Posts

The Scandal of Lying about “Thwarted” “Plots” Started 4 Years Ago

/13 Comments/in , , /by

As predicted, one big takeaway from yesterday’s NSA hearing (the other being the obviously partial disclosure about location tracking) is Keith Alexander’s admission that rather than 54 “plots” “thwarted” in the US thanks to the dragnet, only one or maybe two were. Here are some examples.

But they’re missing this real scandal about the government’s lies about the central importance of Section 215.

That scandal started 4 years ago, when an example the FBI now admits had limited import played a critical role in the reauthorization of Section 215 without limits on the dragnet authority.

First, note that even while Leahy got Alexander to back off his “54 plots” claim, the General still tried to insist Section 215 had been critical in two plots, not just one.

SEN. LEAHY: Let’s go into that discussion, because both of you have raised concerns that the media reports about the government surveillance programs have been incomplete, inaccurate, misleading or some combination of that. But I’m worried that we’re still getting inaccurate and incomplete statements from the administration.

For example, we have heard over and over again the assertion that 54 terrorist plots were thwarted by the use of Section 215 and/or Section 702 authorities. That’s plainly wrong, but we still get it in letters to members of Congress; we get it in statements. These weren’t all plots, and they weren’t all thwarted. The American people are getting left with an inaccurate impression of the effectiveness of NSA programs.

Would you agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the administration were not all plots, and out of the 54, only 13 had some nexus to the U.S. Would you agree with that, yes or no?

DIR. ALEXANDER: Yes.

SEN. LEAHY: OK. In our last hearing, Deputy Director Inglis’ testimony stated that there’s only really one example of a case where, but for the use of Section 215, bulk phone records collection, terrorist activity was stopped. Is Mr. Inglis right?

DIR. ALEXANDER: He’s right. I believe he said two, Chairman; I may have that wrong, but I think he said two, and I would like to point out that it could only have applied in 13 cases because of the 54 terrorist plots or events, only 13 occurred in the U.S. Business Record FISA was only used in (12 of them ?).

SEN. LEAHY: I understand that, but what I worry about is that some of these statements that all is — all is well, and we have these overstatements of what’s going on — we’re talking about massive, massive, massive collection. We’re told we have to do that to protect us, and then statistics are rolled out that are not accurate. It doesn’t help with the credibility here in the Congress; doesn’t help with the credibility with us, Chairman, and it doesn’t help with the credibility with the — with the country. [my emphasis]

Here’s the transcript at I Con the Record from the previous hearing, where Inglis in fact testified that Section 215 was only critical in the Basaaly Moalin case (which was not a plot against the US but rather funding to defeat a US backed invasion of Somalia).

MR. INGLIS: There is an example amongst those 13 that comes close to a but-for example and that’s the case of Basaaly Moalin.

 

That is, in fact, Inglis said it had been critical in just one “plot.”

After he did, FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce piped in to note the phone dragnet also “played a role” by identifying a new phone number of a suspect we already knew about in the Najibullah Zazi case.

MR. JOYCE: I just want to relate to the homeland plots. So in Najibullah Zazi and the plot to bomb the New York subway system, Business Record 215 played a role; it identified specifically a number we did not previously know of a —

SEN. LEAHY: It was a — it was a critical role?

MR. JOYCE: What I’m saying — what it plays a —

SEN. LEAHY: (And was there ?) some undercover work that was — took place in there?

MR. JOYCE: Yes, there was some undercover work.

SEN. LEAHY: Yeah —

MR. JOYCE: What I’m saying is each tool plays a different role, Mr. Chairman. I’m not saying that it is the most important tool —

SEN. LEAHY: Wasn’t the FBI — wasn’t the FBI already aware of the individual in contact with Zazi?

MR. JOYCE: Yes, we were, but we were not aware of that specific telephone number, which NSA provided us. [my emphasis]

So, when pressed, Joyce admitted that Section 215 wasn’t critical to finding Adis Medunjanin, one of Zazi’s conspirators. (And if you read Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman’s Enemies Within, you see just how minor a role it played.)

That’s important, because the Administration’s use of Section 215 in the Zazi case was crucially important to the defeat of two efforts to rein in the dragnet in 2009.

Read more →

James Clapper Proves Inadequate Oversight by Refusing to Answer EO 12333 Questions

/2 Comments/in /by

The headlines from today’s Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on NSA will no doubt be that Pat Leahy forced Keith Alexander to admit they’ve been lying about whether the 54 “plots” they “thwarted” were really “plots” or “thwarted” in the first place. Perhaps just two were.

More astute reporters might note that, in response to questions about the NYT’s report on the dossiers created in the course of foreign intelligence collection analysis, Keith Alexander offered several equivocations first claiming NYT got things wrong, then realizing that was a too broad claim. More interesting, he ultimately admitted that the NSA conducts some of this under Executive Order 12333 — the collection David Kris outlined in his paper.

There was even some follow-up on the NSA’s use of EO 12333, with James Clapper and Alexander claiming Congress had some oversight of that collection (in spite of Dianne Feinstein’s admission that they don’t get news of EO 12333 violations even when they involve Americans).

But the most telling exchange occurred between Amy Klobuchar, Keith Alexander, and James Clapper. (after 1:25) Klobuchar asked why they hadn’t told the Committee of the violations reported in an internal NSA review when they last appeared before the committee. After Alexander tried to filibuster (actually addressing the report in question and noting only ODNI and DOJ get those numbers, not FISC or Congress), Clapper interrupted and pretended she had asked about the LOVEINT incidents just reported to Charles Grassley. Clapper claimed those hadn’t been reported because they were 12333 violations.

Clapper: I think the answer to the question, Senator, was that the subject of the hearing was 215 and 702, and these 12 violations over 10 occurred under the foreign collection under the auspices of Executive Order 12333. [Sits back]

Klobuchar: I thought we were broadly asking questions and it would have been nice to have heard about it there but it’s behind us now.

But Clapper is absolutely incorrect. The review Klobuchar asked about reported 195 FISA violations. Of those, 20% were due diligence violations — of an analyst not following Standard Operating Procedures she has been trained on. 31% are what amount to insufficient intelligence (these are called “resource violations”), resulting in searches on targets who shouldn’t be targeted. A number of the incidents included not detasking someone quickly enough.

In other words, while this may (or may not) be minor, they are real violations of FISA authorities, the stuff that Congress and the Courts are supposed to oversee. And Clapper just blew off the question by saying they don’t have to disclose any violations pertaining to EO 12333 (even though a chunk of these violations weren’t EO 12333 violations).

Which of course demonstrates a further point. The Intelligence Community is basically refusing to discuss any EO 12333 violations and/or programs, even while it also picks up US person information at least incidentally.

And yet they claimed there was adequate oversight over those programs.

Could an Independent NSA Inspector General Have Prevented 3 Years of Violations?

/4 Comments/in , /by

Last week, two former Senate Intelligence Committee members proposed a fix for the NSA no one has yet floated: making NSA’s Inspector General independent. Doing so, they argue, would give the IG more leeway to direct her investigations of the NSA and provide Congress needed insight into NSA’s real activities.

But one important option has yet to be proposed: creating an independent inspector general’s office at the NSA, comparable to the office that was created within the CIA in 1989.

[snip]

Not only was the inspector general’s office viewed differently after the law was passed, but the office itself was different. It decided which of the CIA’s activities would be investigated, inspected or audited without waiting for direction or approval from agency management. Employees of the IG’s office no longer had to worry about the potential effect on their careers if their findings and conclusions were critical of the agency. They may not have always gotten everything right, but they were freer to call things as they saw them and did so, at times to the chagrin of CIA management.

Having an independent inspector general at the CIA produced other advantages for the oversight process: It gave the congressional intelligence committees a more reliable partner — an office that lawmakers could call upon to conduct investigations beyond their own capabilities — and they learned of problems they otherwise might not have come across.

The same dynamic is not possible at the NSA today because the agency’s inspector general is appointed by and works for the NSA director. For all practical purposes, he is a member of the director’s staff and does not report directly to the intelligence committees.

I’m particularly interested in this recommendation given a few data points from the transition period between the illegal phone dragnet to the Section 215 dragnet in 2006.

As the documents submitted in 2009 make clear, the dragnet remained largely if not entirely unchanged from what it was before 2006. The initial “bug” that “arose” in 2009 was really just a “feature” — an alert system on suspect phone identifiers — of the illegal program that never got shut down or properly disclosed to the FISA Court. Many of the subsequent “bugs” (such as access to the queried data for FBI and CIA) also seem to be “features” no one turned off to keep the program legal.

And the Inspector General (from 2002 to 2006, NSA defender Joel Brenner served in that role) knew about the features of the illegal program because he was belatedly read into the illegal program in 2002 and actually provided 3 suggestions to improve oversight of it (see pages 45-46). Among other things, Brenner instituted and attended monthly due diligence meetings.

As Keith Alexander’s February 2009 declaration to Reggie Walton reveals, as the program was transferring to FISC authorization in 2006, someone in the IG office suggested NSA tell the FISA Court how the alert system worked, but NSA chose not to follow that suggestion.

Agency records indicate that, in April 2006, when the Business Records Order was being proposed, NSA’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) suggested to SID personnel that the alert process be spelled out in any prospective Order for clarity but this suggestion was not adopted.

More interesting still is the role of a 2006 study submitted to the FISA Court (starting at 85). Read more →

The People Who Work at Arthur Anderson NSA Are Such Nice People

/8 Comments/in /by

[youtube]uF40mZbrd7I[/youtube]

Back in 2001 or early 2002, I sat next to a lifetime Arthur Anderson accountant on a long plane ride. We talked about the Enron debacle and its ties to Anderson. She hadn’t worked the Enron account, and she insisted that Anderson itself was a highly ethical company — it was just the Enron account that was bad, she said. I gently raised the several other big accounting scandals Anderson starred in — Waste Management and Sunbeam both broke in 2001. But in her mind, that she and the people she worked with seemed like good people was all the proof she needed that Anderson was not a systematically unethical company.

That is, effectively, the defense that Bobby Chesney and Ben Wittes want to offer of the NSA after Chesney helped set up a special meeting of academics (plus Wittes) with the agency.

Our major takeaway concerns the dramatic disparity that separates the perception on the outside of what this agency does and NSA’s self-perception. To hear NSA folks talk about their compliance regime, for example, is to hear about an entirely different animal than the situation depicted in many new stories. To hear NSA folks discuss the relationship between encryption, cyber-security, and cyber offense is a different animal than to read news stories about how NSA breaks encryption. And so forth.  These conversations were all unclassified, but they vividly described a wide gap in understanding between NSA and the press, members of Congress, and the public regarding what the agency does and doesn’t do, how accountable and regulated it is, to what extent it complies with the law and how, and what the relevant law is.

That gap is unnecessary, or at least it need not be so wide. Read more →

Bill Binney Told You So

/13 Comments/in /by

Remember when Bill Binney said NSA was compiling dossiers of Americans, but Keith Alexander said that wasn’t true?

A former NSA official has accused the NSA’s director of deception during a speech he gave at the DefCon hacker conference on Friday when he asserted that the agency does not collect files on Americans.

William Binney, a former technical director at the NSA, said during a panel discussion that NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander was playing a “word game” and that the NSA was indeed collecting e-mails, Twitter writings, internet searches and other data belonging to Americans and indexing it.

“Unfortunately, once the software takes in data, it will build profiles on everyone in that data,” he said. “You can simply call it up by the attributes of anyone you want and it’s in place for people to look at.”

[snip]

Binney was contradicting statements made on Friday by Alexander, who told the crowd of hackers and security professionals that his agency “absolutely” does not maintain files on Americans.

“And anybody who would tell you that we’re keeping files or dossiers on the American people,” Alexander continued, “knows that’s not true.”

The tantalizing reporting duo of Laura Poitras and James Risen (writing at NYT) report the NSA is … compiling graphs that show Americans’ connections with foreign targets, using both communications metadata and public resources like bank, insurance, Facebook, flight, voting property, and GPS information.

Since 2010, the National Security Agency has been exploiting its huge collections of data to create sophisticated graphs of some Americans’ social connections that can identify their associates, their locations at certain times, their traveling companions and other personal information, according to newly disclosed documents and interviews with officials.

[snip]

The policy shift was intended to help the agency “discover and track” connections between intelligence targets overseas and people in the United States, according to an N.S.A. memorandum from January 2011. The agency was authorized to conduct “large-scale graph analysis on very large sets of communications metadata without having to check foreignness” of every e-mail address, phone number or other identifier, the document said. Because of concerns about infringing on the privacy of American citizens, the computer analysis of such data had previously been permitted only for foreigners.

The agency can augment the communications data with material from public, commercial and other sources, including bank codes, insurance information, Facebook profiles, passenger manifests, voter registration rolls and GPS location information, as well as property records and unspecified tax data, according to the documents. They do not indicate any restrictions on the use of such “enrichment” data, and several former senior Obama administration officials said the agency drew on it for both Americans and foreigners.

It sure sounds like a dossier to me.

But then, the safe bet was always to assume Keith Alexander (and James Clapper, who also denied this) was lying.

“Whoa Whoa Whoa, Stop!” Dianne Feinstein Misstates the 2011 Violations

/20 Comments/in /by

One of the most enlightening aspects of yesterday’s Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA came when Dianne Feinstein tried to rebut witness Tim Edgar’s categorization of the 2011 violations described in John Bates October 8, 2011 opinion. In her rebuttal, she proved she either doesn’t know, doesn’t understand, or chooses to misrepresent the opinion, which found that NSA had violated the law and Fourth Amendment in its Section 702 program.

Edgar was arguing (see page 5-6) that if the FISA Court opinions were publicly released, we’d know about ridiculous semantic definitions — like “relevant” — as those definitions were invoked, not years after the fact, which would lead to greater trust in the FISC.

As his second example, he cited NSA’s collection of US person communications on upstream collection. (After 2:20)

EDGAR: [T]he NSA’s interpretation of the requirement in Section 702, for content surveillance targeting foreign persons, that those procedures must target foreign persons is also surprising. The FISA court’s recently released opinions show that communications that target foreign persons include not only communications that are to or from that person, but also those that are merely about that person in a particular narrow sense, that the selection — the selector for that person appears in the communication.

Even communications which are not to or from, or about, the foreign target at all have been acquired as the result of the manner in which some NSA collection was conducted.

DiFi interrupted him (whoa whoa whoa stop!) — and (having read his statement in advance) started reading a written rebuttal to provide her version of the 2011 violations.

FEINSTEIN: Whoa, whoa, whoa, stop. Exactly what program are you talking about?

EDGAR: In the recently released FISA court opinion about upstream collection in the compliance incidents in 2011, it was documented how information from multiple communications — what they called “multiple communications transactions” — was obtained not by mistake, but because of the way the system was designed. That included any selector that was a foreign target in the entire multi- communications transaction.

And so that created a lot of controversy in the FISA court, and required the FISA court to work with the Justice Department and the intelligence community to narrow the minimization guidelines.

FEINSTEIN: OK. Because this is — this is important, may I interrupt this just — respond? [reading from prepared statement] In mid 2011, NSA notified the DOJ, the DNI, and the FISA court, and House and Senate Intelligence Committees, of a series of compliance incidents impacting a subset of NSA collection under Section 702 of FISA, known as upstream collection.

This comprises about 10 percent of all collection that takes place under 702, and occurs when NSA obtains Internet communications, such as e-mails, from certain U.S. companies that operate the Internet background;[sic] i.e., the companies that own and operate the domestic telecommunication lines over which Internet traffic flows.

In essence, the issue that arose in 2011 was that NSA, while trying to acquire e-mails to, from, or about an overseas target, realized it, and was inadvertent — that it was inadvertently acquiring other e-mails, including some e-mails sent between persons inside the United States that happened to be bundled with the e-mail messages NSA was trying to collect.

This bundling is done by Internet companies in order to make it easier to send information quickly over the telecom lines that make up the Internet. Unfortunately, NSA’s technical systems could not easily separate the individual messages within these bundles. And the result was that NSA collected some e-mail messages it did not intend to acquire.

OK. We held a lengthy hearing on the court’s ruling on October 20, 2011, at which General Alexander and Lisa Monaco — then the assistant attorney general for national security — described the court’s ruling and what they were doing to address it.

Here’s my point: It was a mistake. Action was taken immediately to correct it. It came to us. We took action. [bold mine, underline emphasis DiFi applied in delivery]

DiFi’s prepared statement misstates the facts as presented in Bates’ opinion in several ways:

  • The issue had existed since before July 2008
  • The collection was — according to the court ruling — not inadvertent
  • NSA only corrected the problem under threat of criminal referral, after months of delay

First, the issue did not arise in 2011.

As Bates made clear, “NSA has been collecting MCT’s since before the Court’s approval of the first Section 702 certification in 2008.” Read more →

Ron Wyden’s Past Provocative Hearing Question on Cell Site Location

/8 Comments/in , /by

As I’ve noted, yesterday Ron Wyden got Keith Alexander to refuse to answer a question about whether the NSA has ever collected or made plans to collect Americans’ cell-site information in bulk.

Wyden: Senators Udall, Heinrich and I and about two dozen other senators have asked in the past whether the NSA has ever collected or made any plans to collect Americans’ cell-site information in bulk. What would be your response to that?

Gen. Keith Alexander (Alexander): Senator, on July 25, Director Clapper provided a non-classified written response to this question amongst others, as well as a classified supplement with additional detail. Allow me to reaffirm what was stated in that unclassified response. Under section 215, NSA is not receiving cell-site location data and has no current plans to do so. As you know, I indicated to this committee on October 20, 2011, that I would notify Congress of NSA’s intent to obtain cell-site location data prior to any such plans being put in place. As you may also be aware, –

Wyden: General, if I might. I think we’re all familiar with it. That’s not the question I’m asking. Respectfully, I’m asking, has the NSA ever collected or ever made any plans to collect Americans’ cell-site information. That was the question and we, respectfully General, have still not gotten an answer to it. Could you give me an answer to that? [my emphasis]

In addition to saying NSA is not doing so under Section 215, Alexander also pointed to two classified responses he would not repeat in unclassified setting.

Which I think confirms — as if there was any doubt — that the answer is yes, the NSA has at least planned, if not actually collected, cell-site location in bulk (though not necessarily under Section 215).

That said, many people are treating this as Wyden’s first provocative hearing question on the topic. This one — from February 2012, just after the US v Jones decision found use of a GPS to constitute a search — may provide some important insight onto the timing and rationale behind such bulk collection.

Wyden: Director Clapper, as you know the Supreme Court ruled last week that it was unconstitutional for federal agents to attach a GPS tracking device to an individual’s car and monitor their movements 24/7 without a warrant. Because the Chair was being very gracious, I want to do this briefly. Can you tell me as of now what you believe this means for the intelligence community, Read more →

Ron Wyden’s What’s-Old-Is-New Question: Reverse Targeting

/2 Comments/in , /by

When you track Ron Wyden’s persistent attempts to squeeze answers out of National Security officials, you grow familiar with the rhythm of questions. Drone memos — Article II or AUMF, he asked for years before getting a still-secret answer. Has the government ever bulk collected location, Keith Alexander refused to answer yet again yesterday. As I noted, he publicly asked for the common commercial agreement OLC memo back in January before he asked again yesterday, in addition to a number of non-public requests he (and Russ Feingold) made.

That’s true of most of his questions from yesterday.

He asked, again, about the NSA’s ability to search through incidentally collected data for US person communications.

Section 702 of FISA was intended to give the government new authority to target foreigners, but the executive branch has argued that the NSA should have the authority to deliberately go through communications collected under section 702 and conduct warrantless searches for the communications of individual Americans. Has the NSA ever conducted any of these warrantless searches for individual Americans’ communications?

He tried to limit this in last year’s reauthorization, asked about it last fall, and caught Keith Alexander lying about it back in June.

The answer to the question, of course, is “Yes.”

He asked, again, how long the government has used PATRIOT to conduct bulk collection of US person data.

How long has the NSA used Patriot Act authorities to engage in the bulk collection of Americans’ records? And was this collection underway when Congress was voting to reauthorize the Patriot Act in late 2005 and early 2006?

He — and 25 other Senators — asked this question back in June. But Clapper refused to answer it.

The answer to the question (as has been confirmed by the 2009 draft NSA IG Report) is “Yes.” Which of course either means Congress added the “relevant to” language to shut down such bulk collection, or the government lied about how it was using the Pen Register/Trap and Trace and Business Records provisions when Congress reauthorized the PATRIOT Act in 2006.

But it’s the last question that — in this form at least — is new:

One of the recurring debates about section 702 of FISA is whether the law should include stronger protections against reverse targeting, which is the prohibited practice of trying to spy on Americans by collecting the communications of foreigners that those Americans are believed to be talking to. Since the FISA Amendments Act was passed in 2008, have there been any instances of reverse targeting by NSA analysts?

Don’t get me wrong. There has been plenty of discussion of reverse targeting going back to before the FISA Amendments Act (and, for that matter, the Protect America Act) were passed.

But the answer to this question, as with the two others, is almost surely “Yes.” Otherwise, Wyden wouldn’t have asked it (and planned to ask it during a public hearing).

Which means that, either before or after the FISA Court permitted the NSA to search through incidentally collected for US person communications (see question 1), it caught analysts picking foreign targets in such a way that they could collect the communications of Americans.

They did precisely what the law prohibits explicitly.

That is new.

No wonder DiFi ensured Wyden wouldn’t get a second round of questions, saving Keith Alexander and James Clapper from answering this in public.

Did OLC Rule Americans Have Voluntarily Allowed NSA to Collect Their Communications Domestically?

/12 Comments/in , /by

Some weeks ago, I waded into a discussion between Charlie Savage and Ben Wittes to suggest that a still-secret OLC opinion Ron Wyden mentioned back in January might serve as the basis for collecting US person communications at the phone switches.

In his letter to John Brennan in January asking for a slew of things, Ron Wyden mentioned two opinions that may be the still-secret legal analysis mentioned by Savage.

Third, over two years ago, Senator Feingold and I wrote to the Attorney General regarding two classified opinions from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, including an opinion that interprets common commercial service agreements. We asked the Attorney General to declassify both of these opinions, and to revoke the opinion pertaining to commercial service agreements. Last summer, I repeated the request, and noted that the opinion regarding commercial service agreements has direct relevance to ongoing congressional debates regarding cybersecurity legislation. The Justice Department still has not responded to these letters.

The opinions would have to pre-date January 14, 2011, because Feingold and Wyden requested the opinions before that date.

The reason I think the service agreements one may be relevant is because the opinions Ben cites focus on whether government users have given consent for EINSTEIN surveillance; in his article on it Bradbury focuses on whether the government could accomplish something similar with critical infrastructure networks.

I suspect this opinion — whatever question it addresses — makes the case that Americans have given NSA voluntary permission to collect US person communications from certain (I’m not sure which ones) switches.

Whatever it says, though, Ron Wyden just asked for the opinion again.

Over the last few years I have written multiple letters to Attorney General Holder regarding a particular opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel that interprets common commercial service agreements. I have said that I believe that this opinion is inconsistent with the public’s understanding of the law, and that it needs to be both withdrawn and declassified. Despite multiple follow-ups from my staff I still have not received a response to any of these letters. Can you tell me when I can expect a response?

The biggest reason public understanding of the law would matter, after all, is if OLC were interpreting it to reflect voluntary consent for collection of data that the public didn’t realize they had given. And we know NSA wants to — if it is not already — scan communications for malicious code in the name of cybersecurity on critical infrastructure networks the same way it is doing on government networks.

Remember, this is one of 4 questions Wyden would have asked had DiFi allowed an elected Senator to ask questions rather than an NSA apologist to appear. Wyden had apparently alerted Keith Alexander to what those questions were.

Heck, this is even a question aplogist Ben Wittes has expressed an interest in. For once it is his questions, in addition to members of Congress, that are not getting answered.

Dianne Feinstein Gives NSA Apologist Ben Wittes More “Oversight” Time than Ron Wyden

/11 Comments/in , /by

Screen shot 2013-09-26 at 5.01.04 PMThe Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on NSA changes just finished.

It was about what you’d expect: Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss claimed they were making changes that don’t amount to much, at least four Senators filibustered themselves so they wouldn’t have to ask any questions (and therefore betray ignorance).

And of course, Ron Wyden and Mark Udall tried to ask questions.

The problem is, Dianne Feinstein had already deviated from normal Senate policy by giving Senators just 5 minutes to ask questions (that is the practice in the House, which is why House hearings are so much more stupid than Senate ones, generally).

Which meant that when Ron Wyden asked his first question — about geolocation — General Keith Alexander knew he could filibuster. As he did.

Now with respect to questions, let me start with you Director Alexander, and, as you all know, I will notify you in advance so that there won’t be any surprise about the types of issues we are going to get into. And Director Alexander, Senators Udall, Heinrich and I and about two dozen other senators have asked in the past whether the NSA has ever collected or made any plans to collect Americans’ cell-site information in bulk. What would be your response to that?

Gen. Keith Alexander (Alexander): Senator, on July 25, Director Clapper provided a non-classified written response to this question amongst others, as well as a classified supplement with additional detail. Allow me to reaffirm what was stated in that unclassified response. Under section 215, NSA is not receiving cell-site location data and has no current plans to do so. As you know, I indicated to this committee on October 20, 2011, that I would notify Congress of NSA’s intent to obtain cell-site location data prior to any such plans being put in place. As you may also be aware, —

Wyden: General, if I might. I think we’re all familiar with it. That’s not the question I’m asking. Respectfully, I’m asking, has the NSA ever collected or ever made any plans to collect Americans’ cell-site information. That was the question and we, respectfully General, have still not gotten an answer to it. Could you give me an answer to that?

Alexander: We did. We sent that — as you’re also aware I expressly reaffirmed this commitment to the committee on June 25, 2013. Finally, in the most recent and now declassified opinion renewing this program, the FISA court made clear in footnote number five that notice to the court in a briefing would be required if the government were to seek production of cell-site location information as part of the bulk production of call detail records. Additional details were also provided in the classified supplement to Director Clapper’s July 25th response to this question. So what I don’t want to do, Senator, is put out in an unclassified forum anything that’s classified there so I’m reading to you exactly. So we sent both of these to you. I saw what Director Clapper sent and I agree with it.

Wyden: General, if you’re responding to my question by not answering it because you think that’s a classified matter that is certainly your right. We will continue to explore that because I believe this is something the American people have a right to know whether the NSA has ever collected or made plans to collect cell-site information. I understand your answer. I’ll have additional questions on the next round. Thank you, Madam Chair. [my emphasis]

Wyden deferred his further questions to the second round.

But when the first round ended, DiFi said they didn’t have time for a second one, because they had to move onto the two non-governmental witnesses, Ben Wittes and Tim Edgar. Wyden tried to just ask his questions quickly, but Susan Collins objected.

Wittes — who recently admitted that he is an NSA apologist, according to the dictionary definition of the term — had an unfettered (and unsworn) opportunity to read his statement, which seemed to take up far more than the 5 minutes Wyden got to exercise oversight (the entire statement, with admittedly long footnotes, was 13 pages, though I’m not certain he read it all).

Effectively, then, Wittes’ mere presence served as a means to silence people asking real questions about NSA. DiFi claimed she had invited James Clapper and Keith Alexander to set the facts straight, but then made sure they’d be able to filibuster any effort to liberate a stray fact or two.

Next time he accuses Congress of being NAKED!, I do hope he remembers that his very presence has been used to prevent elected members of Congress from asking the questions Wittes is so sure the government is forthcoming in answering.