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Donald Trump Confesses He Can’t Distinguish His Own Influence Ops from that of a Russian Spy

To understand the startling confession at the core of Donald Trump’s motion to compel discovery submitted last night, it helps to read a caveat included in Trump’s discovery request, but not included in this motion.

In a letter requesting the same things described in the motion to compel in discovery, Trump’s team admitted it was using a different definition of “foreign influence” than the one he himself adopted in Executive Order 13848 requiring the Intelligence Community to provide a report on any, “foreign interference that targeted election infrastructure materially affect[ing] the security or integrity of that infrastructure, the tabulation of votes, or the timely transmission of election results.”

Rather than just reports of attempts to tamper with election infrastructure to alter the vote count, Trump intended his discovery request to include efforts by foreign governments and non-state actors to influence US policy.

As used herein, the term “foreign influence” is broader than the definition of the term “foreign interference” in Executive Order 13848 and includes any overt or covert effort by foreign governments and non-state actors, as well as agents and associates of foreign governments and non-state actors, intended to affect directly or indirectly a US person or policy or process of any federal, state, or local government actor or agency in the United States.

A vast majority of Trump’s discovery requests claim to need backup about intelligence on potential compromises that could not have affected the election tabulation. Not a single one in the 37-page motion addresses the specific lies the January 6 indictment accuses him of telling:

dozens of specific claims that there had been substantial fraud in certain states, such as that large numbers of dead, non-resident, non-citizen, or otherwise ineligible voters had cast ballots, or that voting machines had changed votes for the Defendant to votes for Biden.

Here are some of the totally irrelevant things Trump is demanding:

  • The classified backup to the 2016 Intelligence Community assessment, which Trump claims was the source of his purported genuine concern about elections that led him to issue Executive Order 13848, when instead he was probably attempting to stave off a law, proposed by Marco Rubio and Chris Van Hollen, requiring stronger election protection measures
  • The backup to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency statement asserting that the election was the most secure in history (which led Trump to fire Chris Krebs by Tweet)
  • Details about the Solar Winds hack, which was made public after the CISA statement, and which is not known to have compromised any election infrastructure, but which Patrick Byrne offered as an excuse in real time to start seizing voting machines
  • Debates about the findings in the 2020 election report ultimately released that pertain to China’s influence operations, not interference operations
  • Details of a January 2 briefing John Ratcliffe gave Jeffrey Clark (which is not described in the indictment), which Trump insinuates is the reason that Clark strengthened language about election irregularities totally unrelated to the things described in the election report, even though — as the indictment notes — Ratcliffe, “disabused the Defendant of the notion that the Intelligence Community’s findings regarding foreign interference would change the outcome of the election”
  • The FISA Court opinion describing improper efforts to query 702 information regarding possible foreign influence — possibly directed at things like Nick Fuentes’ cryptocurrency donation and Charles Bausman’s ties to Russia — which wouldn’t have affected Trump’s lies at all

Not a single one of these items pertains to whether Ruby Freeman added votes in Fulton County, Georgia, whether 10,000 dead people voted in one or another state, whether non-citizens voted in Arizona, whether there was a vote dump of 149,772 illegal votes in Detroit, whether Pennsylvania received 700,000 more absentee ballots than they had sent out.

That is, not a single one of Trump’s main demands pertains to the specific lies he is accused of telling.

This stunt might have been effective if Trump were charged with moving to seize voting machines after the famous December 18 meeting, at which Byrne and Sidney Powell urged Trump to use EO 13848 and the discovery of the Solar Winds hack to seize voting machines. But that’s not in the indictment — the famed meeting is unmentioned. As I’ve previously noted, Powell is only in the indictment for the way in which Trump adhere to her views about Dominion, not for the December 18 meeting. In this request, Trump repeats an earlier request for investigations into Dominion in passing, but focuses his attention instead on Solar Winds.

Instead of asking for evidence pertaining to the actual lies Trump told, Trump argues that because he had the same goal and effect that Russia pursued in 2016 — to erode faith in democracy — it somehow means his own lies weren’t cynical, knowing lies.

Moreover, whereas the Special Counsel’s Office falsely alleges that President Trump “erode[d] public faith in the administration of the election,” the 2016 Election ICA uses strikingly similar language to attribute the origins of that erosion to foreign influence—that is, foreign efforts to “undermine public faith in the US democratic process.” Compare Indictment ¶ 2, with Ex. A at 1; see also id. at 6 (describing “Kremlin-directed campaign to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest”).

The problem is that the lies Russia and Trump told in common in 2020 — primarily a false claim that Joe Biden corruptly fired a Ukrainian prosecutor — don’t have anything to do with the specific lies that Trump told to mobilize thousands of his followers to attack the Capitol.

That both Russia and Trump want to undermine democracy is not a specific defense to the charges against him.

The MAGA Tourist Geofence and the Violent Confederate Flag-Toting Geofence

By my rough count, Judge Tanya Chutkan has presided over the cases of more than 25 January 6 defendants, in addition to Donald Trump. Nevertheless, Trump keeps trying to lecture Chutkan about what happened, often by pointing to reports from journalists who have not otherwise covered the investigation closely.

Contrary to their false claims about how much video she has seen, Judge Chutkan knows these details far better than Trump’s attorneys.

For example, Trump keeps pointing to a December 2021 piece from Will Arkin to argue, using very dated numbers regarding the investigation, just one percent of his mobsters qualify as insurrectionists.

The Secret Service and the FBI estimated that at least 120,000 Americans gathered on the Mall for President Trump’s speech. 6 Government agencies estimated that about 1,200 people—at most 1% of the size of the crowd gathered to listen to President Trump—entered the Capitol, and a smaller percentage than that committed violent acts. 7 Thus, we can easily conclude that well over 99% of the attendees at President Trump’s speech did not engage in the events at the Capitol. Moreover, as the Indictment recognizes, a crowd had gathered at the Capitol before President Trump finished speaking, further proving he had nothing to do with those events.

6 William M. Arkin, Exclusive: Classified Documents Reveal the Number of January 6 Protestors, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2021), at https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-classified-documentsreveal-number-january-6-protestors-1661296. The January 6 Committee estimated the crowd on the Mall at 53,000, while President Trump estimated it at 250,000. Compare Final Report, SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL (Dec. 22, 2022), 585, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/pdf/GPO-J6-REPORT.pdf with Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial, NPR (Feb. 10, 2021), at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-ofimpeachment-trial (emphasis added).

7 Id. (“[T]he facts seem to indicate that as few as one percent of the people who were there fit the label of insurrectionist.”).

There are a slew of problematic assumptions in Arkin’s piece (as well as the follow-up piece that appears to be the actual source cited in footnote 7): about the relationship between militias and others, about the role of non-militia organized groups like QAnon or anti-vaxxers, about the role and increasing percentage of military participants.

The most important misconception is that only people who entered the building, as distinct from the often more violent crowds outside it or Proud Boy seditionists orchestrating things from afar, could be an insurrectionist.

Plus, Arkin’s 2021 numbers were outdated at the time — most outlets put the number of insiders at 2,000 to 2,500 at the one year anniversary and the Sedition Hunters have identified 3,200 specific people who went inside the Capitol (though this includes people, including at least one WaPo journalist, who weren’t rioters).

Given Trump’s reliance on such outdated numbers, however, I wanted to look at a filing in the latest challenge to one of the geofence warrants used in the investigation, this time from Isreal Easterday, a Confederate-flag toting rioter who sprayed two cops before entering the Capitol through the east door.

There have already been two failed challenges to geofence warrants used in the investigation. In August 2022, then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell rejected Matthew Bledsoe’s challenge to a geofence of those who live streamed to Facebook during the riot; he is appealing his conviction, but not that ruling. In January, then-presiding FISA Judge Rudolph Contreras rejected David Rhine’s challenge to the Google geofence tied to voluntary use of Google’s Location History service (there’s no FISA component to this, but FISA judges see more novel Fourth Amendment issues). Rhine does appear to be including that ruling in his appeal, in which his initial brief is due in February.

Like Rhine, Easterday is challenging the Google geofence, but from a Fourth Amendment standpoint, he is different than Rhine in two key ways. First, the investigation into Rhine started from some tips called in as early as January 10, 2021; the FBI didn’t need the Google geofence to find him, though it made it easier to pinpoint video of his path through the Capitol.

With Easterday (probably because two distinctive aspects of his appearance changed that day — he dropped his flag and took off his hat — making it harder to track him), the first really good lead on his identity was the geofence.

The second difference between Rhine and Easterday arises from the technicalities of how the FBI did the geofence.

The FBI did three rounds of geofence with Google. In the first, starting with a January 13, 2021 warrant to Google, they:

  • Obtained the identifiers for all the phones that hit the geofence during the riot
  • Took out the identifiers that were present in the building in the 15 minutes before and after the riot (assuming those were people who were lawfully present in the Capitol)
  • Sorted out hits that were in places (for example, areas where surveillance footage showed no rioters to be present) inconsistent with unlawful activity
  • Eliminated identifiers without at least one hit entirely within the Capitol factoring in margin-of-error radius
  • Added back in identifiers with lower confidence radius that deleted Location History with the week after the attack
  • Asked Google to deanonymize that data

For the second round, they submitted a second request for deanonymization on April 14, based on the logic that those for whom there were only low confidence hits within the Capitol would be high confidence hits for the larger restricted area.

Based on the same logic, on May 21, 2021, the FBI obtained a second geofence warrant to include (per Easterday’s filings) the entire restricted area on January 6.

This time, to cull the data, they:

  • Obtained the identifier for all the phones that hit the geofence during the riot
  • Removed identifiers previously deanonymized
  • Took out the lawfully present identifiers either voluntarily identified by Congressional offices or obtained by law enforcement
  • Removed identifiers present in the 15 minutes before or after the riot
  • Eliminated identifiers without at least one hit entirely within the restricted grounds
  • Asked Google to deanonymize that data

Rhine’s phone identifier was included in the first batch of identifiers the FBI asked to be deanonymized, a group of about 1,500 identifiers; Easterday’s was not. His phone was included in the second batch deanonymized, an additional 2,200 identifiers obtained in the first warrant. His phone was also IDed in the second warrant, but by that point had already been deanonymized.

The details of how the Google geofence worked were described in filings in the Rhine case (see this post and this post), but because Easterday was not identified until the second batch, the second cull gets more attention in Easterday’s filings.

Easterday did enter the Capitol. There are pictures of him wandering hallways and stairs. On October 26, a jury convicted him of trespassing inside the Capitol, 40 USC 5104, along with the more serious assault and riot felonies he committed outside the building.

Easterday was only inside the Capitol itself for 12 minutes — he entered at 2:39 and exited at 2:51; Easterday entered three minutes before Rhine but left 13 minutes before Rhine. But he would have been at the east door — not inside the Capitol, but helping to violently break into it — for at least 22 minutes; the assault on one of the cops was captured in video that starts at 2:17.

There are a number of possible explanations for why Easterday phone would not have had a high confidence hit inside the Capitol geofence but did trigger the broadened geofence. For example, the original hit or hits on Easterday’s phone may have been in a location (such as the east door) where the confidence radius of the location was partially outside the Capitol itself. Some of the relevant hits were surely entirely within that area outside the Capitol but inside the restricted area that day. As the government noted in their response to this challenge, being in that area was also a trespassing crime, 18 USC 1752, even if DOJ charged fewer of the people who were in that area. The jury convicted Easterday of that crime, too.

The government provided a supplement answering specific questions Chief Judge James Boasberg posed after the guilty verdict that provides more possible explanations why Easterday did not trigger the geofence within the building at high confidence. For example, it describes that iPhones capture a lot less activity in Location History than Androids do.

[Location History] is sometimes collected automatically, but is primarily and most frequently collected when a user is doing something with his or her device that specifically involves location information (such as following Google Maps directions or taking photographs or videos that record location as part of their metadata).

Moreover, in the government’s experience examining Google LH returns, the range of activities that generate a LH point is narrower on Apple’s iPhones than Android phones. Apple iPhones apparently collect LH data primarily when the user is specifically using Google Maps.

[snip]

In contrast, Android phones can collect LH data when the user uses a wider array of Google-based applications, or even when the device is not in use at all, such as when it is sitting on a user’s bedside table overnight. Additionally, if an Android phone detects that a user is moving, the Android phone specifically and automatically requests location data from the server about every two minutes, leading to a LH data point being collected by Google. However, if the phone determines that the user is standing relatively still, or remaining within the same Wi-Fi network’s range, Android phones will request location data much less frequently, as the phone is effectively not moving. Similarly, devices will not automatically request location data from the server—or will do so less frequently—when they are low on battery.

Easterday appears to have made a call while inside the building (which would trigger a different kind of location data, but data that DOJ only obtained with individualized warrants), but that’s less likely to be captured in Location History than taking a picture would.

Judge Boasberg’s request for more information — an order he made after the guilty verdict — appears to stem, in significant part, from the fact that FBI’s initial exclusion set of 215 people is obviously a mere fraction of the people who were lawfully in the Capitol that day.

(2) how could the Control List searches for the Initial Google Geofence Warrant have generated hits for only 215 unique devices/accounts when Google applications are so ubiquitous and presumably between 1,500-2,000 people were lawfully present in the Capitol building in the time periods before and after the riot?

It its earlier filings, DOJ used a dated stat that only 30% of Google users actually use the Location History service, a service that takes several steps to turn on. In this filing, DOJ argues that as the proportion of iPhone users increase, the number of people who trigger Location History will be smaller still, unless they’re using Google maps.

Boasberg is suggesting (and DOJ is not contesting) that their initial exclusion effort may only have included about 15% of those lawfully in the Capitol. While there would be some subset of people lawfully present who weren’t excluded in the first batch (people who were not moving in the 15 minutes before and after but who fled or took pictures during the riot, for example), this filing suggests all these numbers are low — very low.

If just one third of the people who entered the building could be expected to trigger the Google geofence, then the number who entered may be well over 4,000 (a reasonable number given the number Sedition Hunters have IDed).

If just a third of the people who were at the Capitol but not necessarily taking pictures inside it triggered the Google geofence, that number might be closer to 7,000 additional bodies, including those assaulting cops. And there could be another 23,000 people outside the Capitol — some no more than MAGA tourists, but others among the most violent people that day.

Using the Arkin numbers that were outdated when he published them in December 2021, Trump claims that, “we can easily conclude that well over 99% of the attendees at President Trump’s speech did not engage in the events at the Capitol.”

That’s not what the geofence shows. Using the same 120,000 number he uses for his own calculations, about one in ten were right at the building and a quarter may have made it to restricted ground, and the numbers could be double that.

One thing is clear though: the violent mobsters literally carrying the banner of insurrection as they attack cops may not be the ones you’ll find taking pictures inside the Capitol. And once you figure that out, the numbers of potential Trump insurrectionists starts to grow.

And Judge Chutkan knows that.

Take, Robert Palmer, whom Trump raised to complain that Chutkan had presided over the prosecution of someone who said he went to the Capitol at Trump’s behest, where he serially assaulted cops because he believed he needed to stop the voter certification. Robert Palmer never entered the Capitol. But it’s quite clear he believes Trump sent him.

Update: Distinguished between the two trespassing crimes to show one can be applied to both locations.

Timeline Easterday Google Geofence Challenge

June 30, 2023: Motion to Compel, Declaration

August 22, 2023: Opposition Motion to Compel

September 26, 2023: Motion to Suppress Geofence

October 10, 2023: Opposition Motion to Suppress

October 17, 2023: Reply Motion to Suppress

October 26, 2023: Guilty Verdict

November 25, 2023: Supplement Opposition Motion to Suppress

The Former President’s Spaghetti-Wall Assault on the Truth

Donald Trump’s team has submitted its reply briefs on motions to dismiss:

I reiterate the analysis I have made here and here: these motions (plus the Motion to Strike that Judge Chutkan already rejected), taken together, don’t so much attempt to argue about Trump’s conduct. Instead, they try to separate out the conspiracies alleged and the mob that was central to it from a claim that Trump has a right to lie, a right to repeat false claims about the 2020 election no matter how many times those false claims have been debunked in court.

Trump made no effort to address certain key claims. As one example, Trump didn’t mention prosecutors’ observation that Trump couldn’t have a Double Jeopardy claim from Impeachment given that this indictment does not charge him with what Congress did, incitement.

Perhaps recognizing what I pointed out here — that Trump had simply ignored the way in which he used the mob to obstruct the vote certification, he includes a new section in it. But it was lifted from his reply brief on the Motion to Strike that already failed.

January 6.

The prosecution next repeats its false claim that President Trump “directed a large crowd of supporters, whom he knew to be ‘angry’ based on his election fraud lies, to go to the Capitol and obstruct the proceeding.” Doc. 139, at 19. But the indictment does not charge President Trump with any responsibility for the events of January 6, and rightly so. As set forth in detail in Doc. 156, President Trump encouraged the crowd marching to the Capitol to “peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard” and to “cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women.”6 President Trump made clear that he expected to watch the electoral certification proceedings take place as planned that day. Id. And President Trump repeatedly denounced destruction of monuments and other symbols of American democracy, and he reminded the crowd that criminal penalties he signed into law for such actions. Id.

As the indictment itself alleges, the crowd gathered at the Capitol before President Trump finished speaking. Doc. 1, ¶ 107. The crowd already at the Capitol “broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds and advanced on the building” while President Trump was speaking. See id. The indictment does not mention that the 1,200 people who entered the Capitol was less than 1% the size of the crowd gathered to listen to President Trump, and that at least 99% of the crowd gathered to listen to President Trump did not enter the Capitol. William M. Arkin, Exclusive: Classified Documents Reveal the Number of January 6 Protestors, NEWSWEEK (Dec 23, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-classified-documents-reveal-number-january6-protestors-1661296. 7

And having belatedly attempted to address the mob, Trump nevertheless shamelessly claimed that the people he lied to were sophisticated enough to see through his lies.

President’s Trump’s listeners—including the sophisticated elected officials described in the indictment—were free to agree or disagree with President Trump’s views, and the prosecution does not allege otherwise.

Hundreds of January 6 defendants — conservatively — have explained that they pissed away their lives that day because they believed Trump’s lies. Trump’s reply briefs effectively amount to the argument that his First Amendment rights extend to being completely unmoored from any anchor to the truth, his First Amendment rights permit him to deliberately unmoor the truth to mobilize an attack on the country.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, I came away from a quick read of these filings exhausted, the exhaustion deliberately cultivated by the gaslighter. I could — I still might — go back and unpack every one of the gimmicks his attorneys have thrown at Judge Chutkan, like spaghetti at a wall. But ultimately it amounts to a demand that Trump be treated not just as above the law that the hundreds of his mobsters have already been held accountable to, but also above the truth.

DC Circuit Likely To Narrow Judge Chutkan Gag

Ruby Freeman was not a public figure until Donald Trump and Rudy Giuliani made her one, until they turned her into the villain of their feverish conspiracy theories about black women and voting. But early on in the appellate hearing on Judge Tanya Chutkan’s gag in the January 6 trial, Trump’s attorney John Sauer claimed there were no people covered by the gag who were not public persons.

That will become important if, as I suspect, the DC Circuit panel of Patricia Millett, Cornelia Pillard, and Bradley Garcia, upholds Judge Chutkan’s gag, but narrows it with regards to public persons. I suspect the court will throw out the gag on Trump comments about prosecutors (but not their family), limit the gag about public people like Mark Milley and Mike Pence to specifics about this trial, but adopt the gag as is for non-public people like Freeman.

Then we’ll have a fight about who counts as a public figure or not.

The most striking thing about the hearing, however, was how aggressively Trump attorney John Sauer dodged any accountability for his client. The judges, especially Millett, asked him a series of hypotheticals to try to get him to lay out a standard that wouldn’t fall astray of the First Amendment. And Sauer kept getting cornered saying, basically, only the clear harm standard could apply to a gag on his client’s speech. Effectively, he was saying that Trump has to be criminally charged with witness tampering rather than gagged. At one point, Sauer suggested that Trump must be permitted to wage this case in the public sphere, that there can be no consideration for the public interest in a fair trial. In another, he got awfully close to arguing that Trump should be treated as a stranger to this case, meaning no restrictions could be imposed, rather than the accused defendant. In a third, Sauer suggested that Trump must be permitted to run for election on a campaign of threats against his adversaries. Over and over, Sauer argued that Trump should be permitted to say things publicly — at campaign rallies or on his failing Social Media site — that Sauer he agreed would be prohibited under the gag order if he did it on the phone with a witness.

I doubt this will be a winning argument before the DC Circuit. But Sauer is really making a play for Clarence Thomas and Sam Alito, not Patricia Millett.

Update: Fixed reference to Sauer as Lauro.

Trump Continues to Disavow the Mob that Sacrificed Their Lives for Him

As I have shown, Trump’s collective motions to dismiss his January 6 indictment selectively treat the five means alleged in the indictment (pressuring states, the fake elector plot, using Jeffrey Clark, pressuring Pence, and exploiting the mob), never actually dealing with all five as charged.

Rather than addressing the fifth, Mob (“directing supporters to the Capitol to obstruct the proceeding, id. at ¶¶ 86-105; and exploiting the violence and chaos that transpired at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021”), he instead filed a motion to strike all references to the mob.

Poof! It is a legalistic way to deny the very same mobsters (DOJ noted in their response) Trump has sung with and promised to pardon, and in so doing simply wish away the abundant evidence that Trump obstructed the vote certification.

It is the stuff of magic wands.

Trump’s reply uses a series of gimmicks to attempt to wish away parts of the indictment against him.

In one lengthy section that might invite a request to file a sur-reply by DOJ, Trump cites some of the greatest hits of articles by journalists who knew little about the investigation to claim that none of the investigation of the mob related to Trump.

12 Mark Hosenball and Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: FBI finds scant evidence U.S. Capitol attack was coordinated – sources, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2021), at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-fbi-finds-scant-evidence-us-capitol-attack-wascoordinated-sources-2021-08-20/.

13 William M. Arkin, Donald Trump Didn’t Run the January 6 Riot. So Why Did It Happen?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 6, 2022), at https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-didnt-run-january-6-riotso-why-did-it-happen-1661335.

14 Carol D. Leonnig and Aaron C. Davis, FBI resisted opening probe into Trump’s role in Jan. 6 for more than a year, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2023), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/06/19/fbi-resisted-opening-probe-intotrumps-role-jan-6-more-than-year/.

Trump also uses outdated and invented crowd numbers to claim that just a fraction of his mob was part of the mob, focusing just on the mob that entered the Capitol and not the one that besieged it, another part of this motion that might invite sur-reply.

In another place, Trump promises a motion in limine to eliminate all reference to the violence committed in his name, because the sheer violence of it will distract the jury.

For instance, the prosecution claims protesters were “extraordinarily violent and destructive.” Doc. 140, at 11. Even if marginally relevant, which it is emphatically not, the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury,” would far outweigh any probative value. F.R.E. 403. The fact that the prosecution even suggests that such inflammatory claims could have an appropriate place in the trial of President Trump only underscores the unfair and malicious way the Special Counsel is pursuing this case on behalf of the Biden Administration against its leading political opponent, President Trump.

In another paragraph of gibberish, Trump says that DOJ can’t include the actions (including of Couy Griffith, who had met with Trump personally) of people who weren’t charged with the same crimes he was and also says that because Merrick Garland generally defined Jack Smith’s mandate to crimes committed by those who weren’t at the Capitol, it means any crimes committed by people at the Capitol must be excluded.

Indeed, the January 6 cases relied on by the prosecution do not support its contention that “actions at the Capitol are relevant and probative evidence” of the charged conduct. Doc. 140, at 2. Several of the cases did not involve any of the charges brought against President Trump, rendering any relevance analysis inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, No. CR 21-244-2, 2023 WL 2043223, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2023) (charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1752(a)(1), 1752(a)(2); 40 U.S.C. §§ 5104(e)(2)(D), 5104(e)(2)(G)); United States v. MacAndrew, No. CR 21-730, 2022 WL 17961247, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2022) (same). Those cases that did include at least one charge brought against President Trump (as well as charges not brought against him) all involved defendants who were personally present at the Capitol. Those are the types of cases that the Attorney General specifically carved out of the Special Counsel’s authority in Order No. 5559-2022: “This authorization does not apply to . . . future investigations and prosecutions of individuals for offenses they committed while physically present on the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021.” Actual presence has been emphasized as an important factor in the relevance analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Stedman, No. CR 21-383 (BAH), 2023 WL 3303818, at *2 (D.D.C. May 8, 2023) (“defendant’s knowing joinder of a broader crowd is probative of his participation in a venture that interfered with a congressional proceeding”).

In yet another tactic, Trump falsely claims that a passage about how Trump’s manipulation of the mob demonstrates his motive pertains exclusively to his tweet attacking Mike Pence.

Despite three pages of narrative, the prosecution only suggests that one of the paragraphs that is subject to the Motion to Strike is appropriate for this purpose: paragraph 111, which relates to a social media post by President Trump concerning Mike Pence. Paragraph 111 does not show motive or intent as it relates to the actions at the Capitol.

In doing so, Trump ignores references to four other paragraphs explicitly cited in DOJ’s response.

As set forth in the indictment, on the morning of January 6, the defendant knew that the crowd that he had gathered in Washington for the certification “was going to be ‘angry.’” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 98. Despite this knowledge—or perhaps because of it—in his remarks to supporters, the defendant told knowing lies about the Vice President’s role in the congressional certification, stoked the crowd’s anger, and directed them to march to the Capitol and “fight.”

[snip]

Although the defendant knew that the certification proceedings had been interrupted and suspended, he rejected multiple entreaties to calm the rioters and instead provoked them by publicly attacking the Vice President. ECF No. 1 at ¶111. And instead of decrying the rioters’ violence, he embraced them, issuing a video message telling them that they were “very special” and that “we love you.” Id. at ¶ 116. Finally, while the violent riot effectively suspended the proceedings over which the Vice President had been presiding, the defendant and his coconspirators sought to shore up efforts to overturn the election by securing further delay through knowing lies. Id. at ¶¶ 119, 120.

Trump here ignores the warning from his aides that the mob was angry, Trump’s video declaring “we love you” to his mob, and Trump’s renewed efforts to prevent the vote certification even after the mob left.

And in two different ways, Trump tries, again, to simply wish away the evidence that Trump corruptly tried to obstruct the vote certification, two of the charges against him. In one, Trump claims that the certification of the election at the Capitol provides no context to charges that he obstructed the certification of the election at the Capitol.

As a final, futile, attempt to establish relevance, the prosecution argues that the actions at the Capitol on January 6 provide “necessary context for all the charged conduct.” Doc. 140, at 12. Nevertheless, again, the prosecution did not charge President Trump with any crime relating to the actions at the Capitol, such as insurrection or incitement. Actions by others—whom the prosecution does not claim were part of any of the alleged conspiracies—do not provide any context for the actions based on which President Trump is charged.

And then, two paragraphs later, Trump points to the paragraph delimitation in just one charge — the conspiracy to defraud the vote certification — that doesn’t exist for the other three charges, to say that DOJ has excluded the actions described in the paragraphs about the mob.

The challenged allegations’ lack of relevance to the charges against President Trump is further demonstrated by the Indictment itself. The Indictment claims that President Trump “and his co-conspirators committed one or more of the acts to effect the object of the conspiracy alleged” in a list of paragraphs. Doc. 1, ¶ 124. The Indictment omits Paragraphs 10(d), 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, or 113 from this list. Thus, the prosecution does not claim that the actions at the Capitol on January 6 were “acts to effect the object of the conspiracy,” an admission that these paragraphs lack relevance to the charged conduct.

Compare the list of paragraphs cited in the 18 USC 371 charge with paragraphs in the other three charges that cite paragraphs 8 through 123.

The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 4 and 8 through 123 of this Indictment are re-alleged and fully incorporated here by reference.

Not just his motion to strike, the promised motion in limine, and all his other efforts to, like the Apostle Peter, deny the mob he has made his religion are gimmicks, just efforts to wish away abundant evidence against him.

It all comes off as rather desperate.

And as you consider the flop sweat coming off Trump’s motion to strike, consider this: DOJ must have provided, in discovery, the evidence they plan to use to show what Trump’s mob did and that they did it because of him and his lies. DOJ has repeatedly said they’ve provided the evidence they plan to use at trial. Among the things Trump must have in his possession are the videos that show Danny Rodriguez went directly from hearing Trump’s speech to almost murdering Michael Fanone, and others responded to Trump’s Pence tweet by serving a critical role in opening a second front of the attack on the Capitol and breaching the Senate.

Trump has — must have!! — seen the evidence about his mob DOJ intends to use at trial. And his response is this blubbering effort to wish his mob away.

John Lauro’s DC Delay Tactics Backfire in Florida

As I noted, right after Judge Aileen Cannon suggested, during a hearing on November 1, that conflicting trial schedules in DC and Florida meant she’d likely delay the stolen documents trial scheduled for May 20, Trump’s lawyers in DC filed to stay their DC trial. DOJ notified Judge Cannon right away that Trump had done that — basically proving the contention they made in the hearing that Trump was just stalling.

Having secured that delay, Trump turned to delaying his DC trial, with a motion to stay all other DC proceedings until his absolute immunity claim is decided, a 3-page motion Trump could have but did not submit when he was asking for a delay before submitting his other motions. Everything he points to in that 3-page motion, the completed briefing on the absolute immunity bid, was already in place on October 26. But he waited until he first got Cannon to move her trial schedule.

As I laid out the other day, Trump is not making legal arguments sufficient to win this case — certainly not yet. He is making a tactical argument, attempting to run out the clock so he can pardon himself.

Update: LOL. Trump filed the DC motion too soon, giving DOJ a chance to notice the cynical ploy in DC before Aileen Cannon issues her order.

Yesterday, the Court conducted a hearing on the defendants’ motion to adjourn trial, in which defendant Trump claimed that trial in this matter should be delayed in part because “[t]he March 4, 2024 trial date in the District of Columbia, and the underlying schedule in that case, currently require President Trump and his lawyers to be in two places at once.” ECF 167 at 1. Defendant Trump’s counsel reiterated that argument during the hearing yesterday. However, defendant Trump’s counsel failed to disclose at the hearing that they were planning to file – and yesterday evening did file – the attached motion to stay the proceedings in the District of Columbia until their motion to dismiss the indictment based on presidential immunity is “fully resolved.” See United States v. Donald J. Trump, No. 23-cr-257-TSC, ECF No. 128 at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023), attached as Exhibit 1. As the Government argued to the Court yesterday, the trial date in the District of Columbia case should not be a determinative factor in the Court’s decision whether to modify the dates in this matter. Defendant Trump’s actions in the hours following the hearing in this case illustrate the point and confirm his overriding interest in delaying both trials at any cost. This Court should [sic] allow itself to be manipulated in this fashion.

Judge Cannon hates to be embarrassed and probably was particularly perturbed that DOJ suggested she was allowing herself to be manipulated. She filed an order basically telling them never to do that again.

The parties are hereby reminded of the requirements of Local Rule 7.8 on Notices of Supplemental Authority. Except as authorized by Court order, the substantive content of any such notice (or response) may not exceed 200 words and may not be used as a surreply absent leave of Court. Future non-compliant notices or unauthorized filings will be stricken without further notice. Signed by Judge Aileen M. Cannon on 11/3/2023.

But it worked, at least for now. Judge Cannon has issued an order revising pretrial deadlines, some of which (such as a December response to a government motion already filed) don’t make sense at all. But she has not delayed the May 20 trial date and won’t consider it until March 1, at which point it will be clear whether the DC case will go forward that month.

Following review, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows. Defendants’ Motions to Continue Pre-Trial Deadlines are GRANTED IN PART for the reasons stated below. Defendants’ Motion to Continue Trial, currently set for the two-week period commencing on May 20, 2024, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to be considered at a scheduling conference on March 1, 2024, following the initial set of pre-trial and CIPA steps in this proceeding as outlined below.

This increases the chances that at least one of these trials will go foward before the election.

Jack Smith Attempts to Prevent Trump from Delaying DC Trial with Interlocutory Appeals

In a hearing in the stolen documents case on November 2, Jay Bratt implored Judge Aileen Cannon not to base the timing of the Florida trial based on assumptions about the DC case, because that trial date

The Court really cannot let or should not let the D.C. trial drive the schedule here. In the D.C. case, they are making many of the same arguments, though they have not yet filed a motion for adjournment. They have already said that they likely will. They have talked about —

[snip]

A lot of this, though, is in the realm of the — I don’t want to say hypothetical, but it is in the realm of we don’t know what is going to happen. We don’t know what is going to happen in this case. We don’t know what is going to happen in the D.C. case. Among the things that the Defense has raised in the D.C. case is that if there are adverse rulings on any of the pending motions to dismiss, that they would seek an appeal and seek to stay the proceedings. That could happen. We don’t know. Obviously, there are arguments both ways, arguments both before the Trial Court before the D.C. Circuit, but that could happen. That trial date could disappear.

[snip]

Things could happen, things could happen with the D.C. case that would make going forward on May 20th, 2024, in this case not feasible. That may happen and we can address that, at that time, but we should be moving forward in this case.

The one thing he mentioned that could happen was a defense request to stay proceedings pending appeal.

Judge Tanya Chutkan certainly doesn’t want anything to delay the DC case. She said that explicitly in an October 16 hearing on Trump’s bid to stay her gag order.

THE COURT: This trial will not yield to the election cycle and we’re not revisiting the trial date, Mr. Lauro.

Perhaps to make that even clearer, after Trump filed to motion a stay pending appeal of any decision on his Absolute Immunity argument on November 1, she issued a requested order pertaining to jury selection by setting the beginning of that process to start on February 9.

But Jack Smith’s team appears to be concerned that Trump may use interlocutory appeals to delay the trial. In a response to Trump’s November 1 motion, Molly Gaston not only opposed that stay (which she described as an attempt to apply appellate and civil procedure to this criminal trial), but she requested that Judge Chutkan prioritize those decisions that are subject to interlocutory appeal: the Absolute Immunity bid, and one part of Trump’s Constitutional challenge to the indictment pertaining to double jeopardy.

[T]he defendant’s stay motion exposes his intention to use his meritless immunity claim to disrupt the Court’s schedule. Accordingly, to prevent undue delay and maintain the trial date, the Court should consider and decide first among the motions pending on the docket the defendant’s two claims that could be subject to interlocutory appeal: presidential immunity and double jeopardy.

In her motion, Gaston lays out Trump’s various dilatory tactics.

The defendant has planned to file this motion for months but waited until now in hopes of grinding pretrial matters to a halt closer to the trial date. As early as August 28, 2023, for instance, defense counsel informed the Court that the defendant would raise “executive immunity . . . with the Court likely this week or early next week, which is a very complex and sophisticated motion regarding whether or not this court would even have jurisdiction over this case. . . .” ECF No. 38 at 33-34. But the defendant did not file an immunity motion that week or the following. Instead, he waited more than a month before filing the promised pleading on October 5. See ECF No. 74. The defendant then waited another month to file the stay motion, late at night on November 1. Tellingly, earlier that same day, when defense counsel appeared at a hearing in the defendant’s criminal case in the Southern District of Florida, he used this Court’s March 4 trial date and pretrial schedule as an excuse to try to delay that trial—without disclosing that, within hours, he would file his stay motion here seeking to disrupt and delay the very deadlines in this case that he was using as a pretense. See United States v. Trump, No. 23-80101, Hr’g. Tr. at 24 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2023). In short, the defendant’s actions make clear that his ultimate objective with the stay motion, as has consistently been the case in this and other matters, is to delay trial at all costs and for as long as possible.

To thwart Trump’s efforts to stall any longer, Gaston requests that Chutkan prioritize the issues that can be appealed.

To limit such disruption, the Court should promptly resolve the defendant’s immunity motion, as well as his double jeopardy claim that is also potentially subject to interlocutory appeal, so that the Government can seek expedited consideration of any nonfrivolous appeal and preserve the Court’s carefully selected trial date.

She promises DOJ will use all mechanisms available to accelerate Trump’s own appeal.

To prevent the defendant from using the timing of any such appeal to disrupt the Court’s trial date, the Court should promptly consider and decide his immunity and double jeopardy motions. If the Court rules in the Government’s favor and the defendant appeals, the Government will take all possible measures to expedite the appeal, see Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (identifying mechanisms such as requesting summary affirmance or asking to expedite the appeal), just as the defendant sought to expedite his appeal of the Court’s Rule 57.7 Order—relief that the court of appeals provided. See United States v. Trump, No. 23-3190, Order (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (expediting merits briefing and oral argument). In any event, although a non-frivolous appeal would temporarily divest this Court of jurisdiction, it would do so over only “those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). In sum, the Court’s prompt resolution of the defendant’s immunity and double jeopardy claims would best position this case to stay on track with its current pretrial schedule and trial date.

The thing is: The double jeopardy claim is frivolous; James Pearce noted that the four charges in the current indictment are for a totally different crime than the incitement of insurrection charged in impeachment.

But no matter how shitty the Absolute Immunity bid is, because of the historic nature of the case, all judges are going to take it seriously, including Chutkan.

The Absolute Immunity bid was fully briefed on October 26. Trump’s reply in the double jeopardy bid is due next week.

I don’t know appellate procedures well enough, nor can I imagine how John Roberts’ court will respond to a request to expedite something like the Absolute Immunity request.

But I do know that Jack Smith’s team seems to recognize that this bid for delay might work. Political pundits on both sides of the aisle are accounting for a trial that will start on March 4. But there has not yet been enough scrutiny on whether Trump’s bid for delay will succeed.

DOJ’s Responses on Trump’s Motions to Dismiss

DOJ submitted their responses to Trump’s motions to dismiss today. As a reminder, here’s my summary of Trump’s arguments.

I’ll write them up tomorrow, but here are links:

Here’s my Xitter thread on the omnibus response to MTD on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds.

Trump’s New Appellate Argument about His 100 Million Imaginary Friends

Judge Tanya Chutkan issued her order denying Trump a stay of her gag order on October 29.

That was admittedly a Saturday. Nevertheless, it took Trump four days before he ran to the DC Circuit to cry about an emergency infringement on the First Amendment rights of him and his mob.

He took those four days even as he demanded that the DC Circuit — which had been expecting Trump’s initial brief on November 8 — rule on this motion by November 10.

The Court should stay the Gag Order pending appeal. In addition, President Trump respectfully requests that the Court enter a temporary administrative stay pending resolution of this motion and issue its ruling by November 10, 2023. If the Court denies this motion, President Trump requests that the Court extend its administrative stay for seven days to allow him to seek relief from the U.S. Supreme Court.

During those four days that Trump didn’t file for a stay, John Lauro found time to file three different things (one, two, three) in Judge Chutkan’s docket. In those four days, Trump posted a slew of attacks on Joe Biden, the 2020 election, and his prosecution (though admittedly many of the recent posts targeted Arthur Engoron), many of them attacks that — he claims — this gag prevents him from making.

I’ll leave it to smarter people to explain the posture that leaves this case.

What I’m more interested in are the arguments that Trump makes that should not withstand prolonged scrutiny, at least not at the DC Circuit, arguments that are surely designed to trigger the interest of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas.

In his appeal, Trump argues — substantially for the first time — that his gag subjects him to viewpoint discrimination. There’s a very short section dedicated to the topic, citing an inapt precedent.

7. The Gag Order reflects forbidden viewpoint discrimination.

By forbidding speech that “target[s]” certain individuals, the Gag Order prohibits only (vaguely defined) negative speech about them. See infra, Part I.C. In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that prohibiting only negative or “disparaging” speech constitutes forbidden viewpoint discrimination. 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (plurality opinion). Such a prohibition “constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). To prohibit “disparaging” speech “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 249; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391- 92. The Gag Order violates these principles

Trump lards the rest of the discussion with claims that a gag tied to the crimes alleged against Trump amounts to censorship of right wing views.

Based this speculation, the district court entered a sweeping, viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a major Presidential candidate, based solely on an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.” The Gag Order violates the First Amendment rights of President Trump and over 100 million Americans who listen to him.

[snip]

President Trump’s viewpoint and modes of expression resonate powerfully with tens of millions of Americans. The prosecution’s request for a Gag Order bristles with hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint and his relentless criticism of the government—including of the prosecution itself. The Gag Order embodies this unconstitutional hostility to President Trump’s viewpoint. It should be immediately stayed.

[snip]

As a viewpoint-based prior restraint on the core political speech of a Presidential candidate to an audience of over 100 million Americans, the Gag Order is virtually per se invalid.

There are nine appearances of the word “viewpoint” in the entire appendix. All appear in Trump’s filings bidding for a stay, not his underlying opposition to the gag. But all of those also appear as part of an argument about political speech — an important argument, but one largely divorced from the circumstance of this gag, not as a free-standing argument about the free speech of nutjob right wingers.

That argument is closely related to (and builds on) another argument that Trump belatedly raised: that gagging his speech harms the First Amendment rights of his 100 million followers.

4. The Gag Order violates the rights of tens of millions of Americans to receive President Trump’s speech.

The First Amendment’s “protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (citing many cases); Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). A restriction on President Trump’s speech inflicts a reciprocal injury on the rights of over 100 million Americans who listen to him, irrespective of their political beliefs.

This right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message has its “fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,” especially for the Presidency. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 162. Ford emphasized that, if Congressman Ford were silenced, “reciprocally, his constituents will have no access to the views of their congressman on this issue of undoubted public importance.” 830 F.2d at 601. Likewise, Brown stated that “[t]he urgency of a campaign … may well require that a candidate, for the benefit of the electorate as well as himself, have absolute freedom to discuss his qualifications….” 218 F.3d at 430.

In Trump’s appeal, he doesn’t cite evidence supporting this number, but — as I already noted — the underlying motion relies on garbage double counting of bots on the Twitter platform Trump no longer uses. Given that this argument is based on fraudulent numbers, it amounts to a defense of the First Amendment rights to listen of Trump’s imaginary friends, including the Russian bots the now-deceased Yevgeniy Prigozhin deployed to fuck with US politics.

The problem with this argument is, as DOJ noted in its response to Trump’s bid for a gag, Trump misrepresented the record on that point.

11 The defendant did not invoke these interests in his response to the Government’s motion for an order under Local Criminal Rule 57.7(c). And while the defendant claims to have invoked these interests at the hearing, only to have been unfairly interrupted by the Court (ECF No. 110 at 17), his citations mischaracterize the record. For example, he asserts (id.) that the Court interrupted him in response to his statement, “And what the government is proposing here is an order not just directed against President Trump but against the American electorate that wants to hear from President Trump under these circumstances.” The Court did not, in fact, interject in response to that point. See ECF No. 103 at 44. Rather, it was only several sentences later, after defense counsel returned to his oft-repeated talking point that “[t]his is the first time we’ve had a sitting administration prosecute a political opponent” that the Court responded, “I’m going to interrupt you. . . . You have said that. You have said it repeatedly. I have heard it.” Id. Likewise, the defendant asserts (ECF No. 110 at 17) that, when counsel said, “The American people are entitled to understand that and understand the consequences of that,” the Court simply responded, “No.” The Court did no such thing. After defense counsel’s comment, the Court asked why the defendant “is entitled to suggest that an appropriate punishment would be death.” ECF No. 103 at 59-60. When defense counsel invoked the First Amendment in response, the Court said, “No. As part of that. But again, the First Amendment protections must yield to the administration of justice and the protection of witnesses.” Id.

In a footnote of Judge Chutkan’s order denying the stay, she agreed.

Defendant’s Motion argues that his speech restrictions are inconsistent with the “right of listeners to receive President Trump’s message.” Motion to Stay at 15. Defendant did not squarely raise that argument in his opposition brief to the government’s original motion; the closest he came to identifying any authority for it was an unrelated “see also” citation to United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 1987), a case that he now quotes to support his right-of-listeners argument. Compare ECF No. 60 at 5, with Motion to Stay at 16. But the court expressly addressed and distinguished that case. Order at 2–3. In any event, the argument does not alter the fundamental principle that First Amendment rights, whether those of the speaker or the listener, may be curtailed to preclude statements that pose sufficiently grave threats to the integrity of judicial proceedings.

Undeterred by that footnote, Trump argues that Chutkan’s failure to address something he didn’t raise is her reversible error, not a waiver on his part.

Though the issue was raised repeatedly, A159-60, A165, A178; A47, A62-63, the district court gave the First Amendment rights of President Trump’s audiences no meaningful consideration. The Gag Order does not mention them, see A1-3, and the district court declined to consider them when President Trump raised them, e.g., A47, A62-63. That is reversible error.

I’ve linked two of the spots in the record, above, where John Lauro imagines he raised this — A47, which he cites twice, was in the oral arguments, not the underlying brief. None was a substantive argument about his imaginary 100 million friends. Here’s the appendix if you want to see if you can find what other things he is citing to.

There are other problems with this appeal. Trump doesn’t address the part of Chutkan’s order that explicitly permits Trump to attack, “the current administration or the Department of Justice.” Trump does not engage, at all, with the evidence DOJ submitted of expected trial witnesses testifying under oath about how mobs started threatening them after Trump tweeted mean things. Notably, Trump’s citations to the government’s examples of threats that Trump made between August 2 and September 26 doesn’t cite to the footnotes in the government response that reference the threat — made the day after the linked threat, “if you come after me I’m coming after you” — to Judge Chutkan herself.

By the time the Gag Order was entered, the case had been pending for almost three months, and President Trump had often spoken about it. The prosecution provided seventeen examples of public statements by President Trump between August 2 and September 26, 2023, that it considered objectionable. A140-46; A190- 91. However, it did not produce any evidence that any prosecutor, witness, or court staffer experienced “threats” or “harassment” after President Trump’s speech. Likewise, it did not produce any evidence that any witness or prosecutor felt threatened or intimidated by President Trump’s speech—however subjectively—during three months of President Trump’s public commentary on the case. See A140-46; A190-91.

Lauro claims DOJ didn’t present any evidence that anyone, including court staffers but not the judge herself, felt intimidated by threats that followed on Trump’s incitement and simply ignores that footnote. But someone in Judge Chutkan’s chambers alerted the Marshals after that threat, and the FBI deemed it sufficiently dangerous to arrest Abigail Jo Shry for making it.

So there are other problems with this appeal, exhibiting the same obstinate refusal to address the record as it stands that Judge Chutkan described in her opinion refusing the stay.

But the key dynamic, in my opinion, is that Trump is trying to refashion his argument to trigger the known biases of Sam Alito and Clarence Thomas. But he’s doing so — launching a bid to protect the First Amendment rights of his imaginary friends — after the fact.

This is not a frivolous argument. The legal arguments should bear the weight of the historic decision that ultimately will result.

But instead of making serious arguments, John Lauro has pitched the Supreme Court’s right wing justices an argument about Trump’s imaginary Twitter friends.

Update: A DC Circuit panel of 3 Democratic appointees (Obama, Obama, Biden) has stayed the gag and ordered and set an expedited briefing that is quick enough SCOTUS is unlikely to have any reason to intervene.

PER CURIAM ORDER [2025399] filed considering motion to stay case [2025149-2], ORDERED that the district court’s October 17, 2023, order be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. Further ordered that his case be expedited. setting briefing schedule: APPELLANT Brief due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPENDIX due 11/08/2023, at 5:00 p.m.. APPELLEE Brief due on 11/14/2023, at 5:00 p.m., APPELLANT Reply Brief due 11/17/2023, at 12:00 p.m., scheduling oral argument on Monday, 11/20/2023. Before Judges: Millett, Pillard and Garcia. [23-3190] [Entered: 11/03/2023 05:06 PM]

Hours After Aileen Cannon Suggests She’ll Stall Florida Prosecution, Trump Moves to Stall DC One

Judge Aileen Cannon has not yet released a ruling describing how much she’ll bow to Trump’s manufactured claims of classified discovery delays in the stolen documents case, but she made clear that she will delay the trial somewhat. As reported, at least, that delay will come because of the competing schedule in DC.

Trump’s lawyers argued that they need a delay in the documents case because preparations for it will clash with the federal election case, which is slated to go to trial on March 4 and could last several months.

Trump’s indictment in the election case — which came days after Cannon set her initial timeline for the document case — “completely disrupted everything about the schedule your honor set,” Trump lawyer Todd Blanche told Cannon.

Another Trump lawyer, Chris Kise, personified the crunch the former president’s attorneys are facing, phoning into the hearing from a New York courthouse where Trump is undergoing a civil trial targeting his business empire.

“It’s very difficult to be trying to work with a client in one trial and simultaneously try to prepare that client for another trial,” Kise said. “This has been a struggle and a challenge.”

Note: as DOJ pointed out, Kise’s NY trial schedule was already baked into Cannon’s schedule.

Having secured that delay, Trump turned to delaying his DC trial, with a motion to stay all other DC proceedings until his absolute immunity claim is decided, a 3-page motion Trump could have but did not submit when he was asking for a delay before submitting his other motions. Everything he points to in that 3-page motion, the completed briefing on the absolute immunity bid, was already in place on October 26. But he waited until he first got Cannon to move her trial schedule.

As I laid out the other day, Trump is not making legal arguments sufficient to win this case — certainly not yet. He is making a tactical argument, attempting to run out the clock so he can pardon himself.

Update: LOL. Trump filed the DC motion too soon, giving DOJ a chance to notice the cynical ploy in DC before Aileen Cannon issues her order.

Yesterday, the Court conducted a hearing on the defendants’ motion to adjourn trial, in which defendant Trump claimed that trial in this matter should be delayed in part because “[t]he March 4, 2024 trial date in the District of Columbia, and the underlying schedule in that case, currently require President Trump and his lawyers to be in two places at once.” ECF 167 at 1. Defendant Trump’s counsel reiterated that argument during the hearing yesterday. However, defendant Trump’s counsel failed to disclose at the hearing that they were planning to file – and yesterday evening did file – the attached motion to stay the proceedings in the District of Columbia until their motion to dismiss the indictment based on presidential immunity is “fully resolved.” See United States v. Donald J. Trump, No. 23-cr-257-TSC, ECF No. 128 at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023), attached as Exhibit 1. As the Government argued to the Court yesterday, the trial date in the District of Columbia case should not be a determinative factor in the Court’s decision whether to modify the dates in this matter. Defendant Trump’s actions in the hours following the hearing in this case illustrate the point and confirm his overriding interest in delaying both trials at any cost. This Court should [sic] allow itself to be manipulated in this fashion.