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Conclusion To Series On Rights

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Conclusion to How Rights Went Wrong

In the last half of Jamal Greene’s book he gives us his explanation of a better way forward, and applies it to several controversial issues, including abortion and discrimination. Greene thinks that courts, especially SCOTUS, spend too much time on their made-up rules about about rights, instead of the rights themselves. He thinks all applicable rights claims have to be considered in rendering decisions and establishing remedies.

The Rodriguez case discussed in the last post is a good example. Kids are going to school with bats, but nothing can be done because of court-created rules designed to limit the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments. I think Greene is right about this.

I think that there are two problems underlying our current judicial approach that prevent Green’s ideas from being effectuated. First, immediately after the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments SCOTUS limited their reach. The purported reason was preservation of federalism, as we see in The Slaughterhouse Cases. But that doesn’t explain the ferocity with which the Court attacked individual rights and especially Congressional action up to the 1930s, and then after a short respite, returned to the attack beginning in the Reagan era and continuing to the present.

This, I think, reflects a deep skepticism of democracy, whether in claims of individual rights against governments, or in concerted political action through the legislature. It seems SCOTUS has little respect for rights claims of ordinary people regardless of whether the rights arise through legislation or under the Constitution.

The judicial branch has always been a bastion of the privileged elites, who mostly like things the way they are. Powerful commercial interests are heavily over-represented, and have always been. Lewis Powell, the author of Rodriguez, is an example.

The second issue, I think, is the general unwillingness of the judicial system to make rulings requiring other branches to enforce. As an example consider Holmes’ 1902 decision in Giles v. Harris, discussed by Greene. Giles, a Black man, had been registered to vote in Alabama for years. The Alabama Constitution was changed to allow local election registrars to deny registration to people who lacked good character. Giles was not allowed to register under the new system. Ovrall, registration of Black men drooped to nearly zero. There is no doubt that this was a violation of the 15th Amendment. Holmes refused to do anything. One of his reasons was that “…the sheer scale of the conspiracy Giles was alleging exceeded the Court’s power to remedy it.” P. 49.

Courts have always been concerned about their ability to enforce their decrees, and rightly so. But that’s not an excuse for simply refusing to enforce rights. Courts are really good at collecting money. Creative use of this power is a great solution to weakness.

For example, in the Rodriguez case Powell could have given the school district a money judgment large enough to construct a new school, one less friendly to bats, and awarded further monetary damages necessary to bring the school’s textbooks up to date and deal with other issues. He could have imposed costs and attorney’s fees on the school district, and awarded the plaintiffs monetary damages for the injuries they suffered by going to school with bats and ripped up out-of-date textbooks. That would open the door to other under-funded schools in Texas to sue the State and local districts to equalize things. The legislature eventually would have been forced change the funding arrangement.

A third issue, most pornounced in the current panel of SCOTUS, is its effort to justify its decisions by newly created doctrines. The so-called Major Questions Doctrine is an example. This was apparently created for the purpose of thwarting government efforts to remedy serious emergencies pursuant to express legislative action. Another example is the absurd result in US v. Trump, where the loons expressly denied that they were looking at the facts of the actual case:  Trump’s efforts to overthrow an election. Instead they insisted they had to make a rule for the ages.

This is preposterous because the right-wingers on the Court don’t have a problem throwing out cases and rules they don’t like.

There are many better ways forward, including Greene’s. But so what? All Republicans including those on SCOTUS are incorrigible. We can’t even get the current crop of geriatric Democrats to hold a hearing on the corruption we all know exists in the judicial system, ranging from the ethics violations of right-wing SCOTUS members to the scandalous judge-shopping of the creepy right wing, to the overtly political decisions of the District and Circuit Court in Fifth Circuit. The fact is that only sustained aggressive demands will ever change anything.

Conclusion To The Conclusion

In this series I’ve discussed three texts: The Evolution Of Agency by Michael Tomasello; Chapter 9 of The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt; and Greene’s thoughtful book.

Tomasello provided a look at the way we humans evolved. I think it hints at how we came to think about rights. He speculates that the earliest ancestors of humans were weaker, slower, more fragile, and had less sensitive eyes, ears and noses than their competitors. They survived by being more cooperative, more attuned to their group, more sensitive to the desires and emotions of individuals in the group. This increased receptiveness to others was the genesis and result of increasing brain size. The larger brain changed the bodies of women to enable birth babies with larger heads. That led to complications of birth. Dealing with those complications required more social cooperation. The longer dependency of the young also increased the demands of cooperation. These changes increased over time and eventually we became human. For a similar view, I recommend Eve by Cat Bohannon, which discusses evolution from the perspective of the female body and mind.

The importance of cooperation in this story leads me to speculate that rights are a way of maintaining individuality among creatures who are tightly bound for the sake of survival.

The Arendt selection says that rights are mutually guaranteed by equal citizens in a society. It also says that rights don’t matter unless there is some way to enforce and protect them. These are her conclusions about the last 200 years, not the earlier millenia.

Greene’s book tells us the story of our national attempt to insure our rights through the legislature and the judiciary, and the sad results.

I think everything we know and essentially all we think and think we know comes from other humans. That includes our rights. Some of us talk about natural rights, some about constitutional rights, some about human rights, some about God-given rights, but all of that comes from other humans and our own interpretations of their thinking. We draw from religions, philosophy, novels, catechisms, preachers, practical experience, our own emotions and sensitivities, laws, each other, our parents and teachers, our colleagues and our children.

But it’s always just us humans, trying to survive as individuals and as members of a group.

So I conclude with a question: how do you discuss questions of rights with people who believe that they possess the absolute unvarying truth?

 

 

 

Strict Scrutiny and Rational Basis Scrutiny

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Index to posts in this series

In Chapter 2 of How Rights Went Wrong, Jamal Greene introduces us to a rule of Constitutional interpretation suggested by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905).  The idea is that the Constitution protects few rights, but those it protects, it protects strongly. This cashes out as the requirement that the government must show very strong grounds if it infringes a protected right, the strict scrutiny test. However, the government need only show that it has a rational basis for other legislation, the rational basis test.

Chapter 3 explains how that rule came into effect, worked for a while, and then proved inadequate. The principle driver of change was Felix Frankfurter, showing once again the importance of people and relationships in the evolution of our legal system. Frankfurter was the son of Austrian immigrants. He came to New York City in 1894 at the age of 11. He was a star student, went to Harvard Law, and began to rise in government service. Greene describes him as “An inveterate sycophant and social climber” (p, 60). One of his targets was Holmes, and over the years, Frankfurter slobbered over him.

In 1914 Frankfurter joined the law faculty at Harvard and began to advocate for the Holmes dissent in Lochner. He was in and out of government service, and became a sort of Leonard Leo figure, placing his best students in clerkships and government positions.

He forged a relationship with Franklin Delano Roosevelt during WWI when both served on a government board. The relationship grew when FDR became governor of New York.

The effort to actualize Holmes’ Lochner dissent wasn’t going well through the 1920s, as the Supreme Court repeatedly applied the rule of the Lochner majority. When FDR was elected president, Frankfurter became one of his most trusted advisers. In the early years of the New Deal, SCOTUS struck down most of the laws enacted to deal with the Depression. That led to FDR’s threats to pack the Court, and to the sudden change in the outcomes of these cases.

US v. Carolene Products Co. was an early example. In that case, the majority based its decision on Frankfurter’s view of Holmes’ Lochner dissent. Further, it expanded that rule with Footnote 4, which Greene summarizes as holding that strict scrutiny would apply in three different cases:

(1) when the law interferes with a right the Constitution specifically protects, (2) when the law restricts the political process itself, or (3) when the law discriminates against particular religious or racial minorities. P. 66.

I read Greene as suggesting  that one of the factors in Frankfurter’s advocacy was his progressive view of the need for government regulation of corporations. Footnote 4 connects that view with strong protection for minority groups.

Greene shows how this rule made its way into the leading treatises and legal textbooks, largely through the influence of people trained and steeped in Frankfurter’s views.

With minor adjustments, that remained the rule through the 50s and early 60s. That was a period of vast social change, and social unrest, as Black people, women, LGBTQ people, Native Americans, and poor people from all groups began to make demands on the legal system that went beyond the bare scope of Footnote 4.

One example of this push is Griswold v. Connecticut, which Greene discusses in detail. One of Frankfurter’s last SCOTUS decisions was Poe v. Ullman; Poe was a facial challenge to Connecticut’s ban on birth control. Frankfurter punted, saying that the statute was never enforced. Side note: the legal term is desuetude. It ought to apply, for example, to the Comstock Act which isn’t ever enforced, but with the current majority on SCOTUS, who knows.

Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, got herself and a doctor arrested and convicted for dispensing birth control material and information. Frankfurter had retired due to a stroke. William O. Douglass, who had dissented in Poe, wrote the majority opinion in which he laid out the right to privacy.

In the remainder of the Chapter, Greene looks at the different ways courts, especially SCOTUS, have tried to deal with the demands of groups whose rights were limited by all branches of state and federal governments.

Discussion

1. Reading between the lines, it seems to me that Greene thinks that the values, biases, and opinions of judges play a crucial role in decisions. This is one of several versions of legal realism.

For the purposes of this Article, I define “legal realism” as the perspective that Supreme Court decisions resolving important constitutional law questions are based primarily on the Justices’ values, politics, and experiences, not on text, history, or precedent. In other words, personal preferences, rather than the prior law dictate most Supreme Court constitutional law decisions.

2. Here’s an example. Richard Posner is an intellectual. He served on the 7th Cir. From 1981 to 2017. He taught at the University of Chicago Law School for decades. He seems to have been influenced by the strict neoliberalism taught at the Chicago Business School. That connection perhaps led him to his theory of law and economics, which I would describe as the idea that in deciding cases Posner would assume that the law favors the economically efficient outcome.

In a 1985 article, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,  he analyzes crimes like rape in terms of markets and market efficiency, apparently indifferent to the inherent silliness of the effort.

Put differently, the prohibition against rape is to the marriage and sex “market” as the prohibition against theft is to explicit markets in goods and services. [footnote omitted]

After the Great Crash of 2008, he formally renounced the entire project of the Chicago School of economics, including his own law and economics branch. Here’s a discussion.  That, of course, is the mark of an intellectual: he rejected a theory he had relied on for decades when he saw it didn’t work.

2. Greene mentions the deeply felt trope that we have a government of laws, not men, citing John Adams. P. 58.  How does it square with the theory that the prejudices and deeply held world views of judges are a critical factor in their decisions?

In routine cases it’s not a problem. But it’s a huge problem for major constitutional law issues decided by SCOTUS. Neil Gorsuch pompously demonstrated this when he said at oral argument in Trump v. United States,  “…we’re writing a rule for the ages” about presidential immunity from criminal accountability. P. 140. That is not the job of a judge. Writing rules for the ages is the responsibility of legislatures. But the current majority doesn’t think like that. As they showed in Dobbs and the gun cases, they don’t even believe there are rules for the ages. There are only rules laid down by five unelected unaccountable lawyers, good only until changed by five other unelected unaccountable lawyers.

3. I think that when institutions are controlled by people willing to subvert the norms of their jobs to achieve ideological or political goals, the institutions will fail. There are no rules sufficient to restrain them. The only solution is to remove them and replace them with people who comply with the norms.
__________
Graphic: Gilbert Stuart’s portrait of John Adams.

SCOTUS Usurps Congressional Power

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In the previous post in this series I described the thesis of Jamal Greene’s How Rights Went Wrong. He says the Bill of Rights was designed to protect the power of states against intrusion by the newly created federal government. Chapter 1 provides evidence to support his conclusion. My original plan was to go over the evidence he cites. Instead, I have a different bit of evidence.

SCOTUS didn’t mention the Bill of Rights when it listed the rights of citizens of the United States in any of the seminal cases construing the Reconstruction Amendments.

The issue of individual rights under the 14th Amendment came before SCOTUS in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), which I discussed here. The majority says that there is a difference between the rights which Americans have as citizens of the United States on one hand, and the rights they have as citizens of a state on the other.

The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original instrument was accepted shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the true danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and concentrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined resistance to the General Government.

Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added largely to the number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government.

But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the State with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of property [sic] was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation.

So what does the majority say are the rights of citizens of the United States? Very few, all of which are set out in the main body of the Constitution. The majority cites several older cases, and describes each of them as saying that the rights we claim come from our status as citizens of a state.

But neither the majority nor any of the older cases point to the Bill of Rights as a source of our rights as citizens of the US. None of them say that as citizens of the United States we have a right to a jury trial, or to freedom of speech, or any other right in the Bill of Rights.

In that section of The Slaughterhouse Cases the Court says the opposite. It says that the 14th Amendment does not change the principle that our rights come from our status as citizens of a state.

As we saw in earlier posts on the Second Founding, subsequent decisions of SCOTUS including United States v. Cruikshank  and The Civil Rights Cases take the same position, and strike down all of the remedial legislation enacted by Congress under the 14th Amendment to give civil liberties to all citizens including Black people. These cases led us to Plessy v. Ferguson. All of them stand for the proposition that the Reconstruction Amendments do not grant rights to U.S. citizens, and that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant such rights.

Congress gave up trying, and nothing happened to repair the damage of slavery or bring an end to Jim Crow segregation for 70 years.

Discussion

1. SCOTUS ignores America history and its own precedents when it puts itself in charge of our rights. It wasn’t that way in 1792, and it wasn’t that way in the late 1800s. That whole thing was invented in the 20th Century as SCOTUS began to say that the provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to individuals through the Due Process Clause. The concept of due process has a legal definition, and this isn’t it. We now call it “substantive due process,” and I have never understood how it’s supposed to work. Clarence Thomas agrees, calling substantive due process a “legal fiction” in  MacDonald v. City of Chicago, Thomas J. concurring.

Here’s the Wikipedia entry on substantive due process.  I’m not sure I agree with it completely, particularly the pre-Civil War material. Here’s another which seems closer to what I remember from law school.

2. So where do our rights come from? In early cases under the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court says that our rights come from the states. Rights might be found in a state constitution, or in statutes enacted by state legislatures. That means there is no agreed set of rights held by all of us. It means that there is nothing significant to the idea of being a citizen of the U.S. It also means that we have to go from state to state amending laws and constitutions to protect our liberty.

In this post, I pointed to Hannah Arendt’s view of rights. She thinks that rights only exist among people living in societies that are based on equality as citiznes. In those societies rights arise from a mutual guarantee. We give each other rights, and agree to enforcement mechanisms; and we benefit by having the same rights. That certainly doesn’t point to courts as the source of rights. It points to founding documents, and to the legislature. The courts and the executive branch serve only as enforcement mechanisms.

Each of the Reconstruction Amendments expressly empowers Congress to pass legislation to enforce them. This is a power given to Congress, not to SCOTUS. The idea that SCOTUS gets to overrule the exercise of expressly authorized power by Congress is not in the Constitution or any amendment.

I note in passing that the argument in Shelby County v. Holder, striking down a critical part of the Voting Rights Act, is the dignity of the states. That’s a term cited by John Roberts, a long-time foe of the Voting Rights Act and other legislation broadening democratic rights. Dignity is very important when it comes to states limiting the right to vote, says Roberts.

In Trump v. United States, the right-wingers granted the President almost total immunity in the exercise of official duties. It said in essence that citizens can’t hold Presidents accountable civilly or criminally, and it hamstrung any enforcement that might not have been foreclosed.

That’s how we should treat Congressional actions, including legislation and investigation related to its powers under the Constitution. That’s how we get our rights. We petition Congress for rights, and if granted, they are ours without regard to what five unelected zealots scribble.

On This Fourth of July, We Have to Sing

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The Fourth is a day of rest, because tomorrow is the Fifth

On this Fourth of July, I think of the Fifth of July in 1852. On that day, Frederick Douglass spoke in Rochester, New York, about the national celebration that took place the day before. He opened his remarks by looking backwards:

This, for the purpose of this celebration, is the 4th of July. It is the birthday of your National Independence, and of your political freedom. This, to you, is what the Passover was to the emancipated people of God. It carries your minds back to the day, and to the act of your great deliverance; and to the signs, and to the wonders, associated with that act that day.

He described that day long past, that act of great deliverance, and noted that things had changed in some serious ways:

To say now that America was right, and England wrong, is exceedingly easy. Everybody can say it; the dastard, not less than the noble brave, can flippantly discant on the tyranny of England towards the American Colonies. It is fashionable to do so; but there was a time when, to pronounce against England, and in favor of the cause of the colonies, tried men’s souls. They who did so were accounted in their day, plotters of mischief, agitators and rebels, dangerous men. To side with the right, against the wrong, with the weak against the strong, and with the oppressed against the oppressor! here lies the merit, and the one which, of all others, seems unfashionable in our day. The cause of liberty may be stabbed by the men who glory in the deeds of your fathers.

Oops. Words became easy by 1852, as they were twisted by those seeking to be oppressors themselves. To his hearers, this line had to have sounded like thunder in the distance, putting them on notice that a storm was brewing in Douglass’ words. But Douglass took his time getting to the storm, continuing to tell the stories of the days of the founders and their efforts to throw off the British yoke. Having taken his time, however, Douglass brought the storm.

The causes which led to the separation of the colonies from the British crown have never lacked for a tongue. They have all been taught in your common schools, narrated at your firesides, unfolded from your pulpits, and thundered from your legislative halls, and are as familiar to you as household words. They form the staple of your national poetry and eloquence. . . .

I leave, therefore, the great deeds of your fathers to other gentlemen whose claim to have been regularly descended will be less likely to be disputed than mine!

My business, if I have any here today, is with the present. The accepted time with God and his cause is the ever-living now. . . .

Fellow-citizens, pardon me, allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here today? What have I, or those I represent, to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us? and am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits and express devout gratitude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us? . . .

But, such is not the state of the case. I say it with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common.-The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought life and healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony.

And thus the thundering “BOOM” is no long sounding in the distance for Douglass’ hearers, but right there in their midst as Douglass spoke. There’s more, a lot more, to what Frederick Douglass had to say that day, and every word of it bears reading.

On this Fourth of July, I wonder what the Fifth of July, 2024, will bring.

Perhaps King Charles of Great Britain will be writing to Chief Justice Roberts about the words of his majority opinion in Trump v United States. I can imagine His Majesty politely asking Roberts when Great Britain will be getting its North American colonies back, since SCOTUS has now overturned the unfortunate, mistaken allegations about the long-ago acts of his royal predecessor, George III. If a mere president like Trump is entitled to absolute immunity when he or she uses official powers that are core to his or her office, surely the same extends to an actual king like his ancestor George III, the opinions of Thomas Jefferson et al. notwithstanding. It may have taken Ye Olde Colonies almost 250 years to overrule, void, and repudiate the Declaration of Independence, but I’m sure King Charles would be gracious and let bygones be bygones.

On this Fourth of July, on a more serious note, I think of the musician Paul Simon. In late 1968, his musical partner Art Garfunkel suggested that Simon listen to a musical tune he had come across. It was centuries old, with German lyrics, but it was the music that grabbed Simon. They were looking to craft a Christmas album, but not using the usual Christmas classics. Simon was captured by the music, but was not able to come up suitable lyrics to fit a Christmas album.

It was the “Christmas” part that was the problem. As Simon said about his songwriting process,

I spend more time writing music than writing words. The music always precedes the words. The words often come from the sound of the music and eventually evolve into coherent thoughts. Or incoherent thoughts. Rhythm plays a crucial part in the lyric-making as well. It’s like a puzzle to find the right words to express what the music is saying.

The music that Garfunkel played for Simon was a part of Bach’s St. Matthew’s Passion that became the stand-alone hymn “O Sacred Head, Now Wounded.” Even without the words, Bach’s music has the feel of conflict, betrayal, and death. Bach’s music was not the music of Christmas, but Lent. But even though he couldn’t make the tune work for that Christmas album (that never got made), Simon didn’t forget that music, and he finally found the right words to express what the music was saying.

Many’s the time I’ve been mistaken
And many times confused
Yes, and I’ve often felt forsaken
And certainly misused
Oh, but I’m all right, I’m all right
I’m just weary to my bones
Still, you don’t expect to be bright and bon vivant
So far away from home
So far away from home

In the wake of the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, as the Vietnam War continued to spew destruction and death in ever-larger measure, and as Richard Nixon was elected president, Simon mourned for his country. He knew the pain of national mistakes, the fog of confusion over the nation’s founding story, and the forsakenness of separation from what that long-ago Fourth of July promised. And he and his nation were, above all, weary.

And yet.

And yet, the mistakes, the confusion, the forsakenness, and the weariness were not the end of the song. Skipping past the second verse and the bridge, Simon ends “American Tune” like this:

For we come on the ship they call the Mayflower
We come on the ship that sailed the moon
We come in the age’s most uncertain hour
And sing an American tune
But it’s all right, it’s all right, all right
You can’t be forever blessed
Still, tomorrow’s going to be another working day
And I’m trying to get some rest
That’s all I’m trying to get some rest

I’ve heard Simon’s version of this song hundreds of times, and also versions sung by all kinds of others. Two of the covers I like the best are those of Willie Nelson and Allen Toussaint. (Toussaint recorded it for his last album, which was released after his death.) In both Nelson’s country twang and Toussaint’s jazz/blues vocalizations, each voice resonates with the knowledge of mistakes, confusion, and forsakenness, and both also sing with the knowledge that despite the weariness, the work continues.

On this Fourth of July, I know that tomorrow — the Fifth of July — is another working day for this nation. As Frederick Douglass knew, it is a day to repair the mistakes, dispel the confusion, and welcome those who feel forsaken.

Allow me to say, in conclusion, notwithstanding the dark picture I have this day presented, of the state of the nation, I do not despair of this country. There are forces in operation, which must inevitably, work the downfall of slavery. “The arm of the Lord is not shortened,” and the doom of slavery is certain.

I, therefore, leave off where I began, with hope. While drawing encouragement from “the Declaration of Independence,” the great principles it contains, and the genius of American Institutions, my spirit is also cheered by the obvious tendencies of the age. Nations do not now stand in the same relation to each other that they did ages ago. No nation can now shut itself up, from the surrounding world, and trot round in the same old path of its fathers without interference. The time was when such could be done. Long established customs of hurtful character could formerly fence themselves in, and do their evil work with social impunity. Knowledge was then confined and enjoyed by the privileged few, and the multitude walked on in mental darkness. But a change has now come over the affairs of mankind. Walled cities and empires have become unfashionable. The arm of commerce has borne away the gates of the strong city. Intelligence is penetrating the darkest corners of the globe. It makes its pathway over and under the sea, as well as on the earth. Wind, steam, and lightning are its chartered agents. Oceans no longer divide, but link nations together. From Boston to London is now a holiday excursion. Space is comparatively annihilated.-Thoughts expressed on one side of the Atlantic, are distinctly heard on the other. . . .

No abuse, no outrage whether in taste, sport or avarice, can now hide itself from the all-pervading light.

The Fourth of July is a day of rest, my friends, because the Fifth of July is a day of work.

And we’ve got a lot of work to do.

How Courts Came to Control Our Rights

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Index to posts in this series

In Chapter 1 of How Rights Went Wrong, Jamal Greene goes through the actual history of the origin of the Bill of Rights. I think most of us were taught that the Bill of Rights is a list of rights that go with being US citizens. Courts are the arbiters of the meaning of the Constitution, so they protect the minority from overreaching by the majority. That’s not what Greene sees.

The Constitution doesn’t give individuals very many rights. It bars ex post facto laws, and bills of attainder, gives people a right to trial by jury, and a few other rights, not much compared to the rights people thought they have.

The Anti-Federalists objected to the Constitution in large part because of the absence of a bill of rights. They claimed to fear that the central government would infringe on the power of the states just like the British kings had done. The people living at that time were very interested in their individual rights, but according to Greene:

… within Founding-era political thought, the institutions best suited to reconcile the competing demands of rights bearers were not courts but rather state and local political bodies: juries, churches, families, and legislatures. Democracy was not a tool of majoritarian oppression but rather was the means through which a community prevented oppression from the outside. P. 7.

The key phrase here is “reconcile the competing demands of rights bearers.” Greene thinks the goal of the Bill of Rights was to center the balancing of rights claims at the local and state levels, and to keep it out of the hands of the federal government.

This theory was consistent with the political power structures of that era, with local and state governments having the dominant role. Many of the states were run by the rich: slavers, merchants and bankers in varying proportions in each of the states. None of these people were willing to cede much power to the federal government not least because it might interfere with their own power and their own profits. The Federalists held plenty of power in their own states, and had no reason not to agree.

Side note: I may be reading some of this into Greene’s words. He doesn’t discuss power and wealth, but I think this is a fair reading of his words:

The backers of the Bill of Rights were not interested in protecting minorities from majority tyranny. They were interested in protecting their own governing majorities from others who might have different interests or agendas. P. 13

The purpose of the Bill of Rights was not to protect individuals from the tyranny of the majority. It was to protect state and local governments from interference and control by the federal government. Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights in their own words apply to the powers of Congress: “Congress shall make no law”. Only a few of them seem to give rights to individuals, or protect individuals from the power of the States to regulate as they see fit. In fact, as we will see, most states and the federal government enacted laws that seem to violate the express provisions of the Bill of Rights.

Greene says the theory that state and local governments, juries, and private institutions like churches and schools were best positioned to deal with rights claims was destroyed in the Civil War.

Greene goes through each of the first 10 Amendments in the second half of Chapter 1. I’ll look at some of those in the next post.

Discussion

1. So how did the Supreme Court gain control over our rights? SCOTUS claimed the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution. In Dred Scott, it aggressively asserted that it was in charge of the slavery question, no matter what Congress and the people wanted. After the Civil War, instead of refashioning the Supreme Court and insisting on their proper role in control of our rights, Congress and the Executive gave the judiciary a large role in the enforcement of the laws and our rights, including in several Civil Rights laws.

From the beginning, SCOTUS resisted the force of the Reconstruction Amendments. In The Slaughterhouse Cases, there is a nice statement of the goal of the !3th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. Then the Court says it can’t possibly really mean much by that, so those old racists went on to say that the rights of Black people, women and Native Americans were still controlled by the states. In a series of cases SCOTUS restricted the power of Congress to carry out the intent of those amendments, and repurposed them to protect corporations.

After a few decades SCOTUS decided that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment applied against the states, effectively creating a whole set of national rights for individuals which it claimed to find in the Bill of Rights. It claims that the rights it finds there are absolute, and cannot be touched by our government. Congress and the Presidents acquiesced. That’s how we find ourselves under the thumb of a rogue SCOTUS.

2. The current conservative majority agrees with those old courts. They restrict congressional and executive powers. They put crucial matters like women’s health and welfare in the hands of states. They approves of state actions to gerrymander and suppress voters to make sure minorities in those states can dominate the majority. Every disgusting decision the six right-wingers hand down would fit fine with their Reconstruction-era predecessors. Every policy choice they make would satisfy the demands of the Gilded Age Plutocrats.

The founders were rich white men infused with the biases of their day. There were slavers and people willing to compromise with slavers for their own reasons. They agreed that the lives of enslaved people and Native Americans didn’t matter, and that women weren’t really people. Those views informed their drafting of our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Why should they control ours? But Roberts and his majority are trapping us in the amber of those ignorant prejudices.

King John Would Like a Word with Justice Alito

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The Magna Carta Monument, Runnymede England

I am annoyed by folks who claim to love history and are blind to it. I am disgusted by folks who claim to love history, are willfully blind to it, and in their willful blindness try to use their power to inflict damage on others.

Why yes, I *did* listen to the oral arguments at SCOTUS today. Why do you ask?

sigh

Here’s an exchange between Justice Alito and Michael Dreeben, speaking for the government:

JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Dreeben, you dispute the proposition that a former president has some form of immunity.

MR. DREEBEN: Mm-hmm.

JUSTICE ALITO: But, as I understand your argument, you do recognize that a former president has a form of special protection, namely, that statutes that are applicable to everybody must be interpreted differently under some circumstances when they are applied to a former president.

Isn’t that true?

MR. DREEBEN: It is true because, Justice Alito, of the general principle that courts construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions. And that has been the longstanding practice of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice.

JUSTICE ALITO: All right. So this is more, I think, than just a — a quarrel about terminology, whether what the former president gets is some form of immunity or some form of special protection because it involves this difference which I’m sure you’re very well aware of.

If it’s just a form of special protection, in other words, statutes will be interpreted differently as applied to a former president, then that is something that has to be litigated at trial. The — the former president can make a motion to dismiss and may cite OLC opinions, and the district court may say: Well, that’s fine, I’m not bound by OLC and I interpret it differently, so let’s go to trial.

And then there has to be a trial, and that may involve great expense and it may take up a lot of time, and during the trial, the — the former president may be unable to engage in other activities that the former president would want to engage in. And then the outcome is dependent on the jury, the instructions to the jury and how the jury returns a verdict, and then it has to be taken up on appeal.

So the protection is greatly diluted if you take the form — if it takes the form that you have proposed. Now why is that better?

MR. DREEBEN: It’s better because it’s more balanced. The — the blanket immunity that Petitioner is arguing for just means that criminal prosecution is off the table, unless he says that impeachment and conviction have occurred.

Oh, the horrors of forcing a former president to defend himself in a trial! So sayeth Justice Alito, he who cites a 17th century English witchburner of a jurist (who also invented the marital rape exception), in order to justify denying women bodily autonomy.

If Justice Alito is fond of citing old English judicial writings, let me walk him back another 4 centuries and introduce him to John, by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou.

Once upon a time — long before a bunch of rabble-rousing colonial insurrectionists said that “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” — there was a little dustup between John, by the grace of God King of England etc., and a bunch of his barons, as well as various bishops and archbishops. The barons and clergy, distressed at what seemed to them to be very ill treatment at the hand of their king, expressed their frustrations in a manner that could not be ignored.

In June 1215, John and the barons negotiated an agreement. In it, after an introduction and 60 separate clauses in which King John agreed to various reforms and promised to make specific restitution in various particular cases that were demanded by his barons, the 1215 version of the Magna Carta ends like this:

* (61) SINCE WE [ed: John] HAVE GRANTED ALL THESE THINGS for God, for the better ordering of our kingdom, and to allay the discord that has arisen between us and our barons, and since we desire that they shall be enjoyed in their entirety, with lasting strength, for ever, we give and grant to the barons the following security:

The barons shall elect twenty-five of their number to keep, and cause to be observed with all their might, the peace and liberties granted and confirmed to them by this charter.

If we, our chief justice, our officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any man, or transgress any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made known to four of the said twenty-five barons, they shall come to us – or in our absence from the kingdom to the chief justice – to declare it and claim immediate redress. If we, or in our absence abroad the chief justice, make no redress within forty days, reckoning from the day on which the offence was declared to us or to him, the four barons shall refer the matter to the rest of the twenty-five barons, who may distrain upon and assail us in every way possible, with the support of the whole community of the land, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, or anything else saving only our own person and those of the queen and our children, until they have secured such redress as they have determined upon. Having secured the redress, they may then resume their normal obedience to us.

Any man who so desires may take an oath to obey the commands of the twenty-five barons for the achievement of these ends, and to join with them in assailing us to the utmost of his power. We give public and free permission to take this oath to any man who so desires, and at no time will we prohibit any man from taking it. Indeed, we will compel any of our subjects who are unwilling to take it to swear it at our command.

If one of the twenty-five barons dies or leaves the country, or is prevented in any other way from discharging his duties, the rest of them shall choose another baron in his place, at their discretion, who shall be duly sworn in as they were.

In the event of disagreement among the twenty-five barons on any matter referred to them for decision, the verdict of the majority present shall have the same validity as a unanimous verdict of the whole twenty-five, whether these were all present or some of those summoned were unwilling or unable to appear.

The twenty-five barons shall swear to obey all the above articles faithfully, and shall cause them to be obeyed by others to the best of their power.

We will not seek to procure from anyone, either by our own efforts or those of a third party, anything by which any part of these concessions or liberties might be revoked or diminished. Should such a thing be procured, it shall be null and void and we will at no time make use of it, either ourselves or through a third party.

* (62) We have remitted and pardoned fully to all men any ill-will, hurt, or grudges that have arisen between us and our subjects, whether clergy or laymen, since the beginning of the dispute. We have in addition remitted fully, and for our own part have also pardoned, to all clergy and laymen any offences committed as a result of the said dispute between Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign (i.e. 1215) and the restoration of peace.

In addition we have caused letters patent to be made for the barons, bearing witness to this security and to the concessions set out above, over the seals of Stephen archbishop of Canterbury, Henry archbishop of Dublin, the other bishops named above, and Master Pandulf.

* (63) IT IS ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the English Church shall be free, and that men in our kingdom shall have and keep all these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably in their fullness and entirety for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all things and all places for ever.

Both we and the barons have sworn that all this shall be observed in good faith and without deceit. Witness the abovementioned people and many others.

Given by our hand in the meadow that is called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June in the seventeenth year of our reign (i.e. 1215: the new regnal year began on 28 May).

Note the third paragraph, that begins “If we, our chief justice, . . .” In that paragraph, King John, by the grace of God King of England etc., is agreeing that he and his administration are not immune from accountability.

John and the barons agreed on a process for adjudicating disputes. They agreed on a panel that could both bring charges and judge them.  They agreed on how the panel should be chosen, and how the panel should select new members at the death of old ones. They agreed on how many members of the panel needed to agree in order for a judgment to be final. They agreed on a time frame for restitution. Most importantly, should John be found to have violated the terms of this document and yet refuse restitution, John, by the grace of God King of England etc., agreed that his castles and lands could be seized under order of the panel to make restitution for what he had done, or his officials had done on his behalf.

To be fair, the Magna Carta was changed and altered in the years and centuries that followed. But the original text of the original version makes it clear that even the King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou does not enjoy absolute immunity.

Trump may wish to be a monarch with absolute immunity and not a president.

Alito may wish to treat him as a monarch with absolute immunity and not a president.

But in a meadow at Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, John, by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou, said no. That’s not how even a divinely appointed monarch is to be treated.

SCOTUS Lines Up Behind Trump’s Defensive Strategy

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There is no doubt the Republicans on SCOTUS (hereinafter R-SCOTUS) are lined up behind Trump in his criminal cases. The timeline in the ridiculous immunity case and the decision in the Colorado ballot case are clear demonstrations of their commitment to his reelection despite his obvious unfitness for office.

The Colorado case

In Trump v. Anderson,  all nine members of SCOTUS agreed that Colorado can not keep Trump off the ballot under the  Insurrection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The per curium opinion offers several weak reasons to support this result.

Barrett and the Democratic appointees expressly dissented from the majority’s holding that only Congress can enforce the Insurrection Clause, and only with the approval of SCOTUS. The majority concludes with this:

These are not the only reasons the States lack power to enforcethis particular constitutional provision with respect to federal offices. But they are important ones, and it is the combination of all the reasons set forth in this opinion—not, as some of our colleagues would have it, just one particular rationale—that resolves this case. In our view, each of these reasons is necessary to provide a complete explanation for the judgment the Court unanimously reaches.

Restrictions on Congressional Enforcement of the Insurrection Clause

That last quote refers to the part of the per curium opinion saying that § 5 of the 14th Amendment

… limits congressional legislation enforcing Section 3, because Section 5 is strictly “remedial.” To comply with that limitation, Congress “must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing” the specific conduct the relevant provision prohibits. Section 3, unlike other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes conduct of individuals. … Any congressional legislation enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870 and §2383, reflect “congruence and proportionality” between preventing or remedying that conduct “and the means adopted to that end.” Citations omitted.

The women on SCOTUS agree that this is unnecessary for the decision. It’s purely a creation of the SCOTUS men. It prescribes no standards, and it arrogates power to SCOTUS at the expense of Congress.

I note that the claim that the 14th Amendment only applies to the actions of individuals is the invention of an earlier SCOTUS, in cases like US v. Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases, which I discuss here and here. The Congress that drafted the 14th Amendment thought it had the power to legislate against the KKK and other violent white supremacists acting in their private capacity. For example, in Cruikshank, SCOTUS said principles of federalism mean that the 14th Amendment only applies to state action. Those early  rancid decisions are never questioned even though we now have thousands of federal laws governing individuals.

The kicker is that any restrictions on Congress say nothing about limitations on the States. And any limitations SCOTUS dreams up to control Congress of power can just as easily be applied to the states, and with just as much historical and legal justification.

Manipulating the ridiculous immunity claim

Trump, who already defied the norm of a peaceful transition of power, also defies the principle that no one is above the law. He says that no president can be prosecuted for crimes committed while in office unless they are first impeached. He agrees with Richard Nixon “Well, when the president does it … that means that it is not illegal.”

This is an interlocutory appeal. The decision of the Circuit Court was clearly right. There was no need for SCOTUS to take this case at this state of the proceedings. No one thinks the president is entitled to blanket immunity. After sitting on it for two weeks, SCOTUS set the case for “expedited” review seven weeks later. Who knows when they’ll issue a ruling.

It would be stupid for SCOTUS to take up the claim that Trump is immune from prosecution for any and all crimes committed in his official capacity. So SCOTUS rephrased the question presented:

Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

This phrasing enables SCOTUS to screw up the trial by all sorts of legal trickery. For example, Trump is charged with “knowingly” participating in conspiracies. SCOTUS could hold that Trump is entitled to a presumption of immunity, and that the prosecution has the burden of proof on whether Trump intended to take actions outside his official duties. That would dramatically increase the burden on the prosecution.

I’m sure R-SCOTUS can come up with better ideas than mine.

Bad judging

I think R-SCOTUS members are bad at judging. They claim to be originalists, but that’s not what they did in the ballot case. The per curium opinion selectively quotes one iota of the history of the 14th Amendment and ignores the rest. It doesn’t address the mountains of information provided in the two amicus briefs filed by historians. It’s solely based on outcomes.

I discussed good judging in my post on Dobbs.  As I see it, good judging at the appellate level is solving hard problems in the way most likely to produce the best possible long-term results. Past cases and history are not absolutely binding, but provide guidance and wisdom (sometimes) from other judges. For this rule, I rely on Judge Richard Posner’s views, and those of Oliver Wendell Holmes and John Dewey’s pragmatism, but I won’t rehash that here.

What R-SCOTUS does is invent a bunch of reasons why their preferred outcome is right. The per curium opinion is jumbled to the point that they feel obligated to justify its lack of coherence.

The dissent relies on principles of federalism, as the majority claims to do. It then looks at the likely outcomes of the Colorado case and explains why those outcomes are bad for the nation. It says that the Constitution doesn’t require that bad outcome. The dissenters give us exactly what Posner expects: their judgment of what is best for the future. They may be right. They certainly are right to refuse to go beyond what’s needed to resolve the present case; that’s a critical guardrail against overreach.

Why though?

The per curium decision all but insures that Trump will not be subject to disqualification under the Insurrection Clause. The timetable for the absurd immunity claim, and the mischief that awaits us from their decision is additional insurance.

I do not understand why R-SCOTUS is in the bag for Trump. They have life tenure, a decent income, and constant security. They have enormous power, to the point that no law or rule is effective without their consent. They have a long to-do list of laws and rules destined for termination. Why waste any of their muscle on Trump?

The easy answer is that they’re corrupt. There’s plenty of evidence of that. Clarence Thomas? His insurrectionist-adjacent wife? And a free RV? Alito, with his giant salmon? Neil Gorsuch’s house? Brett Kavanaugh’s disappearing debts? John Roberts’ wife with her $10 million from BigLaw for legal recruiting? Their total indifference to ethics and the appearance of impropriety?

But that probably isn’t it, unless Trump or someone else holds receipts for this and whatever else there might be, and made it clear those receipts would become public. And I don’t see why that would benefit the filthy rich donors who put these people into power. They set that to-do list and they don’t need Trump to get it done.

Gratitude? At this level there’s precious little of that.

Is it the purely political calculation that any action taken against Trump is too dangerous? Are they worried that his hard-core followers, armed to the teeth by R-SCOTUS cases, will riot or even attack SCOTUS if they rule against Trump? Do they think that normal people will bitch but still comply with their rulings in his favor and accept his potential election peacefully?

Is there something worse that innocents like me can’t even imagine?

Conclusion To Series on The Reconstruction Era

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Index to posts in this series

This series was motivated by recent scholarship arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, gave our nation a new beginning, one centered on equality of citizens. I discussed The Nation That Never Was by Kermit Roosevelt; The Second Founding by Eric Foner, and Beloved by Toni Morrison, I also discussed several Supreme Court cases from that era, The Slaughterhouse Cases, US v. Cruikshank, and The Civil Rights Cases; and several recent SCOTUS cases continuing their foul legacy. Enough. Here are some final thoughts.

1. Once again I’m reminded of the astonishing amount I don’t know. I think my education as a young person was reasonably solid. But I have no memory of any of the history I’ve discussed in this series. As I recall, I was taught that we passed the Reconstruction Amendments after the Civil War, that Johnson was impeached, and that Grant was corrupt. Then we learned about a the civil service laws, a little early labor history, the financial collapses caused by speculators and frauds, and the reforms of the Progressive Era. I didn’t learn about Plessy v. Ferguson until my first mandatory history course in college. It’s worse today, of course.

Much of what I’ve written about here is posted under Left Theory, because I’ve tried to focus on abstract ideas that might provide a framework for thinking about a left version of the future. It’s hard to get worked up about ideas, which suited me as I didn’t want to write rage posts. But there’s nothing abstract about this series.

I was enraged from the beginning by the insistence of the Founding Fathers on enabling a brutal slave system while yammering about Enlightenment Ideals. Thomas Jefferson enslaved his own children with Sally Hemings even as he claimed that all men are created equal. Maybe Roosevelt is right to say Jefferson was talking about the state of nature but the contrast between ideas and practice is grotesque and disgusting. How are we supposed to accommodate it in our veneration of the Founding Fathers?

The Reconstruction Amendments were drafted by men who had waged and survived the Civil War, knew that the slavers started it, and wanted to stamp out slavery as part of the crushing victory they achieved. Voters elected Senators and Representatives who knew that the slavers had never accepted defeat; that they intended to enforce White Supremacy by force and by legalized resistance, the KKK or state legislatures. Between 1865 and 1875 Congress enacted numerous laws to enforce equal rights for all citizens, regardless of race.

The Supreme Court refused to recognize the Reconstruction Amendments or laws passed pursuant to those amendments. They read the Privileges and Immunities Clause out of the 14th Amendment. They narrowed all three amendments, and ignored the part giving Congress the power to legislate to enforce ir known purpose. Congress passed more laws, and the Supreme Court swatted them away. The Court intentionally substituted its policy preferences for those of the elected branches of government.

I’ve never claimed to be an expert in any of the areas I’ve written about here at Emptywheel. I only claim to be willing to engage with the text and to try to give it a fair reading. But this was simply too emotionally charged. Maybe someone else could read this material as if it were an essay by John Locke, but not me. And to think that a vast majority of moraly and intellectually deficient Red State politicians want to walk away from it — no. Just no.

2. Much of the material in the last part of the series revolves around the role of the Supreme Court and its centuries of rejection of majority rule. But that’s not the whole story. If a majority of White voters thought the Freedmen and their own Black neighbors were their equals they could have forced change one way or another. But while many, perhaps most, white people were sympathetic, that didn’t mean they were ready to accept Black people as equals.

This point is illustrated by a scene in Beloved. Long after the end of the Civil War Denver, a Black woman, desperately needs a job. She goes to the home of the Bodwin’s, the people who helped her grandmother and mother afterthey escaped from slavery. She knocks on the front door, and Janey Wagon, the Bodwin’s maid, opens it.

“Yes?”
“May I come in?”
“What you want?”
….
“I’m looking for work. I was thinking they might know of some.”
“You Baby Suggs’ kin, ain’t you?”
“Yes, ma’am.”
“Come on in. You letting in flies.” She led Denver toward the kitchen, saying, “First thing you have to know is what door to knock on.” P. 297-8.

Even the Bodwin’s, who were aggressively anti-slavery, didn’t let Black people enter at the front door. I’d guess this was the dominant attitude in that era. Citizenship was one thing. But there was little, if any, support for social equality.

One piece of evidence supporting the view that the national consensus was that social equality was impossible can be found in a 1910 editorial in the New York Times, supporting a Jim Crow law requiring separation of Black and White people on railroad cars in interstate commerce. The Times says the case, Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio RR, reverses an earlier decision barring such discrimination.

The present decision reveals the influence of the change in public opinion since the reconstruction era: it justifies both the law and compliance with it by the carrier, and permits the rest of the Southern States to amend their “Jim Crow” laws after the example of Kentucky.

The Southern Legislatures, thwarted during the first years following the civil war in their efforts to separate negroes from whites in public conveyances, have gradually passed laws to this effect in every State save Missouri, and the courts have sustained them.

Without public opinion on their side, Black people were left to their own devices, treated as second-class citizens by state and federal governments. Over time the national mood turned into indifference to violent White Supremacist attacks on Black People. This mood was reflected in Supreme Court decisions in cases like Plessy v. Ferguson. That indifference didn’t even begin to change until the 1950s. White Supremacists, closet racists, and pandering politicians continue to fight a rear-guard action with plenty of wins.

That thought takes the edge off the fury and exposes a deeper layer of emotions: sadness that just like the Founding Fathers we do not live up to our professed ideals.

Thomas, Alito and Christmas Cookies

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You have heard about the private jet and yacht trips given to Clarence Thomas, the jet trips given to Samuel Alito, etc. The stories of this type of absolute impropriety are seemingly endless.

Senior Massachusetts District Judge Michael Ponsor has penned an op-ed in today’s New York Times: in which he discuses the acceptable limits of what federal judges can take as grift. It is quite good and not very long, I’d suggest a read of it.

What has gone wrong with the Supreme Court’s sense of smell?

I joined the federal bench in 1984, some years before any of the justices currently on the Supreme Court. Throughout my career, I have been bound and guided by a written code of conduct, backed by a committee of colleagues I can call on for advice. In fact, I checked with a member of that committee before writing this essay.
….
The recent descriptions of the behavior of some of our justices and particularly their attempts to defend their conduct have not just raised my eyebrows; they’ve raised the whole top of my head. Lavish, no-cost vacations? Hypertechnical arguments about how a free private airplane flight is a kind of facility? A justice’s spouse prominently involved in advocating on issues before the court without the justice’s recusal? Repeated omissions in mandatory financial disclosure statements brushed under the rug as inadvertent? A justice’s taxpayer-financed staff reportedly helping to promote her books? Private school tuition for a justice’s family member covered by a wealthy benefactor? Wow.

This is FAR beyond “the appearance of impropriety”, it is actual impropriety. Any judge and/or lawyer with even an ounce of ethics knows this, and it is patently obvious. It is wrong.

Let me give you an analogy that demonstrates how absurd Thomas and Alito really are.

Many, many years ago, a junior partner in our firm decided to be nice to the local county level judges we practiced in front of. So she got a bunch of boxes of Christmas cookies from a local custom cookie place and tried to deliver them to the pertinent judges for Christmas.They were just local superior court judges, not SCOTUS level. They turned them down, and there were a bunch of cookies suddenly in our kitchen and lounge.

There were a lot of attorneys, including me, both prosecution and defense, that used to drink at a local downtown dive bar after 5 pm. Judges, both federal and state, came in too. The lawyers always swapped rounds. But not the judges, they always paid for their own.

Nobody in the world would have carped about it if the judges would have eaten the cookies, nor had the judges gotten a free drink. They just did not. It was pretty admirable.

And now, when such things should be far more apparent, we have a Supreme Court that thinks they are entitled to the graft and grift. Do I think that makes them “corrupt” per se? I do not know that, we shall see how it all plays out further.

SCOTUS Takes Over

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Good boy, Congress! Now it’s your turn President

SCOTUS has set itself up as the sole arbiter of the constitutional limits on the power of the federal government. We say we have a federal government of limited powers. As I’ve noted in this series, one of the goals of the Founders was to keep the federal government from interfering in the internal affairs of the states. In the debates on the Reconstruction Amendments, there is a constant return to the idea that the feds shouldn’t infringe state power. And there’s the 10th Amendment:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Our federalism, or dual sovereignty, may have served political purposes in the late 18th Century, but now it’s created monstrous problems. By narrowly construing the limits of federal power and asserting control over congress and the president, SCOTUS has created or ignored horrifying problems and made it almost impossible for us to solve them. In this post I’ll look at several of them.

1. Democracy In Citizens United, the right-wing members of SCOTUS held that laws limiting PAC spending on elections were somehow unconstitutional. Now billions of dollars are spent on dark money contributions that benefit campaigns, and while we can assume these people are filthy rich, we don’t know who they are, and we have no to find out what they expect in return. (Hint: it’s not good government.)

In Shelby County v. Holder SCOTUS struck down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the pre-clearance provision,

… because the coverage formula was based on data over 40 years old, making it no longer responsive to current needs and therefore an impermissible burden on the constitutional principles of federalism and equal sovereignty of the states. Fn omitted.

In Rucho v. Common Cause SCOTUS allowed partisan gerrymandering.

The Court ruled that while partisan gerrymandering may be “incompatible with democratic principles”, the federal courts cannot review such allegations, as they present nonjusticiable political questions outside the remit of these courts. Fn omitted.

In Brnovich v. DNC, SCOTUS upheld two Arizona laws making voting harder. The two laws had a disparate negative impact on poor people, mostly minorities. The explanation for this decision even in Wikipedia doesn’t make sense to me, but then, I’m in favor of voting. It was generally seen as the last step before complete dismantling of the Voting Rights Act.

That destruction was narrowly avoided in the recent Allen v. Milligan decision, where John Roberts didn’t reverse an earlier case, Gingles, discussed here. Gingles is a very narrow reading of §2 of the VRA, meeting Robert’s lifelong goal of making it really hard to win a VRA case.

A majority of SCOTUS has now decided not to further attack democracy by adopting the ridiculous independent state legislature silliness. Of course they reserved their own supremacy.

These cases make voter suppression easy, and Red states have imposed a startling array of limitations. For example, Texas passed a law limiting drop boxes for mail-in ballots to one per county. In this interview Rep. Terri Sewell of Alabama, a sponsor of the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, describes some more.

The intent is clear. Continuing centuries of practice, SCOTUS revanchists rule that states are free to restrict voting any way they see fit, no matter the impact on democracy. As a result, SCOTUS is enabling minority rule.

The main impact is on cities, which are routinely cracked and packed to restrict their political power. For example, Texas tightly controls the ability of large cities to govern themselves. Recently cities were forbidden from requiring water breaks for workers as they swelter under a heat dome for the third week.

How long are Dallas, Houston, Austin and San Antonio residents willing to see their taxes spent in small country towns while rural religious fanatics control their personal lives?

2. Women’s Health As I’ve noted Alito’s decision in Dobbs doesn’t comport with constitutional law as I learned it in the long ago. But its consequences have been sickening. Jessica Valenti tries to keep track of attacks on women in her substack. Pregnant women are rufusing to travel to Red states or plan to leave them over health concerns.

Not content with controlling the lives of women who seek treatment inside their jurisdictions, the anti-women states pass laws with extra-territorial effects, like Texas’ SB 8, the Bounty law. These states claim the right to attack citizens of other states who provide care. Blue states are responding by enacting shield laws, refusing to recognize the demands of the aggressors. Here’s an explainer from Vox. Shield laws typically operate to protect all kinds of health care criminalized by legislators in Red States, including gender-affirming care.

This sets up a serious conflict between the states, perhaps reminiscent of the fury over the Fugitive Slave laws. How long will normal people put up with these assaults?

3. Taking away Congressional power SCOTUS is working to hamstring Congress. One obvious example is Shelby County v. Holder, where SCOTUS said Congress didn’t work hard enough to justify renewal of the VRA.

In the middle of the Covid crisis, Congress indicated OSHA should adopt a rule under its emergency authority requiring larger employers to protect their workers. OSHA complied. SCOTUS struck that down on the shadow docket. SCOTUS ruled that Congress couldn’t delegate the management of the crisis to an agency but had to do something specific to prove to SCOTUS Congress did its homework.

In EPA v. West Virginia, SCOTUS said Congress had to pass a new bill if it wanted to do anything serious about climate change. It created a brand-new constitutional rule to explain its decision, which the creators gave the laughable title major questions doctrine. It says that if 5 members of SCOTUS think something is a big deal, Congress can’t delegate authority to an agency under general language, but must specifically authorize the agency to act in a way those 5 oracles think conclusive.

We’re told the solution is through the ballot box. How long will we put up with this sham voting regime when SCOTUS feels free to slap down laws that don’t meet its ever-changing standards?

4. Controlling executive powers In the middle of the Covid crisis, district court judges enjoined enforcement of vaccine mandates for health care workers and rebellious members of the military. The injunctions were upheld by appellate courts. Then SCOTUS overturned them after an emergency hearing. The lower courts set themselves up as arbiters of the nation’s military and health care policies. SCOTUS implicitly agreed that lower courts were entitled to do so, even as it overruled these outrageous decisions.

Shortly after taking office, Biden established immigration enforcement priorities. Ken Paxton, the indicted, impeached, and wildly partisan Attorney General of Texas, filed suit to block those priorities and establish priorities he liked. The lower courts granted a stay and SCOTUS allowed that stay to remain in effect for a year. Then in US v. Texas, a recent decision I haven’t read, SCOTUS overruled the 5th Circuit. This is typical for any decision of the executive. Courts at all levels feel free to impose stays and screw around for months while the problem festers.

How long can we let the judiciary prevent us from dealing with massive problems before we protect ourselves from their ignorance and their dangerous ideology?

Note: Please remember that you should not say, or even think, that SCOTUS is an illegitimate power-grabbing rabble intent on imposing their minority views. It hurts their feelings and detracts from the sanctity of their holy calling.