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“At the Highest Levels of the U.S. Government” … Like the President?

Update: Obama did, in fact, take responsibility for ordering the killing.

And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took out Awlaki.

There’s something missing from Eric Holder’s 8 paragraphs justifying the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki.

In spite of the many sanctioned leaks asserting that President Obama “insist[s] on approving every new name on an expanding ‘kill list,'” Holder never explicitly says Obama did so with Awlaki. The Attorney General attributes the decision itself to “high-level U.S. government officials,” “senior officials,” and “senior officials” again.

Here’s how he describes the review process:

The decision to use lethal force is one of the gravest that our government, at every level, can face. The operation to target Anwar al-Aulaqi was thus subjected to an exceptionally rigorous interagency legal review: not only did I and other Department of Justice lawyers conclude after a thorough and searching review that the operation was lawful, but so too did other departments and agencies within the U.S. government.

The decision to target Anwar al-Aulaqi was additionally subjected to extensive policy review at the highest level of the U.S. Government, and senior U.S. officials also briefed the appropriate committees of Congress on the possibility of using lethal force against al-Aulaqi. Indeed, the Administration informed the relevant congressional oversight committees that it had approved the use of lethal force against al-Aulaqi in February 2010 — well over a year before the operation in question — and the legal justification was subsequently explained in detail to those committees, well before action was taken against Aulaqi. This extensive outreach is consistent with the Administration’s strong and continuing commitment to congressional oversight of our counterterrorism operations — oversight which ensures, as the President stated during his State of the Union address, that our actions are “consistent with our laws and systems of checks and balances.”

Sure, the code words meaning “the President” are in there: “at every level,” “at the highest level of the U.S. Government.” It quotes Obama’s State of the Union address at the very end, like a flourish detached from the nasty killing bit.

And the process described here, where “the Administration” informs the intelligence committees of the lethal force operations “it had approved,” is clearly that of a covert op, which requires the President’s to inform Congress of covert ops he has approved.

But unlike DOJ and the congressional committees, he’s not named in the decision process that ended up killing Awlaki. (Though Holder does later say that Obama approved the Disposition Matrix which he describes will soon be briefed to Congress, which of course implies Presidential approval for all the drone deaths to come, but not Awlaki’s.)

This might be a picayune observation if this Administration had not, secretly, made almost unprecedented efforts to keep a short phrase indicating the President (Bush) had authorized the torture program.

In his letter, Holder references Obama’s Archives Speech pledge that “whenever possible, my administration will make all information available to the American people so that they can make informed judgments and hold us accountable” (though in Holder’s letter, the “us” becomes “their Government”). He ends this letter by assuring its recipients “that the President and his national security team are mindful of this Administration’s pledge to public accountability for our counterterrorism efforts.”

But on the specific issue of Anwar al-Awlaki’s killing, this letter allows Obama (along with the CIA and DOD, presumably to avoid helping the ACLU in its FOIA — though it may be too late) to avoid any accountability.

Perhaps tomorrow Obama will stand before a bunch of cameras and admit “I personally ordered an American citizen to be drone killed.” But this letter feels like an effort to help him avoid publicly accepting just that responsibility.

Update: As QuietAmerican reminded me, Obama is quoted in that NYT piece as saying the decision to kill Awlaki was “an easy one.”

First They Came for James Risen …

I don’t mean to suggest the journalism world did not object to the three subpoenas James Risen got in the Jeffrey Sterling case. They did.

But today’s news that Fox’s James Rosen was accused of being an “Aider or Abettor” to Stephen Jin-Woo Kim’s alleged crime of leaking information on Korea is just part of a progression. (See also WaPo’s story which broke this.)

“I believe there is probable cause to conclude that the contents of the wire and electronic communications pertaining to the SUBJECT ACCOUNT [the gmail account of Mr. Rosen] are evidence, fruits and instrumentalities of criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. 793 (Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information), and that there is probable cause to believe that the Reporter has committed or is committing a violation of section 793(d), as an aider and abettor and/or co-conspirator, to which the materials relate,” wrote FBI agent Reginald B. Reyes in a May 28, 2010 application for a search warrant.

The search warrant was issued in the course of an investigation into a suspected leak of classified information allegedly committed by Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, a former State Department contractor, who was indicted in August 2010.

The Reyes affidavit all but eliminates the traditional distinction in classified leak investigations between sources, who are bound by a non-disclosure agreement, and reporters, who are protected by the First Amendment as long as they do not commit a crime.

[snip]

As evidence of Mr. Rosen’s purported culpability, the Reyes affidavit notes that Rosen and Kim used aliases in their communications (Kim was “Leo” and Rosen was “Alex”) and in other ways sought to maintain confidentiality.

“From the beginning of their relationship, the Reporter asked, solicited and encouraged Mr. Kim to disclose sensitive United States internal documents and intelligence information…. The Reporter did so by employing flattery and playing to Mr. Kim’s vanity and ego.”

“Much like an intelligence officer would run an [sic] clandestine intelligence source, the Reporter instructed Mr. Kim on a covert communications plan… to facilitate communication with Mr. Kim and perhaps other sources of information.”

After all, in January 2011 (which was actually after this affidavit, but appeared 10 months before this affidavit was unsealed), DOJ argued that when Jeffrey Sterling leaked information to James Risen about a dangerous plot to deal nuke blueprints to Iran, his actions were worse than what DOJ called “typical espionage.”

The defendant’s unauthorized disclosures, however, may be viewed as more pernicious than the typical espionage case where a spy sells classified information for money. Unlike the typical espionage case where a single foreign country or intelligence agency may be the beneficiary of the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, this defendant elected to disclose the classified information publicly through the mass media. Thus, every foreign adversary stood to benefit from the defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of classified information, thus posing an even greater threat to society.

Then, in March 2011, DOD charged Bradley Manning with aiding the enemy because he leaked a bunch of stuff to us.

In other words, during a period from May 2010 through January 2011, Eric Holder’s DOJ was developing this theory under which journalists were criminals, though it’s just now that we’re all noticing this May 2010 affidavit that lays the groundwork for that theory.

Maybe that development was predictable, given that during precisely that time period, the lawyer who fucked up the Ted Stevens prosecution, William Welch, was in charge of prosecuting leaks (though it’s not clear he had a role in Kim’s prosecution before he left in 2011).

But it’s worth noting the strategy — and the purpose it serves — because it is almost certainly still in effect. FBI Special Agent Reginald Reyes accused Rosen of being a criminal so he could get around the Privacy Protection Act protections for media work product (See pages 4 and following), which specifically exempts “fruits of a crime” or “property … used [] as a means of committing a criminal offense.” Then he further used it to argue against giving notice to Fox or Rosen.

Because of the Reporter’s own potential criminal liability in this matter, we believe that requesting the voluntary production of the materials from Reporter would be futile and would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation and of the evidence we seek to obtain by the warrant. (29)

While the AP’s phone records weren’t taken via a warrant, it would be unsurprising if the government is still using this formula — journalists = criminals and therefore cannot have notice — to collect evidence. Indeed, that may be one reason why we haven’t seen the subpoena to the AP.

Of course, this is not just about journalists. In this schema, providing information about what our government is doing in our name to citizens constitutes a crime.

This criminalization of journalism is a fundamentally anti-democratic stance.

 

Obama’s Headlong Rush to Counterterrorism Transparency

By my count, Thursday will be the 100th day since Obama promised, in his State of the Union Adress delivered February 12, “to engage Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world.”

Back then there were, officially at least, just a handful of Gitmo detainees on hunger strike. And it’s possible — if DOJ used the two 45-day gags on subpoenas they permit themselves — a subpoena seizing the phone records for 21 AP phone lines had already been issued.

After Obama promised more transparency on drones and other counterterrorism programs, Members of Congress continued to have to demand minimal transparency. On February 20, Rand Paul sent his third request for that information. On February 27, House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte repeated that Committee’s request to see OLC’s drone targeting memos; he also expressed anger that the Administration had refused to send a witness to the hearing.

On March 7, Eric Holder hinted that we would “will hear from the President in a relatively short period of time” on drones and transparency and counterterrorism.  On March 8, guards at Gitmo shot non-lethal bullets at detainees. The following day US conducted a drone strike in Pakistan, one of two strikes that month.

On March 11, Progressive Members of Congress sent a letter asking for information on drone targeting.

On April 9, McClatchy reported that most drone strikes had hit low level militants, contrary to public claims; it also revealed the intelligence reports themselves were false.

On April 10, the House Judiciary Committee finally threatened to subpoena the OLC memos authorizing the killing of an American citizen; that was at least the 23rd request for such information from Congress. A week later the Committee would finally get a promise to see just those memos, memos squarely within the Committee’s oversight jurisdiction.

On April 13, the military locked down Gitmo, effectively depriving most detainees of the human company they had enjoyed for years. On that day, 43 men were hunger striking.

On April 14, Samir Haji al Hasan Moqbel described, in a NYT op-ed, “I’ve been on a hunger strike since Feb. 10 and have lost well over 30 pounds. I will not eat until they restore my dignity.” That same day, the US launched one of two drone strikes in Pakistan that month.

On April 15, the Tsarnaev brothers attacked the Boston Marathon, reportedly in retaliation for treatment of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq.

April 17, a US drone struck the Yemeni village of a Yemeni, Farea al-Muslimi, already scheduled to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee about how drones turn Yemenis against the US.

On April 21, the number of hunger strikes at Gitmo reached 84 — over half the men there. Six days later, on April 27, that number reached 100. Three more men have since joined the hunger strike.

As those numbers were growing, on April 25, Dianne Feinstein called on Obama to transfer those detainees who have been cleared. On April 30, Obama renewed his promise to close Gitmo. The next day, the White House made clear that the moratorium preventing almost half the detainees, men who have been cleared for transfer, to return home to Yemen, remained in place.

On May 10, the AP learned that DOJ had seized phone records from 21 phone lines with no notice, potentially exposing the sources of up to 100 journalists.

On May 16, in a hearing querying whether Congress should eliminate or expand the September 18, 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force, Assistant Defense Secretary Michael Sheehan testified the war on terror would last at least 10-20 more years. He also said DOD won’t be taking over CIA’s side of the drone war anytime soon.

Saturday, a drone strike killed at least 4 thus far unidentified men in Yemen.

Which brings us to Thursday when, the WaPo details, Obama will give a speech telling us once again the drone strikes are legal, his desire to close Gitmo is real, and leaks his new CIA Director exacerbated are serious. He will, apparently, also tell us how he plans to make his counterterrorism plan look more like what he promised it would look like 4 years ago.

President Obama will deliver a speech Thursday at the National Defense University in which he will address how he intends to bring his counterterrorism policies, including the drone program and the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in line with the legal framework he promised after taking office.

In the interim between when he promised this transparency and when he’ll start to sort of deliver it (but not, apparently, any actions to close Gitmo), about 7% of his second term will have passed.

Some of the delay, apparently, comes from the need to address the issues that have been festering during the delay.

Obama was prepared to deliver the speech earlier this month, but it was put off amid mounting concerns over a prisoner hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay and more recently the Justice Department leaks investigation — both of which the revised speech may address.

But otherwise, it appears it has taken 100 days to be able to craft a speech good enough to make his paranoia about secrecy and lip service to human rights in counterterrorism look like something else.

Ah well, at least they’ve sharply curtailed drone strikes while they’ve been writing a speech.

Dear Eric Holder: You’re Doing Recusal Wrong

Let me start this post by saying I think it is absolutely appropriate for Eric Holder to have recused himself from the UndieBomb 2.0 investigation, in part because — as someone read into the UndieBomb 2.0 operation, he was interviewed by the FBI (though so was James Cole, who is now in charge of the investigation), and he turned over his own phone contacts to the FBI — but also because top Administration officials like John Brennan at least should be under close scrutiny in this investigation.

Nor do I think, in his recusal, Eric Holder did anything in bad faith. I have zero reason to believe Holder is tampering with this investigation, in any way shape or form.

But Jeebus, Holder is doing this entire recusal thing wrong.

That’s true, first of all, because with a rabid Congress (at the time he recused from the investigation and now) accusing him of wrongly delegating this investigation to Ronald Machen in an investigation that could net incredibly powerful people as suspects, Holder did not write his recusal — or a delegation of authority of Attorney General powers — to James Cole, who is overseeing the investigation.

Now, Holder claims not to remember whether he memorialized his recusal in past cases, including the John Edwards investigation — the most high profile case in which he has recused. And though George Holding, who conducted that investigation and now represents the Raleigh, NC, area in Congress, was in the room, I’m not sure they clarified whether he had written anything down there, either. Holder was, however, very clear about what authorities he delegated to Patrick Fitzgerald when he investigated the John Adams Society, which led to the prosecution of John Kiriakou, having sent 3 letters (1, 2, 3) memorializing the limits of Fitz’ authority.

I think part of the problem is that Holder didn’t really appoint special counsels to investigate this matter, even while he made a big deal of appointing the people who — US Attorney for DC Ronald Machen’s appointment rather then US Attorney for Eastern District of VA Neil MacBride aside — would have been investigating it anyway. Dumb. Congress was screaming for some kind of formality, and Holder didn’t establish that formality.

And then there’s the journalist-subpoenaing precedent of the Plame investigation where Fitz several times got letters clarifying his authority. The first of those reads,

By the authority vested in the Attorney General by law, including 28 U. S .C. §§ 509, 510, and 515, and in my capacity as Acting Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 508, I hereby delegate to you all the authority of the Attorney General with respect to the Department’s investigation into the alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA employee’s identity, and I direct you to exercise that authority as Special Counsel independent of the supervision or control of any officer of the Department.

This came in handy later in the investigation when Libby’s lawyers challenged Fitz’ authority.

Then, Holder’s recusal hasn’t been very strict. Most troublingly, Eric Holder reviewed the letter James Cole sent to the AP (though Holder saw a draft which, according to his press conference, included things like details on the specific scope of the subpoena that don’t appear in the final letter). NPR’s Carrie Johnson asked him about this.

Johnson: Is that normal practice when you’re recused from a case?

Holder: No, I just wanted to see the le–I saw I mean I saw saw the draft letter this morning. And I just wanted to have an opportunity to see what it looked like so I’d have at least some sense of the case in case there were things in the letter that I could talk about with the press.

Reviewing this letter — particularly before changes got made to it!! (changes which appear to have deprived the AP of full notice of the call record grab) — simply isn’t appropriate for someone recused from the case!

Again, I’m not suggesting malice here.

But the AP has already — rightly, in my opinion — challenged whether DOJ complied with its own guidelines on media subpoenas. In particular, AP complained that they had not been given notice and an opportunity to cooperate. That’s one of the guidelines that requires AG involvement.

Negotiations with the affected member of the news media shall be pursued in all cases in which a subpoena for the telephone toll records of any member of the news media is contemplated where the responsible Assistant Attorney General determines that such negotiations would not pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation in connection with which the records are sought. Such determination shall be reviewed by the Attorney General when considering a subpoena authorized under paragraph (e) of this section.

Yet the guy who signed this subpoena and with it signed off on the claim that alerting AP to the subpoena would do grave damage to the investigation  — James Cole — apparently has no piece of paper giving him authority to sign it.

If DOJ ultimately decides to charge the AP’s sources, if that person has the kind of legal representation DC bigwigs often have, I fully expect them to challenge every bit of their prosecution. After all, by subpoenaing the AP, Cole claimed that DOJ could not get the information from any other source. So if AP’s sources are indicted, they can rest assured that their prosecution went through this bottleneck of an Acting AG who had no paperwork to prove he had the authority to sign off on the claims he was making to get information he was certifying was absolutely necessary to find them. And from this subpoena forward, everything else will be fruit of a tainted AG, at least if you’ve got fancy lawyers.

Dumb.

One last thing. Also in today’s hearing, Holder admitted that it probably would have been a good idea to write down this recusal thing in public. Which, if they do ever charge AP’s sources and if said sources have the resources to make this obvious challenge, they’ll cite in court to document that even the guy who delegated this authority thinks it would be smarter if he did so in writing.

Seriously, this entire recusal process has been an own goal. As I said, I don’t think DOJ is pulling anything fishy. But the entire point of recusing is to ensure there’s proof nothing fishy happened. And in this case, DOJ has anything but.

The White House’s Imminent Benghazi Coup de Grace

As I was watching the Eric Holder hearing and news came out that the White House had released 94 pages of Benghazi emails, I thought at first it was a strategy of whack-a-scandal. The Benghazi scandal is not one; the AP and IRS stories are genuinely damning (though not of the White House per se).

But I predict — and this is just a wildarseguess — that the White House is about to deliver the coup de grace to the Benghazi scandal.

Eric Holder was asked several times (always by Republicans, of course) whether the FBI had let the trail run cold in the Benghazi attack. In response to Jason Chaffetz (one of the chief Bengazhi truthers), Holder suggested that DOJ would imminently announce major progress on the investigation. There were a few more questions, and then Ron DeSantis, who is a very smart but very crazy former JAG who worked with the SEALs asked again.

And Holder — perhaps getting a bit cocky and/or impatient answering one of the last questioners in an interminable hearing — suggested again (this is from memory; I was just getting off the phone) there would be an imminent announcement showing significant progress. DeSantis, who missed that hint but at least knows the boundary between military and civilian law, asked whether it would be military progress or DOJ. Holder announced that something involving their portfolio would show progress.

Again, I’m guessing, but I would bet a fair amount of money one of the main conspirators in the Benghazi attack is sitting somewhere being interrogated by FBI’s High Value Interrogation Group as we speak.

So the way this will roll out is there will be about 2 days of manic scrutiny of the emails, and then just as people begin to get into the nitty gritty that might go further than refuting what the GOP has already leaked, the White House will announce the arrest of the guy that, Holder knows, is already in custody.

Just a prediction, but …

If UndieBomb 2.0 Is One of the Worst Leaks of Holder’s Career, Why Is John Brennan CIA Director?

In a press conference today, Eric Holder didn’t let recusal from the UndieBomb 2.0 leak investigation stop him from commenting on it. Among other things, he claimed this one of the most serious leaks he has seen since he started as a prosecutor in 1976.

This was a very serious leak. A very, very serious leak. I’ve been a prosecutor since 1976, and I have to say that this is among, if not the most serious, it is within the top two or three most serious leaks I’ve ever seen. It put the American people at risk. And that is not hyperbole. It put the American people at risk.

But here’s the thing. According to his own sworn testimony, John Brennan had a key role in providing hints that led to the actually damaging parts of the leak.

I said there was never a threat to the American public as we had said so publicly, because we had inside control of the plot and the device was never a threat to the American public.

[snip]

I — I — what I’m saying is that we were explaining to the American public why that IED was not in fact a threat at the time that it was in the control of individuals. When — when we say positive control, inside control, that means that we (inaudible) that operation either environmentally or any number of ways. It did not in any way reveal any type of classified information. And I told those individuals and there are, you know, transcripts that are available of that conversation, “I cannot talk to you about the operational details of this whatsoever.”

Sure, Brennan claims this didn’t amount to sharing classified information. But he could have just said the plot was actually rolled up on April 22. Instead, he let slip that we (actually, the British and Saudis) had inside control, which led Richard Clarke to figure out what had happened.

Even if DOJ doesn’t consider Brennan a subject or target of this investigation (which is itself noteworthy), his part in the leak still shows really poor judgment and information security.

So if this leak was so damaging, why did a guy who had a central part in it get promoted?

The AP Grab: NSL versus Subpoena

Update: In his letter responding to AP’s complaints, Deputy Attorney General James Cole says these were subpoenas. Cole tries to argue the scope of the subpoena was fair. But what he doesn’t explain is why the government didn’t give the AP notice or an opportunity to turn over the contacts voluntarily.

I want to return to a question I introduced in my post describing DOJ’s grab of call records from 20 AP phone lines.

The assumption has been that DOJ subpoenaed these call records. While that’s probably right, I still think it’s possible DOJ got them via National Security Letter, which DOJ has permitted using to get journalist contacts in national security investigations since fall 2011. I’ll grant that AP President Gary Pruitt mentions subpoenas twice in his letter, once specifically in connection with DOJ’s grab and once more generally.

That the Department undertook this unprecedented step without providing any notice to the AP, and without taking any steps to narrow the scope of its subpoenas to matters actually relevant to an ongoing investigation, is particularly troubling.

The sheer volume of records obtained, most of which can have no plausible connection to any ongoing investigation, indicates, at a minimum, that this effort did not comply with 28 C.F.R. §50.10 and should therefore never have been undertaken in the first place. The regulations require that, in all cases and without exception, a subpoena for a reporter’s telephone toll records must be “as narrowly drawn as possible.’’ This plainly did not happen. [my emphasis]

But the entire point of Pruitt’s letter is to call attention to the way in which DOJ did not honor the spirit of its media guidelines, which are tied to subpoenas, not NSLs. That’s what the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide says explicitly (PDF 166) when it talks about using NSLs with journalists: when using NSLs, the rules don’t apply.

Department of Justice policy with regard to the issuances of subpoenas for telephone toll records of members of the news media is found at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. The regulation concerns only grand jury subpoenas, not National Security Letters (NSLs) or administrative subpoenas. (The regulation requires Attorney General approval prior to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena for telephone toll records of a member of the news media, and when such a subpoena is issued, notice must be given to the news media either before or soon after such records are obtained.) The following approval requirements and specific procedures apply for the issuance of an NSL for telephone toll records of members of the news media or news organizations. [my emphasis]

For a variety of reasons, I think it possible the AP doesn’t actually know how DOJ got its reporters’ contact information. And thus far, the most compelling argument (one Julian Sanchez made) that DOJ used a subpoena is that they did ultimately disclose the grab to the AP; with NSLs they wouldn’t have to do that, at least certainly not in the same time frame.

But Pruitt’s emphasis is sort of why I’m interested in this question: either DOJ used a subpoena and in so doing implicitly claims several things about its investigation, or DOJ used an NSL as a way to bypass all those requirements (and use this as a public test case of broad new self-claimed authorities). Both could accomplish the same objective — getting call records with a gag order — but each would indicate something different about how they’re approaching this investigation.

Here are DOJ’s own regulations about when and how they can subpoena a journalist or his call records. Some pertinent parts are:

(b) All reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from alternative sources before considering issuing a subpoena to a member of the news media, and similarly all reasonable alternative investigative steps should be taken before considering issuing a subpoena for telephone toll records of any member of the news media.

(d) Negotiations with the affected member of the news media shall be pursued in all cases in which a subpoena for the telephone toll records of any member of the news media is contemplated where the responsible Assistant Attorney General determines that such negotiations would not pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation in connection with which the records are sought. Such determination shall be reviewed by the Attorney General when considering a subpoena authorized under paragraph (e) of this section.

(g)(1) There should be reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the information sought is essential to the successful investigation of that crime. The subpoena should be as narrowly drawn as possible; it should be directed at relevant information regarding a limited subject matter and should cover a reasonably limited time period.

(g)(3) When the telephone toll records of a member of the news media have been subpoenaed without the notice provided for in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, notification of the subpoena shall be given the member of the news media as soon thereafter as it is determined that such notification will no longer pose a clear and substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation. In any event, such notification shall occur within 45 days of any return made pursuant to the subpoena, except that the responsible Assistant Attorney General may authorize delay of notification for no more than an additional 45 days. [my emphasis]

US Attorney Ronald Machen statement about the grab largely echoes those parts of the regulations (though somehow he forgot to mention that “subpoenas should be as narrowly drawn as possible”).

We take seriously our obligations to follow all applicable laws, federal regulations, and Department of Justice policies when issuing subpoenas for phone records of media organizations. Those regulations require us to make every reasonable effort to obtain information through alternative means before even considering a subpoena for the phone records of a member of the media. We must notify the media organization unless doing so would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation. Because we value the freedom of the press, we are always careful and deliberative in seeking to strike the right balance between the public interest in the free flow of information and the public interest in the fair and effective administration of our criminal laws.

So either DOJ used an NSL, which would give them a longer gag, fewer express limits on the scope of the request, and zero expectation of giving notice beforehand (in addition, obtaining NSLs from journalists in national security cases doesn’t appear to require Attorney General sign-off). In which case Machen is playing the same kind of word games the DIOG plays, acknowledging there are regulations the spirit of which DOJ appears to have violated.

Or Machen maintains the following about the grab:

  • DOJ has already checked the US person call records of the people known to be read into the UndieBomb plot and not found any obviously calls or emails implicating the journalists involved in the story and either hasn’t been able to access or hasn’t found any obvious clues in the potential Saudi, Yemeni, and British people read into the operation (note, some Saudis were on the record on this within days and Yemenis also appear to have leaked it).
  • Notifying the AP that DOJ was going to go get journalist contact information for two months, in an investigation that has been widely publicized for an entire year, would pose some threat to the investigation. Normally, such a claim is usually based on the premise that revealing the investigation at all would alert the targets who would otherwise not know about it, but that’s obviously not what’s going on here, because this has been one of the most public leak investigations in recent years.

Read more

Harold Koh Relitigates the Argument He Already Lost

The NYT thinks the takeaway “news” of Harold Koh’s speech on Forever War is his call for more transparency on drone killing. Yet that Koh supports more transparency on drones is not news. Daniel Klaidman has been reporting that since January 2012.

What’s newsworthy about this call for transparency, though, is how shrill it is.

But since then, to be candid, this Administration has not done enough to be transparent about legal standards and the decisionmaking process that it has been applying. It had not been sufficiently transparent to the media, to Congress, and to our allies. Because the Administration has been so opaque, a left-right coalition running from Code Pink to Rand Paul has now spoken out against the drone program, fostering a growing perception that the program is not lawful and necessary, but illegal, unnecessary and out of control. The Administration must take responsibility for this failure, because its persistent and counterproductive lack of transparency has led to the release of necessary pieces of its public legal defense too little and too late.

As a result, the public has increasingly lost track of the real issue, which is not drone technology per se, but the need for transparent, agreedupon domestic and international legal process and standards.

Perhaps this shrillness is why Koh ends the speech with a grandiose invocation of our “better angels.”

Because I am an American who loves his country, I have served it for ten years of my professional career. My former professor and former Legal Adviser Abram Chayes once said, after he had sued the United States government from the academy, “I have always thought there is nothing wrong with an American lawyer holding the United States to its own best standards.” It is in that spirit that tonight, from this important podium, I call my country to its own best values and principles. As President Lincoln famously said, there is still time–indeed, it is high time– for Americans once again to answer to the “better angels” of our national nature.

Though it should be noted that Attorney Abe Lincoln appealed for us to answer to our better angels at the beginning of his service in the Executive Branch, not after he had left that position of influence (something John Wilkes Booth prevented in any case). Why is Harold Koh saying this now?

After all, this battle, the battles for transparency, for “discipline” in the drone program, and for closing Gitmo, are all battles he fought and lost while he was still in government.

It’s how Koh relitigates the last of those battles, closing Gitmo, I find most interesting. He calls for the appointment of a Greg Craig type to implement the plan Craig tried to implement himself in the first year of the Obama Administration.

First, and foremost, he must appoint a senior White House official with the clout and commitment to actually make Guantanamo closure happen. There has not been such a person at the White House since Greg Craig left as White House Counsel in early 2010. There must be someone close to the President, with a broad enough mandate and directly answerable to him, who wakes up each morning thinking about how to shrink the Guantanamo population and close the camp.

Second, this White House Envoy need not develop a new paradigm for closing Guantanamo. He or she merely needs to implement the National Archives framework that the President announced three years ago. The White House Envoy should lead the Administration’s efforts to implement the three-part framework for closure of the Guantanamo detention facility specified in the President’s 2010 speech at the National Archives. That speech described a framework for how this closure could happen: through diplomatic transfers of those individuals who could be safely transferred, prosecution of those who can be tried before civilian courts when possible and military commissions where that is the only option, and third, by commencing the long-overdue legally mandated periodic review of so-called Law of War Detainees to see if any can be released, because of changes either in their attitude or in the conditions of the country to which they could be transferred.

Now, I’m all in favor of closing Gitmo and this might be one way to do it. Koh actually improves on the prior plan by admitting the indefinite detainees will have to be released as the war is over, which is legally correct but misapprehends why they’re not being released and why we have to have a Forever War to justify keeping them silent and imprisoned forever.

But Koh’s map for closing Gitmo also misrepresents why appointing Greg Craig himself to carry out the Gitmo task didn’t work. Read more

Outsourcing America’s Bad Human Rights Reputation

Given all the attention to the Administration’s decision, thus far, to neither Mirandize nor charge Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, I wanted to point back to two things that happened last week.

First, in a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee, in response to Congressman Frank Wolf’s frustrated declaration (for a variety of totally justified — such as Holder’s delay in implementing a prison rape preventing program — and totally bogus reasons) that he was just going to ignore Eric Holder, Holder made a case that his DOJ is doing a great job. Josh Gerstein describes his little speech:

I’m proud of what we’ve done across the board at the Justice Department in the last four and a half years. I’m proud of what I’ve done as attorney general. The department that we have now is fundamentally different than the department I found when I got there. We don’t hire people on the bsis of political orientation. We don’t do things as was done in the previous administration. We don’t write memos that say that torture is appropriate when dealing with interrogation techniques. [my emphasis]

No. As far as we know, at least (given the secrecy of the Administration), they have not written memos saying torture is appropriate when dealing with interrogation. They have, however, written memos stretching the concept of public exception beyond its intended function. They have also written memos reinterpreting due process before execution to mean “what John Brennan says in secret.”

In other words, Eric Holder’s DOJ has written memos authorizing practices that are alternatives, but arguably not much better, than the policies his predecessors rubber stamped.

Meanwhile Micah Zenko has a great post summarizing how many of the counterterrorism acts presumably conducted in cooperation with US forces — if not by US forces yet blamed on local ones — fall under the State Department’s definition of human rights violations.

Today—eighty-nine days past its legal deadline—the State Department released its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011. The new, user-friendly interface allows you to find and read individual country chapters much more quickly and easily (and might explain the delay). For all its flaws, the report remains a must-read for its reporting and candor. It serves as a generally honest counter to the rosier assessments of U.S. partners and allies’ human rights practices.

From my vantage point of trying to understand the Obama administration’s policies and practices of target killings, the report is also notable for what it does not include; namely, any mention of U.S. involvement in or responsibility for such operations.

The chapter on Yemen, for instance, has an entire section dedicated to “killings:”

The government also employed air strikes against AQAP and affiliated insurgents in Abyan, with some strikes hitting civilian areas. Although some accused the government of intentionally striking civilians in Abyan, most if not all noncombatant casualties from these bombardments were attributed to a lack of air force training and technical capability.

First, because U.S. targeted killings in Yemen are “covert,” the State Department cannot acknowledge American complicity or collusion. But it stands to reason that some, if not a majority, of these air strikes were carried out by CIA or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) drones, or even U.S. Navy assets offshore.

Zenko goes on to point to passages criticizing human rights abuses in Turkey, Somalia, and Pakistan that likely have US involvement.

It’s bad enough that the Attorney General’s measurement of his Department’s performence is measured against John Yoo’s standards, not the law, but we’re probably helping other countries violate State’s own standards for human rights.

All the while dodging the real shame that ought to come from such abuses.

 

When the Preet Promotion Industry Speaks, the Nation Gets Nervous

In an article with the URL “when-preet-bharara-speaks-the-shady-get-nervous,” the WaPo repeats a now familiar formula for stories boosting US Attorney Preet Bharara’s fortune: lots of quotes from political powerful allies…

“If [Bharara] smells corruption, he’ll go after it and figure out a way to corral it,” [Chuck] Schumer said. “But he will not make up cases for the sake of making up cases.”

Lots of celebration of recent headlines (I mean, cmon, as I understand it, indicting corrupt NY officials has become the prosecutorial equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel)…

“For the second time in three days, we unseal criminal charges against a sitting member of our state legislature,” Bharara, 44, said during the Thursday afternoon news conference in downtown Manhattan. This time, the U.S. attorney accused a Bronx assemblyman of accepting bribes as part of a scheme to aid developers, which Bharara called “a fairly neat trick” that amounted to “a legislator selling legislation.”

And lots of hints that scream “Pick Preet! Promote Preet!”

It is now highly unlikely that the White House would forget about Bharara, as administration officials somehow did in 2009, when they failed to invite the Indian American powerhouse to the Indian state dinner.

[snip]

Such concerns are unlikely to slow down Bharara. Considered politically astute by observers in Washington and New York, Bharara made a point of not taking sides in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary that pitted then-senators Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton. He has been rumored as a possible successor to his boss, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., either in the current administration or the next Democratic one.

But not one word about his failure to hold anyone accountable for the 2008 financial crash (aside from citing last year’s Time magazine story that falsely claimed “This Man Is Busting Wall Street”).

But Chuck Schumer and Preet’s other boosters appear to believe that’s the formula that will get Preet nominated to replace Eric Holder.

Sadly, they’re probably right.