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Kristi Noem Invokes State Secrets to Cover-Up Her Inability to ID Women as Women

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One of the transphobic right wing’s most annoying taunts is that Democrats can’t decide whether women are women. It is central to the long-running campaign to demonize trans people to claim that birth sex, which transphobes claim is a person’s true and immutable sex, is always immediately apparent.

Yet yesterday, Kristi Noem invoked State Secrets to cover-up the fact that she — and the agencies she runs — were unable to identify women as women. DOJ included Noem’s declaration as part of package invoking State Secrets in the Alien Enemies Act lawsuit yesterday.

The declarations, in general, are ridiculous given filings submitted by ACLU earlier yesterday.

Both Rubio and Noem’s declarations include language claiming that official acknowledgement of details of the deportation flights — the kinds of details Judge James Boasberg might use to hold them in contempt — is different than, “assumptions, speculation, public investigation, or informal statements.” This, mentioning “informal” reports or statements five times, is from Noem’s declaration:

Disclosure of the information sought in the Court’s Minute Order would cause significant harm to the United States’ national security even assuming some of that information has already entered public sources as a result of assumptions, speculation, public investigation, or informal statements. It is both true and well known that official acknowledgement of a fact may be damaging to national interests in a way that informal suggestions or speculation about that information is not. If the government were to confirm or deny the information sought by this Court’s Minute Order, there would arise a danger that enemies of our national security would be able to stitch together an understanding of the means and methods used to thwart their unlawful and sometimes violent conduct.

[snip]

There is a difference between official acknowledgement and informal reports: Official disclosures or acknowledgements threaten the United States’ national security interests in a way that informal reports or statements do not, because informal statements leave an important element of doubt that provides an essential layer of protection and confidentiality. That protection would be lost if the United States were forced to confirm or deny the accuracy of unofficial disclosures or speculation. [my emphasis]

But the plaintiffs’ declaration notes that after Nayib Bukele posted a propaganda video showing three planes that had brought detainees to El Salvador, with tail numbers visible, both Trump and Rubio effectively ratified by reposting the video.

In addition, public information shows that two planes were still in the air when the Court issued both its oral and written Orders. Most significantly, based on information publicized by U.S. government officials and publicly available flight data, at least two flights took off during the hearing on March 15—one at 5:26pm EDT and the other at 5:45pm EDT—and landed well after this Court’s written Order had been filed. See Pls. Resp. to Defs. Notice (ECF No. 21); see also Joyce Sohyun Lee and Kevin Schaul, Deportation Flights Landed after Judge Said Planes Should Turn Around, Wash. Post (Mar. 16, 2025). 2 And the video released by President Bukele that shows Plaintiff class members being hauled off the planes in El Salvador includes each plane’s tail number.3 That video was then reposted by both President Trump4 and Secretary of State Rubio.5

2 https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2025/03/16/deportation-flights-trump-elsalvador [https://perma.cc/Q6NH-ATY8]

3 https://x.com/nayibbukele/status/1901245427216978290 [https://perma.cc/BM73-547H].

4 https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114173862724361939 [https://perma.cc/67LY-FREW].

5 https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1901252043517432213 [https://perma.cc/RXH4-XH4R].

The Xitter post from Rubio, using his official Secretary of State Xitter account, specifically says, “Thank you for your assistance and friendship, President Bukele” in response to his claim that 238 members of Tren de Aragua “arrived in our country” effectively ratifying that those planes were the ones used, and that the number Bukele used was the one given to him.

Perhaps the government is prepping a claim that these are “informal” statements. But Donald Trump has fired people by tweet, over and over, and nominated a good number of cabinet members by tweet, including Noem herself.

Trump’s tweets have official effect. To claim Trump’s tweet didn’t ratify Bukele’s post is nonsense.

Rubio and Noem’s focus on the danger of official confirmation is about refusing to provide Boasberg details showing that DHS had not done adequate vetting of the detainees to sustain the claim they really were members of Tren de Aragua. Again, this is from Noem’s declaration:

In addition to flight operations, the number of TdA members on a given removal flight is also information that, if disclosed, would expose ICE’s means and methods, thus threatening significant harm to the national security of the United States. Revealing and/or confirming the number of TdA members involved would reveal key details about how the United States conducts these sorts of operations and would allow other aliens (members of TdA and otherwise) to draw inferences about how the Government prioritizes and uses its resources in immigration enforcement and counterterrorism operations.

[snip]

When the United [sic] seeks to remove individuals to a foreign country, the United States must negotiate the details of that removal with the foreign country. This requires nonpublic, sensitive, and high stakes negotiation with the foreign State, particularly where, as here, the aliens being removed have been deemed enemy aliens and members of a foreign terrorist organization. Those negotiations cover sensitive issues, including representations regarding the bases on which the individuals are being removed from the United States, which can impact the foreign State’s willingness to accept the removed aliens and the procedures it will employ in doing so.

[snip]

Similarly, if sensitive information covered by a compelled disclosure — for example, the number and nature of aliens removed to the foreign State — were to come to light — the receiving foreign State’s government could face internal or international pressure making that foreign State and other foreign States less likely to work cooperatively in the future with the United States on matters affecting its national security.

Moreover, if a disclosure were to in any way undercut or, in the eyes of a foreign State (fairly or not) cast doubt on representations made by the United States during sensitive negotiations, that could likewise make that foreign State and other foreign States less likely to work cooperatively with the United States on matters affecting its national security.

Noem is not entirely making shit up (nor is she lying, elsewhere in her declaration, that confirmation that the flights landed in Honduras could cause problems).

Bukele said he was given 238 members of TdA. It was key to his propaganda campaign. If Boasberg now finds that’s false, it might well embarrass Bukele (though he’s pretty immune from embarrassment).

The problem for Noem and Rubio, is ACLU already presented two sworn declarations asserting that the Trump Administration’s public representations were false. EEPB, for example, described being told that El Salvador would not accept him, a Nicaraguan, because it would cause “conflict.”

I overheard a Salvadoran official tell an ICE officer that the Salvadoran government would not detain someone from another Central American country because of the conflict it would cause. I also heard him say that they would not receive the females because the prison was not for females and females were not mentioned in the agreement. I then saw the ICE officer call someone, and after the call, I overheard him saying we had to be sent back.

They included a guy whose accent undoubtedly makes it clear he’s not Venezuelan, but claimed he was a Venezuelan anyway.

More alarming still, Venezuelan woman SZFR — who, like other women on one of the planes, had not yet been formally deported and so by definition should only have been on one of the planes alleged to carry TdA members — described guards on the plane acknowledging that they knew an order prohibited the departure of the plane. She also described that guards were trying to force the male detainees on the plane to sign forms admitting they were TdA members.

10. When we got on the plane there were already over 50 men on the plane. I could see other migrants walking to the plane but we took off before any additional people boarded.

11. Within a couple of minutes of take off I heard two US government officials talking and they said “there is an order saying we can’t take off but we already have.”

12. I asked where we were going and we were told that we were going to Venezuela.

13. Several other people on the plane told me they were in immigration proceedings and awaiting court hearings in immigration court.

14. We were not allowed to open our window shades.

15. We landed somewhere for refueling. We were there for many hours. We were arm and leg shackled the whole time.

16. We took off again and landed fairly quickly. I was then told we were in El Salvador.

17. While on the plane the government officials were asking the men to sign a document and they didn’t want to. The government officials were pushing them to sign the documents and threatening them. I heard them discussing the documents and they were about the men admitting they were members of TdA.

18. After we landed but were still on the plane a woman opened the shade. An officer rushed to shut the shade and pushed her down by her shoulders to try and stop her from looking out. The person that pushed her down had HOU-02 on his sleeve.

19. I saw out the window for a minute and I saw men in military uniforms and another plane. I saw men being led off the plane. Since I’ve been back in the U.S. I have seen news coverage and the plane I saw looks like the one I’ve seen on TV with migrants from the U.S. being delivered to El Salvador.

20. All the men got off the plane. The remaining women asked what happens to us? I was told that the President of El Salvador would not accept women. I was also told that we were going back to detention in the U.S. [my emphasis]

But the most important part with respect to Noem’s sworn statement that she can’t reveal details about who was on the plane is that the agreement with Bukele said he would not accept women.

And yet Kristi Noem’s DHS sent women — around nine of them — anyway.

There’s a lot that Noem is trying to cover up with her State Secrets declaration, starting with how incompetent her DHS is.

But one of the key details she’s trying to cover up is that a committed transphobe like Noem couldn’t even properly identify the sex of the detainees she was sending to El Salvador.

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Todd Blanche Kicks Off His Tenure Chasing Leaks Implicating His Own Conduct

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Around 8AM on Friday, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche announced an investigation of a leak to the NYT pertaining to Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua.

The Justice Department is opening a criminal investigation relating to the selective leak of inaccurate, but nevertheless classified, information from the Intelligence Community relating to Tren de Aragua (TDA). We will not tolerate politically motivated efforts by the Deep State to undercut President Trump’s agenda by leaking false information onto the pages of their allies at the New York Times. The Alien Enemies Proclamation is supported by fact, law, and common sense, which we will establish in court and then expel the TDA terrorists from this country.

While DHS and DOJ and FBI have made less formal announcements about leak investigations, most notably an evolving claim that leaks from the FBI or maybe DHS or who knows whether this is all a lazy excuse had tipped off alleged TdA members of imminent immigration operations, this was notable in its formality (which, admittedly, may stem exclusively from the fact that Blanche not a Xitter addict like Kristi Noem, Pam Bondi, and Kash Patel). The announcement was even more notable given Blanche’s claim that the leak was “inaccurate,” which would seem to undercut any claim it was classified.

This was, formally at least, maybe just the third public announcement that Blanche made as DAG (though he has already made a stink defending his client Donald Trump in court cases), with one of the others inviting people to claim they’ve been victims of DEI discrimination.

It appears, though no one has said explicitly, the investigation is into the leak claiming that the Intelligence Community disagrees with Trump about TdA’s ties to the Venezuelan government.

President Trump’s assertion that a gang is committing crimes in the United States at the direction of Venezuela’s government was critical to his invocation of a wartime law last week to summarily deport people whom officials suspected of belonging to that group.

But American intelligence agencies circulated findings last month that stand starkly at odds with Mr. Trump’s claims, according to officials familiar with the matter. The document, dated Feb. 26, summarized the shared judgment of the nation’s spy agencies that the gang was not controlled by the Venezuelan government.

The disclosure calls into question the credibility of Mr. Trump’s basis for invoking a rarely used wartime law, the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, to transfer a group of Venezuelans to a high-security prison in El Salvador last weekend, with no due process.

The intelligence community assessment concluded that the gang, Tren de Aragua, was not directed by Venezuela’s government or committing crimes in the United States on its orders, according to the officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Analysts put that conclusion at a “moderate” confidence level, the officials said, because of a limited volume of available reporting about the gang. Most of the intelligence community, including the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency, agreed with that assessment.

Only one agency, the F.B.I., partly dissented. It maintained the gang has a connection to the administration of Venezuela’s authoritarian president, Nicolás Maduro, based on information the other agencies did not find credible.

The story was published on March 20, before the investigation announcement, but only published in the dead tree NYT after it.

If that’s correct, the investigation that Blanche rushed to formally announce implicates his own behavior.

Blanche’s announcement came the same day that he filed an insolent declaration before Judge James Boasberg, adopting the claim made by a regional ICE official in a declaration submitted one day earlier: The government is considering invoking State Secrets to withhold from Boasberg even the most basic details of deportation flights that brought Venezuelans to El Salvador after he ordered them to turn.

2. On March 20, 2025, the Government submitted a declaration from Robert L. Cerna II, which stated: “I understand that Cabinet Secretaries are currently actively considering whether to invoke the state secrets privilege over the other facts requested by the Court’s order. Doing so is a serious matter that requires careful consideration of national security and foreign relations, and it cannot properly be undertaken in just 24 hours.”

3. I attest to the accuracy of those statements based on personal knowledge of the events described by Mr. Cerna, including my direct involvement in ongoing Cabinet-level discussions regarding invocation of the state-secrets privilege.

DOJ wants to withhold those details even though some details of which were leaked to Fox News Deportation Propagandist Bill Melugin right away, other details of which are readily available on flight tracker websites.

Judge Boasberg’s order demanding such a cabinet-level declaration came before Blanche’s leak investigation announcement.

Which is to say NYT was working on this intelligence assessment story even as DOJ was stonewalling Boasberg about why it deported two or three planeloads of Venezuelans after he ordered DOJ not to.

Whether or not Trump’s DOJ invokes State Secrets Tuesday, there’s plenty of information in the public record — including the NYT story — that would undercut, but also explain, such an invocation.

CBS published a list of the Venezuelans who were deported — the kind of leak that elicited heavy pushback when they involved Gitmo under George Bush, and almost certainly had to come from some kind of internal documentation but was not obviously implicated in Blanche’s investigation announcement.

The plaintiffs filed declarations debunking the government’s claims that the men deported or targeted to be were criminals, much less members of TdA. There was plenty of other reporting on missing family members who seem to have been deported based on soccer tattoos.

NYT and WaPo both have stories suggesting the underlying reason this trade happened: Because El Salvador’s authoritarian President Nayib Bukele is anxious to get MS-13 members who could implicate him in terrorism out of US custody. Here’s WaPo’s (later) story:

Some say Bukele is trying to hide his government’s own involvement with the gangs.

More than two dozen high-ranking Salvadoran gang leaders have been charged with terrorism and other crimes in a Justice Department investigation that has lasted years. Several of them are jailed in the United States. One of the indictments details how senior members of Bukele’s government held secret negotiations with gang leaders after his 2019 election. The gang members wanted financial benefits, control of territory and better jail conditions, the court documents say. In exchange, they agreed to tamp down homicides in public areas and to pressure neighborhoods under their control to support Bukele’s party in midterm elections, according to the 2022 indictment.

Bukele’s government went so far as to free a top MS-13 leader, Elmer Canales Rivera, or “Crook,” from a Salvadoran prison, according to the documents — even though the U.S. government had asked for his extradition. (He was later captured in Mexico and sent to the U.S.)

Last weekend, the Trump administration sent back one of the MS-13 leaders named in the indictments, César Humberto López Larios, alias “Greñas,” along with the 238 Venezuelans and nearly two dozen other Salvadorans allegedly tied to gangs.

Some Salvadoran analysts believe Bukele wants the gang leaders back so they won’t testify about his government’s involvement with them — and potentially put him in legal trouble.

“If these returns [of Salvadoran gang members] continue, it takes away the possibility that the U.S. judicial system will open a case against Bukele for negotiations and agreements with terrorist groups,” said Juan Martínez d’Aubuisson, an anthropologist who has studied the gangs.

The possibility that this effort to outsource detention and torture to Bukele is part of a quid pro quo helping a fellow authoritarian to cover up his own criminal ties is not dissimilar from details about Saudi complicity in 9/11 that the Bush Administration spent years invoking State Secrets to cover up.

And then finally, in plain sight, on Friday Trump disclaimed that he personally had signed the Alien Enemies Act declaration, that someone used an autopen for his signature. If true (I certainly don’t rule out Stephen Miller autosigning half the stuff that comes out under Trump’s name), that would undermine the Article II claims the government is making.

In other words, even as the government claims to be contemplating invoking State Secrets (which would require declarations to Boasberg I’m not sure they’re willing to provide), the following details have come out:

  • Names and details of the detainees, debunking the claims of TdA affiliation on which Trump based their deportation, making it clear that Trump rushed these deportations to avoid disclosing that TdA isn’t what he says it is
  • Good reason to question the underlying quid pro quo with Bukele
  • Trump’s claim that the AEA order was not backed by the Article II authority DOJ has spent a week claiming it is.
  • The likely subject of the leak investigation: Claims from spooks that any intelligence to support this AEA effort is based on flimsy intelligence

This is the kind of fact set that has the potential to snowball.

Meanwhile, just two months into this Administration, it’s already investigating leaks about purportedly internal spats. Unrelated to Venezuela, there was the NYT leak disclosing Pete Hegseth was about to brief Elon Musk about DOD’s plans for war with China, in response to which Elon called for leak prosecutions.

The chief Pentagon spokesman, Sean Parnell, initially did not respond to a similar email seeking comment about why Mr. Musk was to receive a briefing on the China war plan. Soon after The Times published this article on Thursday evening, Mr. Parnell gave a short statement: “The Defense Department is excited to welcome Elon Musk to the Pentagon on Friday. He was invited by Secretary Hegseth and is just visiting.”

About an hour later, Mr. Parnell posted a message on his X account: “This is 100% Fake News. Just brazenly & maliciously wrong. Elon Musk is a patriot. We are proud to have him at the Pentagon.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also commented on X late on Thursday, saying: “This is NOT a meeting about ‘top secret China war plans.’ It’s an informal meeting about innovation, efficiencies & smarter production. Gonna be great!”

Roughly 30 minutes after that social media post, The Wall Street Journal confirmed that Mr. Musk had been scheduled to be briefed on the war planning for China.

In his own post on social media early Friday, Mr. Musk said he looked forward to “the prosecutions of those at the Pentagon who are leaking maliciously false information to NYT.”

The leak served a very important (and presumably, its intended) purpose: NYT subsequently reported that Trump had not known about the briefing.

Mr. Trump made clear he had been caught by surprise by The Times’s report, saying he called his White House chief of staff and Mr. Hegseth to ask about it; he said they said it was “ridiculous.” But he also said that Mr. Musk — who has extensive business in China — should not be made aware of such sensitive information. It was one of the first specific statements from the president about what he would consider a bridge too far for Mr. Musk, who has expansive potential conflicts of interest created by a portfolio as a part-time government staff member and adviser.

Yet CNN reported that DOD would conduct an investigation, using polygraphs, which the article explicitly suggests is a reference to this leak.

We’re used to these people doing suspect things to cover up Trump’s alleged crimes. But it took just days for Todd Blanche to involve himself personally in all this, even while siccing investigators on those who might debunk the legal claims he’s making in court. And the DOD leak suggests these are not just — as Blanche claimed in his investigation announcement — the Deep State undermining Trump.

These are, in part, people trying to prevent Trump from making bigger fuck-ups than he’s already making.

Update: Corrected date State Secrets declaration is due.

Update: I said the Todd Blanche announcement was 8AM, based off the time listed on the press release. But it was not sent out until hours later, after the status hearing.

Timeline

[docket]

March 14: Trump issues but does not publish AEA proclamation

March 15: Proclamation posted

March 15: Boasberg certifies class, issues TRO

March 15: Emergency hearing

March 15, 7:25: Boasberg order

March 17: NYT Bukele story

March 17: Boasberg orders briefing on post-order deportations by March 18 at noon

March 17, 5PM: Boasberg hearing

March 18: First Cerna declaration

March 18: Boasberg orders March 19 declarations on details of deportation

March 19: Boasberg partially grants request for extension

March 20, 12:11PM: Second Cerna declaration

March 20, 3:49PM: Boasberg orders a cabinet level declaration

March 20: WaPo Bukele story

March 20 (around 6PM?): NYT publishes intelligence assessment story

March 20, 8:18 PM: CBS publishes list of deported Venezuelans

March 21, AM, 8AM: Blanche announces the investigation

March 21, 12:18: Blanche submits a declaration

March 21, 2:30PM: Motion hearing

March 21: Trump disclaims signing AEA declaration

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Secret Documents! The Ten Month Privilege Fight Whingers Claim Didn’t Happen

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As always happens when people who don’t bother to check the public record get afraid, folks are complaining about Merrick Garland again, both that they didn’t notice the number of times Garland explained publicly that back in June 2021 DOJ had set up a special Election Task Force to prepare for this moment, and to complain that (they say) Garland hasn’t charged Donald Trump.

I was working on a timeline already when Politico’s two year effort to get the DC District Court to unseal grand jury proceedings bore fruit yesterday. Kyle Cheney has a story describing how the documents he liberated show both Beryl Howell and her successor as Chief Judge, James Boasberg, kept swatting back at Trump’s efforts to delay precisely because of the upcoming election.

More than 18 months ago, as Donald Trump sought to delay several high-profile witness’ testimony to a grand jury investigating his effort to subvert the 2020 election, Washington’s top federal district judge sensed a potential calamity.

“The special counsel’s investigation is moving quickly. There is an imperative that it moves quickly particularly so as not to interfere with the 2024 election cycle,” Chief Judge James Boasberg said on April 3, 2023, according to a newly unsealed transcript of the secret proceeding. “So when the former President’s pleading says that there will be a nominal impact from a delay, I think that is a vast understatement, that there would be a serious and deleterious impact from a delay.”

Boasberg’s warning in the early stages of special counsel Jack Smith’s investigation of the former president now rings prescient. A series of delays engineered by Trump, most notably an eight-month freeze while the Supreme Court considered his claim to be immune from the charges altogether, have caused the criminal proceedings to collide with the 2024 election cycle — and made it impossible for Trump to stand trial on the most serious charges he faces before Election Day.

The documents also confirm dates that, just yesterday, anti-Garland whingers claimed I made up. The fight over executive privilege started with a June 15, 2022 subpoena (probably to Greg Jacob and Marc Short) and continued through the next April, when Jack Smith — having come on after the precedents on executive privilege had already been set — got Mike Pence’s testimony on April 27.

Here’s the timeline mapped by the documents Politico liberated:

June 15, 2022: Subpoena to two officials (possibly Jacob and Short)

September 28, 2022: Order and opinion requiring testimony from two officials (possibly Jacob and Short)

October 6, 2022: Order and opinion denying stay of decision

November 19, 2022: Order and opinion requiring testimony (probably the two Pats, Cipollone and Philbin)

December 18, 2022: Order and opinion denying stay

January 23, 2022: Order and opinion extending appeal

December 9, 2022: Order and opinion requiring testimony (possibly Eric Hershmann, given description of his emails demanding written instructions)

January 10, 2023: Order and opinion denying stay

March 15, 2023: Order and opinion requiring testimony (this is the omnibus order covering eight people — see redacted list on page 2 — including Mark Meadows, Stephen Miller, and Dan Scavino)

March 25, 2023: Opinion requiring testimony, probably involving Mike Pence

April 3, 2023: Transcript of hearing, probably involving Mike Pence

April 10, 2023: Transcript of hearing, probably involving Mike Pence

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An Egyptian Bank Claimed Details of a Suspected $10 Million Payment to Trump Might be in China

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Back on September 19, 2018, then DC Chief Judge Beryl Howell denied a motion brought by an Egyptian bank to quash a subpoena for information on a suspected $10 million payment made to then-candidate Trump in fall 2016. That set off litigation that continued, at the District, Circuit, and Supreme Courts, for at least nine months.

As CNN described in 2020, not long after the investigation got shut down under Bill Barr, investigators had been trying to see whether Egypt (or some entity for which Egypt served as go-between) provided the money that Trump spent on his campaign weeks before the election.

For more than three years, federal prosecutors investigated whether money flowing through an Egyptian state-owned bank could have backed millions of dollars Donald Trump donated to his own campaign days before he won the 2016 election, multiple sources familiar with the investigation told CNN.

The investigation, which both predated and outlasted special counsel Robert Mueller’s probe, examined whether there was an illegal foreign campaign contribution. It represents one of the most prolonged efforts by federal investigators to understand the President’s foreign financial ties, and became a significant but hidden part of the special counsel’s pursuits.

The investigation was kept so secret that at one point investigators locked down an entire floor of a federal courthouse in Washington, DC, so Mueller’s team could fight for the Egyptian bank’s records in closed-door court proceedings following a grand jury subpoena. The probe, which closed this summer with no charges filed, has never before been described publicly.

Prosecutors suspected there could be a link between the Egyptian bank and Trump’s campaign contribution, according to several of the sources, but they could never prove a connection.

It took months of legal fight after Judge Howell denied that motion to quash before the Egyptian bank in question complied, and once they got subpoena returns, prosecutors repeatedly complained that the bank was still withholding information, which led prosecutors to reopen the investigation with a new grand jury.

That much we know from documentation unsealed back in 2019 (part one, part two, part three), in response to a Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press request for unsealing.

On August 17, 2023, while she was still Chief Judge, Beryl Howell ordered the government to post newly unsealed sets of some of the orders she issued during the litigation. On Thursday, Chief Judge Boasberg ordered that newly redacted set of opinions to be released. While Howell released six opinions in June 2019 along with the other materials from the case — with redactions done digitally, thereby hiding the length of redactions — just three new versions of her orders got released last week:

These may be limited to orders incorporated as appendices in prior appeals, which might also explain why the first two appear twice in the newly-released materials.

Much of the newly unsealed material pertains to a fight over how much Alston & Bird, the law firm representing the Egyptian bank, could say about the litigation publicly. Among other things, prosecutors under Robert Mueller objected to their own names appearing publicly, out of a desire to tie this litigation to the narrow scope of Mueller’s investigation into interference in 2016.

One thing made clearer by a redaction in that January 2019 opinion on public comments is that the DC Circuit considered what public comments the two sides could make, in addition to SCOTUS, as part of its denial of cert.

It’s possible that the DC Circuit has weighed in, secretly. Among the details newly unsealed in the original opinion are the names of two of the bank’s other lawyers: Ashraf Shaaban (who appears to be or have been in-house counsel) and Mona Zulficar (who runs a Cairo corporate law firm). Those lawyers were named in conjunction with declarations they submitted arguing some part of the claim that Egyptian Anti-Money Laundering law would prohibit compliance with the subpoena as would unspecified law in a third country, described as Country B. 

Howell described that Alston & Bird are relying on,

conclusory declarations by [redacted] own Country A in-house and retained counsel, which themselves cite no legal authority on this question of [redaction] See Decl. of Ashraf Shaaban,, Mov’s Group Legal Counsel (“Shaaban Decl.”)¶7, ECF No. 3-6; Suppl. Decl. of Mona Zulficar, “Suppl. Zulficar Decl.”)¶ 4, ECF No. 12. The Court gives these declarations little weight. [bold newly unsealed, compare this passage with this one]

So if we can figure out who Shaaban works or worked for to ID the bank.

It’s the unspecific third country, Country B, that is the most interesting new disclosure, however.

The newly unsealed passages do not identify which country, described as Country A and which CNN identified as Egypt, owns this bank. But they do show that the bank or its lawyers wanted to share the subpoena with personnel in Cairo.

The newly unsealed passages do identify which third country’s laws, unspecified laws, might prohibit lawyers from searching for responsive documents in that country: China.

In other words, a bank owned by Egypt said it couldn’t comply with a subpoena seeking information on a suspected payment to Trump during the 2016 election, in part, because China’s laws would prevent that.

Update: Ashraf Shaaban works for the National Bank of Egypt.

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Elon Musk’s Xitter Stalls a Criminal Investigation, Again

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On Friday, DC Chief Judge James Boasberg released a redacted version of a March 29 opinion on another attempt by Xitter to refuse compliance with legal process based on a complaint about a gag order (formally, a non-disclosure order, referred to as an NDO below). Kyle Cheney, who first posted on it and who tends to have a good read on these things, noted that it seems important.

As you recall, Xitter successfully delayed Jack Smith’s access to Trump’s Xitter account for 23 days in January and February of last year (from when then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell approved the warrant on January 17 until when Xitter finally complied on February 9), then spent several more months arguing that it should be able to inform Trump they had provided the information and should not have to pay fines for being in contempt.

This time around, Xitter delayed DOJ’s access to the mere subscriber records — that is, records showing who owns the accounts in question — for two Xitter accounts for over two months (January 25 through March 29 of this year) based on a similar complaint: that before it complied, it should be able to tell the subjects of the criminal investigation about the request.

While (as Cheney noted) there’s no clear tie to Trump, this investigation is focused on public figures of some sort.  We know that because Xitter argued that notifying the targets would not harm the investigation, and then claimed there was nothing publicly known about the targets to suggest informing them would lead to witness intimidation or any of the other bases DOJ provided for delaying notice for a year.

Judge Boasberg debunked Xitter’s claim. There was information in the affidavit, he said, even just “based on what is publicly known about the investigation’s targets,” to show that disclosure might result in witness intimidation. Xitter also complained that the government offered more information to justify its gag after Xitter challenged it, but Boasberg declined to “infer” from that the initial basis was lacking.

And while there’s no reason to believe that those public people have a tie to Trump, Boasberg cited last year’s legal dispute in three places to justify denying Xitter’s demand.

He invoked Yogi Berra (and the government’s filings) to explain why Xitter’s “imagined categorical prohibition on omnibus NDOs” was little different than the arguments it made last year.

On that question, much of X’s argumentation may be characterized by Yogi Berra’s immortal line, “It’s déjà vu all over again.” That is because the company mostly regurgitates the arguments that it made — which both this Court’s predecessor and the D.C. Circuit rejected — just last year in a case involving the same parties. See In re Sealed Case, 77 F. 4th 815, aff’g in the Matter of the Search; see also Redacted Gov’t Mot. at 13 (asserting that X “knows [its arguments] are losing arguments — having just had the D.C. Circuit reject them last year when it challenged a different NDO”); see also id., at 1, 7-8. The NDO at issue in In re Sealed Case accompanied a search warrant directing Twitter to produce information related to former President Trump’s account. See 77 F.4th at 821. Twitter challenged the NDO on much the same grounds as it does here, and the Circuit did not bite.

Boasberg likened Xitter’s glib offer to tell only the subjects of the investigation to Xitter’s similar offer last year to tell only Trump, which the DC Circuit rejected.

The company believes that “[a] less restrictive means of furthering the government’s interests . . . would be to permit X to disclose the Subpoena’s existence to the targeted users, while prohibiting disclosure . . . to anyone else.” Id. at 24. That is akin to asking for the donut minus the hole.

Indeed, the Circuit rejected an analogous alternative in In re Sealed Case. There, the company proposed notifying just Trump–the target of the warrant that the challenged NDO accompanied–of the warrant’s existence. Yet the Circuit considered that alternative a “nonstarter[]” because it “would not have maintained the confidentiality of the criminal investigation and therefore risked jeopardizing it.” In re Sealed Case. 77 F.4th at 831. Nor would it have safeguarded the security and integrity of the investigation, as the whole point of the nondisclosure was to avoid tipping off the former President about the warrant’s existence.” Id. at 832. X’s proposal here falls flat for precisely the same reason: permitting it to disclose the subpoena’s existence [redacted] would neither protect the investigation’s confidentiality nor safeguard its integrity. See Redacted Gov’t Mot. at 12 n.4.

[Paragraph redacted]

Notably, last year Xitter at least relied on a purported interest in preserving Executive Privilege. Here, there’s no such claim; just a specious argument that DOJ should have to get individualized NDOs for every subpoena it submits in this investigation, even if all of them ask for no more than basic social media account information. So this is not some protected class, like a member of Congress or staffer.

Perhaps Boasberg’s most interesting invocation of Xitter’s earlier attempt to tamper in the Trump investigation is where, in almost entirely redacted language, he compares the urgency of this investigation with that of Jack Smith’s investigation into, “activity intended to alter the outcome of a valid national election for the leadership of the Executive Branch of the federal government.”

He spends three (redacted) paragraphs describing the import of the investigation.

To be sure, the Government’s interest in In re Sealed Case “was particularly strong” because of the goal of the investigation at issue: “[T]o ferret out activity intended to alter the outcome of a valid national election for the leadership of the Executive Branch of the federal government . . . and to assess whether that activity crossed lines into criminal culpability.” In re Sealed Case. 77 F4th at 830. The United States does not purport to target election interference in this case. But it submits that its interest are nevertheless heightened here for another reason: [1.5 lines redacted] The Court wholly agrees based on the evidence outlined in the Government’s ex parte briefing. [3 paragraphs redacted]

Whether or not this has a direct tie to Trump, it’s worth noting that Musk met with Trump (on March 2) during the pendency of this fight; last year, Musk met with Jim Jordan twice during Xitter’s challenge to the Trump warrant.

Whatever that three paragraph description was, Boasberg described the type of investigation using a short word — four or maybe five characters. This could be a FARA investigation or a leak investigation, for example, or perhaps he cited code to describe it.

Update: I guess I should explain why I used Musk’s Council of Nicea tweets as my featured image? In this post (linked above), I noted that on the day Xitter started complying with the Trump warrant, Musk posted this tweet:

So I went to Musk’s tweets from the day after Boasberg’s order and noted that he tweeted obliquely about “trac[ing] to source documents.”

If this is a leak investigation, it could be a reference to an attempt to source a leak.

Timeline

December 11, 2023: Application for omnibus NDO

January 5, 2024: DOJ serves Xitter with subpoena for subscriber information

January 24: Xitter moves to vacate the NDO, review the affidavit, and stay compliance

January 25: Initial deadline for compliance

March 2: Musk meets with Trump in Florida

March 29: Boasberg orders Xitter to comply

April 12: Boasberg released redacted opinion

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The Seth DuCharme Confession in the Charles McGonigal Sentencing Memo

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In his sentencing memo for Charles McGonigal’s DC case, former Bill Barr flunky Seth DuCharme twice misstated the nature of the false statement for which Kevin Clinesmith was sentenced.

In a passage comparing other government officials who had omitted information from government filings, as McGonigal pled he had, DuCharme asserted that Clinesmith was prosecuted for making “false statements,” plural, “in application for” FISA warrant.

United States v. Clinesmith, No. 1:20-cr-165 (D.D.C. 2020) (imposing probation against FBI attorney for false statements in application for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) warrant); [my emphasis]

Even before that, in arguing that Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly should not apply a sentencing enhancement, he turned to Clinesmith. This time, he accused Clinesmith of causing false information to be submitted to FISC.

Mr. McGonigal disagrees with the application of the cross reference in Section 2B1.1(c)(3), which would increase his base offense level to 14, as inconsistent with case precedent. In United States v. Clinesmith, No. 1:20-cr-165 (D.D.C. 2020), the government did not seek and the sentencing court did not independently apply the cross reference to the obstruction Guideline at the sentencing of an FBI attorney who caused false information to be submitted to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) in an application for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) warrant sought in connection with an active FBI investigation. The government’s position that false statements to the FISC during an active investigation does not warrant application of the cross reference while Mr. McGonigal’s conduct does is perplexing. While Mr. McGonigal concedes that this Court in United States v. Hawkins, 185 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2016) held that it may consider conduct in the statement of the offense, and the court in United States v. Saffarinia, 424 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2020) held that at the motion to dismiss phase Section 1519 is broad enough to cover false statements on OGE-278 forms, it is difficult to reconcile these cases with the Clinesmith court’s more recent analysis. In Clinesmith, the District Court declined to apply the obstruction cross reference in determining the applicable Guidelines range, and we respectfully request that this Court similarly decline to apply the cross reference to the facts at issue here. [my emphasis]

Kevin Clinesmith altered an email and with it, misled a colleague, thereby preventing the FBI from fully informing the FISA Court on something material to the application. In that, he “caused” information not to be shared with the FISC. He did not make false statements in the application (and in any case, the original decision not to notify the court that Page had years earlier shared information with the CIA about Russian spies, which Clinesmith had no part of, had in significant part to do the the fact that Page had not been an approved contact of the CIA for several years before 2016, when he went out of his way to contact the Russians about his role in a counterintelligence investigation). Nor did Clinesmith cause affirmative false statements to be made.

His was a crime of omission, not commission, as DuCharme claimed. I emailed DuCharme about the basis for these claims but got no response.

More importantly, whether you agree with him or not, Judge James Boasberg explained why he sentenced Clinesmith to probation: because he didn’t think Clinesmith believed he was lying and the former FBI lawyer got no benefit from his false claim.

First, he obtained no real personal benefit from his actions and he had no active intent to harm.

Although the government has contested this, my view of the evidence is that Mr. Clinesmith likely believed that what he said about Dr. Page was true, namely that he was a subsource but not a source of the Other Government Agency. By altering the e-mail, he was saving himself some work and taking an inappropriate shortcut. But I do not believe that he was attempting to achieve an end he knew was wrong.

I’m on the record saying Clinesmith should have gotten some jail time, even in spite of the wildly unsubstantiated claims Durham’s team made about politicization. I think DuCharme is totally right to compare how lenient courts have been with government officials who fail to disclose things, including by invoking the Clinesmith sentence. That’s all sound lawyering.

But his sloppy treatment of Clinesmith — the appointment of John Durham to prosecute for which DuCharme played a central role — comes off as petulant and partisan. Indeed, Barr’s office took personal interest in this prosecution all the way through the time DuCharme swapped back to EDNY, as revealed by a text exchange Barr had with his Chief of Staff, probably complaining that Boasberg remained on this case, after the plea deal.

There are few factual similarities to the two cases, and by focusing so much on him, DuCharme seems to be saying, “if Kevin Clinesmith didn’t have to go to jail based on our conspiracy theories about him, my guy shouldn’t have to either.”

All the more so given another enhancement argument DuCharme made. He argues that a 3-level enhancement should not be applied because McGonigal trumped up a FARA investigation into the rival of the Albanian paying him to travel around Europe, the thing he failed to disclose.

Mr. McGonigal further disagrees with the application of Section 2J1.2(b)(2) resulting in a three-level enhancement for “substantial interference” with the administration of justice. According to the PSR, the enhancement is applied to Mr. McGonigal because he admitted to “speaking with a foreign official about a matter in which Person A had a financial interest, and opening a criminal investigation based on information provided to him by Person A.” PSR ¶ 57. While the enhancement is appropriately applied to the “premature or improper termination of a felony investigation,” we are aware of no authority supporting its application to the opening of a felony investigation, as is the case here. 7 As Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) of Counterintelligence for the New York Field Office, it was Mr. McGonigal’s job to pass along information he received that could be indicative of criminal activity. Had Mr. McGonigal taken the alternative route and concealed or withheld the information he received from Person A concerning potential criminal activity in the United States, that would be troubling. Instead, he passed the tip and lead to the FBI, to be appropriately vetted by the Bureau and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Accordingly, the application of Section 2J1.2(b)(2) is unwarranted.

7 U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (“Substantial interference with the administration of justice” means “a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.”); see e.g., United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir 1996) (applying enhancement to police officer who improperly terminated a felony investigation). [my bold, italics original]

The technical issue — whether this enhancement can be used because someone initiated an improper investigation rather than improperly ending one — will make an interesting appeal if Kollar-Kotelly applies the enhancement and and sentences McGonigal to serve his sentence concurrent to the 50-month sentence Judge Jennifer Rearden gave McGonigal for trying to trump up sanctions against an Oleg Deripaska rival in SDNY, something DOJ is not requesting. But it’s likely that would be unsuccessful: As the government notes in its sentencing memo and even the footnote here makes clear, after the termination language DuCharme focuses on, the guideline continues, “or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.” And McGonigal’s opening an investigation against his business partner’s rival used counterintelligence resources that should have been spent on more serious threats.

FBI officials even questioned the propriety of opening up the criminal investigation at the time it was initiated, but cited the defendant’s directive. See Ex. 1 at 1.

[snip]

Here, initiating the investigation based on Person A’s information was particularly egregious given its lack of substantiation, which is why it was promptly closed following the defendant’s retirement.

DOJ provided records showing that one of McGonigal’s colleagues was genuinely troubled about the propriety of opening a FARA case against someone who had already registered under FARA regarding a country, Albania, that isn’t among the countries of priority for such things. By opening an investigation into a lobbyist for an Albanian political party (reportedly former Ted Cruz Chief of Staff Nicholas Muzin), McGonigal was drawing resources away from more pressing threats.

So my question is with all the talk of shortage of resources and most field offices having difficulty covering Band 3 and 4 threats, and FARA cases from banded threat countries rarely prosecuted by DOJ, why is NY requesting a SIM FAR investigation be opened on Albania for an improper FARA registration as a threat to national security?

I of course will fully support anything NY wants to do in their AOR, but once the paperwork to restrict the case gets reported up my chain of command, I would like to be able to explain to them why we are working an Albanian SIM/FARA case when every day I am in there fighting for resources on some national security matters pertaining to banded countries such as [redacted]. I am assuming since this directive is coming from SAC McGonigal there is more to this story?

Per those records, McGonigal appears to have caused a politically connected Republican to have nine of his bank accounts scrutinized before the investigation got closed. The Albanian section of Oversight Democrats’ report on Trump’s acceptance of emoluments provides more background on the political wranglings involved; Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and two aides spent almost $3,500 at Trump’s hotel on a trip when they met with McGonigal.

Notably, the investigation against this lobbyist, like Crossfire Hurricane, was opened as a Full investigation from the start.

And after the FBI discovered that McGonigal had opened up an investigation to help his business partner, the FBI has had to review all the other cases he was working on to make sure he hadn’t similarly used criminal investigations for self-interested purposes.

Moreover, given the defendant’s senior and sensitive role in the organization, the FBI has been forced to undertake substantial reviews of numerous other investigations to insure that none were compromised during the defendant’s tenure as an FBI special agent and supervisory special agent. The defendant worked on some of the most sensitive and significant matters handled by the FBI. PSR ¶¶ 98-101. His lack of credibility, as revealed by his conduct underlying his offense of conviction, could jeopardize them all. The resulting internal review has been a large undertaking, requiring an unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental resources.

The misrepresentation of the Clinesmith plea might be reasonable coming from someone else. Like all criminal defendants, McGonigal deserves zealous advocacy.

But this argument came from Seth DuCharme.

It came from someone who opened a four year follow-on investigation in which the only crime ever identified was that Clinesmith alteration — and that crime was discovered by someone else, and could easily have been, and should have been, prosecuted by the very same prosecutors who did prosecute it, only instead reporting to the Trump appointed US Attorney in DC rather than Durham. And among the prosecutions pursued as part of that four year investigation that Seth DuCharme opened was a false statements case against Michael Sussmann based off logic directly contrary to what DuCharme argues here, that McGonigal would have failed to do his duty if he hadn’t opened the investigation into his business partner’s rival. That logic, applied to the Durham investigation, says it would have been remiss not to investigate the Alfa Bank allegations that Sussmann shared with Jim Baker — which is exactly what Sussmann said from the start.

Worse still, that argument DuCharme makes, that, “it was Mr. McGonigal’s job to pass along information he received that could be indicative of criminal activity,” is precisely the argument that Bill Barr made to explain a similar laundering of self-interested information that Seth DuCharme effected: the channeling of information from Rudy Giuliani to the Hunter Biden investigation.

The DOJ has the obligation to have an open door to anybody who wishes to provide us information that they think is relevant.

That is, the dishonest argument that Seth DuCharme is making, trying to dismiss the seriousness of Charles McGonigal’s use of FBI resources to conduct an investigation in which he had an undisclosed personal interest? It’s an argument that might also exonerate his own twin efforts to launch massive investigations into Donald Trump’s political rivals.

In fact, in McGonigal’s Deripaska-related sentencing hearing, DuCharme said something shocking. In that case, he said that McGonigal’s enthusiasm for working with someone whom the former FBI agent himself had identified as a Russian spy was only a problem because he was no longer covered by public authority defense. “[O]ne of the critical mistakes he makes in embracing this is that he no longer has the public authority that he had as an FBI agent.” That is, Seth DuCharme, who did set up a way to use dirt from a known Russian spy for a politicized investigation, argued that’s all cool if you’ve got the legal cover of official employ.

By all means, lawyers for Charles McGonigal should point out that DC judges rarely punish government officials who lie by omission that harshly. But in attempting to do that, Seth DuCharme said as much about his own ethics and actions than he did about his client’s crimes.

 

 

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The MAGA Tourist Geofence and the Violent Confederate Flag-Toting Geofence

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By my rough count, Judge Tanya Chutkan has presided over the cases of more than 25 January 6 defendants, in addition to Donald Trump. Nevertheless, Trump keeps trying to lecture Chutkan about what happened, often by pointing to reports from journalists who have not otherwise covered the investigation closely.

Contrary to their false claims about how much video she has seen, Judge Chutkan knows these details far better than Trump’s attorneys.

For example, Trump keeps pointing to a December 2021 piece from Will Arkin to argue, using very dated numbers regarding the investigation, just one percent of his mobsters qualify as insurrectionists.

The Secret Service and the FBI estimated that at least 120,000 Americans gathered on the Mall for President Trump’s speech. 6 Government agencies estimated that about 1,200 people—at most 1% of the size of the crowd gathered to listen to President Trump—entered the Capitol, and a smaller percentage than that committed violent acts. 7 Thus, we can easily conclude that well over 99% of the attendees at President Trump’s speech did not engage in the events at the Capitol. Moreover, as the Indictment recognizes, a crowd had gathered at the Capitol before President Trump finished speaking, further proving he had nothing to do with those events.

6 William M. Arkin, Exclusive: Classified Documents Reveal the Number of January 6 Protestors, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 23, 2021), at https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-classified-documentsreveal-number-january-6-protestors-1661296. The January 6 Committee estimated the crowd on the Mall at 53,000, while President Trump estimated it at 250,000. Compare Final Report, SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL (Dec. 22, 2022), 585, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/pdf/GPO-J6-REPORT.pdf with Read Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial, NPR (Feb. 10, 2021), at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-ofimpeachment-trial (emphasis added).

7 Id. (“[T]he facts seem to indicate that as few as one percent of the people who were there fit the label of insurrectionist.”).

There are a slew of problematic assumptions in Arkin’s piece (as well as the follow-up piece that appears to be the actual source cited in footnote 7): about the relationship between militias and others, about the role of non-militia organized groups like QAnon or anti-vaxxers, about the role and increasing percentage of military participants.

The most important misconception is that only people who entered the building, as distinct from the often more violent crowds outside it or Proud Boy seditionists orchestrating things from afar, could be an insurrectionist.

Plus, Arkin’s 2021 numbers were outdated at the time — most outlets put the number of insiders at 2,000 to 2,500 at the one year anniversary and the Sedition Hunters have identified 3,200 specific people who went inside the Capitol (though this includes people, including at least one WaPo journalist, who weren’t rioters).

Given Trump’s reliance on such outdated numbers, however, I wanted to look at a filing in the latest challenge to one of the geofence warrants used in the investigation, this time from Isreal Easterday, a Confederate-flag toting rioter who sprayed two cops before entering the Capitol through the east door.

There have already been two failed challenges to geofence warrants used in the investigation. In August 2022, then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell rejected Matthew Bledsoe’s challenge to a geofence of those who live streamed to Facebook during the riot; he is appealing his conviction, but not that ruling. In January, then-presiding FISA Judge Rudolph Contreras rejected David Rhine’s challenge to the Google geofence tied to voluntary use of Google’s Location History service (there’s no FISA component to this, but FISA judges see more novel Fourth Amendment issues). Rhine does appear to be including that ruling in his appeal, in which his initial brief is due in February.

Like Rhine, Easterday is challenging the Google geofence, but from a Fourth Amendment standpoint, he is different than Rhine in two key ways. First, the investigation into Rhine started from some tips called in as early as January 10, 2021; the FBI didn’t need the Google geofence to find him, though it made it easier to pinpoint video of his path through the Capitol.

With Easterday (probably because two distinctive aspects of his appearance changed that day — he dropped his flag and took off his hat — making it harder to track him), the first really good lead on his identity was the geofence.

The second difference between Rhine and Easterday arises from the technicalities of how the FBI did the geofence.

The FBI did three rounds of geofence with Google. In the first, starting with a January 13, 2021 warrant to Google, they:

  • Obtained the identifiers for all the phones that hit the geofence during the riot
  • Took out the identifiers that were present in the building in the 15 minutes before and after the riot (assuming those were people who were lawfully present in the Capitol)
  • Sorted out hits that were in places (for example, areas where surveillance footage showed no rioters to be present) inconsistent with unlawful activity
  • Eliminated identifiers without at least one hit entirely within the Capitol factoring in margin-of-error radius
  • Added back in identifiers with lower confidence radius that deleted Location History with the week after the attack
  • Asked Google to deanonymize that data

For the second round, they submitted a second request for deanonymization on April 14, based on the logic that those for whom there were only low confidence hits within the Capitol would be high confidence hits for the larger restricted area.

Based on the same logic, on May 21, 2021, the FBI obtained a second geofence warrant to include (per Easterday’s filings) the entire restricted area on January 6.

This time, to cull the data, they:

  • Obtained the identifier for all the phones that hit the geofence during the riot
  • Removed identifiers previously deanonymized
  • Took out the lawfully present identifiers either voluntarily identified by Congressional offices or obtained by law enforcement
  • Removed identifiers present in the 15 minutes before or after the riot
  • Eliminated identifiers without at least one hit entirely within the restricted grounds
  • Asked Google to deanonymize that data

Rhine’s phone identifier was included in the first batch of identifiers the FBI asked to be deanonymized, a group of about 1,500 identifiers; Easterday’s was not. His phone was included in the second batch deanonymized, an additional 2,200 identifiers obtained in the first warrant. His phone was also IDed in the second warrant, but by that point had already been deanonymized.

The details of how the Google geofence worked were described in filings in the Rhine case (see this post and this post), but because Easterday was not identified until the second batch, the second cull gets more attention in Easterday’s filings.

Easterday did enter the Capitol. There are pictures of him wandering hallways and stairs. On October 26, a jury convicted him of trespassing inside the Capitol, 40 USC 5104, along with the more serious assault and riot felonies he committed outside the building.

Easterday was only inside the Capitol itself for 12 minutes — he entered at 2:39 and exited at 2:51; Easterday entered three minutes before Rhine but left 13 minutes before Rhine. But he would have been at the east door — not inside the Capitol, but helping to violently break into it — for at least 22 minutes; the assault on one of the cops was captured in video that starts at 2:17.

There are a number of possible explanations for why Easterday phone would not have had a high confidence hit inside the Capitol geofence but did trigger the broadened geofence. For example, the original hit or hits on Easterday’s phone may have been in a location (such as the east door) where the confidence radius of the location was partially outside the Capitol itself. Some of the relevant hits were surely entirely within that area outside the Capitol but inside the restricted area that day. As the government noted in their response to this challenge, being in that area was also a trespassing crime, 18 USC 1752, even if DOJ charged fewer of the people who were in that area. The jury convicted Easterday of that crime, too.

The government provided a supplement answering specific questions Chief Judge James Boasberg posed after the guilty verdict that provides more possible explanations why Easterday did not trigger the geofence within the building at high confidence. For example, it describes that iPhones capture a lot less activity in Location History than Androids do.

[Location History] is sometimes collected automatically, but is primarily and most frequently collected when a user is doing something with his or her device that specifically involves location information (such as following Google Maps directions or taking photographs or videos that record location as part of their metadata).

Moreover, in the government’s experience examining Google LH returns, the range of activities that generate a LH point is narrower on Apple’s iPhones than Android phones. Apple iPhones apparently collect LH data primarily when the user is specifically using Google Maps.

[snip]

In contrast, Android phones can collect LH data when the user uses a wider array of Google-based applications, or even when the device is not in use at all, such as when it is sitting on a user’s bedside table overnight. Additionally, if an Android phone detects that a user is moving, the Android phone specifically and automatically requests location data from the server about every two minutes, leading to a LH data point being collected by Google. However, if the phone determines that the user is standing relatively still, or remaining within the same Wi-Fi network’s range, Android phones will request location data much less frequently, as the phone is effectively not moving. Similarly, devices will not automatically request location data from the server—or will do so less frequently—when they are low on battery.

Easterday appears to have made a call while inside the building (which would trigger a different kind of location data, but data that DOJ only obtained with individualized warrants), but that’s less likely to be captured in Location History than taking a picture would.

Judge Boasberg’s request for more information — an order he made after the guilty verdict — appears to stem, in significant part, from the fact that FBI’s initial exclusion set of 215 people is obviously a mere fraction of the people who were lawfully in the Capitol that day.

(2) how could the Control List searches for the Initial Google Geofence Warrant have generated hits for only 215 unique devices/accounts when Google applications are so ubiquitous and presumably between 1,500-2,000 people were lawfully present in the Capitol building in the time periods before and after the riot?

It its earlier filings, DOJ used a dated stat that only 30% of Google users actually use the Location History service, a service that takes several steps to turn on. In this filing, DOJ argues that as the proportion of iPhone users increase, the number of people who trigger Location History will be smaller still, unless they’re using Google maps.

Boasberg is suggesting (and DOJ is not contesting) that their initial exclusion effort may only have included about 15% of those lawfully in the Capitol. While there would be some subset of people lawfully present who weren’t excluded in the first batch (people who were not moving in the 15 minutes before and after but who fled or took pictures during the riot, for example), this filing suggests all these numbers are low — very low.

If just one third of the people who entered the building could be expected to trigger the Google geofence, then the number who entered may be well over 4,000 (a reasonable number given the number Sedition Hunters have IDed).

If just a third of the people who were at the Capitol but not necessarily taking pictures inside it triggered the Google geofence, that number might be closer to 7,000 additional bodies, including those assaulting cops. And there could be another 23,000 people outside the Capitol — some no more than MAGA tourists, but others among the most violent people that day.

Using the Arkin numbers that were outdated when he published them in December 2021, Trump claims that, “we can easily conclude that well over 99% of the attendees at President Trump’s speech did not engage in the events at the Capitol.”

That’s not what the geofence shows. Using the same 120,000 number he uses for his own calculations, about one in ten were right at the building and a quarter may have made it to restricted ground, and the numbers could be double that.

One thing is clear though: the violent mobsters literally carrying the banner of insurrection as they attack cops may not be the ones you’ll find taking pictures inside the Capitol. And once you figure that out, the numbers of potential Trump insurrectionists starts to grow.

And Judge Chutkan knows that.

Take, Robert Palmer, whom Trump raised to complain that Chutkan had presided over the prosecution of someone who said he went to the Capitol at Trump’s behest, where he serially assaulted cops because he believed he needed to stop the voter certification. Robert Palmer never entered the Capitol. But it’s quite clear he believes Trump sent him.

Update: Distinguished between the two trespassing crimes to show one can be applied to both locations.

Timeline Easterday Google Geofence Challenge

June 30, 2023: Motion to Compel, Declaration

August 22, 2023: Opposition Motion to Compel

September 26, 2023: Motion to Suppress Geofence

October 10, 2023: Opposition Motion to Suppress

October 17, 2023: Reply Motion to Suppress

October 26, 2023: Guilty Verdict

November 25, 2023: Supplement Opposition Motion to Suppress

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Stan Woodward Thinks Aileen Cannon Is an Easy Mark

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There’s a passage in Stan Woodward’s surreply to DOJ’s motion for a conflicts hearing in the stolen documents case that goes to the core of Woodward’s conduct in his representation of multiple witnesses in Trump investigations.

Woodward claims that because Yuscil Taveras testified in a July 20 grand jury appearance that he had not been coached (by Woodward, presumably) to lie about whether he had any conversation with Carlos De Oliveira, it’s proof that Taveras’ original grand jury testimony that he did not was not perjurious.

[T]he foregoing Surreply is necessary to correct the record with respect to the Special Counsel’s Office’s conduct in this matter. Specifically, defense counsel played no role in Trump Employee 4’s voluntary testimony before the grand jury resulting in the Superseding Indictment in this action.5 Superseding Indictment (July 27, 2023) (ECF No. 85). Moreover, when Trump Employee 4 testified, for the first time, before a Grand Jury in this District, Trump Employee 4 was unequivocal that, with respect to his prior testimony, he, “wasn’t coached,” and that nobody, “suggest[ed] to [him], influence[d] [him to say that th[e] conversation with Carlos De Oliveira didn’t happen.” G.J. Tr. at 50 (July 20, 2023). To that end, Trump Employee 4 did not retract false testimony and provide information that implicated Mr. Nauta, “[i]mmediately after receiving new counsel.” Reply at 4 (Aug. 22, 2023) (ECF No. 129) (emphasis added). Rather, after the Special Counsel’s Office issued a target letter on June 20, 2023, threatening Trump Employee 4 with prosecution, see Reply at 3 (Aug. 22, 2023) (ECF No. 129) (“[O]n June 20, 2023, . . . [a] target letter . . . identified . . . criminal exposure . . . entirely due to [Trump Employee 4’s allegedly] false sworn denial before the grand jury in the District of Columbia that he had information about obstructive acts that would implicate Nauta (and others).” [my emphasis]

Woodward provided no evidence — not one shred — to support his claim that Taveras didn’t change testimony. All he provided was inconclusive evidence that Taveras did not blame Woodward for his original, allegedly false, testimony.

And based off that unsupported claim, Woodward suggested that dealing with alleged perjury delivered in a DC grand jury in DC to support additional charges amounted to abuse of grand jury rules.

The argument of the Special Counsel’s Office, that it did not use the D.C. grand jury for the purpose of adding to the store of witnesses in the instant case, is unpersuasive.10 The theory the Special Counsel’s Office offers, that having called a witness before a distant grand jury to answer questions about events in this District and having nominally created an additional venue in which to claim that the witness was untruthful, should not be condoned. The approach taken by the Special Counsel’s Office – which unquestionably affected the presentation of evidence in the existing Southern District of Florida case – is a tactic inconsistent with precedent barring the use of a grand jury for trial purposes.

All of this is transparent garbage.

But he’s writing for Aileen Cannon, and so his unsubstantiated claim, on which he builds his renewed demand that Cannon exclude Taveras’ testimony altogether, might well work!

Woodward also plays temporal games by using comments Michelle Peterson and James Boasberg made on June 30, in the first conflict hearing, to claim he did nothing wrong.

5 As both the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the First Assistant Federal Public Defender acknowledged:

[First Assistant Federal Public Defender]: Your Honor, one other thing. I did want to say for the record, I should have started with this, have seen no reason to believe that either Mr. Woodward or Mr. Brand or anyone else associated with this has done anything improper. This just came up at this point in time, and based on the status of the record, I’ve given [Trump Employee 4] my best counsel, and he will be making a decision based on everything he knows now.

THE COURT: Right. And thank you. And certainly my reading of the government’s motion for his hearing did not suggest that Mr. Woodward or Mr. Brand had done anything improper either. The government’s was a prophylactic measure to comply with the law as it exists regarding conflicts and to make sure that [Trump Employee 4] is aware of his rights. Hr’g T. at 6 (June 30, 2023) (Attached hereto as Exhibit C).

Those comments were made after just an hour of consultation between Peterson and Taveras. It’s not a comment Peterson made at the second conflicts hearing, on July 5, where Taveras said he wished to have Peterson represent him, much less after Taveras changed his testimony.

And while the exhibits Woodward included purport to support his false claims, they also reveal that the approach to the conflict hearing before Cannon is similar to what he tried — unsuccessfully — to pull before Judge Boasberg.

In an email to Boasberg’s chamber on June 28, Woodward accused the government — which filed this conflict motion with no advance notice to Woodward — of stalling on a conflicts hearing when Taveras testified in March and then played for more time and briefing.

[I]nsisting on a hearing on such short notice prejudices [Taveras] and any appointed conflicts counsel. Although the government alludes to an ex parte submission, neither the Court nor any potential conflics counsel has had the benefit of any submission on behalf of [Taveras]. Effectively, the government would have Mr. [Taveras] through counsel, present his defense to the government’s puported allegation of perjury in just a few days. Of note, the government filed its motion after meeting with us earlier today — a meeting at which we challenged the government’s evidence contesting the veractiy of [Taveras’] testimony. Among other things, government counsel conceded that the government did not believe [Taveras] engaged in obstructive conduct; and, in the heated colloquy that followed, government counsel blurted out that they believed Mr. Nauta had been untruthful to his colleagues concerning certain events related to [Taveras’] testimony, a fact wholly irrelevant to whether [Taveras] had committed perjury and evidencing the government’s clear motive in filing this motion.

Third, although we do not, as a general matter, oppose the appointment of conflicts counsel to consult with and advise [Taveras,] given the serious nature of the matters under investigation by the government, we also believe he deserves — is entitled to the benefit of — a brief responding to the government’s filing in which dozens, perhaps more than a hundred, cases are cited for the Court. Again, more than three months have passed since [Taveras’] testimony with just days’ notice on the Friday before a holiday weekend when travel to and from South Florida is has already proved problematic this week is not just unnecessary, it is unfair.

Again, none of that makes sense — we know DOJ was still obtaining new evidence, including of Nauta’s phone — that would have led to increased certainty that Taveras’ initial testimony conflicted with known evidence.

In June, Woodward tried to buy time and make his own case (and claimed it benefitted Taveras to make that case).

In August, Woodward bought an entire month. In his first response, he equivocally embraced a conflict review three pages in.

Nevertheless, defense counsel does not now – and would not ever – oppose an inquiry of Mr. Nauta by the Court to assure the Court that Mr. Nauta has been advised of all his rights, including the right to conflict-free counsel, so long as such inquiry is conducted ex parte and under seal.

This time around, having spent another month consulting with Nauta, Woodward led with support for a hearing at which Nauta would be asked if he had been advised of his right to conflict-free counsel.

This Court should hold a hearing pursuant to United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975), to conduct an ex parte inquiry1 of Defendant Waltine Nauta as to whether he has been apprised of his rights, including the right to conflict-free counsel.

And in spite of the fact that Woodward bought this delay, in part, by claiming that DOJ had raised new information — they hadn’t; It was in a sealed filing — Woodward didn’t address one of the newly public details in DOJ’s filing: that they had raised his payment by Trump’s PAC in the conflict motion.

That said, this whole process likely isn’t for Woodward’s benefit, or Nauta’s. It is for Judge Cannon.

Among the things Woodward’s exhibits revealed is that DOJ had already alerted Judge Cannon to the conflicts twice before they filed their motion for a Garcia hearing.

We would also note that the court is already aware of the conflicts issue given that the government previously called this to the court’s attention – twice.

Cannon was already aware of these potential conflicfts.

And she did nothing.

Update: DOJ filed a reply in the parallel motion with Carlos De Oliveira, insisting on a hearing even if John Irving has gotten the other witnesses new lawyers.

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Aileen Cannon Working Hard to Protect Stan Woodward; Doing Nothing to Protect Walt Nauta or Carlos De Oliveira

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In this post, I noted all the things in DOJ’s reply on their motion for a Garcia hearing that had to have come from the grand jury, and assumed that DC Chief Judge James Boasberg must have permitted DOJ to share it.

As described here, yesterday’s reply on the motion for a Garcia hearing in the stolen documents case revealed a good deal of grand jury information about Yuscil Taveras’ testimony.

It revealed:

  • Trump’s IT worker, Taveras, testified (falsely, the government claims) in March
  • DOJ obtained two more subpoenas for surveillance footage, on June 29 and July 11, 2023 (the existence of those subpoenas, but not the date, had already been disclosed in a discovery memo)
  • It included the docket number associated with the conflict review — 23-GJ-46 — and cited Woodward’s response to the proceedings
  • James Boasberg provided Taveras with conflict counsel
  • Taveras changed his testimony after consulting with an independent counsel

Under grand jury secrecy rules, DC Chief Judge Boasberg would have had to approve sharing that information, but the docket itself remains sealed and Boasberg has not unsealed any of the proceedings.

A filing submitted from DOJ shows that I was right.

It also shows that Judge Aileen Cannon and Walt Nauta attorney Stan Woodward are engaged in a game that is doing nothing to ensure that Nauta’s getting unconflicted legal representation, but it is protecting Trump’s protection racket.

Let’s review the timeline.

On August 2, DOJ filed their original motion for a Garcia hearing, describing, generally, that Yuscil Taveras had testified against Nauta, which presented a conflict for Woodward, even before you consider the three other possible trial witnesses — of seven remaining witnesses — he also represents. DOJ submitted a sealed supplement with information on those three as well as other information, “to facilitate the Court’s inquiry.” Five days later, Cannon ordered that filing stricken, stating that, the government had, “fail[ed] to satisfy the burden of establishing a sufficient legal or factual basis to warrant sealing the motion and supplement.” In her drawn out briefing schedule on the question, she instructed Stan Woodward to address, “the legal propriety of using an out-of-district grand jury proceeding to continue to investigate and/or to seek post-indictment hearings on matters pertinent to the instant indicted matter in this district.”

On August 17, Woodward responded. He contended that Garcia hearings only covered when an attorney represented two defendants, but ultimately argued that, rather than adopt a more traditional method of resolving such a conflict (such as replacing Woodward), Judge Cannon should exclude Taveras’ testimony.

The government’s reply — filed on August 22 — is the one that made public more, damning, information on what went down in June and July.

Three more days passed before Woodward submitted a furious motion requesting opportunity to file a sur-reply. In it, filed 23 days after DOJ’s original submission and sealed filing, he accused DOJ of contravening, “a sealing order issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,1” though in a rambling footnote, he admitted maybe DOJ had requested to unseal this ex parte.

1. Defense counsel is not currently aware of any application by the government to unseal defense counsel’s submission. To have done so ex parte is arguably less professional than deliberately violating the Court’s sealing order. The government did not solicit defense counsel’s position on the unsealing of defense counsel’s own submission, but appears to have deliberately misled both the District Court for the District of Columbia and this Court. Of course, if they did seek such an application ex parte, this would be the second time in as many weeks that the government has done so – a particularly ironic approach given the Special Counsel’s objection to the Court conducting any ex parte inquiry of Mr. Nauta.

In a fit of Trumpist projection, Woodward also complained that DOJ was doing things that might lead to tampering with witnesses.

2 In the time since the government’s submission, defense counsel has received several threatening and/or disparaging emails and phone calls. This is the result of the Special Counsel’s callous disregard for how their unnecessary actions affect and influence the public and the lives of the individuals involved in this matter. It defies credulity to suggest that it is coincidental that mere minutes after the government’s submission, at least one media outlet was reporting previously undisclosed details that were disclosed needlessly by the government.

Projection, projection, projection.

Well, it worked. Judge Cannon granted Woodward’s motion, even giving him one more day than he asked, until August 31 instead of August 30 (remember that she scheduled a sealed hearing sometime in this timeframe). Which will mean that because of actions taken and inaction by Aileen Cannon, Walt Nauta will go the entire month of August without getting a conflict review.

Meanwhile, on August 16, DOJ filed a motion for a Garcia hearing to discuss the three witnesses represented by Carlos De Oliveira’s attorney who may testify against him. Best as I can tell, Cannon is simply ignoring that one. Fuck De Oliveira, I guess.

After Cannon assented to yet more delay before she addressed the potentially conflicted representation of two of three defendants before her (someday, Cannon may even have to deal with conflicts Todd Blanche has, since he also represents Boris Epshteyn), DOJ submitted notice sharing a filing they submitted before the DC grand jury, assenting to Woodward’s request, filed just yesterday morning (that is, three days after their reply), asking to unseal stuff that was already unsealed.

It includes the Woodward filing, from which DOJ’s reply quoted, that Woodward claims DOJ cited out of context.

The full filing doesn’t help Woodward.

Indeed, Woodward’s own filing suggests that if Taveras wanted to cooperate with the government, that would entail seeking a new attorney.

Ultimately, this is little more than a last-ditch effort to pressure [Taveras] with vague (and likely nonexistent) criminal conduct in the hopes that [Taveras] will agree to become a witness cooperating with the government in other matters. See Government Filing, p. 10 (“A conflict may arise during an investigation if a lawyer’s ‘responsibility to his other clients prevents the lawyer from exploring with the prosecutor whether it might be in the interest of one witness to cooperate with the grand jury or to seek immunity if the witness’s cooperation or testimony would be detrimental to the lawyer’s other client.’ [] ‘Professional ethics prevent [an attorney] from advising a witness to seek immunity or leniency when the quid pro quo is testimony damning to his other clients, to whom he also owes a duty of undivided fidelity[.] [] In many cases, however, that advice is precisely what the client needs to hear, even, or perhaps especially, when it ‘is unwelcome’ advice that ‘the client, as a personal matter, does not want to hear or follow.’ [] (internal citations omitted)). Ultimately, [Taveras] has been advised by counsel that he may, at any time, seek new counsel, and that includes if he ultimately decided he wanted to cooperate with the government. However, [Taveras] has not signified any such desire and that means counsel for [Taveras] can continue to represent [Taveras] both diligently and competently. [my emphasis]

And the filing makes clear that DOJ addressed at more length the conflict presented because Woodward was being paid by Save America PAC; while I’m uncertain about the local rules in SDFL, in DC there is a specific rule 1.8(e), requiring informed consent when an attorney is paid by someone else. While Woodward addressed it (see below), Woodward’s own description that Taveras could get another lawyer if he wanted to cooperate would seem to conflict with that rule’s independence of representation, and when he addresses the rule, Woodward doesn’t address confidentiality.

Furthermore, when Woodward addresses why being paid by Save America PAC is only natural for Taveras because Taveras worked for Trump, he makes an argument that wouldn’t explain the entirety of his representation for Nauta — or, for that matter, Kash Patel, a known Woodward client who testified in the stolen documents case.

While the government has often sought to imply an illicit purpose for the Save America PAC covering the legal costs of certain grand jury witnesses, the truth has always been very simple and legitimate: many of the grand jury witnesses, including [Taveras], are only subject to this investigation by virtue of their employment with entities related to or owned by Donald Trump. Save America PAC has placed no conditions on the provision of legal services to their employees. Ultimately and in compliance with Rule 1.8, [Taveras] was advised that Save America PAC would pay his legal fees, that [Taveras] could pursue other counsel than Mr. Woodward if he so desired, that Save America PAC was not Mr. Woodward’s client, that [Taveras] was Mr. Woodward’s client, and that [Taveras] could always make the decisions relating to the trajectory of [Taveras]’s grand jury testimony. [my emphasis]

Taveras is only a witness because Trump paid him to do IT work. But for much of the conduct about which Kash must have given testimony, represented by Woodward, he was the Acting Chief of Staff at the Pentagon. That’s the period when, per Kash, Trump conducted a wild declassification spree in his last days as President before packing up boxes to move to Mar-a-Lago.

And while most of Nauta’s exposure as a witness (and now defendant) arises from things Nauta did as Trump’s valet after both left the White House, ¶25 of the superseding indictment, describing the process by which Trump and Nauta packed up to leave, entails conduct from before Nauta left government employ.

If Trump were to be charged with 18 USC 2071, Nauta would be a witness to that.

In other words, brushing off the financial conflict with Taveras is one thing, but this conflict is also about Nauta. And Nauta is now being prosecuted for conduct that may have begun when American taxpayers were paying him, not Donald Trump. One of the things Nauta may be hiding by not cooperating are details about Trump’s overt intentions as they both packed up boxes.

And that’s not even the most damning part of the filing DOJ submitted yesterday.

DOJ also submitted its initial motion to unseal grand jury materials, submitted on July 30, in advance of the Garcia motion.

That motion reveals, first of all, that DOJ informed Judge Cannon of the conflict hearing on June 27.

On June 27, 2023, the government filed a sealed motion asking the Court to conduct an inquiry into potential conflicts of interests arising from attorney Stanley Woodward, Jr.’s simultaneous representation of [Taveras] and Waltine Nauta (“conflicts hearing motion”); and a separate sealed motion seeking Court authorization to disclose the conflicts hearing motion by, among other things, attaching a copy of the motion to a sealed notice to be filed in United States v. Donald J. Trump, Waltine Nauta, and Carlos De Oliveira, No. 23-cr-80101 (S.D. Fla.) (“Florida case”). The Court granted both motions, and the government filed the sealed notice, with a copy of the conflicts hearing motion attached, the same day.

As DOJ noted in its reply, that’s what the sealed docket entries 45 and 46 are.

That is, Aileen Cannon knew this was happening in real time. DOJ wasn’t hiding anything from her.

That motion to unseal also describes that DOJ intended to file “all information related to the conflicts hearing,” including the appointment of Michelle Peterson to represent Taveras, in a sealed supplement to its motion for a Garcia hearing.

The government therefore moves for an order permitting it to disclose to the court in the Florida case all information related to the conflicts hearing, including the fact and dates of the hearing, the resulting appointment of AFPD to represent [Taveras], and, if necessary, any filings, orders, or transcripts associated with the conflicts hearing. The government initially intends to include such information only in a sealed supplement to its motion for a Garcia hearing.

In other words, these two docket entries that Judge Cannon ordered be stricken, five days after they were posted and therefore made available to both Cannon and Woodward?

They include the material that, Woodward claims, he had never seen before DOJ’s reply.

Judge Cannon just gave Woodward another bite at the apple, as well as another six days before his client gets a Garcia hearing, based off Woodward’s claim that he had never seen information DOJ had shared (and which would have been available to Woodward for five days) but then Cannon herself had removed from the record. DOJ did provide this information in its initial motion. But because of actions Cannon took — the judicial equivalent of flushing that information down the toilet — Woodward (after waiting three days himself before first asking Judge Boasberg to share the information) claimed that he had never seen it before.

DOJ may have had a sense of where this was going, because back on July 30, in the same paragraph where they asked for permission to submit this information as part of a sealed supplement, DOJ also asked for permission to share it in unsealed form if things came to that.

[T]o ensure that it does not need to return to the Court for further disclosure orders, the government also seeks authorization to disclose information related to the conflicts hearing more broadly in the Florida case, as the need arises, including in briefing and in-court statements related to the Garcia hearing.

Things did, indeed, come to that.

And Woodward may have gotten notice of all that from Judge Boasberg’s order on July 31.

Things are going to get really testy going forward (if they haven’t already under seal) because, in a filing that DOJ did not first ask permission to file (but which I suspect would be authorized by a sealed order elsewhere in the docket, not to mention general ethical obligations requiring DOJ to inform her of everything going on in DC), DOJ just revealed that Judge Cannon threw out precisely the information that she’s now using to grant Woodward’s request for a sur-reply and — between the three days he waited to ask and the six she granted him to respond — nine more days to delay such time before Walt Nauta might be told about the significance of all the conflicted representation Woodward has taken on.

But I also expect that this will escalate quickly in one or another forum. Aileen Cannon was informed weeks ago of two significant conflicts in the representation of defendants before her, and rather than attend to those conflicts (or decide, simply, that she was going to blow them off, which in some forms might be an appealable decision), she has helped Woodward simply stall any resolution to the potential conflict.

Remember how I’ve promised I would start yelling if I believed that Cannon was doing something clearly problematic to help Trump? I’d say we’re there.

Update: Corrected my own math on the delay, which I said was 11 days but is 9. Ignoring that Cannon asked for lengthy briefing on a topic that most judges would just issue an order on, the key delays are:

  • 5 days before Cannon flushed the sealed supplement down the judicial toilet
  • 3 days between the DOJ reply and Woodward’s panicked demand for a sur-reply based on a claim that DOJ hadn’t previously raised the things Cannon flushed
  • 6 days of delay before Woodward will submit his sur-reply
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The Secrets within Donald Trump’s Stolen Secrets Docket

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As described here, yesterday’s reply on the motion for a Garcia hearing in the stolen documents case revealed a good deal of grand jury information about Yuscil Taveras’ testimony.

It revealed:

  • Trump’s IT worker, Taveras, testified (falsely, the government claims) in March
  • DOJ obtained two more subpoenas for surveillance footage, on June 29 and July 11, 2023 (the existence of those subpoenas, but not the date, had already been disclosed in a discovery memo)
  • It included the docket number associated with the conflict review — 23-GJ-46 — and cited Woodward’s response to the proceedings
  • James Boasberg provided Taveras with conflict counsel
  • Taveras changed his testimony after consulting with an independent counsel

Under grand jury secrecy rules, DC Chief Judge Boasberg would have had to approve sharing that information, but the docket itself remains sealed and Boasberg has not unsealed any of the proceedings.

The filing also explains two sealed entries in Judge Cannon’s docket: dockets 45 and 46.

DOJ informed Cannon of the grand jury proceedings in those two docket entries.

The Government notified this Court on the same day, by sealed notice, of the filing in the District of Columbia. See ECF Nos. 45, 46.

That explains, then, two of the multiple sealed entries on the docket. But those weren’t the only sealed dockets.

There was one before DOJ’s notice.

And one after.

Both of those may be orders from Cannon, since she wouldn’t have to ask for permission to file something under seal.

There’s the twin entry on August 2, in which DOJ asked to seal what was probably a description of the potential conflict involving Stan Woodward’s representation of three other witnesses who may testify against Walt Nauta.

Judge Cannon ordered those to be stricken.

Then there were five more — or more likely, two, and then three — on August 11 and 14.

All those sealed docket entries took place before — yesterday’s filing disclosed — the grand jury “completed its term” on August 17.

The Government notes that the grand jury in the District of Columbia completed its term on August 17, 2023.

DC grand juries generally sit for 18 months, but if this was a special grand jury focused only on this investigation (which has always been the assumption), it would have been convened (again, per the filing), in April, 2022, two months shy of that.

There’s no guarantee those other docket entries pertain to the DC grand jury. But it’s one possible explanation for the sealed entries.

Certainly, DOJ afforded itself of the opportunity presented by Cannon’s order to brief what she called “the legal propriety of using an out-of-district grand jury proceeding to continue to investigate and/or to seek post-indictment hearings on matters pertienent to the instant indicted matter in this district.

Waltine Nauta shall file a response to the Motion for a Garcia hearing [ECF No. 97] on or before August 17, 2023. Among other topics as raised in the Motion, the response shall address the legal propriety of using an out-of-district grand jury proceeding to continue to investigate and/or to seek post-indictment hearings on matters pertinent to the instant indicted matter in this district. The Special Counsel shall respond to that discussion in a Reply in Support of the Motion [ECF No. 97], due on or before August 22, 2023.

As DOJ’s reply noted, this wasn’t post-indictment investigation. Rather, it was pre-indictment investigation for the indictment adding Carlos De Oliveira and adding new charges against Trump and Nauta. And DOJ had to deal with all that in DC, because that’s where Taveras’ gave his original false testimony.

Following the indictment in this district, it was appropriate to use the grand jury in the District of Columbia to investigate false statements by Trump Employee 4 and De Oliveira. Neither individual was named in the indictment against Nauta and Trump, and venue for charges based upon their false statements in the District of Columbia would lie only in that district. It therefore necessarily follows that the grand jury was not used “for the primary purpose of strengthening its case on a pending indictment or as a substitute for discovery,” even if that “may be an incidental benefit.” United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 1977).

[snip]

A claim of improper use of the grand jury here is even further afield than in Beasley. Whereas the recanted testimony in Beasley was relevant only to the charges pending in the indictment, as described above, Trump Employee 4’s corrected testimony is probative of “crimes not covered in the indictment.” US Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d at 1214.

Not only was it appropriate to use the grand jury to investigate false statements by Trump Employee 4 and De Oliveira, it was appropriate to use the grand jury in the District of Columbia, where the statements were made and where venue for any false-statement charges would be proper. See United States v. John, 477 F. App’x 570, 572 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (concluding that venue for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is “proper only in the district or districts where the defendant made the false statement”); United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction for perjurious grand jury testimony in the District of Columbia material to antitrust charges subsequently brought in the Northern District of Georgia). And it was necessary to bring to the attention of the Chief Judge in that district the potential conflict that arose from Mr. Woodward’s representation of Trump Employee 4 in those proceedings. As “an incident of [its] supervisory power, a court has jurisdiction” to consider potential conflicts of interest that “relate[] to a grand jury proceeding within that court’s control,” and when the Government discerns such a potential conflict of interest, it “is not only authorized but is in fact obligated to bring the problem to that court’s attention.” In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976).

Nauta is therefore incorrect when he claims (ECF No. 126 at 8) that the Government was “attempt[ing] to diminish the Court’s authority over the proceedings in this case and to undermine attorney-client relationships.” When a conflict arose in the context of Trump Employee 4’s status as a putative defendant in the District of Columbia, the Government raised the conflicts issue there; now that a conflict arises from potential cross-examination of Trump Employee 4 in the case against Nauta in this district, the Government has raised the conflicts issue here. Nauta makes no showing of improper use of the grand jury, let alone the strong showing that is required to rebut the presumption of regularity in grand jury proceedings.

There’s far more secrecy than there should be, for the prosecution of the former President, even accounting for the highly sensitive documents involved.

Not only has Cannon made it prohibitively difficult for the media to cover the proceedings, but she canceled an open hearing scheduled for August 25 in lieu of a sealed hearing — secret time, secret place — to discuss the classified protective order. She did that while refusing to let DOJ protect the secrecy of the grand jury in DC.

It’s her courtroom, and if she wants to pick and choose which proceedings against the former President become public, to some degree that’s her prerogative.

Having been forced to unseal these matters by Cannon’s order, though, this filing (and in the Garcia motion pertaining to John Irving), DOJ laid out how damning the alternative can be.

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