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How Garland-Whinger Ankush Khardori’s Willful Impotence Helps Trump Evade Accountability

There’s a telling quote from Greg Sargent in his description of Kamala Harris’ difficulties in convincing voters that Trump was a bad president.

Some Democrats believe that the leading pro-Harris Super PAC, Future Forward, failed to spend enough of its enormous budget on advertising early on that might have reminded voters of the horrors of the Trump presidency. That perhaps allowed him to slowly rehabilitate himself and edge up his favorable numbers while Democrats weren’t looking.

“There was a calculation among Democrats after 2020 that Trump was disqualified and wouldn’t be back,” Democratic data analyst Tom Bonier told me. “That evolved into a calculation that he would be disqualified by his legal troubles and could end up in jail. Democrats undeniably failed to disqualify him. The result was that by the time the Harris campaign started, it was too late.”

“Was disqualified … would be disqualified … failed to disqualify.”

Bonier is just one person. But the passivity he describes on the part of Democrats expecting and hoping that some magic unicorn would just make the problem of Donald Trump go away is telling. As described, Democrats as a party apparently abdicated all agency for making that case themselves until it was far too late.

It is precisely the reason I’m so impatient with the Merrick Garland whinger industry, which has flourished again since Trump’s win: because they replicate precisely the impotence that got us here. They always asked that Garland do the work, singlehandedly, of making Trump go away, without considering the political groundwork that was necessary to any successful legal case.

Take Ankush Khardori’s description of Trump’s legal impunity. After laying out that, with his election, Trump’s legal troubles will now go away, with which I mostly agree, Khardori then lays out his three culprits: Merrick Garland, Mitch McConnell, SCOTUS.

His culprits are not in temporal order; if McConnell — who had an immediate way to disqualify Trump from further office — had engaged in an impeachment effort, DOJ would have had more time to prosecute.

They’re not in order of culpability. He addresses SCOTUS’ actions in four paragraphs close to the end of his rant. He ignores how their interventions on the Colorado case and Fischer also affected DOJ’s options, and never mentions precisely how long they stalled the case: eight months, with a guarantee of more on the back end. Once you address SCOTUS’ delays and rewriting of the Constitution, it’s not clear a case could ever have been brought before an election, even ignoring how COVID stalled everything for a year, to say nothing of bringing an insurrection charge that would be (per the Colorado decision) the only thing that could disqualify Trump from office. If that’s the case, it wouldn’t matter whether Garland or a gun-toting Adam Schiff, as prosecutor, were in charge. SCOTUS’ intervention, assuming it would have been the same whether it happened in 2021 or 2022 or 2023, was decisive. Trump’s judges made a prosecution of him before the election impossible and further ruled that the only thing that could disqualify him was an insurrection charge.

Instead of focusing primarily on the main culprits, Khardori prioritizes what he imagines was Garland’s role over that of McConnell and — astonishingly — SCOTUS.

And as is typical with Garland whingers, his indictment of Garland is riddled with problems (and, as the red typeface I used to mark links to his own past pieces shows, his own bellybutton lint).

It is now clearer than ever that Garland was a highly questionable choice to serve as attorney general from the start. From the outset of the Biden presidency, it was readily apparent that Garland had little desire to investigate and potentially prosecute Trump.

The most comprehensive accounts on the matter, from investigative reporting at The Washington Post and The New York Times, strongly indicate that the Jan. 6 committee’s investigation and public hearings in 2022 effectively forced Garland to investigate Trump and eventually to appoint Smith in November of that year — nearly two years after Trump incited the riot at the Capitol.

There are many people — including many Democratic legal pundits — who have continued to defend this delay and may continue to do so, so let me be very clear: Those people are wrong.

It was clear after Trump’s loss in 2020 — even before Jan. 6 — that his conduct warranted serious legal scrutiny by the Justice Department, particularly in the area of potential financial crimes. But that probe, which could and should have been pursued by Biden’s U.S. Attorney and aspiring attorney general in Manhattan, somehow never materialized.

It was also clear — on Jan. 6 itself — that Trump may have committed criminal misconduct after his loss in 2020 that required immediate and serious attention from the Justice Department.

The formation of the Jan. 6 committee in early 2021 did nothing to change the calculus. There too, it was clear from the start that there would still need to be a criminal investigation to deliver any meaningful legal accountability for Trump.

In fact, the warning signs for where this could all end up — where the country finds itself now — were clear by late 2021, less than a year into Biden’s term. The public reporting at the time indicated (correctly, we now know) that there was no real Justice Department investigation into Trump and his inner circle at that point, even though the outlines of a criminal case against Trump — including some of the charges themselves that were eventually brought nearly two years later — were already apparent.

As a result, the Biden administration and the Garland Justice Department were running an extremely obvious risk — namely, that Trump would run for reelection and win, and that any meaningful criminal accountability for his misconduct after 2020 would literally become impossible. That, of course, has now happened. It was all eminently predictable.

Garland’s defenders over the years — including many Democratic lawyers who regularly appear on cable news — claimed that Garland and the department were simply following a standard, “bottom-up” investigative effort. Prosecutors would start with the rioters, on this theory, and then eventually get to Trump.

This never made any sense.

It did not reflect some unwritten playbook for criminal investigations. In fact, in criminal cases involving large and potentially overlapping groups of participants — as well as serious time sensitivity — good prosecutors try to get to the top as quickly as possible.

The Justice Department can — and should — have quickly pursued the rioters and Trump in parallel. The fact that many legal pundits actually defended this gross dereliction of duty — and actually argued that this was the appropriate course — continues to amaze me.

As for Garland, his legacy is now out of his control, and the early returns are not looking good.

Garland is a serious, well-intentioned and complex figure. But given all this, he may go down as one of the worst and most broadly unpopular attorney generals in American history — hated by the anti-Trump part of the country for failing to bring Trump to justice, and hated by the pro-Trump part of the country for pursuing Trump at all. I sincerely hope he provides a first-hand accounting of what happened after he too leaves office next year.

The only sources of information on the investigation Khardori cites (aside from his own posts about what he could see without looking) are a WaPo and a NYT article. From both, only Glenn Thrush, a political journalist rehabilitated to the DOJ beat, covered the Trump case closely; none covered the larger investigation.

The WaPo article, which fairly obviously relies heavily on sources from the January 6 Committee members and people who left DOJ when Garland came in, has a number of problems I’ve laid out before (one, two, three).

  • It missed the significance of Brandon Straka, whose “cooperation” I believe was mishandled, but had it not been, might have gotten you into the Willard in March 2021.
  • It focused on the Oath Keepers and almost entirely ignores the Proud Boys, and in the process misunderstands the specific role they played, the ways DOJ under Bill Barr had made their prosecution far harder, and their importance to any hypothetical insurrection charge (because they kicked off the insurrection before Trump did, a problem impeachment prosecutors faced).
  • It ignored the decisions DOJ made with Rudy Giuliani’s phone — which was seized with a warrant obtained on Lisa Monaco’s first day on the job — which made that content, including content J6C never got, available to DOJ starting in November 2021.
  • It ignored the way DOJ, in August 2021, opportunistically used the prior Deferred Prosecution Agreement of Alex Jones sidekick Owen Shroyer to arrest and exploit the phone of someone who otherwise would likely be protected under media guidelines.
  • It ignored the overt investigative steps against Sidney Powell taken no later than September 2021.
  • It ignored a subpoena that was overt in May 2022, which included people who were not immediately a focus of J6C (and so not derivative of that investigation), as well as warrants dating no later than May 2022 targeting (among others) John Eastman. Since then, thanks to Khardori’s colleagues at Politico who do cover these investigations, we’ve learned the exact date that kicked off over ten months of Executive Privilege fights to get the testimony of 14 of Trump’s closest aides: June 15, 2022, one day before J6C interviewed those same witnesses: Marc Short and Greg Jacob. Which is to say, WaPo’s timeline even of known investigative steps is off in a way that suggests DOJ was entirely derivative of J6C, which it could not have been.
  • Perhaps predictably, given the obvious reliance on J6C sources, it didn’t talk about how their decision to delay sharing transcripts from April until December 2022 withheld information both helpful and crucial from criminal investigators.

More importantly, WaPo focused on Steve D’Antuono’s hesitancy to turn to the fake electors, even as DOJ was pushing to do so. Which is to say that D’Antuono — someone no longer at DOJ — was the key cause for delay, not Garland.

So there are a lot of problems with the WaPo story that Khardori, if he had actually tracked the investigation or followed those of us (including Politico’s own reporters) who do, should have known.

But Khardori didn’t even need to do that to understand that the WaPo had blind spots. That’s because the NYT story describes two prongs of the investigation, started in 2021, that don’t make the WaPo. It describes that,

  • Garland encouraged investigators to follow the money in his first meeting with them, though that turned out to be largely a dead end (note: Garland publicly implied that investigators were following the money in October 2021).
  • By summer of 2021, Lisa Monaco convened a team focusing on John Eastman, Boris Epshteyn, Rudy, and Roger Stone.

The NYT story missed a lot of what I included above, too (though not the Proud Boys), but it tells a very different story about efforts to focus on people close to Trump in 2021 than the WaPo did.

In spite of the NYT description of two prongs of the investigation that started in March and summer 2021 that attempted to get directly to those in Trump’s orbit, Khardori spent four paragraphs of his complaint claiming that DOJ had exclusively tried to work their way up from rioters. That’s not what the public record shows, it’s not what NYT says happened, it’s not what public reports on the Powell subpoenas say, it’s not what Garland said in October 2021 testimony. And yet that is the basis Khardori uses to condemn Garland. Further, the NYT describes that, in his first meeting with investigators, Garland, “said he would place no restrictions on their work, even if the ‘evidence leads to Trump,'” That statement is inconsistent with most of Khardori’s first two paragraphs on Garland. The Attorney General told investigators from the start he had no problem investigating Trump. Yet Khardori still links his own past work and claims vindication, rather than confessing that, if the NYT piece he relies on is accurate, he was wrong.

Which is to say, Khardori doesn’t claim to (and shows no signs of) having reviewed how the investigation actually happened.  That’s not his job, I guess, as a legal journalist. Instead, he relies on two sources, one of which partly debunks the other, as well as countering his own claim about Garland’s unwillingness to investigate and his four-paragraph argument that Garland should have pursued multiple routes to Trump but did not.

There are facts. And Khardori chooses to ignore them, clinging instead to past assertions that he falsely claims have been vindicated.

It’s the most irresponsible kind of laziness. Without having learned what really happened, Khardori concocts out of his uncertainty and frustration broad judgements that support his priors but are inconsistent with the public record. Via that invented theory to explain the scary unknown, Merrick Garland remains his primary villain, not John Roberts, not Mitch McConnell.

Poof! Thousands of clicks, each time misleading another despondent reader, encouraging helplessness.

Having made Garland his villain, he proclaims defeat.

I am, if anything, more furious than Khardori that Trump will not face legal accountability for his alleged crimes, because I know the kind of insurrectionists whose likely pardons will effectively flip patriotism on its head, valorizing Trump over country. This is a potentially irreparable blow to rule of law in the US.

But I’m not ready, as Khardori seems to be, to concede defeat. That’s because legal accountability is not the only recourse; indeed, we were never going to get legal accountability without first demanding political accountability. That’s the mistake many made: by looking passively at Merrick Garland and begging for a sparkle unicorn to make Trump go away, many failed to take steps, themselves, to hold Republicans to account for abandoning rule of law.

Consider how Khardori disempowers himself elsewhere in his column. Here’s how he describes Jack Smith’s closure of the case.

Already there is reporting suggesting that special counsel Jack Smith will leave his post and dismiss the pending cases, which is not that surprising considering that Trump pledged to fire him once back in office anyway.

He describes this as driven by Trump’s threat to fire Jack Smith, not DOJ regulations that prohibit further prosecution. He doesn’t link or consider any of the reports that lay out the obvious: by stepping down rather than waiting to get fired, Smith obliges himself to write a report. He chooses how he will go out. Admittedly, Khardori published his piece before last week’s filing that suggests we’ll have, at least, clarity by early December which, if it were the actual report, would (among other things) be early enough to hold a hearing.

That’s not going to change Trump’s win. But it provides an opportunity to lay a marker in the sand: This is what Republicans have chosen to enable going forward. This is what Republicans have chosen as a party to become.

It lays a marker for the two other villains in Khardori’s column: McConnell and the other Senate Republicans who refused to convict Trump, and John Roberts and his colleagues who vastly expanded his power without even knowing what Jack Smith had discovered.

Fresh off a big electoral victory, I doubt any will much care. But when the obvious repercussions come — when a guy who stored nuclear documents in a coat closet further compromises US security — the report and the hearing provide a marker that those who failed to stop Trump were warned and chose to do nothing (or worse, on the part of SCOTUS, chose to give him more power).

One of the only remaining possible checks on Trump’s power are the people in the Senate and SCOTUS who failed to check him on these alleged crimes before (though SCOTUS did check some of his other initiatives the first time around). We won’t soon persuade any of them to change their minds. But that doesn’t mean we stop trying — or at least laying a record of their complicity. In that path lies capitulation.

All the more so given that Roberts and his colleagues will be the villains in many more stories that have direct impact on people’s lives going forward.

Donald Trump is about to do a great deal of outrageous things at the start of his term to reverse the treatment of January 6 as a crime. The response cannot be to say, ho hum, if only that awful Merrick Garland would have yelled louder, and give up, especially not when no amount of yelling was going to change what SCOTUS did.

The response is to stop hoping for a sparkle unicorn to do this work for us. The response is to take some agency for making the case about Donald Trump. And a first step in that process is to stop blaming Garland for things — the public record shows — he didn’t do, and especially to stop blaming Garland for things that more important villains, like John Roberts, did do.

The first step to effective accountability is to identify the actual villain.

Update: Ty Cobb, when asked what he thinks about Trump’s promise to pardon the Jan6 defendants, stated, I don’t think anybody in our history has more tarnished the rule of law than Donald Trump.”

Proud Boy Closure or John Roberts’ Get Out of Jail Free Card?

There have been some developments in the Proud Boy prosecutions I want to note.

First, according to a status update filed on October 23, Jeremy Bertino — the most important cooperating Proud Boy witness — is done cooperating. That follows a four month continuance obtained in June. He will be sentenced in February.

Then, in the case of the Ron Loerkhe and Jimmy Haffner, on October 24, DOJ asked for and got an awkwardly timed 35-day motion to continue, until December 3, between the election and inauguration. AUSA Jason McCullough — who took over the case from Erik Kenerson a year ago, had previously asked for and gotten a 75-day continuance in July, which would have expired Tuesday. This case has done nothing but continue like this since they were first charged in December 2021. As I described then, Loehrke especially, who is a former Marine, was pretty instrumental in moving the crowd around on January 6, and would have been involved in any charges tied to the effort to open a second front of attack on the East doors of the Capitol.

Finally, on October 25, Alexis Loeb dropped off some or all of her cases. For years, the AUSA has shepherded a fairly breathtaking number of Proud Boy and Proud Boy adjacent cases — often those where the defendants couldn’t be tied to the Proud Boy leaders. In that role, she has had to manage a number of the cases that SCOTUS’ Fischer decision most complicated, in some cases shifting obstruction charges into civil disorder ones or arguing that defendants get the same sentence on the latter charge after the government gave up on the former. Ockham’s razor would suggest she’s dropping off because she has already put years into an investigation that for most others was a six month assignment. All the more so given she has finished up some recent business. On October 8, she got a plea with Jerry Braun; on October 18, Tim Kelly denied his bid to stay out of prison pending sentencing. On October 25, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly denied a bid by George Tenney to reduce his sentence. And on October 23, Kollar-Kotelly held a stipulated trial for Nicholas Kennedy’s obstruction charge (he already pled to his other charges, including Civil Disorder) under the new Fischer rules.

But not only is Fischer himself still pending, with trial scheduled in February, but Kennedy is not done. Immediately after the stipulated trial, Kollar-Kotelly ordered more briefing, scheduled out through November.

MINUTE ORDER as to NICHOLAS KENNEDY (1): Yesterday, October 23, 2024, the Court held a stipulated trial on Count Two of the 63 Second Superseding Indictment (Obstruction of an Official Proceeding and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2) and 2). After reviewing the stipulated facts with Defendant, the Court discussed with the parties the 82 Proposed Jury Instructions. During that discussion, it became clear that the parties agreed on the elements of a Section 1512(c)(2) offense but disagreed about the application of those elements to Defendant’s stipulated conduct. The Court has not yet reached a verdict. The Court ORDERS the Government to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on or before NOVEMBER 1, 2024. Defendant shall respond on or before NOVEMBER 15, 2024. And the Government shall reply, if necessary, on or before NOVEMBER 25, 2024. Signed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on 10/24/2024. (lcckk3) (Entered: 10/24/2024)

This briefing will go to the core of DOJ’s theory via which they think they can hold people accountable for trying to disrupt the counting of actual vote certifications.

Still, the most likely explanation is that Loeb has earned a break.

What I’m wondering, given the silence about the Proud Boys in Jack Smith’s immunity briefing, is what these movements mean for any implication of the militia into a case for Trump or his closest allies (the cases Loeb has overseen treated both Alex Jones and Roger Stone as unindicted co-conspirators).

I speculated earlier this month that we might see something implicating the Proud Boys after the election.

Back in December, in the last filing Jack Smith submitted before Trump’s lawyers got Judge Chutkan to prohibit such things, Smith said he wanted to introduce Trump’s encouragement of the Proud Boys as 404(b) evidence.

The Government plans to introduce evidence from the period in advance of the charged conspiracies that demonstrates the defendant’s encouragement of violence. For instance, in response to a question during the September 29, 2020, presidential debate asking him to denounce the extremist group the Proud Boys, the defendant instead spoke publicly to them and told them to “stand back and stand by.” Members of the group embraced the defendant’s words as an endorsement and printed merchandise with them as a rallying cry. As discussed below, after the Proud Boys and other extremist groups participated in obstructing the congressional certification on January 6, the defendant made clear that they were acting consistent with his intent and direction in doing so.

[snip]

Of particular note are the specific January 6 offenders whom the defendant has supported— namely, individuals convicted of some of the most serious crimes charged in relation to January 6, such as seditious conspiracy and violent assaults on police officers. During a September 17, 2023, appearance on Meet the Press, for instance, the defendant said regarding Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio—who was convicted of seditious conspiracy—“I want to tell you, he and other people have been treated horribly.” The defendant then criticized the kinds of lengthy sentences received only by defendants who, like Tarrio, committed the most serious crimes on January 6. [my emphasis]

But the Proud Boys don’t appear, at all, in the immunity filing. You can go search for them using this OCR version. Nothing. Jack Smith said he wanted them to be part of the trial, but they’re not in this filing laying out that Smith might mention them at trial.

To be sure, there is a section of the immunity filing that addresses Trump’s fondness for convicted Jan6ers.

In the years after January 6, the defendant has reiterated his support for and allegiance to 39478 39479 rioters who broke into the Capitol, calling them “patriots478 and “hostages,479 providing them financial assistance,480 and reminiscing about January 6 as “a beautiful day.”481 At a rally in Waco, Texas, on March 25, 2023, the defendant started a tradition he has repeated several times—opening the event with a song called “Justice for All,” recorded by a group of charged—and in many cases, convicted—January 6 offenders known as the “January 6 Choir” and who, because of their dangerousness, are held at the District of Columbia jail.482 At the Waco Rally, of the January 6 Choir, the defendant said, “our people love those people, they love those people.”483 The defendant has also stated that if re-elected, he will pardon individuals convicted of crimes on January 6.484

But not only doesn’t it mention the Proud Boys directly (one of them was part of the Jan6 Choir, though not any of the seditionists), it doesn’t include the September 2023 interview in which Trump addressed Enrique Tarrio by name (bolded above).

478 GA 1973 at 16:52 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023); GA 1962 at 48:29 (Video of Trump at Faith and Freedom Coalition 06/17/2022); GA 1971 (Video of Trump Interview 02/01/2022).

479 GA 1935 at 35:50, 01:16:16 (Video of Greensboro Rally 03/02/2024).

480 GA 1966 at 09:30 (Video of Trump Interview 09/01/2022).

481 GA 1967 at 45:18 (Video of Trump Interview 08/23/2023); GA 1692 (Transcript of CNN Town Hall 05/10/2023).

482 GA 1973 at 03:00 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023). See, e.g., United States v. Jordan Robert Mink, 21-cr-25 (D.D.C. 2023); United States v. Ronald Sandlin, 21-cr-88 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. Barton Shively, 21-cr-151 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. Julian Khater, 21-cr-222 (D.D.C. 2022); United States v. James McGrew, 21-cr-398 (D.D.C. 2022).

483 GA 1973 at 06:02 (Video of Waco Rally 03/25/2023).

484 GA 1971 at 15:51 (Video of Trump Interview with Schmitt 02/01/2022).

If you’re going to impress SCOTUS with Trump’s outrageous support for convicted rioters, you would include the Proud Boys.

Maybe that’s right.

Or maybe, with Fischer, John Roberts effectively wrote people like Jones and Stone a Get out of jail free card. For years, I’ve been laying out how Alex Jones and Roger Stone are right there in a networked conspiracy between the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers and Donald Trump.

But that was envisioned — I believe DOJ envisioned it, starting years ago — as a conspiracy built around obstruction charges, 18 USC 1512(k).

Given Fischer’s new evidentiary component, I’m not sure whether you could sustain charges for obstruction against Jones and Stone.

There’s at least one clue that DOJ doubts it can sustain such charges against people further from the action. In the SoCal Conspiracy, in which some anti-vaxers and Three Percenters joined up to plan their travel to January 6, DOJ just filed an information for Morton Irvine Smith, for just trespassing.

Smith funded much of the conspiring. He appeared to be involved in earlier plotting, going back to the MAGA March in December 2020. And DOJ imaged his computer years ago, back in June 2021.

To be sure, since he was charged via information, it’s clear that Smith has negotiated these charges. But particularly as the obstruction charges against the guys he funded, notably Alan Hostetter, have been put at risk with Fischer, I wonder whether DOJ has simply given up trying to hold Smith to any more serious charges.

It may be we’ll see some new Proud Boy developments after the election. But it’s just as likely that John Roberts’ revision of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) made it difficult if not impossible to hold key players between the crime scene and the Willard accountable.

At Least Four Trump Supporters Arrested for Cheating

Thus far, four Trump supporters have been arrested for cheating.

There’s Danielle Christine Miller, charged with two felonies for casting a vote in her dead mother’s name for Trump.

There’s Larry Lee Savage Jr, who stole two ballots during a test run of voting machines in Indiana.

There’s Val Biancaniello, who was arrested for disorderly conduct after allegedly harassing voters in a line in Media, PA.

And there’s Caleb James Williams, who harassed early voters in Neptune Beach, FL waving a machete.

Update: Jeffrey Michael Kelly, who was arrested last week for shooting up some Democratic offices in AZ, was indicted on terrorism charges today.

In addition, an unaffiliated racist, Nicholas Farley, was arrested in West Palm Beach for yelling racial and antisemitic slurs at voters (I’m not counting him as a Trump supporter because he was intimidating Republican voters too).

Trump, predictably, is claiming that others are cheating.

And the Republicans on the Supreme Court permitted Glenn Youngkin to continue purging voters, including some citizens, from voting rolls in violation of the National Voter Registration Act. [Corrected the law in question.]

Update: A Chinese Green Card holder who is a U Michigan student has also been charged, for illegally voting.

John Roberts’ Sordid Legacy: 14 Pages of Mean Tweets

“One of the ways Trump” disseminated false claims of election fraud, Jack Smith’s immunity briefing describes, “was by Tweet, day in and day out.”

I’m still wading through Jack Smith’s immunity briefing. Later today, I plan to explain how we got here and how Trump’s lawyers will try to bury it. Then I’ll show the substance of their argument, how prosecutors plan to convict Donald Trump for attempting to steal an election without using any evidence that Chief Justice John Roberts has deemed official and therefore immune.

But first I want to talk about an utterly remarkable passage in the filing: 14 pages examining Trump’s mean tweets.

As I’ll explain in more detail later, the filing first lays out, in Part I, what evidence prosecutors plan to rely on, then sets up a legal framework to conduct this analysis, and then explains, in Part III, why the evidence laid out in the first part is not immune.

In Part III, prosecutors go both by type of evidence (for example, conversations with Republican state officials and politicians) to explain why such conduct is not immune. The section looks like this:

  • Trump’s interactions with Pence
    • Trump’s interactions with Pence were official, but presumption of immunity is overcome
    • Trump’s interactions with Pence as a running mate were unofficial
  • Trump’s interactions with officials from swing states
    • The interactions were unofficial (followed by five instances)
    • Even if they were official, the government can rebut the presumption of immunity
  • Trump’s efforts to organize fake electors
    • The effort was unofficial
    • Even if it was official, the government can rebut the presumption of immunity
  • Trump’s public speeches and tweets as a candidate
    • The statements were unofficial
      • Speeches (with analysis of the two prosecutors want to use, one in Georgia and the January 6 one)
      • Tweets
      • Other public statements
    • Parts of Trump’s statements that are official can be excised
  • Trump’s interactions with White House staff (including Eric Herschmann, Dan Scavino, Molly Michaels, and two others)
    • The interactions were unofficial
    • The government could rebut any presumption of immunity
  • Other evidence of knowledge and intent
    • The evidence was unofficial
      • Federal officials (including Bill Barr and Chris Krebs)
      • Evidence about Trump’s use of Twitter
      • Trump’s post-Administration statements
    • Even if it were official, the government could rebut any presumption of immunity

This section takes up 75 pages of the brief.

Of that, 18 pages are dedicated to analysis about Trump’s Tweets (not including the additional pages describing how they plan to explain Trump’s Twitter habits). Fourteen of those pages go through Trump’s manic Tweets from the period, each time explaining why such Tweets should not be viewed as the official acts of the President of the United States.

The section describes six ways Trump’s Twitter habit served his coup attempt:

  • Casting doubt on election integrity
  • Making false claims of election fraud
  • Attacking Republicans who speak the truth about the election
    • Al Schmidt
    • Chris Krebs
    • Rusty Bowers and four Pennsylvania State GOP legislators
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Brian Hagedorn
    • Chris Carr
    • Governor Doug Ducey, Governor Brian Kemp, and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger
  • Exhorting people to come to January 6
  • Pressuring Mike Pence
  • Almost getting Mike Pence killed

Prosecutors don’t include all the attacks Trump made on Twitter — for example, while Section I describes his attacks on Shaye Moss and Ruby Freeman, prosecutors don’t include them in the immunity analysis. The immunity analysis instead focuses only on the people with whom, Trump might argue, he was engaged in official business by ginning up death threats against them.

John Roberts not only rewrote the Constitution to protect Donald Trump. He forced prosecutors to spend 14 pages arguing that it is not among the job duties of the President of the United States to attack Republicans who’ve crossed him on Twitter.

This is what the Chief Justice wants to protect. This is the all-powerful President John Roberts wants to have. Someone who can sit in his dining room siccing mobs on fellow Republicans.

Who knows whether it will work? Who knows whether these right wing Justices will go that far — to argue that even the President’s mean Tweets targeting members of his own party must be protected from any accountability?

But prosecutors personalized it.

As noted above, the 14 pages analyzing mean Tweets follows the analysis of two rally speeches, in which prosecutors first show the January 4 Georgia speech was a campaign event, and then (among other things) lay out the similarity between that speech and Trump’s January 6 one.

Among the things Trump included in both speeches was an attack on the Supreme Court:

The defendant, who in his capacity as a candidate had suffered personal legal defeats in his private, election-related litigation at the Supreme Court, attacked it (Dalton at GA 1095; “I’m not happy with the Supreme Court. They are not stepping up to the plate. They’re not stepping up.” Ellipse at GA 1125: “I’m not happy with the Supreme Court. They love to rule against me.”).

Of course, the Justices can’t view that as an official act. It would be anathema to the very principles of separation of powers the Justices claim to be guarding. Plus (as noted here and elsewhere), Trump had specifically labeled his intervention in Ken Paxton’s lawsuit as done in his personal capacity. But building off how obviously unofficial this attack on John Roberts and his buddies is, it makes it all the more obvious that Donald Trump’s mean Tweets aren’t official acts either.

Though the inclusion of Trump’s attacks on them also might get these partisan hacks to think more seriously about the nearly identical exhortations Trump made on Truth Social before they decided to rewrite the Constitution in his favor.

Update: Fixed where I said that Trump intervened in Ken Paxton’s lawsuit in his official capacity–he specifically said he did so in his personal capacity as a candidate.

Trump Wants to Hide His Attempt to Assassinate Mike Pence from Voters

In 2016, Donald Trump bragged, “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK?”

This election, Trump wants to hide from voters details of how he almost killed his Vice President, Mike Pence, and his claim that doing so was an official act protected by presidential immunity.

That’s the primary thing you need to know about the joint status report presented to Judge Tanya Chutkan in Trump’s January prosecution last night.

Jack Smith doesn’t propose a schedule (thereby avoiding any claim he’s trying to push pre-election developments), but he’s ready to get this process started right away. He does want Judge Chutkan to make determinations regarding immunity first and foremost. He cites Chutkan’s own order and SCOTUS’ remand order to justify that.

The Court has indicated that it intends to conduct its determinations related to immunity first and foremost. See, e.g., ECF No. 197 (Order denying without prejudice the defendant’s motion to dismiss the previous indictment on statutory grounds and specifying that he “may file a renewed motion once all issues of immunity have been resolved”). The Government agrees with this approach, both because the Supreme Court directed such a process on remand, see Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2340 (2024), and because the Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (internal citations omitted).

Trump, by contrast, wants to stall any consideration of immunity until December 13 by first litigating a challenge to Jack Smith’s appointment that Aileen Cannon approved but which conflicts with several binding precedents in the DC Circuit (and which Trump pointedly didn’t try before Chutkan last fall, when he submitted all his other motions to dismiss).

Trump-appointed Judge Mark Scarsi rejected Hunter Biden’s similar attempt to challenge David Weiss’ Special Counsel appointment in the wake of Judge Cannon’s ruling as untimely, and there’s good reason to believe that would be the likely outcome here, even before getting to the binding DC Circuit precedent.

You need look no further than Trump’s description of what he wants to challenge in the superseding indictment to understand why Trump wants to delay this fight until December: As I predicted, he wants to have the Mike Pence allegations thrown out.

In addition, while continuing to strongly maintain that many classes of conduct alleged in the Superseding Indictment are immune—including, but not limited to, Tweets and public statements about the federal 2020 Presidential election, communications with state officials about the federal election, and allegations relating to alternate slates of electors—President Trump may file a motion to dismiss focused specifically on the Special Counsel’s improper use of allegations related to Vice President Pence, along with other potential key threshold motions. Namely, in Trump, the Supreme Court held that President Trump is “at least presumptively immune from prosecution for” all alleged efforts “to pressure the Vice President to take particular acts in connection with his role at the certification proceeding.” Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2336 (2024). These same allegations are foundational to the Superseding Indictment and each of its four counts. See Doc. 226 at ¶¶ 5, 9(b), 11(c)-(d), 14, 51(b), 55, 67–90, 99–100. If the Court determines, as it should, that the Special Counsel cannot rebut the presumption that these acts are immune, binding law requires that the entire indictment be dismissed because the grand jury considered immunized evidence. Trump, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2340 (2024) (“Presidents . . . cannot be indicted based on conduct for which they are immune from prosecution.”).

The Special Counsel’s inability to rebut the presumption as to Pence is dispositive to this case. The special counsel will be unable to do so as a matter of law, thus rendering the remainder of the case moot. Trump, 144 S. Ct. 2312, 2337 (2024) (“We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” (emphasis added)).

To be sure, he’s not wrong to challenge the inclusion of the Pence allegations. Nor is he wrong in his view of how central Pence is to this indictment (though he overstates when he claims it would moot all else; the fake electors plot might survive the excision of the Mike Pence allegations).

As I explained, Justice Roberts raised the conversations with Pence specifically. But as I also explained, that is one of the shrewd things Jack Smith did in superseding the indictment: he stripped out all other things that obviously fit under Roberts’ guidelines, leaving only Trump’s efforts to get Pence to throw out the votes of 81 million Biden voters and when Pence refused, Trump’s action — a tweet — that almost got Pence assassinated.

Trump may well succeed in arguing that he can’t be prohibited from asking Pence to overturn the results of the election so the two of them could remain in power because any such prohibition would chill the normal conversations between Presidents and their Vice Presidents. That is simply the absurd logical result of Roberts’ opinion: that a President can order his Vice President to steal an election because any prohibition on doing so would chill the authority of the President.

But if Jack Smith has his way, Trump will have to make that argument — once, probably in a court filing in October — before voters go to the polls in November.

There are a bunch of legal details in this status report. But given the near certainty that if Trump wins, the entire prosecution will go away, the only one that really matters is that, this election, Trump isn’t so sure that he would lose no votes if he shot someone on Fifth Avenue — or if voters learned why and how he almost had his Vice President assassinated in the US Capitol — as he was in 2016.

Trump doesn’t want to tell voters he thinks that as President, he could have Mike Pence shot on the Senate floor — shot as punishment because his Vice President refused an illegal order to steal an election — and be immune from any consequences for doing so.

The Superseding Trump Indictment Is about Obstruction as Much as Immunity

In this Xitter thread, I went through everything that had been added or removed from the superseding indictment against Trump, based on this redline. The changes include the following:

  1. Removal of everything having to do with Jeffrey Clark
  2. Removal of everything describing government officials telling Trump he was nuts (such as Bill Barr explaining that he had lost Michigan in Kent County, not Wayne, where he was complaining)
  3. Removal of things (including Tweets and Trump’s failure to do anything as the Capitol was attacked) that took place in the Oval Office
  4. Addition of language clarifying that all the remaining co-conspirators (Rudy Giuliani, John Eastman, Sidney Powell, Kenneth Chesebro, and — probably — Boris Epshteyn) were private lawyers, not government lawyers
  5. Tweaked descriptions of Trump and Mike Pence to emphasize they were candidates who happened to be the incumbent
  6. New language about the treatment of the electoral certificates

Altogether, the changes incorporate not just SCOTUS’ immunity decision, but also the DC Circuit’s Blassingame decision deeming actions taken as a candidate for office are private acts, and SCOTUS’ Fischer decision limiting the use of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to evidentiary issues.

The logic of Blassingame is why Jack Smith included these paragraphs describing that Trump and Pence were acting as candidates.

1. The Defendant, DONALD J. TRUMP, was a candidate for President of the United States in 2020. He lost the 2020 presidential election.

[snip]

5. In furtherance of these conspiracies, the Defendant tried–but failed–to enlist the Vice President, who was also the Defendant’s running mate and, by virtue of the Constitution, the President of the Senate, who plays a ceremonial role in the January 6 certification proceeding.

As I’ve said repeatedly, it’s not clear that adopting the Blassingame rubric will work for SCOTUS, even though they did nothing to contest this rubric.

That’s because Chief Justice Roberts used Pence’s role as President of the Senate to deem his role in certification an official responsibility, thereby deeming Trump’s pressure of Pence an official act. Smith will need to rebut the presumption of immunity but also argue that using these conversations between Trump and Pence will not chill the President’s authority.

Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their official responsibilities, they engage in official conduct. Presiding over the January 6 certification proceeding at which Members of Congress count the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice President. Art. II, §1, cl. 3; Amdt. 12; 3 U. S. C. §15. The indictment’s allegations that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President to take particular acts in connection with his role at the certification proceeding thus involve official conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively immune from prosecution for such conduct.

The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. When the Vice President presides over the January 6 certification proceeding, he does so in his capacity as President of the Senate. Ibid. Despite the Vice President’s expansive role of advising and assisting the President within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s Article I responsibility of “presiding over the Senate” is “not an ‘executive branch’ function.” Memorandum from L. Silberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., to R. Burress, Office of the President, Re: Conflict ofInterest Problems Arising Out of the President’s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller To Be Vice President Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 2 (Aug. 28, 1974). With respect to the certification proceeding in particular, Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes, see, e.g., 3 U. S. C. §15, and the President plays no direct constitutional or statutory role in that process. So the Government may argue that consideration of the President’s communications with the Vice President concerning the certification proceeding does not pose “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754; see supra, at 14.

At the same time, however, the President may frequently rely on the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate to advance the President’s agenda in Congress. When the Senate is closely divided, for instance, the Vice President’s tiebreaking vote may be crucial for confirming the President’s nominees and passing laws that align with the President’s policies. Applying a criminal prohibition to the President’s conversations discussing such matters with the Vice President—even though they concern his role as President of the Senate—may well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitutional functions.

It is ultimately the Government’s burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.

This is the most important advantage of superseding the indictment. When someone boasted to Bloomberg that Jack Smith’s purported decision not to have a mini-trial on these issues was a “win” for Trump, they envisioned that this meant there would be no media friendly election-season developments, providing a way to get through (a successful or stolen) election so future President Trump could throw the case out.

Such a hearing would have been the best chance for voters to review evidence about Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election result as he campaigns to regain the White House.

The decision is a win for Trump and his lawyers, who have fought efforts to reveal the substance of allegations against the former president.

The decision to supersede this indictment may have turned what could have been an immediate dispute about the viability of the indictment at all into an evidentiary dispute to be managed later. We’ll find out more on Tuesday.

At the very least, Jack Smith suggests he has something viable on which to arraign Trump (and Trump’s Xitter wails treating this as a real indictment suggest he may believe that).

Smith will still need to overcome the presumption created out of thin air by John Roberts on all of this. But he may do so from a posture where the utter absurdity of Roberts’ ruling are made obvious.

That’s one reason it’s important that Smith has included the tweet via which Trump almost got Mike Pence assassinated.

Smith rationalized doing so by emphasizing that Trump wrote it neither in the Oval Office nor with anyone’s assistance.

92. Beginning around 1:30 p.m., the Defendant, who had returned to the White
House after concluding his remarks, settled in the dining room off of the Oval Office. He spent much of the afternoon reviewing Twitter on his phone, while the television in the dining room showed live events at Capitol.

[snip]

94. At 2:24 p.m., the Defendant personally, without assistance, issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!” [my emphasis]

This situates this Tweet, which almost got Mike Pence killed, a private act for which Trump has no immunity. It may not work. But that’s the logic.

But the other changes in this passage are all about Fischer, about showing how Trump deliberately sicced a mob on the Capitol with the goal of making it impossible to count the certifications.

After adding language from Trump’s speech (included based on the justification that the rally was paid for by private funds) in which he emphasized the certification process, Smith added other language describing how Trump’s mob disrupted the vote certification over which Pence was presiding.

Everything italicized below is new.

86d. The Defendant specifically referenced the process by which electoral votes are counted during the proceeding, including by stating, “We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.”

[snip]

90. On the floor of the House of Representatives, the Vice President, in his role as President of the Senate, began the certification proceeding. At approximately 1:11 p.m., the Vice President opened the certificates of vote and certificates of ascertainment that the legitimate electors for the state of Arizona had mailed to Washington, consistent with the ECA. After a Congressman and Senator lodged an objection to Arizona’s certificates, the House and Senate retired to their separate chambers to debate the objection.

91. A mass of people-including individuals who had traveled to Washington and to
the Capitol at the Defendant’s direction-broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds and advanced on the building, including by violently attacking law enforcement officers trying to secure it.

92. Beginning around 1:30 p.m., the Defendant, who had returned to the White
House after concluding his remarks, settled in the dining room off of the Oval Office. He spent much of the afternoon reviewing Twitter on his phone, while the television in the dining room showed live events at Capitol.

93. At 2:13 p.m., after more than an hour of steady, violent advancement, the
crowd at the Capitol broke into the building, and forced the Senate to recess. At approximately 2:20 p.m., the official proceeding having been interrupted, staffers evacuating from the Senate carried with them the legitimate electors’ certificates of vote and their governors’ certificates of ascertainment. The House also was forced to recess.

94. At 2:24 p.m., the Defendant personally, without assistance, issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!”

95. One minute later, at 2:25 p.m., the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.

96. At the Capitol, throughout the afternoon, members of the crowd chanted, “Hang Mike Pence!”; “Where is Pence? Bring him out!”; and “Traitor Pence!”

This narrative ties the mob, particularly the storming of the Senate chamber, directly to Trump’s goal of interrupting the counting of the electoral certificates. This instrumentality was always a part of the indictment — has been part of this investigation since no later than January 5, 2022. But Roberts’ dual interventions in the January 6 prosecutions forced Smith and crime scene prosecutors working under US Attorney Matthew Graves to make it far more explicit.

A significant number of mobsters either knew the import of the certificates ahead of time, and/or heard Trump describe the goal at the Ellipse, and when they stormed the Capitol, assaulted cops, and occupied the space that the Vice President had only just evacuated, they had the goal of preventing the authentic certificates from being counted.

And Jack Smith is making this argument before Judge Chutkan even as other prosecutors are making a parallel argument before other judges.

As DOJ laid out in their filing describing how they plan to retry Matt Loganbill (who joined Alex Jones as he opened a second, eastern front on the attack on the Capitol) under the new Fischer standard, Loganbill had the goal of getting Pence to shred the envelopes as early as December 20, 2020, and after he stormed the Capitol, he headed towards the Senate where he believed they were counting the vote.

  • On December 20, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “This would take place Jan 6 Witnesses should be 60 feet away while Pence counts the Electoral College votes . . . Pence should open all the envelopes and then stack all the EC ballots in a pile, he should then shred all the envelopes and burn the shreds.” Gov. Ex. 302.47.
  • On December 30, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “CALL SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY’S OFFICE T O D A Y AND LET HIM KNOW YOU SUPPORT HIS INTENT TO BE THE FIRST REPUBLICAN SENATOR TO CHALLENGE THE ELECTORAL VOTE ON JANUARY 6.” Gov. Ex. 302.49.
  • On January 6, 2021, at 1:20 p.m., the defendant sent a text message, “Are you watching what’s going on in the house/ elector certification.” Gov. Ex. 303.
  • On January 7, 2021, the defendant replies to a comment by another person on Facebook saying, “Why do you think we were trying every means possible to stop these idiots from stealing the presidency and destroying this nation.” Gov. Ex. 302.65

Evidence at trial showed Loganbill entered the Capitol, the location where the Electoral College ballots were located and where Congress and the Vice President were conducting the official proceeding.6 Gov Exs 101.1 and 701. Once inside, the defendant proceeded towards the Senate, where Congress would be handing objections to the Electoral College vote – attempting to obstruct Congress’ certification of the Electoral College ballots. The defendant knew where he was going. The government admitted a Facebook post by the defendant on January 7 and 8, 2021, he wrote, “They didn’t [let us in] at the chamber, we could have over run them, after 10-15 minutes of back and forth, we walked out” and “The only place [the police officers] wouldn’t give was the hallway towards the Rep. chamber.” Gov Exs 302.66 and 302.82, respectively. The “chamber” and “Rep. chamber” were where the Vice President and members of Congress would have been counting and certifying the Electoral College ballots. Gov Ex 701

[snip]

From this evidence, including the defendant’s express statement related to the destruction of the electoral ballots, the Court would be able to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted to obstruct the certification of the electoral vote, and specifically, that he intended to, and attempted to, impair the integrity or availability of the votes (which are documents, records, or other things within the meaning of Fischer) under consideration by the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.

Of course, with any retrial, both parties would be permitted to introduce new evidence, or start the record over anew. Indeed, the government would likely introduce additional evidence related to the ballots and staffers attempts to remove the ballots from the chambers when the riot started.

6 According to the testimony of Captain Jessica Baboulis’ testimony, “[t]he official proceeding had suspended due to the presence of rioters on Capitol Grounds and inside the Capitol. ECF No. 31 at 23. As the Court said in its verdict, “It doesn’t matter to this count if he entered the building after the official proceeding had been suspended and Pence had been evacuated.” ECF No. 40 at 5. Loganbill attempted to and did obstruct the Electoral College vote, including the counting of ballots, the presence of members of Congress, and the presence of the Vice President.

Here’s how DOJ plans to prove that the Chilcoats, Shawndale and Donald, planned to prevent the votes from being counted by occupying the Senate.

[A]t approximately 2:46 p.m., the defendants watched rioters attempt to break open windows, then entered the Capitol building itself through a broken-open door on the building’s northwest side. A cell phone video shows that, after they learned of the breach, Donald Chilcoat cautioned Shawndale Chilcoat that they should let other rioters enter first. That way, if the police deployed pepper spray, those other rioters, and not the Chilcoats, would bear the brunt of it. In other words, the defendants knew they were not welcome, and they knew their entry might be met with force. After the defendants entered the building, they traveled to the Senate Chamber – the very place where the proceeding was taking place – and joined other rioters in occupying it. There, they took photographs and remained in the chamber while other rioters searched desks belonging to the former Vice President and to Senators.

Through their conduct, the defendants demonstrated an intent to invade and occupy the Capitol building and to stop the certification of the electoral college vote. And, critically, they were aware that this proceeding involved records, documents, or other things—specifically, the electoral votes that Congress was to consider. On January 4, 2021, via Facebook, a friend of Shawndale Chilcoat told her to “give Rob Portman a call and let him know what you think of him not rejecting the fraudulent votes.” Shawndale Chilcoat affirmed “just did.” Then, late on January 5 or early on January 6, Shawndale Chilcoat posted a message to Facebook saying that “[Vice President] Pence is stating he can not reject the votes.” On January 7, 2021, after the riot, Shawndale Chilcoat admitted “we were just trying to stop them from certifying the votes and didn’t know they were already gone.” On the same day, she also bragged, “[o]k so antifa is being blamed for breaking windows and storming congress. Um no, it was us I was with them and couldn’t be more proud.”

Here’s one of the most interesting things about yesterday’s superseding indictment.

The efforts to address Fischer are intertwined. While DOJ might be able to sustain some obstruction cases against rioters based on their own communications, and while Jack Smith might rescue this indictment with a focus on the effort to create fake elector certificates, Smith can only show that Trump almost got his Vice President assassinated if enough of the crime scene obstruction cases survive DC District review (and jury verdicts) such that Smith can show the mob was his instrument.

Jack Smith did things (describing that Trump was in his private Dining Room, not the Oval Office, noting that he sent the threatening Tweet with no assistance, labeling the rally a privately-funded speech, labeling Trump and Pence as candidates) that increase his chances of overcoming the presumption of immunity that John Roberts invented. But a number of judges (and some juries) are going to have to buy that a handful of members of the mob stormed the Capitol, and especially the Senate, with the intent of making it impossible to count vote for Joe Biden.

Here’s where things get interesting. As far as I’m aware, we have yet to see any of the superseding indictments for crime scene defendants against whom DOJ wants to sustain obstruction charges (we have seen superseding indictments against people against whom DOJ has replaced obstruction with something else, like rioting).

DOJ could have used a combined grand jury to do both, Trump and his mob. They’re each going to focus on the same issues: What staffers did to preserve the certificates as mobster came in, and the intent to prevent their counting.

They appear not to have done so; yesterday’s indictment lacks the date the grand jury was seated, which normal DC District grand juries have.

If that’s right, then Jack Smith (appears to have) seated a grand jury that could spend the next several months examining different charges, perhaps boosted by whatever precedents come out of the proceedings before Judge Chutkan and others, rather than simply sharing a grand jury with prosecutors doing much the same thing, addressing Fischer.

If Jack Smith succeeds in preserving this indictment — and that’s still a big *if* — then he will do so by making the argument that Trump, in his role as candidate, had the intention of using a mob to target the guy who played the ceremonial role of counting the vote. It would result in a collection of judicial holdings that presidential candidate Donald Trump had a mob target his Vice President in an attempt to remain President unlawfully.

Sure, John Roberts and his mob might yet try to overturn that. John Roberts might endorse the idea that presidential candidates, so long as they are the incumbent, can kill members of Congress to stay in power.

But doing so would clarify the absurdity of such a ruling.

Correction: Kyle Cheney reports that this is a grand jury seated last year. It has indicted other Jan6ers and so could do any 1512 indictments that require superseding.

Spirit of Revenge: John Roberts Says Joe Biden Can Demand an Investigation of Ginni Thomas

As I wrote in this post, John Roberts chose to cloak his radical opinion eliminating rule of law for Presidents by nodding to George Washington’s Farewell Address.

Our first President had such a perspective. In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the Nation that “a Government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of Liberty is indispensable.” 35 Writings of George Washington 226 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). A government “too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction,” he warned, could lead to the “frightful despotism” of “alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge.” Id., at 226–227. And the way to avoid that cycle, he explained, was to ensure that government powers remained “properly distributed and adjusted.” Id., at 226.

It is these enduring principles that guide our decision in this case.

As I showed, that was partly an attempt to spin the usurpation of Executive Branch prosecutorial authority between Administrations as, instead, protection of the separation of powers of co-equal branches.

But it was also an attempt to deploy Washington’s warnings against partisanship as if they counseled doing what Roberts was doing, rather than the opposite.

Roberts had the audacity, for example, to quote from a passage talking about how unbridled partisanship could lead to foreign influence, corruption, insurrection, and authoritarianism and suggest he was preventing that, rather than immunizing it.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and the duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. [my emphasis]

As I described in the initial release of Ball of Thread, the podcast I’m doing with LOLGOP, the Republicans on SCOTUS really believe Trump’s garbage claims that his prosecution was about revenge and despotism, rather than an effort to stave it off.

Trump has gotten people who claim to care about the country to view up as down, fascism as freedom.

Never mind that a court riddled with corruption scandals invoked the passage of the Farewell Address warning against it.

Between the shock of the overall holding and the obsession with Joe Biden’s poor debate, though, there has been little focus on an equally troubling part of Roberts’ opinion: one sanctioning the wholesale politicization of DOJ.

In the passage throwing out the charges involving Jeffrey Clark altogether, Roberts prohibits review of not just DOJ’s prosecutorial decisions (except, of course, when they involve a President’s predecessor, in which case DOJ has very constrained authority), but also of the President’s involvement in those decisions.

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. As we have explained, the President’s power to remove “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed” may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts. Myers, 272 U. S., at 106, 176; see supra, at 8. The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. App. 186–187, Indictment ¶10(c). And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority. Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. [my emphasis]

Here, Roberts turns the Take Care Clause on its head. Whereas conservative judge Karen Henderson viewed the Take Care Clause to require that the President obey the law, Roberts instead sees that as a source of permission for the President to demand investigations, even if they are proposed for an improper purpose.

In doing so, Roberts gives Joe Biden permission to demand an investigation of Ginni Thomas for the purpose of revenge against her spouse.

To be sure, in spite of Roberts’ expansive permission for President’s to politicize DOJ, there appear to be limits. Joe Biden cannot order the IRS to review whether Clarence Thomas has written off all the undeclared boondoggles Harlan Crow has given him.

One of the only laws specifically mention the President, it turns out, is 26 USC 7217, which prohibits certain people, including the President himself, from asking the IRS to take investigative action against a taxpayer.

(a)Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any applicable person to request, directly or indirectly, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or terminate an audit or other investigation of any particular taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer.

(b)Reporting requirement
Any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service receiving any request prohibited by subsection (a) shall report the receipt of such request to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration.

[snip]

(e)Applicable person
For purposes of this section, the term “applicable person” means—
(1)the President, the Vice President, any employee of the executive office of the President, and any employee of the executive office of the Vice President; and

This law could one day, in the not-too-distant future, come before the Justices. It could even do so in the specific context at issue here, Donald Trump’s pressure on Jeffrey Rosen on December 27, 2020.

That’s because, as laid out in Hunter Biden’s selective and vindictive prosecution claim, in the very same conversation where Trump demanded that DOJ make false claims about election fraud, he also pressured Rosen to investigate Hunter Biden “for real.”

On December 27, 2020, then Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue took handwritten notes of a call with President Trump and then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, showing that Mr. Trump had instructed Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue to “figure out what to do with H[unter] Biden” and indicating that Mr. Trump insisted “people will criticize the DOJ if he’s not investigated for real.”57

57 Dec. 27, 2020 Handwritten Notes of Richard Donoghue Released by H. Oversight Comm. at 4 (emphasis added), www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-richard-donoghue-s-handwrittennotes-on-trump-rosen-calls/cdc5a621-dfd1-440d-8dea-33a06ad753c8; see also Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue at 56 (Oct. 1, 2021), H. Oversight Comm., https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-TRANSCRIPT-CTRL0000034600/pdf/GPO-J6- TRANSCRIPT-CTRL0000034600.pdf.

Hunter Biden’s as-applied challenge to his gun charges are more likely to get to SCOTUS and do so more quickly.

But his prosecution, with the President privately and publicly intervening both as President and as candidate to replace his father raises fairly unprecedented questions about the due process rights of a person whom the President has demanded be investigated for the purpose of revenge.

Until such a case gets reviewed, however, John Roberts has invited Joe Biden to call up Merrick Garland and demand not just that DOJ open an investigation into Ginni Thomas, but to appoint a Special Counsel who could continue the investigation for the foreseeable future.

By refusing all review of improper pressure on the Attorney General, John Roberts has not eliminated the risk of revenge and despotism.

He has, rather, sanctioned it.

Chief Justice John Roberts Just Invited President Biden to Pardon Nicholas Roske

Since Republicans on the Supreme Court voted to make Presidents king yesterday, I’ve been thinking about ways to reverse the decision.

Some of those ways (like expanding the court) are structural, long term, and involve winning both the presidency and Senate in November by good margins.

But another way is to get the court to recognize how insane their ruling was in practice, to encourage them to moderate their order, as they did by using the Rahimi decision to moderate their Bruen insanity.

Another way is to use the pretrial hearings on what counts as official and unofficial conduct as a way to demonstrate the problem with the decision. Since any decisions Tanya Chutkan makes will come back to SCOTUS, they will have to review their handiwork.

But the one I keep thinking of is action President Biden can take that would demonstrate to the Justices the problem with their decision.

Some such actions would be symbolic: Biden can order the military to use military planes to fly women needing abortions in states where it is banned for necessary medical care, for example. Acting as Commander in Chief, his power would be at its zenith.

On Bluesky, someone recommended selling Willie Nelson a pardon — one guitar — for smoking marijuana in a National Park in a state where pot is legal.

But the most symbolic way that President Biden could convey the insanity of yesterday’s decision would be to pardon Nicholas Roske. Roske is the suicidal man who, in June 2022, flew to Maryland with vague plans but real weapons to assassinate Brett Kavanaugh. Since he filed a suppression motion for admissions he made after his arrest, he and the government have been discussing a plea.

Let me be clear: I don’t think it would be wise to pardon Roske. Biden has the unreviewable authority to do so, but it would be stupid to do so. While Roske seems he is mentally ill, he nevertheless armed himself and took steps that put Justice Kavanaugh in danger.

But Roske is exactly the kind of menace that John Roberts just immunized yesterday.

The weapons Roske armed himself with — including a Glock, pepper spray, zip ties, a hammer, a screw driver, a nail punch, a crow bar, and duct tape — were precisely the kinds of things with which January 6ers armed themselves when they attacked the Capitol and threatened to kill Mike Pence, Nancy Pelosi, and Mitch McConnell. Many January 6ers, like Roske, suffer from mental illnesses. Like Roske, many Jan6ers were trying to give their life meaning.

The only thing that makes Roske different is that he wasn’t sent by a political candidate trying to get elected.

Still, Roske is always used, especially by Congressional Republicans, to describe the unique danger the Justices face.

There would be no better way for Biden to make it clear to the Justices what kind of danger they have blessed than to pardon Roske (for which, again, I’m not advocating).

With their ruling yesterday, the Justices have said that Members of Congress, Biden voters, and democracy itself must face similar threats without recourse. And one way to make that clear would be to pardon Roske.

Justice Roberts’ Drone Strike on George Washington’s Legacy

Chief Justice John Roberts cloaked his radical opinion granting Presidents broad immunity in the Farewell Address of George Washington, normally celebrated as the codification of the peaceful cession of power, the humility of the role of the President.

Our first President had such a perspective. In his Farewell Address, George Washington reminded the Nation that “a Government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of Liberty is indispensable.” 35 Writings of George Washington 226 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). A government “too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction,” he warned, could lead to the “frightful despotism” of “alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge.” Id., at 226–227. And the way to avoid that cycle, he explained, was to ensure that government powers remained “properly distributed and adjusted.” Id., at 226.

It is these enduring principles that guide our decision in this case.

But Roberts instead focuses on Washington’s warning against factionalism — and from there, to a claim to honor separation of powers.

Never mind that, as Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson notes, Roberts’ opinion instead radically altered the balance of powers, which (adopting Washington’s logic) will arguably feed factionalism.

It is important to note that the majority reframes the immunity question presented here as a separation of powers concern that is compelled by Article II—as if what is being asked is whether Congress can criminalize executive prerogatives. See, e.g., ante, at 6–7; see also ante, at 1– 2 (BARRETT, J., concurring in part). But that is not anywhere close to what is happening in this case. No one maintains that Congress has passed a law that specifically criminalizes the President’s use of any power that the Constitution vests exclusively in the Executive, much less that the Judiciary is being conscripted to adjudicate the propriety of such a statute. To the contrary, the indictment here invokes criminal statutes of general applicability that everyone is supposed to follow, both on and off the job. So, the real question is: Can the President, too, be held accountable for committing crimes while he is undertaking his official duties? The nature of his authority under Article II (whether conclusive and preclusive, or shared with Congress, or otherwise) is entirely beside the point.

Plus, by my read, the only separation of powers that Roberts really cares about is that between one Executive and his successor. Roberts is, in actuality, usurping the Article II authority of DOJ to prosecute crimes exclusively in the case of a former President, adopting that power to the judiciary.

Roberts’ opinion does that even while it permits the sitting President to use the trappings of DOJ against everyone but his predecessor, with personal presidential involvement. All the abuses of the Trump DOJ? The revenge prosecution of Greg Craig, Michael Sussmann, and Igor Danchenko? All cool with John Roberts. The use of DOJ resources to have an FBI informant frame Joe Biden? Still totally cool. Not revenge. Just the President doing what he’s empowered to do.

But it’s that more cherished precedent Washington set, of the transfer of power rather than kings, that Roberts has done real violence to.

Consider what happened to Blassingame — the DC Circuit opinion holding that a former President can be sued for actions taken in his role as candidate for office — in this opinion.

Blassingame was mentioned repeatedly in the argument of this case, 16 times, often when a Republican who joined Roberts’ opinion today queried John Sauer if he agreed with it.

It came up when Clarence Thomas asked whether Sauer accepted the function of a candidate to be a private act — with which he mostly agreed and then backtracked somewhat.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Sauer, in assessing the official acts of a president, do you differentiate between the president acting as president and the president acting as candidate?

MR. SAUER: Yes, we do. And we don’t dispute essentially the Blassingame discussion of that.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Okay. Now —

MR. SAUER: But, of course, that has to be done by objective determinations, not by looking at what was the purpose of what you did this, and that’s the most important point there.

It came up when Neil Gorsuch queried Sauer about it (in which case Sauer adopted former Trump White House Counsel Greg Katsas’ more narrow holding on it).

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And then the question becomes, as we’ve been exploring here today a little bit, about how to segregate private from official conduct that may or may not enjoy some immunity, and we — I’m sure we’re going to spend a lot of time exploring that. But the D.C. Circuit in Blassingame, the chief judge there, joined by the panel, expressed some views about how to segregate private conduct for which no man is above the law from official acts. Do you have any thoughts about the test that they came up with there?

MR. SAUER: Yes. We think, in the main, that test, especially if it’s understood through the lens of Judge Katsas’ separate opinion, is a very persuasive test. It would be a great source for this Court to rely on in drawing this line. And it emphasizes the breadth of that test. It talks about how actions that are, you know, plausibly connected to the president’s official duties are official acts. And it also emphasizes that if it’s a close case or it appears there’s considerations on the other side, that also should be treated as immune. Those are the — the aspects of that that we’d emphasize as potentially guiding the Court’s discretion.

Gorsuch would go on to question Dreeben about Blassingame at length.

It came up when John Kavanaugh invited Sauer to rewrite Blassingame, and Sauer largely declined.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Where — where do you think the D.C. Circuit went wrong in how it determined what was official versus what’s personal?

MR. SAUER: Well, I read — I read the opinion below in this particular case as adopting a categorical view. It does not matter, is the logic of their — their opinion because there is no immunity for official acts and, therefore, you know, that’s the end of the story. I don’t really think they went wrong in Blassingame in the civil context when they engaged in the same determination with respect to what’s official and what isn’t official. There, we agree with most of what that opinion said.

And it came up when Sammy Alito asked John Sauer if he’d like an order saying that the President was immune unless there was no possible justification, in which case Sauer raised Blassingame, and Alito shifted from analysis of official and unofficial.

JUSTICE ALITO: But what if it were not — what if it did not involve any subjective element, it was purely objective? You would look objectively at the various relevant factors? MR. SAUER: That sounds to me a lot like Blassingame and especially viewed through the lens of Judge Katsas’ separate opinion, and that may not be different than what we’re proposing to the Court today.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Blassingame had to do with the difference between official conduct and private conduct, right?

MR. SAUER: That’s correct. I — I understood the Court to be asking that.

JUSTICE ALITO: No. This — this would apply — and it’s just a possibility. I don’t know whether it’s a good idea or a bad idea or whether it can be derived from the structure of the Constitution or the Vesting Clause or any other source. But this would be applied in a purely objective — on purely objective grounds when the president invokes an official power in taking the action that is at issue?

MR. SAUER: Yes, I believe — the reason I think of Blassingame is because it talks about an objective context-specific determination to winnow out what’s official and what is purely private conduct, and, again, in a — with a strong degree of deference to what — and, therefore, you know, that’s the end of the story. I don’t really think they went wrong in Blassingame in the civil context when they engaged in the same determination with respect to what’s official and what isn’t official. There, we agree with most of what that opinion said.

You might be justified in thinking that Blassingame would be central to today’s ruling, not least because the charged crimes are the same ones as the complaints alleged in Blassingame.

The central holding of Blassingame, however, is gone.

Blassingame appears just three times in the opinion rendered today. Roberts uses it as a limiting factor.

But the breadth of the President’s “discretionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United States “in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive,” frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innumerable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.” Id., at 756. And some Presidential conduct—for example, speaking to and on behalf of the American people, see Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 701 (2018)—certainly can qualify as official even when not obviously connected to a particular constitutional or statutory provision. For those reasons, the immunity we have recognized extends to the “outer perimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” Blassingame v. Trump, 87

Sonia Sotomayor notes that Roberts has used it as a limiting factor, then notes he has also eliminated any analysis of motive.

In fact, the majority’s dividing line between “official” and “unofficial” conduct narrows the conduct considered “unofficial” almost to a nullity. It says that whenever the President acts in a way that is “‘not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority,’” he is taking official action. Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023)). It then goes a step further: “In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives.” Ante, at 18.

Jackson makes a similar observation.

At most, to distinguish official from unofficial conduct, the majority advises asking whether the former President’s conduct was “‘manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.’” Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023)).

There’s not even much discussion of Trump’s role as a candidate! Roberts raises it, and then says Trump’s electioneering tweets might serve some other purpose.

There may, however, be contexts in which the President, notwithstanding the prominence of his position, speaks in an unofficial capacity—perhaps as a candidate for office or party leader. To the extent that may be the case, objective analysis of “content, form, and context” will necessarily inform the inquiry. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 453 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “there is not always a clear line between [the President’s] personal and official affairs.” Mazars, 591 U. S., at 868. The analysis therefore must be fact specific and may prove to be challenging.

The indictment reflects these challenges. It includes only select Tweets and brief snippets of the speech Trump delivered on the morning of January 6, omitting its full text or context. See App. 228–230, Indictment ¶104. Whether the Tweets, that speech, and Trump’s other communications on January 6 involve official conduct may depend on the content and context of each. Knowing, for instance, what else was said contemporaneous to the excerpted communications, or who was involved in transmitting the electronic communications and in organizing the rally, could be relevant to the classification of each communication.

In ruling (unsurprisingly) that the Jeffrey Clark allegations have to be thrown out, Roberts goes further, and reads the Executive Branch interest in policing election crime to extend to making false claims about the election.

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8)

And when entertaining Trump’s claims that his interference in state and congress’ role were just an effort to protect the integrity of the election, Roberts thumbs both the scale and the facts again, using the Take Care clause as a shield rather than the sword that Judge Karen Henderson viewed it as.

On Trump’s view, the alleged conduct qualifies as official because it was undertaken to ensure the integrity and proper administration of the federal election. Of course, the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” plainly encompasses enforcement of federal election laws passed by Congress. Art. II, §3. And the President’s broad power to speak on matters of public concern does not exclude his public communications regarding the fairness and integrity of federal elections simply because he is running for re-election. Cf. Hawaii, 585 U. S., at 701. Similarly, the President may speak on and discuss such matters with state officials—even when no specific federal responsibility requires his communication—to encourage them to act in a manner that promotes the President’s view of the public good.

Even when conceding that Trump was pressuring Mike Pence as President of the Senate, not as his Vice President, when he was threatening to have him assassinated, Roberts suggests this is a close call, because Trump has to be able to pressure the President of the Senate to get legislation passed.

The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. When the Vice President presides over the January 6 certification proceeding, he does so in his capacity as President of the Senate. Ibid. Despite the Vice President’s expansive role of advising and assisting the President within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s Article I responsibility of “presiding over the Senate” is “not an ‘executive branch’ function.” Memorandum from L. Silberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., to R. Burress, Office of the President, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising Out of the President’s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller To Be Vice President Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 2 (Aug. 28, 1974). With respect to the certification proceeding in particular, Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes, see, e.g., 3 U. S. C. §15, and the President plays no direct constitutional or statutory role in that process. So the Government may argue that consideration of the President’s communications with the Vice President concerning the certification proceeding does not pose “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754; see supra, at 14.

At the same time, however, the President may frequently rely on the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate to advance the President’s agenda in Congress. When the Senate is closely divided, for instance, the Vice President’s tiebreaking vote may be crucial for confirming the President’s nominees and passing laws that align with the President’s policies. Applying a criminal prohibition to the President’s conversations discussing such matters with the Vice President—even though they concern his role as President of the Senate—may well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitutional functions.

It is ultimately the Government’s burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.

Over and over again, then, Roberts has applied his new standard — whether anything might conceivably intrude on the functions of the Presidency — to immunize usurping Congress’ (and states’) role in certifying the election.

What John Roberts has done — at least preliminarily — is carve out an Executive authority so broad that in every area where the President is explicitly excluded, even in the role of candidate-for-President, the President can still act with absolute immunity.

That authorizes the President to use all the powers of the Presidency to win re-election — precisely the opposite holding of what Blassingame adopted.

In an opinion that tries to cloak his power grab with an appeal to President Washington, John Roberts has suffocated the greatest thing Washington gave the United States, the presumption that Presidential powers would cede to the power of elections.