Politicizing Show Trials at the Same Time as Politicizing DOJ
Marty Lederman links to the important opinion disqualifying General Thomas Hartmann from any involvement in Salim Ahmed Hamdan’s–Osama bin Laden’s driver–military tribunal. (Kudos to Marty Lederman for thwacking the traditional media for touting an opinion’s limited availability–and then not providing a link to that opinion.)
As Marty notes, the opinion does much more than the traditional press coverage of the opinion lets on–though as always, Carol Rosenberg’s coverage of the show trials is quite good. The opinion basically affirms that the Gitmo show trials under Hartmann have been just that–trials driven by political motivations rather than legal evidence. Go read the opinion, written by Judge Keith Allred, for the timeline it offers of Hartmann’s (and others’) attempts to tailor the show trials to political considerations.
I’m particularly interested in the coincidence of timing the opinion reveals. The Bush Administration started crafting its show trials at precisely the same time–fall 2006–when it was engineering the firing of 8 US Attorneys for political reasons.
5. About 28 September of 2006, [Colonel Morris Davis] attended a meeting of the Senior Oversight Group, held in the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. During one of these meetings, Mr. England said "there could be strategic political value in getting some of these cases going before the [November 2006–editorial comment original] elections. We need to think about who could be tried" or words to that effect. The commission takes judicial notice that the Supreme Court issued Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006 and that the Military Commissions Act was not signed until late October 2006. Consequently, there was no possible way in which any military commission case could be referred, much less brought to trial, before the November 2006 elections.
[snip]
Colonel Davis viewed [England’s] remark as an opinion, rather than a command. Colonel Davis affirmatively denies that this statement had any effect on any decision he made with respect to Mr. Hamdan’s case.
7. During the same meeting, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Mr. Steve Cambone opined that Department of Defense (DoD) attorneys were not sufficiently experienced to handle these cases, and that they needed to get some Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys involved. Although no DOJ attorney had made an appearance in a military commission hearing before that date, they have since been assigned to military commission trial teams.