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The William Webster Report: Working Thread

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The William Webster report into the Nidal Hasan killing is here. I’m about 45 pages in–it’s an interesting report, both in content and in method. In particular, I like the way Webster dealt with classified information, including both redactions bu also substitutions.

I’m going to do a working thread here, though will be reading most of this after dinner. I’m going to use both the spelling Aulaqi here, bc that’s what the report uses, just so I can type directly, as well as Awlaki, bc that’s what I’m used to. Sorry about the lack of page numbers at the beginning.

Page 7: Note what is not included on the list of JTTF successes: The Najibullah Zazi investigation, even though FBI has bragged about JTTF’s work in Aurora CO. Also note that Mohamed Osman Mohamud–and a bunch of other entrapments–are on the list.

Databases: Webster’s section on databases really makes it clear that 7 years after 9/11, FBI agents were still dealing with a klugy, unworkable system.

Note the reference to what tier Aulaqi’s investigation was treated as.

Note the investigation into Aulaqi had lapsed, then got picked up again in 2006. Also, unless I’m missing it, they don’t mention the prostitution.

PDF 45: “The Aulaqi [investigation] [redacted] also served as an occasional “trip wire” for identifying [redacted] persons of interest.” This admits something that has been clear: FBI used Aulaqi (and Samir Khan and others) as a place to go look for radicals.

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Abdulelah Haider Shaye and Anwar al-Awlaki’s Emails

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Al-Jazeera did another long piece on the imprisonment of Abdulelah Haider Shaye, whose story Jeremy Scahill first covered here. There are two details worth note. First, just after 15:40, AJE describes the White House’s non-denial denial of their involvement with Shaye’s continued imprisonment.

Well, we got in touch with the White House on this last week, and this is what we were told: “The President’s comments have absolutely nothing to do with Shaye’s reporting or his criticism of Yemen or the United States. A Yemeni court, not a US court, convicted him.”

It’s an odd comment because if, as alleged, Shaye’s imprisonment has something to do with being an AQAP propagandist, then it would have to do with his journalism. Furthermore, given the language the White House itself included in its readout of the February 2, 2011 conversation between President Obama and Ali Abdullah Saleh…

President Obama called President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen on February 2 to welcome the significant reform measures that President Saleh had announced earlier that day, and to stress that President Saleh now needs to follow-up his pledge with concrete actions.  President Obama asked that Yemeni security forces show restraint and refrain from violence against Yemeni demonstrators who are exercising their right to free association, assembly, and speech.  The President also told President Saleh that it is imperative that Yemen take forceful action against Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to protect innocent lives in Yemen as well as abroad.  Finally, President Obama expressed concern over the release of Abd-Ilah al-Shai, who had been sentenced to five years in prison for his association with AQAP.  President Saleh thanked the President for U.S. support and committed to continuing and strengthening relations with the United States. [my emphasis]

… It’s quite clear that regardless of whose courts convicted Shaye, Obama’s comments played a key role in his continued imprisonment.

The irony? In the same conversation Obama pressured Saleh to show restraint with Yemenis exercising their right to speech. So now the White House is issuing non-denial denials about a conversation in which they criticized Saleh for his violent repression by attributing responsibility to Yemen’s legal system?

Nevertheless, I find it significant that, rather than offer some explanation for Obama’s pressure to keep Shaye imprisoned, the White House is now dodging the issue.

Particularly given this detail Scahill reveals just after 20:00.

What I’m going to say right now about it is the extent of what I can say about any specific media organization. My understanding from sources within one of those media organizations [ABC, WaPo, and NYT] that you cited, and a major American media organization, was that they were approached by the US government earlier on, before Shaye was actually locked up and put in prison and sentenced by this court, that a major US media organization that had done work with him was approached and told that they should stop working with him, suggesting that his relationship to Al Qaeda was more than just journalist source relationship and that organization stopped working with Abdulelah Haider. To my knowledge, none of those organizations have take an editorial stance calling for his release or even or even condemning the sham nature of his trial.

That is, presumably around the time ABC and WaPo and NYT were all relying on Shaye to get reporting from Yemen, the government approached at least one of them and told them to stop, which they did.

I find that particularly interesting given some reporting I reviewed yesterday while working on posts assessing whether the new NCTC data-sharing guidelines would have prevented the Nidal Hasan and Undiebomber attacks.

On November 16, 2009, 11 days after Nidal Hasan’s attack and about a week after Pete Hoekstra revealed the email exchanges, the WaPo published a story based on a Shaye interview with Anwar al-Awlaki which provides far more information about the emails Awlaki exchanged with Hasan before the attack.

Shaea allowed a Post reporter to view a video recording of a man who closely resembles pictures of Aulaqi sitting in front of his laptop computer reading the e-mails, and to hear an audiotape in which a man, who like Aulaqi speaks English with an American accent, discusses his e-mail correspondence with Hasan.

The quotes in this article are based on Shaea’s handwritten notes. Shaea said he was allowed to review the e-mails between Hasan and Aulaqi, but they were not provided to The Post.

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5 Years of Data Not Collected by NSA

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Just days after General Keith Alexander successfully dodged questions about the NSA’s massive new data storage facility by disclaiming any responsibility for collecting US person data, the National Counterterrorism Center is preparing to extend how long they can retain US person data to 5 years.

The Justice Department is close to approving guidelines that would allow the intelligence community to lengthen the period of time it retains information about U.S. residents, even if they have no known connection to terrorism.

Senior U.S. officials familiar with the guidelines said the changes would allow the National Counterterrorism Center, the intelligence community’s clearinghouse for counterterrorism data, to keep such information for up to five years.

Currently, the center must promptly destroy any information about U.S. citizens or residents unless a connection to terrorism is evident.

I guess if you’ve got all that data storage space in UT, you’re going to need something to fill it with.

To justify this power grab, the WaPo’s sources point to two attacks that had nothing to do with the length of data retention: the Nidal Hasan attack, in which information on his conversations with Anwar al-Awlaki hadn’t been shared throughout the government, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, in which his suspect status hadn’t been loaded into the no-fly list.

They don’t, however, point to a concrete example where 5 year old data of US persons might have helped solve an actual terror attack.

But thanks to this measure pushed through in almost complete secrecy, when they declare–say–your Church a terrorist organization in three year’s time, they’ll have records of your association with it in a database in UT.

Update: Here’s Charlie Savage on this. Here’s the new guidelines. And here’s the guidelines they replaced. I’ll come back to these later.

CNN: Only Brown People Can Be Lone Wolves

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Just in time for the 9/11 fearmongering season, CNN comes out with this ridiculous article on lone wolf terrorists.

It starts by correctly identifying Khalid Aldawsari as a lone wolf (at least as far as is publicly known thus far). Piggybacking on an Obama comment, it then raises the example of Anders Behring Breivik, which leads to the following passage.

The president told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer: “When you’ve got one person who is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it’s a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators.” He pointed to the case of Anders Breivik, who went on a bombing and shooting rampage in July in Norway, killing 77 people. No evidence has been uncovered linking Breivik to other conspirators.

A growing wave
The Norway attack and the Aldawsari case show how modern technological tools, especially the availability of vast amounts of information useful for bomb making and targeting, have made lone terrorists more dangerous than ever before.

In the last two years, eight of the 14 Islamist terrorist plots on U.S. soil involved individuals with no ties to terrorist organizations or other co-conspirators.

These included plans to blow up buildings in Illinois and Texas in September 2009, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings allegedly carried out by U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hasan, an alleged plot to bomb a tree-lighting ceremony in Portland in November 2010, and another aimed at blowing up an Army recruiting station near Baltimore the following month.

As a threshold matter, while “no evidence has been uncovered” thus far that ties Breivik to others, Norwegian investigators are just getting around to interviewing some of the people mentioned in Breivik’s manifesto and the prosecutor does “not rule out the possibility” he had accomplices.

But what’s more troubling about this passage is the way it mentions Breivik to support the claim that “lone terrorists [are] more dangerous than ever before,” but then completely ignores the problem of any right wing terrorism save Breivik’s! Given that Aldawsari was nowhere close to actually making a bomb, and given that the only actually executed attack mentioned in this passage (the article later mentions Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, a Muslim convert who killed one soldier at an Army recruiting center) is that of Nidal Hasan, a man trained by the US Government who relied on nothing more than readily accessible guns, it’s not clear that technology is making these Islamic terrorists all that more dangerous.

Indeed, the article ignores that almost every single attack it describes here was solved–but also created in part–by the FBI. It was not the Internet that taught Mohamed Osman Mohamud how to make a bomb. It was the FBI.

Which supports the conclusion that the US Government–whether it be the Army or the FBI–is the thing making Islamic “lone wolves” more dangerous, not technology. Not that I believe that is or necessarily has to be the case (though while we’re talking our dangerous government I will mention the still unsolved anthrax attack), but it is what CNN’s evidence supports.

Yet, as the example of Breivik does show, apparent lone wolves can be dangerous. So why does CNN let this assertion stand?

A senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN that lone assailants have been responsible for every deadly terrorist attack in the West since June 2009, when a U.S. servicemen was shot dead outside a recruiting station in Arkansas by a convert to Islam, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad.

The stat is almost meaningless in any case; what this counter-terrorism official spewing nonsense under cover of anonymity really means is that there have been exactly two “deadly terrorist attacks” committed by Muslims in the US since June 2009, Muhammad’s and Hasan’s, and both happened to be lone wolves.

But this senior counter-terrorism official appears to be ignorant of or ignoring other deadly terrorist attacks, such as Scott Roeder’s killing of George Tiller (the attack actually happened on May 31, 2009, and the DOJ investigated, but did not charge, Roeder’s accomplices in the anti-choice movement), James von Brunn’s attack on the Holocaust Museum, Jerry and Joseph Kane’s attack on a police station, or Jared Lee Loughner’s attack on Gabby Giffords. Sure, some of these count as lone wolves (others as organized members of right wing terrorist groups), but it seems these attacks–as well as the other right wing terrorist attacks that did not result in death–deserve to be part of this discussion, not least because it in part supports CNN’s discussion of how reading extremist materials online may radicalize potential terrorists.

And then, finally, there’s CNN’s uncritical invocation of informants.

Counter-terrorism analysts say that outreach by U.S. law enforcement into Muslim communities is key in providing early warnings of threats. U.S. law enforcement agencies have also kept a watchful eye over individuals who may be moving toward violent extremism. Warning signs include ties individuals may have developed with known Islamist radicals or online interaction through jihadist websites.

Undercover agents and informants have also played a key role in helping the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies uncover threats. The New York Police Department has developed the most extensive informant network in the country and has the largest number of undercover police officers assigned to terrorism cases. It has also developed a Cyber Intelligence Unit in which undercover “cyber agents” track the online activities of suspected violent extremists and interact with them online to gauge the potential threat they pose.

I’ll respond to CNN’s approving mention of the NYPD’s spy system by reminding, again, that it failed to find the two most dangerous terrorists, Faisal Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi, in spite of ties to Zazi’s imam.

But I’ll also suggest that if this effort remains focused primarily on Muslims it will continue to miss the MLK Day bombers, the George Roeders, and indeed, the Breiviks of the world.

CNN’s biggest piece of evidence that apparent lone wolf terrorists can be dangerous is the lethality of Breivik’s attack. But the entire article takes the example of a right wing terrorist as justification to otherwise ignore the problem of right wing terrorism.

A Defense of Tyranny?

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I’m pretty fascinated by this attempt by one of John Cole’s readers to defend the Administration’s stance on assassinating US citizens. It’s fascinating and not a little disturbing, but it deserves a response, if only to clarify precisely what the problem with the Administration’s filing last Friday is.

The reader starts with this:

On Al-Awlaki, what’s your response to the argument that targeted killing of him is allowable, under international law, because he’s been designated by the US and the UN as an “active operational member of AQAP” and, as such, if and only if the US determines he presents an imminent threat, the US can take actions to defend itself against an attack (like, say, the Christmas bombing, in which there’s evidence he was involved in planning) by either capturing or killing him?

For starters, this question misrepresents what the suit tries to do. The suit readily admits that the government has the right to kill someone who presents an imminent threat. The plaintiffs are asking for the judge to prevent the government from killing Anwar al-Awlaki unless he is, in fact, an imminent threat.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that the Constitution and international law prohibit the government from carrying out targeted killings outside of armed conflict except as a last resort to protect against concrete, specific, and imminent threats of death or serious physical injury; and an injunction prohibiting the targeted killing of U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi outside this narrow context. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction requiring the government to disclose the standards under which it determines whether U.S. citizens can be targeted for death. [my emphasis]

Moreover, John’s reader misstates the argument the government is making. They refuse to grant that the only legal basis they’d have for assassinating al-Awlaki would be because they had determined him to be an imminent threat and never once argue that he is an imminent threat, particularly not that he, personally, as opposed to AQAP more generally, is an imminent threat.

For example, even assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff has appropriately described the legal contours of the President’s authority to use force in a context of the sort described in the Complaint,

In fact, as I have shown, the government refuses to lay out its entire argument for claiming it has the authority to target al-Awlaki.

Accordingly, although it would not be appropriate to make a comprehensive statement as to the circumstances in which he might lawfully do so, it is sufficient to note that, consistent with the AUMF, and other applicable law, including the inherent right to self-defense, the President is authorized to use necessary and appropriate force against AQAP operational leaders, in compliance with applicable domestic and international legal requirements, including the laws of war.

One thing is clear, though: the government is claiming to have the authority not only through international law (the “imminent threat”), but also the AUMF. But it’s not at all clear the AUMF does grant them that authority (and this is one reason why John’s reader’s appeal to the political branches is so problematic). AQAP was not included in the AUMF. No  one has ever claimed it had a role in 9/11, which is how the AUMF defines the opponent. The decisions on habeas cases have been mixed about whether attenuated connections like AQAP’s are strong enough to be included in the AUMF and because of it, legally detainable. John’s reader just ignores that the primary basis for which the government claims authority to kill al-Awlaki is the AUMF (even if they refuse to say whether AQAP is al Qaeda, or only affiliated with al Qaeda). But that basis is contested.

But let’s set aside the problems with the government’s claim to authority under the AUMF for the moment and focus instead on what John’s reader seems comfortable with: the “imminent threat.” John’s reader seems satisfied that al-Awlaki’s role in the Christmas day bombing makes him an imminent threat. There are two problems with that. First, we have a tradition in this country of requiring the government to prove the allegations it makes against people. Here’s how the government presents this allegation, in James Clapper’s public declaration.

Since late 2009, Al-Aulaqi has taken on an increasingly operational role in AQAP, including preparing Umar Farouk Adbulmutallab [sic], who attempted to detonate an explosive device aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, for his operation. In November 2009, while in Yemen, Abdulmutallab swore allegiance to the emir of AQAP and shortly thereafter received instructions from al-Aulaqi to detonate an explosive device aboard a U.S. airplane over U.S. airspace.

Particularly given the government’s reported belief, before the Nidal Hasan attack, that al-Awlaki’s activities extended only to First Amendment protected speech, we deserve to know how they determined that his activities since then have become operational. If we know that from classified intercepts, then the government can share them with the Court without disclosing them publicly. If we know that solely through Abdulmutallab’s interrogations, then we deserve to know the circumstances surrounding those interrogations, not least whether Abdulmutallab was promised he would not face the death penalty if he implicated al-Awlaki.

More importantly, we have means to do all this–to have a judge weigh the evidence to make sure the government’s allegations are true. That’s a trial. And for some reason, the government has chosen not to charge al-Awlaki with conspiracy in Abdulmutallab’s crime, and therefore chosen not to expose its evidence to the scrutiny of a judge. I wouldn’t necessarily have much reason to doubt the government’s claims about al-Awlaki, but the government loses a great deal of credibility when they choose not to avail themselves of the means to prove those allegations.

If the case against al-Awlaki is strong enough to kill him, then it ought to be strong enough to prove in a court.

And then there’s the other problem with the claim that al-Awlaki is an “imminent” threat: the timing.

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The Secrets They’re Keeping Selectively Leaking about Anwar al-Awlaki

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As I noted yesterday (and Glenn has examined at more length), in addition to asserting that the government can target Anwar al-Awlaki … because they said so, the Obama Administration also invoked state secrets in its motion to dismiss the ACLU/CCR suit challenging targeted killings.

The Obama Administration has officially positioned itself to the right of hack lawyer David Rivkin.

But the state secrets invocation is interesting not just because it shows a Democratic Administration out-hacking a noted hack.

For example, I think the invocation shows just how weak they recognize their own argument to be. Consider what Robert Gates (who invoked something newfangled called the “military and state secrets privilege”) and James Clapper described as falling under their invocation of state secrets (Leon Panetta basically said only that CIA could neither confirm nor deny its involvement, which sort of makes me wonder whether CIA really has targeted al-Awlaki or not).

Robert Gates:

A. Intelligence information DoD possesses concerning AQAP and Anwar al-Aulaqi, including intelligence concerning the threat AQAP or Anwar al-Aulaqi pose to national security, and the sources, methods, and analytic processes on which any such intelligence information is based;

B. Information concerning possibly military operations in Yemen, if any, and including criteria or procedures DoD may utilize in connection with such military operations; and

C. Information concerning relations between the United States and the Government of Yemen, including with respect to security, military, or intelligence cooperation, and that government’s counterterrorism efforts.

James Clapper:

A. (U) Intelligence information concerning al-Qaeda and the sources and methods for acquiring that information.

B. (U) Intelligence information concerning AQAP and the sources and methods for acquiring that information.

C. (U) Intelligence information concerning Anwar al-Aulaqi and the sources and methods for acquiring that information.

The Administration is sort of kind of relying on the President’s authority under the AUMF (unless the judge doesn’t buy that argument, in which case the Administration promises to try something else), which states:

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

In other words, the Administration is relying on some tie between AQAP and the al Qaeda organization that hit us on 9/11 for its authority to kill an American citizen with no due process. Mind you, it can’t say precisely what that tie is–whether AQAP is al Qaeda or whether it is just closely connected enough to be included under the AUMF. But that’s precisely what it has called a state secret: the evidence of ties between the group against which Congress declared war in 2001 and the group we’re targeting in Yemen.

Effectively, the Executive Branch–with no known support from Congress–is saying we’re at war against AQAP. But it’s also saying no one outside of select people within the Executive Branch (and, presumably, a group of four or maybe eight members of Congress who serve in leadership or on the Intelligence Committees) can see the evidence that proves we’re at war against AQAP.

The President has unilaterally declared war against a group but then said no one can see why he has done so.

And then both Gates and Clapper invoke state secrets over the evidence the government has against al-Awlaki.

Rather than prove to a judge that they even have reasonable suspicion to believe al-Awlaki is part of AQAP, much less enough evidence to execute him, the government has instead asserted that all of that is a state secret. They’ve declared everything al-Awlaki would need to challenge his execution a state secret. Even KSM will be able to see the evidence against him; and he has admitted to killing 3,000 Americans. But American citizen al-Awlaki, whom no one has accused of actually killing anyone, can’t see the same kind of information.

Finally, there’s the tired old sources and methods catch all. We can’t know how the government has collected the evidence it has against al-Awlaki.

Except we already do.

Thanks largely to the efforts of Crazy Pete Hoekstra, we know that the government had wiretaps on al-Awlaki going back at least since December 2008. Al-Awlaki himself has challenged the government to release the intercepts they have on him (which public reports say include correspondence with tens of thousands of people). Al-Awlaki has even made some of that correspondence available himself. But the government says all that is a state secret.

Furthermore, some of the evidence against al-Awlaki appears in court documents, from the public testimony of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The alleged recruitment of Abdulmutallab is one of the key issues the government describes al-Awlaki to have been involved in. That information is public. Yet the government also says it is a state secret.

And if all this really is a state secret, then why isn’t Crazy Pete Hoekstra in jail? Read more →

Eight Months after Putting Anwar al-Awlaki on Kill List, DOJ Considers Charges

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Back in January, Dana Priest first revealed that Anwar al-Awlaki was on a JSOC kill list and was being considered for a CIA kill list. Now, eight months later, DOJ is considering charging him.

The Obama administration is considering filing the first criminal charges against radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in case the CIA fails to kill him and he’s is captured alive in Yemen.

[snip]

Such charges, however, would come with political and intelligence-gathering risks. Counterterrorism officials regard al-Awlaki as a terrorist operative, not just a preacher, but they have revealed few specifics. Charging al-Awlaki with having direct involvement in terrorism could require the U.S. to reveal evidence gleaned from foreign wiretaps or confidential informants.

Now, it appears DOJ sources are throwing some baloney in with this news. For example, the claim that criminal charges might require the US to reveal evidence collected using wiretaps doesn’t sound all that awful, given that the contents of some of the wiretaps of al-Awlaki’s communications with Nidal Hasan have already been published. The government didn’t seem to have a problem leaking these intercepts earlier this year…

And the claim that they’re charging al-Awlaki just in case they happen to capture him alive rather than dead (opps!)? I’d suggest it probably has a lot more to do with the suit CCR and ACLU have taken against the government. I’m guessing that following shortly on formal charges, DOJ will tell the courts they can’t litigate the al-Awlaki suit because it pertains to an ongoing criminal investigation. Voila! No discovery in the lawsuit!!

Particularly given this detail:

If the Justice Department decides to charge al-Awlaki, it’s likely he would not be indicted. Rather, charges are more likely to take the form of an FBI complaint. That’s because an indicted suspect automatically gets the right to an attorney if he is captured, making it harder for authorities to question him.

In other words, this doesn’t appear to be an effort to finally use due process before targeting an American citizen with assassination. Rather, it seems to be more about closing off legal options to that American citizen.

Update: Here’s the joint ACLU/CCR statement on this:

Our organizations have long stated that if the government has evidence that Anwar Al-Aulaqi is involved in terrorist activity, it should present that evidence to a court – not authorize his execution without charge or trial. Now, months after the government announced its intent to kill Al-Aulaqi, it may finally bring charges against him. This would be a step in the right direction. The constitutional guarantee of due process relies on the critical distinction between allegations and evidence. If the reports that charges may be brought against Al-Aulaqi are true, the fact that it has taken the government this long – months after having announced his death sentence – suggests that, in this case, the government’s allegations were far ahead of its evidence.

While bringing charges against Al-Aulaqi based on credible evidence would be a step in the right direction, it would not mean that he could now be targeted for killing without trial. It is well established that the government cannot use extrajudicial killing to punish people for past acts, but only to prevent grave and imminent threats. A criminal charge for past crimes does not provide a license to kill.

We continue to believe that the courts must play a role in establishing legal standards for when the government can take the life of one of its own citizens without charge or trial. For that reason, we will continue with our litigation.”

What Changes Did Obama Just Make to Courts Martial?

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In 30 days, changes to Part II (Rules) and IV (Punitive Articles) of the Courts Martial Manual will go into effect. Only, we don’t know what those changes are because the annex that describes them appears to be classified.

All we get is this Executive Order noting the change–and explaining that nothing in yesterday’s order affects acts or legal actions that took place before the EO goes into effect in 30 days.

(a) Nothing in these amendments shall be construed to make punishable any act done or omitted prior to the effective date of this order that was not punishable when done or omitted.

(b) Nothing in these amendments shall be construed to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment proceedings, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial in which arraignment occurred, or other action begun prior to the effective date of this order, and any such nonjudicial punishment, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial, or other action may proceed in the same manner and with the same effect as if these amendments had not been prescribed.

I’m particularly interested in this because of two recent high profile events: the Nidal Hasan attack–the report on which DOD just released–and Bradley Manning’s arrest. Both might precipitate some changes in the handling of courts martial, charges, and the handing of charges.

But it’s not clear how.

WaPo Top Secret Story: Why Not Nominate God to Be Director of National Intelligence?

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I trust you will all read Dana Priest and William Arkin’s story on the unwieldiness of our Intelligence Industrial Complex. It is good, insofar as it focuses needed attention on a huge problem.

But boy is it itself unwieldy. Today’s overview appears to want to be two stories: one on the problem with out-of-control contracting, and one on how that led to the failure to identify the Nidal Hasan and UndieBomber threats.

Moreover, what I find utterly shocking is that today’s 5315-word installment includes only this reference to the simmering battle over intelligence reform and the Director of National Intelligence position and tomorrow’s confirmation hearing for James Clapper!

“There’s only one entity in the entire universe that has visibility on all SAPs – that’s God,” said James R. Clapper, undersecretary of defense for intelligence and the Obama administration’s nominee to be the next director of national intelligence. [my emphasis]

Remember, this hearing is tomorrow. The debate that has led up to it has covered whether or not we need a stronger DNI, whether or not GAO can audit intelligence programs, and whether more than 4 people should be briefed on major new intelligence programs.

Every single one of the issues that has led to tomorrow’s confirmation hearing is an issue that goes to the heart of the problems identified in the WaPo piece: the ongoing lack of real value-added analysis to make sense of all the intelligence collected, the opacity and potential waste and fraud of the entire IIC, and the turf battles that contribute to that waste.

So while I’m grateful that this story (and more importantly, the issues behind the story, since the content of today’s installment has largely already been reported by Tim Shorrock) is getting as much attention as it is, I’m aghast that the WaPo didn’t try to contextualize it by framing the issues in it in terms of Clapper’s nomination to be DNI.

The guy the Obama Administration nominated to be Director of National Intelligence seems glib about the utter lack of transparency and oversight in our intelligence world (his predecessor, Dennis Blair, claims in the story he was able to see it all). One after another high level security official are quoted in the story complaining about the lack of central focus on intelligence–precisely the issue that Clapper’s nomination won’t solve.

If Clapper’s nomination is approved tomorrow–and it sounds like DiFi has resigned herself to approving Clapper not because she thinks he’s adequate to the job but because the interim DNI is retiring shortly–it will represent success on Obama’s part at forestalling efforts to deal in substantive way with the problems identified in the story.

That’s the news in this WaPo story.

Targeting al-Awlaki

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There’s actually what I think is a big scoop in this weird David Ignatius column on debates over whether we can target Anwar al-Awlaki. The scoop? The Yemeni government approached the US in October asking for help targeting al-Awlaki.

Last October, the Yemeni government came to the CIA with a request: Could the agency collect intelligence that might help target the network of a U.S.-born al-Qaeda recruiter named Anwar al-Aulaqi?

Now, one aspect of the weirdness of this article is that Ignatius doesn’t state clearly what the Yemeni government wanted.

He later suggests the request was not to “collect intelligence” but rather to capture al-Awlaki. But even in the same breath, he admits that that presumed “capture” might also mean “kill.”

The CIA concluded that it could not assist the Yemenis in locating Aulaqi for a possible capture operation. The primary reason was that the agency lacked specific evidence that he threatened the lives of Americans — which is the threshold for any capture-or-kill operation against a U.S. citizen. The Yemenis also wanted U.S. Special Forces’ help on the ground in pursuing Aulaqi; that, too, was refused.

The rest of Ignatius’ column engages in some hindsight reflection about what a shame it is that CIA and/or JSOC couldn’t help collect intelligence or maybe capture an American citizen or maybe kill him in the process of capturing him back in October, before Nidal Hasan launched his attack at Fort Hood. And to Ignatius’ credit, he ultimately does come down on the side of having actual evidence against Americans before the government can kill them.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the available information should have triggered closer scrutiny of both Hasan and Aulaqi. We’ll never know whether such action could have deterred Hasan. As for Aulaqi, officials now say he is on the U.S. target list.

Finally, does it make sense to require NSC permission before a potentially lethal operation against a U.S. citizen such as Aulaqi? My answer would be yes. The higher threshold that was in place in 2009 was appropriate then and still is: Use of lethal force always needs careful controls — especially when it involves Americans.

But there are two things Ignatius doesn’t really deal with in this column.

First, we were already “collecting information” from al-Awlaki. We appear to have had legal FISA wiretap on him going back some years. So, particularly given that our government has sold both warranted and bulk wiretapping as the fail safe prevention for terrorism, we really need to know why it is that CIA even entertained an information collection-I mean capture-I mean kill operation against al-Awlaki when, presumably, our existing no-kill information collection hadn’t collected even enough information to indict him.

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