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Justice Roberts’ Drone Strike on George Washington’s Legacy

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Chief Justice John Roberts cloaked his radical opinion granting Presidents broad immunity in the Farewell Address of George Washington, normally celebrated as the codification of the peaceful cession of power, the humility of the role of the President.

Our first President had such a perspective. In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the Nation that “a Government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of Liberty is indispensable.” 35 Writings of George Washington 226 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). A government “too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction,” he warned, could lead to the “frightful despotism” of “alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge.” Id., at 226–227. And the way to avoid that cycle, he explained, was to ensure that government powers remained “properly distributed and adjusted.” Id., at 226.

It is these enduring principles that guide our decision in this case.

But Roberts instead focuses on Washington’s warning against factionalism — and from there, to a claim to honor separation of powers.

Never mind that, as Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson notes, Roberts’ opinion instead radically altered the balance of powers, which (adopting Washington’s logic) will arguably feed factionalism.

It is important to note that the majority reframes the immunity question presented here as a separation of powers concern that is compelled by Article II—as if what is being asked is whether Congress can criminalize executive prerogatives. See, e.g., ante, at 6–7; see also ante, at 1– 2 (BARRETT, J., concurring in part). But that is not anywhere close to what is happening in this case. No one maintains that Congress has passed a law that specifically criminalizes the President’s use of any power that the Constitution vests exclusively in the Executive, much less that the Judiciary is being conscripted to adjudicate the propriety of such a statute. To the contrary, the indictment here invokes criminal statutes of general applicability that everyone is supposed to follow, both on and off the job. So, the real question is: Can the President, too, be held accountable for committing crimes while he is undertaking his official duties? The nature of his authority under Article II (whether conclusive and preclusive, or shared with Congress, or otherwise) is entirely beside the point.

Plus, by my read, the only separation of powers that Roberts really cares about is that between one Executive and his successor. Roberts is, in actuality, usurping the Article II authority of DOJ to prosecute crimes exclusively in the case of a former President, adopting that power to the judiciary.

Roberts’ opinion does that even while it permits the sitting President to use the trappings of DOJ against everyone but his predecessor, with personal presidential involvement. All the abuses of the Trump DOJ? The revenge prosecution of Greg Craig, Michael Sussmann, and Igor Danchenko? All cool with John Roberts. The use of DOJ resources to have an FBI informant frame Joe Biden? Still totally cool. Not revenge. Just the President doing what he’s empowered to do.

But it’s that more cherished precedent Washington set, of the transfer of power rather than kings, that Roberts has done real violence to.

Consider what happened to Blassingame — the DC Circuit opinion holding that a former President can be sued for actions taken in his role as candidate for office — in this opinion.

Blassingame was mentioned repeatedly in the argument of this case, 16 times, often when a Republican who joined Roberts’ opinion today queried John Sauer if he agreed with it.

It came up when Clarence Thomas asked whether Sauer accepted the function of a candidate to be a private act — with which he mostly agreed and then backtracked somewhat.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Sauer, in assessing the official acts of a president, do you differentiate between the president acting as president and the president acting as candidate?

MR. SAUER: Yes, we do. And we don’t dispute essentially the Blassingame discussion of that.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Okay. Now —

MR. SAUER: But, of course, that has to be done by objective determinations, not by looking at what was the purpose of what you did this, and that’s the most important point there.

It came up when Neil Gorsuch queried Sauer about it (in which case Sauer adopted former Trump White House Counsel Greg Katsas’ more narrow holding on it).

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And then the question becomes, as we’ve been exploring here today a little bit, about how to segregate private from official conduct that may or may not enjoy some immunity, and we — I’m sure we’re going to spend a lot of time exploring that. But the D.C. Circuit in Blassingame, the chief judge there, joined by the panel, expressed some views about how to segregate private conduct for which no man is above the law from official acts. Do you have any thoughts about the test that they came up with there?

MR. SAUER: Yes. We think, in the main, that test, especially if it’s understood through the lens of Judge Katsas’ separate opinion, is a very persuasive test. It would be a great source for this Court to rely on in drawing this line. And it emphasizes the breadth of that test. It talks about how actions that are, you know, plausibly connected to the president’s official duties are official acts. And it also emphasizes that if it’s a close case or it appears there’s considerations on the other side, that also should be treated as immune. Those are the — the aspects of that that we’d emphasize as potentially guiding the Court’s discretion.

Gorsuch would go on to question Dreeben about Blassingame at length.

It came up when John Kavanaugh invited Sauer to rewrite Blassingame, and Sauer largely declined.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Where — where do you think the D.C. Circuit went wrong in how it determined what was official versus what’s personal?

MR. SAUER: Well, I read — I read the opinion below in this particular case as adopting a categorical view. It does not matter, is the logic of their — their opinion because there is no immunity for official acts and, therefore, you know, that’s the end of the story. I don’t really think they went wrong in Blassingame in the civil context when they engaged in the same determination with respect to what’s official and what isn’t official. There, we agree with most of what that opinion said.

And it came up when Sammy Alito asked John Sauer if he’d like an order saying that the President was immune unless there was no possible justification, in which case Sauer raised Blassingame, and Alito shifted from analysis of official and unofficial.

JUSTICE ALITO: But what if it were not — what if it did not involve any subjective element, it was purely objective? You would look objectively at the various relevant factors? MR. SAUER: That sounds to me a lot like Blassingame and especially viewed through the lens of Judge Katsas’ separate opinion, and that may not be different than what we’re proposing to the Court today.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Blassingame had to do with the difference between official conduct and private conduct, right?

MR. SAUER: That’s correct. I — I understood the Court to be asking that.

JUSTICE ALITO: No. This — this would apply — and it’s just a possibility. I don’t know whether it’s a good idea or a bad idea or whether it can be derived from the structure of the Constitution or the Vesting Clause or any other source. But this would be applied in a purely objective — on purely objective grounds when the president invokes an official power in taking the action that is at issue?

MR. SAUER: Yes, I believe — the reason I think of Blassingame is because it talks about an objective context-specific determination to winnow out what’s official and what is purely private conduct, and, again, in a — with a strong degree of deference to what — and, therefore, you know, that’s the end of the story. I don’t really think they went wrong in Blassingame in the civil context when they engaged in the same determination with respect to what’s official and what isn’t official. There, we agree with most of what that opinion said.

You might be justified in thinking that Blassingame would be central to today’s ruling, not least because the charged crimes are the same ones as the complaints alleged in Blassingame.

The central holding of Blassingame, however, is gone.

Blassingame appears just three times in the opinion rendered today. Roberts uses it as a limiting factor.

But the breadth of the President’s “discretionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States “in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive,” frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innumerable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. And some Presidential conduct—for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018)—certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized extends to the “outer perimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87

Sonia Sotomayor notes that Roberts has used it as a limiting factor, then notes he has also eliminated any analysis of motive.

In fact, the majority’s dividing line between “official” and “unofficial” conduct narrows the conduct considered “unofficial” almost to a nullity. It says that whenever the President acts in a way that is “‘not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority,’” he is taking official action. Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023)). It then goes a step further: “In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives.” Ante, at 18.

Jackson makes a similar observation.

At most, to distinguish official from unofficial conduct, the majority advises asking whether the former President’s conduct was “‘manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.’” Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023)).

There’s not even much discussion of Trump’s role as a candidate! Roberts raises it, and then says Trump’s electioneering tweets might serve some other purpose.

There may, however, be contexts in which the President, notwithstanding the prominence of his position, speaks in an unofficial capacity—perhaps as a candidate for office or party leader. To the extent that may be the case, objective analysis of “content, form, and context” will necessarily inform the inquiry. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 453 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “there is not always a clear line between [the President’s] personal and official affairs.” Mazars, 591 U. S., at 868. The analysis therefore must be fact specific and may prove to be challenging.

The indictment reflects these challenges. It includes only select Tweets and brief snippets of the speech Trump delivered on the morning of January 6, omitting its full text or context. See App. 228–230, Indictment ¶104. Whether the Tweets, that speech, and Trump’s other communications on January 6 involve official conduct may depend on the content and context of each. Knowing, for instance, what else was said contemporaneous to the excerpted communications, or who was involved in transmitting the electronic communications and in organizing the rally, could be relevant to the classification of each communication.

In ruling (unsurprisingly) that the Jeffrey Clark allegations have to be thrown out, Roberts goes further, and reads the Executive Branch interest in policing election crime to extend to making false claims about the election.

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8)

And when entertaining Trump’s claims that his interference in state and congress’ role were just an effort to protect the integrity of the election, Roberts thumbs both the scale and the facts again, using the Take Care clause as a shield rather than the sword that Judge Karen Henderson viewed it as.

On Trump’s view, the alleged conduct qualifies as official because it was undertaken to ensure the integrity and proper administration of the federal election. Of course, the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” plainly encompasses enforcement of federal election laws passed by Congress. Art. II, §3. And the President’s broad power to speak on matters of public concern does not exclude his public communications regarding the fairness and integrity of federal elections simply because he is running for re-election. Cf. Hawaii, 585 U. S., at 701. Similarly, the President may speak on and discuss such matters with state officials—even when no specific federal responsibility requires his communication—to encourage them to act in a manner that promotes the President’s view of the public good.

Even when conceding that Trump was pressuring Mike Pence as President of the Senate, not as his Vice President, when he was threatening to have him assassinated, Roberts suggests this is a close call, because Trump has to be able to pressure the President of the Senate to get legislation passed.

The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. When the Vice President presides over the January 6 certification proceeding, he does so in his capacity as President of the Senate. Ibid. Despite the Vice President’s expansive role of advising and assisting the President within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s Article I responsibility of “presiding over the Senate” is “not an ‘executive branch’ function.” Memorandum from L. Silberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., to R. Burress, Office of the President, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising Out of the President’s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller To Be Vice President Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 2 (Aug. 28, 1974). With respect to the certification proceeding in particular, Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes, see, e.g., 3 U. S. C. §15, and the President plays no direct constitutional or statutory role in that process. So the Government may argue that consideration of the President’s communications with the Vice President concerning the certification proceeding does not pose “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754; see supra, at 14.

At the same time, however, the President may frequently rely on the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate to advance the President’s agenda in Congress. When the Senate is closely divided, for instance, the Vice President’s tiebreaking vote may be crucial for confirming the President’s nominees and passing laws that align with the President’s policies. Applying a criminal prohibition to the President’s conversations discussing such matters with the Vice President—even though they concern his role as President of the Senate—may well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitutional functions.

It is ultimately the Government’s burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.

Over and over again, then, Roberts has applied his new standard — whether anything might conceivably intrude on the functions of the Presidency — to immunize usurping Congress’ (and states’) role in certifying the election.

What John Roberts has done — at least preliminarily — is carve out an Executive authority so broad that in every area where the President is explicitly excluded, even in the role of candidate-for-President, the President can still act with absolute immunity.

That authorizes the President to use all the powers of the Presidency to win re-election — precisely the opposite holding of what Blassingame adopted.

In an opinion that tries to cloak his power grab with an appeal to President Washington, John Roberts has suffocated the greatest thing Washington gave the United States, the presumption that Presidential powers would cede to the power of elections.

Jack Smith’s Way Forward

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I’m going to write a long post on how John Roberts made elections subservient to the President.

But first, I want to lay out a way forward for Jack Smith. I’ll return to a way forward for Biden.

First: SCOTUS has remanded this case to Judge Chutkan to determine which of the charges can be sustained as unofficial acts. As I’ll lay out, I think they’ve put their thumb on the scale that none of them can be. But by all means, she is now required to spend the next four months figuring that out.

So if I’m Jack Smith, I ask her to block out her time for the foreseeable future to do just that.

Because the President cannot be prosecuted for anything considered a core Presidential act, like bribing Roger Stone with pardons, Jack Smith should issue a report of what Trump did with his core official acts.

Nothing in this opinion prohibits Jack Smith from prosecuting everyone else (save Trump’s closest aides and Jeffrey Clark). So Jack Smith should roll out any and all indictments for Trump’s associates that would otherwise have been introduced in his case in chief.

SCOTUS’ Republicans Allow Presidents to Use SEAL Team 6 To Execute Their Opponents

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Until this morning, it was a joke that if a President sent out SEAL Team Six to take out, say, their opponent, their Vice President, or Sammy Alito as an official act, they would be immune from prosecution.

But the Republicans on SCOTUS have just given Presidents presumptive immunity for official acts.

I’ll post updates. But the effect of the opinion is to throw out the entirety of the charges involving Jeffrey Clark, and remand for further consideration on Trump’s pressure on Mike Pence and his public comments. It also prohibits the government from using Trump’s communications with his advisors. That guts the case.

From Sotomayor’s dissent:

Looking beyond the fate of this particular prosecution, the long-term consequences of today’s decision are stark. The Court effectively creates a law-free zone around the President, upsetting the status quo that has existed since the Founding. This new official-acts immunity now “lies about like a loaded weapon” for any President that wishes to place his own interests, his own political survival, or his own financial gain, above the interests of the Nation. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The President of the United States is the most powerful person in the country, and possibly the world. When he uses his official powers in any way, under the majority’s reasoning, he now will be insulated from criminal prosecution. Orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to assassinate a political rival? Immune. Organizes a military coup to hold onto power? Immune. Takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon? Immune. Immune, immune, immune.

Let the President violate the law, let him exploit the trappings of his office for personal gain, let him use his official power for evil ends. Because if he knew that he may one day face liability for breaking the law, he might not be as bold and fearless as we would like him to be. That is the majority’s message today.

Supreme Court Makes 18 USC 1512 a Paperwork Crime, But Does Not Address Corrupt Purpose

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The most important SCOTUS ruling today overturned Chevron, basically giving a bunch of lifetime appointed judges who just legalized accepting gratuities for themselves power to veto regulations imposed by Executive Agencies.

But others are more expert on that opinion, so I’ll let them explain how it’ll change life in the United States for decades to come.

I am an expert on the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to January 6, and so can explain the significance of Justice Roberts’ ruling that it must involve making documents unavailable to an official proceeding.

Before the ruling, I had argued the court could do one of four things:

  1. Leave the application in place
  2. Overturn its application to January 6 altogether (effectively, ruling that the vote certification was no an official proceeding)
  3. Limit its application to paperwork crimes
  4. Address the meaning of “corrupt purpose”

The court opted for option 3:

To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so. See supra, at 9. The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the D. C. Circuit may assess the sufficiency of Count Three of Fischer’s indictment in light of our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2).

This has the ability of overturning most, if not all, the obstruction convictions associated with January 6.

Or it may not.

Or it may not affect those who knew of the purpose of the vote certification.

After all, there was a set of January 6 defendants convicted of obstruction who knew not just that they were trying to prevent Congress from certifying Joe Biden as President, but who also knew the thing they were trying to prevent was the certification of Biden’s electoral certificates.

If DOJ can prove a given defendant knew the import of the certifications, they may preserve some of these prosecutions.

There’s even the possibility that DOJ can successfully argue that the Jan6ers were attempting to impair “witness” testimony of members of Congress or, more importantly, Mike Pence, by scaring the bejesus out of them.

Someone whose prosecution is far less likely to be affected by this ruling is Donald Trump. That’s because he had created a set of fraudulent certifications that he intended to use to either replace Joe Biden’s real electoral certifications, or at the very least, to stall the certification of them.

It goes back to the DC Circuit to decide.

Importantly, SCOTUS left the definition of “corrupt purpose” undecided, something else on which the DC Circuit has issued unstable opinions. A review of that definition could lead to a further narrowing of the application. But there, too, Donald Trump’s charges should remain, because his efforts to remain in power after being fired fit the definition of “corrupt purpose.” Or did, before SCOTUS started chipping away at corruption law.

Update: Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s concurrence notes that there were documents at the core of January 6: the electoral votes, and also notes that there may have been other attempted impairment.

In my view, the Court properly interprets §1512(c)(2) in the opinion it issues today. It also rightly vacates the judgment below and remands this case for further proceedings. Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) by corruptly obstructing “a proceeding before Congress, specifically, Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote.” App. 183. That official proceeding plainly used certain records, documents, or objects—including, among others, those relating to the electoral votes themselves. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 65–67. And it might well be that Fischer’s conduct, as alleged here, involved the impairment (or the attempted impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those specified in (c)(1).” Ante, at 8. If so, then Fischer’s prosecution under §1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed. That issue remains available for the lower courts to determine on remand.

Update: This language from the syllabus should make it clear that Trump’s charges should remain unscathed and there may be other ways to sustain the charges against some of the existing defendants.

For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false evidence—rather than altering incriminating evidence. Subsection (c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond the “record[s], document[s], or other object[s]” enumerated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible information.

Trump’s Other Immunity Claim: Stealing Boxes and Boxes of Classified Documents

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Whatever else the SCOTUS grant of Trump’s immunity claim did, it provided the basis for scheduling clarity.

It seems likely SCOTUS has committed to deciding the immunity question by the end of term, in June.

That would present Tanya Chutkan with the decision of whether to try the January 6 case during the election season (it is her choice, not DOJ’s to make). She had been entertaining starting the trial in August, which would have bled into election season as it is, so she may decide to do this. If she does, it is unlikely a jury would reach a verdict before election day, but the trial would give voters opportunity to see the evidence before voting.

The decision to grant cert is as interesting for Trump’s other immunity claim — Trump’s even more frivolous claim that he can’t be prosecuted for stealing boxes and boxes of classified documents because his claimed decision to convert those government documents to his personal possession in violation of the Presidential Records Act is immune from prosecution, as well. I’ve seen some commentary that SCOTUS may have been trying to come up with a different solution but then decided to hear the case. If that’s true, the decision to hear the case came less than a week after Trump made that other claim of immunity, that he can steal classified documents with impunity. Who knows? It’s not before the court, but it may have affected their decision to hear the case.

The matter will be fully briefed by the time Jack Smith submits his brief to SCOTUS on April 8. So he can have two absurd claims of immunity to address, Trump’s claim he can steal the election with impunity, and Trump’s claim he can convert boxes and boxes of classified documents to do with as he pleases on the way out the door even if it violates the Presidential Records Act, a law passed specifically to apply to Presidents. One of the matters that had been hypothetical before the DC Circuit — that Trump might sell nuclear documents to our adversaries — has become concrete.

Given the question as posed by SCOTUS — Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office? — I think SCOTUS may have been uncomfortable with the DC Circuit’s thin treatment of Trump’s argument that, without immunity, former Presidents could be prosecuted for things like approving the drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki (note, when Trump raises this, he never mentions that he himself killed Awlaki’s daughter).

Former President Trump argues that criminal liability for former Presidents risks chilling Presidential action while in office and opening the floodgates to meritless and harassing prosecution. These risks do not overcome “the public interest in fair and accurate judicial proceedings,” which “is at its height in the criminal setting.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424.

Former President Trump first asserts that the prospect of potential post-Presidency criminal liability would inhibit a sitting President’s ability to act “fearlessly and impartially,” citing the “especially sensitive duties” of the President and the need for “bold and unhesitating action.”

There has to be something that distinguishes such actions from those charged against Trump. That something is likely the conversion of the Presidency to one’s own personal benefit. It’s not in the DC Circuit opinion and needs to be — all the more so given that, in Florida, Trump is claiming that he could legally simply convert boxes and boxes of classified documents to his personal property, even though the Presidential Records Act prohibits it.

It’s not in the DC Circuit opinion. But something like that has to be, some measure to distinguish the ordinary unlawful stuff Presidents are asked to authorize on behalf of the country and the venal stuff Trump did to benefit himself.

Tomorrow, Judge Cannon will hold a hearing to discuss how to schedule that trial. Her original schedule included six months of things after pretrial motions, which would put her schedule at September as well (though she’s obviously more likely to stall until after the election). But one thing she can expect is that, by June, Trump’s immunity claim will be resolved.

Update: Here’s the language from Trump’s brief that addresses this problem.

The panel opinion ignores the long history of real-world examples of Presidents engaging in actual behavior that political opponents viewed as egregious and “criminal.” Instead, keying on the Special Counsel’s arguments, the panel fretted about lurid hypotheticals that have never occurred in 234 years of history, almost certainly never will occur, and would virtually certainly result in impeachment and Senate conviction (thus authorizing criminal prosecution) if they did occur—such as a hypothetical President corruptly ordering the assassination of political rivals through “SEAL Team Six.” D.C. Cir. Oral Arg Tr. 10:19-21. Such hypotheticals provide fodder for histrionic media coverage, but they are a poor substitute for legal and historical analysis. Confronted with real-world hypotheticals—such as President Obama’s killing of U.S. citizens by drone strike—the Special Counsel conceded below that Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts likely exists and would apply, directly contradicting the “categorical,” App’x 20A, holdings to the contrary of both the appellate panel and the trial court. D.C. Cir. Oral Arg Tr. 49:18-22 (Special Counsel admitting that a “drone strike” where “civilians were killed … might be the kind of place in which the Court would properly recognize some kind of immunity”). Further, the logical presupposition of such speculative hypotheticals—i.e., that the Founders supposedly must have intended that no alleged Presidential misdeed could ever escape prosecution—is plainly incorrect and contradicts the basic premises of a system of separated powers. “While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Jack Smith’s response doesn’t really deal with this issue in depth.

7 A sufficient basis for resolving this case would be that, whatever the rule in other contexts not presented here, no immunity attaches to a President’s commission of federal crimes to subvert the electoral process. See Amici Br. of John Danforth et al., at 7. The court of appeals’ analysis was “specific” to the allegations that applicant conspired to “overturn federal election results and unlawfully overstay his Presidential term,” Appl. App. 31A, and a stay can be denied on that basis alone, leaving for another day whether any immunity from criminal prosecution should be recognized in any circumstances. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 45-49 (explaining that foreign affairs are not implicated in this case); cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707, 710, 712 n.19 (reserving whether an absolute presidential-communications privilege might exist for military, diplomatic, or national security secrets).

SCOTUS Rushes to Grant Trump Protections After It Refused to Rush to Ensure Due Process

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Unsurprisingly, after declining to rush to make sure Trump got due process before a jury of his peers, SCOTUS granted cert to the appeal of Trump’s disqualification by Colorado.

The case will be heard on February 8.

Update: Rick Hasen, who is very smart on these issues, notes that SCOTUS did not hone the issues it will review.

I’m more surprised that the Court did not better focus the questions to be briefed. Trump’s question presented is a blob of a question on disqualification. The challengers to Trump had written 7 questions presented in the alternative. In the Colorado challenge, which does not seem to have been granted by this order, they raised three questions, which somewhat overlap with Trump’s claims.

This seems like it could be a free-for-all in arguments and briefing. I take the failure to hone it down due to lack of consensus on the court or time for there to be serious research on these issues.

Clarence Thomas’ Club Votes Against Democracy

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SCOTUS denied Jack Smith’s effort to get a SCOTUS review of Trump’s absolute immunity claim immediately.

SCOTUS will wait until after DC Circuit hears arguments on January 9, decides the issue, and then they’ll take it up at their leisure, when they’re not taking rich vacations with right wing donors.

This is the easiest of all decisions before SCOTUS, because by taking the case right away, they might make all their other decisions easier.

But instead, they’re stalling.

The Major Questions Metadoctrine and The Slaughterhouse Cases

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In my last post I show how US v. Cruikshank (1876) and The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) affect our gun control crisis. In this post I look at the connection between The Slaughterhouse Cases and Biden v. Nebraska, the recent case striking down Biden’s student loan reduction plan.

The Slaughterhouse Cases

I discuss The Slaughterhouse Cases here. The Supreme Court could have decided them strictly on the basis of the police power. The appellant butchers argued that the untrammeled right to earn a living was a right protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment. That’s obviously not true. The Court later takes up the purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments, and there’s nothing to support the Appellants’ argument.

But Samuel Miller, who wrote the majority opinion, explains that he and the other members of the Court have thought it over, and “ we now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that, we have neither the inclination nor the right to go.”

One of the advisory opinions that follow is that the Reconstruction Amendments were not intended to change the balance of powers between the federal and state governments. Miller justifies this by saying that if Congress wants to make an significant change the balance of powers between the states and the US, it has to do so in language acceptable to the Supreme Court.

Earlier in the opinion, MIller said that the Reconstruction Amendments were intended to insure that Black people had a full range of rights, just like White people. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enact laws to secure that right. So at the very least, the Reconstruction Amendments change the relations between state and US governments enough to permit the US to protect the rights of Black people. It’s hard to imagine clearer language, and Miller doesn’t even hint at one.

Furthermore, by the time of The Slaughterhouse Cases Congress had enacted two civil rights laws and three enforcement acts. This effectively is a declaration of Congress’ understanding of its power, and that of the President. Miller ignores the views of the other two branches. Only the opinion of five members of the Supreme Court counts. The Supreme Court is the unelected final authority in our democracy.

So, we have three points from The Slaughterhouse Cases:

1. If the Supreme Court majority wants to issue a ruling in a case, it will do so, regardless of precedents it might have established.

2. If Congress wants to accomplish a major change in our government it must figure out some language that even the Supreme Court is afraid to reject, but likely that’s impossible.

3. SCOTUS is supreme; it ignores the other two branches if it chooses.

Biden v. Nebraska

Majority Opinion. John Roberts’ majority opinion addresses the standing of the Appellants. Most of them don’t have standing, but no matter, because Roberts asserts that Missouri does and one is plenty. The basis for Missouri’s standing is that it had created MOHELA, an independent nonprofit governmental corporation, which owns and services student loans. MOHELA refused to participate in the lawsuit (I wonder why) but the Missouri AG claims that Missouri can sue in its place. He says MOHELA would lose an estimated $44 million in fees for loan servicing. None of that would ever go to Missouri, ever, but so what?

Roberts and the Fox News Six say MOHELA is an “instrumentality” of Missouri, the instrumentality might lose money which is an injury sufficient for standing, and that’s good enough. What he means is that standing is available because he wants to rule on the merits. Just like in The Slaughterhouse Cases.

In her dissent Elena Kagan explains that standing rules arise from the Constitutional requirement that SCOTUS only has jurisdiction of actual controversies. If a plaintiff isn’t injured, there is no standing.

It still contravenes a bedrock principle of standing law—that a plaintiff cannot ride on someone else’s injury. Missouri is doing just that in relying on injuries to the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA), a legally and financially independent public corporation. And that means the Court, by deciding this case, exercises authority it does not have.

On the merits, Roberts addresses the statutory power granted to the executive branch to waive or modify any provision of the student loan program in the event of a national emergency. He explains that “waive” doesn’t mean waive, and that “modify” doesn’t mean modify, if the change is big. A lot of money is a big change. He doesn’t even hint at the words Congress should have used to get its way.

He says his opinion is supported by what he grandiosely calls the Major Questions Doctrine, because there’s a lot of money at stake. I call it the Major Questions Metadoctrine, or MQM, for reasons that will appear.

Barrett’s Concurrence. Amy Coney Barret, who clerked for the odious Antonin Scalia, styles herself a textualist. She wants us to know that the MQM is very good, so she writes a concurring opinion. Most of is is technical legal stuff about canons of interpretation. Two points are worth mentioning.

1. Barrett cites a 2010 law journal article by John f. Manning, a Harvard Law professor: Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution. You don’t have to read past the abstract to find out what Manning thinks:

This Essay argues that such clear statement rules rest on the mistaken premise that the Constitution contains freestanding values that can be meaningfully identified and enforced apart from the specific terms of the clauses from which the Court derives them.

Barrett ignores this point entirely. The MQM is supposed to be a clear statement rule. There are a number of these, mostly directed to structural constitutional issues like federalism. The Slaughterhouse Cases could be seen as an application of a clear statement rule, if it weren’t so obviously unnecessary and wrong.

In Biden v. Nebraska the MQM is applied to enforce Congressional control over the purse. But as Barrett herself shows, that isn’t in the Constitution. In her view, this purpose is an emanation from the Appropriations Clause. The power of the purse is a judicial trope, already once removed from the text of the Constitution. The MQM is a further step from the Constitution. Thus, a metadoctrine.

2. Barrett offers a hypothetical to explain her view.

Consider a parent who hires a babysitter to watch her young children over the weekend. As she walks out the door, the parent hands the babysitter her credit card and says: “Make sure the kids have fun.” Emboldened, the babysitter takes the kids on a road trip to an amusement park, where they spend two days on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel. Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with the parent’s instruction?

This is a laughable hypothetical. The Biden Administration didn’t just decide for funsies to reduce student debt. There was an economic catastrophe caused by a pandemic that killed a million Americans and sickened tens of millions.

The correct hypothetical is not a trip to a theme park, but a trip to the emergency room paid with the credit card.

This is shoddy work, but it’s all we an expect from rigid ideologues. It’s also an ugly parallel with the Reconstruction Era Supreme Court.

Conclusion

The parallels to The Slaughterhouse Cases are, I hope, obvious.

1. SCOTUS will ignore every restriction on its use of power if five members want to.

2. There is no statutory language clear enough if five (or more) members of SCOTUS don’t like the policy.

3. SCOTUS is very supreme.

Justice Jackson’s Brilliant Debut

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On her second day of oral argument at the Supreme Court, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson showed the wisdom of her appointment and confirmation. A short clip of one of her questions in Merrill v. Milligan made the rounds on Twitter, giving everyone a taste of her skill and understanding. Her point was so powerful I wondered how the lawyer responded.

The case involves an Alabama redistricting map. Plaintiffs alleged that the map unfairly discriminated against Black voters by reducing the number of majoirity-minority congressional districts unfairly. A three-judge district court ruled that the map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Here’s a fairly neutral discussion of the legal context in which the case was argued. Sec. 2 gives individuals the right to sue to prevent any state action to dilute minority voting power. The leading case on Sec. 2 is Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 US 30 (1986). The case sets out three factors which the plaintiff must prove to establish a violation of Sec. 2.

1.The racial or language minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”;

2. The minority group is “politically cohesive” (meaning its members tend to vote similarly); and

3. The “majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it … usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”

The colloquy between Justice Jackson and Alabama Solicitor General Edmond Lacour concerns the first Gingles test. Lacour argues that plaintiffs were required to present a race-neutral map as a benchmark to show that Alabama’s map diluted Black voting power. The transcript can be found here. We start at page 52. Justice Amy Coney Barrett asks Lacour this question:

…if you were forced to adopt a map proposed by the plaintiffs that was racially gerrymandered because race was predominant in its drawing, that you would be violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

Therefore, the first factor of Gingles required to get past the hurdle that Justice Jackson was talking about, to get past that hurdle, it required race neutrality.

Is that your central argument?

MR. LACOUR: Yes, that –that is our core argument that it –it cannot be that they can come forward with a map that we would never be allowed to draw, call it reasonably configured and then force us to draw a map we would never be allowed to constitutionally draw.

You can think of that either –the problem is either race predominance or the problem is, when race enters in to the equation, then traditional districting principles necessarily have to yield, which is what the district court found on page 214 of the Milligan stay appendix, non-racial considerations had to yield to race.

He’s saying that the Constitution bars Alabama from drawing a map that uses race to create majority Black districts. After further discussion, Justice Jackson takes over.

JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. I am so, so glad for Justice Barrett’s clarification because I had the same thought about what you were arguing, and I’m glad that you clarified that your core point is that the Gingles test has to have a race-neutral baseline or that the –the first step has to be race-neutral.

And –and what I guess I’m a little confused about in light of that argument is why, given our normal assessment of the Constitution, why is it that you think that there’s a Fourteenth Amendment problem? And let me just clarify what I mean by that.

I don’t think we can assume that just because race is taken into account that that necessarily creates an equal protection problem, because I understood that we looked at the history and traditions of the Constitution at what the framers and the founders thought about and when I drilled down to that level of analysis, it became clear to me that the framers themselves adopted the equal protection clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, in a race conscious way.

That they were, in fact, trying to ensure that people who had been discriminated against, the freedmen in –during the reconstructive –reconstruction period were actually brought equal to everyone else in the society.
So I looked at the report that was submitted by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, and that report says that the entire point of the amendment was to secure rights of the freed former slaves.

The legislator who introduced that amendment said that “unless the Constitution should restrain them, those states will all, I fear, keep up this discrimination and crush to death the hated freedmen.”

That’s not –that’s not a race-neutral or race-blind idea in terms of the remedy. And –and even more than that, I don’t think that the historical record establishes that the founders believed that race neutrality or race blindness was required, right? They drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which specifically stated that citizens would have the same civil rights as enjoyed by white citizens. That’s the point of that Act, to make sure that the other citizens, the black citizens, would have the same as the white citizens. So they recognized that there was unequal treatment, that people, based on their race, were being treated unequally.

And, importantly, when there was a concern that the Civil Rights Act wouldn’t have a constitutional foundation, that’s when the Fourteenth Amendment came into play. It was drafted to give a foundational –a constitutional foundation for a piece of legislation that was designed to make people who had less opportunity and less rights equal to white citizens.

So with that as the framing and the background, I’m trying to understand your position that Section 2, which by its plain text is doing that same thing, is saying you need to identify people in this community who have less opportunity and less ability to participate and ensure that that’s remedied, right? It’s a race-conscious effort, as you have indicated. I’m trying to understand why that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, given the history and -and background of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Lacour says:

The Fourteenth Amendment is a prohibition on discriminatory state action. It is not an obligation to engage in affirmative discrimination in favor of some groups vis-à-vis others.

That contradicts what Justice Jackson just said. She repeats her point using shorter words. Lacour repeats his earlier statement that Alabama shouldn’t have to sacrifice “other redistricting principles” for the sake of racial fairness unless plaintiffs prove Alabama’s map is discriminatory. He says plaintiffs have to prove specific racial discrimination before thay can use race as a factor in drawing lines. That would require plaintiffs to produce a race-neutral map as a matter of evidence. Justice Jackson says that the point of the Gingles test is to make that determination as required by Sec. 2. Lacour says:

Not if they’re allowed to sacrifice our principles to come up with their maps.

“They” refers to the Black Plaintiffs. Justice Jackson pokes at this response and Lacour says some words. Roberts moves to the next lawyer.

Discussion

1. Justice Jackson is right on the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. In The Slaughter-House Cases SCOTUS construed it so narrowly that it became useless for equalizing government treatment of newly freed slaves, or anyone else, except in very rare cases. But recent scholarship has recovered the original intent. See, e.g. R. Barnett and E. Bernick, The Original Meaning Of The Fourteenth Amend: It’s Letter And Spirit (2018). I haven’t read this book, but based on reviews, it generally tries to extricate the original breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment in Line with Justice Jackson’s analysis. Barnett is a well-known originalist.

2. Lacour’s position is absurd. How can you not laugh at the idea that Alabama has sacred principles of drawing district lines? Of course it does: draw the lines so White people always win. Even if we could imagine some other principle, why should it be so important as to justify diluting minority voting power?

3. John Roberts has devoted his career to destroying the Voting Rights Act. The other right-wingers follow him because it suits their own partisan purposes. They all follow in the tradition of the revanchist SCOTUS of the Slaughter-House Cases. The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment is color-blind is madness.

4. The six right-wingers pretend that their decisions are guided by originalism. When this opinion comes out, look for the tortured logic dismissing the originalist argument so clearly laid out by Justice Jackson.

5. The coward Ben Sasse said that he couldn’t vote to confirm Justice Jackson because he only supported originalists. Obviously she is intellectually rigorous, using originalism as one of the tools of interpretation, just as she said in her confirmation hearing. The six right-wingers only care about original intent when it can be made to fit their preferred outcome.

6. The revanchist six claim that their opinions are driven by their judicial philosophy, not by political ends. They scold their critics for questioning their legitimacy. But the reality is that their so-called judicial philosophy is indistinguishable from right-wing Republican ideology.

Six Weeks: The Tactics of Sammy Alito’s Abortion

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Last night, Politico published a February 10 draft opinion in the Dobbs case, authored by Sam Alito, that overturns Roe and Casey entirely. I’ll leave it to experts to analyze the opinion. For my purposes, it matters only that it is legally and historically shoddy (meaning, Alito didn’t even care about making a convincing argument before taking away constitutional protections), and that it would also permit states to roll back protections for gay rights, contraception, and privacy generally.

I’d like to talk about tactics.

This leaked draft opinion, while not unprecedented, is almost that momentous. But the leak of the draft will in no way affect abortion access after June in any case. Since the oral argument, there was never a doubt that Casey, at least, was going to be effectively overturned. The only suspense, then, and now, concerned the scope of rights the Supreme Court eliminated and how John Roberts will vote.

The most hackish five justices support the Alito argument. And — in CNN reporting that is almost as important as the Politico leak — John Roberts would have voted to uphold Mississippi’s sharp restrictions on abortion in any case.

CNN legal analyst and Supreme Court biographer Joan Biskupic reported late Monday that Chief Justice John Roberts did not want to completely overturn Roe, meaning he would have dissented from part of Alito’s draft opinion, likely with the top bench’s three liberals.
That would still give the conservatives a 5-4 majority on the issue.

Roberts is willing, however, to uphold the Mississippi law that would ban abortion at 15 weeks of pregnancy, CNN has learned. Under current law, government cannot interfere with a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy before about 23 weeks, when a fetus could live outside the womb.

CNN’s report suggests this leak more likely came from Roberts’ chambers than the most likely other source, Stephen Breyer’s. The most logical explanation for the leak is that Roberts is trying to get his colleagues to adopt a less radical opinion. And if that’s the purpose, it might have the desired effect, both by making it clear what a shit-show the original Alito opinion will set off, but also by exposing the opinion itself to the ridicule and contempt it, as written, deserves.

But that doesn’t change the fact that in one way or another, the national protection for access to abortion is gone by the end of the SCOTUS term next month.

So those who support equality for women (and LGBTQ rights, and privacy generally) should consider this leaked draft as an opportunity to use the next six weeks — assume the final opinion will be released in mid-June — to lay the groundwork for what comes next. Symbolically, those who support equality for women (and LGBTQ people) now have about as long as many states will permit abortions to do something to protect the right to abortion (and to marry who you love) going forward.

It’s not clear how overturning abortion access or the early release of this opinion will affect politics going forward. I can certainly see it driving the plurality of Republicans who support such a radical stance. I can also see this decision being decisive in defeating some anti-choice Senate candidates and maybe, because this was released before the run-off, the remaining anti-choice Democrat, Henry Cuellar. Gavin Newsom has already talked about adding abortion to California’s constitution, and California might not be the only such state. Perhaps it is not too late to find a way to put reproductive rights on the ballot as a referendum (though I assume it is). Certainly, this is way to make abortion support a litmus test for state-wide elections.

Certainly, this decision raises the stakes of Brett Kavanaugh’s lies in his confirmation and Clarence Thomas’ implication in his wife’s participation in a coup attempt.

Democrats are talking about abolishing the filibuster to pass abortion rights, but there’s no indication they have 51 votes to pass it. Maybe this would change things?

But there are other ways to mobilize what is a solid majority (including most large corporations) in the United States to undercut this decision, and possibly to change the tenor of politics in this country. Americans believe that women and gays (at least) should be treated as equals. A radical minority disagrees.

Use the next six weeks to figure out how to isolate them as a radical minority.

Update: Noted that this opinion will just end national protections on abortion access.

Update: Roberts is ordering an investigation, suggesting he is not aware of the leaker’s identity. Others have made persuasive arguments that this is from one of the radicals, attempting to keep the five vote majority.