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31 Flavors of Stolen Classified Documents

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In days ahead, there’ll be a heated discussion of what kind of sentence Espionage Act defendant Donald Trump might face. But even among the really experienced people — who correctly point out that Trump’s sentence would be a tiny fraction of the total 400 max he faces — I think the discussions are wrongly conceived. To explain why, I plan to return to my argument that the Mar-a-Lago indictment is tactical.

But first, I want to emphasize the magnitude of the fact DOJ charged Trump with hoarding 31 documents, each charged as an individual count and described, with classification markings, in the indictment. Virtually all of these documents are the type that the government is normally loathe to include at trial, and yet DOJ piled them on, compartmented document on top of compartmented document. The decision to commit to presenting all of them at trial is really remarkable, and must be (and is not being) accounted for in discussions of potential sentencing.

As background I’d like to review five similar prosecutions.

Daniel Hale

First consider two recent prosecutions (Chelsea Manning’s court martial, after which she was sentenced 35 years, is a third) where the indictments listed a long catalog of stolen documents like DOJ did with Trump: Hal Martin and Daniel Hale.

In Hale’s case, the indictment first listed all 23 documents he printed out from his job at a defense contractor, only four of which were as sensitive as most of the documents Trump was charged for hoarding.

DOJ only described the 11 documents that were published by The Intercept (document H, the fourth TS document, was not published by The Intercept and so not included in the charged documents). It then charged five counts:

  • 18 USC 793(c) for taking the 11 documents ultimately published
  • 18 USC 793(e) for taking and sharing the files with Jeremy Scahill
  • 18 USC 793(e) for causing to be published the files
  • 18 USC 798(a)(3) for sharing 4 SIGINT documents (documents A, D, E, and K, above)
  • 18 USC 641 for taking the files, charged to include the 11 that got published and a few other unclassified documents that they had proof he had taken

Hale pled guilty to one count without a plea agreement immediately before trial and got a 45 month sentence. He is due to be released in July 2024.

Had Hale gone to trial, the government wouldn’t have had to expose any new information (though it would need to declassify it), because every charged document had been published already. So DOJ really risked very little by charging all 11 documents published by The Intercept. Any damage was already done.

Hal Martin

The way DOJ charged Hal Martin, though, is more akin to how DOJ has charged Trump.

Martin, remember, was arrested, guns-a-blazing, immediately after Shadow Brokers pegged him as the source of the documents being released in 2016. When the FBI searched his home, they found stacks and stacks of documents, including in his car. It took six months to charge Martin, presumably because DOJ had to do an investigation into what and why he had taken — including whether he was Shadow Brokers or had wilfully leaked the documents to Shadow Brokers. Unlike Trump, he was in pre-trial custody that whole time.

In the end, there were no dissemination charges (ultimately, the public record in his case is inconclusive whether he wilfully leaked these documents or not, but if he did, DOJ either couldn’t prove it or chose not to try). As DOJ did with Trump, each of a bunch of documents, a total of 20, were charged as separate counts.

There are descriptions of each of these 20 documents in the indictment, but not classification markers. The indictment describes that they were a mix of Secret, Top Secret, and SCI.

DOJ presumably got sign-off from the agencies to present these documents at trial, but after a very long pre-trial process, Martin ultimately pled guilty in March 2019 to one count of 18 USC 793(e) as part of a plea agreement, with an agreed on sentence of 9 years, one year short of the 10-year max. He’s scheduled for release in May 2024.

Nghia Pho

By comparison, Nghia Pho — the other presumed source of Shadow Brokers, from whom hackers stole a bunch of NSA files loaded onto his home computer — entered into a plea agreement from the start. His Information didn’t describe any of the documents he took home, though suggested many were TS/SCI. Pho was sentenced to 66 months. Pho, who was in his 60s when he was sentenced and is now 72, is due for release in September.

This is the way DOJ normally prefers to treat those responsible for leaks and other compromises, because the prosecution does little additional damage. Of course, there was never a chance in hell such an approach would work for Trump.

Note that Thomas Windom, who is one of the lead January 6 prosecutors, was on the Pho prosecution team.

Jeremy Brown

Two other relevant cases involve Floridians prosecuted in the last year. With Oath Keeper Jeremy Brown, the government did list and present the five documents, all classified Secret, he was accused of hoarding. They used the Silent Witness rule to present the classified documents at trial, all of which were far more dated and less sensitive than the ones Trump is accused of stealing. Here’s how they described that process in the pre-trial process.

First, the government would provide each juror, the Court, and the defense with a binder of unredacted copies of the Classified Documents. The same process was followed in Mallory, 40 F.4th at 173, and it would enable the jurors to examine the Classified Documents while the government elicits unclassified testimony about the same from its expert witness. As in Mallory, the defense would be permitted to follow the same procedures during cross examination and/or with its own cleared expert, should the defense choose to retain one. Id. This procedure ensures that the jury has full access to the information it needs to fulfill its obligations. Id. at 178 (“But a review of the record reveals that the silent witness rule denied the jury none of the information on which Mallory based his defense.” (emphasis in original)). Second, the government will have Bates and line numbers added to the Classified Documents to enable the witness, the government, and the defense to direct the jurors to specific portions of the material.

Brown was only convicted of one of five Espionage Act counts, but nevertheless was sentenced to 87 months for the document as well as the illegal weapons he was convicted of hoarding.

Robert Birchum

Finally, there’s Robert Birchum, a retired Lieutenant Colonel who was just sentenced to 36 months a few weeks ago. Birchum was found hoarding over 300 documents he had collected before 2008, in 2017, six years ago. The Air Force declined to court martial him, and he was honorably discharged (it sounds like the Air Force really valued the counterinsurgency work he did). The first his case was made public was in January, when he was charged by Information with one count of 793(e). That Information did describe two documents he was charged with:

two documents classified at the TOP SECRET/SCI level from the National Security Agency (NSA) relating to the national defense that discuss the NSA’s capabilities and methods of collection of information.

The government asked for a bottom of guidelines sentence of 78 months, emphasizing Birchum’s abuse of a position of trust and the sensitivity of the documents he took. Among other things Birchum raised at sentencing is that he was so important to the Air Force, they sent him back to Afghanistan even after diagnosing him with PTSD. He also invoked all the high ranking people, including Trump, who had brought classified records home.

Among others, Mr. Birchum’s case now shares a stage with the current President of the United States, the former President and Vice-President of the United States, and a former Secretary of State. Looking a bit further back in time, one can see examples of other high-level government executives involved in the same type of offenses, including a former national security adviser who pled guilty to knowingly removing classified documents from the National Archives and a former CIA director and retired four-star general who pled guilty to sharing classified documents with his biographer and mistress. Both the former national security adviser and the former CIA director were sentenced to pay a fine and probation. No charges have been bought against any of the other individuals noted above. Similar cases involving lower-level government employees that did result in prison sentences typically involved attempts to obstruct the investigation or actual dissemination of the information or both.

He was sentenced to 36 months.

The reason I laid all this out is to suggest how remarkable it was that DOJ listed 31 documents Trump allegedly stole. Of the cases above, they did so with less sensitive, dated records that Brown was charged with, with the 11 documents already published in Hale’s case, and then the catalog of documents charged against Martin, some of which may also have been compromised as part of the Shadow Brokers release. If Martin’s charged documents were already compromised as part of the Shadow Brokers case, it means that among these cases, there is no precedent for the government choosing to charge a catalog of incredibly sensitive documents like they have with Trump.

That’s one reason I keep harping on the footnote in a DOJ filing in the Trump case from last September, invoking the Pho case (where we know the documents were badly compromised) to suggest that sometimes the Intelligence Community has to operate on the assumption that programs have been compromised and shut them down.

Once the government loses positive control over classified material, the government must often treat the material as compromised and take remedial actions as dictated by the particular circumstances. Depending on the type and volume of compromised classified material, such reactions can be costly, time consuming and cause a shift in or abandonment of programs. In this case, the fact that such a tremendous volume of highly classified, sophisticated collection tools was removed from secure space and left unprotected, especially in digital form on devices connected to the Internet, left the NSA with no choice but to abandon certain important initiatives, at great economic and operational cost.

We know one of the 31 documents charged against Trump — the document described in Count 8 that fell out of a box in the storage closet — would be treated as compromised, particularly if someone knocked the box over or is believed to have found it (remember that there are no cameras inside the storage room).

I can’t emphasize this point enough: One possible explanation for the catalog of charges against Trump is that the IC knows, or made a decision last September to assume, that all of these documents have been compromised. It’s one of the most likely ways to explain DOJ’s willingness to include all of them in charges, just like they did with the documents charged against Hale.

That possibility is not being factored into any of the discussions about sentencing, and it should be. The IC likely has to assume that the many intelligence services that targeted Mar-a-Lago, including two known Chinese infiltrators, found some of these documents, or maybe just the musicians and partygoers who could have had access while they were taking a shit.

Importantly, all the documents charged remained in an unsecured storage room after it became public that there were classified documents among the ones that Trump had delivered to NARA in January 2022. (Note, among the really sensitive documents that weren’t included in Trump’s charges are ones classified HCS-O, describing HUMINT operations.)

The Pho and Birchum examples show that DOJ would far prefer negotiating a plea agreement in advance, to minimize further damage to national security. But Trump made quite clear after the search last year, he was unwilling to go quietly.

The only one of these five who went to trial was Brown, and DOJ used the Silent Witness rule for him. That rule is rightly controversial even with disfavored shithole defendants like Brown (or Kevin Mallory, who was convicted of spying for China using it). I simply can’t imagine using the Silent Witness rule in a trial with a former President. The issues of legitimacy are too great. And so, if this thing goes to trial, I assume redacted copies of all these documents would be introduced as evidence that would get shared with the public.

Which is why I point to the Martin case as the one most similar to Trump. My read of that case is that DOJ charged so many documents — just 20, though, rather than 31 — as part of the coercion process to get Martin to plead.

The problem, in Donald Trump’s case, is that he has more incentive to start a civil war than plead guilty to these charges.

Those are some of the assumptions — not to mention that by charging this in West Palm Beach, where Aileen Cannon was likely to and did get the assignment — that Jack Smith must have had in mind when he charged the MAL case like he did.

With every other similarly situated defendant, DOJ has pursued strategies to get the defendant to plead before exacerbating the damage of the compromise at trial. But with Donald Trump, they’re facing a uniquely intransigent defendant. And that is what Jack Smith was facing when he decided to charge this case this way.

The Trump-Biden-Pence Documents Story Is Not (Yet) about Overclassification

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It is my belief that had Eric Holder appointed a Special Counsel to investigate David Petraeus’ hoarding of classified information, the retired General might have been charged with 18 USC 793(e) and maybe even 793(d).

That’s true, first of all, because the facts he admitted to as part of his wrist-slap plea largely cover the elements of the offense. That’s true, too, because everyone but Holder seemed to support charging Obama’s CIA Director. Ultimately, the decision would have remained Holder’s. Holder might have overruled a Special Counsel even still, as he is reported to have overruled prosecutors. Holder may have calculated that Petraeus’ years-long cultivation of Congress would mitigate any blowback for overriding the recommendation to prosecute.

Certainly Holder paid no price for making the decision he did make: Congress believed that Petraeus could do no wrong.

Instead, Petraeus is (with Sandy Berger) one of the two poster children for the premise that the powerful will never be held accountable for mishandling classified information the way lower ranking personnel will be. That could change with at least two Special Counsels involved.

Yet even as powerful as he was during the period he was leaking to his biographer, David Petraeus is still differently situated than Trump, Biden, and Pence, starting with the fact that even in his case, DOJ relied on his clearance and nondisclosure agreements to prosecute him.

By comparison, all three of the men currently under investigation were Original Classification Authorities under EO 13526, the Executive Order governing classification during the period in question. None of those men would ever have been required to get any security clearance beyond the courtesy clearance given to formers after their tenure (of which Trump was stripped). And so all of these men went from a status of near immunity while in office, instantly — at 12:00PM on January 20 — to having to sort through files in boxes to decide what he was permitted to take home and what he was obligated to turn over to the Archives.

That process was at least part of what went wrong in all three cases, even Biden’s possession of documents from when he was a powerful Senate Chair. One minute, they were virtually immune from rules pertaining to classification, and literally the next minute — before they had finished that sorting process! — they were subject to the rule of law again.

Indeed, because all three are explicitly subject to the Presidential Records Act, the basis by which they lack authorization to possess the documents in question stems, in significant part, from an entirely different basis than it does for other people, which arises from the clearances they were never required to get.

And that’s one reason why all the punditry (here, here, here, here) — almost all from people who haven’t followed the details even of the Trump case, where we’ve got the most facts available — claiming that this is a problem with overclassification is, at best, wildly premature.

Indeed, with Trump, we can say with some certainty that this is not about overclassification. The classification markings from the subpoena DOJ served on him, understood to be based in part on what they had already found in the boxes he turned over, are not trivial. Nor are the likely contents of the documents we see in the FBI picture of his stolen documents. Even some of the documents from the Russian investigation that Trump wanted to declassify and disseminate rely on either human source and/or intelligence collection targeting Russia’s spy service, and the reporting was just five years old at the time (a brand new must read from the NYT also reveals the intelligence came from the Dutch, so it wasn’t our intelligence to declassify).

These men were the President and Vice President. They had access to highly sensitive information, and Trump, at least, had a well-established history of releasing it with abandon.

Until we have evidence that the documents in question were simply materials that some agency was bigfooting (as was the case in most of the classification pertaining to Hillary’s emails), we should not assume this is about overclassification. There’s no evidence of that.

Chuck Rosenberg argues that it also should not matter.

One place we might see overclassification is in classification reviews of the hand-written notes that both Trump and Biden took, though even there, Trump was reportedly waving around his private love letters with a nuclear-armed dictator as a party trick, and that probably did have the ability to make it harder to manage a very difficult threat. But with Trump, at least, the possibility that some of his hand-written notes won’t turn out to be as sensitive as the spooks will declare them doesn’t mitigate that he had documents that are almost certainly unbelievably sensitive sitting in a beach resort known to be targeted by intelligence services.

Thus far, we have no evidence that this is about overclassification. We do have abundant evidence that these three specific compromises have to do with the wacky way Presidents and Vice Presidents (and to a lesser degree, Members of Congress) operate outside the system of clearances that leads virtually everyone else with access to classified information to exercise a great deal of caution when handling it. One day they’re immune, the next day they’re sorting documents to try to sort out what needs to go to the Archives.

That’s a different problem than overclassification.

Crazier still, most of the people who are out there claiming this about overclassification are using (at least partly) as their examples people who sought out documents that were not part of their work and then leaked those documents. Those cases are also not about overclassification.

And amid all the talk of overclassification, none of the pundits have mentioned a case that is a far more apt example of overclassification and the way the Executive uses classification to punish people: Jeremy Brown, the Oath Keeper recently found guilty of unlawfully retaining — right next to some grenades for which he was also convicted — one document that Brown wrote himself in 2011, classified Secret, believed to be about the Bowe Bergdahl case.

Brown was acquitted on 793 charges for four other documents, also classified Secret, that were even older.

Brown’s case in many ways parallels Trump’s. Like Trump, the Feds showed up and asked him to return the document and he lied to hide it. Like Trump, the FBI found the documents with a warrant.

But it’s far more likely these documents, all of which were at least ten years old, are overclassified.

Don’t get me wrong: I think Brown is a dangerous shithole. I’m not unhappy he’s going to prison.

I also think DOJ believed, correctly, they could use these classified documents (along with the grenades) as a way to neutralize a dangerous loose canon.

Want to make a case about overclassification? Jeremy Brown is the dangerous shithole you should be defending. Want to prevent the grave disparities in how powerful people are treated, as compared to dangerous shitholes like Jeremy Brown?

You need to address that magic process by which Presidents are treated with immunity and then — in an instant!! — purportedly subjected to the same rules as everyone else.

The Rules Against Keeping Classified Documents in an Unsecure RV Parked alongside Jeremy Brown’s Home

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Several days into the trial of Oath Keeper Jeremy Brown, it continues to provide useful lessons for the case of that other disgruntled former Federal employee who took classified documents home to Florida with him.

In a motion in limine submitted yesterday, the government sought to preclude Brown from taking the stand and explaining why he took one of the classified documents he is accused of storing in his RV.

Count 10 charges the Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) in connection with his willful retention of the Classified Trip Report. The parties have agreed that in order to prove the Defendant guilty of this offense, the government must establish that (1) the Defendant possessed the Classified Trip Report without authorization, (2) the Classified Trip Report relates to the national defense, and (3) the Defendant willfully retained the Classified Trip Report and failed to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled to receive it. See Dkt. 230-1 at 19 (joint jury instruction setting forth elements of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)).

Notably absent from these elements is any requirement that the Defendant intended to harm the United States. Nor does the government need to prove that the Defendant even knew or had reason to know that his conduct would harm the United States. Consequently, evidence of the Defendant’s motive, rationale, or justification for possessing the Classified Trip Report is irrelevant to the elements of this offense—unless he is contending that he was authorized to possess the Report (which he has never and cannot credibly argue).

Such evidence is also not relevant to establishing that the Defendant “willfully” retained the Classified Trip Report. The Defendant either acted willfully—i.e., he knew that his conduct was generally unlawful—or he did not. His reasons or motive for so acting are irrelevant. Here, the Defendant knew that the Trip Report was classified and he knew that it was against the rules to keep classified [sic] in an unsecure RV parked alongside his home. Indeed, he placed the classified markings on the document himself, and chose to include particularly sensitive information in the Report that could jeopardize U.S. national security. The Defendant’s subjective preference that some of the information in the document should have been at a different classification level – as pointed out to the jury during cross-examination of Special Agent Koundarakis – is similarly irrelevant. On these facts, the Defendant acted willfully. The Defendant’s subjective belief that he had good intentions, or his preferred classification level for the information in the document, is entirely immaterial to that analysis.

This is the kind of motive argument that many people accused of 18 USC 793(e) want to argue. Trump (or Kash Patel) himself has argued a form of it by arguing that he should have been able to take the documents about the Russian investigation to prove he was unfairly targeted.

In this case, the government is arguing that doing so (Brown already did so in opening arguments) amounts to jury nullification.

“[T]he potential for jury nullification is no basis for admitting otherwise irrelevant evidence.” Funchesi, 135 F.3d at 1409. The defendant does not have a due process right to present evidence “the only relevance of which is to inspire a jury to exercise its power of nullification.” Id. at 1408. Rather, “[j]ury nullification verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.” Id. at 1409.

If and when Brown’s fellow Floridian is ever charged with 793(e), I expect to see a much more extended version of this argument: That’s it’s okay to bring home classified documents and store them in your RV or leatherbound box of trophies because you had a good motive.

But there will be a whole bunch of precedent ruling such arguments about — possibly even from Brown’s own case! And since the 11th Circuit ruled that Trump isn’t special, I don’t expect any attempt to argue motive will work

That Other Bitter Jan6er about to Start Trial for Bringing Classified Documents Home from Work

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There’s a guy in Florida who participated in the attack on democracy on January 6 about to go on trial on October 3 for hoarding classified documents in his home.

No, not that guy.

I’m talking about Jeremy Brown, the Oath Keeper charged with trespassing for January 6, but also charged with possession of illegal weapons and classified documents in Florida. Brown’s is an instructive example of what normally happens when a disgruntled former government employee hoards government secrets and allegedly plots the overthrow of constitutional government.

It started with a misdemeanor arrest warrant arising out of the January 6 grand jury investigation in DC, just for trespassing. Upon searching Brown’s house and RV, FBI agents saw several firearms and some grenades that cooperating Oath Keeper witness Caleb Berry had told investigators that Brown brought to January 6 in his RV. So the FBI got another warrant the next day to seize the weapons.

On October 19, DOJ indicted him for the weapons. They found a bunch of documents in a briefcase in that search, though, and after six months, they superseded Brown, adding four counts of 18 USC 793e, the same crime for which that other guy in Florida is being investigated.

It may have taken them six months to determine whether the 18-year old documents from a deployment to Afghanistan were still classified. Or — as explained below — they may have considered but decided not to charge him for a report Brown bragged about while drunk five yers ago. That process of deciding which documents to charge (what Brandon Van Grack revealed recently are called “Goldilocks” documents) takes some time and requires the input of the agencies whose documents would be charged.

That’s part of the discussion going on right now about the documents Trump took home.

Like many Jan6ers, Brown spent much of the last year challenging his detention and searching for increasingly MAGAt lawyers, ultimately settling on representing himself, pro se. Brown challenged the search of his home — but not the seizure of those classified documents. The two sides have also had a fight about how much of the money that Brown grifted by fund-raising off his arrest he or his girlfriend could access, rather than pay off his court appointed lawyer. Brown’s girlfriend also successfully fought to have a rifle belonging to her returned to her.

It’s not just Trump who tries to get their personal stuff back after an invasive search.

The case has only recently turned to the classified information that will be debated at trial. For example, the government is seeking to admit related evidence (called 404(b)), about the time in 2017 when investigators came to his home based on a suspicion he had classified information. They didn’t find the classified document in the place he permitted them to look, but he refused to let him search his whole house.

On October 17, 2017, Special Agents from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations conducted a voluntary interview of the Defendant at his residence, which was the same residence that was searched in this case. The purpose of the interview was to determine whether the Defendant possessed any classified information and, if so, to retrieve the information and return it to the government entity to which it belonged.

During the interview, the Defendant denied possessing any classified information, and he further stated that he did not recall telling anyone that he possessed classified information. The Defendant admitted that he had drafted a classified trip report about a missing soldier, and that he may have discussed that report with others. The Defendant stated that it was possible that he may have discussed this classified information with one of his friends while he was intoxicated, and that it was possible that his friend had misconstrued that conversation to mean that he had classified information in his home. Agents asked the Defendant whether he had that classified memorandum or any other classified information in his possession, and he stated that he did not.

At the request of the interviewing agents, the Defendant consented to a search of the storage containers in his shed, which he stated contained all of the items that he had removed from his office upon his retirement from the military in 2012. Agents searched the storage containers, and they did not find any classified information. Agents requested permission to search the remaining residence and other areas on the property. The Defendant refused to consent to the search of anywhere else on the property.

The government wants to introduce evidence of this earlier search as proof he knew he had the classified documents, fulfilling one element of the offense — precisely the same thing DOJ would do with the June 3 meeting if they were ever to charge Trump.

What’s more, the Defendant’s 2017 refusal to consent to a search of his residence for classified information further establishes his consciousness of guilt for the charged crimes, which is relevant to proving that he willfully retained the documents, as required by the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (“Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document . . . . relating to the national defense . . . willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”).

This is exactly how the June 3 meeting would function in a Trump prosecution. Before that, he might have been able to claim he didn’t know he had the documents or hadn’t refused to hand them back. After that, it’s far easier to make the case. That’s why it’s virtually impossible to charge Trump for 18 USC 793 for the earlier possession of classified documents.

Brown objects to that evidence coming in because, he says, the documents that he did brag about in 2017 aren’t classified in the form in which they were found in his briefcase, because he wrote them himself.

The documents that are the subject of the 404(b) notice allegedly were found in the Defendant’s possession along with the alleged classified documents are the subject of the criminal charges in the Indictment.

[snip]

The 404(b) documents that the Government chose not to charge the Defendant with, probably because in the form they are in, are not classified, were allegedly in the same briefcase as the charged documents. In 2017, the Defendant was discussing documents that he did have in his possession that he himself had marked “SECRET,” that he had authored, and that the Government decided did not warrant criminal charges for him possessing when they found the documents.

That’s probably not true: the documents are probably just harder to prove to be classified and possibly a good deal more sensitive, given that Brown was bragging about them.

Again, this is something we might see with a Trump prosecution: The government might charge less sexy documents that could be shared with a jury, but reference the far more damning ones stored with the charged documents.

The government has also recently turned to how they’ll persuade the jury, which is the ultimate judge, that these documents constitute National Defense Information. Here’s the standard the jury will be asked to consider.

To establish that the Documents contained “information relating to the national defense,” the government need show only that (1) the information is directly and reasonably connected with the national defense, and (2) the information was closely held by the government. See United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 1004-05 (11th Cir. 2008) (“‘information relating to the national defense’ . . . is limited to information that the government has endeavored to keep from the public”). The Supreme Court has held that “national defense” is a “generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness.” Id. (quoting Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941)).

To prove this, the government wants to have a witness attest the documents remain classified.

At trial, the government anticipates calling an expert witness to testify that the Classified Documents were and remain classified, and that, as a result, they were subject to access restrictions, specific handling and storage requirements, and other protections designed to avoid the disclosure of information and material relating to the national security.

They want the witness to explain the documents. While that person testifies, they want to share the documents with the jury under what is called a Silent Witness Rule. They’ll be handed binders — the one time I’ve seen this process, the documents were in the brightly colored classified folders like the ones Trump stole — with the actual documents inside, but then have to return the binders as soon as the witness is done.

As part of this testimony, the government’s expert will testify about the Classified Documents. To enable the jury to adequately weigh this testimony, the government will provide copies of the Classified Documents to the jurors. The Court and the defense will also receive copies of the Classified Documents. However, because public disclosure of the Classified Documents reasonably could cause serious damage to national security, the Classified Documents cannot be declassified for the trial.

[snip]

First, the government would provide each juror, the Court, and the defense with a binder of unredacted copies of the Classified Documents. The same process was followed in Mallory, 40 F.4th at 173, and it would enable the jurors to examine the Classified Documents while the government elicits unclassified testimony about the same from its expert witness. As in Mallory, the defense would be permitted to follow the same procedures during cross examination and/or with its own cleared expert, should the defense choose to retain one. Id. This procedure ensures that the jury has full access to the information it needs to fulfill its obligations. Id. at 178 (“But a review of the record reveals that the silent witness rule denied the jury none of the information on which Mallory based his defense.” (emphasis in original)). Second, the government will have Bates and line numbers added to the Classified Documents to enable the witness, the government, and the defense to direct the jurors to specific portions of the material.

While that happens, the public will have access only to heavily redacted versions of the documents.

The SWR is fairly controversial. In Jeffrey Sterling’s case (the one time I’ve seen it), it accorded the documents a kind of mystique and also limited the amount of time the jury could spend examining the documents, which weren’t related to the charged offenses in the case.

But (as the government explained) the SWR is one of the few tools the government has to prove to a jury that information is classified so they can hold someone accountable for hoarding such documents after he leaves government.

Because the Defendant is charged with violation 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), the government must establish that the Classified Documents found in his RV contain information relating to the national defense. Thus, the Classified Documents will necessarily be a part of the upcoming trial. Declassification of these documents is not an option given the national security risks presented by disclosure. Nor can the Classified Documents be redacted in a manner that would mitigate the national security risks, while also preserving the jury’s ability to meaningfully evaluate whether the Classified Documents relate to the national defense. This is exactly the sort of Hobson’s choice—protecting the national security versus pursuing charges under the Espionage Act—that CIPA was designed to prevent. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Prior to CIPA, there was no way to evaluate the cost, by way of damage to the national security and the nation’s foreign relations, should the prosecution be initiated or pursued.”).

Brown is just an angry old former Green Beret who has been stewing on his bitterness with all the keepsakes in his RV. He’s not the former President. Though they both seem to spend a lot of time stewing with their treasures.

But the same complexities arise even in his case. And even with Brown, prosecuting someone for hoarding classified documents he brought home from work is not easy.

Update: Added more contextualization of how this would work with Trump.

Update: Another filing in the Brown case provided some context for how, the government claims, he left the Special Forces. He loaded some porn onto a DOD computer, did not contest the charges, and so was not permitted to re-enlist. DOJ ties the incident directly to the classified documents found in his RV.

While in the Special Forces, over the course of eight months from September 2010 to April 2011, the Defendant “knowingly and willfully placed approximately 67 unauthorized files on the [Department of Defense computer system] shared drive.” See Exhibit 1. The military determined that the 67 files that the Defendant had uploaded contained “pornographic photos and videos.”

On September 29, 2011, the Defendant received a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (“GOMR”) for these actions, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. The GOMR determined that, but uploading pornography to the military computer systems, the Defendant had “compromised the high standards of personal conduct and exemplary behavior expected of a Senior Noncommissioned Officer and Special Forces.” It further determined that the Defendant’s behavior was “inexcusable and incompatible with the maintenance of high standards of performance, military discipline and readiness,” and had “demonstrated extremely poor judgment, a lack of self-discipline, lack of professionalism and set an extremely poor example for all Soldiers.”

[snip]

The Defendant’s commanding officer, wanting to ensure that the Defendant’s children would not lose their pension, intervened to prevent the Defendant from being dishonorably discharged. As a result of this GOMR, however, the Defendant was barred from reenlistment in the military.

The Defendant was angry about the GOMR, and he later claimed that the GOMR was levied against him in retaliation for the contents of a classified memorandum that he had written. The Defendant finished out his term of enlistment and retired from the Army in 2012.

And it provides more detail on how and where it found the documents.

On September 30, 2021, federal agents executed a search warrant at the Defendant’s residence and recreational vehicle (R.V.). In the bedroom of the R.V., agents located an ammunition carrier containing two M-67 fragmentation grenades. On a couch in the R.V., agents located an illegal short-barrel shotgun. Next to the shotgun, agents located a briefcase. Inside the briefcase, agents located photographs and personal papers of the Defendant. Among those papers, agents found a paper copy of a classified Memorandum concerning a missing soldier that the Defendant had authored, which was marked “SECRET,” as well as a C.D. marked as classified with a red “SECRET” sticker. Subsequent review of that C.D. revealed that it had numerous classified documents that the Defendant had retained from his time in the military.

If you believe the government’s story (though stories of how DOD disposes of guys like Brown are always suspect), he brought these documents home nursing a grievance, certain he was not fired for cause.

It’s another thing he has in common with Trump, I guess.

On Oath Keeper Jeremy Brown’s Asymmetric Treatment

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CNN got a lot of people in a tizzy by incorrectly claiming that a 404b notice filed Friday included new information about the Oath Keeper conspiracy (this story, from Kyle Cheney, makes no claim this is new information). None of the general allegations — that Jessica Watkins had explosives making recipe at her house, that Thomas Caldwell had a list targeting a Georgia election official, that the Oath Keepers did a variety of training sessions before the insurrection — are new. They’ve shown up in detention motions going back to January 2021.

Perhaps the most inflammatory allegation, regarding former Special Forces guy Jeremy Brown, describes that the grenade discovered in Brown’s RV when the FBI searched his property in September was in the RV as it drove to DC for the insurrection.

Jeremy Brown is currently an unindicted co-conspirator in the Oath Keeper conspiracy.2 In November 2020, Brown led the Florida chapter of the Oath Keepers in a training on “unconventional warfare.” See ECF No. 167 at ¶ 22. During this period, he messaged extensively with Florida-based co-conspirators on Signal.3 For example, on November 9, he messaged, “As I am sure you all have plenty of ammo and guns. What I suspect we are not deep on are burner phones and phone cards. These will be needed in great numbers as part of a clandestine comms plan.”

In preparation for January 6, 2021, Brown continued to participate on Signal chats with Rhodes and various Florida Oath Keepers, including Meggs, Kenneth Harrelson and Caleb Berry, regarding transportation to Washington, D.C. on January 6:

We have a RV an Van going. Plenty of Gun Ports left to fill. We can pick you up… If you can, come to my house anytime Saturday. You can stop by and drop stuff off, or stay the night. This way we can load plan, route plan, and conduct PCIs (Pre Combat Inspections). I would LIKE to depart by 0645 on Sunday morning, Jan 3rd. Push through to the NC linkup on the 3rd, RON (Rest Over Night) there, then push to DC on the 4th. This will give us the 4th/5th to set up, conduct route recons, CTR (Close Target Reconnaissance) and any link ups needed with DC elements.

On January 4, 2021, Brown supplied a helmet to Florida Oath Keeper Berry, who met Brown at Brown’s house, and then caravanned with Berry, Meggs, Harrelson and other Florida Oath Keepers first to North Carolina, where they rendezvoused with additional Oath Keepers, and then to the Washington, D.C. area.

The same day, January 4, Meggs informed Jessica Watkins and other co-conspirators via Signal that Brown would be assisting in the Washington, D.C. operation, writing, “Jessica you have 4 working the detail from Ohio. Padimaster you have 6 confirmed for detail from SC. If correct that gives us 27 man team I like it!! Perfect mi with 4-5 medics in the group. I’ll keep working on overall contact between Natl/congress team and stop the steal team for scheduling etc… Kenneth Harrelson runs the ground team. Whippit and Jeremy Brown will assist him especially when we are moving!” Upon arrival in the Washington, D.C. area, Brown deposited various weapons at the Comfort Inn hotel in Virginia that served as the staging area for the QRF. During this same period, Meggs informed Berry that Brown possessed explosives in his Recreational Vehicle (“RV”). 4

The government subsequently seized explosives from Brown. On September 30, 2021, pursuant to an authorized search warrant, the government seized two illegal short barrel firearms from Brown’s residence and military ordinance grenades from Brown’s RV—the same RV that Brown used to travel to Washington, D.C. on January 6.

4 The government is unaware whether Brown deposited the explosives at the Comfort Inn in Virginia or retained them in his RV, which he parked in College Park, Maryland.

Substantially that same information appeared in a detention dispute for Brown in February.

These details have, probably, gone largely unnoticed because Brown is, thus far, only charged for trespassing in conjunction with January 6; he is charged in Florida for his arsenal and some classified documents he kept from his service in Afghanistan. That trial is currently scheduled to start August 1.

Let that be a lesson not to sleep on the misdemeanor cases, because some of them are quite important!

His inclusion in this 404b notice, however, does raise questions about his asymmetric treatment, thus far. He didn’t enter the building — but that’s true of Thomas Caldwell (who is accused of playing a leadership role) or Bennie Parker (who is not) as well. If he is treated as an unindicted co-conspirator, then why isn’t he a charged conspirator?

Indeed, Brown — who is representing himself but who as of recently had two pro bono lawyers expecting to share his discovery without filing notices of appearance — asked just that question in a status hearing on June 23. He noted that the full Oath Keeper team had been added to his case and was demanding the discovery from the sedition case, wanting to share it with those unnamed pro bono standby attorneys. He demanded to know whether he would be charged with sedition.

At the hearing, prosecutor Louis Manzo said there was no plan to add him to the sedition trial scheduled for September. When Brown noted that that didn’t preclude him being added to the lesser Oath Keeper conspiracy, Manzo said that as of now DOJ had no plan to add him to either of the existing conspiracies, though wanted to avoid committing to it.

Obviously, that could change. DOJ only recently added the field leader for the day, Michael Greene/Simmons to the lesser conspiracy. And if he were acquitted in the Florida trial, DOJ would likely charge him in DC to keep him detained — they believed he was dangerous even before the insurrection.

But I can’t help but wonder whether DOJ has some other plan for him.

Update: To clarify something for those claiming this asymmetry reflects a lack of seriousness on DOJ’s part, what DOJ has done is charge Brown with crimes that could represent ~80 years in jail (though would more likely end up in the 10-20 year range), all without having to risk him fucking up the main sedition case, even while allowing DOJ to use his actions against the accused seditionists. That is, this may reflect a way to hold Brown accountable in a way that gives him the least ability to fuck up the main case.