sprayed the contents of a fire extinguisher at the officers until it was empty, and then threw the fire extinguisher” at them; and “assaulted another group of law enforcement officers with a 4-5 foot pole,” which he threw “like a spear at the officers.” United States v. Palmer, 21-cr-328, ECF 30, at 10, 2 (Govt. Sentencing Mem.); id., ECF No. 23, at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Statement of Offense). Palmer was charged with, and pled guilty to, assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers using a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b). Id., ECF No. 24 at 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021) (Plea Agreement).

In a sentencing memorandum filed before his hearing, Palmer’s attorney asserted that he had gone to the Capitol “at the behest of” the defendant and had been convinced by individuals, including the defendant, that the election was fraudulent and that Palmer needed to take action to stop the presidential transition. Id., ECF No. 31 at 8 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2021) (Def. Sentencing Mem.). [my emphasis]

John Lauro is lying when he claims that there is “no evidence of any causal connection between his speech and the alleged unlawful acts of others.” Lauro himself elicited that evidence. And the evidence is that, according to Robert Palmer, because of the false claims Trump and others told about the election, Palmer went to the Capitol on January 6 “at the behest of” Donald Trump, and serially assaulted several cops.

Trump’s reply ignored the substance of Palmer’s claims; it even dropped all mention of the Palmer case. Trump thereby left uncontested DOJ’s representation of Palmer’s claim that he did what he did “at the behest” of Trump.

Thus far, in the case against Trump, DOJ has been rather reserved about the dockets and dockets full of evidence that rioters believed they had been ordered by Trump to do what they did. The indictment itself shows that Trump’s several days of pressure — including his 2:24PM tweet — resulted in direct threats from rioters to Pence.

111. At 2:24 p.m., after advisors had left the Defendant alone in his dining room, the Defendant issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!”

112. One minute later, at 2:25 p.m., the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.

113. At the Capitol, throughout the afternoon, members of the crowd chanted, “Hang Mike Pence!”; “Where is Pence? Bring him out!”; and “Traitor Pence!”

Yet, DOJ has not made it anywhere explicit that evidence in the case of dozens, if not hundreds, of Jnauary 6 defendants make it clear that these threats to Pence arose directly from Trump’s statements. And in their motion for a gag order, DOJ did not tie the threats against Pence Trump elicited on January 6 to one he has made recently that they included in the motion.

But because John Lauro made it an issue in his recusal motion, DOJ has provided crystal clear evidence of one case where someone believed he was taking action — violent assaults against cops — “at the behest of Trump.”

John Lauro wanted it this way — he wanted to create the false illusion that whatever gag Chutkan might impose came only after he accused her of being a biased Black Woman. But in the process, he himself elicited proof that Trump’s statements to lead directly to violence.