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Stan Woodward Contemplating His Former Client Might “Become Unavailable” for Testimony

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Last week, Judge Aileen Cannon had the much delayed Garcia vote to make sure that Trump’s co-defendants, Walt Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira, had knowingly waived any conflicts their attorneys had. The reporting on the hearing all focused on the scolding Cannon gave the Special Counsel’s Office, because they had brought up a possible risk — that Stan Woodward would impugn Yuscil Taveras during closing arguments — they hadn’t previously briefed.

I do want to admonish the Government for, frankly, wasting the Court’s time because, had you brought up these issues in an appropriate way, we could have done this without circling the wagons and creating confusion that was unnecessary. So, I am disappointed in that.

Immediately after the hearing, journalists presented conflicting stories about the hearing, some reporting that biggest flashpoint was an assertion by the government that Stan Woodward should be categorically excluded from cross-examining his former client Yuscil Taveras at trial, and others reporting the problem to be that SCO’s David Harbach suggested that Woodward should also be prevented from maligning the man he used to represent in closing arguments.

None of the coverage I saw got something very basic right: what the past briefing had been about.

The past briefing was about whether to have a Garcia hearing. It wasn’t about what to include in a Garcia hearing.

David Harbach, arguing for Special Counsel, even pointed that out in the morning session.

MR. HARBACH: Specifically it is our view that a lawyer who suffers under a conflict, that — in that situation the lawyer is precluded from — by his duty of loyalty to his [former] client, from arguing to the jury that his former client lacks credibility or attacking his former client’s character.

And those obligations flow from the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his or her former client, and do not turn on whether specific confidential information was provided to the lawyer that might or might not facilitate better or worse cross-examination of the witness.

THE COURT: All right. So, did you make this argument about sort of weaker arguments to juries in your papers?

MR. HARBACH: Not in our papers suggesting that we needed to have a hearing because that wasn’t necessary for the Court’s obligation to conduct this hearing.

Harbach pointed out — rather meekly — that previously they had only been arguing that Cannon needed to hold a hearing. She never asked what to include in it.

Don’t believe me? Here’s the tell: After the hearing, Judge Cannon ordered just that briefing.

On or before October 17, 2023, the parties shall meaningfully confer to further clarify the nature, scope, and potential manifestations of the conflicts alleged by the OSC regarding Stanley Woodward’s former representation of Trump Employee 4 and current representation of Witness 1. 1 This conferral should include a comprehensive discussion of the ways in which the OSC believes that Mr. Woodward’s former representation of Trump Employee 4 and current representation of Witness 1 could adversely affect Mr. Woodward’s performance so as to render his assistance of Defendant Nauta ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.2 The OSC shall disclose to defense counsel all legal authorities in support of its position so that Mr. Woodward may adequately advise Defendant Nauta prior to the continued Garcia hearing.

Sure, she blamed Jack Smith’s team, pretending they brought up new stuff. They did! But they did so only because she had never considered the full scope of the conflict.

She still isn’t. She views the conflict exclusively in terms of Nauta’s rights; she’s ignoring Yuscil Taveras’ right to have his past attorney-client privilege respected.

None of the discussion at the hearing addressed the obligations under the Florida Bar, which SCO included in their original motion.

The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar reflect these concerns, providing that, absent informed consent, a lawyer “must not represent a client” if “there is a substantial risk” that the representation “will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client” or “a former client.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.7(a).4 Informed consent requires, among other things, that “each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.7(b)(4). The Rules further provide that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter must not” either “represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent” or “use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.9(a)-(b). The commentary to the Rule explains that “information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client without the former client’s consent.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.9 commentary. [my emphasis]

And because journalists were so focused on Cannon blaming prosecutors, forgetting that she has already blamed prosecutors for her own fuck-ups and manufactured problems, they missed two specific things that Woodward said.

First, as ABC noted, Woodward was angriest that he might be be prevented from cross-examining Taveras. As part of his argument, he suggested he didn’t have to address that eventuality because Taveras — still a Trump employee — might instead “become[] unavailable.”

MR. HARBACH: So, that is why we think in this case it is crystal clear that Mr. Nauta should be advised and should be well aware of the possibility, likelihood, eventuality, however your Honor would like to put it, that his lawyer would not be able to cross-examine Trump Employee 4 at trial. That much seems clear, and we don’t, frankly, understand how Mr. Woodward could think that he could cross-examine Mr. — Trump Employee 4 under these circumstances. We are at a loss.

[snip]

MR. WOODWARD: To presume that I am incapable of cross-examining him is a presumption that is unnecessary because, contrary to the Government’s position, we don’t know that he will testify in this trial. There is the potential that the Court could preclude him from testifying. There is the potential that he becomes unavailable.

Woodward’s solution to a conflict is to contemplate that Taveras might become unavailable for testimony. Woodward did this even while arguing that SCO was asking both too early and too late for a conflicts hearing.

Plus, most coverage missed Stanley Woodward’s past claims.

It is absolutely bullshit that cross-examination didn’t come up. In Woodward’s sur-reply, his last bid to prevent this conflict hearing, he stated that of course cross-examination wouldn’t be a problem, because another attorney (Sasha Dadan) was available.

11 The Special Counsel’s Office cites particularly inapt conflict cases which reveal the lack of a sound basis to request the hearing that the Office now seeks. See United States v. Braun, No. 19-80030-CR, 2019 WL 1893113, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2019) (hearing as to, ”two defense attorneys from [the same firm, jointly] representing two defendants in this case[.]”); United States v. Schneider, 322 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1296-97 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (addressing representation of two co-defendants, where counsel represented first defendant in his role as a cooperating government witness, and then thereafter newly took on representation of the second defendant, the target of the cooperation, while still representing the first cooperating defendant). The case at bar – involving limited former representation, no ongoing joint representation, no indication of conflict resulting from the representation itself, no indication of attorney-client privileged information at issue, and no occasion for cross-examination by the counsel in question (as other counsel is available for same) – is entirely incompatible with these cases and demonstrates the insubstantiality of the Special Counsel’s Office’s present use of a conflict rationale. [my emphasis]

I wrote about Woodward’s comments in a post called, “Stan Woodward Thinks Aileen Cannon Is an Easy Mark.”

We will get SCO’s brief later today about the scope of what Cannon should be asking, with Woodward’s due tomorrow, and the follow-up hearing Friday.

But things are going to get testy. In her order, Cannon finally copped onto how testy they might get. She envisioned the possibility of considering a disqualification motion after the Garcia hearing.

2 To date, the OSC has not moved the Court to disqualify Mr. Woodward as counsel or to impose remedial measures on Mr. Woodward’s ability to perform as counsel for Defendant Nauta [ECF No. 97 p. 9]. Any consideration of disqualification or imposition of other remedial measures will be addressed following the Garcia hearing as part of the Court’s decision to accept or decline any proffered waiver.

Taveras has not waived privilege. It’s not clear how, under Florida Bar rules, Woodward can comment about the conflicting testimony Taveras gave while represented by the DC attorney.

Aileen Cannon Working Hard to Protect Stan Woodward; Doing Nothing to Protect Walt Nauta or Carlos De Oliveira

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In this post, I noted all the things in DOJ’s reply on their motion for a Garcia hearing that had to have come from the grand jury, and assumed that DC Chief Judge James Boasberg must have permitted DOJ to share it.

As described here, yesterday’s reply on the motion for a Garcia hearing in the stolen documents case revealed a good deal of grand jury information about Yuscil Taveras’ testimony.

It revealed:

  • Trump’s IT worker, Taveras, testified (falsely, the government claims) in March
  • DOJ obtained two more subpoenas for surveillance footage, on June 29 and July 11, 2023 (the existence of those subpoenas, but not the date, had already been disclosed in a discovery memo)
  • It included the docket number associated with the conflict review — 23-GJ-46 — and cited Woodward’s response to the proceedings
  • James Boasberg provided Taveras with conflict counsel
  • Taveras changed his testimony after consulting with an independent counsel

Under grand jury secrecy rules, DC Chief Judge Boasberg would have had to approve sharing that information, but the docket itself remains sealed and Boasberg has not unsealed any of the proceedings.

A filing submitted from DOJ shows that I was right.

It also shows that Judge Aileen Cannon and Walt Nauta attorney Stan Woodward are engaged in a game that is doing nothing to ensure that Nauta’s getting unconflicted legal representation, but it is protecting Trump’s protection racket.

Let’s review the timeline.

On August 2, DOJ filed their original motion for a Garcia hearing, describing, generally, that Yuscil Taveras had testified against Nauta, which presented a conflict for Woodward, even before you consider the three other possible trial witnesses — of seven remaining witnesses — he also represents. DOJ submitted a sealed supplement with information on those three as well as other information, “to facilitate the Court’s inquiry.” Five days later, Cannon ordered that filing stricken, stating that, the government had, “fail[ed] to satisfy the burden of establishing a sufficient legal or factual basis to warrant sealing the motion and supplement.” In her drawn out briefing schedule on the question, she instructed Stan Woodward to address, “the legal propriety of using an out-of-district grand jury proceeding to continue to investigate and/or to seek post-indictment hearings on matters pertinent to the instant indicted matter in this district.”

On August 17, Woodward responded. He contended that Garcia hearings only covered when an attorney represented two defendants, but ultimately argued that, rather than adopt a more traditional method of resolving such a conflict (such as replacing Woodward), Judge Cannon should exclude Taveras’ testimony.

The government’s reply — filed on August 22 — is the one that made public more, damning, information on what went down in June and July.

Three more days passed before Woodward submitted a furious motion requesting opportunity to file a sur-reply. In it, filed 23 days after DOJ’s original submission and sealed filing, he accused DOJ of contravening, “a sealing order issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,1” though in a rambling footnote, he admitted maybe DOJ had requested to unseal this ex parte.

1. Defense counsel is not currently aware of any application by the government to unseal defense counsel’s submission. To have done so ex parte is arguably less professional than deliberately violating the Court’s sealing order. The government did not solicit defense counsel’s position on the unsealing of defense counsel’s own submission, but appears to have deliberately misled both the District Court for the District of Columbia and this Court. Of course, if they did seek such an application ex parte, this would be the second time in as many weeks that the government has done so – a particularly ironic approach given the Special Counsel’s objection to the Court conducting any ex parte inquiry of Mr. Nauta.

In a fit of Trumpist projection, Woodward also complained that DOJ was doing things that might lead to tampering with witnesses.

2 In the time since the government’s submission, defense counsel has received several threatening and/or disparaging emails and phone calls. This is the result of the Special Counsel’s callous disregard for how their unnecessary actions affect and influence the public and the lives of the individuals involved in this matter. It defies credulity to suggest that it is coincidental that mere minutes after the government’s submission, at least one media outlet was reporting previously undisclosed details that were disclosed needlessly by the government.

Projection, projection, projection.

Well, it worked. Judge Cannon granted Woodward’s motion, even giving him one more day than he asked, until August 31 instead of August 30 (remember that she scheduled a sealed hearing sometime in this timeframe). Which will mean that because of actions taken and inaction by Aileen Cannon, Walt Nauta will go the entire month of August without getting a conflict review.

Meanwhile, on August 16, DOJ filed a motion for a Garcia hearing to discuss the three witnesses represented by Carlos De Oliveira’s attorney who may testify against him. Best as I can tell, Cannon is simply ignoring that one. Fuck De Oliveira, I guess.

After Cannon assented to yet more delay before she addressed the potentially conflicted representation of two of three defendants before her (someday, Cannon may even have to deal with conflicts Todd Blanche has, since he also represents Boris Epshteyn), DOJ submitted notice sharing a filing they submitted before the DC grand jury, assenting to Woodward’s request, filed just yesterday morning (that is, three days after their reply), asking to unseal stuff that was already unsealed.

It includes the Woodward filing, from which DOJ’s reply quoted, that Woodward claims DOJ cited out of context.

The full filing doesn’t help Woodward.

Indeed, Woodward’s own filing suggests that if Taveras wanted to cooperate with the government, that would entail seeking a new attorney.

Ultimately, this is little more than a last-ditch effort to pressure [Taveras] with vague (and likely nonexistent) criminal conduct in the hopes that [Taveras] will agree to become a witness cooperating with the government in other matters. See Government Filing, p. 10 (“A conflict may arise during an investigation if a lawyer’s ‘responsibility to his other clients prevents the lawyer from exploring with the prosecutor whether it might be in the interest of one witness to cooperate with the grand jury or to seek immunity if the witness’s cooperation or testimony would be detrimental to the lawyer’s other client.’ [] ‘Professional ethics prevent [an attorney] from advising a witness to seek immunity or leniency when the quid pro quo is testimony damning to his other clients, to whom he also owes a duty of undivided fidelity[.] [] In many cases, however, that advice is precisely what the client needs to hear, even, or perhaps especially, when it ‘is unwelcome’ advice that ‘the client, as a personal matter, does not want to hear or follow.’ [] (internal citations omitted)). Ultimately, [Taveras] has been advised by counsel that he may, at any time, seek new counsel, and that includes if he ultimately decided he wanted to cooperate with the government. However, [Taveras] has not signified any such desire and that means counsel for [Taveras] can continue to represent [Taveras] both diligently and competently. [my emphasis]

And the filing makes clear that DOJ addressed at more length the conflict presented because Woodward was being paid by Save America PAC; while I’m uncertain about the local rules in SDFL, in DC there is a specific rule 1.8(e), requiring informed consent when an attorney is paid by someone else. While Woodward addressed it (see below), Woodward’s own description that Taveras could get another lawyer if he wanted to cooperate would seem to conflict with that rule’s independence of representation, and when he addresses the rule, Woodward doesn’t address confidentiality.

Furthermore, when Woodward addresses why being paid by Save America PAC is only natural for Taveras because Taveras worked for Trump, he makes an argument that wouldn’t explain the entirety of his representation for Nauta — or, for that matter, Kash Patel, a known Woodward client who testified in the stolen documents case.

While the government has often sought to imply an illicit purpose for the Save America PAC covering the legal costs of certain grand jury witnesses, the truth has always been very simple and legitimate: many of the grand jury witnesses, including [Taveras], are only subject to this investigation by virtue of their employment with entities related to or owned by Donald Trump. Save America PAC has placed no conditions on the provision of legal services to their employees. Ultimately and in compliance with Rule 1.8, [Taveras] was advised that Save America PAC would pay his legal fees, that [Taveras] could pursue other counsel than Mr. Woodward if he so desired, that Save America PAC was not Mr. Woodward’s client, that [Taveras] was Mr. Woodward’s client, and that [Taveras] could always make the decisions relating to the trajectory of [Taveras]’s grand jury testimony. [my emphasis]

Taveras is only a witness because Trump paid him to do IT work. But for much of the conduct about which Kash must have given testimony, represented by Woodward, he was the Acting Chief of Staff at the Pentagon. That’s the period when, per Kash, Trump conducted a wild declassification spree in his last days as President before packing up boxes to move to Mar-a-Lago.

And while most of Nauta’s exposure as a witness (and now defendant) arises from things Nauta did as Trump’s valet after both left the White House, ¶25 of the superseding indictment, describing the process by which Trump and Nauta packed up to leave, entails conduct from before Nauta left government employ.

If Trump were to be charged with 18 USC 2071, Nauta would be a witness to that.

In other words, brushing off the financial conflict with Taveras is one thing, but this conflict is also about Nauta. And Nauta is now being prosecuted for conduct that may have begun when American taxpayers were paying him, not Donald Trump. One of the things Nauta may be hiding by not cooperating are details about Trump’s overt intentions as they both packed up boxes.

And that’s not even the most damning part of the filing DOJ submitted yesterday.

DOJ also submitted its initial motion to unseal grand jury materials, submitted on July 30, in advance of the Garcia motion.

That motion reveals, first of all, that DOJ informed Judge Cannon of the conflict hearing on June 27.

On June 27, 2023, the government filed a sealed motion asking the Court to conduct an inquiry into potential conflicts of interests arising from attorney Stanley Woodward, Jr.’s simultaneous representation of [Taveras] and Waltine Nauta (“conflicts hearing motion”); and a separate sealed motion seeking Court authorization to disclose the conflicts hearing motion by, among other things, attaching a copy of the motion to a sealed notice to be filed in United States v. Donald J. Trump, Waltine Nauta, and Carlos De Oliveira, No. 23-cr-80101 (S.D. Fla.) (“Florida case”). The Court granted both motions, and the government filed the sealed notice, with a copy of the conflicts hearing motion attached, the same day.

As DOJ noted in its reply, that’s what the sealed docket entries 45 and 46 are.

That is, Aileen Cannon knew this was happening in real time. DOJ wasn’t hiding anything from her.

That motion to unseal also describes that DOJ intended to file “all information related to the conflicts hearing,” including the appointment of Michelle Peterson to represent Taveras, in a sealed supplement to its motion for a Garcia hearing.

The government therefore moves for an order permitting it to disclose to the court in the Florida case all information related to the conflicts hearing, including the fact and dates of the hearing, the resulting appointment of AFPD to represent [Taveras], and, if necessary, any filings, orders, or transcripts associated with the conflicts hearing. The government initially intends to include such information only in a sealed supplement to its motion for a Garcia hearing.

In other words, these two docket entries that Judge Cannon ordered be stricken, five days after they were posted and therefore made available to both Cannon and Woodward?

They include the material that, Woodward claims, he had never seen before DOJ’s reply.

Judge Cannon just gave Woodward another bite at the apple, as well as another six days before his client gets a Garcia hearing, based off Woodward’s claim that he had never seen information DOJ had shared (and which would have been available to Woodward for five days) but then Cannon herself had removed from the record. DOJ did provide this information in its initial motion. But because of actions Cannon took — the judicial equivalent of flushing that information down the toilet — Woodward (after waiting three days himself before first asking Judge Boasberg to share the information) claimed that he had never seen it before.

DOJ may have had a sense of where this was going, because back on July 30, in the same paragraph where they asked for permission to submit this information as part of a sealed supplement, DOJ also asked for permission to share it in unsealed form if things came to that.

[T]o ensure that it does not need to return to the Court for further disclosure orders, the government also seeks authorization to disclose information related to the conflicts hearing more broadly in the Florida case, as the need arises, including in briefing and in-court statements related to the Garcia hearing.

Things did, indeed, come to that.

And Woodward may have gotten notice of all that from Judge Boasberg’s order on July 31.

Things are going to get really testy going forward (if they haven’t already under seal) because, in a filing that DOJ did not first ask permission to file (but which I suspect would be authorized by a sealed order elsewhere in the docket, not to mention general ethical obligations requiring DOJ to inform her of everything going on in DC), DOJ just revealed that Judge Cannon threw out precisely the information that she’s now using to grant Woodward’s request for a sur-reply and — between the three days he waited to ask and the six she granted him to respond — nine more days to delay such time before Walt Nauta might be told about the significance of all the conflicted representation Woodward has taken on.

But I also expect that this will escalate quickly in one or another forum. Aileen Cannon was informed weeks ago of two significant conflicts in the representation of defendants before her, and rather than attend to those conflicts (or decide, simply, that she was going to blow them off, which in some forms might be an appealable decision), she has helped Woodward simply stall any resolution to the potential conflict.

Remember how I’ve promised I would start yelling if I believed that Cannon was doing something clearly problematic to help Trump? I’d say we’re there.

Update: Corrected my own math on the delay, which I said was 11 days but is 9. Ignoring that Cannon asked for lengthy briefing on a topic that most judges would just issue an order on, the key delays are:

  • 5 days before Cannon flushed the sealed supplement down the judicial toilet
  • 3 days between the DOJ reply and Woodward’s panicked demand for a sur-reply based on a claim that DOJ hadn’t previously raised the things Cannon flushed
  • 6 days of delay before Woodward will submit his sur-reply

DOJ Invites Aileen Cannon to Avoid Another Reversible Error

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Nine pages into the twelve page reply regarding DOJ’s request that Judge Aileen Cannon hold a Garcia hearing to explain to Walt Nauta the potential hazards of Stan Woodward’s conflicts in the stolen document case, DOJ warns Judge Cannon that if she does what Woodward wants her to do, it will be (reversible) error.

In his response, Woodward had suggested that rather than hold a hearing to explain to Nauta the potential conflict and hazards to his defense, Judge Cannon should just exclude the testimony of Yuscil Taveras, the IT guy who testified against Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira.

To do that, DOJ argued, would be unprecedented, particularly given that Woodward had advance notice of this conflict.

III. It Would Be Error to Suppress Trump Employee 4’s Testimony

Nauta contends (ECF No. 126 at 4-5) that if the Court finds a conflict, it should preclude Trump Employee 4 from testifying at trial, rather than employ more routine remedies. That proposed remedy is contrary to precedent and—except for the district court ruling reversed in United States v. Messino, 181 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 1999)—would appear to be unprecedented.

Courts have rejected exclusion of evidence as a remedy to avoid a conflict of interest, concluding that evidence that is “relevant to the Government’s case” should not “be excluded to accommodate a defendant’s choice of counsel.” United States v. Urbana, 770 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 1991); see Messino, 181 F.3d at 830; United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 586, 592- 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Exclusion of probative testimony “is an extreme sanction and would only harm the interests of justice.” Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 592. A “defendant’s choice of counsel” should not “take precedence over the Government’s discretion in deciding what charges to prosecute and how to present its case.” United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1990).

[snip]

Nauta has not identified any case, and the Government is unaware of one, in which a court has excluded evidence to avoid a conflict on facts remotely similar to this case, where the Government put Mr. Woodward on notice long ago about potential conflicts, and he is now seeking to affirmatively use those conflicts to gain a tactical advantage at trial by excluding highly incriminating evidence to the benefit of not only his own client but also a co-defendant (Trump) whose PAC is paying his legal fees. The Court should not countenance this maneuver. [my emphasis]

Before they provided this implicit warning that if she makes such a decision, DOJ laid out how and why Taveras testified in DC, after the original indictment obtained in Florida. As I predicted, it’s because he had made false claims in an earlier appearance before the grand jury — one Woodward (who was still representing him) knew about.

In March, DOJ claims, Taveras gave false testimony to the grand jury about this, denying all knowledge of an attempt to destroy surveillance footage.

Before that, DOJ raised Woodward’s conflict, but he said he was not aware of one.

Then, after the June 8 indictment in Florida, DOJ warned Taveras, through Woodward, he was a target, and served two more subpoenas for surveillance footage. After serving the target letter, DOJ got DC Chief Judge James Boasberg involved and told Judge Cannon about it. Woodward raised no objection to a review of the conflict in DC. And that’s when Judge Boasberg assigned a public defender to advise Taveras, which led him to revise his testimony against Nauta and De Oliveira.

The target letter to Trump Employee 4 crystallized a conflict of interest arising from Mr. Woodward’s concurrent representation of Trump Employee 4 and Nauta. Advising Trump Employee 4 to correct his sworn testimony would result in testimony incriminating Mr. Woodward’s other client, Nauta; but permitting Trump Employee 4’s false testimony to stand uncorrected would leave Trump Employee 4 exposed to criminal charges for perjury. Moreover, an attorney for Trump had put Trump Employee 4 in contact with Mr. Woodward, and his fees were being paid by Trump’s political action committee (PAC). See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 453, 460 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (explaining that potential conflicts can be “further heightened by the financial dynamics of the joint representation,” where, for example, a client “did not independently select the” attorney but instead had the attorney “pre-selected for them by the attorney to the [person] who is the central focus of the grand jury proceedings”).

On June 27, 2023, consistent with its responsibility to promptly notify courts of potential conflicts, and given the prospective charges Trump Employee 4 faced in the District of Columbia, the Government filed a motion for a conflicts hearing with the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for District of Columbia (Boasberg, C.J.), who presides over grand jury matters in that district. The Government notified this Court on the same day, by sealed notice, of the filing in the District of Columbia. See ECF Nos. 45, 46. Mr. Woodward raised no objection to proceeding in the District of Columbia regarding Trump Employee 4. In fact, he responded that he “welcome[d] the Court’s inquiry into [his] representation of” Trump Employee 4, Response at 1, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 23-GJ-46 (D.D.C. June 30, 2023), but asserted that he had no “information to support the Government’s claim that [Trump Employee 4] has provided false testimony to the grand jury,” and that “even if [Trump Employee 4] did provide conflicting information to the grand jury such that could expose him to criminal charges, he has other recourse besides reaching a plea bargain with the Government. Namely, he can go to trial with the presumption of innocence and fight the charges as against him.” Id. at 3. According to Mr. Woodward, if Trump Employee 4 “wishes to become a cooperating Government witness, he has already been advised that he may do so at any time.” Id.

Chief Judge Boasberg made available independent counsel (the First Assistant in the Federal Public Defender’s Office for the District of Columbia) to provide advice to Trump Employee 4 regarding potential conflicts. On July 5, 2023, Trump Employee 4 informed Chief Judge Boasberg that he no longer wished to be represented by Mr. Woodward and that, going forward, he wished to be represented by the First Assistant Federal Defender. Immediately after receiving new counsel, Trump Employee 4 retracted his prior false testimony and provided information that implicated Nauta, De Oliveira, and Trump in efforts to delete security camera footage, as set forth in the superseding indictment. [my emphasis]

Because Taveras’ false statements to the grand jury were in DC, venue would have been DC.

Not only was it appropriate to use the grand jury to investigate false statements by Trump Employee 4 and De Oliveira, it was appropriate to use the grand jury in the District of Columbia, where the statements were made and where venue for any false-statement charges would be proper. See United States v. John, 477 F. App’x 570, 572 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (concluding that venue for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is “proper only in the district or districts where the defendant made the false statement”); United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction for perjurious grand jury testimony in the District of Columbia material to antitrust charges subsequently brought in the Northern District of Georgia). And it was necessary to bring to the attention of the Chief Judge in that district the potential conflict that arose from Mr. Woodward’s representation of Trump Employee 4 in those proceedings. As “an incident of [its] supervisory power, a court has jurisdiction” to consider potential conflicts of interest that “relate[] to a grand jury proceeding within that court’s control,” and when the Government discerns such a potential conflict of interest, it “is not only authorized but is in fact obligated to bring the problem to that court’s attention.” In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976)

The term of that grand jury ended on August 17.

Judge Cannon has already been reversed by the 11th Circuit in humiliating fashion on this matter once.

DOJ is trying to help her avoid a second reversal.

Meanwhile, twice in this filing (bolded above), DOJ notes that Woodward is being paid by Trump’s PAC. DOJ is inching closer to raising that as a separate conflict in his representation of Nauta.