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FSOC’s 15 Minutes to Save the World

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As I noted, the Financial Stability Oversight Council is meeting today. As announced, they discussed foreclosure fraud and securitization.

For less than 15 minutes.

And then they moved on, without once raising the issue of whether or not the banks’ exposure due to securitization problems posed a systemic risk to our financial system.

As the first order of business in the public session (the Council had an hour of private business before the public session), the departing Michael Barr reviewed what the “foreclosure working group” was doing about the problem. He noted that there seemed to be problems, but described that onsite examiners were collecting information and would not be done doing that until the end of the year; they’d issue a substantive report in January. He did, however, say that there had been significant putbacks and he expected them to continue.

And that was it. Timmeh Geithner asked if anyone had questions. And no one did. No one asked, “What do you expect will happen between now and January?” No one asked, “Do you think this is systemic?” No one asked, “What kind of exposure are we talking about here? Are the banks insolvent?”

No one even pointed out that existing home sales were sliding again, at least partly because the banksters couldn’t sell their foreclosures and partly because consumers weren’t stupid enough to buy them. So no one mentioned that waiting until January may not be so smart, as nothing is getting fixed in the meantime.

Now perhaps they did ask these questions during the hour of private business before the cameras started rolling. Perhaps they spent the hour before we got to watch screaming “hair’s on fire, hair’s on fire, hair’s on fire,” before taking a sip of tea, and then performing a complete lack of concern about this. Perhaps they talked about how serious this might be before we were allowed to watch, not wanting to concern the markets (which are busy freaking out, in any case, about a run on Europe’s banks).

But the optics of it–this apparent lack of concern about the way the banks will postpone admitting to their own insolvency by degrading the private property system in this country at the expense of real people–suck. They sure provide zero confidence that the FSOC intends to do its job to prevent this from becoming a systemic crisis.

Update: Felix Salmon has a good article describing where Michael Barr thinks this is all going.

Me? I’m w/Salmon. This isn’t going to fix things. Note, particularly, that Barr (who is probably one of the more aggressive folks at Treasury on this, at least for the next two weeks) is still just talking about fines, not prison.

TARP Oversight Panel: Securitization Mess May (Re)Crash the Economy

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The TARP Congressional Oversight Panel just released a report dedicated to the foreclosure fraud problem and the securitization mess underlying it. They conclude that the problems may represent a significant problem for the housing market and the financial system more generally.

Here’s a great summary of why:

If documentation problems prove to be pervasive and, more importantly, throw into doubt the ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also pooled mortgages, the consequences could be severe. Clear and uncontested property rights are the foundation of the housing market. If these rights fall into question, that foundation could collapse. Borrowers may be unable to determine whether they are sending their monthly payments to the right people. Judges may block any effort to foreclose, even in cases where borrowers have failed to make regular payments. Multiple banks may attempt to foreclose upon the same property. Borrowers who have already suffered foreclosure may seek to regain title to their homes and force any new owners to move out. Would-be buyers and sellers could find themselves in limbo, unable to know with any certainty whether they can safely buy or sell a home. If such problems were to arise on a large scale, the housing market could experience even greater disruptions than have already occurred, resulting in significant harm to major financial institutions. For example, if a Wall Street bank were to discover that, due to shoddily executed paperwork, it still owns millions of defaulted mortgages that it thought it sold off years ago, it could face billions of dollars in unexpected losses.

[snip]

In addition to documentation concerns, another problem has arisen with securitized mortgage loans that could also threaten financial stability. Investors in mortgage-backed securities typically demanded certain assurances about the quality of the loans they purchased: for instance, that the borrowers had certain minimum credit ratings and income, or that their homes had appraised for at least a minimum value. Allegations have surfaced that banks may have misrepresented the quality of many loans sold for securitization. Banks found to have provided misrepresentations could be required to repurchase any affected mortgages. Because millions of these mortgages are in default or foreclosure, the result could be extensive capital losses if such repurchase risk is not adequately reserved.

To put in perspective the potential problem, one investor action alone could seek to force Bank of America to repurchase and absorb partial losses on up to $47 billion in troubled loans due to alleged misrepresentations of loan quality. Bank of America currently has $230 billion in shareholders‟ equity, so if several similar-sized actions – whether motivated by concerns about underwriting or loan ownership – were to succeed, the company could suffer disabling damage to its regulatory capital. It is possible that widespread challenges along these lines could pose risks to the very financial stability that the Troubled Asset Relief Program was designed to protect. Treasury has claimed that based on evidence to date, mortgage-related problems currently pose no danger to the financial system, but in light of the extensive uncertainties in the market today, Treasury‟s assertions appear premature. Treasury should explain why it sees no danger. Bank regulators should also conduct new stress tests on Wall Street banks to measure their ability to deal with a potential crisis. [my emphasis]

There’s a lot of conditional language here, reflecting a general uncertainty about how deep the shitpile is this time around. But the demand that Treasury conduct another stress test of these obviously insolvent banks is a good start.

DOJ IG Doesn’t List Foreclosure Fraud among Significant Performance Challenges

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A month ago, the Financial Fraud Task Force first started to get around to investigating the systemic fraud in our foreclosure system.

Federal investigators are exploring whether banks and other financial firms broke U.S. law when using fraudulent court documents to foreclose on people’s homes, according to sources familiar with the effort.

The criminal investigation, still in its early days, is focused on whether companies misled federal housing agencies that now insure a large share of U.S. home loans, and whether the firms committed wire or mail fraud in filing false paperwork.

The announcement was tied to a Shaun Donovan announcement that a HUD investigation started in May had identified problems from some mortgage servicers; HUD is a member of the Financial Fraud Task Force.

Donovan said the administration had yet to complete its review, which began in May. Thus far, though, it had found “significant difference in the performance of servicers, and in particular, information that shows us there is not compliance with FHA rules and regulations around loss mitigation.” Donovan said the findings were limited to firms that deal with FHA loans. He declined to single out servicers.

All of which would seem to suggest that HUD–and therefore the Financial Fraud Task Force–knows there’s some there there (though they deny it is systemic).

Which is why I find it rather troubling that, two months after it became clear foreclosure mills and servicers are engaging in rampant fraud, DOJ’s Inspector General Glenn Fine does not specify it among the significant performance challenges for the year (Financial Crimes generally places seventh on his list of issues, after IT planning and violent crime, the latter of which is falling).

7 Financial Crimes and Cyber Crimes: The need to aggressively combat financial crimes and cyber crimes is an increasing challenge for the Department. Financial fraud continues to affect the economy, and the increased use of computers and the Internet in furtherance of financial crimes, as well as the international scope of these criminal activities, has exacerbated the challenge of cyber crime.

In November 2009, a presidential Executive Order created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Task Force). The Department described the Task Force as the “cornerstone” of its work in the financial fraud area. Led by the Department, the Task Force combines the work of several agencies to focus on mortgage crime, securities fraud, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) and rescue fraud, and financial discrimination.

In connection with the Task Force the Department launched Operation Stolen Dreams, a multi-agency initiative designed to combat mortgage fraud. In June 2010 the Department reported that this operation involved the prosecution of 1,215 criminal defendants nationwide who allegedly were responsible for more than $2.3 billion in losses. The Department also reported that the operation recovered more than $147 million through 191 civil enforcement actions.

The Department and the Task Force are also focusing investigative resources on securities fraud as well as on Recovery Act fraud and fraud in other rescue funds. Among other things, the Department is providing training to federal grantees and contractors on ways to prevent and detect such fraud.

Note that Operation Stolen Dreams is focused on the small-scale thugs that pumped up housing prices. That’s apparently a priority. But Fine, at least, seems to think an investigation into the GMACs and BoAs, the David Sterns and Lender Processing Services, is not a priority.

He may well be right in that DOJ doesn’t consider this a top challenge. So while counterterrorism is number one–based partly on two unsuccessful attacks launched by losers in the last year–the wholescale assault on our economy is apparently not even part of number seven.

Sheriff Dart: 5% of Chicago’s Foreclosures DON’T Have Problems

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The WaPo has a story on the growing realization that the banksters have been engaging in massive fraud to keep churning out foreclosures. It includes a detail about Chicago Sheriff Thomas Dart’s refusal to enforce foreclosures I did not know: that when he had a sample of foreclosures reviewed, he found that only 5% of them had all their paperwork in order.

After reading about problems such as banks “robo-signing” foreclosure documents without verifying their accuracy, Dart asked that attorneys for mortgage companies sign something personally confirming that evictions are justified. None did. So Dart has refused to honor their requests.

[snip]

In Illinois, Dart said in an interview that, after hearing about improperly prepared paperwork at major lenders, he and his deputies pulled an admittedly unscientific sample of 400 foreclosure cases processed by the courts. He said they found that only 20 of them had the proper paperwork and that the others were missing “very significant” documents.

While not carrying out evictions could land Dart in trouble if a judge decides to bring contempt-of-court charges, he said he thinks his actions have been “just and legal.”

“When I have the lending institutions themselves admitting to problems, what are we supposed to do?” Dart said. “All I’m asking them to do is certify that what they are doing is legal. The fact that they are not racing to do this makes the case for us.”

One of the biggest problems communicating the problems the deadbeat banksters have introduced through their own shoddy or fraudulent work lies in explaining the scope of the problem. And while the numbers Chicago found may be worse than other places–with a very high population of people of color, after all, it would have been a target for predatory lending–I’m happy using the 5% number a law enforcement officer has provided in the interim.

Torture? Check. Covering Up Torture? Check. Rule of Law? Nope.

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I think it was the timing of the end of the torture investigation that hurts most of all. Just days ago, Harold Koh was boasting of the Durham investigation to the UN. Then Bush started his dog and pony show, including his proud admission to have ordered up torture. All of which made today’s announcement, that no one will be charged for covering up evidence of torture, almost anti-climactic.

Of course no one will be charged for destroying the evidence of torture! Our country has spun so far beyond holding the criminals who run our country accountable that even the notion of accountability for torture was becoming quaint and musty while we waited and screamed for some kind of acknowledgment that Durham had let the statute of limitations on the torture tape destruction expire. I doubt they would have even marked the moment–yet another criminal investigation of the Bush Administration ending in nothing–it if weren’t for the big stink bmaz has been making. Well, maybe that’s not right–after all, Bob Bennett was bound to do a very public victory lap, because that’s what he’s paid for.

The investigation continues, DOJ tells us, into obstruction of the Durham investigation itself. Maybe they think they’ve caught someone like Porter Goss in a lie. But at this point, that almost seems like a nice story the prosecutors are telling themselves so they can believe they’re still prosecutors, so they can believe we still have rule of law in this country.

This inquiry started long before Obama started looking forward, not backward. It started before the White House allowed the Chief of Staff to override the Attorney General on Gitmo and torture. It started before we found out that someone had destroyed many of the torture documents at DOJ–only to find no one at DOJ cared. It started before the Obama DOJ made up silly reasons why Americans couldn’t see what the Vice President had to say about ordering the leak of a CIA officer’s identity. It started before the Obama White House kept invoking State Secrets to cover up Bush’s crimes, from illegal wiretapping, to kidnapping, to torture. It started at a time when we naively believed that Change might include putting the legal abuses of the past behind us.

This inquiry started before the Obama Administration assumed the right to kill American citizens with no due process–all the while invoking State Secrets to hide that, too.

This inquiry started before Bush and then Obama let BP get away with serial violations of the laws that protect our workers and environment, and then acted surprised when BP ruined our Gulf.

This inquiry started before Obama helped to cover up the massive fraud committed by our banks, even while it continued to find ways to print money for those same banks. It started, too, before the Obama Administration ignored mounting evidence that banks–the banks employed by taxpayer owned Fannie and Freddie–were foreclosing on homes they didn’t have the legal right to foreclose on, going so far as to counterfeit documents to justify it. This inquiry started when we still believed in the old-fashioned principle of property rights.

This inquiry started before banksters got excused when they mowed down cyclists and left the scene of the crime, because a felony would mean the bankster would lose his job.

The ACLU’s Anthony Romero reacted to this news saying, in part, “We cannot say that we live under the rule of law unless we are clear that no one is above the law.”

I think it’s clear. We cannot say we live under the rule of law.

Tax the Deadbeats, Tax the Banksters

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The narrative the banksters and their enablers have used to fight a foreclosure moratorium focuses on property values. If we put off foreclosures, they argue, it’ll have detrimental effects on the local community, not least by (continuing to) drive down local property values.

Now, the entire premise ignores the fact that the banksters have been sitting on a bunch of shadow inventory for years; the banks have been in no rush to foreclose on these properties and write down the losses, and Treasury has been happy to string out foreclosures to avoid a hit on the housing market.

But there’s another problem with that narrative.

If property values are falling because the properties are falling into disrepair, that’s partly the fault of the banks.

If property values are going down because no one is mowing lawns and preventing squatters, then that’s partly because banks are deadbeat neighbors who are not paying for the upkeep on the houses they own.

And, as this post from Mike Konczal (subbing for Ezra) notes, those deadbeat banks are costing local communities a fortune.

At $20,000 a pop, three vacant, unsecured and abandoned properties is the same as a teacher’s salary.

As Konczal explains, LA recently figured out a way to do something about the deadbeat banksters ruining our communities:

Given the high economic and social costs, the Los Angeles City Council, led by community activists including Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment and others, as well as city workers who are members of SEIU Local 721 and L.A. Council member Richard Alarcon, did the sensible economic thing: They proposed a tax on abandoned and unkempt properties.

The details: “L.A.’s City Council recently passed a ‘foreclosure registry’ ordinance, requiring lenders to maintain foreclosed properties or be fined $1,000 per day, up to $100,000 a year. Lenders will have 30 days to fix problems before fines set in.”

What a sensible and elegant policy solution. This encourages banks to find suitable negotiations with homeowners to keep people in their homes. It has a serious stick to require banks to actually obey the law when it comes to the destruction of blight in neighborhood.

It works because everyone is well-incentivized to do their jobs; the city will collect money, which it loves to do, if the banks don’t comply. Citizens have a means to report blight, which they want to do to keep their neighborhoods well functioning and safe. In fact, cool online innovations like SEIU’s “Hoodwinked LA” Web page, which allows citizens to track foreclosed properties to report to city officials, have been created to empower people. And banks will avoid destroying neighborhoods out of neglect lest they pay a tax, which they had no incentive to do previously. The thing practically runs itself.

Not only does this policy have important benefits for local communities, not only does it incent everyone to modify loans and prevent foreclosures.

But it highlights the fact that banks are the deadbeats destroying your local community, not individual homeowners.

I hope as other communities follow LA’s example, they call this the “Deadbeat Bank Tax.”

Update: Via Atrios, here’s a heart-breaking story of a young boy who died in a foreclosed home’s pool. When his parents tried to sue for wrongful death, they couldn’t sort out who actually owned the house.

It took months for the family’s attorney, Janet Spence of Pembroke Pines, to sort through the property’s muddied chain of title possessions and transfers. At one point, Spence said, the home had two separate foreclosure actions pending simultaneously.

Spence also has faced some of the same paperwork irregularities that have put the nation’s foreclosure cases on indeterminate hold.

Several documents transferring the mortgage appear to be flawed or possibly fraudulent, with conflicting dates. Two documents show that the mortgage was transferred from one mortgage company to an affiliated company in November 2007 and again in February 2008.

One of the questionable documents was generated by the Florida Default Law Group in Tampa, one of four law firms that are under state investigation for allegedly “fabricating and/or presenting false and misleading documents in foreclosure cases,” according to the Florida Attorney General’s Office.

COMPLEX TRAIL

Because of the confusing paper trail, Spence has named 20 defendants in the case. They include banks that once owned the mortgage, companies that serviced the loan, property maintenance companies and even a company that was holding the mortgage for the banks.

Fidelity National’s Role in the Cover-Up

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I’ve got a slightly different take than DDay on the news that Fidelity just established a policy requiring lenders to warrant all foreclosure sales going forward.

Fidelity National Financial Inc., the largest U.S. title insurer by market share, will require lenders to sign a warranty assuring their paperwork is sound before backing sales of foreclosed homes.

An indemnity covering “incompetent or erroneous affidavit testimony or documentation” must be signed for all foreclosure sales closing on or after Nov. 1, the Jacksonville, Florida- based company said in a memorandum to employees today. The agreement was prepared in consultation with the American Land Title Association and mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Fidelity National said.

DDay argues that Fidelity National is basically asking for a guarantee that it won’t have to pay off any claims on title problems.

I’m sure the health insurance market would love a clause that forced the maternity ward to sign a warranty that the baby they birthed into the world will be healthy their entire life, or else they pay up. I do understand the title insurers’ complaint, and I’m glad they’re forcing the issue with the lenders, but I can’t help but find it a little weird. If the banks are paying on the insurance, I’m not sure we need a title insurance industry.

Now, I’m not an expert. I’m just someone who has been considering whether she should still be looking to buy a house in this market. But as I understand title insurance the biggest part of the service they offer–what you’re paying them for–is not risk going forward, but rather a competent and thorough search for any outstanding title problems. Here’s one explanation:

Because title insurance protects against what may have happened in the past, most of the expense incurred by title companies or their agents is in loss reduction. They look to reduce losses by finding and fixing defects before the policy is issued, in much the same way as firms providing elevator or boiler insurance. These types of insurance are very different from life, property or mortgage insurance, which protect against losses from future events over which the insurers have no control.

So I take this move not as an effort to avoid paying any claims. I take it as an admission from Fidelity National that it cannot or will not adequately do that main part of its job: review the documents on a house and make sure the documents say what they appear to say. Instead of doing the forensics required to check that documentation (lawyers challenging foreclosures have proven fraud by showing notary stamps post-date the purported signing of the notarized document, comparing signatures to prove some are forgeries, and pointing to allonges not attached to the actual note, among other things) on every sale, they’re simply demanding that banks claim they don’t need to do that work.

Note, too, that Fidelity National instituted this policy (as distinct from the agreement it signed with Bank of America on the day BoA halted foreclosures) in consultation with Fannie and Freddie. That is, in consultation with government owned entities holding a majority of the mortgages out there.

So the government and Fidelity National have gotten together and said, “rather than actually check for fraud we’ve got abundant evidence exists not just in foreclosures being processed now, but in foreclosures already sold and–significantly–in performing loans that were securitized at the height of the boom, let’s just have the banks sign off on any foreclosures going forward.” As a particularly nice touch, they’re describing this fraud not as fraud, but “incompetent or erroneous affidavit testimony or documentation.”

From the standpoint of an industry and a government hoping to prevent people from learning about the extent to which our property system has been tainted by the banksters, that might be shrewd. After all, the most common time for real people to challenge bank conduct here is when they are foreclosed on or when they buy a house–when they are involved in a legal transaction. We only came to understand the true extent of foreclosure fraud after foreclosure and bankruptcy lawyers had dealt with such volume of cases that they came to learn the tricks of the servicers and even reviewed enough documents to have solid evidence of notary and robosigner fraud. By getting indemnity from the banks, Fidelity National (and our government acting through Fannie and Freddie) will ensure that one entity at least will continue to offer lenders title insurance, helping them unload those properties that may or may not have fraudulent title, but will never look closely at the documentation to see if there has been fraud. Fannie and Freddie just worked with Fidelity National to ensure that 38% (Fidelity National’s market share) of the 25% of all homes that are sold that are foreclosures will never have their title examined closely. 9.5% of homes will be sold without the thorough paperwork review that everyone knows should be done at this point, thereby ensuring not only that the market will continue to move, but also that banks always have a way to sell a house without the title insurer doing its job, but instead relying only on the bank’s say-so for the most likely title problem.

But the thing is, they may well get away with it (or, at the very least, minimize bank losses). Read more →

Obama Admin: Look Forward! Even in the Face of Obvious Corporate Fraud!

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I’m not surprised by this–but I simply don’t understand how the Obama Administration can claim they haven’t found anything fundamentally flawed (though that could be HuffPo’s formulation) when thousands of people have been thrown out of their homes based on documents whose signers falsely attested to those documents.

U.S. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan said Wednesday that the Obama administration will attempt to protect homeowners and police the kind of paperwork fraud that led the nation’s largest banks to temporarily halt foreclosures this month, but added that the administration had yet to find anything fundamentally flawed in how large banks securitized home loans or how they foreclosed on them.

“Where any homeowner has been defrauded or denied the basic protections or rights they have under law, we will take actions to make sure the banks make them whole, and their rights will be protected and defended,” Donovan said at a Washington press briefing. “First and foremost, we are committed to accountability, so that everyone in the mortgage process — banks, mortgage servicers and other institutions — is following the law. If they have not followed the law, it’s our responsibility to make sure they’re held accountable.”

He added, however, that the administration is focused on ensuring future compliance, rather than on looking back to make sure homeowners and investors weren’t harmed during the reckless boom years. The administration is “committed to forcing institutions to change the way that they conduct business,” Obama’s top housing official said, “to make sure these problems don’t happen again.”

When people were suckered into inflated mortgages, it wasn’t good enough for them to “make sure [those] problems don’t happen again.” They lost their homes, their credit ratings, and their savings.

But I guess that’s their own fault for being a mere human rather than a corporate person.

Administration Inches Closer to Rule of Law on Foreclosure Crisis

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…with this statement from Robert Gibbs:

As institutions are determining their next steps in addressing these issues, we remain committed to holding accountable any bank that has violated the law. In addition to strongly supporting the investigation by the state attorneys general, the administration’s Federal Housing Administration and Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force have [sic] undertaken their own regulatory and enforcement investigation into the foreclosure process.

This is stronger than the repeated statements from HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan.

Let’s hope the Administration includes individual banksters in that statement.

HUD Secretary Donovan: Banks Should Fix Problems Caused by their Law Breaking

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Check out the following passage in HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan’s statement opposing a moratorium on foreclosures:

No one should lose their home as a result of a bank mistake. No one. That is why the Obama Administration has a comprehensive review of the situation underway and will respond with the full force of the law where problems are found. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force that President Obama established last November has made this issue priority number one. Bringing together more than 20 federal agencies, 94 US Attorney’s Offices and dozens of state and local partners to form the broadest coalition of law enforcement, investigatory and regulatory agencies ever assembled to combat fraud, the Task Force is examining this issue and the Attorney General has said publicly that if it finds any wrongdoing the members of the task force will take the appropriate action. The Federal Housing Administration and Federal Housing Finance Agency have launched reviews to make sure servicers are in full compliance with the law. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has directed seven of the nation’s largest servicers to review their foreclosure processes, fix the processing problems and determine whether there is specific harm that has been caused in individual cases.

The message all these institutions are sending is the same: banks must follow the law — and those that haven’t should immediately fix what is wrong. [my emphasis]

Donovan offers a list of government agencies which have regulatory and legal authority to penalize the banks, but ultimately says that the banks themselves will be directed to police themselves.

The message these regulatory and law enforcement agencies are sending, Donovan says, is that the banks that haven’t followed the law should immediately fix what is wrong. Not, “the banks that haven’t followed the law should be prosecuted.” But “the banks that haven’t followed the law should make it right on their own.”

And while Donovan brags that the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force has been on the job for almost a year, it has done nothing about the multiple bank employees who have given sworn dispositions admitting to committing fraud on courts.

But that’s not all that surprising. After all, Donovan is also propagating the myth that this systemic fraud is just bank “mistakes.”

The rest of Donovan’s statement is no better. It tries to personalize the harm that hypothetically would result from a moratorium. But the examples make no sense and all basically assume that banks owning properties lead to declining property values; if that’s the case, then let’s crack down on deadbeat bank landlords. And it certainly misunderstands how a generalized problem with titles–the Administration’s refusal to address the underlying problem–will affect the housing market a lot more than a delay to address to address that underlying problem.

It all appears to be further indication that the Administration hopes that by letting the banks fix this themselves, the problems caused and covered up by the banks’ crimes will just go away.