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Gul Rahman and Manadel al-Jamadi Investigations: The New Information

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In his announcement that John Durham is investigating the deaths by torture of two CIA detainee, Eric Holder suggested that John Durham reviewed information that had not been reviewed by the prosecutors who had earlier declined to prosecute the cases.

That review included both information and matters that had never previously been examined by the Department.

He implied that one source of that new information might be some of the reports–among other things, the CIA IG Report and the OPR Report.

He identified the matters to include within his review by examining various sources including the Office of Professional Responsibility’s report regarding the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda related to enhanced interrogation techniques, the 2004 CIA Inspector General’s report on enhanced interrogations, additional matters investigated by the CIA Office of Inspector General, the February 2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody, and public source information.

I wanted to look at what that new information might be.

Manadel al-Jamadi

The AP advances the issue in the case of Manadel al-Jamadi by reporting on what Lynndie England and other Abu Ghraib testified about at their grand jury appearance earlier this month (England’s testimony was first reported by Jane). Of note, the prosecutor asked who put al-Jamadi in the stress position that ultimately ended up effectively crucifying him–and asked questions about a hood that “disappeared.”

Another person who testified told the AP that prosecutors asked about a hood placed over al-Jamadi’s head that later disappeared and who shackled al-Jamadi’s arms behind his back and bound them to a barred window. This witness requested anonymity to avoid being connected publicly with the case.

As a threshold matter, if this person offered some new insight into the people personally involved in al-Jamadi’s asphyxiation–perhaps something that had been reflected in the IG report–then it might constitute new information. There’s also the question of how al-Jamadi’s treatment exceeded the torture John Yoo authorized; both the type of stress position used and the hood might qualify (and the importance of it would be reflected in the 2007 ICRC Report). We know, for example, that on May 26, 2010, Jay Bybee told the House Judiciary Committee that the CIA had not asked about–and so the Bybee Memo had not addressed–whether shackling someone to the ceiling fit the memo’s definition of a stress position.

Jerrold Nadler: Does Bybee Memo 2 or any other legal advice you gave at OLC authorize shackling a detainee to a hook in the ceiling as was described in my earlier question?

Jay Bybee: I don’t recall that any place in Bybee Memo 2 that we have addressed the question of shackling. So I don’t think it was one of the assumptions on which the CIA requested our advice. (Page 85-86)

So one new piece of evidence is Bybee’s testimony that he–and therefore Yoo–did not approve the crucifixion-type stress position that contributed to al-Jamadi’s death.

But that disappearing hood is worth noting by itself–it reflects an intent to cover up the crime.

Gul Rahman

I’m more interested in the possibly new information about Gul Rahman, because some reporting I’ve done reflects why DOJ revisited some of this.

As I noted here, amidst a discussion about prosecution declinations on PDF 72 of the second draft of the OPR Report, the OPR recommended reopening a specific declination because of the changed legal landscape.

The EDVA Memorandum was issued after the Bybee Memo had been publicly withdrawn, but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. Accordingly. the prosecutors may have relied upon OLC’s erroneous determination that the War Crimes Act did not apply to suspected terrorists held abroad. We found no indication, however, that the EDVA declination decisions were revisited after Hamdan. In reviewing the declination decisions, the Department will have to determine whether prior OLC opinions and executive orders bar prosecution of these matters.

Now, this reference might refer to the death threats used with Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri (which today’s announcement suggests have been dropped), because that’s what the discussion preceding the four redacted pages immediately preceding this discussion treats. But we know from a footnote in Jay Bybee’s Second Response to the report that page 92 of the IG Report–that is, at least part of the second page of redaction–refers to the CIA’s argument that Rahman’s death shouldn’t be prosecuted, so it may well be Rahman. In any case, what’s key is that the OPR Report notes the EDVA’s reliance on OLC’s claim that crimes committed overseas couldn’t be prosecuted to be false.

That’s not the only “new” jurisdictional issue addressing whether crimes against Rahman could be prosecuted.

As I have written at length, the Bullet Point document–which appears to have been drafted as part of CIA’s information collection process in response to the IG Report and used as part of the declination process–also directly addressed whether crimes committed in the process of torture could be prosecuted. And one of the things included in it was the claim that no ordinary crimes (like negligent homicide, which would be relevant to Rahman’s death) could be prosecuted.

And in August 10, 2009. the 4th Circuit made it clear in David Passaro’s case that the Asadabad Firebase counted as a military mission at which US law applied. That’s precisely the kind of jurisdictional issue prosecutors used to decline the case in the past.

CIA officials referred the Salt Pit case to the Justice Department five years ago. Prosecutors concluded at the time that the Afghan prison was outside the reach of U.S. law, even though the CIA funded it and vetted its home-country guards.

Given that EDVA is in the same circuit, and given that Asadabad was less established than the Salt Pit, the fairly broad reading of this jurisdictional issue in Passaro’s case may impact Gul Rahman’s.

But the Bullet Point document is interesting for another reason that may pertain to Rahman’s death: because Rahman was reportedly water doused. Particularly given Holder’s emphasis on Yoo’s approvals, it’s relevant that the CIA stuck water dousing into the Bullet Point documents, after Rahman’s death, to suggest OLC had approved it as a torture technique.

But they hadn’t.

Which Bybee confirmed when he testified to HJC.

Nadler: Did Bybee Memo 2 or any other legal advice you gave at OLC authorize dousing detainees with cold water to keep them awake?

Bybee: Dousing with cold water was not one of the techniques that we were asked about in Bybee 2.

Nadler: So the answer is “no”?

Bybee: That’s right. (Page 104)

A full understanding of the Bullet Point documents, if the prosecutors didn’t already have one, would be one new factor making it possible to charge for water dousing and the subsequent death. But Bybee’s testimony would confirm that water dousing was not included in the Bybee Memos.

There’s some more, which I’ll get to in a subsequent post or three.

But for now, it looks like Durham has a few new details, a changed legal framework (because of Hamdan and, in Rahman’s case, possibly because of Passaro), and Jay Bybee’s testimony making it clear that the stress position and the water dousing that led to these detainees’ deaths had not been approved by OLC.

Two Dead Detainees May Get Justice. The Other 99 Will Not.

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Eric Holder just released an announcement revealing that John Durham has recommended criminal investigation of two detainees tortured to death. But cases of the remaining 99 detainees whose treatment Durham investigated will be dismissed.

On January 2, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham of the District of Connecticut to conduct a criminal investigation into the destruction of interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 24, 2009, based on information the Department received pertaining to alleged CIA mistreatment of detainees, I announced that I had expanded Mr. Durham’s mandate to conduct a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations. I made clear at that time that the Department would not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees. Accordingly, Mr. Durham’s review examined primarily whether any unauthorized interrogation techniques were used by CIA interrogators, and if so, whether such techniques could constitute violations of the torture statute or any other applicable statute.

In carrying out his mandate, Mr. Durham examined any possible CIA involvement with the interrogation of 101 detainees who were in United States custody subsequent to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of whom were determined by Mr. Durham to have never been in CIA custody. He identified the matters to include within his review by examining various sources including the Office of Professional Responsibility’s report regarding the Office of Legal Counsel memoranda related to enhanced interrogation techniques, the 2004 CIA Inspector General’s report on enhanced interrogations, additional matters investigated by the CIA Office of Inspector General, the February 2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody, and public source information.

Mr. Durham and his team reviewed a tremendous volume of information pertaining to the detainees. That review included both information and matters that had never previously been examined by the Department. Mr. Durham has advised me of the results of his investigation, and I have accepted his recommendation to conduct a full criminal investigation regarding the death in custody of two individuals. Those investigations are ongoing. The Department has determined that an expanded criminal investigation of the remaining matters is not warranted.

As I noted at the time I announced the expansion of Mr. Durham’s authority, the men and women in our intelligence community perform an incredibly important service to our nation, and they often do so under difficult and dangerous circumstances. They deserve our respect and gratitude for the work they do. However, I concluded based on information available to me then, and continue to believe now, that the Department needed to thoroughly examine the detainee treatment issue. I am confident that Mr. Durham’s thorough review has satisfied that need. [my emphasis]

We know one of these detainees is Manadel al-Jamadi. I haven’t heard the identity of the second; I’m betting it more likely to be Major-General Abed Hamed Mowhoush (though I’m trying to verify whose custody he was in when he died) than it is to be Gul Rahman. Update: Adam Goldman reports that the second detainee is Gul Rahman. That is rather surprising news, as it may implicate the chain of command.

But note the implication here?

Durham only considered investigating the death by torture of those killed in CIA custody. Which seems to suggest detainees killed while in military custody would not be investigated.

Oh well. I suppose as Americans we should be content that 2% of the people we torture to death might get justice.

Update: Thanks to Eric Jaffa for pointing out the murder/torture error in my last line.

Update: al-Jamadi’s name fixed.

Durham Targeting More Contractors?

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Time reports that John Durham has sent out recent subpoenas for grand jury testimony pertaining to torture and war crimes, specifically as it relates to Manadel al-Jamadi, the dead Iraqi depicted in one of the most graphic Abu Ghraib photo.

It has been nearly a decade since an Iraqi prisoner known as “the Iceman” — for the bumbled attempt to cool his body and make him look less dead — perished in CIA custody at Abu Ghraib prison. But now there are rumbles in Washington that other alleged CIA abuses as well as the notorious case could be coming back to haunt the agency. TIME has learned that a prosecutor tasked with probing the CIA — John Durham, a respected Republican-appointed U.S. attorney from Connecticut — recently began calling witnesses before a secret federal grand jury in Alexandria, Va., looking into, among other things, the lurid Nov. 4, 2003, “homicide,” documented by the magazine in 2005.

TIME has obtained a copy of a subpoena signed by Durham that points to his grand jury’s broader mandate, which could involve the charging of additional CIA officers and contract employees in other cases. The subpoena says that “the grand jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of federal criminal laws involving War Crimes (18 USC/2441), Torture (18 USC 243OA) and related federal offenses.”

As Time points out, the likely target of any inquiry focusing on al-Jamadi’s death would be Mark Swanner, a contract CIA interrogator.

Perhaps most importantly, according to someone familiar with the investigation, Durham and FBI agents have said the probe’s focus involves “a specific civilian person.” Durham didn’t name names, but those close to the case believe that person is Mark Swanner, a non-covert CIA interrogator and polygraph expert who questioned Jamadi immediately before his death.

Don’t get me wrong, I would lose no sleep if someone–Swanner–actually paid a legal price for al-Jamadi’s death. But it does seem remarkable that the only criminal torturers our government can find are either low-level people like Lynndie England or contractors like David Passaro. The apparent immunity of everyone else involved in our torture system sure leads to cynicism, as if the only reason to go after a contractor whose role has been discussed for years was just to show a scalp to the international community.

DOJ Points to David Passaro’s Trial as Proof We Investigate Torture, But It Actually Proves John Yoo Should Be Tried

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Update: Meanwhile, the Spanish judge threw out the case.

A SPANISH judge overnight dismissed a complaint filed against former top US officials over alleged torture at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Judge Eloy Velasco decided to throw out the case as he said the US justice system is competent to handle any such complaint.

The last time Spain considered investigating American torture, DOJ and Spain’s Chief Prosecutor Jose Zaragoza worked together to find a way for Spain to decline the case: shortly after Zaragoza told us that “if a proceeding regarding this matter were underway in the U.S., that would effectively bar proceedings in Spain,” Eric Holder asked John Durham to investigate torture. There’s no visible sign in the least, mind you, that Durham has investigated the crimes in his mandate (which includes, among other things, the use of death threats against Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri and the manslaughter of Gul Rahman in Afghan’s Salt Pit). But his investigation serves as a convenient diplomatic stunt to shield American torture from Spanish law.

DOJ attempts to stave off Spanish investigations by claiming we investigate torture

DOJ’s back in the diplomatic stunt business with a letter attempting to convince Spain to drop its investigations of the lawyers who authorized torture.

We understand from Judge Velasco’s request that a criminal complaint has been made by the Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners, claiming that the United States, as part of a strategy in its conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda and its affiliates, sanctioned a series of executive orders supported by legal memoranda drawn up by the above-listed persons and their legal counsel and advisors, authorizing interrogation techniques in violation of international conventions in force. We have also been advised that the complaint further alleges that U.S. government personnel used the memoranda as a legal basis to conduct interrogations using these illegal techniques upon persons suspected of acting in concert with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the request, Judge Velasco seeks information indicating whether any U.S. authority has instituted investigations or proceedings in connection with the facts describes in the above-referenced complaint, and, if so, the specific authority (administrative or judicial) that has dealt or is dealing with such matters. The request further notes that if the facts are currently being investigated by U.S. authorities, that the referenced complaint will be sent to the United States in order that the facts reported therein may be investigated by the United States.

There’s a lot that is misleading about DOJ’s response letter. But one of its key strategies is badly fraudulent: the centrality of its focus on David Passaro’s conviction for assault. The letter boasts:

In 2003 [EW: it was 2004], the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal charges against Passaro, a CIA contractor accused of brutally assaulting a detainee in Afghanistan in 2003. The CIA described his conduct as “unlawful, reprehensible, and neither authorized nor condoned by the Agency.” The then Attorney General stated that “the United States will not tolerate criminal acts of brutality and violence against detainees….” And the U.S. Attorney noted that the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the United States is “[n]ot only vital to investigating and prosecuting terrorists, but also it is instrumental in protecting the civil liberties of those on U.S. military installations and diplomatic missions overseas, regardless of their nationality.” See press release at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr2004/June/04_crm_414.htm, a copy of which is annexed as Attachment A hereto. Following a jury trial, Passaro was convicted of felony assault. On August 10, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction, holding that a U.S. federal court has jurisdiction over the trial of an American citizen for committing assaults on the premised of U.S. military missions abroad. The full opinion of the court is annexed as Attachment B hereto. In February 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by Passaro. Passaro was sentenced to 8 years and 4 months in prison. [EW: his sentence was reduced to 80 months on appeal.]

But there’s a lot that’s wrong with this boast, aside from the error of date and the representation that Passaro’s ultimate sentence was 20 months longer than it ultimately was.

There were irregularities with Passaro’s trial

As I’ve described, Passaro was charged and convicted with assault that led to the death of a suspect Afghan insurgent, Ahmed Wali, at Asadabad firebase on June 21, 2003. There’s a lot that’s funky about Passaro’s case: The military prevented any autopsy on Wali, making it impossible for Passaro to refute arguments the government made about cause of death. There was a Special Forces person with access to Wali whose role was never explored at trial, and the two guards who had custody (and unsupervised access) to Wali during the period leading up to his death were magically assigned to duty in Alaska during Passaro’s trial, making them unavailable to be cross-examined during the trial.

But the central problem with Passaro’s conviction is that the government withheld all the evidence he asked for that would have shown that, even if his treatment of Wali did lead to his death, it had been officially sanctioned under the CIA’s detention policy. And that evidence goes straight to John Yoo’s role in sanctioning torture.

Passaro was denied directly responsive evidence that goes to heart of Yoo’s role in torture

Passaro attempted to use a public authority defense, basically arguing he had been ordered to use any force he used with Wali. In addition to asking for evidence on SERE training–indicating that Passaro knew well the CIA, with John Yoo’s sanction, had used SERE as the basis for its interrogation program–Passaro asked for (in part):

  • All memoranda from OLC on the capture, detention, and interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan
  • All memoranda from CIA’s Office of General Counsel on the capture, detention, and interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan
  • “[C]omplete contents of the rules of engagement for the CIA that address the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations or combatants operating in Afghanistan” including those categorized as “force protection targets”
  • “[A]ll written documents, photographs, video, and sound recordings that contain the methods employed in Afghanistan by members of CIA, DOD, or OGA for the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations, or other combatants operating in Afghanistan, including policies and guidelines developed in early 2003 for use by Special Operations forces“
  • “[A]ll orders, directives, and/or authorizations by President George W. Bush; ex-CIA Director George J. Tenet; the CIA Director of Operations; and the head of CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Office of Military Affairs, or any other CIA component, that address the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations or combatants operating in Afghanistan”
  • All information on Passaro’s training [my emphasis]

In response, the government gave Passaro an otherwise never-released guidance [see PDF 21] which the CIPA summary claimed was “an excerpt of guidance provided to the field on 03 December 2002 in support of ongoing CIA operations in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan border” which read,

When CIA officers are involved in interrogation of a detainee, the conduct of such interrogation should not encompass any significant physiological aspects (e.g., direct physical contacts, unusual mental distress, unusual physical restraints, or deliberate environmental deprivations)–beyond those reasonably required to ensure the safety and security of the detainee–without prior and specific headquarters guidance.

Note the date: December 3, 2002. But remember, Wali died on June 21, 2003. And in between the time that guidance was issued and the time when Wali died, CIA issued four more documents that were directly responsive to Passaro’s request but which the government didn’t turn over (and which weren’t released in this form until several weeks after the Appeals decision cited in DOJ’s letter):

  • CIA’s Guidelines on Confinement, dated January 28, 2003, signed by George Tenet (written after consultation with John Yoo)
  • CIA’s Guidelines on Interrogation, dated January 28, 2003, signed by George Tenet (written after consultation with John Yoo)
  • The Bullet Point document created by the CounterTerrorism Center with John Yoo’s involvement, delivered from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller to John Yoo on April 28, 2003
  • The Bullet Point document, described as a “final summary” sent from CTC to OLC’s Patrick Philbin on June 16, 2003

Between the Tenet Guidelines and the Bullet Points, a number of the actions for which Passaro was convicted were sanctioned by the CIA at the time Wali died.

Read more →

Dear Judge Hellerstein: Ask About the OLC Torture Documents, Too

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On Friday, Judge Alvin Hellerstein had a hearing to figure out how to end the contempt suit the ACLU brought against the CIA for destroying the torture tapes. The ACLU asked that he hold the CIA in contempt. Hellerstein said that wouldn’t serve much purpose. The ACLU suggested that he could hold individuals–presumably meaning Jose Rodriguez–in contempt. In the end, Hellerstein asked the two sides to brief him with suggestions. He seems likely, however, to do two things:

  • Require the CIA to do a report for him to explain how they’ll prevent such a thing from happening in the future
  • Meet with John Durham to hear what he learned in his investigation and make as much of that public as possible

Now, I’m all in favor of getting a very complete report very public report of how the CIA destroyed evidence of torture. The citizens of this country deserve–at the very least–an overview of the investigation and a clear explanation of the roles of the public figures like Porter Goss and John Rizzo. We deserve to know what John McPherson said about the earlier damage done to the torture tapes after John Durham immunized him–and whether Jose Rodriguez and George Tenet pressured him to lie about it. We deserve to know how this relates to all the lies CIA told Congress. We deserve to know each point when the White House got involved in this process.

But I bet you a quarter that Durham will say he can’t make any of this public, because of that mythic ongoing investigation into torture.

It’s what they do.

But as for the homework assignment Hellerstein plans on giving the CIA, to provide him with a report that will convince them they will prevent this kind of evidence disappearing in the future?

It has to go further than the torture tapes themselves.

As I cataloged last year, a great deal of evidence pertaining to torture disappeared over the years:

  • Before May 2003: 15 of 92 torture tapes erased or damaged
  • Early 2003: Gitmo commander Mike Dunlavey’s paper trail documenting the torture discussions surrounding Mohammed al-Qahtani “lost”
  • Before August 2004: John Yoo and Patrick Philbin’s torture memo emails deleted
  • June 2005: most copies of Philip Zelikow’s dissent to the May 2005 CAT memo destroyed
  • November 8-9, 2005: 92 torture tapes destroyed
  • July 2007 (probably): 10 documents from OLC SCIF disappear
  • December 19, 2007: Fire breaks out in Cheney’s office

While we have no idea what, if anything, got destroyed in Cheney’s fire, we do know that CIA, DOD, DOJ, and the State Department (along with whoever owned the server on which John Yoo sent his most classified emails about torture) all somehow “lost” evidence pertaining to torture. It’s not just CIA’s problem, it’s the entire executive branch, seemingly losing torture evidence left and right.

And at the very least, Hellerstein ought to demand the very same kind of report from DOJ as he’s asking for from CIA. I mean, has DOJ done anything to make sure the drafts that go into our secret legal opinions authorizing the executive branch to ignore the law don’t disappear, as they did here?? Has DOJ done even the presumably minimal things CIA has done to make sure such documents don’t keep disappearing when they become inconvenient or dangerous? And what about John Yoo’s emails? What has DOJ done, Judge Hellerstein should ask, to find John Yoo’s missing emails and make sure similar emails don’t go missing in the future?

It’s not just the CIA that treated Judge Hellerstein’s order with contempt. So did DOJ. And yet our Justice Department is not even being held to the very low standard that our nation’s spooks are.

Torture? Check. Covering Up Torture? Check. Rule of Law? Nope.

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I think it was the timing of the end of the torture investigation that hurts most of all. Just days ago, Harold Koh was boasting of the Durham investigation to the UN. Then Bush started his dog and pony show, including his proud admission to have ordered up torture. All of which made today’s announcement, that no one will be charged for covering up evidence of torture, almost anti-climactic.

Of course no one will be charged for destroying the evidence of torture! Our country has spun so far beyond holding the criminals who run our country accountable that even the notion of accountability for torture was becoming quaint and musty while we waited and screamed for some kind of acknowledgment that Durham had let the statute of limitations on the torture tape destruction expire. I doubt they would have even marked the moment–yet another criminal investigation of the Bush Administration ending in nothing–it if weren’t for the big stink bmaz has been making. Well, maybe that’s not right–after all, Bob Bennett was bound to do a very public victory lap, because that’s what he’s paid for.

The investigation continues, DOJ tells us, into obstruction of the Durham investigation itself. Maybe they think they’ve caught someone like Porter Goss in a lie. But at this point, that almost seems like a nice story the prosecutors are telling themselves so they can believe they’re still prosecutors, so they can believe we still have rule of law in this country.

This inquiry started long before Obama started looking forward, not backward. It started before the White House allowed the Chief of Staff to override the Attorney General on Gitmo and torture. It started before we found out that someone had destroyed many of the torture documents at DOJ–only to find no one at DOJ cared. It started before the Obama DOJ made up silly reasons why Americans couldn’t see what the Vice President had to say about ordering the leak of a CIA officer’s identity. It started before the Obama White House kept invoking State Secrets to cover up Bush’s crimes, from illegal wiretapping, to kidnapping, to torture. It started at a time when we naively believed that Change might include putting the legal abuses of the past behind us.

This inquiry started before the Obama Administration assumed the right to kill American citizens with no due process–all the while invoking State Secrets to hide that, too.

This inquiry started before Bush and then Obama let BP get away with serial violations of the laws that protect our workers and environment, and then acted surprised when BP ruined our Gulf.

This inquiry started before Obama helped to cover up the massive fraud committed by our banks, even while it continued to find ways to print money for those same banks. It started, too, before the Obama Administration ignored mounting evidence that banks–the banks employed by taxpayer owned Fannie and Freddie–were foreclosing on homes they didn’t have the legal right to foreclose on, going so far as to counterfeit documents to justify it. This inquiry started when we still believed in the old-fashioned principle of property rights.

This inquiry started before banksters got excused when they mowed down cyclists and left the scene of the crime, because a felony would mean the bankster would lose his job.

The ACLU’s Anthony Romero reacted to this news saying, in part, “We cannot say that we live under the rule of law unless we are clear that no one is above the law.”

I think it’s clear. We cannot say we live under the rule of law.

Durham Torture Tape Case Dies, US Duplicity in Geneva & The Press Snoozes

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From the best available information as to the original destruction date of the infamous “Torture Tapes” having been on November 8, 2005, the statute of limitations for charging any general crime by employees and/or agents of the US Government for said destruction will expire at midnight Monday November 8, 2010 as the general statute of limitation is five years. By operation of law, the statute would have run yesterday were it not a Sunday. So, by the time you are reading this, it is over. Absent something extraordinary, and I mean really extraordinary, a criminal statute of limitation is effectively a bar to subject matter jurisdiction and that is that. Ding dong, the John Durham torture tape investigation is thus dead.

Last week, I wrote a letter to the DOJ and saw to it that it was delivered to the main contacts, Dean Boyd and Tracy Schmaler, as well as John Durham’s office. None of them responded. Finally, late Monday afternoon I called Durham’s office, and they acknowledged having received the letter. Although extremely cordial, there was simply no meaningful information or discussion to be had on the subject. “We have no comment” was about the size of it. I asked about the remote possibility of the existence of a sealed indictment; there was “no comment” on that either, and there is absolutely no reason in the world to think anything exists in this regard.

Oh, there was one thing; when I asked why there had been no formal response to my letter, I was told perhaps it was a “little edgy”. Apparently actually phrasing an inquiry with legal specificity and facts makes it too “edgy” for the United States Department Of Justice. Who knew? Ironically, at the same time this discussion was transpiring today, the very same Obama DOJ was in US Federal Court, in front of Judge John Bates of the DC District, arguing for their unfettered right to extrajudicially execute an American citizen, and do so in secret without explanation. But my letter asking about the dying Durham investigation was edgy. The DOJ’s priorities, morals and duties seem to be a bit off kilter when it comes Read more →

Letter to DOJ and John Durham Re: Torture Tape Crimes Expiring

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As you may know, in early November of 2005, agents of the United States government destroyed at least ninety two videotapes containing direct evidence of the interrogation and, upon admission and belief, torture of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see: here, here, here, here and here). The statute of limitations, for the criminal destruction of said taped evidence in the cases of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri will expire on Sunday November 7 (since the last day falls on a weekend, the statute should maintain through the next business day, which is Monday November 8). As we have heard absolutely nothing from Eric Holder, John Durham, the DOJ or the Obama Administration in relation to indictments or other results of the investigation Mr. Durham has been conducting since January 8, 2008, nearly three years, I thought a letter was in order asking just exactly what their status was. Said letter was addressed to Dean Boyd and Tracy Schmaler, official representatives and spokesmen for the Department of Justice, and reads as follows:

Dean and Tracy,

As I believe you are already aware, the statute of limitation on criminal charges including, notably, obstruction of justice for the destruction of evidence, are about to expire. The destruction appears to have occurred on or about November 8, 2005 and there is a five year statute on most all of the general crimes that could possibly be under investigation by John Durham. No competent prosecutor would have waited this long to file charges if he intended to do so, but there are still a couple of days left; what is the status?

Secondly, I would like to point out that should you be thinking about relying on some rhetoric that Mr. Durham simply cannot find any crimes to prosecute and/or that there were no proceedings obstructed, it is intellectually and legally impossible to not consider the tapes to be evidence, and as they almost certainly exhibit torture to some degree and to some part they would almost certainly be exculpatory evidence, in the cases of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri themselves. The United States government continues to detain these individuals and they have charges that will putatively be brought against them in some forum (civil or tribunal), Habeas rights and/or indefinite detention review processes that will occur in the future.

In short, there exist not just the potential, but the necessity, of future proceedings, and agents of, or on behalf of, the United States government have destroyed material, and almost certainly exculpatory, evidence. Crimes have been committed. At a bare root minimum, it is crystal clear Jose Rodriquez has clear criminal liability; there are, without question, others culpable too. What is the status?

If the DOJ does not intend to proceed in any fashion on these clear crimes, please provide me with some intellectually consistent explanation for why the US government is covering up, and refusing to prosecute, the criminal acts of its own employees and agents.

Thank you.

bmaz

emptywheel.com

If there is any worthwhile or meaningful response, I will advise.

Bush Admits to Approving Torture–But Which Use of It?

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The WaPo reports that Bush, in his book, admits to approving waterboarding.

In a memoir due out Tuesday, Bush makes clear that he personally approved the use of that coercive technique against alleged Sept. 11 plotter Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an admission the human rights experts say could one day have legal consequences for him.

In his book, titled “Decision Points,” Bush recounts being asked by the CIA whether it could proceed with waterboarding Mohammed, who Bush said was suspected of knowing about still-pending terrorist plots against the United States. Bush writes that his reply was “Damn right” and states that he would make the same decision again to save lives, according to a someone close to Bush who has read the book.

At one level, this is thoroughly unsurprising. We know the Bush Administration very deliberately implemented torture, so it’s unsurprising to hear that it was approved by the President.

But–at least as Jeffrey Smith relays the admission from Bush–it raises as many questions as it does answers.

It appears that Bush admits to approving torture for use with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. That is, he approved torture sometime around March 1, 2003, when KSM was captured.

That date is itself very significant. After all, on February 5, 2003, the first Democrat (Jane Harman) was briefed that the CIA had used waterboarding. Her response was a letter, objecting not just to the destruction of the torture tapes, but also asking specifically whether Bush had signed off on torture.

I would like to know what kind of policy review took place and what questions were examined. In particular, I would like to know whether the most senior levels of the White House have determined that these practices are consistent with the principles and policies of the United States. Have enhanced techniques been authorized and approved by the President?

In response, CIA appears to have met with the White House around February 19, ostensibly to talk about an appropriate response. They also appear to have consulted with the White House on how they should record the results of the Gang of 4 briefings from that month; in the end, they only recorded the outcome of the Senate briefing–which Jay Rockefeller did not attend and at which Pat Roberts is recorded to have signed off not just on torture, but on destroying the torture tapes depicting that torture. In other words, for much of February 2003, CIA was working closely with the White House to create a false appearance of Congressional approval for torture, even while they were specifically refusing to give Congress something akin to a Finding making it clear the President had signed off on that torture.

And now we come to find out that’s precisely the period during which–at least according to Bush–he approved torture.

But note what that leaves out. At least from Smith’s description, it appears that Bush says nothing about approving the waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah (nor the reported waterboarding of Ibn Sheikh al-Libi). Mind you, Ron Suskind has reported that Bush was intimately, almost gleefully, involved in ordering torture for Abu Zubaydah.

But Bush doesn’t cop to that in his book.

Now, there may be good reason for that. After all, John Yoo had not yet written the memo claiming that waterboarding did not amount to torture at the time Abu Zubaydah was first tortured.

Moreover, there’s the whole issue of the approval method for the torture that occurred before August 1, 2002.

The source says nearly every day, Mitchell would sit at his computer and write a top-secret cable to the CIA’s counterterrorism center. Each day, Mitchell would request permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques on Zubaydah. The source says the CIA would then forward the request to the White House, where White House counsel Alberto Gonzales would sign off on the technique. That would provide the administration’s legal blessing for Mitchell to increase the pressure on Zubaydah in the next interrogation.

According to multiple reports, the White House–Alberto Gonzales at least, if not his boss–approved the torture of Abu Zubaydah on a daily basis. And when you read the Bybee Memo and the OPR Report on it, it’s very clear that the memo carved out legal authorization specifically for the torture directly authorized by the President. Indeed, the White House’s prior approval for torture–potentially up to and including waterboarding–may explain the urgency behind the memo in the first place, to provide retroactive legal cover for Bush’s unilateral disregard for US laws prohibiting torture.

In other words, Bush has admitted to approving torture in 2003. But that likely obfuscates his earlier approval for torture at a time when he had no legal cover for doing so.

In other news, the statute of limitations on the torture tape destruction expires in just three or four days. Yet we’ve got silence coming from John Durham.

Polish Prosecutor Looks Backward; US Prosecutor Lets Statute of Limitations Tick Away

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ACLU reports that Rahim al-Nashiri’s lawyer’s request to include their client’s treatment at a black site in Poland in the country’s investigation has been successful.

The Polish prosecutor will investigate the detention and torture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri at a black site in Poland after he was kidnapped and transported there by the CIA.

[snip]

Al-Nashiri, who is accused in the 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing, was granted the status of “injured party” in Poland’s ongoing investigation into torture in response to a September 21 petition from his lawyers.

Jameel Jaffer uses this event to focus on how little our own country has done to hold its torturers accountable.

Today’s announcement that Poland will investigate the torture of Mr. al-Nashiri serves as a stark reminder of how little has been done in the U.S. to hold top officials accountable for torture. Holding torturers accountable is essential to restoring American credibility at home and abroad – the U.S. can no longer remain silent as, one by one, other nations begin to reckon with their own agents’ complicity in the torture program through prosecutions and judicial inquiries.

Of course, at the rate we’re going, there will be no accountability. The statute of limitations on the destruction of the torture tapes will expire in just 11 days. At that point, the CIA will have officially gotten away with destroying the evidence of their torture, including evidence pertaining to al-Nashiri himself.