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Bombshell “New[s]:” Jack Smith DID Consult about Timing before Adopting Post-SCOTUS Path

October 9, 2024/56 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, 2024 Presidential Election, January 6 Insurrection /by emptywheel

After I wrote this post laying out that Elie Honig was not only wrong about Jack Smith’s immunity briefing, but that it was very likely DOJ had decided not to take certain steps in August because of the election, I thought about sending the post to Jack Goldsmith, because he tends to make claims about Jack Smith violating DOJ guidelines with little understanding of the facts.

Oops. Too late.

Whereas Honig dedicated just one paragraph to asserting that the problem here lay in “new” disclosures,

The immediate takeaway lies in the revelations contained in Smith’s oversize brief. (He asked the judge for, and received, permission to file a brief that was 180 pages long, four times the normal maximum.) We now have damning new details on Trump’s effort to pressure Vice-President Mike Pence to throw the election his way, Trump’s phone use and use of Twitter as the riot unfolded, and his conversations with family members about efforts to contest his electoral loss. The story’s structure is the same as we’ve long known, but the new details lend depth and dimension.

Goldsmith repeated his claim that there were “new” disclosures in Jack Smith’s immunity filing four times, starting in the lead paragraph.

Last week a judge unsealed a 165-page legal brief with damaging new revelations about President Donald Trump’s efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election.

[snip]

The brief he filed last week sought to show that the election prosecution can continue despite the Supreme Court’s immunity ruling. It laid out the government’s case against Mr. Trump with what many media reports described as “bombshell” new details about his wrongdoing. The filing is in clear tension with the Justice Department’s 60-day rule, which the department inspector general has described as a “longstanding department practice of delaying overt investigative steps or disclosures that could impact an election” within 60 days of an election. However, the “rule” is unwritten and, as the inspector general made clear, has an uncertain scope.

[snip]

Perhaps the department thinks the new disclosures are marginal and won’t affect the election, or that the rule does not apply to litigation steps in previously indicted cases, even if they would affect the election.

[snip]

Because it didn’t need to disclose the new details now, and because it was foreseeable that the disclosures would cause approximately half the country to suspect the department’s motives, it is hard to understand any reason to go forward this close to the election other than to influence it — a motive that would clearly violate department policy.

New new new new.

Bombshell!

I’ll note, I was not among the allegedly “many media reports” that declared I had found “‘bombshell’ new details.” Nor was Brandi Buchman, in her new gig at HuffPo. Nor were Politico’s Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein. While a subhed of the WaPo story on the brief promised “new” details, the story itself describes that we knew most of this before.

Much of the evidence against Trump in the case had already become public, either through previous filings, news reports or an extensive congressional investigation into the events of Jan. 6.

Tellingly, while NYT devoted a section of their four takeaways piece to “new” evidence, they specifically said none of this was “game-changing.”

The prosecutor revealed new evidence.

The brief contained far more detail than the indictment and included many specific allegations that were not previously part of the public record of the events leading up to the attack on the Capitol by a mob of Trump supporters on Jan. 6, 2021.

None of the new details were game-changing revelations, but they add further texture to the available history. For example, part of the brief focuses on a social media post that Mr. Trump sent on the afternoon of the attack on the Capitol, telling supporters that Vice President Mike Pence had let them all down.

Mr. Trump was sitting alone in the dining room off the Oval Office at the time. According to the brief, forensic data shows he was using the Twitter app on his phone and watching Fox News. Fox had just interviewed a man who was frustrated that Mr. Pence was not blocking the certification and then reported that a police officer may have been injured and the protesters had breached the Capitol.

Mr. Trump posted to Twitter that Mr. Pence had lacked the “courage” to do what was right. The mob became enraged at the vice president, and the Secret Service took him to a secure location. An aide to Mr. Trump rushed in to alert him to the peril Mr. Pence was in, but Mr. Trump looked at the aide and said only, “So what?” according to the brief. [my emphasis]

And much of this isn’t new.

We learned prosecutors were going to rely on forensic data from an expert notice submitted in December. The original indictment revealed that Trump was alone in his dining room when he sent the Tweet targeting Mike Pence. The superseding indictment added to the existing description in the original indictment that Trump was “watch[ing] events unfold” that his TV was showing “live coverage.” If you couldn’t already guess that meant he was watching Fox News, the January 6 Committee told us that in hearings and their final report. The actual content shown on Fox News at that moment is new to court filings, but it is publicly available. The Tweet itself, of course, has been discussed in detail starting from Trump’s impeachment. The Nick Luna comment, “So what?”, is new, but simply a better sourced version of Cassidy Hutchinson’s far more damning hearsay testimony of Mark Meadows telling Pat Cipollone that Trump thought Pence “deserves it” even as his supporters chanted “hang Mike Pence.”

The CNN piece that Honig linked to substantiate his claim this was new described that the filing provided “fullest picture yet of [Jack Smith’s] 2020 election case,” not that these were bombshells. It described “new” details to include:

Trump’s frayed relationship with former Vice President Mike Pence; FBI evidence of Trump’s phone usage on January 6, 2021, when rioters overtook the US Capitol; and conversations with family members and others where the then-president was fighting his loss to Joe Biden.

Those details of Trump’s phone usage — as I noted above — were actually covered in earlier filings and even the indictments. The one new attribution to a conversation with Trump’s family members — the “fight like hell” claim — is important mostly because it echoed the very public exhortation in the January 6 speech we all saw four years ago. And virtually all the references in the brief about Trump’s frayed relationship with Pence are parallel sourced to Mike Pence’s book, published years ago.

What Goldsmith cites instead of the NYT, where his op-ed was published (which, many people complained, didn’t play up the brief enough), was this ABC story. It promises stuff that is new, but then lists a bunch of stuff we knew already.

Special counsel Jack Smith has outlined new details of former President Donald Trump and his allies’ sweeping and “increasingly desperate” efforts to overturn his 2020 election loss, in a blockbuster court filing Wednesday aimed at defending Smith’s prosecution of Trump following the Supreme Court’s July immunity ruling.

Trump intentionally lied to the public, state election officials, and his own vice president in an effort to cling to power after losing the election, while privately describing some of the claims of election fraud as “crazy,” prosecutors alleged in the 165-page filing.

And it doesn’t substantiate its claims that this stuff is new.

For example, the immunity filing explains how prosecutors know that Trump called Sidney Powell “crazy:” after Tucker Carlson ripped her to shreds, Trump let Dan Scavino and P7 — who may be Hope Hicks — listen to a conversation with Powell on speakerphone while he mocked her. That he called her crazy was included in the original indictment’s description of Powell.

One other thing some blow-ins to this story claimed was new — Mike Roman’s instruction to “Make them riot” — was also something already revealed in a December filing.

What Honig and Goldsmith are all worked up about is not new news, but editors who, trying to hype stories about this filing, felt the need to oversell the amount of new news in it.

Their concern arises out of click-bait, not the substance of the immunity filing itself.

And from that, Goldsmith scolds that Smith should have justified filing this brief in response to an order from Judge Chutkan.

[T]he department has not publicly justified its actions in the election prosecution, and its failure to do so in this highest-of-stakes context is a mistake.

Only, even Goldsmith’s claim that the department didn’t justify its actions is not entirely accurate.

Jack Smith hasn’t told us what internal DOJ deliberations were. But he did publicly reveal that before he did anything in the wake of the SCOTUS remand, he spent most of a month “consult[ing] with other Department of Justice components” regarding DOJ “rules, regulations … and policies” about “the most appropriate schedule” moving forward.

The Government continues to assess the new precedent set forth last month in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), including through consultation with other Department of Justice components. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(a) (“A Special Counsel shall comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the Department of Justice,” including “consult[ing] with appropriate offices within the Department for guidance with respect to established practices, policies and procedures of the Department . . . .”). Although those consultations are well underway, the Government has not finalized its position on the most appropriate schedule for the parties to brief issues related to the decision.

DOJ is never going to reveal these deliberations (and Jack Goldsmith knows that better than most, given the number of far more important internal deliberations involving Goldsmith himself, dating to two decades ago, that we’ve never been allowed to and won’t ever be allowed to see).

But they did tell us they engaged in them. Jack Smith literally told us that he was spending weeks consulting about how to comply with DOJ policies regarding timing even before he superseded the indictment.

Only that detail — the one that they keep harping about — appears to be news to Honig and Goldsmith.

So chalk this up to yet another instance where the people complaining about what Jack Smith did, instead, only reveal they don’t know what Jack Smith did.

Update: Trump submitted, under seal, another request not to have any evidence released before the election. It cites both Honig and Goldsmith. Neither, of course, address the point Trump claims to be making.

President Trump maintains his objections, see ECF No. 248, based on overt and inappropriate election interference, violations of longstanding DOJ policy, the Office’s previous safety-related representations in this District and the Southern District of Florida, grand jury secrecy, and the influence on potential witnesses and jurors of prejudicial pretrial publicity—which predictably followed from the filing of the redacted “Motion for Immunity Determinations.”2

2 See, e.g., Ellie Honig, Jack Smith’s October Cheap Shot, N.Y. Magazine (Oct. 3, 2024), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/jack-smith-october-surprise-donald-trump.html; see also Jack Goldsmith, Jack Smith Owes Us an Explanation, N.Y. Times (Oct. 9, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/09/opinion/jack-smith-trump-biden.html.

Trump’s deadline to submit objections to Jack Smith’s proposed redactions is today at 5PM ET. Last time, when Trump made no substantive suggestions, Judge Chutkan released the file.

Alberto Gonzales Lectures Jack Goldsmith about Perception versus Reality in a Democracy

August 13, 2023/120 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, emptywheel, Hunter Biden, January 6 Insurrection, Leak Investigations /by emptywheel

I never, never imagined I’d see the day when Alberto Gonzales would school Jack Goldsmith on how to defend democracy.

Once upon a time, remember, it fell to Goldsmith to school Gonzales that the President (or Vice President) could not simply unilaterally authorize torture and surveillance programs that violate the law by engaging in cynical word games.

But now, Goldsmith is the one befuddled by word games and Gonzales is the one reminding that rule of law must operate in the realm of truth, not propaganda.

In a widely circulated NYT op-ed last week, Goldmith warned that democracy may suffer from the January 6 indictment of Donald Trump because of the perceived unfairness (Goldsmith doesn’t say, perceived by whom) of the treatment of Trump.

This deeply unfortunate timing looks political and has potent political implications even if it is not driven by partisan motivations. And it is the Biden administration’s responsibility, as its Justice Department reportedly delayed the investigation of Mr. Trump for a year [1] and then rushed to indict him well into the G.O.P. primary season. The unseemliness of the prosecution will most likely grow if the Biden campaign or its proxies use it as a weapon against Mr. Trump if he is nominated.

This is all happening against the backdrop of perceived unfairness in the Justice Department’s earlier investigation, originating in the Obama administration, of Mr. Trump’s connections to Russia in the 2016 general election. Anti-Trump texts by the lead F.B.I. investigator [2], a former F.B.I. director who put Mr. Trump in a bad light through improper disclosure of F.B.I. documents and information [3], transgressions by F.B.I. and Justice Department officials in securing permission to surveil a Trump associate [4] and more were condemned by the Justice Department’s inspector general even as he found no direct evidence of political bias in the investigation. The discredited Steele dossier, which played a consequential role in the Russia investigation and especially its public narrative, grew out of opposition research by the Democratic National Committee and the Hillary Clinton campaign. [5]

And then there is the perceived unfairness in the department’s treatment of Mr. Biden’s son Hunter, in which the department has once again violated the cardinal principle of avoiding any appearance of untoward behavior in a politically sensitive investigation. Credible whistle-blowers have alleged wrongdoing and bias in the investigation [6], though the Trump-appointed prosecutor denies it. And the department’s plea arrangement with Hunter Biden came apart, in ways that fanned suspicions of a sweetheart deal, in response to a few simple questions by a federal judge [7]. [my emphasis; numbers added]

Rather than parroting perceptions, in his op-ed, Gonzales corrects a core misperception by pointing out a key difference between Hillary’s treatment and Trump’s: Hillary cooperated.

I recently heard from friends and former colleagues whom I trust and admire, people of common sense and strong values, who say that our justice system appears to be stacked against Trump and Republicans in general, that it favors liberals and Democrats, and that it serves the interests of the Democratic Party and not the Constitution. For example, they cite the department’s 2018 decision not to charge Hillary Clinton criminally for keeping classified documents on a private email server while she was secretary of state during the Obama administration.

I can understand the skepticism, but based on the known facts in each case, I do not share it.

[snip]

A prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence affects decisions on whether to charge on a set of known facts, and government officials under investigation, such as Clinton, often cooperate with prosecutors to address potential wrongdoing. By all accounts, Trump has refused to cooperate.

By contrast, Goldsmith simply ignores the backstory to virtually every single perceived claim in his op-ed.

Aside from a slew of other problems with the linked Carol Leonnig article, her claims of delay in the investigation do not account for the overt investigative steps taken against three of Trump’s co-conspirators in 2021, and nine months of any delay came from Trump’s own frivolous Executive Privilege claims
Trump’s Deputy Attorney General chose to release Peter Strzok’s texts (which criticized Hillary and Bernie Sanders, in addition to Trump), but not those of agents who wrote pro-Trump texts on their FBI devices; that decision is currently the subject of a Privacy Act lawsuit
After Trump used Jim Comey’s gross mistreatment of Hillary in actions that was among the most decisive acts of the 2016 election as his excuse to fire Comey, DOJ IG investigated Comey for publicly revealing the real reason Trump fired him
No Justice Department officials were faulted for the Carter Page errors, and subsequent reports from DOJ IG revealed that the number of Woods file errors against Page were actually fewer than in other applications; note, too, that Page was a former associate of Trump’s, not a current one
Investigations against both Hillary (two separate ones predicated on Clinton Cash) and Trump were predicated using oppo research, but perceptions about the Steele dossier ended up being more central because in significant part through the way Oleg Deripaska played both sides
One of the IRS agents Goldsmith treats as credible refused to turn over his emails for discovery for eight months when asked and the other revealed that he thought concerns about Sixth Amendment problems with the case were merely a sign of “liberal” bias; both have ties to Chuck Grassley and one revealed that ten months after obtaining a laptop that appears to have been the result of hacking, DOJ had still never forensically validated the contents of it
In the wake of that organized campaign against Hunter Biden, a Trump appointed US Attorney limited the scope of the plea which led to a Trump appointed judge refusing to accept it

For each instance of perceived unfairness Goldsmith cites — again, without explaining who is doing the perceiving — there’s a backstory of how that perception was constructed.

Which is the more important insight Gonzales offers: That perceived unfairness Goldsmith merely parrots, unquestioned? Trump deliberately created it.

[A]s I watched a former president of the United States, for the first time in history, be arraigned in federal court for attempting to obstruct official proceedings and overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, I found myself less troubled by the actions of former president Donald Trump than by the response of a significant swath of the American people to Trump’s deepening legal woes.

[snip]

While Trump has a right to defend himself, his language and actions since 2016 have fueled a growing sense among many Americans that our justice system is rigged and biased against him and his supporters.

Sadly, this has led on the right to a growing distrust of and rage against the Justice Department.

[snip]

We have a duty as Americans not to blindly trust our justice system, but we also shouldn’t blindly trust those who say it is unjust. Our government officials have a duty to act at all times with integrity, and when appropriate to inform and reassure the public that their decisions are consistent based on provable evidence and in accordance with the rule of law.

Defendants do not have the same duty. They can, and sometimes do, say almost anything to prove their innocence — no matter how damaging to our democracy and the rule of law. [my emphasis]

Trump’s false claims of grievance, his concerted, seven year effort to evade any accountability, are themselves the source of damage to democracy and rule of law, not the perception that arises from Trump’s propaganda.

Which beings me back to the question of who is perceiving this unfairness. By labeling these things “perceived” reality, Goldsmith abdicates any personal responsibility.

Goldsmith abdicates personal responsibility for debunking the more obvious false claims, such as that Hunter Biden, after five years of relentless attacks assisted by Bill Barr’s creation of a way to ingest known Russian disinformation about him without holding Rudy legally accountable for what he did to obtain it, after five years of dedicated investigation by an IRS group normally focused on far bigger graft, somehow got a sweetheart deal.

More troubling, from a law professor, Goldsmith abdicates personal responsibility for his own false claims about the legal novelty of the January 6 indictment against Trump.

The case involves novel applications of three criminal laws and raises tricky issues of Mr. Trump’s intent, his freedom of speech and the contours of presidential power.

One reason the investigation took so long — one likely reason why DOJ stopped well short of alleging Trump incited the violence on the Capitol and Mike Pence personally, in spite of all the evidence he did so deliberately and with malign intent — is to eliminate any First Amendment claim. One might repeat this claim if one had not read the indictment itself and instead simply repeated Trump’s lawyers claims or the reports of political journalists themselves parroting Trump’s claims, but not after a review of how the conspiracies are constructed.

As to the claim that all three statutes are novel applications? That’s an argument that says a conspiracy to submit documents to the federal government that were identified as illegal in advance is novel. Kenneth Chesbro wrote down in advance that the fake elector plot was legally suspect, then went ahead and implemented the plan anyway. John Eastman acknowledged repeatedly in advance that the requests they were making of Mike Pence were legally suspect, but then went ahead and told an armed, angry crowd otherwise.

The claim that all three charges are novel applications is especially obnoxious with regards to 18 USC 1512(c)(2) and (k), because the application has already been used more than 300 times (including with people who did not enter the Capitol). The DC Circuit has already approved the treatment of the vote certification as an official proceeding. And — as I personally told Goldsmith — whatever definition of “corruptly” the DC Circuit and SCOTUS will eventually adopt, it will apply more easily to Trump than to his 300 mobsters. And if SCOTUS were to overturn the application of obstruction to the vote certification — certainly within the realm of possibility from a court whose oldest member has a spouse who might similarly be charged — the response would already be baked in.

To argue that 300 of Trump’s supporters should be charged and he should not is simply obscene.

American democracy, American rule of law, is no doubt in great peril and the prosecutions of Donald Trump for the damage he did to both will further test them.

But those of us who want to preserve democracy and rule of law have an ethical obligation not just to parrot the manufactured grievances of the demagogue attempting to end it, absolving ourselves of any moral responsibility to sort through these claims, but instead to insist on truth as best as we can discern it.

Six Data Points about the CIA Dragnet

February 16, 2022/14 Comments/in emptywheel, EO 12333 /by emptywheel

Last week, Ron Wyden and Martin Heinrich released a declassified letter they wrote last April, describing a CIA bulk program that had not been fully briefed to the Intelligence Committees, which violated the spirit and understanding of efforts to shut down bulk collection.

This history demonstrates Congress’s clear intent, expressed over many years and through multiple pieces of legislation, to limit, and in some cases, prohibit the warrantless collection of Americans’ records, as well as the public’s intense interest in and support for these legislative efforts. And yet, throughout this period, the CIA has secretly conducted it own bulk program [redacted]. It has done so entirely outside the statutory framework that Congress and the public believe govern this collection, and without any of the judicial, congressional or even executive branch oversight that comes with FISA collection.

I’ve been hesitating writing about it. That’s true, because it’s not the least little surprise to me. I’ve written a series of pieces describing how the self-congratulatory pieces claiming legislation passed in the wake of Snowden’s leaks won’t do what they say. I pointed out some of what PCLOB was likely to find when they started this review.

Then there’s bullet 4, which suggests CIA and/or NSA are collecting “within the United States or from U.S. companies.”

With regards collection “within the US,” Mayer’s post is helpful here too, pointing to loopholes for wireless and satellite communication.

The law that results is quite counterintuitive. If a communication is carried by radio waves, and it’s one-end foreign, it falls under Executive Order 12333. If that same communication were carried by a wire, though, it would fall under FISA. (Specifically, the Section 702 upstream program.)

As for how this Executive Order 12333 authority might be used beyond satellite surveillance, I could only speculate. Perhaps intercepting cellphone calls to or from foreign embassies?¹² Or along the national borders? At any rate, the FISA-free domestic wireless authority appears to be even broader than the Transit Authority.

As far as collection outside the US, this may simply be a reference to providers voluntarily providing data under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), as we know at least some of the telecoms do.

I pointed out that a consideration of the risks of surveillance under EO 12333 to US persons had to consider CIA’s use of it (then got yelled at because I pointed out enormous blindspots in “expert” reports). I noted that when cautioning about the dragnet Donald Trump would wield, you had to consider EO 12333.

I mean, there’s been a whole lot of self-congratulation since Snowden. And it has all been just that, something to brag to donors about. Because EO 12333 was always out there, and it was always possible to do virtually all of what Snowden exposed in the Section 215 program via EO 12333.

Add that to the list of unpopular things I have said over the years that leads “experts” to prefer to ignore me.

So I assume this will be ignored like all those other warnings of precisely this moment.

Here’s where I would propose to go find the CIA dragnet.

CIA always wanted to restore its Stellar Wind component

First, remember there was a CIA component to Stellar Wind, the first dragnet set up for counterterrorism (which this program is). CIA had to do its own IG Report on Stellar Wind.

Remember that one of Bill Binney’s gripes about how NSA repurposed his surveillance was that they eliminated the encryption hiding US person identifiers, effectively making it easy to spy on US persons.

Now consider that on July 20, 2004, the CIA took the lead on pushing for the adoption of “supplemental procedures” allowing the analysis of US person metadata under EO 12333. July 20, 2004 was days after Jack Goldsmith, who had shut down parts of Stellar Wind, resigned, and the agencies immediately moved to start turning all the programs he had shut down (including both surveillance and torture) back on.

It took years to restore that access to US person data (I have a theory that Alberto Gonzales was fired because he refused to reauthorize it). But starting in 2007, expanding in 2009 (at a time when the Section 215 program was under threat), and then fully implementing in 2011 (after NSA had to shut down the PRTT program knowing full well it violated John Bates upstream order), SPCMA was rolled out.This meant that, so long as data was collected via whatever means overseas, US person metadata could be included in the analysis.

The government has been preserving its ability to use 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f)

Over a series of IG Reports written by Glenn Fine, I honed in a memo that David Barron (the OLC head who, under Obama, played a similar role as John Yoo did for George Bush) wrote seemingly authorizing using 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) to get “international” data from telecoms provided voluntarily. In 2013, David Kris confirmed that that had been happening.

In March 2021 — so before he wrote the letter just declassified but after he was briefed by PCLOB on the report on the CIA dragnet — the Congressional Research Service wrote a report on 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) for Senator Wyden. It describes how it works as an exception to FISA and other criminal laws.

Accordingly, Section 2511(2)(f) identifies two broad categories of government activities that are exempt from Title III, the SCA, the Pen Register statute, and section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934:27 (1) the “acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications”; and (2) “foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system.” These two categories are further qualified so that the exception only applies if: (3) the acquisition or the foreign intelligence activity is not “electronic surveillance” as defined under FISA; and (4) an “exclusivity” clause states that ECPA, the SCA, and FISA shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. Each of these clauses is discussed in more detail below.

It describes that some things don’t count as an “acquisition” under FISA, such as something obtained from a telephone instrument being used in the ordinary course of business.

Therefore, some intelligence activities that qualify as “acquisitions” for purposes of Section 2511(2)(f) may not qualify as “electronic surveillance” under FISA because the acquisition is not accomplished through an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device. Although FISA does not define this phrase, ECPA provides a definition of “electronic, mechanical, or other device” to mean “any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.”46 However, this definition expressly excludes “any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof” that is “being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business.”47

This is the kind of language that was used to treat bulk metadata as a mere business record under Section 215 after the government stopped relying exclusively on voluntary production. The bulk telephony data of all Americans was just a business record.

The report written for Ron Wyden during the same period he was writing the now unclassified letter also notes that “exclusivity” only applies to “domestic” communications, not stuff acquired overseas.

The exclusivity clause is first directed at interception of domestic communications, which would not appear to be affected by the previous disclaimers regarding acquisition of foreign and international communications or foreign intelligence activities directed at foreign electronic communications systems.

In other words, if telephone companies want to voluntarily give the records they otherwise keep to the IC for the purpose of foreign intelligence, it fits in this loophole. And given the realities of telecommunication, a huge percentage of “domestic” communications can be obtained overseas.

In 2013, NYT reported that AT&T was providing CIA call records

In 2013, as a bunch of different dragnets were being disclosed while everyone was looking exclusively at Section 215 and right after Kris had confirmed this application of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), Charlie Savage described that the CIA had its own dragnet based on telephone records purchased from AT&T.

The C.I.A. is paying AT&T more than $10 million a year to assist with overseas counterterrorism investigations by exploiting the company’s vast database of phone records, which includes Americans’ international calls, according to government officials.

The cooperation is conducted under a voluntary contract, not under subpoenas or court orders compelling the company to participate, according to the officials. The C.I.A. supplies phone numbers of overseas terrorism suspects, and AT&T searches its database and provides records of calls that may help identify foreign associates, the officials said. The company has a huge archive of data on phone calls, both foreign and domestic, that were handled by its network equipment, not just those of its own customers.

Legally, this dragnet would fit solidly in the 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) loophole.

Obama’s codification of EO 12333 in his final days

Insanely, Obama finished the process of reconstituting the Stellar Wind program in his final days. He did so, I’ve been told, in an effort to put guidelines in place (for example, Loretta Lynch adopted rules that you couldn’t use EO 12333 data for political purposes, as if that would restrain Donald Trump). But I emphasized then precisely what Wyden and Heinrich are emphasizing now. There’s no oversight.

Which brings us to whether the EO sharing procedures, as released, might bind Trump anymore than EO 12333 bound Bush in 2001.

In general, the sharing procedures are not even as stringent as other surveillance documents from the Obama Administration. The utter lack of any reasonable oversight is best embodied, in my opinion, by the oversight built into the procedures. A key cog in that oversight is the Department of National Intelligence’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer — long inhabited by a guy, Alex Joel, who had no problem with Stellar Wind. That role will lead reviews of the implementation of this data sharing. In addition to DNI’s PCLO, NSA’s PCLO will have a review role, along with the General Counsels of the agencies in question, and in some limited areas (such as Attorney Client communications), so will DOJ’s National Security Division head.

What the oversight of these new sharing procedures does not include is any statutorily independent position, someone independently confirmed by the Senate who can decide what to investigate on her own. Notably, there is not a single reference to Inspectors General in these procedures, even where other surveillance programs rely heavily on IGs for oversight.

There is abundant reason to believe that the PATRIOT Act phone and Internet dragnets violated the restrictions imposed by the FISA Court for years in part because NSA’s IG’s suggestions were ignored, and it wasn’t until, in 2009, the FISC mandated NSA’s IG review the Internet dragnet that NSA’s GC “discovered” that every single record ingested under the program violated FISC’s rules after having not discovered that fact in 25 previous spot checks. In the past, then, internal oversight of surveillance has primarily come when IGs had the independence to actually review the programs.

Of course, there won’t be any FISC review here, so it’s not even clear whether explicit IG oversight of the sharing would be enough, but it would be far more than what the procedures require.

I’d add that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which provided key insight into the Section 215 and 702 programs, also has no role — except that PCLOB is for all intents and purposes defunct at this point, and there’s no reason to believe it’ll become operational under Trump.

I guess I was wrong about PCLOB. It did get reconstituted, and seven years after the EO 12333 review started we’re getting dribbles about what it found!

And in fact if this whole discussion didn’t make me crabby, I’d point out details from the PCLOB report that suggest things aren’t as bad as I thought they’d get in 2017, when this dragnet was handed over to Donald Trump.

So I’m not entirely a pessimist!

PCLOB only has authority over counterterrorism programs

The only problem with being proven wrong about PCLOB, however, is even though there were efforts to expand its mandate during the Trump years, those efforts failed.

It can only look at counterterrorism programs.

So there could be a parallel program used for counterintelligence (indeed, the sharing rules make it quite clear there’s a CI purpose for it), and we’d never get oversight over it. So Wyden and Heinrich should be pushing to get a full briefing on the CI version of this, because it’s there, I would bet you a lot of money.

Anyway, if you want to find the CIA dragnet, you can look at my warnings over the last 9 years (or Charlie Savage’s report on it from 2013). Or you can look at the loophole that 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) creates, Ron Wyden was exploring closely when he was writing this letter. Another place you might look is AT&T’s earnings statements.

John Bolton Versus Navy Versus Egan

June 19, 2020/35 Comments/in 2020 Presidential Election, Impeachment /by emptywheel

John Bolton filed a motion opposing the government’s legal actions against him last night (it is both a memorandum in opposition to the Temporary Restraining Order as well as a motion to dismiss). It is particularly interesting because of some things Jack Goldsmith and Marty Lederman laid out in this post. As they note, the judge presiding over today’s hearing has no tolerance for Executive Branch bullshit, even on classified matters; the government’s own description of what happened raises lots of questions about regularity of the claim of classification, particularly as respects to whether there any compartmented information (SCI) remains in Bolton’s book; and the scrutiny of the government will be particularly stringent here, since it wants to censor something before publication.

This, however, might be a case in which a judge rejects or at least refuses to countenance the government’s classification decisions, at least for purposes of the requested injunction. That’s because of a confluence of unusual factors. They include:

Several years ago, Judge Lamberth declared at a conference of federal employees that federal courts are “far too deferential” to the executive branch’s claims that certain information must be classified on national security grounds and shouldn’t be released to the public. Judges shouldn’t afford government officials “almost blind deference,” said Lamberth.

The decision to classify material here appears to be highly irregular. The career official responsible for prepublication review at the National Security Council determined after a long process that Bolton’s manuscript contained no classified information. A political appointee who had only recently become a classifying authority, Ellis, then arrived at a different conclusion after only a brief review. It is even possible that Ellis classified information in Bolton’s manuscript for the first time after Bolton was told by Knight that the manuscript contained no classified information. At a minimum there were clearly process irregularities in the prepublication consideration of Bolton’s manuscript.

The D.C. Circuit in dicta in McGehee stated that the government “would bear a much heavier burden” than the usual rationality review of executive branch classified information determinations in cases where the government seeks “an injunction against publication of censored items”—i.e., in a case like this one. Although it’s not clear whether that’s right, the First Amendment concerns raised by this case, in this setting, may affect how credulous Judge Lamberth is of the government’s classified information determinations and of the unusual way in which Bolton’s prepublication review was conducted.

Bolton’s motion answers a lot of questions that Goldsmith and Lederman asked in their post. For example, they ask whether Ellen Knight consulted with other top classification authorities before she verbally told Bolton the book had no more classified information in it; Bolton’s motion describes that on the call when Knight told Bolton the book had no more classified information, she, “cryptically replied that her ‘interaction’ with unnamed others in the White House about the book had ‘been very delicate,’ and that there were ‘some internal process considerations to work through.'”

Goldsmith and Lederman lay out a lot of questions contemplating the likelihood that Michael Ellis claimed the manuscript had SCI information after Knight informed Bolton that it had no more classified information, of any kind (remember, Ellis is likely the guy who moved Trump’s Ukraine transcript onto the compartmented server after people started raising concerns about it, so there would be precedent). Bolton’s brief lays out an extended description of why, if this indeed happened, it doesn’t matter with respect to the way his SCI non-disclosure agreement is written, because based on the record even the government presents, Bolton had no reason to believe the manuscript had SCI in it, and plenty of reason to believe it had no classified information of any type, when he instructed Simon & Schuster to move towards publication.

However, in its brief, the Government asserts for the first time that Ambassador Bolton’s book contains SCI and, therefore, that the SCI NDA applied to his manuscript and required that he receive written authorization from the NSC to publish it. See Doc. 3 at 12–14. This surprise assertion that the book contains SCI, even if true, would not alter the conclusion that the SCI NDA is inapplicable to this case.

The Government is not painting on a blank canvas when it asserts that Ambassador Bolton’s book contains SCI. Rather, the Government’s assertion comes after a six-month course of dealing between the parties that informs whether and how the NDAs apply. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981); see also id. § 223. Ambassador Bolton submitted his manuscript for prepublication review on December 30, 2019. Over the next four months, he (or his counsel) and Ms. Knight exchanged more than a dozen emails and letters, participated in numerous phone calls, and sat through more than a dozen hours of face-to-face meetings, painstakingly reviewing Ambassador Bolton’s manuscript. Yet, in all that time, Ms. Knight never asserted—or even hinted—that the manuscript contained SCI, even as she asserted that earlier drafts contained classified information. 102 After conducting an exhaustive process in which she reviewed the manuscript through least four waves of changes, Ms. Knight concluded that it contains no classified information—let alone SCI—as the Government concedes. Doc. 1 ¶ 46.

Nor did Mr. Eisenberg assert in either his June 8 or June 11 letters that the manuscript contains SCI. Nor did Mr. Ellis assert in his June 16 letter that the manuscript contains SCI. Indeed, not even the Government’s complaint asserted that the manuscript contains SCI, even as it specifically alleges that it contains “Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret” information. Doc. 1 ¶ 58. The first time that anyone in the Government so much as whispered that the manuscript contains SCI to either Ambassador Bolton or the public was yesterday, when the Government filed its motion. For nearly six months, it has been common ground between the NSC and Ambassador Bolton that his manuscript does not contain SCI. Only now, on the eve of the book’s publication and in service of seeking a prior restraint, has the Government brought forth this allegation.

And here is the key point: Ambassador Bolton authorized Simon & Schuster to publish his manuscript weeks ago, not long after receiving Ms. Knight’s confirmation that the book did not contain classified information and long before the Government’s first assertion yesterday that the book contained SCI. 103 Thus, at the time Ambassador Bolton proceeded with publishing his book—a decision that has long-since become irrevocable—he had absolutely no reason to believe that the book contained SCI. Indeed, quite the opposite: the Government had given him every reason to believe that it agreed with him that the book did not contain SCI. And if the book did not contain SCI, the SCI NDA did not apply when Ambassador Bolton authorized the book’s publication.

Yet the Government now argues that the SCI NDA did apply based on its discovery of alleged SCI six months after the prepublication-review process began. If that argument is sustained—if, that is, an author may be held liable under the SCI NDA even though neither the author nor the Government believed that the author’s writing contained SCI through four months of exhaustive prepublication review—it would mean that any federal employee who signs the SCI NDA would have no choice but to submit any writing, and certainly any writing that could even theoretically contain SCI, and then await written authorization before publishing that writing. The risk of liability would simply be too great for any author to proceed with publishing even a writing that both he and the official in charge of prepublication review believe, in good faith, is not subject to the SCI NDA.

What Goldsmith and Lederman don’t address — but Bolton does at length in his brief — is the role of the President in these matters. Bolton lays out (as many litigants against the President have before) abundant evidence that the President was retaliating here, including by redefining as highly classified any conversation with him at a very late stage in this process.

Yet, the evidence is overwhelming that the Government’s assertion that the manuscript contains classified information, like the corrupted prepublication review process that preceded it, is pretextual and in bad faith:

On January 29, the President tweeted that Ambassador Bolton’s book is “nasty & untrue,” thus implicitly acknowledging that its contents had been at least partially described to him. He also said that the book was “All Classified National Security.”112

On February 3, Vanity Fair reported that the President “has an enemies list,” that “Bolton is at the top of the list,” and that the “campaign against Bolton” included Ms. Knight’s January 23 letter asserting that the manuscript contained classified information.113 It also reported that the President “wants Bolton to be criminally investigated.”114

On February 21, the Washington Post reported that “President Trump has directly weighed in on the White House [prepublication] review of a forthcoming book by his former national security adviser, telling his staff that he views John Bolton as ‘a traitor,’ that everything he uttered to the departed aide about national security is classified and that he will seek to block the book’s publication.”115 The President vowed: “[W]e’re going to try and block the publication of [his] book. After I leave office, he can do this.”116

As described in detail above, Ambassador Bolton’s book went through a four-month prepublication-review process with the career professionals at NSC, during which he made innumerable revisions to the manuscript in response to Ms. Knight’s concerns. At the end of that exhaustive process, she stated that she had no further edits to the manuscript,117 thereby confirming, as the Government has admitted, that she had concluded that it did not contain any classified information.118

At the conclusion of the prepublication-review process on April 27, Ms. Knight thought that Ambassador Bolton was entitled to receive the pro-forma letter clearing the book for publication and suggested that it might be ready that same afternoon.119 She and Ambassador Bolton even discussed how the letter should be transmitted to him.120

During that same April 27 conversation, Ms. Knight described her “interaction” with unnamed others in the White House about the book as having “been very delicate,”121 and she had “some internal process considerations to work through.”

After April 27, six weeks passed without a word from the White House about Ambassador Bolton’s manuscript, despite his requests for a status update.122

When the White House finally had something new to say, it was to assert its current allegations of classified information on June 8, in a letter that—by the White House’s own admission—was prompted by press reports that the book was about to be published.123

Even though the manuscript was submitted to NSC on December 30, 2019, and despite the exhaustive four-month review and the six weeks of silence that had passed since Ms. Knight’s approval of the manuscript on April 27, the White House’s June 8 letter gave itself until June 19—only four days before the book was due to be published—to provide Ambassador Bolton’s counsel with a redacted copy of the book identifying the passages the White House purported to believe were classified.

On the eve of this lawsuit being filed, in response to a question about this lawsuit, the President stated: “I told that to the attorney general before; I will consider every conversation with me as president highly classified. So that would mean that if he wrote a book, and if the book gets out, he’s broken the law.”124 The President reiterated: “Any conversation with me is classified.”125 The President added that “a lot of people are very angry with [Bolton] for writing a book” and that he “hope[d]” that Ambassador Bolton “would have criminal problems” due to having published the book.126

On June 16, the NSC provided to Ambassador Bolton a copy of the manuscript with wholesale redactions removing the portions it now claims are classified. Consistent with President Trump’s claim, statements made by the President have been redacted, as have numerous passages that depict the President in an unfavorable light.127

It is clear from this evidence that the White House has abused the prepublication-review and classification process, and has asserted fictional national security concerns as a pretext to censor, or at least to delay indefinitely, Ambassador Bolton’s right to speak.

While Goldsmith and Lederman focused, with good reason, on Ellis’ role, Bolton is focused on President Trump’s role. Bolton lays out abundant evidence that the reason this prepublication review went off the rails is because the President, knowing how unflattering it was to him, made sure it did.

And that raises entirely new issues because under a SCOTUS precedent called Navy v. Egan, the Executive has long held that the President has unreviewable authority over classification and declassification decisions. That doesn’t change contract law. And–given that the courts have already granted the President a limited authority to protect the kinds of things being called SCI here under Executive Privilege–it raises real questions about whether Trump is relying on the proper legal claim here (which may be a testament to the fact that Executive Privilege holds little sway over former government officials).

Still, courts have sanctioned a bunch of absurdity about classification under the Navy v. Egan precedent, arguably far beyond the scope of what that decision (which pertained to clearances) covered. Yet, I would argue that Bolton has made Navy v. Egan a central question (though he does not mention it once) in this litigation.

Can the President retroactively classify information as SCI solely to retaliate against someone for embarrassing him — including by exposing him to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act? That’s the stuff of tyranny, and Royce Lamberth is not the judge who’ll play along with it.

Let me very clear however, particularly for the benefit of some frothy leftists who are claiming — in contradiction to all evidence — that liberals are somehow embracing Bolton by criticizing Trump’s actions here: Bolton’s plight is not that different from what whistleblowers claim happens to them when they embarrass the Executive Branch generally. Their books get held up in review and some of them get prosecuted under the Espionage Act.

What makes this more ironic, involving Bolton, is that he has been on the opposite side of this issue. Indeed, the Valerie Plame leak investigation focused closely on whether Dick Cheney’s orders to Scooter Libby to leak classified information — after which he leaked details consistent with knowing Plame’s covert status, as well as details from the National Intelligence Estimate — were properly approved by George Bush. Bolton was a party to that pushback and his deputy Fred Fleitz was suspected of having had a more active role in it. In that case, the President (or Vice President) retaliated for the release of embarrassing information by declassifying information for political purposes. But in that case, the details of what the President had done have remained secret, protected by Libby’s lies to this day.

In this case, Bolton can present a long list of evidence — including the President’s own statements — that suggest these classification decisions were retaliatory, part of a deliberate effort to trap Bolton in a legal morass.

So Bolton isn’t unique for his treatment as a “whistleblower” (setting aside his cowardice in waiting to say all this). He’s typical. What’s not typical is how clearly the President’s own role and abusive intent is laid out. And because of the latter fact — because, as usual, Trump hasn’t hidden his abusive purpose — it may more directly test the limits of the President’s supposedly unreviewable authority to classify information. So, ironically, someone like Bolton may finally be in a position to test whether Navy v. Egan really extends to sanctioning the retroactive classification of information solely to expose someone to criminal liability.

As Democrats Entertain a Ukraine-Only Impeachment, Jack Goldsmith Lays Out Import of Impeaching for Clemency Abuse

September 28, 2019/75 Comments/in 2016 Presidential Election, 2020 Presidential Election /by emptywheel

As June Bug the Terrorist Foster Dog and I drove the last leg of our epic road trip over the last few days, I listened to Jack Goldsmith’s book on his stepfather, Chuckie O’Brien, In Hoffa’s Shadow: A Stepfather, a Disappearance in Detroit, and My Search for the Truth.

It’s a fascinating book I’m pondering how to write about: Imagine a book written by a top surveillance lawyer describing how he learned things his beloved stepfather was lying about by reading old FBI transcripts of wiretaps targeted at top mobsters.

The entire point of the book is to exonerate O’Brien of any role in Jimmy Hoffa’s murder, and it fairly convincingly does that. As Goldsmith describes, the FBI admitted privately to him that they belatedly realized his father couldn’t have had a role in Hoffa’s disappearance, but because the FBI is the FBI, they refused to state that in an official letter (though it was Barb McQuade, then as Detroit’s US Attorney, who made the final call).

But in Goldsmith’s effort to exonerate his step-father on the Hoffa murder, he implicates him in a shit-ton of other crimes … including being the bagman for a $1 million bribe to Richard Nixon so he would commute Hoffa’s sentence for jury tampering (which Chuckie was also a key player in). Here’s how Goldsmith describes O’Brien’s claims about the payoff.

Chuckie nonetheless insists there was a payoff. And he says he was the delivery boy.

Chuckie told me that in early December 1971, he received a telephone call in Detroit from Fitzsimmons’s secretary, Annie. “Mr. Fitzsimmons would like to see you,” she said. Chuckie got on the next plane, flew to Washington, and went straight to Hoffa’s former office at the foot of Capitol Hill. After small talk, Fitzsimmons got to the point. “He’s coming home, and it’s going to cost this much,” Fitzsimmons whispered to Chuckie, raising his right index finger to indicate $1 million. “There will be a package here tomorrow that I want you to pick up and deliver.”

The following afternoon, Annie called Chuckie, who was staying at a hotel adjacent to the Teamsters headquarters near the Capitol building. “Mr. Fitzsimmons asked me to tell you that you left your briefcase in his office,” she said. Chuckie had not left anything in Fitzsimmons’s office, but he quickly went there. Fitzsimmons was not around, but Annie pointed Chuckie to a leather litigation bag next to Fitzsimmons’s desk—a “big, heavy old-fashioned briefcase,” as Chuckie described it. Chuckie picked up the bag, and Annie handed him an envelope. Inside the envelope was a piece of paper with “Madison Hotel, 7 p.m.” and a room number written on it.

It was about 5:00 p.m., and Chuckie took the bag to his hotel room. He had delivered dozens of packages during the past two decades, no questions asked, mostly for Hoffa, sometimes for Giacalone, and very occasionally for Fitzsimmons. But this time was different. Chuckie knew of the strain between Fitzsimmons and Hoffa. He wasn’t sure what game Fitzsimmons was playing, especially since Hoffa had not at this point discussed a payoff with him. Chuckie was anxious about what he was getting into. And so he did something he had never done before: he opened the bag.

“I wanted to see what was in the briefcase,” Chuckie told me. “I didn’t trust these motherfuckers. I needed to look; it could have been ten pounds of cocaine in there and the next thing I know a guy is putting a handcuff on me.”

What Chuckie saw was neatly stacked and tightly wrapped piles of one-hundred-dollar bills. He closed the bag without counting the money.

The Madison Hotel, where Chuckie was supposed to deliver the bag, was two miles away, six blocks north of the White House. It “was a very famous hotel” in the early seventies, a place where “political big wheels” and “foreign dignitaries” stayed, Chuckie told me. At about 6:45 p.m., Chuckie took a taxi to the Madison, went to the designated floor, walked to the room (he doesn’t remember the number), and knocked on the door. A man opened the door from darkness. Chuckie stepped in one or two feet. He sensed that the room was a suite, but could not tell for sure.

“Here it is,” Chuckie said, and handed over the bag.

“Thank you,” said the man. Chuckie turned and left. That was it. The whole transaction, from the time he left his hotel to the delivery on the top floor of the Madison, took less than twenty minutes. The actual drop was over in seconds.

If O’Brien is telling the truth, it means that in addition to locking in Teamster support for 1972, Nixon got a chunk of money for the election (just as Trump just hit up Wayne LaPierre for fundraising support in exchange for killing gun control).

Goldsmith’s step-father claims that the money for the payoff came directly from Hoffa — but he either didn’t know or wouldn’t say whom he delivered it to.

“Where did the money come from?” I asked. “From the Old Man,” Chuckie answered. “Through Allen Dorfman. It was the Old Man’s money. Dorfman had a lot of his money. Fitz wouldn’t give you a dime if you were dying.”

[snip]

“Did Fitz tell you who you were delivering the bag to?” I asked. “No. I took the fucking briefcase to where it’s supposed to go, I never asked any questions. You never ask, Jack.”

This is something that John Mitchell lied about to prosecutors, just as the stories of Rudy Giuliani and Jay Sekulow regarding the pardons they’ve negotiated with Russian investigation witnesses don’t hold up.

Since that time, presidential abuses of pardons have only gotten worse. Say what you will about the Marc Rich pardon (and I agree it was ridiculous), both Poppy Bush (Cap Weinberger) and W (Scooter Libby) provided clemency to witnesses to silence them about actions of the Bush men. Bill Barr was a key player in the Poppy pardons, and he seems all too willing to repeat the favor for Trump.

Until Congress makes reining in the abuse of executive clemency a priority, the claim that no one is above the law will be a pathetic joke. Plus, there are at least allegations that Trump’s effort to dig up Ukrainian dirt stemmed from an effort to make pardoning Paul Manafort easier. And the Ukraine corruption involves someone — Rudy — who was intimately involving in bribing witnesses with pardons in the past.

More generally, any decision to narrowly craft impeachment would be catastrophically stupid, not least because other impeachable acts — such as Trump’s treatment of migrants — will be far more motivating to Democratic voters than Ukraine. But to leave off Trump’s abuse of the pardon power would be a historic failure.

The William Barr Case for Impeaching Donald Trump: From Whom Did Trump Suborn False Statements?

January 4, 2019/65 Comments/in 2016 Presidential Election, Mueller Probe /by emptywheel

Last month, I argued that a memo William Barr wrote that many say disqualifies him to be Attorney General in fact (or perhaps, “also”) should make him utterly toxic to Trump, because he (unknowingly) makes the case for impeaching Trump.

That’s because of the specific content of a William Barr memo sent to Rod Rosenstein, first reported by WSJ last night. While I’m certain Barr didn’t intend to do so, the memo makes a compelling case that Trump must be impeached.

The memo is long, lacks pagination, and presents an alarming view of unitary executive power. Barr also adopts the logically and ethically problematic stance of assuming, in a memo that states, “I realize I am in the dark about many facts” in the second sentence, that he knows what Mueller is up to, repeating over and over claims about what theory of obstruction he knows Mueller is pursuing.

Yet even before Barr finishes the first page, he states something that poses serious problems for the White House.

Obviously, the President and any other official can commit obstruction in this classic sense of sabotaging a proceeding’s truth-finding function. Thus, for example, if a President knowingly destroys or alters evidence, suborns perjury, or induces a witness to change testimony, or commits any act deliberately impairing the integrity or availability of evidence, then he, like anyone else, commits the crime of obstruction.

Probably by the time Mueller’s office captured Peter Strzok’s testimony on July 19, 2017 — and almost certainly by the time they obtained Transition emails on August 23, 2017 (perhaps not coincidentally the day after Strzok’s 302 was formalized) showing Trump’s orchestration of Mike Flynn’s calls with Sergei Kislyak — Mueller has almost certainly had evidence that Trump suborned false statements from Mike Flynn. So even before he finishes the first page, Trump’s hand-picked guy to be Attorney General has made the argument that Trump broke the law and Mueller’s obstruction investigation is appropriate.

Today, as part of a rebuttal to Daniel Hemel and Eric Posner’s comments about the memo, Jack Goldsmith reviews an OLC memo they rely on to back my argument.

Barr’s invocation and application of the presidential plain-statement rule, far from shocking, is quite ordinary. It is so ordinary, in fact, that I doubt Mueller is pursuing the theory that Barr worries about, even though press reports have sometimes suggested that he is. (For similar doubts, see the analyses of Mikhaila Fogel and Benjamin Wittes and of Marty Lederman.) Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein implied that Barr misunderstood Mueller’s theory when he stated that Barr did not have the “actual facts of the case.” One can read Rosenstein’s statement, as Marcy Wheeler does, to mean that Mueller possesses facts—including evidence that Trump suborned false statements from Flynn—to show that Trump has obstructed justice under Barr’s “evidence impairment” theory and that, under the Barr memorandum’s separate discussion of impeachment, Trump can be impeached.

If Wheeler is right, then the Barr memorandum is more likely to be cited in support of an article of impeachment of President Trump for obstruction of justice than it is to be cited, as Hemel and Posner suggest, to immunize Trump from obstruction. We will see if the Democrats presiding over Barr’s confirmation hearings are clever enough not to take Hemel and Posner’s suggestion that Barr’s memo is extreme, and instead use Barr’s memo, as Wheeler counsels, “to talk the incoming Attorney General into backing the logic of the Mueller probe and impeachment in a very public way.”

Given the stakes on all this, I wanted to focus on why I think the public record suggests strongly that Trump suborned perjury (actually, false statements), meaning that Barr has already made the case for impeachment.

Mike Flynn lied to hide consultations with the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago

First, let’s consider what Mike Flynn lied about, which I lay out in detail here. In addition to lies about being a foreign agent for Turkey and trying to undercut an Obama foreign policy decision pertaining to Israeli settlements, Flynn admitted to lying about whether he discussed sanctions during a series of conversations with Sergey Kislyak. The focus in reporting has always been on the conversations with Kislyak, but as the statement of the offense makes clear, Flynn’s conversations with other Transition Team members — most notably his Deputy, KT McFarland — got almost as much emphasis.

On or about January 24, 2017, FLYNN agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI (“January 24 voluntary interview”). During the interview, FLYNN falsely stated that he did not ask Russia’s Ambassador to the United States (“Russian Ambassador”) to refrain from escalating the situation in response to sanctions that the United States had imposed against Russia. FLYNN also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which the Russian Ambassador stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those sanctions as a result of FL YNN’s request. In truth and in fact, however, FLYNN then and there knew that the following had occurred:

a. On or about December 28, 2016, then-President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which was to take effect the following day. The executive order announced sanctions against Russia in response to that government’s actions intended to interfere with the 2016 presidential election (“U.S. Sanctions”).

b. On or about December 28, 2016, the Russian Ambassador contacted FLYNN.

c. On or about December 29, 2016, FLYNN called a senior official of the Presidential Transition Team (“PTT official”), who was with other senior ·members of the Presidential Transition Team at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida, to discuss what, if anything, to communicate to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S. Sanctions. On that call, FLYNN and the PTT official discussed the U.S. Sanctions, including the potential impact of those sanctions on the incoming administration’s foreign policy goals. The PIT official and FLYNN also discussed that the members of the Presidential Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation.

d. Immediately after his phone call with the PTT official, FLYNN called the Russian Ambassador and requested that Russia not escalate the situation and only respond to the U.S. Sanctions in a reciprocal manner.

e. Shortly after his phone call with the Russian Ambassador, FLYNN spoke with the PTT official to report on the substance of his call with the Russian Ambassador, including their discussion of the U.S. Sanctions.

f. On or about December 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin released a statement indicating that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the U.S. Sanctions at that time.

g. On or about December 31, 2016, the Russian Ambassador called FLYNN and informed him that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to FL YNN’s request.

h. After his phone call with the Russian Ambassador, FLYNN spoke with senior members of the Presidential Transition Team about FLYNN’s conversations with the Russian Ambassador regarding the U.S. Sanctions and Russia’s decision not to escalate the situation. [my emphasis]

And the 302 (302s are what the FBI calls interview reports) makes this even more clear: Flynn was not only lying about the content of his calls with Kislyak, he was lying about his consultations with McFarland, and through her, the rest of the Transition Team, almost certainly including Trump. Flynn was lying about using language, “tit-for-tat,” that came right out of those consultations.

He was lying to hide that his interactions with Kislyak reflect a deliberate Trump Transition policy choice, rather than his own choice to freelance foreign policy.

Flynn got other people to lie — to the public and to the FBI

But it’s not just Flynn’s lies. It’s also the lies others in the Administration told. According to the NYT story of the relevant emails, at a minimum both McFarland and Sean Spicer would have known that Flynn got instructions ahead of his call with Kislyak and reported positively afterwards.

Mr. Bossert forwarded Ms. McFarland’s Dec. 29 email exchange about the sanctions to six other Trump advisers, including Mr. Flynn; Reince Priebus, who had been named as chief of staff; Stephen K. Bannon, the senior strategist; and Sean Spicer, who would become the press secretary.

That’s important because both McFarland and Spicer lied to the press about the call in early 2017.

Early on the morning of Jan. 13, 2017, McFarland phoned one of the authors of this article to rebut a column in The Washington Post, which said Flynn and Kislyak had spoken “several times” on Dec. 29, the day the Obama administration announced it was expelling 35 Russian officials and taking other punitive measures.

The column, by David Ignatius, questioned why Flynn was engaging in sensitive foreign policy discussions with Russia when Trump had yet to take office.

McFarland insisted in an on-the-record conversation that Flynn and Kislyak had never discussed sanctions and that they had actually spoken before the administration’s announcement on Dec. 29.

[snip]

McFarland’s earlier account from the on-the-record conversation also matches public statements from Sean Spicer, the transition team’s spokesman and future White House press secretary.

Spicer said that Flynn and Kislyak spoke Dec. 28, before the sanctions were announced, and that “the call centered around the logistics of setting up a call with the president of Russia and the president-elect after he was sworn in.”

“That was it, plain and simple,” he said.

Most of the focus on public statements about the Kislyak calls has been on Mike Pence, but there’s no public record that he was in the loop on discussions about the Kislyak call (nor is there a record of him being interviewed by either the FBI or Mueller, which is one of the reasons I keep saying there’s no public record of him doing anything for which he could or should be indicted).

With McFarland and Spicer, however, we can be sure they both knowingly lied when they told the press that sanctions had not come up.

That’s why I keep pointing to two passages from the addendum to Flynn’s sentencing memo describing the significance of his cooperation. This passage makes it clear there’s some significance to the fact that Transition Team people repeated Flynn’s lies.

This passage makes it clear that, in the wake of Flynn’s cooperation, several other people decided to cooperate.

We know that McFarland is included among the people who decided to be forthcoming with Mueller; Sean Spicer probably is too and others (like Reince Priebus) may be as well. Importantly, we know they decided to be forthcoming after not having been at first. McFarland, at a minimum, lied not just to the press, but also in her first interview with the FBI, after which she made a concerted effort to unforget what really transpired.

Note, too, that that redaction is the last line of the Flynn addendum. While we don’t know what it says, it’s likely that the addendum as a whole reflects something that Mueller seems to be doing with his cooperating witnesses: either finding ways to rehabilitate liars (as he did with Michael Cohen) or using their testimony to pressure others to tell the truth, resulting in witnesses who will be more credible on the stand (which is what I suspect he has done with a number of witnesses with Flynn).

Trump has changed stories about what his Administration knew about Flynn’s lies at least twice

The public record doesn’t actually say how it happened that McFarland and Spice lied about something they should have known to be false. As I’ve laid out, it’s clear that Flynn was not free-lancing when he discussed sanctions with Kislyak, but the record is still unclear about whether he was freelancing when he ordered others to lie about it or not.

But two things strongly suggest he was not.

First, nothing yet has come close to explaining Trump’s actions with Jim Comey, first asking for his loyalty, then, after firing Flynn, asking him to let Flynn’s lies go. That’s all the more true if, as is likely but not publicly proven yet, Pence also knew he was lying when he claimed sanctions didn’t come up in the Flynn-Kislyak call, because lying to Pence is the only explanation Trump has offered for firing Flynn.

It is virtually certain Flynn was following orders — Trump’s orders — when he engaged in discussions about sanctions with Kisylak. And so it is virtually certain that Trump knew, from before he was inaugurated, that his top aides were lying to the press. Yet Trump didn’t find those lies to be a fireable offense until it became clear the lies would lead to a sustained FBI investigation into why Flynn had Kislyak hold off on responding to sanctions.

And over the course of the Mueller investigation, Trump has struggled to come up with a credible explanation for why Flynn’s lies became a fireable offense only after the FBI started looking more closely at his plans for sanctions relief.

Don McGahn wrote a report inventing one explanation for the firing just after it happened (akin to the way he later orchestrated a paper trail justifying Comey’s firing). But even when he wrote the report, it was inconsistent with what Sally Yates told McGahn.

Then, after Flynn flipped and it became clear Comey also documented his side of events (and shared those events contemporaneously with others in DOJ and FBI), Trump’s lawyers tried to massage the story one more time.

Mike Flynn, KT McFarland, Sean Spicer, Don McGahn, and John Dowd (at a minimum — possibly Reince Priebus and others, too) have all had to revise the stories they told the press and even, for some, FBI or Mueller after the fact to try to come up with a non-incriminating explanation for why everyone lied, first to the press, and then to the government.

There’s really only one thing that might explain why at least five top Donald Trump aides or lawyers had to revise stories to try to come up with innocent explanations for non-credible stories they were willing to tell the government from the start. And that’s if Trump were involved in all these lies.

It may well be that Trump didn’t formally suborn false statements before Mike Flynn interviewed with the FBI on January 24, 2017. Perhaps he just instructed Flynn to lie to the press and Flynn sustained the story he had been ordered to tell when the FBI came calling (Trump may well be more involved in the lies that Michael Cohen told to Congress).

But there is little else that can explain why so many people were willing to tell bullshit stories about Flynn (both his conversation with Kislyak and his firing) except that Trump was involved in orchestrating those stories.

Mueller’s obstruction investigation was likely always premised on a theory of obstruction that Trump’s presumed Attorney General nominee William Barr has argued does merit investigation and impeachment: that Trump ordered his subordinates to lie to obstruct an investigation.

As I disclosed last July, I provided information to the FBI on issues related to the Mueller investigation, so I’m going to include disclosure statements on Mueller investigation posts from here on out. I will include the disclosure whether or not the stuff I shared with the FBI pertains to the subject of the post.

How to Charge Americans in Conspiracies with Russian Spies?

July 17, 2018/104 Comments/in 2016 Presidential Election, Mueller Probe /by emptywheel

As I laid out a few weeks ago, I provided information to the FBI on issues related to the Mueller investigation, so I’m going to include disclosure statements on Mueller investigation posts from here on out. I will include the disclosure whether or not the stuff I shared with the FBI pertains to the subject of the post.

In general, Jack Goldsmith and I have long agreed about the problems with charging nation-state spies in the United States. So I read with great interest his post laying out “Uncomfortable Questions in the Wake of Russia Indictment 2.0 and Trump’s Press Conference With Putin.” Among other larger normative points, Goldsmith asks two questions. First, does indicting 12 GRU officers in the US expose our own nation-state hackers to be criminally prosecuted in other countries?

This is not a claim about the relative moral merits of the two countries’ cyber intrusions; it is simply a claim that each side unequivocally breaks the laws of the other in its cyber-espionage activities.

How will the United States respond when Russia and China and Iran start naming and indicting U.S. officials? Maybe the United States thinks its concealment techniques are so good that the type of detailed attribution it made against the Russians is infeasible. (The Shadow Brokers revealed the identities of specific NSA operators, so even if the National Security Agency is great at concealment as a matter of tradecraft that is no protection against an insider threat.) Maybe Russia and China and Iran won’t bother indicting U.S. officials unless and until the indictments actually materialize into a trial, which they likely never will. But what is the answer in principle? And what is the U.S. policy (if any) that is being communicated to military and civilian operators who face this threat? What is the U.S. government response to former NSA official Jake Williams, who worked in Tailored Access Operations and who presumably spoke for many others at NSA when he said that “charging military/gov hackers is dumb and WILL eventually hurt the US”?

And, how would any focus on WikiLeaks expose journalists in the United States to risks of prosecution themselves.

There is a lot of anger against WikiLeaks and a lot of support for indicting Julian Assange and others related to WikiLeaks for their part in publishing the information stolen by the Russians. If Mueller goes in this direction, he will need to be very careful not to indict Assange for something U.S. journalists do every day. U.S. newspapers publish information stolen via digital means all the time. They also openly solicit such information through SecureDrop portals. Some will say that Assange and others at WikiLeaks can be prosecuted without threatening “real journalists” by charging a conspiracy to steal and share stolen information. I am not at all sure such an indictment wouldn’t apply to many American journalists who actively aid leakers of classified information.

I hope to come back to the second point. As a journalist who had a working relationship with someone she came to believe had a role in the attack, I have thought about and discussed the topic with most, if not all, the lawyers I consulted on my way to sitting down with the FBI.

For the moment, though, I want to focus on Goldsmith’s first point, one I’ve made in the past repeatedly. If we start indicting uniformed military intelligence officers — or even contractors, like the trolls at Internet Research Agency might be deemed — do we put the freedom of movement of people like Jake Williams at risk? Normally, I’d absolutely agree with Goldsmith and Williams.

But as someone who has already written extensively about the ConFraudUs backbone that Robert Mueller has built into his cases, I want to argue this is an exception.

As I’ve noted previously, while Rod Rosenstein emphasized that the Internet Research Agency indictment included no allegations that Americans knowingly conspired with Russians, it nevertheless did describe three Americans whose activities in response to being contacted by Russian trolls remain inconclusive.

Rod Rosenstein was quite clear: “There is no allegation in the indictment that any American was a knowing participant in the alleged unlawful activity.” That said, there are three (presumed) Americans who, both the indictment and subsequent reporting make clear, are treated differently in the indictment than all the other Americans cited as innocent people duped by Russians: Campaign Official 1, Campaign Official 2, and Campaign Official 3. We know, from CNN’s coverage of Harry Miller’s role in building a cage to be used in a fake “jailed Hillary” stunt, that at least some other people described in the indictment were interviewed — in his case, for six hours! — by the FBI. But no one else is named using the convention to indicate those not indicted but perhaps more involved in the operation. Furthermore, the indictment doesn’t actually describe what action (if any) these three Trump campaign officials took after being contacted by trolls emailing under false names.

On approximately the same day, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the email address of a false U.S. persona, [email protected], to send an email to Campaign Official 1 at that donaldtrump.com email account, which read in part:

Hello [Campaign Official 1], [w]e are organizing a state-wide event in Florida on August, 20 to support Mr. Trump. Let us introduce ourselves first. “Being Patriotic” is a grassroots conservative online movement trying to unite people offline. . . . [W]e gained a huge lot of followers and decided to somehow help Mr. Trump get elected. You know, simple yelling on the Internet is not enough. There should be real action. We organized rallies in New York before. Now we’re focusing on purple states such as Florida.

The email also identified thirteen “confirmed locations” in Florida for the rallies and requested the campaign provide “assistance in each location.”

[snip]

Defendants and their co-conspirators used the false U.S. persona [email protected] account to send an email to Campaign Official 2 at that donaldtrump.com email account.

[snip]

On or about August 20, 2016, Defendants and their co-conspirators used the “Matt Skiber” Facebook account to contact Campaign Official 3.

Again, the DOJ convention of naming makes it clear these people have not been charged with anything. But we know from other Mueller indictments that those specifically named (which include the slew of Trump campaign officials named in the George Papadopoulos plea, KT McFarland and Jared Kushner in the Flynn plea, Kilimnik in the Van der Zwaan plea, and the various companies and foreign leaders that did Manafort’s bidding, including the Podesta Group and Mercury Public Affairs in his indictment) may be the next step in the investigation.

In the GRU indictment, non US person WikiLeaks is given the equivalent treatment.

On or about June 22, 2016, Organization I sent a private message to Guccifer 2.0 to “[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing.” On or about July 6, 2016, Organization 1 added, “if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic] days prefable [sic] because the DNC [DemocraticNationalConvention] is approaching and she Will solidify bernie supporters behind her after.” The Conspirators responded,“0k . . . i see.” Organization I explained,“we think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary . . . so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting.”

But the activities of other American citizens — most notably Roger Stone and Donald Trump — are discussed obliquely, even if they’re not referred to using the standard of someone still under investigation. Here’s the Roger Stone passage.

On or aboutAugust 15,2016, the Conspirators,posing as Guccifer 2.0,wrote to a person who was in regular contact with senior members of the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump, “thank u for writing back. . . do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?” On or about August 17, 2016, the Conspirators added, “please tell me if i can help u anyhow . . . it would be a great pleasureto me.” On or about September 9, 2016,the Conspirators, again posing as Guccifer 2.0, referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked the person, “what do u think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign.” The person responded,“[p]retty standard.”

The Trump one, of course, pertains to the response GRU hackers appear to have made when he asked for Russia to find Hillary’s emails on July 27.

For example, on or about July 27, 2016, the Conspirators attempted after hours to spearphish for the first time email accounts at a domain hosted by a third‑party provider and used by Clinton’s personal office. At or around the same time, they also targeted seventy‐six email addresses at the domain for the Clinton Campaign.

Finally, there is yesterday’s Mariia Butina complaint, which charges her as an unregistered Russian spy and describes Aleksandr Torshin as her boss, but which also describes the extensive and seemingly willful cooperation with Paul Erickson and another American, as well as with the RNC and NRA. Here’s one of the Americans, for example, telling Butina that her Russian bosses should take the advice he had given her about which Americans she needed to meet.

If you were to sit down with your special friends and make a list of ALL the most important contacts you could find in America for a time when the political situation between the U.S. and Russia will change, you could NOT do better than the list that I just emailed you. NO one — certainly not the “official” Russian Federation public relations representative in New York — could build a better list.

[snip]

All that you friends need to know is that meetings with the names on MY list would not be possible without the unknown names in your “business card” notebook. Keep them focused on who you are NOW able to meet, NOT the people you have ALREADY met.

Particularly as someone whose communications (including, but not limited to, that text) stand a decent chance of being quoted in an indictment in the foreseeable future, let me be very clear: none of these people have been accused of any wrong-doing.

But they do suggest a universe of people who have attracted investigative scrutiny, both by Mueller and by NSD, as willing co-conspirators with Russian spies.

Granted, there are three different kinds of Russian spies included in these three documents:

Uniformed military intelligence officers working from Moscow
Civilian employees who might be considered intelligence contractors working from St. Petersburg (though with three reconnaissance trips to the US included)
Butina and Torshin, both of whom probably committed visa fraud to engage as unregistered spies in the US

We have a specific crime for the latter (and, probably, the reconnaissance trips to the US by IRA employees), and if any of the US persons and entities in Butina’s indictment are deemed to have willingly joined her conspiracy, they might easily be charged as well. Eventually, I’m certain, Mueller will move to start naming Americans (besides Paul Manafort and Rick Gates) in conspiracy indictments, including ones involving Russian spies operating from Russia (like Konstantin Kilimnik). It seems necessary to include the Russians in some charging documents, because otherwise you’ll never be able to lay out the willful participation of everyone, Russian and American, in the charging documents naming the Americans.

So while I generally agree with Goldsmith and Williams, this case, where we’re clearly discussing a conspiracy between Russian spies — operating both from the US and from Russia (and other countries), wearing uniforms and civilian clothing –and Americans, it seems important to include them in charging documents somewhere.

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey Run Cover for Those Giving Jeff Sessions Unreviewable Authority to Criminalize Dissent

January 18, 2018/34 Comments/in FISA /by emptywheel

I’m used to Susan Hennessey partnering with Ben Wittes to write apologies for NSA and FBI that ignore known facts. I’m a bit surprised that Jack Goldsmith did so in this defense of Democrats — like Adam Schiff and Nancy Pelosi and nineteen Democratic Senators — who have voted to give Jeff Sessions unreviewable authority to criminalize dissent using certain privacy tools.

NSA did not fix “abouts” problems before the issues became public

There are numerous problems with this post. The one that irks me the most, however, is the claim that the “system itself” identified and addressed problems with “abouts” collection before they became public.

We acknowledge that the program has raised hard legal questions as well as difficult compliance issues, primarily involving “abouts” collection. But these problems were identified by the system itself, long before the issues became public, and the practices were fixed or terminated.

This claim, one I’ve corrected Hennessey for on numerous occasions on Twitter, is false, and should be retracted.

I say that with great confidence, because I wrote about the problems on August 11, 2016, well before NSA failed to disclose the full extent of the problems in an October 4, 2016 hearing, which led the worst FISC judge ever, Rosemary Collyer, to complain about NSA’s institutional “lack of candor.”

At the October 26, 2016 hearing, the Court ascribed the government’s failure to disclose those IG and OCO reviews at the October 4, 2016 hearing to an institutional “lack of candor” on NSA’s part and emphasized that “this is a very serious Fourth Amendment issue.”

As a reminder, the problem (the FISC has) with “abouts” collection is not so much that it collected entirely domestic communications — that’s the complaint of the rest of us. It’s that NSA never ever complied with John Bates’ 2011 requirement that NSA not conduct back door searches on upstream collection, because it might result in searches of those entirely domestic communications. In my August 2016 post, I noted that reviewers kept discovering that NSA continued to do back door searches on upstream data in violation of that prohibition, and kept refusing to implement technical fixes to avoid them.

I also raised concerns about the oversight of 704/705(b), which is how the NSA first realized how badly non-compliant their upstream searches were, on May 13, 2016, That’s about when NSA first reported to DOJ “in May and June 2016” that “approximately eighty-five percent of” queries using a tool the NSA employs with 704/705b queries “were not compliant with the applicable minimization procedures.”

I’ll grant that I’m remarkably attentive to documents that get declassified years after the fact. But I’m nevertheless “the public.” If I’m identifying these problems — and NSA’s refusal to make the technical fixes to avoid them — before they get fully briefed to DOJ or FISC, then it is absolutely false to claim that “the system” fixed or terminated the problem long before they became public.

Again, Lawfare should issue a retraction for that claim.

Update, January 19: On Twitter yesterday, Hennessey claimed I misread this quote, and that her proof that the system works was that the NSA had gotten away with ignoring Bates’ orders for five years, but finally shut it down before the public learned that NSA had been ignoring FISC’s orders.

This is still factually false — as I responded to her, the NSA was still identifying problems for eight months after I wrote about the problems, even assuming it had found all of them by April 2017, which was the last declassified reporting on it. But her explanation actually makes the comment downright damning for the NSA. It suggests a lawyer who was at NSA during the period it was not in compliance believes that getting away with violating the Fourth Amendment for five years, but fixing it before documents released on a three year delay (and only because of Snowden) is a sign of a law-abiding agency.

A portrait of a guy who doesn’t know key details as a rigorous overseer

The fact that I was harping on the “abouts” problems before any overseers of the program managed to fully investigate and fix them by itself disproves the claims that Hennessey and Goldsmith make in their hagiography of Adam Schiff.

He is the ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee and one of the most knowledgeable and informed members of Congress on intelligence matters. Schiff has not hesitated to be critical of intelligence community practices when he sees fit. He has watched the 702 program up close over many years in classified settings in his oversight role. He knows well its virtues and its warts. We suppose it is possible that Schiff would vote to give the president, whose integrity he so obviously worries about, vast powers to spy on Americans in an abusive way. Given everything Schiff has publicly said and done over the last year, however, a much more plausible inference is that he knows not only how valuable the 702 program is but also how law-constrained and carefully controlled and monitored it is.

Plus, I’m not sure why they think that Schiff’s attempt to fix the Section 215 phone dragnet only after Edward Snowden made it public proves that Schiff “never hesitated to be critical of intelligence community practices.” On the contrary, it proves that he did hesitate to do so before excessive programs became public.

The distinction is utterly critical given something I’ve pointed out about this bill. The bill itself is an admission that the intelligence community is out of control, and that congressional overseers can’t get information they need to adequately oversee the program without demanding it in legislation. That’s because it requires the IC to provide information on two practices that Congress cannot be deemed competent to legislate on without having answers about first.

For example, the bill requires an IG Report on how FBI queries raw data.

(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, an assessment of the following:

(1) The interpretations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, respectively, relating to the querying procedures adopted under subsection (f) of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)), as added by section 101.

[snip]

(6) The scope of access by the criminal division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to information obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), including with respect to information acquired under subsection (a) of such section 702 based on queries conducted by the criminal division.

(7) The frequency and nature of the reviews conducted by the National Security Division of the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence relating to the compliance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with such querying procedures.

I have explained (and I know Hennessey regards this as a problem too) that since 2012, FBI has devolved its access to raw 702 data to field offices. The FBI already conducted far, far less oversight of the back door searches it conducts than NSA does. But because the DOJ/DNI 702 review teams visit only a fraction of the FBI field offices with each review, and because FBI’s querying system doesn’t collect enough information to do oversight remotely, it is possible that the offices that are least familiar with 702 requirements are — for the smaller number of 702 queries they conduct — getting the least oversight.

You can’t pass a bill that effectively blesses FBI’s use of back door searches on Americans about whom it has no evidence of any wrongdoing, while admitting you don’t know how FBI conducts those back door searches, and make any claim to conduct adequate oversight. Rather, the bill permits FBI to continue practices it has stubbornly refused to brief Congress on, rather than demanding that FBI brief Congress first, so Congress can impose any restrictions that might be necessary to adequately protect Americans.

The bill also requires a briefing within six months to explain how DOJ complies with FISA’s legally mandated notice requirements (because notice under 702 is treated as notice under 106(c), this covers 702 surveillance as well).

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select 10 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a briefing with respect to how the Department of Justice interprets the requirements under sections 106(c), 305(d), and 405(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 14 U.S.C. 1806(c), 1825(d), and 1845(c)) to notify an aggrieved person under such sections of the use of information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, physical search, or the use of a pen register or trap and trace device. The briefing shall focus on how the Department interprets the phrase ‘‘obtained or derived from’’ in such sections.

The public treatment of DOJ’s serial, obvious failures to give notice to defendants is a nifty trick. When DOJ fails to give notice, it clearly violates the law, but notice is not included in minimization procedure review, so therefore is not reviewed by the FISC. When surveillance boosters like Hennessey and Goldsmith say there have never been any willful violations of the law, they manage to ignore the notice violations that have allowed some pretty problematic practices to avoid judicial oversight only because by breaking the law DOJ ensures no court will find them to be breaking the law.

Catch 22: Heads legal violations never get reviewed by a court, tails surveillance boosters can claim the surveillance has a clean bill of health.

Again, this is a known, egregious problem with the implementation of 702.

But rather than do the obvious thing as part of what this post dubs “robust democratic deliberation,” which is to demand answers about how notice is (not) given and require DOJ to fix it as part of the bill, the bill instead simply requires DOJ to provide the information that Congress needs to do basic oversight six months after reauthorization, which effectively punts fixing the problem six years down the road.

How many Chinese-American scientists will be improperly prosecuted because FBI is technically inane in those 6 years, because a bunch of California legislators like Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, and Dianne Feinstein chose to punt on basic oversight?

The most egregious example of this, however, involves the government’s obstinate refusal to explain how many US persons are affected by 702. This bill also did not incorporate an HJC proposal requiring a count of how many Americans got referred for criminal prosecution off of 702 collection.

Letting Jeff Sessions criminalize dissent

That refusal — the refusal to even legislatively require the government to report on the impact of 702 surveillance on Americans, via incidental collection and/or criminal referral — brings us to the problem with this bill that opponents are all raising, but about which Hennessey and Goldsmith are inexcusably silent: the codification of giving Jeff Sessions unreviewable authority to determine what counts as a “criminal proceeding [that] affects, involves, or is related to the national security of the United States.”

Here’s how Hennessey and Goldsmith describe the impact of this program on Americans.

As Lawfare readers know, Section 702 authorizes the intelligence community to target the communications of non-U.S. persons located outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. It does not permit the intelligence community to target a U.S. person anywhere in the world. But it does permit incidental collection on U.S. persons, subject to strict rules about minimization and use.

Their silence about how the bill doesn’t deal with back door searches is problematic enough.

But they predictably, but problematically, make no mention of the way the bill codifies the use of 702 in domestic law enforcement under the Tor/VPN exception.

As I have laid out, in 2014 FISC created an exception to the rule that NSA must detask from a facility as soon as they learn that Americans are also using that facility. That exception applies to Tor and (though I understand this part even less) VPN servers — basically the kinds of privacy tools that criminals, spies, journalists, and dissidents might use to hide their online activities. NSA has to sort through what they collect on the back end, but along the way, they get to decide to keep any entirely domestic traffic they find has significant foreign intelligence purpose or is evidence of a crime, among other reasons. The bill even codifies 8 enumerated crimes under which they can keep such data. Some of those crimes — child porn and murder — make sense, but others — like transnational crime (including local drug dealers selling imported drugs) and CFAA (with its well-known propensity for abuse) pose more potential for abuse.

But it’s the unreviewable authority for Jeff Sessions bit that is the real problem.

We know, for example, that painting Black Lives Matter as a national security threat is key to the Trump-Sessions effort to criminalize race. We also know that Trump has accused his opponents of treason, all for making critical comments about Trump.

This bill gives Sessions unreviewable authority to decide that a BLM protest organized using or whistleblowing relying on Tor, discovered by collection done in the name of hunting Russian spies, can be referred for prosecution. The fact that the underlying data predicating any prosecution was obtained without a warrant under 702 would — in part because this bill doesn’t add teeth to FISA notice — ensure that courts would never learn the genesis of the prosecution. Even if a court somehow managed to do so, however, it could never deem the domestic surveillance unlawful because the bill gives Jeff Sessions the unreviewable authority to treat dissent as a national security threat.

This is such an obviously bad idea, and it is being supported by people who talk incessantly about the threat that Trump and Sessions present. Yet, rather than addressing the issue head on (which I doubt Hennessey could legally do in any case), they simply remain silent about what is the biggest complaint from privacy activists, that this gives a racist, vindictive Attorney General far more authority than he should have, and does so without fixing the inadequate protections for criminal defendants along the way.

I mean, I get that surveillance boosters who recognize the threat Trump and Sessions pose want to absolve themselves for giving Trump tools that can so obviously be abused.

But this attempt does so precisely by dodging the most obvious reasons for which boosters should be held to account.

Update: Changed post to note that just Trump has accused FBI Agents of treason, not Sessions, and not (yet) journalists.

Update: Here’s the roll call of the 65-34 vote passage of the bill. Democrats who voted in favor are:

Carper
Casey
Cortez Masto
Donnelly
Duckworth
Feinstein
Hassan
Heitkamp
Jones
Klobuchar
Manchin
McCaskill
Nelson
Peters
Reed
Schumer
Shaheen
Stabenow
Warner
Whitehouse

A Dragnet of emptywheel’s Most Important Posts on Surveillance, 2007 to 2017

December 5, 2017/in Cybersecurity, emptywheel, EO 12333, FISA /by emptywheel

Happy Birthday to me! To us! To the emptywheel community!

On December 3, 2007, emptywheel first posted as a distinct website. That makes us, me, we, ten this week.

To celebrate, the emptywheel team has been sharing some of our favorite work from the last decade. This is my massive dragnet of surveillance posts.

For years, we’ve done this content ad free, relying on donations and me doing freelance work for others to fund the stuff you read here. I would make far more if I worked for some free-standing outlet, but I wouldn’t be able to do the weedy, iterative work that I do here, which would amount to not being able to do my best work.

If you’ve found this work valuable — if you’d like to ensure it remains available for the next ten years — please consider supporting the site.

2007

Whitehouse Reveals Smoking Gun of White House Claiming Not to Be Bound by Any Law

Just days after opening the new digs, I noticed Sheldon Whitehouse entering important details into the Senate record — notably, that John Yoo had pixie dusted EO 12333 to permit George Bush to authorize the Stellar Wind dragnet. In the ten years since, both parties worked to gradually expand spying on Americans under EO 12333, only to have Obama permit the sharing of raw EO 12333 data in its last days in office, completing the years long project of restoring Stellar Wind’s functionalities. This post, from 2016, analyzes a version of the underlying memo permitting the President to change EO 12333 without providing public notice he had done so.

2008

McConnell and Mukasey Tell Half Truths

In the wake of the Protect America Act, I started to track surveillance legislation as it was written, rather than figure out after the fact how the intelligence community snookered us. In this post, I examined the veto threats Mike McConnell and Michael Mukasey issued in response to some Russ Feingold amendments to the FISA Amendments Act and showed that the government intended to use that authority to access Americans’ communication via both what we now call back door searches and reverse targeting. “That is, one of the main purposes is to collect communications in the United States.”

9 years later, we’re still litigating this (though, since then FISC has permitted the NSA to collect entirely domestic communications under the 2014 exception).

2009

FISA + EO 12333 + [redacted] procedures = No Fourth Amendment

The Government Sez: We Don’t Have a Database of All Your Communication

After the FISCR opinion on what we now know to be the Yahoo challenge to Protect American Act first got declassified, I identified several issues that we now have much more visibility on. First, PAA permitted spying on Americans overseas under EO 12333. And it didn’t achieve particularity through the PAA, but instead through what we know to be targeting procedures, including contact chaining. Since then we’ve learned the role of SPCMA in this.

In addition, to avoid problems with back door searches, the government claimed it didn’t have a database of all our communication — a claim that, narrowly parsed might be true, but as to the intent of the question was deeply misleading. That claim is one of the reasons we’ve never had a real legal review of back door searches.

Bush’s Illegal Domestic Surveillance Program and Section 215

On PATRIOTs and JUSTICE: Feingold Aims for Justice

During the 2009 PATRIOT Act reauthorization, I continued to track what the government hated most as a way of understanding what Congress was really authorizing. I understood that Stellar Wind got replaced not just by PAA and FAA, but also by the PATRIOT authorities.

All of which is a very vague way to say we probably ought to be thinking of four programs–Bush’s illegal domestic surveillance program and the PAA/FAA program that replaced it, NSLs, Section 215 orders, and trap and trace devices–as one whole. As the authorities of one program got shut down by exposure or court rulings or internal dissent, it would migrate to another program. That might explain, for example, why Senators who opposed fishing expeditions in 2005 would come to embrace broadened use of Section 215 orders in 2009.

I guessed, for example, that the government was bulk collecting data and mining it to identify targets for surveillance.

We probably know what this is: the bulk collection and data mining of information to select targets under FISA. Feingold introduced a bajillion amendments that would have made data mining impossible, and each time Mike McConnell and Michael Mukasey would invent reasons why Feingold’s amendments would have dire consequences if they passed. And the legal information Feingold refers to is probably the way in which the Administration used EO 12333 and redacted procedures to authorize the use of data mining to select FISA targets.

Sadly, I allowed myself to get distracted by my parallel attempts to understand how the government used Section 215 to obtain TATP precursors. As more and more people confirmed that, I stopped pursuing the PATRIOT Act ties to 702 as aggressively.

2010

Throwing our PATRIOT at Assange

This may be controversial, given everything that has transpired since, but it is often forgotten what measures the US used against Wikileaks in 2010. The funding boycott is one thing (which is what led Wikileaks to embrace Bitcoin, which means it is now in great financial shape). But there’s a lot of reason to believe that the government used PATRIOT authorities to target not just Wikileaks, but its supporters and readers; this was one hint of that in real time.

2011

The March–and April or May–2004 Changes to the Illegal Wiretap Program

When the first iteration of the May 2004 Jack Goldsmith OLC memo first got released, I identified that there were multiple changes made and unpacked what some of them were. The observation that Goldsmith newly limited Stellar Wind to terrorist conversations is one another reporter would claim credit for “scooping” years later (and get the change wrong in the process). We’re now seeing the scope of targeting morph again, to include a range of domestic crimes.

Using Domestic Surveillance to Get Rapists to Spy for America

Something that is still not widely known about 702 and our other dragnets is how they are used to identify potential informants. This post, in which I note Ted Olson’s 2002 defense of using (traditional) FISA to find rapists whom FBI can then coerce to cooperate in investigations was the beginning of my focus on the topic.

2012

FISA Amendments Act: “Targeting” and “Querying” and “Searching” Are Different Things

During the 2012 702 reauthorization fight, Ron Wyden and Mark Udall tried to stop back door searches. They didn’t succeed, but their efforts to do so revealed that the government was doing so. Even back in 2012, Dianne Feinstein was using the same strategy the NSA currently uses — repeating the word “target” over and over — to deny the impact on Americans.

Sheldon Whitehouse Confirms FISA Amendments Act Permits Unwarranted Access to US Person Content

As part of the 2012 702 reauthorization, Sheldon Whitehouse said that requiring warrants to access the US person content collected incidentally would “kill the program.” I took that as confirmation of what Wyden was saying: the government was doing what we now call back door searches.

2013

20 Questions: Mike Rogers’ Vaunted Section 215 Briefings

After the Snowden leaks started, I spent a lot of time tracking bogus claims about oversight. After having pointed out that, contrary to Administration claims, Congress did not have the opportunity to be briefed on the phone dragnet before reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act in 2011, I then noted that in one of the only briefings available to non-HPSCI House members, FBI had lied by saying there had been no abuses of 215.

John Bates’ TWO Wiretapping Warnings: Why the Government Took Its Internet Dragnet Collection Overseas

Among the many posts I wrote on released FISA orders, this is among the most important (and least widely understood). It was a first glimpse into what now clearly appears to be 7 years of FISA violation by the PRTT Internet dragnet. It explains why they government moved much of that dragnet to SPCMA collection. And it laid out how John Bates used FISA clause 1809(a)(2) to force the government to destroy improperly collected data.

Federated Queries and EO 12333 FISC Workaround

In neither NSA nor FBI do the authorities work in isolation. That means you can conduct a query on federated databases and obtain redundant results in which the same data point might be obtained via two different authorities. For example, a call between Michigan and Yemen might be collected via bulk collection off a switch in or near Yemen (or any of the switches between there and the US), as well as in upstream collection from a switch entering the US (and all that’s assuming the American is not targeted). The NSA uses such redundancy to apply the optimal authority to a data point. With metadata, for example, it trained analysts to use SPCMA rather than PATRIOT authorities because they could disseminate it more easily and for more purposes. With content, NSA appears to default to PRISM where available, probably to bury the far more creative collection under EO 12333 for the same data, and also because that data comes in structured form.

Also not widely understood: the NSA can query across metadata types, returning both Internet and phone connection in the same query (which is probably all the more important now given how mobile phones collapse the distinction between telephony and Internet).

This post described how this worked with the metadata dragnets.

The Purpose(s) of the Dragnet, Revisited

The government likes to pretend it uses its dragnet only to find terrorists. But it does far more, as this analysis of some court filings lays out.

2014

The Corporate Store: Where NSA Goes to Shop Your Content and Your Lifestyle

There’s something poorly understood about the metadata dragnets NSA conducts. The contact-chaining isn’t the point. Rather, the contact-chaining serves as a kind of nomination process that puts individuals’ selectors, indefinitely, into the “corporate store,” where your identity can start attracting other related datapoints like a magnet. The contact-chaining is just a way of identifying which people are sufficiently interesting to submit them to that constant, ongoing data collection.

SPCMA: The Other NSA Dragnet Sucking In Americans

I’ve done a lot of work on SPCMA — the authorization that, starting in 2008, permitted the NSA to contact chain on and through Americans with EO 12333 data, which was one key building block to restoring access to EO 12333 analysis on Americans that had been partly ended by the hospital confrontation, and which is where much of the metadata analysis affecting Americans has long happened. This was my first comprehensive post on it.

The August 20, 2008 Correlations Opinion

A big part of both FBI and NSA’s surveillance involves correlating identities — basically, tracking all the known identities a person uses on telephony and the Internet (and financially, though we see fewer details of that), so as to be able to pull up all activities in one profile (what Bill Binney once called “dossiers”). It turns out the FISC opinion authorizing such correlations is among the documents the government still refuses to release under FOIA. Even as I was writing the post Snowden was explaining how it works with XKeyscore.

A Yahoo! Lesson for USA Freedom Act: Mission Creep

This is another post I refer back to constantly. It shows that, between the time Yahoo first discussed the kinds of information they’d have to hand over under PRISM in August 2007 and the time they got directives during their challenge, the kinds of information they were asked for expanded into all four of its business areas. This is concrete proof that it’s not just emails that Yahoo and other PRISM providers turn over — it’s also things like searches, location data, stored documents, photos, and cookies.

FISCR Used an Outdated Version of EO 12333 to Rule Protect America Act Legal

Confession: I have an entire chapter of the start of a book on the Yahoo challenge to PRISM. That’s because so much about it embodied the kind of dodgy practices the government has, at the most important times, used with the FISA Court. In this post, I showed that the documents that the government provided the FISCR hid the fact that the then-current versions of the documents had recently been modified. Using the active documents would have shown that Yahoo’s key argument — that the government could change the rules protecting Americans anytime, in secret — was correct.

2015

Is CISA the Upstream Cyber Certificate NSA Wanted But Didn’t Really Get?

Among the posts I wrote on CISA, I noted that because the main upstream 702 providers have a lot of federal business, they’ll “voluntarily” scan on any known cybersecurity signatures as part of protecting the federal government. Effectively, it gives the government the certificate it wanted, but without any of the FISA oversight or sharing restrictions. The government has repeatedly moved collection to new authorities when FISC proved too watchful of its practices.

The FISA Court’s Uncelebrated Good Points

Many civil libertarians are very critical of the FISC. Not me. In this post I point out that it has policed minimization procedures, conducted real First Amendment reviews, taken notice of magistrate decisions and, in some cases, adopted the highest common denominator, and limited dissemination.

How the Government Uses Location Data from Mobile Apps

Following up on a Ron Wyden breadcrumb, I figured out that the government — under both FISA and criminal law — obtain location data from mobile apps. While the government still has to adhere to the collection standard in any given jurisdiction, obtaining the data gives the government enhanced location data tied to social media, which can implicate associates of targets as well as the target himself.

The NSA (Said It) Ate Its Illegal Domestic Content Homework before Having to Turn It in to John Bates

I’m close to being able to show that even after John Bates reauthorized the Internet metadata dragnet in 2010, it remained out of compliance (meaning NSA was always violating FISA in obtaining Internet metadata from 2002 to 2011, with a brief lapse). That case was significantly bolstered when it became clear NSA hastily replaced the Internet dragnet with obtaining metadata from upstream collection after the October 2011 upstream opinion. NSA hid the evidence of problems on intake from its IG.

FBI Asks for at Least Eight Correlations with a Single NSL

As part of my ongoing effort to catalog the collection and impact of correlations, I showed that the NSL Nick Merrill started fighting in 2004 asked for eight different kinds of correlations before even asking for location data. Ultimately, it’s these correlations as much as any specific call records that the government appears to be obtaining with NSLs.

2016

What We Know about the Section 215 Phone Dragnet and Location Data

During the lead-up to the USA Freedom Debate, the government leaked stories about receiving a fraction of US phone records, reportedly because of location concerns. The leaks were ridiculously misleading, in part because they ignored that the US got redundant collection of many of exactly the same calls they were looking for from EO 12333 collection. Yet in spite of these leaks, the few figured out that the need to be able to force Verizon and other cell carriers to strip location data was a far bigger reason to pass USAF than anything Snowden had done. This post laid out what was known about location data and the phone dragnet.

While It Is Reauthorizing FISA Amendments Act, Congress Should Reform Section 704

When Congress passed FISA Amendments Act, it made a show of providing protections to Americans overseas. One authority, Section 703, was for spying on people overseas with help of US providers, and another was for spying on Americans overseas without that help. By May 2016, I had spent some time laying out that only the second, which has less FISC oversight, was used. And I was seeing problems with its use in reporting. So I suggested maybe Congress should look into that?

It turns out that at precisely that moment, NSA was wildly scrambling to get a hold on its 704 collection, having had an IG report earlier in the year showing they couldn’t audit it, find it all, or keep it within legal boundaries. This would be the source of the delay in the 702 reauthorization in 2016, which led to the prohibition on about searches.

The Yahoo Scan: On Facilities and FISA

The discussion last year of a scan the government asked Yahoo to do of all of its users was muddled because so few people, even within the privacy community, understand how broadly the NSA has interpreted the term “selector” or “facility” that it can target for collection. The confusion remains to this day, as some in the privacy community claim HPSCI’s use of facility based language in its 702 reauthorization bill reflects new practice. This post attempts to explain what we knew about the terms in 2016 (though the various 702 reauthorization bills have offered some new clarity about the distinctions between the language the government uses).

2017

Ron Wyden’s History of Bogus Excuses for Not Counting 702 US Person Collection

Ron Wyden has been asking for a count of how many Americans get swept up under 702 for years. The IC has been inventing bogus explanations for why they can’t do that for years. This post chronicles that process and explains why the debate is so important.

The Kelihos Pen Register: Codifying an Expansive Definition of DRAS?

When DOJ used its new Rule 41 hacking warrant against the Kelihos botnet this year, most of the attention focused on that first-known usage. But I was at least as interested in the accompanying Pen Register order, which I believe may serve to codify an expansion of the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information the government can obtain with a PRTT. A similar codification of an expansion exists in the HJC and Lee-Leahy bills reauthorizing 702.

The Problems with Rosemary Collyer’s Shitty Upstream 702 Opinion

The title speaks for itself. I don’t even consider Rosemary Collyer’s 2017 approval of 702 certificates her worst FISA opinion ever. But it is part of the reason why I consider her the worst FISC judge.

It Is False that Downstream 702 Collection Consists Only of To and From Communications

I pointed out a number of things not raised in a panel on 702, not least that the authorization of EO 12333 sharing this year probably replaces some of the “about” collection function. Most of all, though, I reminded that in spite of what often gets claimed, PRISM is far more than just communications to and from a target.

UNITEDRAKE and Hacking under FISA Orders

A document leaked by Shadow Brokers reveals a bit about how NSA uses hacking on FISA targets. Perhaps most alarmingly, the same tools that conduct such hacks can be used to impersonate a user. While that might be very useful for collection purposes, it also invites very serious abuse that might create a really nasty poisonous tree.

A Better Example of Article III FISA Oversight: Reaz Qadir Khan

In response to Glenn Gerstell’s claims that Article III courts have exercised oversight by approving FISA practices (though the reality on back door searches is not so cut and dry), I point to the case of Reaz Qadir Khan where, as Michael Mosman (who happens to serve on FISC) moved towards providing a CIPA review for surveillance techniques, Khan got a plea deal.

The NSA’s 5-Page Entirely Redacted Definition of Metadata

In 2010, John Bates redefined metadata. That five page entirely redacted definition became codified in 2011. Yet even as Congress moves to reauthorize 702, we don’t know what’s included in that definition (note: location would be included).

FISA and the Space-Time Continuum

This post talks about how NSA uses its various authorities to get around geographical and time restrictions on its spying.

The Senate Intelligence Committee 702 Bill Is a Domestic Spying Bill

This is one of the most important posts on FISA I’ve ever written. It explains how in 2014, to close an intelligence gap, the NSA got an exception to the rule it has to detask from a facility as soon as it identifies Americans using the facility. The government uses it to collect on Tor and, probably VPN, data. Because the government can keep entirely domestic communications that the DIRNSA has deemed evidence of a crime, the exception means that 702 has become a domestic spying authority for use with a broad range of crimes, not to mention anything the Attorney General deems a threat to national security.

“Hype:” How FBI Decided Searching 702 Content Was the Least Intrusive Means

In a response to a rare good faith defense of FBI’s back door searches, I pointed out that the FBI is obliged to consider the least intrusive means of investigation. Yet, even while it admits that accessing content like that obtained via 702 is extremely intrusive, it nevertheless uses the technique routinely at the assessment level.

Tuesday: Tilted

July 26, 2016/14 Comments/in Culture, Cybersecurity /by Rayne

I miss prosthesis and mended souls
Trample over beauty while singing their thoughts
I match them with my euphoria
When they said “Je suis plus folle que toi”

— excerpt, Tilted by Christine And The Queens

We’ve spent (and will spend) a lot of time looking at Americans this month, given the two major parties’ political conventions back to back. Yeah, we’ll look at Russia with a gimlet eye directed by media. But we could use a look away.

The artist in this video is actually Héloïse Letissier; Christine and the Queens is the stage name she and a group of transgender supporting artists use, though many of her works are solo performances. Letissier’s work isn’t confined to music alone as she also works in graphic arts. Her work frequently combines French and English lyrics with strong synthpop beat, making for wide appeal outside of France. If you like Tilted, try the mournful but earworm-y Paradis Perdus and the more hip-hoppy No Harm Is Done.

Allons-y!

Eat more cyber

Hullabaloo about hacking of DNC continues, now with more Russian (The Daily Beast) — Another security firm, ThreatConnect, says it’s definitely the Russians. Okay. Right, then.
The question,”Is the DNC Hack an Act of War?” put to Jack Goldsmith (Slate) — Assuming it’s Russian in origin, Goldsmith said the hack is “not an act of war, at least not by traditional standards. It is closer to an intelligence operation with the twist of a damaging publication of the stolen information.” But Goldsmith didn’t think there was enough evidence to say for certain this was Russia’s work in this interview published last evening.
Goldsmith on U.S. involvement in cyberwarfare and hacking preparedness (Twitter) — He included a link to his related blogpost in his tweet-storm recap. In short, we’re in it up to our eyeballs, we shouldn’t be surprised at returned fire.
President Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive addressing U.S. Cyber Incident Coordination (WhiteHouse.gov) — Surely just a coincidence PPD-41 was issued today on the heels of alleged hacking by Russians. Note there’s an annex to this PPD with more details (which I did not see online), and sub-section V. A. “supersedes NSPD54/HSPD-23, paragraph 13, concerning the National Cyber Response Coordination Group.”

Motor mayhem

Tesla driver ‘speeding’ before Florida crash (Reuters) — IMO, the truck driver still bears some responsibility here, failed to yield to oncoming vehicle in spite of their speed. But I don’t have all the data, can’t be certain. One thing I can be more sure of: Tesla’s ‘driving-assist software’ should NOT be perceived as autopilot. If this was true autopilot, the software would have adjusted the vehicle’s speed to meet and not exceed the posted limit.
U.S. District court gives prelim approval to Volkswagen’s $15B settlement (LAT) — Settlement covers consumers’ and EPA’s suit on passenger diesels with emissions cheat devices. The deal offers car owners to choose a vehicle buy-back on 2.0L passenger diesel models. VW Group’s 3.0L models are not included in this preliminary offer.
Volkswagen owners in EU get an apology, not a check (Politico.EU) — They are NOT happy with the disparity between the $15B initial settlement offered to US passenger diesel owners and the lip service offered to EU vehicle owners.

“For the same car, in the U.S., you get a compensation, while in Europe you get an apology,” said Maroš Šefčovič, a Commission vice president overseeing energy and climate policy. “I don’t think it is fair.”

Yeah, it’s not fair, and VW’s head engineer Ulrich Eichhorn is wrong when he says EU customers aren’t damaged. Baloney–the entire EU is damaged by higher NOX and other pollutants generated by these fraudulent cars. People are sick and dying because EU’s biggest automaker is poisoning the air.

Science-y schtuff

WHO: Antibiotic resistance a bigger threat than cancer within ~30 years (Euronews) — The rise of superbugs and inadequate research is already costing tens of thousands lives each year and beaucoup money. It will only get worse if the use of antibiotics remains excessive and research doesn’t increase.
Plasma technology may extend storage life of fruits (ScienceDaily) — Plasma technology — using energy applied to a gas — can zap bacteria on surface of fruit to prevent deterioration the bacteria cause. Except it’s expensive compared to simply washing fruit with known natural antibacterial agents. Like vinegar and water. Plasma tech might be best used on soft fruits like berries which don’t handle washing very well. But still, more energy required, and any heat generated might cook the fruit. ~smh~
Better beer through yeast (Nature) — Soon-to-be-published paper will detail 150 yeast strains’ genomes in an effort to help beermakers find the perfect yeast. What happens when they find The One, though? Will we lose our excuse for sampling widely and deeply?

Longread for your next commute
Belt magazine offers a four-part series, Walking to Cleveland by Drew Philps. It’s a travelogue of sorts, documenting Philp’s journey on foot from Dearborn to Cleveland in time for the Republican National Convention. Visit the Midwest with read.

Catch you later!