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The Superseding Trump Indictment Is about Obstruction as Much as Immunity

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In this Xitter thread, I went through everything that had been added or removed from the superseding indictment against Trump, based on this redline. The changes include the following:

  1. Removal of everything having to do with Jeffrey Clark
  2. Removal of everything describing government officials telling Trump he was nuts (such as Bill Barr explaining that he had lost Michigan in Kent County, not Wayne, where he was complaining)
  3. Removal of things (including Tweets and Trump’s failure to do anything as the Capitol was attacked) that took place in the Oval Office
  4. Addition of language clarifying that all the remaining co-conspirators (Rudy Giuliani, John Eastman, Sidney Powell, Kenneth Chesebro, and — probably — Boris Epshteyn) were private lawyers, not government lawyers
  5. Tweaked descriptions of Trump and Mike Pence to emphasize they were candidates who happened to be the incumbent
  6. New language about the treatment of the electoral certificates

Altogether, the changes incorporate not just SCOTUS’ immunity decision, but also the DC Circuit’s Blassingame decision deeming actions taken as a candidate for office are private acts, and SCOTUS’ Fischer decision limiting the use of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) to evidentiary issues.

The logic of Blassingame is why Jack Smith included these paragraphs describing that Trump and Pence were acting as candidates.

1. The Defendant, DONALD J. TRUMP, was a candidate for President of the United States in 2020. He lost the 2020 presidential election.

[snip]

5. In furtherance of these conspiracies, the Defendant tried–but failed–to enlist the Vice President, who was also the Defendant’s running mate and, by virtue of the Constitution, the President of the Senate, who plays a ceremonial role in the January 6 certification proceeding.

As I’ve said repeatedly, it’s not clear that adopting the Blassingame rubric will work for SCOTUS, even though they did nothing to contest this rubric.

That’s because Chief Justice Roberts used Pence’s role as President of the Senate to deem his role in certification an official responsibility, thereby deeming Trump’s pressure of Pence an official act. Smith will need to rebut the presumption of immunity but also argue that using these conversations between Trump and Pence will not chill the President’s authority.

Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their official responsibilities, they engage in official conduct. Presiding over the January 6 certification proceeding at which Members of Congress count the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice President. Art. II, §1, cl. 3; Amdt. 12; 3 U. S. C. §15. The indictment’s allegations that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President to take particular acts in connection with his role at the certification proceeding thus involve official conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively immune from prosecution for such conduct.

The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. When the Vice President presides over the January 6 certification proceeding, he does so in his capacity as President of the Senate. Ibid. Despite the Vice President’s expansive role of advising and assisting the President within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s Article I responsibility of “presiding over the Senate” is “not an ‘executive branch’ function.” Memorandum from L. Silberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., to R. Burress, Office of the President, Re: Conflict ofInterest Problems Arising Out of the President’s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller To Be Vice President Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 2 (Aug. 28, 1974). With respect to the certification proceeding in particular, Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes, see, e.g., 3 U. S. C. §15, and the President plays no direct constitutional or statutory role in that process. So the Government may argue that consideration of the President’s communications with the Vice President concerning the certification proceeding does not pose “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754; see supra, at 14.

At the same time, however, the President may frequently rely on the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate to advance the President’s agenda in Congress. When the Senate is closely divided, for instance, the Vice President’s tiebreaking vote may be crucial for confirming the President’s nominees and passing laws that align with the President’s policies. Applying a criminal prohibition to the President’s conversations discussing such matters with the Vice President—even though they concern his role as President of the Senate—may well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitutional functions.

It is ultimately the Government’s burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.

This is the most important advantage of superseding the indictment. When someone boasted to Bloomberg that Jack Smith’s purported decision not to have a mini-trial on these issues was a “win” for Trump, they envisioned that this meant there would be no media friendly election-season developments, providing a way to get through (a successful or stolen) election so future President Trump could throw the case out.

Such a hearing would have been the best chance for voters to review evidence about Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election result as he campaigns to regain the White House.

The decision is a win for Trump and his lawyers, who have fought efforts to reveal the substance of allegations against the former president.

The decision to supersede this indictment may have turned what could have been an immediate dispute about the viability of the indictment at all into an evidentiary dispute to be managed later. We’ll find out more on Tuesday.

At the very least, Jack Smith suggests he has something viable on which to arraign Trump (and Trump’s Xitter wails treating this as a real indictment suggest he may believe that).

Smith will still need to overcome the presumption created out of thin air by John Roberts on all of this. But he may do so from a posture where the utter absurdity of Roberts’ ruling are made obvious.

That’s one reason it’s important that Smith has included the tweet via which Trump almost got Mike Pence assassinated.

Smith rationalized doing so by emphasizing that Trump wrote it neither in the Oval Office nor with anyone’s assistance.

92. Beginning around 1:30 p.m., the Defendant, who had returned to the White
House after concluding his remarks, settled in the dining room off of the Oval Office. He spent much of the afternoon reviewing Twitter on his phone, while the television in the dining room showed live events at Capitol.

[snip]

94. At 2:24 p.m., the Defendant personally, without assistance, issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!” [my emphasis]

This situates this Tweet, which almost got Mike Pence killed, a private act for which Trump has no immunity. It may not work. But that’s the logic.

But the other changes in this passage are all about Fischer, about showing how Trump deliberately sicced a mob on the Capitol with the goal of making it impossible to count the certifications.

After adding language from Trump’s speech (included based on the justification that the rally was paid for by private funds) in which he emphasized the certification process, Smith added other language describing how Trump’s mob disrupted the vote certification over which Pence was presiding.

Everything italicized below is new.

86d. The Defendant specifically referenced the process by which electoral votes are counted during the proceeding, including by stating, “We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.”

[snip]

90. On the floor of the House of Representatives, the Vice President, in his role as President of the Senate, began the certification proceeding. At approximately 1:11 p.m., the Vice President opened the certificates of vote and certificates of ascertainment that the legitimate electors for the state of Arizona had mailed to Washington, consistent with the ECA. After a Congressman and Senator lodged an objection to Arizona’s certificates, the House and Senate retired to their separate chambers to debate the objection.

91. A mass of people-including individuals who had traveled to Washington and to
the Capitol at the Defendant’s direction-broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds and advanced on the building, including by violently attacking law enforcement officers trying to secure it.

92. Beginning around 1:30 p.m., the Defendant, who had returned to the White
House after concluding his remarks, settled in the dining room off of the Oval Office. He spent much of the afternoon reviewing Twitter on his phone, while the television in the dining room showed live events at Capitol.

93. At 2:13 p.m., after more than an hour of steady, violent advancement, the
crowd at the Capitol broke into the building, and forced the Senate to recess. At approximately 2:20 p.m., the official proceeding having been interrupted, staffers evacuating from the Senate carried with them the legitimate electors’ certificates of vote and their governors’ certificates of ascertainment. The House also was forced to recess.

94. At 2:24 p.m., the Defendant personally, without assistance, issued a Tweet intended to further delay and obstruct the certification: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!”

95. One minute later, at 2:25 p.m., the United States Secret Service was forced to evacuate the Vice President to a secure location.

96. At the Capitol, throughout the afternoon, members of the crowd chanted, “Hang Mike Pence!”; “Where is Pence? Bring him out!”; and “Traitor Pence!”

This narrative ties the mob, particularly the storming of the Senate chamber, directly to Trump’s goal of interrupting the counting of the electoral certificates. This instrumentality was always a part of the indictment — has been part of this investigation since no later than January 5, 2022. But Roberts’ dual interventions in the January 6 prosecutions forced Smith and crime scene prosecutors working under US Attorney Matthew Graves to make it far more explicit.

A significant number of mobsters either knew the import of the certificates ahead of time, and/or heard Trump describe the goal at the Ellipse, and when they stormed the Capitol, assaulted cops, and occupied the space that the Vice President had only just evacuated, they had the goal of preventing the authentic certificates from being counted.

And Jack Smith is making this argument before Judge Chutkan even as other prosecutors are making a parallel argument before other judges.

As DOJ laid out in their filing describing how they plan to retry Matt Loganbill (who joined Alex Jones as he opened a second, eastern front on the attack on the Capitol) under the new Fischer standard, Loganbill had the goal of getting Pence to shred the envelopes as early as December 20, 2020, and after he stormed the Capitol, he headed towards the Senate where he believed they were counting the vote.

  • On December 20, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “This would take place Jan 6 Witnesses should be 60 feet away while Pence counts the Electoral College votes . . . Pence should open all the envelopes and then stack all the EC ballots in a pile, he should then shred all the envelopes and burn the shreds.” Gov. Ex. 302.47.
  • On December 30, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “CALL SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY’S OFFICE T O D A Y AND LET HIM KNOW YOU SUPPORT HIS INTENT TO BE THE FIRST REPUBLICAN SENATOR TO CHALLENGE THE ELECTORAL VOTE ON JANUARY 6.” Gov. Ex. 302.49.
  • On January 6, 2021, at 1:20 p.m., the defendant sent a text message, “Are you watching what’s going on in the house/ elector certification.” Gov. Ex. 303.
  • On January 7, 2021, the defendant replies to a comment by another person on Facebook saying, “Why do you think we were trying every means possible to stop these idiots from stealing the presidency and destroying this nation.” Gov. Ex. 302.65

Evidence at trial showed Loganbill entered the Capitol, the location where the Electoral College ballots were located and where Congress and the Vice President were conducting the official proceeding.6 Gov Exs 101.1 and 701. Once inside, the defendant proceeded towards the Senate, where Congress would be handing objections to the Electoral College vote – attempting to obstruct Congress’ certification of the Electoral College ballots. The defendant knew where he was going. The government admitted a Facebook post by the defendant on January 7 and 8, 2021, he wrote, “They didn’t [let us in] at the chamber, we could have over run them, after 10-15 minutes of back and forth, we walked out” and “The only place [the police officers] wouldn’t give was the hallway towards the Rep. chamber.” Gov Exs 302.66 and 302.82, respectively. The “chamber” and “Rep. chamber” were where the Vice President and members of Congress would have been counting and certifying the Electoral College ballots. Gov Ex 701

[snip]

From this evidence, including the defendant’s express statement related to the destruction of the electoral ballots, the Court would be able to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted to obstruct the certification of the electoral vote, and specifically, that he intended to, and attempted to, impair the integrity or availability of the votes (which are documents, records, or other things within the meaning of Fischer) under consideration by the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.

Of course, with any retrial, both parties would be permitted to introduce new evidence, or start the record over anew. Indeed, the government would likely introduce additional evidence related to the ballots and staffers attempts to remove the ballots from the chambers when the riot started.

6 According to the testimony of Captain Jessica Baboulis’ testimony, “[t]he official proceeding had suspended due to the presence of rioters on Capitol Grounds and inside the Capitol. ECF No. 31 at 23. As the Court said in its verdict, “It doesn’t matter to this count if he entered the building after the official proceeding had been suspended and Pence had been evacuated.” ECF No. 40 at 5. Loganbill attempted to and did obstruct the Electoral College vote, including the counting of ballots, the presence of members of Congress, and the presence of the Vice President.

Here’s how DOJ plans to prove that the Chilcoats, Shawndale and Donald, planned to prevent the votes from being counted by occupying the Senate.

[A]t approximately 2:46 p.m., the defendants watched rioters attempt to break open windows, then entered the Capitol building itself through a broken-open door on the building’s northwest side. A cell phone video shows that, after they learned of the breach, Donald Chilcoat cautioned Shawndale Chilcoat that they should let other rioters enter first. That way, if the police deployed pepper spray, those other rioters, and not the Chilcoats, would bear the brunt of it. In other words, the defendants knew they were not welcome, and they knew their entry might be met with force. After the defendants entered the building, they traveled to the Senate Chamber – the very place where the proceeding was taking place – and joined other rioters in occupying it. There, they took photographs and remained in the chamber while other rioters searched desks belonging to the former Vice President and to Senators.

Through their conduct, the defendants demonstrated an intent to invade and occupy the Capitol building and to stop the certification of the electoral college vote. And, critically, they were aware that this proceeding involved records, documents, or other things—specifically, the electoral votes that Congress was to consider. On January 4, 2021, via Facebook, a friend of Shawndale Chilcoat told her to “give Rob Portman a call and let him know what you think of him not rejecting the fraudulent votes.” Shawndale Chilcoat affirmed “just did.” Then, late on January 5 or early on January 6, Shawndale Chilcoat posted a message to Facebook saying that “[Vice President] Pence is stating he can not reject the votes.” On January 7, 2021, after the riot, Shawndale Chilcoat admitted “we were just trying to stop them from certifying the votes and didn’t know they were already gone.” On the same day, she also bragged, “[o]k so antifa is being blamed for breaking windows and storming congress. Um no, it was us I was with them and couldn’t be more proud.”

Here’s one of the most interesting things about yesterday’s superseding indictment.

The efforts to address Fischer are intertwined. While DOJ might be able to sustain some obstruction cases against rioters based on their own communications, and while Jack Smith might rescue this indictment with a focus on the effort to create fake elector certificates, Smith can only show that Trump almost got his Vice President assassinated if enough of the crime scene obstruction cases survive DC District review (and jury verdicts) such that Smith can show the mob was his instrument.

Jack Smith did things (describing that Trump was in his private Dining Room, not the Oval Office, noting that he sent the threatening Tweet with no assistance, labeling the rally a privately-funded speech, labeling Trump and Pence as candidates) that increase his chances of overcoming the presumption of immunity that John Roberts invented. But a number of judges (and some juries) are going to have to buy that a handful of members of the mob stormed the Capitol, and especially the Senate, with the intent of making it impossible to count vote for Joe Biden.

Here’s where things get interesting. As far as I’m aware, we have yet to see any of the superseding indictments for crime scene defendants against whom DOJ wants to sustain obstruction charges (we have seen superseding indictments against people against whom DOJ has replaced obstruction with something else, like rioting).

DOJ could have used a combined grand jury to do both, Trump and his mob. They’re each going to focus on the same issues: What staffers did to preserve the certificates as mobster came in, and the intent to prevent their counting.

They appear not to have done so; yesterday’s indictment lacks the date the grand jury was seated, which normal DC District grand juries have.

If that’s right, then Jack Smith (appears to have) seated a grand jury that could spend the next several months examining different charges, perhaps boosted by whatever precedents come out of the proceedings before Judge Chutkan and others, rather than simply sharing a grand jury with prosecutors doing much the same thing, addressing Fischer.

If Jack Smith succeeds in preserving this indictment — and that’s still a big *if* — then he will do so by making the argument that Trump, in his role as candidate, had the intention of using a mob to target the guy who played the ceremonial role of counting the vote. It would result in a collection of judicial holdings that presidential candidate Donald Trump had a mob target his Vice President in an attempt to remain President unlawfully.

Sure, John Roberts and his mob might yet try to overturn that. John Roberts might endorse the idea that presidential candidates, so long as they are the incumbent, can kill members of Congress to stay in power.

But doing so would clarify the absurdity of such a ruling.

Correction: Kyle Cheney reports that this is a grand jury seated last year. It has indicted other Jan6ers and so could do any 1512 indictments that require superseding.

The Pared Down Superseding Indictment for January 6

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As I predicted in this post, Jack Smith did not wait around for a dispute before Tanya Chutkan to talk about which allegations in the January 6 indictment against Trump are and are not official acts. He superseded the existing indictment.

But Smith took the “pared down” approach NYT’s Alan Feuer imagined: The indictment takes out all reference to Jeffrey Clark. It emphasizes throughout that Trump worked with private individuals to try to steal the election.

That said, it does keep the Mike Pence allegations in the indictment, emphasizing that those actions were exclusively about remaining in power.

Update: In his notice regarding this superseding indictment, Smith emphasized that he used an entirely new grand jury. He would have had to do that anyway — the one he had used previously expired last summer, probably over a year ago.

Today, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned a superseding indictment, ECF No. 226, charging the defendant with the same criminal offenses that were charged in the original indictment. The superseding indictment, which was presented to a new grand jury that had not previously heard evidence in this case, reflects the Government’s efforts to respect and implement the Supreme Court’s holdings and remand instructions in Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024). The Government does not oppose waiver of the defendant’s appearance for arraignment on the superseding indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 10(b). As this Court directed, ECF No. 197, the Government will confer with the defense and make a joint proposal, to the extent possible, regarding pretrial litigation in the status report due Friday.

But the mention of “pretrial litigation” suggests he wants to pick up where he left off.

Update: Here are the parts of my post from Saturday explaining what the logic here would be.

Now, as I suggested, even if you were doing nothing more than removing the Jeffrey Clark references, doing so would be smart in any case. Not only could Smith excise all the Jeffrey Clark materials, thereby giving Trump less surface area to attack the indictment, but he could tweak what is already there to address some of the other concerns raised by SCOTUS, for example, to clarify how candidate Trump’s reliance on fake elector certificates do not threaten Executive authorities. But minor tweaks, even the excision of the Jeffrey Clark stuff, would not require consultation with DOJ, and if Jack Smith were just excising the Jeffrey Clark stuff, he could have done that before DOJ’s election prohibition on indictments kicks in on roughly September 1.

So let’s talk about what would require consultation with DOJ, consultation requiring two full months from the immunity ruling, because it raises ways that Smith might supersede the indictment that would be a lot more interesting than simply excising the Clark stuff:

  • Consultation with the Solicitor General’s office regarding edge cases on official acts
  • Consultation with DC USAO on how to apply obstruction more generally

[snip]

Consultation with the Solicitor General’s office regarding edge cases on official acts: First, and least controversially, DOJ would consult with the Solicitor General’s office regarding any more difficult issues regarding official acts. Perhaps the most obvious of these — and one squarely raised in SCOTUS’ ruling — is the status of Mike Pence in conversations about certifying the electoral certificates. If Pence was acting exclusively in his role as President of the Senate, then Trump’s relationship to him would be as a candidate, and so under Blassingame, an unofficial act. But the Republicans on SCOTUS want to argue that some of these conversations were official acts, making Pence’s testimony inadmissible under their order. If DOJ is superseding an indictment to excise the things that need to be excised, DOJ would want the Solicitor General involved in such decisions not just because they’ll have to defend whatever stance Jack Smith adopts, but also so as to protect the equities of the Executive Branch, which DOJ traditionally guards jealously.

Consultation with DC USAO on how to apply obstruction more generally: More interestingly (and as I focused on here), if Jack Smith were to supersede the indictment against Trump, he would undoubtedly tweak the language on the two obstruction charges to squarely comply with the Fischer decision limiting it to evidentiary issues.

Since Smith got his extension, DOJ has started weighing in on a handful of crime scene cases where (unlike around 60 others) it thinks it can sustain obstruction charges under a theory that the defendant knew the import of the electoral certifications themselves and took steps to obstruct the actual counting of them.

[snip]

DOJ is making the effort of trying to sustain the obstruction charges for defendants who can’t be charged with one of several other felonies (obstructing the cops or rioting), but whose conduct — DOJ believes — should still be a felony. They’re going to have to do this with some members of the two militia conspiracies, the felony convictions on which are often the primary felonies (though DOJ used the obstruction of cops with them too).

It’s fairly easy to see how this effort has to harmonize with however Smith revamps the obstruction charges against Trump. And given the evidence that Smith was moving to include the Proud Boys in Trump’s case, that harmonization may be key to sustaining obstruction charges against the Proud Boys.

The other parts — on if Smith decided to add new charges — aren’t relevant here.

Be Careful What Trump’s Lawyers Wish For, Superseding Indictment Edition

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On Friday, first Bloomberg (Yahoo version), then NYT reported that Jack Smith “has decided against seeking a major hearing” to address which of the allegations charged against Donald Trump were official versus unofficial acts. Here’s Bloomberg:

Special Counsel Jack Smith has decided against seeking a major hearing to present evidence in the election-interference case against Donald Trump before voters go to the polls Nov. 5, according to people familiar with the matter.

The move means that it’s unlikely a so-called mini-trial, which would include evidence and testimony from possible blockbuster witnesses like former Vice President Mike Pence, would take place before the presidential election.

Such a hearing would have been the best chance for voters to review evidence about Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 election result as he campaigns to regain the White House.

The decision is a win for Trump and his lawyers, who have fought efforts to reveal the substance of allegations against the former president. If Trump wins the election, the case would collapse as the Justice Department has a policy against prosecuting sitting presidents. Trump could also order the department to throw it out.

Instead, Smith and his team are carefully revising the case against Trump, according to the people familiar, who asked not to be named discussing a confidential matter. [my emphasis]

The emphasis here was on a supposed “win” for Trump’s lawyers, though they haven’t actually done anything to get that win. They haven’t filed a brief, they haven’t made any formal requests. This is a “win” that they did nothing — at least, nothing since SCOTUS rewrote the Constitution for Trump — to earn. Though the piece is right: If Trump wins the election, it seems impossible that this prosecution will lead anywhere, and Smith’s reported decision not to ask to explain the charges in more detail makes it less likely that such a mini-trial could have a bearing on whether Trump does win or not. (While Bloomberg states that “Trump’s lawyers didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment,” that description doesn’t rule out that this story was sourced to someone close to Trump, and the story does cite Trump’s spox, who seems to have just ranted about witch hunts.)

The NYT provides a better sense of whence the hopes for a mini-trial before the election came — from outside commentators (probably including me), not from anything Smith had officially said — which is important to making sense of this development.

Still, the ruling left open the possibility that Mr. Smith’s prosecutors could use a public hearing to air some of the evidence they had collected against the former president before Election Day. Several legal experts and commentators seized on the idea, saying that a hearing like that would almost resemble the trial itself — albeit without the finality of a jury verdict.

And yet such a proceeding was always going to be fraught with complications — not least if it ended up being held in the homestretch of an election in which Mr. Trump is seeking to return to the White House.

Neither of these stories mentions the last official thing we did hear from Jack Smith: that his team needed an extra three weeks, from August 9 to August 30, to consult with other DOJ components, as required by Special Counsel regulations.

The Government continues to assess the new precedent set forth last month in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), including through consultation with other Department of Justice components. . See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a) (“A Special Counsel shall comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the Department of Justice,” including “consult[ing] with appropriate offices within the Department for guidance with respect to established practices, policies and procedures of the Department . . . .”). Although those consultations are well underway, the Government has not finalized its position on the most appropriate schedule for the parties to brief issues related to the decision.

So two weeks before these stories, Jack Smith said, we need more time to talk to other people at DOJ to decide our “position on the most appropriate schedule … to brief issues,” though, as I noted here, Special Counsel regulations would not technically require consultation about the timing of hearings or briefs regarding the case in its current posture, especially given Jack Smith’s past representations that DOJ guidelines on elections would not have prohibited holding an actual trial in the pre-election period. And then, in the two weeks since, “people familiar with the matter” have decided, heard, or learned that the most appropriate schedule does not include a mini-trial, which is not something that Smith had ever publicly considered in the first place.

And neither of these stories fully address that, in most circumstances, this would not be Smith’s decision to make. Bloomberg says, “Chutkan could overrule Smith and order a major hearing prior to the election.” NYT describes that, “Judge Chutkan could in theory still order such a hearing to be held.” NYT does walk through the range of alternatives to do what SCOTUS ordered, that is, to sort through which parts of the indictment are official acts and which are not. But, in most circumstances, it was never Smith’s position to demand a public hearing, and nothing he ever said indicated he intended to do so. The goal of a mini-trial, as NYT reported, came from outside commentators.

There is one circumstance, however, where Judge Tanya Chutkan would not have a chance to weigh in. And it is one circumstance that is alluded to by both of these pieces, without addressing its potential implications. NYT states that prosecutors might seek what it assumes would be a pared-down indictment.

The prosecutors could also seek to bring a new, pared-down indictment against Mr. Trump focusing on charges they believed arose from acts undertaken in his private role as a candidate for office, not in his official role as president.

Bloomberg cites (and includes in its subhead) that prosecutors “are carefully revising the case.”

You can’t change a word in that indictment — you can’t take out all references to Jeffrey Clark’s role in subverting the election, the one thing SCOTUS said has to happen — without going back to a grand jury and superseding the original indictment. But even just doing that would put Jack Smith in the driver’s seat, effectively giving him the first shot at drafting what should and shouldn’t be included among unofficial acts that constitute crimes.

If Jack Smith is really doing what Bloomberg says — revising the case — then they have decided that they will supersede the indictment.

Now, as I suggested, even if you were doing nothing more than removing the Jeffrey Clark references, doing so would be smart in any case. Not only could Smith excise all the Jeffrey Clark materials, thereby giving Trump less surface area to attack the indictment, but he could tweak what is already there to address some of the other concerns raised by SCOTUS, for example, to clarify how candidate Trump’s reliance on fake elector certificates do not threaten Executive authorities. But minor tweaks, even the excision of the Jeffrey Clark stuff, would not require consultation with DOJ, and if Jack Smith were just excising the Jeffrey Clark stuff, he could have done that before DOJ’s election prohibition on indictments kicks in on roughly September 1.

So let’s talk about what would require consultation with DOJ, consultation requiring two full months from the immunity ruling, because it raises ways that Smith might supersede the indictment that would be a lot more interesting than simply excising the Clark stuff:

  • Consultation with the Solicitor General’s office regarding edge cases on official acts
  • Consultation with DC USAO on how to apply obstruction more generally
  • Approval from Merrick Garland for new types of charges against Trump on January 6 actions
  • Approval from Merrick Garland for charges pertaining to January 6 aftermath

Consultation with the Solicitor General’s office regarding edge cases on official acts: First, and least controversially, DOJ would consult with the Solicitor General’s office regarding any more difficult issues regarding official acts. Perhaps the most obvious of these — and one squarely raised in SCOTUS’ ruling — is the status of Mike Pence in conversations about certifying the electoral certificates. If Pence was acting exclusively in his role as President of the Senate, then Trump’s relationship to him would be as a candidate, and so under Blassingame, an unofficial act. But the Republicans on SCOTUS want to argue that some of these conversations were official acts, making Pence’s testimony inadmissible under their order. If DOJ is superseding an indictment to excise the things that need to be excised, DOJ would want the Solicitor General involved in such decisions not just because they’ll have to defend whatever stance Jack Smith adopts, but also so as to protect the equities of the Executive Branch, which DOJ traditionally guards jealously.

Consultation with DC USAO on how to apply obstruction more generally: More interestingly (and as I focused on here), if Jack Smith were to supersede the indictment against Trump, he would undoubtedly tweak the language on the two obstruction charges to squarely comply with the Fischer decision limiting it to evidentiary issues.

Since Smith got his extension, DOJ has started weighing in on a handful of crime scene cases where (unlike around 60 others) it thinks it can sustain obstruction charges under a theory that the defendant knew the import of the electoral certifications themselves and took steps to obstruct the actual counting of them.

Here’s what such an argument looks like in the case of Matt Loganbill:

At the time Fischer was decided, approximately 259 cases of the over 1,400 cases charged in the January 6 prosecution involved the application of §1512(c)(2). Some of the 259 cases were convictions at trial, while others were convictions through pleas. Some of those are currently pending trial, whereas other defendants have served their sentences of incarceration fully. As a result of Fischer, the government has endeavored to review cases – particularly those cases pending appeal, pending trial, or actively serving a sentence – in a timely and responsive fashion. Of those original 259 cases, the government has, as of the date of this filing, sought to forgo application of §1512(c)(2) – either post-conviction, pending appeal, or pending trial, in over 60 cases.5 The government continues to evaluate and/or litigate §1512(c)(2) in a variety of contexts. In this case, after a careful analysis of the Fischer opinion, the government contends that the defendant violated the statute and intends to proceed with the charge.

[snip]

  • On December 20, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “This would take place Jan 6 Witnesses should be 60 feet away while Pence counts the Electoral College votes . . . Pence should open all the envelopes and then stack all the EC ballots in a pile, he should then shred all the envelopes and burn the shreds.” Gov. Ex. 302.47.
  • On December 30, 2020, the defendant wrote to Facebook, “CALL SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY’S OFFICE T O D A Y AND LET HIM KNOW YOU SUPPORT HIS INTENT TO BE THE FIRST REPUBLICAN SENATOR TO CHALLENGE THE ELECTORAL VOTE ON JANUARY 6.” Gov. Ex. 302.49.
  • On January 6, 2021, at 1:20 p.m., the defendant sent a text message, “Are you watching what’s going on in the house/ elector certification.” Gov. Ex. 303.
  • On January 7, 2021, the defendant replies to a comment by another person on Facebook saying, “Why do you think we were trying every means possible to stop these idiots from stealing the presidency and destroying this nation.” Gov. Ex. 302.65

Evidence at trial showed Loganbill entered the Capitol, the location where the Electoral College ballots were located and where Congress and the Vice President were conducting the official proceeding.6 Gov Exs 101.1 and 701. Once inside, the defendant proceeded towards the Senate, where Congress would be handing objections to the Electoral College vote – attempting to obstruct Congress’ certification of the Electoral College ballots. The defendant knew where he was going. The government admitted a Facebook post by the defendant on January 7 and 8, 2021, he wrote, “They didn’t [let us in] at the chamber, we could have over run them, after 10-15 minutes of back and forth, we walked out” and “The only place [the police officers] wouldn’t give was the hallway towards the Rep. chamber.” Gov Exs 302.66 and 302.82, respectively. The “chamber” and “Rep. chamber” were where the Vice President and members of Congress would have been counting and certifying the Electoral College ballots. Gov Ex 701

[snip]

From this evidence, including the defendant’s express statement related to the destruction of the electoral ballots, the Court would be able to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted to obstruct the certification of the electoral vote, and specifically, that he intended to, and attempted to, impair the integrity or availability of the votes (which are documents, records, or other things within the meaning of Fischer) under consideration by the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.

Of course, with any retrial, both parties would be permitted to introduce new evidence, or start the record over anew. Indeed, the government would likely introduce additional evidence related to the ballots and staffers attempts to remove the ballots from the chambers when the riot started

5 The government’s decision to forgo charges should not be read as a concession that the defendant’s conduct does not meet the test as articulated by Fischer. Rather, we are evaluating the facts on a case-by-case basis, including whether the defendant committed other felonies, whether the criminal penalties of other applicable crimes sufficiently serves the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and whether additional litigation is warranted. This process is appropriately time-consuming.

6 According to the testimony of Captain Jessica Baboulis’ testimony, “[t]he official proceeding had suspended due to the presence of rioters on Capitol Grounds and inside the Capitol. ECF No. 31 at 23. As the Court said in its verdict, “It doesn’t matter to this count if he entered the building after the official proceeding had been suspended and Pence had been evacuated.” ECF No. 40 at 5. Loganbill attempted to and did obstruct the Electoral College vote, including the counting of ballots, the presence of members of Congress, and the presence of the Vice President.

DOJ is making the effort of trying to sustain the obstruction charges for defendants who can’t be charged with one of several other felonies (obstructing the cops or rioting), but whose conduct — DOJ believes — should still be a felony. They’re going to have to do this with some members of the two militia conspiracies, the felony convictions on which are often the primary felonies (though DOJ used the obstruction of cops with them too).

It’s fairly easy to see how this effort has to harmonize with however Smith revamps the obstruction charges against Trump. And given the evidence that Smith was moving to include the Proud Boys in Trump’s case, that harmonization may be key to sustaining obstruction charges against the Proud Boys.

Approval from Merrick Garland for new types of charges against Trump on January 6 actions: In my last post, I also suggested that Jack Smith could be considering adding insurrection charges against Trump. I argued that the three opinions protecting Trump — Immunity, Fischer, and Colorado — squarely permit such a charge. Notably, the immunity ruling said that acquittal on a charge, like the insurrection charge on which Trump was impeached, does not prohibit criminal charges for the same crime. And the Colorado decision noted that insurrection remains good law. If Smith decided he wanted to do this, it would require approval from Garland. I consider it an unlikely move (not least because some of the evidence to prove it would still be inadmissible under the immunity decision). So go read my earlier post for more on this.

Approval from Merrick Garland for charges pertaining to January 6 aftermath: By design, SCOTUS has made it really hard to prove the case against Trump, because it requires Jack Smith to successfully argue that Trump’s own speech — even his Tweets!! — are unofficial acts, when SCOTUS has made them presumptively official. Smith would not face the same difficulty for his speech as a private citizen. And a significant swath of the known investigation actually pertained to things Trump did after he left office: That investigating how he used donations made in the name of election integrity to do things entirely unrelated. It’s unclear why Smith dropped that side of his investigation, but it’s something that would face fewer of the challenges created by the immunity ruling.

Similarly, Smith had already asked to use statements Trump made after the period of the charged conspiracies (which go through January 7 or January 20) to threaten those who debunked his voter fraud claims.

In apparent response [to January 6 Committee testimony], the defendant then doubled down and recommenced his attacks on the election workers in posts on Truth Social. He even zeroed in on one of the election workers, falsely writing that she was an election fraudster, a liar, and one of the “treacher[ous] . . . monsters” who stole the country, and that she would be in legal trouble.

The Government will introduce such evidence to further establish the defendant and his co-conspirators’ plan of silencing, and intent to silence, those who spoke out against the defendant’s false election fraud claims; the defendant’s knowledge that his public attacks on officials—like those on his Vice President as described in the indictment—could foreseeably lead to threats, harassment, and violence; and the defendant’s repeated choice to attack individuals with full knowledge of this effect. It also constitutes after-the-fact corroboration of the defendant’s intent, because even after it was incontrovertibly clear that the defendant’s public false claims targeting individuals caused them harassment and threats, the defendant persisted—meaning that the jury may properly infer that he intended that result. Finally, evidence of the defendant’s encouragement of violence and the consequences of his public attacks is admissible to allow the jury to consider the credibility and motives of witnesses who may be the continuing victims of the defendant’s attacks.

Smith also asked to introduce evidence of Trump ratifying the violence of and promising to pardon those who engaged in it, other statements after he left office that would not be entitled to any immunity.

Of particular note are the specific January 6 offenders whom the defendant has supported— namely, individuals convicted of some of the most serious crimes charged in relation to January 6, such as seditious conspiracy and violent assaults on police officers. During a September 17, 2023, appearance on Meet the Press, for instance, the defendant said regarding Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio—who was convicted of seditious conspiracy—“I want to tell you, he and other people have been treated horribly.” The defendant then criticized the kinds of lengthy sentences received only by defendants who, like Tarrio, committed the most serious crimes on January 6. Similarly, the defendant has chosen to publicly and vocally support the “January 6 Choir,” a group of defendants held at the District of Columbia jail, many of whose criminal history and/or crimes on January 6 were so violent that their pretrial release would pose a danger to the public. The defendant nonetheless has financially supported and celebrated these offenders—many of whom assaulted law enforcement on January 6—by promoting and playing their recording of the National Anthem at political rallies and calling them “hostages.”

Any crimes that focus on things Trump has done since he left office to undermine democracy would not be entitled to any immunity.

In a presser the other day, Garland pointed to the number of prosecutions DOJ has pursued for January 6, arguing that the prosecutions have “shown to everybody how seriously we take an effort to interfere with the peaceful transfer of power: The last January 6, the coming January 6, and every January 6 after that.” Charging Trump for his continued efforts to undermine democracy would be one way to do that.

I’m not sure if Smith believes he could prove that these constituted crimes. But if he does, he would need Merrick Garland’s approval to charge them.

All that said, there’s the issue of timing. Usually, when DOJ is considering superseding someone, they tell defense attorneys. So I had been wondering, given Trump’s recent rumpiness, whether DOJ had indicated they would. If last week’s stories were sourced to people close to Trump, as opposed to people in DOJ, then it would seem Smith did not do that.

Which gets to another thing Jack Smith would have to consult on: If he were to supersede, when he could do that. And while he would have one more week to roll out an indictment to avoid DOJ’s pre-election deadlines, I think in this case, Garland likely would require Smith to hold off a superseding indictment itself until after the election.

We’ll learn more on Friday. But it’s possible we’ll learn that DOJ intends to supersede the indictment after the election, meaning everything would halt until then.

Update: Tweaked what I meant by Tweets being official or unofficial speech.

2024 Remains an Unpredictable Race: Six Predictable Things that Could Still Upend It

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Donald Trump announced he was running in the 2024 Presidential race over 21 months ago. Tomorrow marks four weeks since Joe Biden dropped out of the race. It marks two weeks since Vice President Harris became the presumptive Democratic nominee. Monday, the Democratic Convention starts.

Back before and when Joe Biden dropped, I was certain about two things: that Kamala Harris would bring a lot more stamina to the race and she would give much better voice to a pro-Choice position that could impact the outcome of the race. I was also pretty sure that because someone was out selling wildly successful policies, both Biden and Harris’ approval ratings would improve (remember my screen caps are 5 hours ahead of ET; this tweet was three hours after Biden dropped and two after he endorsed Harris).

I hoped that Kamala would break the Double Hater logjam that has characterized the past two Presidential races (and this one, until that point).

Kamala’s approval ratings have gone up (Biden’s are less dramatic, but have ticked up maybe a point so far).

And newfound enthusiasm, especially among Independent voters, suggests the Vice President may, indeed, break that Double Hater logjam.

That said, I think far too many people are complacent in their belief that Harris will continue to slowly grow a lead that will be sustainable in the face of whatever rat-fuckery Trump tries in November.

If we’ve learned one thing about the 2024 election, it’s that normal predictions won’t hold.

I still think a true Black Swan event is possible — something like a global war.

I also think the unpredicted and widespread notoriety of Project 2025 will upend any normal political outcomes. It’s not just a post-Dobbs election (with abortion on the ballot in swing states like Arizona), but continued coverage of Project 2025 in both the political and the popular press has put democracy on the ballot in a surprising way.

But even the following six things are quite possible, which could significantly affect the race in a number of ways.

Big protests at DNC: Many of the people pressuring Biden to drop, including Nancy Pelosi, favored some kind of speed primary. Instead, Biden and Harris managed to make that impossible within 24 hours of his departure. So instead of a wildly divisive Convention, Harris can instead mostly look forward to a lovefest, where the biggest questions are whether Jimmy Carter can manage a video cameo and which surprise performers — potentially including Bruce Springsteen, Beyoncé, or even Taylor Swift will show up.

The very important caveat to that, though, is that around 30 Uncommitted delegates can will cause some dissension inside the Convention and tens of thousands of protestors will cause even more outside of it. It’s the latter I’m most worried about. The protests themselves will restore attention to the ongoing catastrophe in Gaza. But they’re also an easy target that provocateurs and right wing cops can exploit.

Meaningful ceasefire in Israel — or, further escalation: In the face of potential escalation, negotiators have redoubled efforts to forge some kind of ceasefire deal. But there’s some reason to believe that Trump and Bibi will thwart this at all costs.

The potential for Gaza to dampen Democratic enthusiasm (or to juice third party candidates) has long been a focus. But few have fully unpacked how it has been exploited by the right. So one way or another, this continues to be the most obvious pivot for more dissension among likely Democratic voters.

And all that’s before Iran’s very real efforts to target Donald Trump.

Superseding indictment and/or September sentencing for Trump: As of right now, Trump is due to be sentenced in his New York document fraud case on September 18 and the parties in Trump’s January 6 case should begin discussing what to do about SCOTUS’ immunity indictment in early September.

Yesterday, Trump asked to delay the sentencing until after the election. Roger Parloff gave a nuanced assessment of the mostly but not entirely frivolous request. Even if he’s sentenced, it’s not at all clear that Juan Merchan would sentence Trump to prison time.

Meanwhile, I’m not the only one who thinks that Jack Smith asked for an extension until the last possible day to supersede Trump before the election because he may be contemplating such a course (since I wrote that post, DOJ has chose to recharge even more crime scene January 6ers charged with obstruction). A superseding indictment might add his co-conspirators (what others predict) or change the crimes charged against Trump (my own suspicion). One way or another, though, there will be legal proceedings on the January 6 case in September, proceedings that have the possibility to expose more details about how closely Trump’s team worked with the Proud Boys or about how central a role Trump played in sending bodies to the Capitol.

The thing about both these eventualities is that it’s not at all clear whether the rule to date — that Trump’s legal troubles only make him more popular with right wingers — will hold, not least because independent voters will finally be tuning in. And even if they do, they’ll happen against a backdrop where Kamala is running as a prosecutor who has taken on thugs like Trump in the past.

Another tumultuous debate: Trump actually had a really poor debate in June, but a combination of asymmetric press coverage and normalization of Trump covered for that. If he has another such debate, it could serve as a real weight on his campaign.

But it’s really not guaranteed that Kamala will ace a debate either. Trump’s ability to reframe entire conversations is unmatched, and thus far no moderator has been able to rein that in. Plus, for at least half of Trump’s presidential debate appearances, he has arranged some kind of gimmick for them (such as hosting Tony Bobulinski or making a framed false claim about Biden’s role in the Mike Flynn investigation). Usually, they fizzle, but you can’t guarantee they will.

Further decline in Trump’s mental state: Honestly, I think the degree to which Trump’s rambling and grievance are new is wildly overblown. He has always been like this. But I think the way in which it has been perceived of late has changed. That’s partly true because his schtick has gotten tired enough that even Trumpsters have begun to tune out (and occasionally, leave his events) in noticeable numbers. Because Trump has attempted to replace his big rallies in recent weeks, appearing at events with smaller or no crowds, he hasn’t gotten the juice he normally gets from crowd adulation that he needs to pull off his performances.

That may change now that the Secret Service has developed a plexiglass booth to protect him outdoors.

Even still, Kamala Harris has found ways to trigger Trump’s ugliest side, making it harder for him to control his grievances.

As a result, the press and some Republicans have begun to comment on his mental performance in a way they’ve haven’t done since 2016.

Far right political violence: As I laid out here, Trump’s allies and Elon Musk have both been part of a transnational effort to stoke violence based on fearmongering about migrants. In the past, right wing efforts to sow fear based on fabricated claims about caravans and the like have failed. And there’s always the likelihood that Trump’s mob will rise up in response to one of the events above, such as a superseding indictment.

As noted at the start of this post, it is possible that Kamala Harris will continue to engage new voters, competing in states (started with North Carolina) that haven’t been competitive in years.

But that’s if trends continue. And this year, there’s lots of reason to question whether they will.

Update: WaPo’s latest (very positive for Kamala) poll shows that the number of people happy with their choices for POTUS have gone up 16 points, a measure of the decline in Double Haters.

In July, when the contest was still Biden vs. Trump, 28 percent of voters overall said they were satisfied with the choice. Today, 44 percent say they are satisfied with the choice of Harris or Trump.

Jack Smith Asks for an Extension

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Judge Tanya Chutkan was clearly ready to get the prosecution of Donald Trump back on the road.

The day after she got the SCOTUS mandate from its immunity ruling, she set a deadline for a status report and status conference, and denying (for now, until all issues of immunity are settled) Trump’s challenge to the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2).

ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: Setting status conference for August 16, 2024 at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 9; requiring joint status report by August 9, 2024; denying without prejudice Defendant’s 114 Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based on Statutory Grounds; and staying briefing deadlines for the Government’s 191 Motion in Limine and Motion for CIPA Section 6(a) Hearing. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 8/3/2024.

But yesterday, Jack Smith asked for more time, citing the need to consult with other parts of DOJ before proposing a way forward.

The Government continues to assess the new precedent set forth last month in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), including through consultation with other Department of Justice components. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a) (“A Special Counsel shall comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the Department of Justice,” including “consult[ing] with appropriate offices within the Department for guidance with respect to established practices, policies and procedures of the Department . . . .”). Although those consultations are well underway, the Government has not finalized its position on the most appropriate schedule for the parties to brief issues related to the decision. The Government therefore respectfully requests additional time to provide the Court with an informed proposal regarding the schedule for pretrial proceedings moving forward. The defense does not object to the Government’s request for an extension.

Accordingly, the Government requests that the Court enter an order requiring the parties to submit another joint status report by Friday, August 30.

Of course, no one knows why Smith might need the delay.

By far the most obvious, however, has to do with how DC USAO plans to apply 18 USC 1512(c)(2) going forward after SCOTUS limited the application of obstruction charges in Fischer to matters pertaining to the evidence. Two of Trump’s charges are obstruction, one charged as a conspiracy, the other individually.

Thus far, DOJ has dealt with the crime scene cases implicating obstruction on a case by case basis. Those before Carl Nichols, the judge whose outlier ruling was adopted by SCOTUS, are getting dismissed. But some others are getting delayed, still others are getting recharged under 18 USC 231 (rioting). Sentencing involving obstruction are likewise being delayed.

As Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson noted in her concurring opinion on the obstruction ruling, because the vote certification involved the electoral certifications themselves, some of those crime scene cases might survive this ruling.

That official proceeding plainly used certain records, documents, or objects—including, among others, those relating to the electoral votes themselves. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 65–67. And it might well be that Fischer’s conduct, as alleged here, involved the impairment (or the attempted impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those specified in (c)(1).” Ante, at 8. If so, then Fischer’s prosecution under §1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed. That issue remains available for the lower courts to determine on remand.

DOJ has always argued this was possible. But it’s likely only possible, if at all, for those defendants who knew the import of the certificates themselves.

For Trump, however, the continued exposure is far broader (as Justice Amy Coney Barrett noted in her concurrence on the immunity ruling), because by orchestrating the fake elector certificates, Trump created a fraudulent document.

And DOJ needs to figure out how these two potential bases will interact going forward. Likely, DC USAO also has to consult with the Solicitor General’s Office, to figure out what they think will survive appeal, including how an obstruction charge built on the fake electors would survive.

So that’s probably a big cause of the delay: DOJ, as a whole, has to settle on how they’ll deal with obstruction going forward in light of Fischer. Charges for some crime scene defendants may depend on how Smith approaches obstruction charges against Trump.

But I’m mindful of something else. Jack Smith asked for a delay until August 30, three weeks plus a day from the original deadline. That’s the last day of the month — and that may be the only reason Smith asked for that date.

It’s also probably the last day that DOJ would permit charging anyone political before the election. That is, as has happened with some crime scene defendants, DOJ may be considering recharging this case (or charging others against whom some of these charges would stick).

And, aside from the possibility of charging a bunch of Trump’s co-conspirators, that allows for one very provocative possibility.

Justice John Roberts’ explicitly said that an acquittal on impeachment doesn’t rule out charging that same count criminally.

Impeachment is a political process by which Congress can remove a President who has committed “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Art. II, §4. Transforming that political process into a necessary step in the enforcement of criminal law finds little support in the text of the Constitution or the structure of our Government

So if Jack Smith originally avoided the insurrection charge against Trump to avoid any claim Trump’s impeachment acquittal ruled out such a charge, he has no such worry now.

As the per curium opinion in the Colorado disqualification case noted, insurrection remains on the books (I need to refer back to the hearing transcript, but someone like Justice Sammy Alito made the same observation at the hearing).

And the Confiscation Act of 1862, which predated Section 3, effectively provided an additional procedure for enforcing disqualification. That law made engaging in insurrection or rebellion, among other acts, a federal crime punishable by disqualification from holding office under the United States. See §§2, 3, 12 Stat. 590. A successor to those provisions remains on the books today. See 18 U. S. C. §2383.

Recharging this to include insurrection is the exact equivalent to what DOJ is doing elsewhere, replacing an obstruction charge with a rioting charge. And it would be consistent with the inclusion of a Proud Boy prosecutor on the Trump case, which I suspect to have occurred.

Again, by far the most likely explanation for the delay is that DOJ is just trying to figure out what to do with 1512 charges, against Trump and all the crime scene defendants.

But the three SCOTUS opinions — immunity, 1512, and 14th Amendment — explicitly leave this possibility. The immunity provision does not exclude charges on which Trump has been acquitted in an impeachment. Elsewhere, DOJ is replacing obstruction with rioting charges. And the 14th Amendment ruling explicitly noted that Insurrection remains good law.

So it is a possibility — and a possibility that would have to be considered by August 30.

How to Fact Check Trump’s Lies about His Document Case

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I just won the case in Florida. Everyone said that was the biggest case, that was the most difficult case. And I just won it.

Biden has a similar case, except much worse. I was protected under the Presidential Records Act. Biden wasn’t, because he wasn’t President at the time. And he had 50 years worth of documents, and they ruled that he was incompetent, and therefore he shouldn’t stand trial.

And I said, isn’t that something? He’s incompetent and he can’t stand trial — and yet, he can be President. Isn’t that nice? But they released him on the basis that–

[Goba attempts to interrupt]

— that he was incompetent. They said he had no memory, nice old guy, but he had no memory. Therefore we’re not gonna prosecute him.

I won the case. It got very little publicity. I didn’t notice ABC doing any publicity on it, George Slopodopoulos. I didn’t notice you do any publicity on it at all.

[Scott tries to interrupt]

I won the case, the biggest case. This is an attack on a political opponent. I have another one where I have a hostile judge

Scott: Sir, if you don’t mine, we have you for a limited time. I’d love to move onto a different topic.

Trump: No excuse me, you’re the one that held me up for 35 minutes.

The three women who attempted to interview Trump yesterday had an uneven performance. At times, their questioning flummoxed Trump. But in several cases, when he took over the interview, they just sat there silently as he lied at length.

A particularly egregious moment came in his false claims about the parallel investigations into his and President Biden’s retention of classified information. Trump told several lies without (successful) interruption. It was an unfortunate missed opportunity for correction, because Trump repeats these lies in his stump speech all the time, and it may be some time before someone competent has the ability to correct them in real time again.

Since Trump is going to keep telling the lie, I’d like to talk about how to fact check it.

Elements of the Offense

It starts with the elements of the offense — the things that prosecutors would have to prove if presenting this case to a jury. While Aileen Cannon has entertained doing fairly novel things with jury instructions, a model jury instruction for 18 USC 793(e), the statute considered with both men, includes the following five elements:

Did the defendant have possession of documents without authorization? The investigations into both Trump and Biden started when the Archives became aware that they had classified documents at their home. Contrary to what Trump said, the Presidential Records Act applies to both him and Biden, insofar as both were required to turn over any document that was a Presidential record when the Administration in which they served ended. That’s the basis of the proof that they had unauthorized possession of the documents that happened to be classified. That said, the PRA has an exception, however, for, “diaries, journals, or other personal notes serving as the functional equivalent of a diary,” which is relevant to why Biden wasn’t charged in two of four items Robert Hur considered charging seriously.

Trump has claimed that he had the ability to convert Presidential Records — even highly classified ones — into personal records, and thereby to take them home. But if this ever goes to trial, prosecutors would show that Trump first espoused that theory, which he got from non-lawyer Tom Fitton, in February 2022, long after the time he would have had to convert the documents to personal records.

Did the document in question relate to the national defense? The question of whether a document is National Defense Information or not is left to the jury to decide. That’s likely one reason why Jack Smith’s team included a bunch of highly classified documents among those charged. Generally, juries are asked to decide whether the government continues to take measures to keep a charged document secret, and whether it has to do with protecting the United States. A number of the documents charged against Trump pertain to either the US or other countries (like Iran’s) nuclear weapons programs.

Did the defendant have reason to believe the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation? Generally, prosecutors prove this by pointing to training materials cleared personnel get on classified information, and that’s one reason Jack Smith obtained the letters Trump’s White House sent out about classified information. With both Trump and Biden, however, prosecutors would also rely on their public comments talking about how important it is to protect classified information. In Trump’s case, prosecutors would or will use both the things he said to Mark Meadows’ ghost writer and Susie Wiles when he shared classified information, but also the things he said during the 2016 campaign — targeted at Hillary — about the import of protecting classified information.

Did he keep this document willfully? For both men, prosecutors would need to show that they realized they had classified documents, and then retained them. Given the extended effort to recover documents from Trump, it would be far easier to do for Trump than for Biden.

Did the defendant retain the above material and fail to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it? This is an element of the offense that Robert Hur misstated in his report (as I wrote here). It’s not enough to prove that someone willfully retained classified documents he wasn’t authorized to have, you also have to prove he failed to give them back. Normally, this is done (in part) by pointing to someone’s exit interview, when they are read out of their compartments and asked to give everything back. Because Presidents and Vice Presidents don’t have clearance and so aren’t read out of them, it is normally harder to prove that someone affirmatively refused to give documents back. But not in Trump’s case, which is what really distinguishes him from Biden, because the Archives and DOJ kept asking for the documents, including via subpoena, and Trump kept playing games to withhold them.

Theories of Biden Crime

There were four main documents or sets of documents for which Robert Hur considered charging Biden. They don’t include the 50 years of documents Trump described. Those were included in boxes of documents sent to universities; most were barely classified still if at all, and since Biden had given them away, it would be hard to prove he intentionally kept them.

Iran documents: The most sensitive documents found in the Biden investigation were some documents pertaining to Iran found in a box in a closet in Penn Center. Hur determined they had been sent to the Naval Observatory for a meeting Biden had with a bunch of Senators to suss out where they were on Obama’s Iran deal. They may never have gotten moved back to the White House, and were likely stuck in a box and moved to Penn Center by staffers when Biden moved out of the Naval Observatory. These documents were unquestionably Presidential records and National Defense information, but Hur had no evidence Biden knew they were there.

Afghan documents: Hur spent a lot of time trying to prove that, when Biden told his ghost writer during a meeting in his Virginia house on February 16, 2017 that, “I just found all this classified stuff downstairs,” he was referring to several dated folders pertaining to Afghanistan that were found in a ratty box in Biden’s garage in a consensual search. There were many problems with this theory: Hur couldn’t prove that the documents had ever been in the Virginia house (and so could have been downstairs when Biden made the comment); he couldn’t prove that Biden had personally put them in the box where they were found; he couldn’t come up with a compelling argument for why he would have retained them. When Hur included his language about what a forgetful old fogey Biden was, he did so to cover the possibility that Biden forgot he had the documents he hypothetically discovered in 2017 and so didn’t return them at that point, in 2017. But Hur would never have gotten close to where Biden would be relying on faulty memory, because Hur didn’t have very compelling evidence to prove his hypothesis about how the documents got into the garage in the first place, much less that Biden was involved in that process.

Afghan memo: Hur’s extended effort to make a case out of the Afghan documents was particularly difficult given that the best explanation for what Biden was referring to when mentioning classified documents was a 40-page handwritten memo Biden sent Obama in Thanksgiving 2009 to try to dissuade him from surging troops in Afghanistan. (The second best explanation for what Biden was referring to was a set of documents he had recently returned in 2017 when he made the comment.) That memo was found in a drawer in Biden’s office. Biden ultimately admitted to keeping it for posterity, meaning it might fall under the PRA exception for diaries. Because it was handwritten, it had no classification marks and couldn’t be proven to have obviously classified information, much less information still classified in 2023, when it was found.

Diaries: The FBI also found a bunch of notebooks that Biden called diaries and Hur called notebooks. When reading them to his ghost writer, Biden exhibited awareness they included sensitive information, which Hur argued was proof he knew they had classified information. Biden had a very good case to make that these fell under the PRA exception for diaries, as well as decades of precedent, including Ronald Reagan, that DOJ would not charge someone for classified information in his diaries. It would have been impossible to prove that Biden willfully retained something he knew he couldn’t retain, because Biden knew other Presidents and Vice Presidents hadn’t been prosecuted for doing the same exact thing.

There simply was no document or set of documents for which Hur could prove all the elements of offense.

Why You Can Charge Trump

As noted above, the thing that distinguishes Trump from Biden is that Biden found classified documents and invited the FBI to come look for more, making it virtually impossible to prove the final element of offense (the one Hur botched), that Biden refused to give them back.

Trump, by contrast, spent a full year refusing to give documents back, including after DOJ specifically subpoenaed him for documents with classification marks.

There were 32 documents charged against Trump. They include:

  • The document that Trump showed to Meadows’ ghost writers in 2021 and acknowledged was classified; that was returned to NARA in January 2022. You can charge this because prosecutors have a recording of Trump acknowledging it was classified months before he ultimately returned it.
  • Ten documents among those returned in response to a subpoena in June 2022. It’s unclear how Smith intends to prove that Trump knew he had these after he returned the first set of documents in 2021. But most if not all of them date to fall 2019, so he may know why Trump would have retained them. Matt Tait has argued at least some of them pertain to the US withdrawal from Turkey.
  • Ten documents found, in the August 2022 search, in the same box also containing bubble wrap and a Christmas pillow. Among the ten documents was one classified Formerly Restricted, meaning that, under the Atomic Energy Act, Trump could not have declassified it by himself.
  • Five more documents, also found in August 2022, that had been stored in boxes in the storage closet, including the one captured in a picture Walt Nauta took of documents that had spilled out of the boxes.
  • Three documents found during the Mar-a-Lago search in the blue leather bound box found in the closet in Trump’s office. At least a few of these likely pertain to Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal. These are likely documents that Trump referred to.

For every charged document besides the Iran one, then, prosecutors can show that Trump withheld the documents after he first returned documents in January 2021. Trump will certainly argue that he may not have known he had those specific documents. But Trump’s decision to end his sorting process in January 2021 and his efforts to thwart Evan Corcoran’s June 2022 search will go a long way to prove intent.

How Trump’s Case Got Dismissed

Trump falsely claimed he “won” his classified documents case. That’s false: Aileen Cannon dismissed it, just in time for the RNC. Her argument that Jack Smith was unconstitutionally appointed isn’t even the primary one that Trump’s attorneys were making: that Smith required Senate approval and that his funding was improper. Rather, she argued that Merrick Garland simply didn’t have the authority to appoint Smith in the way he did.

There are several reasons the distinction is important.

First, if SCOTUS upholds Cannon’s theory, then it will hold for all similar appointments. That extends unquestionably to Hur’s appointment, because like Smith he was a non-DOJ employee when appointed. It likely also extends to Alexander Smirnov, into whom most investigative steps occurred after David Weiss was appointed as a Special Counsel under the same terms as Smith and Hur, and whose alleged crimes happened somewhere besides Delaware. Whether it applies to Hunter Biden is a closer question: Judge Mark Scarsi seems poised to argue that since Weiss had already charged Hunter, his appointment is different (and given the way Scarsi has worked so far, I don’t rule out him trying to find a way to make this unappealable).

In other words, if the steps Jack Smith took after November 2022 were unconstitutional, then it means everything Hur did after January 2023 was also unconstitutional. If Trump “won,” then he needs to stop making any claims about Hur’s interview with Biden, because it was unconstitutional.

More importantly, not even Aileen Cannon has ruled that Trump didn’t knowingly and intentionally retain classified documents. All she has ruled is that if DOJ wants to charge him for it, they need to recreate the investigative steps completed since November 2022, under the review of US Attorney for Southern Florida Markenzy Lapointe.

Aileen Cannon Makes Clarence Thomas’ Calvinball Newly Significant

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Aileen Cannon’s order throwing out the stolen documents prosecution may make some Calvinball Justice Thomas engaged in more important in days ahead.

Cannon actually didn’t give Trump his preferred outcome: a ruling that Jack Smith would have had to be senate-confirmed and also that he was funded improperly. Aside from the timing, neither is this outcome one (I imagine) that Trump would prefer over a referral of Jack Smith for investigation or a dismissal on Selective Prosecution or spoilation or some other claim that would allow Trump to claim he was victimized.

Rather, she adopted a second part of Trump’s argument, that Merrick Garland didn’t have the legal authority to appoint a Special Counsel, of any sort, whether someone from outside the Department or someone (like David Weiss) who was already part of it. She punted on most of the question on whether a Special Counsel is a superior officer requiring Senate confirmation or an inferior one not requiring it.

Cannon’s argument lifts directly from Clarence Thomas’ concurrence, which she cites three times (though that is, in my opinion, by no means her most interesting citation). Thomas argues that the four statutes that Garland cited in his appointment of Jack Smith are insufficient to authorize the appointment of a Special Counsel.

We cannot ignore the importance that the Constitution places on who creates a federal office. To guard against tyranny, the Founders required that a federal office be “established by Law.” As James Madison cautioned, “[i]f there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Executive powers ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices.” 1 Annals of Cong. 581. If Congress has not reached a consensus that a particular office should exist, the Executive lacks the power to create and fill an office of his own accord.

It is difficult to see how the Special Counsel has an office “established by Law,” as required by the Constitution. When the Attorney General appointed the Special Counsel, he did not identify any statute that clearly creates such an office. See Dept. of Justice Order No. 5559–2022 (Nov. 18, 2022). Nor did he rely on a statute granting him the authority to appoint officers as he deems fit, as the heads of some other agencies have.3 See supra, at 5. Instead, the Attorney General relied upon several statutes of a general nature. See Order No. 5559–2022 (citing 28 U. S. C. §§509, 510, 515, 533).

None of the statutes cited by the Attorney General appears to create an office for the Special Counsel, and especially not with the clarity typical of past statutes used for that purpose. See, e.g., 43 Stat. 6 (“[T]he President is further authorized and directed to appoint . . . special counsel who shall have charge and control of the prosecution of such litigation”). Sections 509 and 510 are generic provisions concerning the functions of the Attorney General and his ability to delegate authority to “any other officer, employee, or agency.” Section 515 contemplates an “attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law,” thereby suggesting that such an attorney’s office must have already been created by some other law. (Emphasis added.) As for §533, it provides that “[t]he Attorney General may appoint officials . . . to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” (Emphasis added.) It is unclear whether an “official” is equivalent to an “officer” as used by the Constitution. See Lucia, 585 U. S., at 254–255 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (considering the meaning of “officer”). Regardless, this provision would be a curious place for Congress to hide the creation of an office for a Special Counsel. It is placed in a chapter concerning the Federal Bureau of Investigation (§§531–540d), not the separate chapters concerning U. S. Attorneys (§§541–550) or the now-lapsed Independent Counsel (§§591–599).4

To be sure, the Court gave passing reference to the cited statutes as supporting the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 694 (1974), but it provided no analysis of those provisions’ text. Perhaps there is an answer for why these statutes create an office for the Special Counsel. But, before this consequential prosecution proceeds, we should at least provide a fulsome explanation of why that is so.

4Regulations remain on the books that contemplate an “outside” Special Counsel, 28 CFR §600.1 (2023), but I doubt a regulation can create a federal office without underlying statutory authority to do so.

Cannon takes Thomas’ treatment of Nixon as a “passing reference” as invitation to make truly audacious analysis of it as dicta.

D. As dictum, Nixon’s statement is unpersuasive.

Having determined that the disputed passage from Nixon is dictum, the Court considers the appropriate weight to accord it. In this circuit, Supreme Court dictum which is “well thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated” is due near-precedential weight. Schwab, 451 F.3d at 1325–26 (collecting cases); Peterson, 124 F.3d at 1392 n.4. Additionally, courts are bound by Supreme Court dictum where it “is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.” Id. at 1326 (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)). The Nixon dictum is neither “thoroughly reasoned” nor “of recent vintage.” Id. at 1325–26. For these reasons, the Court concludes it is not entitled to considerable weight.

She then reviews the cited statutes one by one and deems them all insufficient to authorize a Special Counsel, with special focus on 28 USC 515 and (because Garland cited it for the first time) 533.

The Court now proceeds to evaluate the four statutes cited by the Special Counsel as purported authorization for his appointment—28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533. The Court concludes that none vests the Attorney General with authority to appoint a Special Counsel like Smith, who does not assist a United States Attorney but who replaces the role of United States Attorney within his jurisdiction.

[snip]

Section 515(b), read plainly, is a logistics-oriented statute that gives technical and procedural content to the position of already-“retained” “special attorneys” or “special assistants” within DOJ. It specifies that those attorneys—again already retained in the past sense—shall be “commissioned,” that is, designated, or entrusted/tasked, to assist in litigation (more on “commissioned” below). Section 515(b) then provides that those already-retained special attorneys or special assistants (if not foreign counsel) must take an oath; and then it directs the Attorney General to fix their annual salary. Nowhere in this sequence does Section 515(b) give the Attorney General independent power to appoint officers like Special Counsel Smith—or anyone else, for that matter.

Cannon twice notes her order applies only to the indictment before her (perhaps the only moment of judicial modesty in an otherwise hubristic opinion).

The instant Superseding Indictment—and the only indictment at issue in this Order—arises from the latter investigation.

[snip]

The effect of this Order is confined to this proceeding.

This is obvious — but it is also a way of saying that if the Eleventh backs this ruling, it would set up a circuit split with the DC rulings that she dismisses in cursory fashion.

Effectively, this represents one Leonard Leo darling, Cannon, dropping all her other means of stalling the prosecution for Trump, to act on seeming instructions from a more senior Leonard Leo darling.

A bunch of lawyers will dispute Cannon’s recitation of Thomas’ reading of the law. Indeed, Neal Katyal has already done so in an op-ed for the NYT.

Judge Cannon asserts that no law of Congress authorizes the special counsel. That is palpably false. The special counsel regulations were drafted under specific congressional laws authorizing them.

Since 1966, Congress has had a specific law, Section 515, giving the attorney general the power to commission attorneys “specially retained under authority of the Department of Justice” as “special assistant[s] to the attorney general or special attorney[s].” Another provision in that law said that a lawyer appointed by the attorney general under the law may “conduct any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal,” that other U.S. attorneys are “authorized by law to conduct.”

Yet another part of that law, Section 533, says the attorney general can appoint officials “to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.” These sections were specifically cited when Attorney General Merrick Garland appointed Mr. Smith as a special counsel. If Congress doesn’t like these laws, it can repeal them. But until then, the law is the law.

I drafted the special counsel regulations for the Justice Department to replace the Independent Counsel Act in 1999 when I worked at the department. Janet Reno, the attorney general at the time, and I then went to Capitol Hill to brief Congress on the proposed rules over a period of weeks. We met with House and Senate leaders, along with their legal staffs, as well as the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. We walked them extensively through each provision. Not one person raised a legal concern in those meetings. Indeed, Ken Starr, who was then serving as an independent counsel, told Congress that the special counsel regulations were exactly the way to go.

This legal dispute will be aired in the Eleventh in Jack Smith’s promised appeal.

Katyal’s more salient point is in describing where this leads if Trump’s Supreme Court gets to review Special Counsel appointments at some time after the November election will determine whether the rule applies to Trump or to a normal president.

Imagine a future president suspected of serious wrongdoing. Do we really want his appointee to be the one investigating the wrongdoing? The potential for a coverup, or at least the perception of one, is immense, which would do enormous damage to the fabric of our law.

That’s the kind of explanation, after all, why Cannon would drop all her other obstruction and pursue this angle: to ensure that a second Donald Trump administration could not be threatened with even the possibility of a Special Counsel.

But I’m interested in the way Thomas ended his concurrence, to an opinion about a prosecution involving official acts of a then-president. It is not dissimilar to the way John Roberts closed his majority opinion, by claiming this was all about separation of powers.

Whether the Special Counsel’s office was “established by Law” is not a trifling technicality. If Congress has not reached a consensus that a particular office should exist, the Executive lacks the power to unilaterally create and then fill that office. Given that the Special Counsel purports to wield the Executive Branch’s power to prosecute, the consequences are weighty. Our Constitution’s separation of powers, including its separation of the powers to create and fill offices, is “the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government” and the liberty that it secures for us all. Morrison, 487 U. S., at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There is no prosecution that can justify imperiling it.

In this case, there has been much discussion about ensuring that a President “is not above the law.” But, as the Court explains, the President’s immunity from prosecution for his official acts is the law. The Constitution provides for “an energetic executive,” because such an Executive is “essential to . . . the security of liberty.” Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Respecting the protections that the Constitution provides for the Office of the Presidency secures liberty. In that same vein, the Constitution also secures liberty by separating the powers to create and fill offices. And, there are serious questions whether the Attorney General has violated that structure by creating an office of the Special Counsel that has not been established by law. Those questions must be answered before this prosecution can proceed. We must respect the Constitution’s separation of powers in all its forms, else we risk rendering its protection of liberty a parchment guarantee.

Here, the Executive is sharply constrained, even in its prosecutorial function, by guardrails Congress has given it.

I’m not sure this is consistent with this language from Roberts’ opinion, which reads maximalist authority for presidents to conduct criminal investigations (and cites to Nixon, with its assertion of great deference on Article II issues).

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” Brief for United States 46; see id., at 10–11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 125. The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. As we have explained, the President’s power to remove “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed” may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts. Myers, 272 U. S., at 106, 176; see supra, at 8. The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. App. 186–187, Indictment ¶10(c). And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority. Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials. [my emphasis]

That is, Roberts has to read presidential authority to intervene in DOJ’s prosecutorial functions in order to sanction Trump’s plan to demand DOJ’s participation in his fraud. But then Thomas argues that the president can only do so if Congress has given him authority.

Which is it?

Aileen Cannon Unwound the Stolen Documents Prosecution Back to November 2022

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There’s a detail of Judge Cannon’s order throwing out the stolen documents case that people seem to be missing.

She unwound the prosecution back to the time when Jack Smith took it over from when Jay Bratt had the lead.

Here, as in Lucia, the appropriate remedy is invalidation of the officer’s ultra vires acts. Since November 2022, Special Counsel Smith has been exercising “power that [he] did not lawfully possess.” Collins, 594 U.S. at 258. All actions that flowed from his defective appointment—including his seeking of the Superseding Indictment on which this proceeding currently hinges [ECF No. 85]—were unlawful exercises of executive power. Because Special Counsel Smith “cannot wield executive power except as Article II provides,” his “[a]ttempts to do so are void” and must be unwound. Id. at 283 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Defendants advance this very argument: “any actions taken by Smith are ultra vires and the Superseding Indictment must be dismissed” [ECF No. 326 p. 9]. And the Court sees no alternative course to cure the unconstitutional problem.

There are a lot of people saying that DOJ can just charge the 18 USC 793 charges in SDFL or charge obstruction in either DC or SDFL.

But they can only do so relying on evidence obtained prior to Smith’s appointment. Some key things they got after that?

  • Evan Corcoran’s testimony
  • Yuscil Taveras’ cooperation
  • Some, but not all, of the surveillance footage
  • Testimony from Mark Meadows’ ghost writers, reflecting Trump’s knowledge that he had not declassified the Iran document

Probably, a simple obstruction charge limited to Trump’s refusal to respond to the subpoena might survive (though such a case would be stronger with Corcoran’s testimony). But there is no way they could charge the stolen documents case without recreating some of this investigation.

Update: Jack Smith has announced he will appeal.

Aileen Cannon Dismisses Stolen Documents Case Based on Special Counsel Appointment

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Here’s the 93-page opinion, which I’m still reading.

Procedurally, this may actually not help Trump in the way he’d like (because DOJ has the option of appealing it or having a US Attorney charge Trump).

But it’s also hilarious, since Aileen Cannon has been treating herself like an Appellate Judge that she hasn’t been confirmed to be.

Update: One thing Cannon appears upset about is Merrick Garland’s invocation of Section 533, which appoints FBI-like figures.

Special Counsel Smith argues that Section 533(1) confers on the Attorney General the authority to appoint special counsels, specifically, constitutional officers wielding the “full power and independent authority . . . of any United States Attorney.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.6. After careful review, the Court is convinced that it does not. Congress “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Special Counsel  Smith’s interpretation would shoehorn appointment authority for United States Attorney-equivalents into a statute that permits the hiring of FBI law enforcement personnel. Such a reading is unsupported by Section 533’s plain language and statutory context; inconsistent with Congress’s usual legislative practice; and threatens to undermine the “basic separation-of-powers principles” that “give life and content” to the Appointments Clause. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court explains below.

33 Order No. 5730-2023 (appointing David C. Weiss); Order No. 5588-2023 (appointing Robert K. Hur).

That is her only mention of Robert Hur, whose appointment would be unconstitutional under her theory as well. (I’m still trying to figure out whether Cannon will help Hunter Biden go free, too.)

Update: Okay, I’ve read the thing.

It’s hilarious.

It’s hilarious, because it doesn’t create any delay that Cannon was not pursuing anyway. Indeed, Jack Smith could immediately appeal this and try to get her tossed, so it may hasten things (unless Trump wins!).

It’s hilarious because it is unbelievably hubristic. The only credible future for Judge Cannon now is Trump’s first SCOTUS appointment in a second term.

It’s hilarious because the way she did this, if it were upheld (not an impossibility given how nutty SCOTUS has gotten), it would be even more useful for Hunter Biden than Donald Trump (especially if Trump didn’t win reelection), because the statutes of limitation on Hunter’s alleged crimes have started to expire.

Update: Jack Smith has announced he will appeal.

Jack Smith’s Way Forward

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I’m going to write a long post on how John Roberts made elections subservient to the President.

But first, I want to lay out a way forward for Jack Smith. I’ll return to a way forward for Biden.

First: SCOTUS has remanded this case to Judge Chutkan to determine which of the charges can be sustained as unofficial acts. As I’ll lay out, I think they’ve put their thumb on the scale that none of them can be. But by all means, she is now required to spend the next four months figuring that out.

So if I’m Jack Smith, I ask her to block out her time for the foreseeable future to do just that.

Because the President cannot be prosecuted for anything considered a core Presidential act, like bribing Roger Stone with pardons, Jack Smith should issue a report of what Trump did with his core official acts.

Nothing in this opinion prohibits Jack Smith from prosecuting everyone else (save Trump’s closest aides and Jeffrey Clark). So Jack Smith should roll out any and all indictments for Trump’s associates that would otherwise have been introduced in his case in chief.