Posts

SCOTUS Takes Up January 6 Obstruction Challenge — But with Unknown Scope

Today, SCOTUS granted cert to one of the initial challenges to 18 USC 1512(c)(2), that of Joseph Fischer.

Depending on what they do with the appeal, the review could have significant effect on all the January 6 cases charging obstruction — over 300 defendants so far, including Trump.

But no one knows how broadly they will be reviewing this appeal.

On its face, the only thing being appealed in Fischer is whether this statute requires document tampering.

Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering”), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

If SCOTUS upheld the DC Circuit opinion (and all the underlying District opinions), nothing would change. If it overturned the DC Circuit opinion, then hundreds of cases of rioters would be thrown out.

Remember that defendants have always likened the January 6 attack with the interruption by protestors of Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing (there are significant differences, starting with the fact that all the protestors who disrupted Kavanaugh’s hearing were in the building legally). So I wouldn’t even rule out some set of Republicans rejecting this application on those grounds.

But it’s not clear that would affect the charges against Trump. That’s because Trump’s obstruction does involve document tampering: the forged elector certificates.

It’s possible, though, that SCOTUS will also review a more contentious issue: the definition of “corrupt purpose” in the statute. Fischer addresses that deeper in the petition.

While some courts have limited Section 1512(c)(2)’s scope by a particular definition of the critical mens rea element—“corruptly”—they have not defined it uniformly. See Miller, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 70 n.3. And the D.C. Circuit’s lead opinion declined to define it all, even while stating that “corrupt intent” limited Section 1512(c)(2)’s reach. Compare Pet. App. 17a-18a with Pet. App. 20a. The lead opinion nonetheless acknowledged three potential definitions:

1. Corruptly means conduct that is “wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil.” Pet. App. at 18a (quoting Arthur Anderson LLP, 544 U.S. at 705, discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)).

2. Undertaken with a “corrupt purpose or through independently corrupt means, or both.” Pet. App. 18a-19a (quoting United States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d 16, 30 (D.D.C. 2021) (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., concurring and dissenting in part)).

3. Conduct that involves “voluntarily and intentionally [acting] to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or a benefit of another person.” Pet. App. 19a (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616-17) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Here, SCOTUS could adopt the more restrictive definition of corrupt benefit, option 3.

In that case, it’s not clear what would happen with the crime scene defendants: at the DC Circuit, Justin Walker argued that Trump supporters might have obtained a corrupt purpose if Trump were unlawfully retained.

But for Trump, there’s no question: He was attempting to retain one of the most valuable jobs in the world through unlawful means.

All of which is to say, SCOTUS’ decision to review the case is huge — though not entirely unexpected.

But we won’t know what to make of the review for some time.

Update: I had been anxiously waiting to see what Steve Vladeck had to say about this. He notes that SCOTUS took Fischer but not Miller and Alam, which had been joined to it.

All three defendants filed cert. petitions challenging the D.C. Circuit’s decision. The Department of Justice filed a single, consolidated brief in opposition—and the Court’s website used to reflect that the three cases had been “vided” (meaning that they were being considered alongside each other). Thus, it’s really strange that the Court granted Fischer, but not Lang and Miller. (And then quietly removed the notation from Fischer’s docket page that the case was tied to Lang and Miller.) Yes, the Court often holds parallel cases for a lead case, but not after both the court of appeals and the government had already consolidated them.

Part of why it’s weird is because all three petitions raise the question presented in Fischer—the actus reus question. The other two petitions also raise the mens rea question (and Fischer does not), but if the Court was interested in answering the actus reus question in general (and only the actus reus question), it could easily have granted all three petitions only on that question.

Otherwise, the only difference I can readily discern between Fischer and the other two cases is that Fischer entered the Capitol later on January 6 (after the Joint Session recessed). But it’s hard to believe that the Court is intervening in an interlocutory posture (remember, the cases have not yet gone to trial) because it wants to draw a temporal distinction among which January 6 rioters can and can’t be prosecuted under 1512(c)(2).

All of this is to say that, if the Court really was interested in narrowing the scope of 1512(c)(2) to align with Judge Katsas’s dissent in Fischer, I don’t get why the Court would sever cases that had hitherto been consolidated.

 

Maggie and Mike Back Together Again, This Time on, or with, January 6 Corrupt Purpose

Yesterday, the NYT broke the news that Jared Kushner testified before Jack Smith’s grand jury last month and told them — in testimony that conflicts with other witness testimony — that his father-in-law really did believe he had won the election.

Federal prosecutors investigating former President Donald J. Trump’s attempts to overturn the 2020 election have questioned multiple witnesses in recent weeks — including Mr. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner — about whether Mr. Trump had privately acknowledged in the days after the 2020 election that he had lost, according to four people briefed on the matter.

The line of questioning suggests prosecutors are trying to establish whether Mr. Trump was acting with corrupt intent as he sought to remain in power — essentially that his efforts were knowingly based on a lie — evidence that could substantially bolster any case they might decide to bring against him.

Mr. Kushner testified before a grand jury at the federal courthouse in Washington last month, where he is said to have maintained that it was his impression that Mr. Trump truly believed the election was stolen, according to a person briefed on the matter.

The scoop, which brings the old team of Maggie and Mike back together again, is fine. Whoohoo! Another top witness.

Just as interesting that Jared has testified is the news — buried in paragraph 31 — that Ivanka has not yet testified before the grand jury, though there’s a good deal of wiggle room about whether she has complied with a document subpoena or whether she has spoken with prosecutors outside of a grand jury.

The New York Times reported in February that Mr. Smith’s office had subpoenaed Mr. Kushner and his wife, Ivanka Trump, to testify before the grand jury. The special counsel’s office has yet to question her before the grand jury. Ms. Trump testified before the House committee last year.

Maggie and Mike, always solicitous of Ivanka and her family, mention Ivanka’s testimony to the January 6 Committee, but they neglect to mention that after Ivanka testified to the January 6 Committee, the committee specifically called her out for her lack of candor, effectively inviting DOJ to consider false statements charges for her. So it may not be a good sign for Ivanka that she hasn’t been called before the grand jury.

That’s an interesting detail, but given that this is Maggie and Mike, I’m as interested in what appears between the Jared news and the Ivanka news: Maggie and Mike’s explanation for why (they claim) this matters. They explain that asking whether Trump knew he lost is important to ascertaining whether he had a “corrupt purpose” in obstructing the vote certification. Based on that premise, Maggie and Mike raise doubts about whether Jack Smith will be able to charge this, because without that, they suggest, Smith will lack one key element of the obstruction statute.

Maggie and Mike don’t mention that dozens — probably over a hundred — people have been convicted under 18 USC 1512(c)(2) for their actions on January 6 already; by DOJ’s most recent count, 310 people have been charged with it. Many if not most of them tried to argue at some point that their crimes were cool because they really did believe Donald Trump’s lies.

To be fair to poor Maggie and Mike, who after all are mere journalists, the conceit that Trump might dodge obstruction charges because he believed his own hype is one that has long been parroted by TV lawyers, and Maggie and Mike do cite several lawyers talking about how having proof that Trump knew he lost would strengthen the case.

But we have two years of public record showing that’s not how it works.

What VIP obstruction looks like: Alan Hostetter

Here’s what a guilty verdict for obstructing January 6 looks like in reality, taken from findings that Reagan-appointed Judge Royce Lamberth wrote up to support his guilty verdict yesterday for Alan Hostetter, a southern California anti-mask activist who played a key role in organizing others from southern California to come to DC on January 6.

In December 2021, I wrote about the challenges and import of prosecuting people like Hostetter — I called him and similar figures organizer-inciters — for obstruction, in part because it’s a test of whether DOJ will be able to hold even more senior people accountable for inciting others to commit violence.

Like Trump, Hostetter is a VIP who didn’t enter the Capitol, but who spent the weeks leading up to January 6 riling up others to obstruct the vote certification. As such, he’s a really good read on how obstruction might apply to Trump.

Every time Lamberth presides over a bench trial, he writes up and dockets his findings. I could hug him for doing so, because they provide a really superb way to understand how a very senior judge who has been presiding over these cases for over two years views them. Journalists and TV lawyers who, unlike Lamberth, haven’t been living and breathing January 6 for two years could learn a lot from reading every one of his findings reports, or at least this one.

Lamberth pointed to the following evidence to support his guilty verdict that Hostetter had obstructed the vote certification:

After arriving at the West Plaza, Mr. Hostetter advanced underneath the inauguration stage scaffolding and up a set of stairs leading to the inauguration stage. While on the stairs, Mr. Hostetter used a bullhorn to cheer on the crowd below as it violently fought against police and attempted to break the lines. Meanwhile, on a landing at the top of the stairs, several officers formed a line to prevent a group of rioters from reaching the inauguration stage. Mr. Hostetter’s co-conspirator, Mr. Taylor, joined the group of rioters and began pushing against the officers who were blocking access to the stage.

[snip]

Mr. Hostetter’s actions obstructed and impeded the proceeding by, together with the actions of others, forcing the evacuation of Congress and the end of the certification session, as shown in the testimony of Inspector Hawa and Mr. Schwager. By joining the riot, exhorting the crowd, standing with a vanguard of rioters making a highly-visible and violent effort to access the inauguration stage, and remaining on the Upper West Terrace for two hours while police attempted to clear out rioters, Mr. Hostetter helped ensure that Congress was under a sufficient security threat requiring adjournment and then an inability to resume the official proceeding that their actions helped to disrupt.

It’s not just that Hostetter’s own physical premise obstructed the vote certification, his exhortations to other, more violent people, did too.

Lamberth specifically noted that Hostetter’s purpose was to obstruct an election result he viewed as fraudulent.

Among other evidence … Mr. Hostetter’s own testimony[] demonstrate[s] that Mr. Hostetter understood his purpose on that day to be stopping an election result that he viewed as fraudulent by obstructing or impeding the Electoral College Certification.

Lamberth cited multiple exhibits and testimony showing that Hostetter knew the significance of the Electoral Certification. Notably, he describes how Hostetter listened to Trump explaining what he wanted, and then took action.

Mr. Hostetter testified that he had been closely following the efforts to overturn the 2020 Presidential Election and news about what was happening with the Electoral College Certification. Additionally, Mr. Hostetter testified that he listened to speeches at the Ellipse given by Rudy Giuliani and President Trump, was engaged by them, and remembers President Trump talking about Vice President Pence. During President Trump’s speech, President Trump made statements concerning what he wanted to happen with the certification and Vice President Pence’s role in the certification, which Mr. Hostetter heard.

Lamberth substantiated Hostetter’s corrupt purpose — what Maggie and Mike claim requires proof of knowledge that Trump lost — by pointing to the former cop’s consciousness of wrong-doing by walking, armed with a hatchet, onto Capitol grounds, what Dabney Friedrich adopted as “otherwise illegal means” standard to meet the statute’s corrupt purpose requirement.

Mr. Hostetter had the necessary mental state to meet the “corruptly” requirement. First, by himself carrying an inherently dangerous weapon into the restricted grounds of the Capitol, Mr. Hostetter used an unlawful means, specifically the independently felonious means of entering and remaining in a restricted building with a deadly or dangerous weapon.

Lamberth also pointed to Hostetter’s own incitement of others as evidence of corrupt purpose.

Additionally, Mr. Hostetter sent numerous messages and made speeches before and immediately after January 6 effectively calling for revolution. He also recorded videos in which he called for executions of public officials in connection with the 2020 Presidential Election.

Importantly, Lamberth specifically addresses, and dismisses the import of, Hostetter’s claims that he believed he was doing something good.

I also find that even if Mr. Hostetter genuinely believed the election was stolen and that public officials had committed treason, that does not change the fact that he acted corruptly with consciousness of wrongdoing. Belief that your actions are ultimately serving a greater good does not negate consciousness of wrongdoing.

[snip]

[T]he point isn’t that the defendant needs to understand what he’s doing is morally wrong; it’s that he needs to understand that what he’s doing is unlawful. Even if Mr. Hostetter sincerely believed–which it appears he did–that the election was fraudulent, that President Trump was the rightful winner, and that public officials committed treason, as a former police chief, he still must have known it was unlawful to vindicate that perceived injustice by engaging in mob violence to obstruct Congress.

And Lamberth addresses the mid-point of the appellate debate at the DC Circuit on corrupt purpose in the Fischer decision — requiring an unlawful benefit to find corrupt purpose.

I find that Mr. Hostetter took these actions in order to provide an unlawful benefit to his preferred presidential candidate, President Trump–by disrupting the Electoral College Certification that would have led to President Trump’s loss of the presidency.

Requiring finding an unlawful benefit is not, yet, the standard for obstruction in the DC Circuit. A separate panel considered the standard for corrupt purpose in Thomas Robertson’s appeal on May 11. But it is likely to be the most conservative standard that the DC Circuit (and even SCOTUS) would adopt, so Lamberth is protecting this verdict in advance of further rulings from the Circuit.

In any case, as I’ve noted over and over, even if that were the standard, it would apply to Trump if he were charged far more easily than any of the 300-plus people who’ve already been charged with obstruction for January 6. For Trump, whether he believes he won or not is not only unnecessary, but because he was trying to steal the election, it’s easier to prove corrupt purpose under this standard for him than for anyone else.

This is what applying the obstruction statute to January 6 looks like in real life. One after another judge has, like Lamberth, explained why it doesn’t matter whether someone believed that Trump won.

It doesn’t matter. Maggie and Mike built an entire story around a standard that two years of directly applicable precedents — precedents that will dictate terms of the elements of offense if Trump ever is charged under 18 USC 1512(c)(2) — show doesn’t matter.

Whether Trump believes he won doesn’t matter for 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

Jared Kushner’s central role in monetizing the lies

Whether Trump knew he won doesn’t matter for 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

It does matter — a lot — for any campaign finance charges arising out of January 6, and in that, it could have an indirect impact on Jack Smith’s charging decisions.

And, in part because Jared made himself scarce for January 6 itself, that’s actually the area where the former President’s son-in-law has more personal exposure than on the conspiracy to obstruct the vote certification.

This is a point MSNBC’s Lisa Rubin made at length in response to this news yesterday (and her coverage of this is so good I hereby create a special category of people who happen to be lawyers but even in spite of that provide superb TV analysis based on the actual facts).

Here’s how J6C addressed it.

Several days earlier, Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller had explained the intention for this round of advertisements in an email. He wrote that, “the President and Mayor Giuliani want to get back up on TVASAP, and Jared [Kushner] has approved in budgetary concept, so here’s the gameplan” in order to “motivate the GOP base to put pressure on the Republican Governors of Georgia and Arizona and the Republican controlled State legislatures in Wisconsin and Michigan to hear evidence of voter fraud before January 6th.”317 Miller anticipated a budget of $5 million and asked for the messaging to follow an earlier round of advertisements, “but the endings need to be changed to include phone numbers and directions to call the local Governor or state legislature.”318 On December 22nd, Jason Miller texted Jared Kushner that “POTUS has approved the buy.”319

[snip]

Trump Campaign leadership was fully aware of post-election fundraising totals. According to Coby, President Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner “had the most interest in the digital program” and “would just check in on [fundraising] results,” and routinely received updates regarding fundraising from Coby.70 Coby also made clear that Kushner was heavily involved in the Campaign’s budget process71 and that he updated Kushner on TMAGAC’s post-election fundraising totals.72

The Select Committee received documents confirming Kushner’s involvement. For example, on November 8, 2020, Kushner requested that a daily tracker be created showing the Trump Campaign’s financial position from election day forward.73 In an email, Kushner noted that the tracker would allow the Campaign to consider its cash flow ahead of the creation of “a new entity for POTUS[’s] other political activities.”74 Just days after the election, and after the Campaign had three of its four best fundraising days ever on November 4th, 5th, and 6th,75 Kushner was preparing for the launch of President Trump’s new leadership PAC, Save America. Kushner stated that he needed this new daily tracker because the Trump Campaign was going to continue fundraising post-election.76 Kushner continued to receive these detailed daily trackers, which included Save America’s fundraising hauls, through at least December 2020.77

Jared Kushner isn’t much use as a witness about Trump’s actions and intent on January 6 itself.

He’s a central witness to the decision to monetize Trump’s lies by sowing violence — and even, to then use that money for purposes other than addressing election integrity. That’s why his grand jury testimony last month is of interest.

And his claim that Trump really believed he won may not help Trump; it may hurt Jared. But then, Jared has a very direct interest in claiming that all this fundraising based off lies were based on a good faith belief Trump had won.

Campaign finance fraud is an otherwise illegal action

I’m not promising here that Trump will be charged with obstruction — though, as noted, I long ago pointed to people like Hostetter as early tests of whether he could be, and his conviction yesterday shows how that might work.

I’m saying that people who came late to the understanding that DOJ is using obstruction to prosecute January 6 — which I first mapped out 23 months ago — seem little interest in the two years of precedent about how it will be applied. I include, for special notice, this “model prosecution memo” from JustSecurity — which doesn’t even mention the Justin Walker concurrence in Fischer (which Lamberth addressed in his findings), much less the pending Robertson decision in the DC Circuit that will dictate this application for Thomas Robertson, for Alan Hostetter, and for Donald Trump — in that category.

Trump’s knowledge of his loss matters far more for his decisions about fundraising than it does for obstruction charges. But they may influence any obstruction charges, because campaign finance violations — Trump’s fundraising through the moment he sicced his mob on the Capitol — would be one way DOJ could prove otherwise illegal conduct to meet that corrupt purpose standard under 18 USC 1512(c)(2) if that’s what the DC Circuit adopts in Robertson.

Plus, profiting off false claims of being robbed is another way that Trump personally benefitted from the incitement, even ignoring his bid to stay in power.

Update: This post on Maggie’s curious foray into campaign finance journalism notes that shortly after that misleading story, she and Mike broke the news of the Jared and Ivanka subpoena, which Maggie and Mike claimed was about calling off dad’s attack.

After I started unpacking Maggie’s story, I got distracted with the possibility that DOJ will tie Trump and Rudy Giuliani and John Eastman directly to the almost-murder of Michael Fanone. So, in the interim, Maggie broke the news that Smith’s prosecutors had subpoenaed Jared and Ivanka.

That story, written with Mike Schmidt, is exceptional only for the fact that they managed to avoid most of the hype about “aggressive steps” that peppers most reporting on Jack Smith. It pointed to things like the morning Oval Office meeting (Ivanka’s response to which her Chief of Staff Julie Radford was likely already questioned about, since — as the J6C Report noted explicitly — Radford was far more candid about it than Ivanka) and efforts to get Trump to call off his mob as likely topics of questioning.

Smith no doubt wants to get Jared and Ivanka’s stories about such topics locked in. Given questions about their candor before J6C, too, Smith will likely also give them an opportunity to revise their prior answers so they more closely match known facts.

Back to Maggie’s solo endeavor to read FEC filings.

[snip]

As it happens, all this ties back to Maggie’s newest story breaking the news of a subpoena to Ivanka and Jared. I’m sure Jack Smith wants to ask Ivanka and Jared about their efforts to get dad to call off his mob.

But he may also want to know why Herschmann — a lawyer whose legal status in the White House remains entirely unexplained — why Herschmann, according to Pat Cipollone’s testimony, told the White House Counsel not to join in that Oval Office meeting where Trump ordered Pence to break the law because “this is family.”

“This is family,” Cipollone said Herschmann told him before he walked in the door. “You don’t need to be here.”

I would imagine that Jack Smith wants to know why, at that moment when Trump prepared to give his Vice President an illegal order, Herschmann was treated as family.

 

Where the Trump Investigations Stand: The January 6 Conspiracies

As noted in this post, I started to write short summaries of where the three main investigations into Trump stand, but they turned into posts. So I’m posting them serially. I wrote about the Georgia investigation here and the stolen documents investigation here.

On Thursday, Mike Pence testified to the January 6 grand jury for over five hours. Many commentators have suggested — and I agree — that was one of the last major testimonial steps Jack Smith would need to take before deciding whether and if so how to charge Trump for inciting a mob to threaten to assassinate his Vice President.

But — in addition to Smith’s efforts to obtain recordings from Rudy Giuliani and others that former Fox producer Abby Grossberg has in her possession (which are going to make great evidence at trial) — there are still a few pieces that Smith’s prosecutors seem to be working on.

The most important of those may be continued appellate uncertainty regarding the law that Smith is likely to use to charge Trump and others in conjunction with January 6, obstruction of the vote certification, 18 USC 1512(c)(2), a charge successfully used against dozens of other January 6 defendants already. The DC Circuit will have a hearing on that, in an appeal former Virginia cop Thomas Robertson made of his obstruction conviction, on May 11.

To understand its import, let me explain how I think the various things Smith is investigating fit together. I think it likely that, in addition to some charges relating to the obstruction of this or the January 6 Committee’s investigation, Smith’s team is pursuing:

  • Conspiracy to defraud the United States for submitting fake elector certificates to the Archives (18 USC 371)
  • Obstruction of the vote certification and conspiracy to obstruct (18 USC 1512(c)(2) and (k))
  • Conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 USC 1343; 1349)
  • Aiding and abetting assault (18 USC 111(b) and 2)

This differs from the January 6 Committee’s referrals in that I’ve included wire fraud, for which they provided abundant evidence, in an appendix, but did not include in their referrals. Also, I believe Smith would charge conspiracy tied to January 6 under 1512(k) rather than 371, as DOJ has been doing for over a year, not least because it provides stiffer sentences and more flexibility at sentencing. And I’ve suggested DOJ might use aiding and abetting of Michael Fanone’s assault based off Amit Mehta’s ruling addressing it and the evidence DOJ used in the Ed Badalian trial. I think that’s more likely than a charge for incitement of insurrection (18 USC 2383) unless DOJ built upwards off of still-hypothetical guilty verdicts in the Proud Boys case, but it might take time. I frankly think adding seditious conspiracy charges would be more likely than incitement of insurrection, if one spent the time to build up the intervening case, but that’s highly unlikely for constitutional reasons.

The way these three main charges — conspiracy to defraud tied to the fake elector certificates, conspiracy to obstruct the vote certification, and wire fraud — intersect likely provide some prosecutorial tools for the same reason that some Georgia Republicans are now turning on other ones.

While the fake electors case may seem like a slam dunk, the criminal exposure it presents is quite uneven.

Part of that stems from the fact that the extent to which a fake certificate was fraudulent is tied to state law about the requirements for elector ascertainment. On December 9, 2020, campaign lawyer Kenneth Cheesebro wrote down (!!) where such efforts would be less and more problematic.

Many of the States contested by the Trump team had laws that specified requirements for electors to validly cast and transmit their votes—and the December 9, 2020, memo recognized that some of these criteria would be difficult, if not impossible, for the fake electors to fulfill. (As described later, most were not fulfilled.) For example, Nevada State law required that the secretary of state preside when Presidential electors meet,16 and Nevada Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske, a Republican, had already signed a certificate ascertaining the Biden/Harris electors as the authorized, winning slate.17 Several States also had rules requiring electors to cast their votes in the State capitol building, or rules governing the process for approving substitutes if any original proposed electors from the November ballot were unavailable. As a result, Chesebro’s December 9, 2020, memo advised the Trump Campaign to abide by such rules, when possible, but also recognized that these slates could be “slightly problematic in Michigan,” “somewhat dicey in Georgia and Pennsylvania,” and “very problematic in Nevada.”18

That memo marks the moment when Trump’s official campaign lawyers like Justin Clark and Matt Morgan started to distance themselves from the campaign efforts, to be replaced by Rudy Giuliani and his band of merry warriors.

Something similar happened at the states, as smarter people insulated themselves from this stupid legal move. The fake electors in New Mexico and Pennsylvania included caveats that likely protects them from legal exposure; in other states (notably, Wisconsin) the fake electors credibly believed that the certificates would only be used if a court ruled that there was some remaining legal dispute. Fourteen fake electors refused to participate, several of whom had very useful things to say about its dubious legality even to the January 6 Committee.

While there’s lots of documentary record reflecting that Trump approved the plan, proving his knowledge of the legal problems with the fake certificates themselves would likely require witnesses who saw him do so after having been advised of the legal sketchiness of it all (that may have been among the things the two Pats, Philbin and Cipollone, were asked about in their grand jury testimony in December). To include Trump in these charges, you need witnesses. His call to Brad Raffensberger and his assent to a lawsuit using numbers known to be dodgy are related; his pressure on electors to participate is part of the same conspiracy; but to charge him with the conspiracy itself you need those direct witnesses (in addition to the two Pats, Jason Miller, Rudy, Mark Meadows, Epshteyn, and John Eastman are likely those witnesses).

By last June, the subpoenas DOJ sent out asking for communications with those deeply implicated reflected this differential exposure. So do the phone seizures of Mike Roman and Epshteyn in September, both of whom were key gatekeepers of this process. This post shows how the investigation proceeded from there. In other words, the parts of the fake elector investigation we can see reflect awareness from before the first J6C hearing that the scam implicated differential legal exposure.

That kind of differential exposure is the same thing that Fani Willis is using to secure cooperating witnesses in Georgia.

While I’ll come back to it, the same kind of differential exposure exists with the wire fraud case. Just as one example, while Justin Clark claims to have distanced himself from the obviously illegal fake elector scam, he remained in Trump’s employ as he spent the money earned from making false claims about voter fraud between November and January. He already would have had an incentive to provide evidence to prosecutors that he had no part of the fake electors scheme. His incentive to do so increases to the extent that he benefitted from fraudulent fundraising and spending.

But first I want to explain one thing Smith may be waiting on: A clear sense of how the DC Circuit will define “corrupt purpose” under 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

If he charges it, Smith will likely prove that Trump obstructed the vote certification by:

  • Asking Mike Pence to take action to delay the certification that Trump had been told was illegal (Greg Jacob, Mark Short, the two Pats, and Pence are witnesses to this, all of whom have now made Executive Privilege-waived grand jury appearances)
  • Falsely leading the mob to believe that Pence could take that action (changes Trump made to his speech, about which Stephen Miller was likely asked by the grand jury this month, and his tweets are evidence of this)
  • After Pence refused to take that action, using the mob to try to pressure him to take it anyway or to otherwise disrupt the certification (DOJ has spent two years obtaining evidence that this was, in fact, why many people rioted, with specific evidence tied to Danny Rodriguez)

Contrary to what a million TV lawyers have told you, to prove obstruction, Smith won’t have to prove Trump knew he lost. DOJ has repeatedly won convictions of other January 6 defendants who tried to use that as a defense.

DOJ will need to prove he had corrupt purpose in attempting to obstruct the vote certification. And what that means in the DC Circuit won’t be decided until after May 11.

This post provides both a summary of the debate as it existed in January. This post describes how a DC Circuit panel of Florence Pan, Justin Walker, and Greg Katsas ruled that 1512(c)(2) does apply to the vote certification and that obstruction can extend beyond documentary obstruction. It also explains how none of the three of them could agree on what “corrupt purpose” means, from which some January 6 defendants have tried to argue (unsuccessfully in at least two cases) that Walker’s preferred meaning should apply.

Wildly simplified, the three main definitions of what corrupt purpose might mean are:

  • Corrupt benefit
  • Using otherwise illegal means, which in the case of other January 6 defendants has meant trespass or assault
  • Aiming to obtain an unlawful benefit

On May 11, a DC Circuit panel including Pan, Poppy Bush appointee Karen Henderson, and Obama appointee Cornelia Pillard will consider whether former Virginia cop Thomas Robertson had the corrupt purpose required to be convicted of obstruction. As part of that, they’ll decide whether the earlier ruling decided the issue of what corrupt purpose is, and if not, what it is.

As I wrote, to the extent that Smith has proof Trump knew the fake elector certificates were fraudulent, 1512 should apply to Trump in every imaginable case, far more easily than it does with rioters. The attempted delivery of the fake elector certificates to Pence constitutes a documentary attempt to obstruct the vote certification. Trump’s illegal request to Pence, as well as the knowingly fraudulent lawsuit in Georgia and the effort to pressure Raffensperger, to say nothing of any incitement or aid-and-abet liability in the assaults, are illegal means he used to stop the vote certification. And Trump, more than anyone else involved in efforts to obstruct the vote certification on January 6 was seeking an unlawful personal benefit, the ability to remain in power for another term. Mitch McConnell protégé Walker clearly laid out that basis for that case in his concurring opinion in Fischer.

But former Trump White House counsel Katsas didn’t necessarily view the continued election of Donald Trump to be such an advantage, at least not for those accused of assault before him. He sought a stricter definition of “financial, exculpatory, or professional” gain.

Which brings me (back) to the wire fraud investigation, something that DOJ has been investigating since at least September and in which CNN reported DOJ got cooperators after January 6.

[T]he financial investigation has sought information about Trump’s post-election Save America PAC and other funding of people who assisted Trump, according to subpoenas viewed by CNN. The financial investigation picked up steam as DOJ investigators enlisted cooperators months after the 2021 riot, one of the sources said.

Wire fraud charges would closely resemble the successful Build the Wall prosecution for which Steve Bannon’s co-conspirators just got four year sentences (he was pardoned in for it in one of Trump’s last pardons but faces trial for the same scam in New York State in November). It would follow a similar wire fraud investigation of Sidney Powell that dates back to before September 2021.

If you think of these three prongs of the investigation, the wire fraud prong serves two purposes. First, many of the people who were witnesses but not subjects of the events leading up to January 6 might be subjects of the wire fraud investigation. As I noted, it may provide a tool to get cooperators.

Just as importantly, even under the most constrained definition of corrupt purpose for obstruction, grifting off false claims of election fraud would qualify.

That is, for Trump, a prosecutor should be able to prove corrupt purpose regardless of any conceivable standard that the DC Circuit or even a conservative SCOTUS would adopt, because he attempted to obstruct the vote certification so that he could remain President after losing the election.

But even if you don’t believe getting Trump elected provides an unlawful benefit to his supporters (or, to put it another way, disqualifying the votes of 81 million other Americans so yours counts more), disseminating false claims about voter fraud to get rich and then cashing in on that Big Lie for years afterwards is a different kind of corrupt purpose, the kind of financial corrupt purpose that Katsas is looking for.

If you riled up tens of thousands of Trump supporters who went on to attack the Capitol just so you could benefit financially, you’ve realized the kind of corrupt financial benefit from the riot that would seem to meet Katsas’ most constrained definition of corrupt purpose.

So it’s not just that the wire fraud part of the investigation is a crime that should, like all the other ways Trump and his flunkies have exploited his credulous followers, be prosecuted. It’s a important complement to the two other conspiracies, both because it’s likely to motivate more cooperators, but also because it helps to prove corrupt purpose for all the people who profited off the fraud.

And that may have an impact on the timing.

As I’ve noted, Trump should qualify under the definition of corrupt purpose no matter what the DC Circuit decides, though some of his flunkies might not. And so on top of whatever continued investigation Smith has to do on the wire fraud prong, he may want to wait until at least after that hearing before he makes final charging decisions.

Lots of people are impatient that neither Trump nor his flunkies have been charged thirty months after their crimes. But the likely charge hasn’t even been defined yet.

Links

Where the Trump Investigations Stand: Georgia

Where the Trump Investigations Stand: Stolen Documents

Where the Trump Investigations Stand: The January 6 Conspiracies

DC Circuit Upholds 18 USC 1512(c)(2), Sort Of

This passage from Judge Justin Walker’s concurring opinion in the DC Circuit’s ruling upholding the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to three defendants accused of assaulting cops on January 6 may be the most important language, until further litigation sorts out the rest.

5 The dissenting opinion says a defendant can act “corruptly” only if the benefit he intends to procure is a “financial, professional, or exculpatory advantage.” Dissenting Op. 35. I am not so sure. Cf. United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1010-11 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1979); Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1130-32 (Fla. 1982). Besides, this case may involve a professional benefit. The Defendants’ conduct may have been an attempt to help Donald Trump unlawfully secure a professional advantage — the presidency. Like the clerkship that Samuel Vaughan corruptly sought hundreds of years ago, the presidency is a coveted professional position. See Vaughan (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 308-10; but see Telegram from William T. Sherman to Republican National Convention (1884) (“I will not accept if nominated, and will not serve if elected.”).

True, the Defendants were allegedly trying to secure the presidency for Donald Trump, not for themselves or their close associates. But the beneficiary of an unlawful benefit need not be the defendant or his friends. Few would doubt that a defendant could be convicted of corruptly bribing a presidential elector if he paid the elector to cast a vote in favor of a preferred candidate — even if the defendant had never met the candidate and was not associated with him. See Oral Arg. Tr. 18-19, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (discussing the fear that electoral college voters might one day be bribed).

[snip]

[I]t might be enough for the Government to prove that a defendant used illegal means (like assaulting police officers) with the intent to procure a benefit (the presidency) for another person (Donald Trump). * *

I most recently wrote about this appeal here (which links to my past coverage). DOJ has charged over 300 people with obstructing the vote certification on January 6. All but one judge — former Clarence Thomas clerk Carl Nichols — upheld the application. Judge Nichols said that the application of 1512 to these defendants, who allegedly engaged in significant assaults as part of their actions on January 6, had to involve a documentary component, like destroying a document.

Walker joined Florence Pan’s majority opinion upholding the obstruction statute with Garret Miller, Joseph Fischer, and Jake Lang. The decision before the court was primarily whether obstruction required a documentary aspect, and Pan and Walker agreed it did not, though at the hearing, Walker and Greg Katsas made it clear they were interested in limiting the “corrupt purpose” requirement of the statue.

That’s where Walker disagreed with Pan: whether the “corrupt purpose” part of 1512 must involve some kind of personal corruption or may be broader. He argues here — in a part of the opinion that Greg Katsas did not join — that it must.

But he interpreted his own definition requiring some personal corruption to extend to those, like the appellees, who committed crimes in service of keeping Trump in office.

I’m not sure his adoption of personal corruption to assault in the service of election theft is so obvious (his opinion makes it sound like he’s not sure either).

But as written, his language would extend to virtually all the people already charged with obstruction.

This will be further litigated. But given that this is the starting place, unless SCOTUS does something remarkable, it likely means obstruction will be upheld for all those currently charged and could be used with Trump and all his aides who were more clearly working for a corrupt purpose.

[Fixed appellee appellant — because I forgot the defendants won before Nichols]

Update: Earlier this week, I did a podcast with Joshua Holland. I said there were a number of things that Jack Smith might wait on before charging Trump. One of those was this appeal.

Update: Added a bit more description the Nichols’ holding that was overturned.

Update: Both Nick Smith (for Ethan Nordean and the guy who argued before the DC Circuit) and Carmen Hernandez (for Zach Rehl) are using the opinion to disrupt the Proud Boy trial, with Hernandez making a much more expansive ask.

They argue that because Walker would not have joined Pan’s majority opinion on the documents issue without a more narrow reading of “corruptly” than she adopted, Tim Kelly has to apply Walker’s standard in the Proud Boy case. That’s why I noted that Walker had little problem applying his “corruptly” standard to the defendants before him: if it can apply to guys who weren’t called out by the President in advance of playing a key role in an assault on the Capitol, then it surely could apply to guys accused of doing just that.

In her majority, Pan noted that Thomas Robertson’s appeal includes a challenge to the “corruptly” language used to convict him on obstruction, but this bid by the Proud Boys may hasten DOJ’s request for some other resolution.

How Legal Certainty about 1512(c)(2) Has Wobbled Even as Certainty Trump Violated It Increased

In the past year, those who believe Trump could and should be held accountable for January 6 reached near unanimity that he should be charged with obstruction of the vote certification — 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

In the same year, certainty about how the law applies to January 6 has wobbled, with one appeal pending before the DC Circuit (which will be appealed no matter how it comes out), and either an expansion of this appeal or a follow-on one virtually certain. All that uncertainty may not change DOJ’s determination to use it; under all but the most restrictive appellate rulings, it should still easily apply to Trump and his ilk, though not necessarily all the January 6 rioters who’ve already been prosecuted with it.

But DOJ probably won’t know exactly how it’ll apply for at least six months, maybe another year.

This post will attempt to explain what has happened and what might happen going forward.

1512(c)(2) reads:

Whoever corruptly otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

You need an official proceeding — here, Congress’ vote certification mandated by the 12th Amendment, you need an attempt to obstruct it, and you need corrupt purpose. The “otherwise” here is at the center of the legal dispute, meaning how this clause relates to the rest of the obstruction statute is under dispute. But depending on that relationship, the obstruction statute has the advantage of including a potential 20 year sentence, an explicit conspiracy charge, with enhancements under the sentencing guidelines for things tied to the degree of obstruction and the use of violence that offers a good deal of flexibility to tailor sentences ranging from 4 months to 6 years (and hypothetically far higher).

At first, lawyers not following the actual DOJ investigation imagined that Trump could be held accountable for January 6 on an incitement model; indeed, that’s what Congress used in impeachment. But from the start, DOJ charged many of the rioters who premeditated their effort to stop the vote certification with obstruction. It charged Oath Keepers Jessica Watkins and Proud Boy Joe Biggs with obstruction from their initial arrest affidavits on January 16 and 19, 2021, respectively. A jury found Watkins guilty of obstruction (but not seditious conspiracy) on November 30, 2022, and Biggs’ obstruction and sedition conspiracy trial kicked off last Thursday.

In July 2021, I argued that Trump (and any of members of Congress prosecuted) would be charged with obstruction, not incitement. I repeated and expanded that argument in August 2021. In her December speech calling to hold Mark Meadows in contempt, Liz Cheney invoked obstruction as the crime under consideration, which led TV lawyers, almost a year after the fact, to consider Trump’s conduct using the frame of obstruction. In March, Judge David Carter ruled it more likely than not that Trump and John Eastman had attempted to obstruct the vote certification (adopting the 9th Circuit standard for corrupt purpose).

At that point, 14 months after the attack, everyone was in agreement: That’s how Trump could be held accountable. By prosecution under 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

But starting in a November 22, 2021 hearing in the case of Garret Miller, former Clarence Thomas clerk Carl Nichols explicitly raised questions about whether obstruction could apply to the President. In March, even before Judge Carter’s ruling, Nichols ruled that while the vote certification counted as an official proceeding, obstruction required the involvement of documents. In refusing to change his mind on reconsideration, Nichols also noted the discrepancy among DC judges as to what “corruptly” means in the statute.

And that’s how on December 12, 2022, almost two years into this process and a month after the appointment of a Special Counsel, former Trump White House lawyer Greg Katsas, Mitch McConnell protégé Justin Walker, and Biden appointee Florence Pan came to consider how 1512(c)(2) would apply to January 6. On paper, the question they were reviewing pertained to Nichols’ ruling that obstruction under 1512(c)(2) must involve documents. But along the way, the Republican judges invited both sides to weigh in on both how to define corrupt purpose under the statute and, procedurally, how to address it if they were going to rule on it (that is, whether to issue a ruling now, or to remand it back to Carl Nichols only to be appealed after he rules).

Defendants have challenged whether the vote certification counts as an official proceeding too, and I don’t rule out that this Supreme Court, would insert itself into that issue as well, especially given that protests associated with the Brett Kavanaugh confirmation have, from the start, been raised as an inapt parallel to January 6.

It has been a month since the DC Circuit ruling, so they could rule anytime. In the hearing, Katsas seemed inclined to rule for defendants on requiring obstruction to include a documentary component and to intervene to sharply narrow corrupt purpose. Walker seemed to start out in the same camp, but by the end may have come around to splitting his ruling, ruling with DOJ on the documents question but with defendants on the corrupt purpose one. Importantly, he seemed to favor tying “corrupt purpose” to some personal benefit. Pan, who presided over some of these cases before being elevated to the Circuit, seemed inclined to rule with DOJ on both counts.

Whatever the DC Circuit decides, it will be appealed.

If DOJ loses, they’re likely to ask for an en banc review, where they would not face a panel with a majority of Trump appointees. If the defendants lose, they’re likely to appeal it to SCOTUS, where they’d be guaranteed a conservative majority. If the DC Circuit remands the “corrupt purpose” issue — procedurally the correct thing to do — it might be another nine months before DC Circuit gets it back. And then that decision will be appealed by the losing side, to the full panel or SCOTUS. Plus there’s a minor issue on a Trevor McFadden ruling that will be appealed too, how much of a penalty to impose at sentencing.

There will not be certainty on how 1512(c)(2) applies to January 6 before June, and such certainty might not come until next June.

With rioters, DOJ has responded to these legal challenges by adopting several backstop positions. With edge cases, it allowed defendants accused of obstruction to plead down to the more serious misdemeanor, 18 USC 1752. With defendants who had some kind of confrontation with the cops, they have charged civil disorder, 18 USC 231. At the beginning of this process, there were the same kind of appellate challenges to 231, too, but those have been significantly resolved. With the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys, DOJ has also added 18 USC 372 charges, conspiracy to prevent Congress from doing its duty of certifying the vote count.

To see how those backstops would work, consider the Oath Keepers found guilty in the first sedition trial. If the obstruction verdict against all five were thrown out, Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs would remain jailed on sedition guilty verdicts, Kenneth Harrelson and Jessica Watkins would remained jailed on 372 verdicts (as well as civil disorder in Watkins’ case), Thomas Caldwell’s other obstruction conviction — obstructing the investigation by destroying evidence — would stand, as would those of Rhodes, Meggs, and Harrelson. There seems to be some movement on plea bargaining in the third Oath Keepers group, which suggests DOJ may be offering some of them 231 pleas as well.

And because of that mens rea requirement, DOJ has had limited success in getting obstruction convictions. A jury hung on obstruction with Riley Williams, and Judge Amy Berman Jackson just acquitted Joshua Black of obstruction as well. Both Williams and Black were found guilty of other felonies.

As I said above, even if the DC Circuit or SCOTUS adopts the most restrictive rulings on existing challenges, an obstruction charge against Trump still should survive. That’s because Trump’s obstruction, which included the recruitment of fake electors to create falsified certificates that members of Congress could use to justify their vote challenges, entails a documentary component that should meet Nichols’ standard. And while the most restrictive imaginable definition of corrupt purpose would include a desire for personal benefit, Trump was seeking the most craven personal benefit of all: to remain President even after voters had fired him.

But the further you get from Trump, the harder proving such a corrupt purpose would be. Did Mark Meadows do what he did because he wanted to remain in a powerful White House position? Did John Eastman do what he did because he was seeking personal benefit? Did Peter Navarro? Did the lower level aides who flew fake elector certificates from state to state? Many of them did what they did because they believe Democrats are illegitimate, just like Clarence Thomas and Sam Alito do, or resent them like Brett Kavanaugh does, and so even that kind of ruling would constrain 1512’s applicability to the stuff that Jack Smith has been appointed to investigate.

Plus, if SCOTUS rules (perhaps driven byBrett Kavanaugh’s ever-festering resentment) that non-investigative Congressional proceedings are not official proceedings, then 18 USC 1512(c)(2) wouldn’t even apply to Trump.

As I alluded to in passing recently, one reason I think the scope of what has become the Jack Smith investigation has expanded, beyond the fact that it is investigating real corruption and the fact that numerous witnesses may be exposed on one part of the scheme and so could be coerced to cooperate on other parts of the scheme, is to backstop the Trump investigation. If you charge fraud based on raising money off false claims about vote fraud, and charge campaign finance violations tied to violating PAC rules, and charge  conspiracy to defraud the US, forgery, and extortion tied to the fake elector plot, then it meets the standard for corrupt purpose that Dabney Friedrich adopted on 1512(c)(2): otherwise illegal activity.

But it also ensures that if SCOTUS throws out the obstruction charge for anyone for January 6, even someone corruptly seeking to remain President after being fired, those other charges would backstop the main charge, just like 18 USC 372 and civil disorder are backstopping charges against the Oath Keepers.

I think Trump has exposure on other charges, too. I believe Trump has exposure to aid and abet charges tied to the assaults his armed mob committed; that’s a lonely position, but I’ll take Amit Mehta’s opinion on the issue over virtually anyone else’s. I’m increasingly confident DOJ is trying to charge Trump in a conspiracy, via at least Alex Jones and Roger Stone, with the Proud Boys and other militias (though what that conspiracy would be depends on the Proud Boy jurors and the various appellate rulings). I wouldn’t be surprised if DOJ used 372 as a backstop with people like Trump, Eastman, and Meadows, just like they did with the two militias.

And DOJ is no doubt doing a similar kind of analysis as it considers whether and if so, how, to charge others who tie Trump and his associates with the crime scene, along with people who, independently of the White House efforts, funded or otherwise abetted the attack. None of that will entirely hold off further charges; in September, DOJ charged Kellye SoRelle, who has ties to the Oath Keepers, Latinos for Trump, and Trump’s efforts to undermine votes in some states, with three counts of obstruction (one of which would not be affected by these appellate issues). But her case has been continued until March. And, in part, because of the centrality of the Proud Boys case to where things go from here, I expect a lot to remain in flux until then on a bunch of other cases.

No matter how much work Jack Smith and his team get accomplished in the weeks ahead, it will be hamstrung by appellate uncertainty around the one charge, most everyone agrees, that should be used to hold Trump accountable.

Resources

Opinions upholding DOJ’s interpretation of 1512(c)(2)

  1. Dabney Friedrich, December 10, 2021, Sandlin*
  2. Amit Mehta, December 20, 2021, Caldwell*
  3. James Boasberg, December 21, 2021, Mostofsky
  4. Tim Kelly, December 28, 2021, NordeanMay 9, 2022, Hughes (by minute order), rejecting Miller
  5. Randolph Moss, December 28, 2021, Montgomery
  6. Beryl Howell, January 21, 2022, DeCarlo
  7. John Bates, February 1, 2022, McHughMay 2, 2022 [on reconsideration]
  8. Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, February 9, 2022, Grider
  9. Richard Leon (by minute order), February 24, 2022, CostianesMay 26, 2022, Fitzsimons (post-Miller)
  10. Christopher Cooper, February 25, 2022, Robertson
  11. Rudolph Contreras, announced March 8, released March 14, Andries
  12. Paul Friedman, March 19, Puma
  13. Thomas Hogan, March 30, Sargent (opinion forthcoming)
  14. Trevor McFadden, May 6, Hale-Cusanelli
  15. Royce Lamberth, May 25, Bingert

Carl Nichols’ interventions:

DC Circuit proceedings

Amit Mehta opinion ruling it plausible that Trump conspired with rioters and the militias: February 18, 2022

David Carter opinion ruling, on 9th Circuit standard, it more likely than not that John Eastman and Trump obstructed vote certification: March 28, 2022

January 6 Committee Executive Summary, including referral for obstruction and other crimes: December 19, 2022

Merrick Garland Hasn’t Done the Specific Thing You Want because DOJ Has Been Busy Doing Things They Have to Do First

The passage of the election has set off the Merrick Garland whingers again, people who like displaying their ignorance by claiming there has been no sign of progress on the investigations into Trump when (often as not) there were signs of progress that the whingers are ignoring in the last few days.

Yes. It has been almost a week since the close of polls last Tuesday. No. Merrick Garland has not carted Trump away in a paddy wagon yet (nor would the FBI, if and when they ever did arrest him).

Yes. We actually know why Garland hasn’t done so — and it’s not for want of actions that might lead there.

There are still known steps that have to or probably will happen before Trump would be indicted in any of the known criminal investigations into him. For those demanding proof of life from the DOJ investigations into Trump, you need look no further than the public record to find that proof of life. The public record easily explains both what DOJ has been doing in the Trump investigations, and why there is likely to be at least a several month delay before any charges can be brought.

The reason is that DOJ is still pursuing the evidence they would need before charging a former President.

Here’s an update on the various investigations into Trump (I’ve bolded the two appellate deadlines below).

Stolen documents

The reason I’m particularly crabby about the Merrick Garland whinging is because people were accusing DOJ of inaction hours after DOJ’s most recent step in the investigation into Trump’s stolen documents. On November 3, for example, DOJ compelled Kash Patel to testify before a grand jury under grant of use immunity, testimony that would be necessary, one way or another, before charging Trump, because DOJ would need to rule out or at least account for any claim that Trump mass-declassified the documents he stole.

DOJ continues to fight to ensure it can keep the documents it seized on August 8, and to be permitted to use the unclassified documents it seized in the investigation. The most recent filings in that fight, as I wrote up here, were filings about the disputes Trump and DOJ have about the seized documents, which Special Master Raymond Dearie will use to rule on those designations by December 16. After Dearie does that, Trump will dispute some of Dearie’s decisions, and Judge Aileen Cannon will make her own decision de novo. She has not set her own deadline for how long that decision would take. But if the Special Master process is the means by which DOJ guarantees its access to the evidence against Trump, it won’t be resolved until after the New Year, even assuming DOJ won’t have to appeal some ridiculous Cannon ruling.

Short of doing a search on another Trump property, preferably in Virginia but possibly in New Jersey or New York, this case cannot be charged until DOJ can present documents the custody of which it has guaranteed to a grand jury. DOJ has to make sure they have the evidence they would use to charge Trump (though adjudicating these disputes now might make any prosecution quicker on the back end).

That said, DOJ may guarantee custody of the documents it seized in August more quickly, via its challenge to Cannon’s decision to appoint a Special Master in the first place, in the 11th Circuit. Trump’s response to that appeal, which he submitted on November 10, seemed desultory, as if Chris Kice knows they will lose this appeal (indeed, that seems likely given that both the 11th Circuit and SCOTUS have already declined to see the case in the way Trump would prefer). DOJ’s response is due on November 17. Because of the way the 11th Circuit has scheduled this appeal, the panel reviewing it will be prepared for oral argument on rather quick turnaround. Even so, DOJ is not likely to guarantee access to these documents via any favorable 11th Circuit decision (which Trump will undoubtedly appeal) before December 1, and it would take about a week to present any case to the grand jury. So the very earliest that DOJ could indict this case would be early- to mid- December.

Update: In a filing submitted on November 8 but only unsealed today, DOJ asked Raymond Dearie to recommend that Judge Cannon lift the injunction on the 2,794 out of 2,916 documents over which Trump is making no privilege claim.

Update: The 11th Circuit has set a hearing for November 22, so DOJ may actually have access to those files sooner than December 1, though not all that sooner.

January 6 investigation(s)

There are at least four ways that Trump might be charged in conjunction with January 6:

  • For asking Mike Pence to illegally overturn legal votes and then threatening him, including with violence, when he refused
  • For setting up fake electors to contest the election
  • For fundraising off false claims of voter fraud and using the money to benefit those who helped the attack
  • Via people like Roger Stone, in a networked conspiracy with those who attacked the Capitol

DOJ sent out subpoenas in the first three prongs of this just before the pre-election pause. This post summarizes who was included.

These are all (and have been) intersecting conspiracies (this CNN story describes how many areas the subpoenas cover). For example, since January, it has been clear that the top-down investigation most visible in the January 6 Committee work and the crime-scene investigation visible in ongoing prosecutions had converged on the pressure both Trump and the mob focused on Mike Pence. It’s unclear how DOJ will treat the intersection of these investigations, and whether DOJ will wait for all prongs to converge before charging.

The Mike Pence prong is where DOJ made its most obvious progress during the pre-election pause. On October 6, Mike Pence Counsel Greg Jacob testified before a grand jury. October 14, Pence’s Chief of Staff Marc Short testified. Also in October, DOJ asked Beryl Howell to compel Trump’s White House Counsels Pat Cipollone and Pat Philbin as well. I’m not aware of the status of appeals on that (or whether Judge Howell compelled testimony from the two Pats in the meantime). We know that all four men would describe the debates over the extent of Pence’s authority to reject lawful electors, including the recognition from people like John Eastman that their legal theories were unsupported by law. The two Pats would also testify about Trump’s reaction to the mob, as he watched the attack on the Capitol from inside the White House dining room, including the tweet that specifically targeted Pence. These are all very credible first-hand witnesses to Trump’s words and actions both in advance of and during the attack. Obtaining their testimony would be necessary before charging a former President. But DOJ’s efforts (and success) at obtaining their testimony reflects the seriousness of the investigation.

The publication of Pence’s book, which relays his version about exchanges with Trump, would seem to invite a demand from DOJ that he testify about the same topics to the grand jury as well, particularly given the way he spun the story in ways that might help Trump. If I were a prosecutor contemplating charging the former President, I would want that potentially exculpatory (to Trump) locked in under oath. And any claim from Pence that he can’t share these details because of Executive Privilege seem ridiculous in the face of a book tour. But if DOJ decided they needed Pence’s testimony it might result in delay.

It’s unclear how much progress DOJ has made on the subpoenas issued before the pause. None of those subpoenaed have been spotted at grand jury appearances at Prettyman (though that may change this week). In particular, there are a bunch of senior Republicans involved in the fake elector plots from whom I expect DOJ to try to lock in testimony.

But two things may cause delay in any case. First, as I wrote here, subpoenas (generally served on people who might be expected to comply) are easy, because they require the person who received the subpoena to do the search for the subpoenaed materials. But it takes time to exploit phones, all the more so if the phone was seized without some way to open it. Here’s how long the communications of various high profile people have taken to exploit:

This is not indolence. It is physics and due process: it just takes time to crack phones, to filter the content, and to scope what is responsive to a warrant.

Among the steps taken before the pause, in early September, DOJ seized the phones of Boris Epshteyn and Mike Roman. While it’s possible DOJ will be able to accelerate the process of exploiting these phones (they have done so with Oath Keeper lawyer Kellye SoRelle’s phone, as last week DOJ submitted material that had gone through a filter review from the phone seized from her in early September in the sedition case), you should not assume they can fully exploit these phones (with whatever Signal content is on them) in less than six months, so March. In Epshteyn’s case, his claims to be playing a legal role in the stolen document case may cause further delays because of a filter review.

As someone involved in vote fraud efforts, Latinos for Trump, and the Oath Keepers, SoRelle is one of the pivots from the White House and Willard focused activities to the crime scene. DOJ seems closer to moving against others at that pivot point. Roger Stone, for example, has been mentioned over and over in the Oath Keeper trial. But that’s probably several months off. Alex Jones sidekick Owen Shroyer has been given until the end of the month to decide whether he wants to plead or take his chances on further charges. And I expect DOJ will wait until the verdict at least in the Oath Keeper case (they might not even get through all the defense witnesses this week), and possibly in the more complex Proud Boy case (which would be February barring likely unforeseen changes), before going too much further.

There’s one more thing that may delay any more spectacular charges in January 6. The oral argument for DOJ’s appeal of Carl Nichols’ outlier decision on the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to the insurrection won’t happen until December 12. It drew a pretty unfavorable panel for that hearing (listed as Joseph Fischer here): Trump appointees Greg Katsas (like Nichols, a former Clarence Thomas clerk, who also worked as Deputy White House Counsel in 2017) and Justin Walker (who is close to Mitch McConnell), and Biden appointee Florence Pan (who presided over January 6 cases before being promoted to the Circuit Court). It’s possible, but by no means certain, that the Trump appointees will do something nutty, in which case, DOJ would surely appeal first to the full DC Circuit panel; if they overturn Nichols, Garret Miller and the other January 6 defendants who got their obstruction charges thrown out will presumably appeal to SCOTUS.

Nichols’ decision, which ruled that January 6 did count as an official proceeding but ruled that any obstruction had to involve some kind of documents, probably wouldn’t stall any charges relating to the fake electors, which were after all about using fraudulent documents to overturn the vote certification. But it might lead DOJ to pause for other charges until the legal application is unquestioned. 18 USC 1512 is the charge on which DOJ has built its set of interlocking conspiracy charges, and so this decision is pretty important going forward.

Unlike the stolen document case, I can’t give you a date that would be the soonest possible date to expect indictments. But for a variety of reasons laid out here, unless DOJ were to indict on charges specifically focused on Mike Pence (with the possibility of superseding later), it probably would not be until March or April at the earliest.

Georgia investigation

The Georgia investigation, like the Federal one, was paused for a period leading up to the election (it’s unclear whether the run-off between Raphael Warnock and Herschel Walker will further delay things). But during the pre-election period, DA Fani Willis won decisions for testimony from Lindsey Graham and Newt Gingrich. Those grand jury appearances were scheduled for the end of this month (though may be pushed back). In any case, Willis has indicated that any charges from this investigation may come before the end of the year.

To be clear, none of this is a guarantee that DOJ (or Willis) will indict Trump and/or his closest aides. It is, however, a summary of the reasons that are public that all these investigations have been taking steps that would have to happen before they could charge Trump, and that most have additional steps that would have to happen before prosecutors could even make a prosecutorial decision.

The Rebellion Rorschach: The Many Faces of the January 6 Investigation

Four different things happened yesterday to demonstrate how differently judges presiding over the January 6 trial view it, and how little they seem to understand the intersecting nature of this investigation.

DC Circuit ignores its own language about co-conspirators and abettors

The final event was the reversal, by a per curiam panel including Karen Henderson, Judith Rogers, and Justin Walker, of Thomas Hogan’s decision to hold George Tanios pretrial.

As a reminder, Tanios is accused of both conspiring and abetting in Julian Khater’s attack on three cops, including Brian Sicknick, with some toxic substance.

I’m not going to complain about Tanios’ release. By way of comparison, Josiah Colt has never been detained, and he pled out of a conspiracy with Ronnie Sandlin and Nate DeGrave in which they, like Tanios and Khater, planned to arm themselves before traveling to DC together, and in which Sandlin and DeGrave, like Khater, are accused of assaulting cops that played a key role in successfully breaching the Capitol. The main difference is that Khater’s attack injured the three officers he targeted using a toxic spray purchased by Tanios.

It’s how the DC Circuit got there that’s of interest. Tanios had argued that Hogan had used the same language from the Munchel decision everyone else does, distinguishing those who assault or abet in assaulting police which the DC Circuit has returned to in upholding detention decisions since, and in so doing had applied a presumption of detention for those accused of assault and abetting assault.

In assessing Tanios’s risk of danger, the District Court placed too much emphasis on this sentence from Munchel: “In our view, those who actually assaulted police officers and broke through windows, doors, and barricades, and those who aided, conspired with, planned, or coordinated such actions, are in a different category of dangerousness than those who cheered on the violence or entered the Capitol after others cleared the way.” Id. at 1284.

This is only one line in a ten-page opinion written by Judge Wilkins. It is dicta. It was not quoted or adopted by Judge Katsas’s separate opinion. This line does not create a new approach for evaluating detention issues in this Circuit. It does not mandate that defendants be placed in two separate categories. It does not require a separate, harsher treatment for defendants accused of specific violent offenses. Critically, it does not create a presumption of future dangerousness and should not create a presumption of detention. Rather, it seems that the line is merely intended to remind district court judges that violence is one factor to consider in making a determination about dangerousness. [my emphasis]

The DC Circuit specifically ruled against Tanios on his claim that Hogan had misapplied Munchel.

[A]ppellant has not shown that the district court applied a presumption of detention in contravention of the Bail Reform Act and precedent, see United States v. Khater, No. 21-3033, Judgment at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 2021)

They had to! As their citation makes clear, just two weeks ago, a per curiam panel of Patricia Millet, Robert Wilkins, and Ketanji Brown Jackson upheld the very same detention order (which covered both defendants), holding that the same line of the Hogan statement that Tanios pointed to did not do what both Tanios and Khater claimed it had, presume that assault defendants must be detained.

Appellant contends that the district court misapplied our decision in United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2021), by making a categorical finding, based solely on the nature of the offense charged (assaultive conduct on January 6), that no conditions of release could ever mitigate the per se prospective threat that such a defendant poses. If the district court had proceeded in that fashion and applied some sort of non-rebuttable presumption of future dangerousness in favor of detention, it would have been legal error. See id. at 1283 (“Detention determinations must be made individually and, in the final analysis, must be based on the evidence which is before the court regarding the particular defendant. The inquiry is factbound.”) (quoting United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 888 (1st Cir. 1990)). However, while the district court stated, “Munchel delineates an elevated category of dangerousness applied [to] those that fall into the category that necessarily impose a concrete prospective threat,” the district court also explained, “I think Munchel does not set a hard-line rule. I don’t think that the categories are solely determinative, but it creates something like a guideline for the Court to follow . . . .” Detention Hr’g Tr. at 42:21-24; 43:11-13, ECF No. 26 (emphasis added). In making its ruling, the district court discussed at length the facts of this case, and expressly noted that “we have to decide whether the defendant is too dangerous based upon that conduct to be released or is not,” “every circumstance is different in every case, and you have to look at individual cases,” and that “the government may well not overcome the concrete and clear and convincing evidence requirement.” Id. at 43:8-10, 43:16-18, 43:20-21. Based on our careful review of the record, we find that the district court made an individualized assessment of future dangerousness as required by the Bail Reform Act and that appellant has not shown that the district court applied an irrefutable presumption of mandatory detention in contravention of the statute and our precedent.

Yesterday’s panel cited the earlier affirmation of the very same opinion that detained Tanios.

It’s in distinguishing Tanios where the panel got crazy. The panel could have argued that the evidence that Tanios conspired with or abetted Khater’s assault was too weak to hold him — Tanios made a non-frivolous argument that in refusing to give Khater one of the two canisters of bear spray he carried, he specifically refused to join in Khater’s attack on the cops. But they don’t mention conspiracy or abetting charges.

Instead, the DC Circuit argued that Hogan clearly erred in finding Khater’s accused co-conspirator to be dangerous.

[T]he district court clearly erred in its individualized assessment of appellant’s dangerousness. The record reflects that Tanios has no past felony convictions, no ties to any extremist organizations, and no post-January 6 criminal behavior that would otherwise show him to pose a danger to the community within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act. Cf. Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1282-84 (remanding pretrial detention orders where the district court did not demonstrate it adequately considered whether the defendants present an articulable threat to the community in light of the absence of record evidence that defendants committed violence or were involved in planning or coordinating the events of January 6).

Munchel isn’t actually a precedent here, because that decision remanded for further consideration. The DC Circuit ordered Hogan to release Tanios. Crazier still, in citing the same passage from Munchel everyone else does, the DC Circuit edited out the language referring to those who abetted or conspired with those who assaulted cops, the language used to hold Tanios. It simply ignores the basis Hogan used to hold Tanios entirely, his liability in a premeditated attack he allegedly helped to make possible, and in so doing argues the very same attack presents a danger to the community for one but not the other of the guys charged in it.

If this were a published opinion, it would do all kinds of havoc to precedent on conspiracy and abetting liability. But with two short paragraphs that don’t, at all, address the basis for Tanios’ detention, the DC Circuit dodges those issues.

Beryl Howell has no reasonable doubt about January 6

Earlier in the day, DC Chief Judge Beryl Howell grew exasperated with another plea hearing.

This time, it was Glenn Wes Lee Croy, another guy pleading guilty to a misdemeanor “parading” charge. The plea colloquy stumbled on whether Croy should have known he wasn’t permitted on the Capitol steps — he claimed, in part, that because this was his first trip to DC, he didn’t know he shouldn’t have been on the steps, even in spite of the barricades. Croy was fine admitting he shouldn’t have been in the building, though.

Things really heated up when Howell started asking Croy why he was parading (Josh Gerstein has a more detailed description of this colloquy here).

Under oath, pleading to a misdemeanor as part of a deal that prohibits DOJ from charging Croy with anything further for his actions on January 6, he made some kind of admission that Howell took to mean he was there to support Trump’s challenge to the election, an admission that his intent was the same as the intent required to charge obstruction of the vote count.

When she quizzed AUSA Clayton O’Connor why Croy hadn’t been charged with felony obstruction for his efforts to obstruct the vote certification, the prosecutor explained that while the government agreed that contextually that’s what Croy had been doing, the government didn’t find direct evidence that would allow him to prove obstruction beyond a reasonable doubt, a sound prosecutorial decision.

O’Connor is what (with no disrespect intended) might be deemed a journeyman prosecutor on the January 6 cases. He has seven cases, five of which charge two buddies or family members. Of those, just Kevin Cordon was charged with the obstruction charge Howell seems to think most defendants should face, in Cordon’s case for explicitly laying out his intent in an interview the day of the riot.

We’re here to take back our democratic republic. It’s clear that this election is stolen, there’s just so much overwhelming evidence and the establishment, the media, big tech are just completely ignoring all of it. And we’re here to show them we’re not having it. We’re not- we’re not just gonna take this laying down. We’re standing up and we’re taking our country back. This is just the beginning.

O’Connor is prosecuting Clifford Mackrell and Jamie Buteau for assault and civil disorder. But otherwise, all his cases are trespass cases like Croy’s (including that of Croy’s codefendant Terry Lindsey).

This was the guy who, with no warning, had the task of explaining to the Chief Judge DOJ’s logic in distinguishing misdemeanor cases from felonies. Unsurprisingly, it’s all about what the government thinks they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, based on evidence like that which Cordon shared with a journalist or, just as often, what people write in their social media accounts. This process has made sense to the few of us who have covered all these cases, but like O’Connor, Howell is dealing primarily with the misdemeanor cases and my not see how DOJ appears to be making the distinction.

Howell also demanded an explanation from O’Connor in Croy’s sentencing memo why DOJ is not including the cost of the National Guard deployment in the restitution payments required of January 6 defendants.

Both according to its own prosecutorial guidelines and the practical limitations of prosecuting 560 defendants, DOJ can’t use a novel application of the obstruction statute to charge everyone arrested in conjunction with January 6 with a felony. It’s a reality that deserves a better, more formal explanation than the one O’Connor offered the Chief Judge extemporaneously.

Trevor McFadden believes a conspiracy to overthrow democracy is not a complex case

Meanwhile, the Discovery Coordinator for the entire investigation, Emily Miller, missed an opportunity to explain to Trevor McFadden the logic behind ongoing January 6 arrests.

In advance of a hearing for Cowboys for Trump founder Couy Griffin, prosecutor Janani Iyengar submitted a motion for a 60-day continuance to allow for the government to work through discovery. She brought Miller along to a status hearing to explain those discovery challenges to McFadden, who had complained about them in the past and refused to toll the Speedy Trial Act in this case. Because Iyengar recently offered Griffin a plea deal, his attorney Nick Smith was fairly amenable to whatever McFadden decided.

Not so the judge. He expressed a sentiment he has in this and other cases, that the government made a decision to start arresting immediately after the attack and continues to do so. “There seems to be no end in sight,” McFadden complained, suggesting that if DOJ arrested someone in three months who offered up exculpatory evidence that affected hundreds of cases, those would have to be delayed again. In spite of the fact that several prosecutors have explained that the bulk of the evidence was created on January 6, McFadden persists in the belief that the trouble with discovery is the ingestion of new evidence with each new arrest.

Miller noted that the government could start trials based on the Brady obligation of turning over all exculpatory evidence in their possession, so future arrests wouldn’t prohibit trials. The problem is in making the universe of video evidence available to all defense attorneys so they have the opportunity of finding evidence to support theories of defense (such as that the cops actually welcomed the rioters) that would require such broad review of the video.

McFadden then suggested that because Griffin is one of the rare January 6 defendants who never entered the Capitol, Miller’s team ought to be able to segregate out an imagined smaller body of evidence collected outside. “Were that it were so, your honor,” Miller responded, pointing out that there were thousands of hours of surveillance cameras collected from outside, the police moved in and outside as they took breaks or cleaned the bear spray from their eyes so their Body Worn Cameras couldn’t be segregated, and the Geofence warrant includes the perimeter of the Capitol where Griffin stood.

McFadden then said two things that suggested he doesn’t understand this investigation, and certainly doesn’t regard the attack as a threat to democracy (he has, in other hearings, noted that the government hasn’t charged insurrection so it must not have been one). First, he complained that, “In other cases,” the government had dealt with a large number of defendants by giving many deferred prosecutions or focusing just on the worst of the worst, a clear comparison to Portland that right wingers like to make. But that’s an inapt comparison. After noting the data somersaults one has to do to even make this comparison, a filing submitted to Judge Carl Nichols in response to a selective prosecution claim from Garret Miller explained the real differences between Portland and January 6: There was far less evidence in the Portland cases, meaning prosecutions often came down to the word of a cop against that of a defendant and so resulted in a deferred prosecution.

This comparison fails, first and foremost, because the government actually charged nearly all defendants in the listed Oregon cases with civil-disorder or assault offenses. See Doc. 32-1 (Attachments 2-31). Miller has accordingly shown no disparate treatment in the government’s charging approaches. He instead focuses on the manner in which the government ultimately resolved the Oregon cases, and contrasts it with, in his opinion, the “one-sided and draconian plea agreement offer” that the government recently transmitted to him. Doc. 32, at 6. This presentation—which compares the government’s initial plea offer to him with the government’s final resolution in 45 hand-picked Oregon cases—“falls woefully short of demonstrating a consistent pattern of unequal administration of the law.”3 United States v. Bernal-Rojas, 933 F.2d 97, 99 (1st Cir. 1991). In fact, the government’s initial plea offer here rebuts any inference that that it has “refused to plea bargain with [Miller], yet regularly reached agreements with otherwise similarly situated defendants.” Ibid.

More fundamentally, the 45 Oregon cases serve as improper “comparator[s]” because those defendants and Miller are not similarly situated. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 31. Miller unlawfully entered the U.S. Capitol and resisted the law enforcement officers who tried to move him. Doc. 16, at 4. He did so while elected lawmakers and the Vice President of the United States were present in the building and attempting to certify the results of the 2020 Presidential Election in accordance with Article II of the Constitution. Id. at 2-3. And he committed a host of federal offenses attendant to this riot, including threatening to kill a Congresswoman and a USCP officer. Id. at 5-6. All this was captured on video and Miller’s social-media posts. See 4/1/21 Hr’g Tr. 19:14-15 (“[T]he evidence against Mr. Miller is strong.”). Contrast that with the 45 Oregon defendants, who—despite committing serious offenses—never entered the federal courthouse structure, impeded a congressional proceeding, or targeted a specific federal official or officer for assassination. Additionally, the government’s evidence in those cases often relied on officer recollections (e.g., identifying the particular offender on a darkened plaza with throngs of people) that could be challenged at trial—rather than video and well-documented incriminating statements available in this case. These situational and evidentiary differences represent “distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify making different prosecutorial decisions” in Miller’s case. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Price v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 865 F.3d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (observing that a prosecutor may legitimately consider “concerns such as rehabilitation, allocation of criminal justice resources, the strength of the evidence against the defendant, and the extent of a defendant’s cooperation” in plea negotiations) (brackets and citation omitted).

3 Miller’s motion notably omits reference to the remaining 29 Oregon cases in his survey, presumably because the government’s litigation decisions in those cases do not conform to his inference of selective treatment. [my emphasis]

McFadden ended with one of his most alarming comments. He said something to the effect of, he doesn’t feel that the January 6 investigation was a complex type of case akin to those (often white collar cases) where a year delay before trial was not that unusual.

This was a fairly breathtaking comment, because it suggests that McFadden sees this event as the magical convergence of thousands of criminals at the Capitol rather than the result of a sustained conspiracy to get a mass of bodies to the building, a conspiracy that started at least as early as the days after the election. While McFadden’s highest profile January 6 case is a sprawling assault case against Patrick McCaughey and others (the one that trapped Officer Daniel Hodges in the Capitol door), this view seems not to appreciate some larger investigative questions pertinent to some of his other defendants. For example, what happened to the laptops stolen from various offices, including the theft that Brandon Fellows may have witnessed in Jeff Merkley’s office. Did America First engaged in a conspiracy to gets its members, including Christian Secor, to the Capitol (and did a huge foreign windfall that Nick Fuentes got days before the insurrection have anything to do with that). What kind of coordination, if any, led a bunch of Marines to successfully open a second front to the attack by opening the East Doors also implicates Secor’s case. One of the delays in Griffin’s own case probably pertained to whether he was among the Trump speakers, as members of the 3-Percenter conspiracy allegedly were, who tied their public speaking role to the recruitment of violent, armed rioters (given that he has been given a plea offer, I assume the government has answered that in the negative).

It has become increasingly clear that one of the visible ways that DOJ is attempting to answer these and other, even bigger questions, is to collect selected pieces of evidence from identifiable trespassers with their arrest. For example, Anthony Puma likely got arrested when he did because he captured images of the Golf Cart Conspiracy with his GoPro. He has since been charged with obstruction — unsurprisingly, since he spoke in detailed terms about preventing the vote certification in advance. But his prosecution will be an important step in validating and prosecuting the larger conspiracy, one that may implicate the former President’s closest associates.

This is white collar and complex conspiracy investigation floating on top of a riot prosecution, one on which the fate of our democracy rests.

Melody Steele-Smith evaded the surveillance cameras

A report filed yesterday helps to explain the import of all this. Melody Steele-Smith was arrested within weeks of the riot on trespass charges, then indicted on trespass and obstruction charges. She’s of particular interest in the larger investigation because — per photos she posted on Facebook — she was in Nancy Pelosi’s office and might be a witness to things that happened there, including the theft of Pelosi’s laptop.

At a hearing last week, the second attorney who has represented her in this case, Elizabeth Mullin, said she had received no discovery, particularly as compared to other January 6 defendants. So the judge in that case, Randolph Moss, ordered a status report and disclosure of discovery by this Friday.

That status report admits that there hasn’t been much discovery, in particular because, aside from the surveillance photos used in her arrest warrant, the government hasn’t found many images of Steele-Smith in surveillance footage.

The United States files this memorandum for the purpose of describing the status of discovery. As an initial matter, the government has provided preliminary discovery in this case. On or about June 4, 2021, the government provided counsel for defendant preliminary discovery in this matter. This production had been made previously to the defendant’s initial counsel of record. Counsel for defendant received the preliminary production that had been provided to previous counsel. This preliminary production included the FBI 302 of defendant’s sole interview, the recorded interview of defendant which formed the basis of the aforementioned FBI 302, over one thousand pages of content extracted from defendant’s Facebook account, and thirty-nine photographs confiscated from defendant’s telephone.

The government is prepared to produce an additional discovery production no later than August 13, 2021. The production will include additional items that have been obtained by the government from the FBI. These items include, additional FBI investigative reports and the Facebook search warrant dated January 21, 2021. The FBI has provided the government with the full extent of the materials in its possession. While these items are few in number, the government is continuing to review body worn camera footage in an attempt to locate the defendant. Camera footage will be provided if it is located. The government has been diligent in its efforts to obtain all discoverable items in possession of the FBI.

That still leaves a thousand Facebook pages and 39 photos, some of them taken at a key scene in the Capitol a scene that — given the evidence against Steele-Smith and in other cases — is a relative blind spot in the surveillance of the Capitol. The interview described here is not reflected in her arrest warrant, and so may include non-public information used to support the obstruction case.

Beryl Howell might argue this is sufficient evidence to prove the government’s obstruction case. Trevor McFadden might argue that this case can’t wait for more video evidence obtained from future arrestees of what Steele-Smith did while “storm[ing] the castle” (in her own words), including the office of the Speaker of the House. But the theft of the Pelosi laptop — including whether Groypers like Riley Williams were involved — remains unsolved.

If a single terrorist with suspect ties to foreign entities broke into the office of the Speaker of the House and stole one of her laptops, no one would even think twice if DOJ were still investigating seven months later. But here, because the specific means of investigation include prosecuting the 1,000 people who made that break-in possible, there’s a push to curtail the investigation.

I don’t know what the answer is because the Speedy Trial issues are very real, particularly for people who are detained. But I do know it’s very hard for anyone to get their mind around this investigation.