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The March–and April or May–2004 Changes to the Illegal Wiretap Program

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Apologies in advance. I’m going to be in the weeds reading the May 6, 2004 Goldsmith opinion for a little bit.

In this post, I want to point to some details of timing that, I think, suggest that the changes DOJ made to Cheney’s illegal wiretap program in 2004 included, first, a limitation on collection to people with actual alleged terrorist ties (but not just with al Qaeda), and second, a shift of the data-mining part of the program under other parts of the PATRIOT Act.

What follows is largely a wildarsed guess.

The Half-Redacted Timing of the Post-Hospital Changes

As I noted in my working thread, DOJ has redacted part of the date of the 2004 modifications in the table of contents and pages 9 and 11. But on page 16, it has left unredacted a reference to a March 19, 2004 redaction. The opinion itself gives partial explanation for this: Goldsmith refers to “those” modifications, plural, on page 9, and describes a “series of changes” on page 11. The existence of more than one modification is confirmed by the IG Report, which says,

Notwithstanding Gonzales’s letter, on March 17, 2004 the President decided to modify certain PSP intelligence-gathering activities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence Activities that DOJ believed were legally unsupported. The President’s directive was expressed in two modifications to the March 11, 2004 Presidential Authorization.

Though note the slight discrepancy between Goldsmith’s reference to a “series” (which to me means more than two) versus the IG reference to two modifications.

Now, the redactions and common sense suggest when at least one of the other changes must have taken place. Since Goldsmith wrote the memo on May 6, the redacted phrase can only be “April” or “May.” Given the spacing in the redactions–particularly the one in the second line of the only complete paragraph on page 11, which takes up the same space as the 9 characters “concernin” in the line below–it is unclear which it would be. It might read “and April ” or it might read “and May, “. It is worth noting that if the March 11 authorization were a 45-day one, it would have expired on April 25 and left, without this May 6 opinion, the program working without any basis still. Yet SSCI has told us the March 11 authorization was for “not more than 60 days,” which would have extended to May 5. For these and other reasons, my guess is May (suggesting that Goldsmith waited until the last changes were made to write his memo), but that’s just a guess. And DOJ, obviously, isn’t telling.

[Update: Thanks to William Ockham, who did the kerning work, it looks like “May” is correct.]

The March 19 Modification Limits Content Collection to Terrorist Conversations

On page 16, Goldsmith writes,

In the March 19, 2004 Modification, the President also clarified the scope of the authorization [~ 6-7 word redaction] He made clear that the Authorization applied where there were reasonable grounds to believe that a communicant was an agent of an international terrorist group

Further down that page, Goldsmith begins the list of the only three things this opinion authorizes. The first is:

the authority to intercept the content of international communications “for which, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are reasonable grounds to believe … [that] a party to such communication is a group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a group,” as long as that group is al Qaeda, an affiliate of al Qaeda or another international terrorist group that the President has determined both (a) is in armed conflict with the United States and (b) poses a threat of hostile actions within the United States;

Goldsmith’s language here is remarkably similar to that he used in some of the letters he wrote at precisely the same time limiting the torture program. In both cases, he is trying to impose limits on a program that has already exceeded those limits. That, plus the reference to Bush’s “clarifi[cation]” of the scope of the program suggests the limit on intercepting the content of conversations in which one party is a terrorist is new.

I’ll have much more to say about this. But note that Goldsmith’s limit here does not match the terms of the Afghan AUMF, which is limited to those who were directly tied to 9/11.

That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. [my emphasis]

In other words, while the requirement that the program collect content only from those with a tie to a terrorist may be a new limit imposed in 2004, it also seems to exceed the very AUMF that Goldsmith was newly relying upon to authorize the program.

Goldsmith does have one out for that problem. As he notes elsewhere, the Afghan AUMF language on terrorism is repeated (and actually expanded) in the Iraq AUMF.

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Did you know that the Iraq AUMF mentions “terrorist” or “terrorism” two more times–19–than it mentions “weapon”–17?

So writing in 2004, I guess, Goldsmith could claim that a still-active AUMF authorized war against terrorism more generally. Now, we apparently just avoid written AUMFs altogether.

And with it, he authorized the interception of content of not just al Qaeda affiliates conversations, but of any terrorist who was at war with the United States. I wonder if Hamas and FARC are included in that?

The April or May Change(s)

But that’s just the change DOJ is willing (sort of) to let us know about. What about the other changes?

While I can’t say for sure, consider the following data points.

First, note that Robert Mueller’s chronology of the warrantless wiretap confrontation had what used to seem like a bizarre end date. He shows multiple contacts a day with Jim Comey until March 17. Shortly thereafter on March 19, it appears, Bush at least narrowed the content collection to actual alleged terrorist conversations. But then there’s a March 23 meeting between Mueller and Dick Cheney, at the Vice President’s request and in his office.

Next, remember there’s a great deal of evidence–including reporting during the Protect America Act debate–to suggest that data mining was one of, if not the key, problem behind the hospital confrontation.

A 2004 dispute over the National Security Agency’s secret surveillance program that led top Justice Department officials to threaten resignation involved computer searches through massive electronic databases, according to current and former officials briefed on the program.It is not known precisely why searching the databases, or data mining, raised such a furious legal debate. But such databases contain records of the phone calls and e-mail messages of millions of Americans, and their examination by the government would raise privacy issues.

Then, note that the day after Mueller’s meeting with Cheney, FBI moved toward actually using Section 215 of PATRIOT, which they had not done previously.

Finally, consider some of the changes made to the way Section 215 and NSLs were used that year–effectively using them to collect call data–and Section 215 specifically to support a secret program in 2005.

So Lichtblau suggests that the big change–the one DOJ won’t let us know about–has to do with searches of massive databases of records of phone calls and email messages of millions of Americans. And on they day after a private Mueller meeting with Cheney but probably before the second (at least) big change from spring 2004, FBI starts using the provision they would go on to use, some time in 2004, to collect call data. (And sometime in 2005 Section 215 came to be used to support a secret program unto itself.)

In any case, this is a wildarsed guess. But it appears likely that DOJ stopped acquiring metadata on calls to use in data mining in one fashion, and instead started using Section 215 and trap and trace requests to get the data.

Given the Bybee memo we’ve recently discovered which seems to support fairly expansive use of databases, however, I’m guessing they didn’t stop doing data mining of the call data.

Another Secret OLC Opinion: This One on Information Sharing

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As MadDog and I were discussing on this thread, the May 6, 2004 Jack Goldsmith opinion on the warrantless wiretap program references an OLC opinion that appears not to have been publicly released or, even in the course of FOIA, disclosed.

Thus, this Office will typically construe a general statute, even one that is written in unqualified terms, to be implicitly limited so as not to infringe on the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers. Cf, id. at 464-66 (applying avoidance canon even where statute created no ambiguity on its face). Only if Congress provides a clear indication that it is attempting to regulate the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and in the realm of national security will we construe the statute to apply.19

19. For example, this Office has concluded that, despite statutory restrictions upon the use of Title III wiretap information and restrictions on the use of grand jury information under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), the President has an inherent constitutional authority to receive all foreign intelligence information in the hands of the government necessary for him to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities and that statutes and rules should be understood to include an implied exception so as not to interfere with that authority. See Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Effect of the Patriot Act on Disclosure to the President and Other Federal Officials of Grand Jury and Title III Information Relating to National Security and Foreign Affairs 1 (July 22, 2002);

This is probably a memo examining what kind of limits section 203 of the PATRIOT Act impose on Executive Branch officials. That section permits the sharing of Grand Jury and Title III wiretap information with the intelligence community–even information pertaining to US persons. But it requires that, “any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.”

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Working Thread on Illegal Wiretap Memo

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As I noted in this post, DOJ has released two of the memos used to authorize the illegal wiretap program. I made some brief comments on the November 2, 2001 John Yoo memo here. This will be a working thread on the May 6, 2004 Jack Goldsmith memo.

P1: Note in the TOC (and in later references), DOJ has redacted the date when the program was modified. We know this date is some time after the March 10, 2004 hospital confrontation. Pretty much the only reason to redact that date is to make it harder to know how long the program operated solely with Bush’s authorization. And the biggest reason to do that is to hide the detail from al-Haramain’s lawyers, because it would add evidence that the phone calls intercepted in early March 2004 were intercepted at a time when the program didn’t have DOJ sanction.

P3: The first redaction on the page is interesting because it seems to qualify what they do after they intercept communications in the US; remember that one of the big conflicts at the hospital confrontation was the data mining they were doing (in defiance of Congress specifically defunding data mining of US citizens).

P3: Note the invocation of 18 USC 2510-2521 in addition to FISA. This makes it sort of explicit they were using other authorization processes for some of this. I’ll come back to this point. But it’s worth noting that the 2010 opinion cleaning up past exigent letter use used 18 USC 2511(2)(f) to do so.

P5-6: Note that footnote 2, which probably describes ongoing air patrol surveillance of the country is redacted. Note, too, that the entire paragraph is classified Secret. Goldsmith was basically using the black (heh) helicopters patrolling the skies–which we could literally hear and see–as basis to rationalize the claim that it was okay for the military to be operating in the US. And the government believes we shouldn’t know that. Moreover, there appears to have been ongoing patrols we weren’t supposed to know about in 2004.

P6: Note how Cap’n Jack asserts that 2001 AUMF is still active in May 2004:

Acting under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, and with the support of Congress, the President dispatched forces to Afghanistan and, with the cooperation of the Northern Alliance, toppled the Taliban regime from power. Military operations to seek out resurgent elements of the Taliban regime and al Qaeda fighters continue in Afghanistan to this day. See e.g., Mike Wise and Josh White, Ex-NFL Player Tillman Killed in Combat, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 2004, at A1 (noting that “there are still more than 10,000 U.S. troops in the country and fighting continues against remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda”).

He could have found any number of sources to support his claim that the 10,000 troops (ah, the good old days) in Afghanistan sustained the AUMF. Instead, he cited a story reporting Pat Tillman was “killed in combat”–itself a story that was the product of elaborate govt propaganda.

P6-7: Note the citation of the Mueller quote from testimony he gave to SSCI on February 24, 2004. That’s interesting timing, because at a February 11, 2004 hearing, Ron Wyden had asked whether Total Information Awareness, which had been explicitly defunded for that fiscal year, at which point Michael Hayden said he wanted to answer in closed session.

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., asked Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and FBI Director Robert Mueller whether it was “correct that when [TIA] was closed, that several … projects were moved to various intelligence agencies…. I and others on this panel led the effort to close [TIA]; we want to know if Mr. Poindexter’s programs are going on somewhere else.”

Negroponte and Mueller said they didn’t know. But Negroponte’s deputy, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, who until recently was director of the NSA, said, “I’d like to answer in closed session.” Asked for comment, Wyden’s spokeswoman referred to his hearing statements.”

I wonder if the Mueller briefing Goldsmith cited was from the closed session where DIA and FBI gave their response?

P7: Note the reference to minimization. I believe that’s the first we’ve heard about minimization in the early days of the program. Also note that he directs DOD generally, not NSA specifically, to do the minimization. That’s downright odd. [Update: now, we’ve had discussion about minimization before. See this post.]

P8: Note the fourth redaction on this page, after the words, “without resort to judicial warrants.” It appears that warrants is followed by a period, but that doesn’t make sense as it appears there are a few more words to that sentence. Judicial warrants … “and oversight,” maybe? Any other guesses?

P8: Goldsmith notes that the Gang of Four were briefed on the program “in 2002 and 2003.” As I have noted before, there should have been a briefing in January 2004. Much of the rest of that footnote may well explain how they got out of that briefing.

P9: Note the second redaction, hiding who besides the DCI reviews the threat assessment that justifies the continuation of the program before it goes to OLC. That’s particularly interesting given that the Terrorist Threat Integration System was doing the treat assessment in May 2004, when Goldsmith wrote this opinion. And John Brennan, currently Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor, was in charge of the TTIC at the time. In any case, it doesn’t seem justifiable to redact who, besides the DCI, does this review. Note that the IG Report also refers OGC attorneys reviewing the the threat assessment to fluff it up if it wasn’t sufficient to justify sustaining the program.

P9: Goldsmith writes:

As explained below, since the inception of [redacted name of program] intelligence from various sources (particularly from interrogations of detained al Qaeda operatives) has provided a continuing flow of information indicating that al Qaeda has had, and continues to hae, multiple redundant plans for executing further attacks with the United States.

See how one illegal program serves to justify another illegal program?

P11: Goldsmith launches his discussion of the changes that took place in March 19 with a discussion of “how the NSA accomplishes the collection activity under [the program].” That might support the datamining aspect, but maybe not.

P15: Note there’s a word after the “Commander in Chief Clause” in the description of the basis Bush invoked to authorize the program on March 11. Wonder what that is?

P16: The modification took place on March 19. Note that it pertained to making it clear “there were reasonable grounds to believe that a communicant was an agent of an international terrorist group …” I’m betting the caveat after that doesn’t ultimately say what Goldsmith would, that the terrorist organization has to target the US.

P16: Note Goldsmith authorizes three activities. One is the authority to “intercept the content of international communications ‘for which … a party to such communication is a group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparations therefor, or any agent of such a group,’ as long as that group is al Qaeda, an affiliate of al Qaeda, or another international terrorist group that the President has determined both (a) is in armed conflict with the United States and (b) poses a threat of hostile action within the United States.”

P17: Goldsmith lists the following opinions related to this program:

  • October 4, 2001
  • November 2, 2001, expressly authorizing a November 2, 2001 authorization
  • October 11, 2002: confirming the application of prior analysis

Note two things. First, this list doesn’t coincide with other lists (Goldsmith ignores the October 23, 2001 4th amendment eliminating one, as well as some “hypothetical ones” in between; the IG Report only talks about the November 4 one, and Bradbury talks about a few more.

Also note the space between the date, October 4, 2001, and the main clause of the sentence, “we evaluated.” One thing I’m increasingly convinced is that the program operated under FISA’s 15-day window until October 3, 2001. So I wonder if that acknowledges that fact?

P18: Note that Goldsmith starts w/12333. That’s the EO that Bush pixie dusted.

P20: The paragraphs that appear in part on this page appear to be misclassified. They both talk exclusively about published legislation. Neither mentions the name of the program. Yet both are classified TS.

P21: Note how Goldsmith introduces his claim that FISA is not exclusive: “We conclude that the Congressional Authorization is critical for [redacted name of program] in two respects.” That reveals how much he reverse his analysis, not looking at what the AUMF said, bu what he needed to justify the program.

P23: My discussion of the newly disclosed OLC opinion discussed in the footnote is here.

P30: The examples Goldsmith uses to show the continuity of SIGINT is terrible cherry picking. How is Jeb Stuart’s personal wiretapper, wiretapping commercially run cables, similar to wiretapping private phone calls? MOre damning still is his lack of any treatment of Vietnam era wiretapping, done under cover of war, but targeting speech.

Note too where Goldsmith highlights the phrase “control all other telecommunications traffic” when discussing WWII surveillance. Since that’s what we think they were doing here, I find the emphasis notable.

P31: Note that Goldsmith refers to the 15-day exemption under FISA; he says “as noted above,” meaning he has already treated this, in what must be a now-redacted section. Particularly given Goldsmith’s discussion of the legislative intent–to give Congress time to alter FISA in time of war–his non-discussion of PATRIOT here is nothing short of dishonest. (He does discuss it later, though.) This allows him to say, “The mere fact that the Authorization does not amend FISA is not material,” without at the same time acknowledging that Congress was at that moment amending FISA! It’s all the more important given the October 4 approval that would have marked the end of the 15-day exemption period.

P31: Note the footnote invoking the Padilla and Hamdi circuit court decisions. On his last day as AAG, Goldsmith wrote an opinion that reviews whether a recent court decision–almost certainly Rasul–affected his analysis. But we’re not being given that opinion.

P32: I wonder how Goldsmith responded to Tom Daschle’s op-ed making it clear that Congress specifically refused action in the US, given that he claims the “deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the US” amounted to carte blanche to operate in the US.

P32: NOte the reference to the Iraq AUMF–and its invocation of terrorism. That’s relevant not least bc Goldsmith expands the terms of the Afghan AUMF beyond al Qaeda.

P34: Note that the paragraph of this page, discussing a PATRIOT change, is unclassified. The next, also discussing a PATRIOT change, is classified TS. The only plausible explanation I can think of for the the second is to hide from people outside of the compartment how full of shit that second paragraph is.

[Note: I lost a huge chunk of this post right in here–looking to see if I can reconstruct it]

P39: Check out this tautology Goldsmith uses to argue foreign intelligence doesn’t need a warrant:

In foreign intelligence investigations, the targets of surveillance are agents of foreign powers who may be specially trained in concealing their activities from our government and whose activities may be particularly difficult to detect.

Of course, the whole point of this program is to find people who might be agents of foreign powers; we don’t know that they are until the investigation finds them.

P40-41: This is a troubling assertion about Keith:

In addition, there is a further basis on which Keith is readily distinguished. As Keith made clear, one of the significant concerns driving the Court’s conclusion in the domestic security context was the inevitable connection between perceived threats to domestic security and political dissent. As the Court explained, “Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when teh targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute when the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect “domestic security.” Keith 407 US at 314.see also id at 120 (“Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent.”) Surveillance of domestic groups necessarily raises a First Amendment concern that generally is not present when the subjects of the surveillance are the agents of foreign powers.

Aside from the obvious fact that the surveillance Goldsmith was justifying almost always had a religious component, a lot of the evidence picked up on alleged domestic Islamic terrorists amounts to speech. And often a disagreement about things like the Iraq war. It’s more of the tautological construction, if foreign then not First Amendment, when that is obviously not the case. Note, there’s a big redaction after the passage above which I suspect is nonsense.

P41: Goldsmith:

Second, it also bears noting that in the 1970s the Supreme Court had barely started to develop the “special needs” jurisprudence of warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment.

I’m gonna have to either return to this or just hope bmaz hits it. It’s like every section of this opinion Goldsmith chooses to deal with a second, exclusive period of history.

P43: Note how Goldsmith pretends Congress passed FISA in 2001, not 1978.

To be more precise, analysis of [redacted–name of program] presents an even narrower question: namely, whether, in the context of an ongoing armed conflict, Congress may, through FISA, impose restrictions on the means by which the Commander in Chief may use the capabilities of the Department of Defense to gather intelligence about the enemy in order to thwart foreign attacks on the United States.

Putting aside the fact that this program identified who the enemy is, as much as collecting information from that enemy, Goldsmith here betrays his task. Not to see whether Bush acted properly in not asking for legislation to amend FISA, but to suggest that FISA is an addition to the already existing program. Which of course it was not.

This is made more clear a few lines later:

In almost every previous instance in which the country has been threatened by war or imminent foreign attack and the President has taken extraordinary measures to secure the national defense, Congress has acted to support the Executive through affirmative legislation granting the President broad wartime powers, or else the Executive has acted as exigent circumstances in the absence of any congressional action whatsoever.

In his book Goldsmith repeatedly says Bush’s (Cheney’s, Addington’s) mistake was in not consulting Congress. And that’s evident here, too: of course Congress made affirmative legislation. It’s called the PATRIOT Act. But for some reason the President refused to ask for these powers.

P46: Note that in his review of enumerated Congressional powers Goldsmith doesn’t consider the power to declare war?

P51: Note the reference to the President’s threat assessment on March 11, 2004. You’d think that’d mention the Madrid bombing that happened that day. But of course at that point Aznar was pretending that ETA caused the bombing, not an al Qaeda inspired–but not AQ direct–group.

P61: I presume Goldsmith didn’t have a straight face when he wrote the last full paragraph trying to distinguish Youngstown–bc Congress gave other alternatives to resolve labor disputes–from FISA, which Congress was actively changing per the Executive’s requests in 2001.

P70ff: Note how here Goldsmith argues not just that FISA can’t restrict POTUS bc of inherent power, but it can’t bc FISA is so onerous that “it ‘render[s] it impossible for the President to perform his constitutionally prescribed functions.’ [Redacted–curious what this cite is] Several factors combine to make the FISA process an insufficient mechanism for responding to the crisis the President has faced in the wake of the September 11 attacks.” It then has a totally redacted discussion about why FISA makes POTUS’ job impossible. This strikes me as the reason why Goldsmith’s innocuous discussion of the switch to 72-hour warrant requirement is classified TS. Because Congress was working to make it less onerous.

P102: Jack Goldsmith, bleeding heart defender of Wall Street:

The nation has already suffered one attack that disrupted the Nation’s financial center for days and that successfully struck at the command and control center for the Nation’s military.

Glad to see those 3000 people didn’t weigh in here. I’ll return to this logic in upcoming days. After all, if the risk of disruption on Wall Street gives the President super-human powers, then shouldn’t we be using them to reel in Wall Street now?

P105: Goldsmith’s stawmen:

Thus, a program of surveillance that operated by listening to the content of every telephone call in the United States in order to find those calls that might relate to terrorism would require us to consider a rather different balance here.

Right. They’re not taking “content” of every telephone call. They’re taking data.

Newly Released OLC Opinion Reveals How Yoo Relied on Eliminating Fourth Amendment to Wiretap Illegally

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As Josh Gerstein and Jack Goldsmith note, DOJ just released two of the opinions underlying the warrantless wiretap programs. They both focus on the May 6, 2004 opinion Goldsmith wrote in the wake of the hospital confrontation; I’ll have far more to say about that opinion later today and/or tomorrow.

But I wanted to look at what the highly redacted opinion John Yoo wrote on November 2, 2001 tells us.

The opinion is so completely redacted we only get snippets. Those snippets are, in part:

FISA only provides safe harbor for electronic surveillance, and cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches that protect the national security.

[snip]

Thus, unless Congress made a clear statement that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area–which it has not–then the statute must be construed to avoid such a reading.

[snip]

intelligence gathering in direct support of military operations does not trigger constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures.

[snip]

A warrantless search can be constitutional “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”

To understand what those quotes mean, it helps to recall that on October 23, 2001, John Yoo and Robert Delahunty wrote another memo assessing whether the military could deploy in the US in a war against terrorists. It concludes, in part, that,

Fourth, we turn to the question whether the Fourth Amendment would apply to the use of the military domestically against foreign terrorists. Although the situation is novel (at least in the nation’s recent experience), we think that the better view is that the Fourth Amendment would not apply in these circumstances. Thus, for example, we do not think that a military commander carrying out a raid on a terrorist cell would be required to demonstrate probable cause or to obtain a warrant.

Fifth, we examine the consequences of assuming that the Fourth Amendment applies to domestic military operations against terrorists. Even if such were the case, we believe that the courts would not generally require a warrant, at least when the action was authorized by the President or other high executive branch official. The Government’s compelling interest in protecting the nation from attack and in prosecuting the war effort would outweigh the relevant privacy interests, making the search or seizure reasonable.

It relies on the hypothetical in which a military commander searches an entire apartment building for the WMD inside.

Consider, for example, a case in which a military commander, authorized to use force domestically, received information that, although credible, did not amount to probable cause, that a terrorist group had concealed a weapon of mass destruction in an apartment building. In order to prevent a disaster in which hundreds or thousands of lives would be lost, the commander should be able to immediately seize and secure the entire building, evacuate and search the premises, and detain, search, and interrogate everyone found inside.

As I have suggested in the past, it helps to replace “apartment building” with “email server” to understand the implications of such an opinion given that our wiretapping is done by military commanders at the NSA.

In other words, on October 23, 2001, Yoo wrote an opinion largely justifying searches by military commanders domestically.

And then on November 2, 2001, he interpreted wiretapping as a search (presumably arguing that since we were vacuuming up all data signals, we were obtaining physical possession of them that thereby got around restrictions on electronic surveillance, at least in Yoo’s addled little mind).

Of course, the Fourth Amendment opinion is utterly ridiculous. But they were still relying on it until October 6, 2008, even while equivocating to members of Congress about doing so.

So you see, Cheney’s illegal wiretapping program was totally legal. What you didn’t know, though, is that the Fourth Amendment is just a quaint artifact of time before 9/11.

Woodward’s Secrets

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Jeebus: Goldsmith may be getting a hang of this blogging thing, but I’m not: John Rizzo, not John Brennan. So the stuff I originally said about Brennan doesn’t make any sense.

I may not always agree with Jack Goldsmith, but he’s getting a hang of this blogging thing. Today, he posts the answer John Brennan gave him to the question of how Bob Woodward got very specific details of a meeting that a number of Obama’s top advisors had to leave because they didn’t have the appropriate clearance.

The first Chapter of Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars describes Barack Obama’s first post-election intelligence briefing from Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, on November 6, 2008.  The chapter shows McConnell, at the direction of President Bush, excluding many Obama aides (including Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta and former Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg) from the briefing.  Because the briefing contained highly classified information about “sources and methods,” McConnell explained, only those “designated to take a top national security cabinet post” could attend.   Woodward then recounts this highly classified intelligence briefing in great detail, including several highly classified CIA and NSA programs, and their code names.

After reading this chapter, I wondered how a meeting involving classified information so sensitive that a close Obama aide and former top national security official could not attend could the following year be recounted in such loving detail in the first chapter of a best-selling book.  Woodward clearly got his information from participants in the meeting or their close aides.  Was it right for these people to speak to Woodward about these matters?  Was it legal?  I sent these questions to John Rizzo, the just-retired thirty-four year veteran CIA lawyer who has seen his share of leaked classified information over the years.

John responded:

Simple.  When a President himself is a key source and directs or at least signals to his Administration to cooperate with the author, that for all intents and purposes means the book becomes one big authorized disclosure. That’s what Obama did for Woodward, and that’s what Bush did for Woodward in his three books during that Administration, which also were packed with hitherto sensitive information.  That’s what is remarkable and unique about Woodward’s standing.

Now, Goldsmith appears offended that Obama and Bush would treat classified information so lightly.

Me, I’m more interested in what this says about Woodward’s (and, while we’re talking about it, Judy Miller’s) position in the information management function.

John Brennan–a guy who oversaw targeting for Cheney’s illegal wiretap program and therefore presumably had the highest clearance in two Administrations–lackadaisically says that if the President wants something leaked, it becomes legal to leak it.

In Judy Miller’s case, we saw how this selective leaking ensured the Administration could declassify its politicized case for war, while ensuring those who disputed the case were kept silent under threat of prosecution.

Woodward is even more interesting. Woodward knew to ask certain pointed questions of Richard Armitage–the same questions, as it turns out, that Bob Novak asked to elicit information about Valerie Plame’s purported role in Joe Wilson’s trip to Niger. But according to John Brennan, at least, even if Richard Armitage leaked Plame’s role intentionally, it would not be illegal. And remember, too, that on July 8 or 9 (this is reflected in notes introduced at trial; you’ll have to take my word for it though, because I don’t have my records with me), the VP’s office did give Woodward detailed information about the Iraq NIE. In other words, we know Woodward was a part of the OVP’s strategy for rebutting Joe Wilson in what was effectively a political hit.

More generally, though, consider what this suggests about the excuse that Cheney was prepared to use for having ordered the leak of Plame’s identity. John Brennan, at least, argues that if the President “signals to his Administration” that he wants certain information out there, it’s legal to leak it. I don’t necessarily buy that, mind you.

But it suggests one of Obama’s key advisors buys off on the idea that it’s cool for the President to selectively declassify information (you know, like leaks to the press about targeting Anwar al-Awlaki, even if you later invoke state secrets about it) for political gain.

A Way Towards The Rule of Law – An Answer to Cap’n Jack

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Justice, what do you care about justice. You don’t even care whether you’ve got the right men or not. All you know is you’ve lost something and someone’s got to be punished. The Ox-Bow Incident.

Nine years after September 11 and eight years after the CIA provided a memorandum to the White House explaining that at a minimum, one-third of the detainees at GITMO were “mistakes” who had been purchased in bounty transactions. Nine years after the Department of Justice covertly elevated the President of the United States as a power above the Constitution and the laws of the United States and seven years after the Department of Justice assisted in allowing the torture of Ibn al Shaykh al-Libi to be laundered through Colin Powell to the UN and to America. So many years after so many incidents, our nation is still being flimflammed over what to do with so-called terrorist detainess. 

Enter Jack Goldsmith with his recent op ed titled, “A way past the terrorist detention gridlock.”  While Marcy and Spencer have already weighed in, I whined until Marcy let me have my own go at this too, because I wanted to provide an alternative route to deal with the “gridlock.”  

Goldsmith’s advice to Obama is to:  (i) keep GITMO open because closing it is hard, (ii) forget civilian criminal actions because they are hard, (iii) forget military commissions because they have no international crediblity and are hard, (iv) get Congress to give the President unchecked and unsupervised powers to engage in forever detentions without respect to guilt or innocence, and (v) use the reality of  forever detentions for the innocent as well as the guilty and other coercion to get detainees to offer up confessions and plea deals and thereby get around the hard parts of civilian criminal suits.   Part (v) includes the caring-compassionate touch of only being recommended if Obama takes the death penalty off the table.  

Despite such awesome[ly bad] advice, GITMO has not proved hard to close because there are not Read more →

Cap’n Jack’s Crackerjack Logic!

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Here’s where Jack Goldsmith’s op-ed, purporting to offer a solution to the Gitmo problem, breaks down (see Spencer’s take on it here).

Civilian trials for terrorists have also proven difficult. They gathered disfavor when Attorney General Eric Holder said he would prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed and other alleged Sept. 11 plotters in civilian court in Manhattan. Disfavor grew when the failed Christmas Day plotter, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and the Times Square suspect, Faisal Shahzad, were placed in the civilian criminal system and read Miranda rights rather than detained and interrogated in the military system. The Bush administration prosecuted scores of terrorists in civilian court with little controversy. But the charge that the Obama administration is insufficiently tough on terrorists has made it harder for this administration to try terrorists in civilian court.

Difficulties with trials have left the Obama administration, like its predecessor, relying primarily on military detention without trial to hold terrorists.

Granted, Goldsmith uses the lawyerly trick of hiding the agency in his statement–substituting “disfavor grew” for “Republicans drummed up disfavor because it polled well”–to hide his faulty logic. But what he’s basically saying is that: (1) there’s no big deal with civilian courts, as the Bush experience shows, (2) nevertheless a bunch of fearmongerers who just happen to come from Goldsmith’s own party have been bad-mouthing civilian trials for crass political reasons, and therefore (3) civilian trials are just too difficult to pull off.

The rest of Goldsmith’s op-ed follows from this artificially created difficulty.

The correct response, for someone in Goldsmith’s position, would be to say, “stop being such cynical assholes, Republicans, this is about law, not your political stunts!” But instead, he wrings his hand and invents a new legal system to work around the difficulty created by his colleagues in the Republican party.

Which offers him the ability to make this move, which addresses an issue that has nothing to do with closing Gitmo:

Courts have given their general blessing to military detention as a legitimate form of terrorist incapacitation. But military detention still raises hard legal questions, about which Congress has said practically nothing. As a result, unaccountable judges are making fateful detention decisions, demanding release of some whom the administration thinks are dangerous terrorists.

[snip]

Second, acknowledge that military detention will remain the primary basis for holding terrorists, and strengthen the system. The president will eventually need Congress’s help, not only to put Guantanamo detentions on firmer footing but also to support the growing global fight against terrorists beyond traditional battlefields. The main legal foundation for targeting and detention in places such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen is the September 2001 congressional authorization to deal with the Sept. 11 attacks. But as dangerous terrorists have ever-dimmer connections to Sept. 11, the government is bumping up against the limits of what this authorization permits.

Again, Goldsmith hides his logic here. But what he’s actually saying is, “those mean judges on whom our entire legal system relies have pointed out that we’ve illegally been holding people who have nothing to do with 9/11” (and in fact have been doing so since the Bush Administration collected a lot of people who they called terrorists but weren’t tied to al Qaeda), “so we need to invent some means to hold them and more like them even though we have no legal basis to do so.” Sure, he, like John Bellinger, notes that the Obama Administration is pushing the legal limits of what the AUMF for Afghanistan legally authorized. But what he’s really calling for is some new legal authorization to just pick up anyone anywhere in the world and hold them indefinitely and maybe give them a civilian trial if we feel like it.

In the process he ignores the larger logical problem with this argument. Yes, the international community recognizes military detention as legal during times of war.

But what Goldsmith is advocating for is that Congress create some legal justification for military detention of those we are not at war with.

Now, Cap’n Jack isn’t really a big fan of international law binding US actions, which may be why he introduces this idea with so little thought, the same way he dismisses the symbolic value of closing Gitmo.

But if Congress were to pass a law granting the Executive the authority to unilaterally declare organizations terrorist groups, and on that basis, to indefinitely detain those alleged to be members without even the guise of war as a time-limiting factor, my guess is the international community would look none too fondly on it. It would be a new stain on our international reputation, added to the still-oozing sore of Gitmo.

And Jack Goldsmith, whose entire op-ed is premised on allowing his party to do anything it wants for political gain, doesn’t see where this kind of unilateral Executive power might lead.

What Happened to that OTHER OPR Report?

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Remember the OPR Report? No, not the OPR Report on John Yoo’s laughably bad torture memos. I’m talking about the OPR Report on John Yoo’s even worse memo(s) authorizing domestic surveillance. The Torture OPR Report notes that it was the domestic surveillance memo, and not the torture memos, that first clued Jack Goldsmith into how dangerous John Yoo was.

Because of the problems with Yoo’s NSA opinions, Goldsmith asked Philbin, who was familiar with Yoo’s work at OLC, to bring him copies of any other opinions that might be problematic.

And it was OPR’s investigation into the domestic surveillance memo–not the investigation into torture memos (as far as we know)–that George Bush tried to spike by refusing investigators the clearance to conduct the investigation.

Last we’ve heard official mention of this OPR investigation was last July, in the combined IG Report on warrantless wiretapping. At that point, we know, the investigation was not yet complete.

Title III of the FISA Amendments Act required that the report of any investigation of matters relating to the PSP conducted by the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) be provided to the DOJ Inspector General, and that the findings and conclusions of such investigation be included in the DOJ OIG review. OPR has initiated a review of whether any standards of professional conduct were violated in the preparation of the first series of legal memoranda supporting the PSP. OPR has not completed its review.

Since then we’ve heard nothing.

It turns out, I asked DOJ a week and a half ago about the report and got a “Oh, let me do research.” I did a follow-up last week (as it happens, on Friday, the day Dawn Johnsen withdrew her nomination) and got a very different response: “We don’t comment on OPR investigations.” Now, perhaps that’s just a prudent response after all the accusations Yoo and Bybee made that OPR was leaking information on the Torture memo investigation.

Still.

I find the secrecy around the domestic surveillence OPR Report all the more interesting given that DOJ still hasn’t decided what to do about the 2006 White Paper used to justify warrantless wiretapping after Jim Comey and Jack Goldsmith realized the inherent powers argument failed. Mind you, David Barron’s OLC passed what appears–from Glenn Fine’s description–just as troubling as those two earlier memos back on January 8, 2010. So maybe it doesn’t matter. Maybe we’re doomed to have OLC recklessly authorize illegal wiretapping of Americans in the dark of night, no matter who’s in charge there.

Nevertheless, it does seem worthwhile to remember that John Yoo was investigated not just for his egregious torture memos, but also for saying the President didn’t have to follow the law–even the laws saying that Presidents can’t wiretap Americans.

Daniel Levin Tells Jim Haynes, Again, Not to Torture

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We’ve long known that in February 2005, then-acting head of OLC Daniel Levin contacted DOD General Counsel to remind him that the March 14, 2003 Yoo memo on torture had been withdrawn. But I, for one, had never seen a copy of that letter. It turns out the government included it with their Appeals brief in the David Passaro case (see pages 99-100).

The memo is important for several reasons.

First, note the date: February 4, 2005. The memo was written on Levin’s last day as acting OLC head, the day Alberto Gonzales was confirmed Attorney General. Particularly given questions about what authority DOD had for detainee interrogations after Jack Goldsmith purportedly withdrew the memo, the fact that Levin saw the need to formally remind Haynes the memo had been withdrawn on his last day is telling. Remember, too that Levin had real concerns about whether Steven Bradbury–who would take over as acting head of OLC the following day and would go on to write a crazy opinion authorizing DOD’s Appendix M the following year–should be appointed OLC head.

Only, it’s not entirely clear Goldsmith ever did withdraw the memo.

Here is the text of the memo:

In December 2003, then-Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith advised you that the March 2003 Memorandum was under review by his Office and should not be relied upon for any purpose. Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith specifically advised, however, that the 24 interrogation techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense for use with al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were authorized for continued use as noted below. I understand that, since that time, the Department of Defense has not relied on the March 2003 Memorandum for any purpose. I also understand that, to the extent that the March 2003 Memorandum was relied on from March 2003 to December 2003, policies based on the substance of that Memorandum have been reviewed and, as appropriate, modified to exclude such reliance. This letter will confirm that this Office has formally withdrawn the March 2003 Memorandum.

The March 2003 Memorandum has been superseded by subsequent legal analyses. The attached Testimony of Patrick F. Philbin before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 14, 2004, reflects a determination by the Department of Justice that the 24 interrogation techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense mentioned above are lawful when used in accordance with the limitations and safeguards specified by the Secretary. This also accurately reflects Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith’s oral advice in December 2003. In addition, as I have previously informed you, this Office has recently issued a revised interpretation of the federal criminal prohibition against torture, codified at 18 USC 2340-2340A, which constitutes the authoritative opinion as to the requirements of that statute. [citation omitted; my emphasis]

Note that Levin makes it clear that Goldsmith did not withdraw the memo in December 2003, he just advised Haynes not to rely on it (we knew this). But Levin also makes no mention of Goldsmith formally withdrawing the memo, as the OPR Report suggests happened, in spring of 2004. And while Levin makes it clear–as he did in his September 2004 memo summarizing the advice OLC had given on torture–that Pat Philbin’s testimony to HPSCI was understood to serve as OLC advice to DOD, Levin’s statement that he was “confirming” that OLC had withdrawn the memo suggests DOD had not yet received such a written notice before then.

How CIA Avoided Negligent Homicide Charges in the Salt Pit Killing

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Since the AP story on the Salt Pit death, reporters have focused a lot of attention to a particular footnote in Jay Bybee’s second response to the OPR Report and what it claims about intent (and, to a lesser degree, what it says about Jay Bybee’s fitness to remain on the 9th Circuit). In it, Jay Bybee references a memo CIA’s Counterterrorism Center wrote in response to Gul Rahman’s death at the Salt Pit; the memo argued that the CIA officer in charge should not be prosecuted under the torture statute because he did not have the specific intent to make Rahman suffer severe pain when he doused him with water and left him exposed in freezing temperatures.

Notably, the declination memorandum prepared by the CIA’s Counterterrorism Section regarding the death of Gul Rahman provides a correct explanation of the specific intent element and did not rely on any motivation to acquire information. Report at 92. If [redacted], as manager of the Saltpit site, did not intend for Rahman to suffer severe pain from low temperatures in his cell, he would lack specific intent under the anti-torture statute. And it is also telling that the declination did not even discuss the possibility that the prosecution was barred by the Commander-in-Chief section of the Bybee memo.

As Scott Horton noted the other day, analysis of the torture statute should not have been the only thing in the declination memo. Prosecutors should have analyzed whether or not Rahman’s killing constituted negligent homicide, among other things.

Note that the declination, issued by politically loyal U.S. attorneys who were subsequently rewarded with high postings at Main Justice, carefully follows the rationalizations that Yoo and Bybee advanced for not prosecuting deaths or serious physical harm resulting from state-sanctioned torture. But the obvious problem, as John Sifton notes at Slate, is that torture and homicide are hardly the only charges that could be brought in such a circumstance. Negligent homicide or milder abuse charges would have obviously been available, and a survey of comparable cases in the setting of state and local prisoners suggests that they are far more common. By looking only at homicide and torture, the prosecutors were paving the way for a decision not to charge.

But the OPR Report and the Legal Principles/Bullet Points documents it describes may explain why this didn’t happen. The Legal Principles/Bullet Points document shows that CIA claimed–possibly, with the tacit approval of the Principals Committee–that the only two criminal statutes that could be applied to its interrogation program were the Torture Statute and the War Crimes Statute.

As a threshold matter, Horton appears to be misstating what the declination memo described in the footnote is and–more importantly–who wrote it. “Politically loyal US Attorneys” did not write the declination described here. Some lawyer at CIA’s CTC wrote it. That’s because, as the OPR Report explains in the section preceding the entirely redacted passage that discusses this letter (the declination letter appears on PDF 98, which appears in the same section as the following quotes from pages PDF 96 and 97), DOJ told CIA to go collect facts about the abuses they reported in January 2003 (which include the Salt Pit killing and threats of death used with Rahim al-Nashiri) themselves.

According to a CIA MFR drafted by John Rizzo on January 24,2003, Scott Muller (then CIA General Counsel), Rizzo and [redacted] met with Michael Chertoff Alice Fisher, John Yoo, and [redacted–probably Jennifer Koester] to discuss the incidents at [redacted]. According to Rizzo, he told Chertoff before the meeting that he needed to discuss “a recent incident where CIA personnel apparently employed unauthorized interrogation techniques on a detainee.”

[snip]

Chertoff reportedly commented that the CIA was correct to advise them because the use of a weapon to frighten a detainee could have violated the law. He stated that the Department would let CIA OIG develop the facts and that DOJ would determine what action to take when the facts were known. According to Rizzo, “Chertoff expressed no interest or intention to pursue the matter of the [redacted].

On January 28, 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson called Yoo and told him that the CIA OIG was looking into the [redacted] matter. According to Helgerson’s email message to Rizzo, Yoo “specifically said they felt they do not need to be involved until after the OIG report is completed.” Rizzo responded to Helgerson: “Based on what Chertoff told us when we gave him the heads up on this last week, the Criminal Division’s decision on whether or not some criminal law was violated here will be predicated on the facts that you gather and present to them.”

Alerted that, in the course of interrogating detainees, CIA had killed one and threatened to kill another detainee, DOJ’s first response (at least according to two different CIA versions of what happened) was to tell CIA to go collect information on the events themselves. Only after CIA finished investigating and presented the facts of the case would DOJ weigh in on whether a crime had been committed.

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