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Get Your Torture Team Trading Cards

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I said in my last post that I was going to do a post dedicated to pitching the Center for Constitutional Right’s new Torture Team trading cards [link fixed]. And here’s that post–showing off what the cards look like.

As I said in the comments to the last thread, CCR has played a critical role in protecting the Constitution over the last eight years–they were the first organization to file a habeas petition for one of the Gitmo detainees. So while you can get a small batch of these cards for free, if you can afford it, please consider paying for the complete set. (CCR originally wasn’t going to charge for these at all, but when they unveiled them at the torture panel I did with Jerry Nadler at Netroots Nation, we all thought they should charge money.)

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The Continuity of Addington’s Man-Sized Safe

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The CIA IG Report provides this narrative of the CIA’s past involvement with interrogation techniques.

In the early 1980s, a resurgence of interest in teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political sensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation." The Agency then. developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) training program designed to train foreign liaison services on interrogation techniques.

In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interrogations and the death of one individual [redacted] Following that investigation, the Agency took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance to the field.

In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program because of allegations of human rights abuses in Latin America.

From that point, the IG Report lays out the Directorate of Operations policy on interrogations developed in response to the HRE scandal (it is redacted in our copy), and suggests that’s where the narrative leaves off, with the CIA completely out of the business of torture since 1986.

Of course, that history didn’t quite end there. In 1991, we know, the Defense Department "discovered" that seven counterintelligence and interrogation manuals used for training in Latin American–including the one on Interrogation–still contained material that violated human rights and was derived from lesson plans developed in 1982 and used at the School of the Americas. After a nine-month investigation, DOD cited management problems for the inclusion of the inappropriate material in manuals, called for a damage assessment, and ordered that all the manuals be collected and destroyed. All the manuals, that is, except for one master copy:

For record purposes, the DoD General Counsel should retain one copy of each of the seven manuals along with a copy of this report. All other copies of the manuals and associated instructional materials, including computer disks, lesson plans, and "Project X" documents, should be destroyed.

The cover sheet showing the initialed approval of that recommendation by then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney bears his then Special Assistant (and soon-to be DOD General Counsel) David Addington’s recommendation: "I concur."

While the CIA IG Report underplays the degree to which this knowledge remained at DOD between 1992 and 2001, that’s where we know it remained during the Clinton Administration.

Read more →

Ashcroft versus CIA

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When I read the CIA IG Report yesterday, I thought to myself, "Of course! They didn’t investigate all the instances when torturers exceeded the Bybee Two memo description of waterboarding because John Ascroft approved of them."

I got that from reading the following passages:

On 29 July 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on CIA’s detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value detainees," to include the expanded use of EITS.28 According to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeting [which was dated August 5, 2003], the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple applications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said he believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of the effort.

[snip]

The Review determined that the interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, in that the technique was used on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad a large number of times. According to the General Counsel, the Attorney General acknowledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DoJ opinion and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual. [my emphasis]

But John Ashcroft disagrees with that representation, as relayed in a June 18, 2004 letter from Jack Goldsmith to George Tenet.

Dear Director Tenet:

I am writing at the Attorney General’s request concerning a report that that [sic] the Inspector General of the CIA has recently forwarded to your office. The Department of Justice did not have an opportunity to review a draft of the report and instead only had a chance to review the final report after it had been forwarded to your office.

The Department of Justice believes that the report contains some ambiguous statements concerning the Attorney General’s remarks at a 29 July 2003 meeting of selected NSC principals that should be clarified and that it contains some statements that mistakenly characterize the extent of advice provided by the Department.

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Cheney’s Cherry-Pick

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picture-126.thumbnail.pngWIndy has put the two documents Dick Cheney wanted released up (or go to CCR’s somewhat clearer versions).

The most important thing to understand about these documents–aside from the very, um, finished feel that graphics like the one on the left give it–is the timing. The first one came just after (July 17, 2004) the release of the IG Report and was, significantly, an attempt to rationalize the torture program. And the other came at a time (June 3, 2005) when Congress was increasingly pressuring the Administration to bring the torture program under CAT guidelines prohibiting cruel and inhuman treatment.

So they’re big PR pieces, boasting of how important KSM is to their fight against terror, boasting of how much information they’ve gotten from detainees. 

The pieces do (and I suspect would even more so if not so heavily redacted) sort of contradict themselves. For example, the 2005 document reveals that "almost immediately following his capture in March 2003, [KSM] elaborated on his plot to crash commercial jets into Heathrow."

The IG Report, in its section on efficacy, says, 

On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of that information revealed that much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or incomplete.

So which is correct? The claim, made in 2004, that this early info was outdated? Or the claim made in 2005 that it was worthwhile?

As Center for Constitutional Rights lawyer Gitanjali Gutierrez says of them:

These are the documents Dick Cheney was so excited to see declassified, but they don’t make the case for torture, they only show that the CIA is able to tailor documents to justify its actions after the fact. The descent into torture has made the world a darker and more dangerous place for everyone.

Have fun with these. I’m going to head out and do some drinking to celebrate mr. ew’s very successful defense of his Master’s Thesis today. I’ll have way more on all this tomorrow.

Is DOJ Withholding the OPR Report Tomorrow to Frame a White-Wash Investigation?

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MadDog pointed to this passage in NYT’s story on the new revelations from the CIA IG report.

Besides the inspector general’s report, other documents expected to be released Monday are a 2007 Justice Department memo reauthorizing the C.I.A.’s “enhanced” interrogation techniques, documents that former Vice President Dick Cheney has said provide evidence that the interrogation methods produced valuable information about Al Qaeda; and Justice Department memos from 2006 concerning conditions of confinement in C.I.A. jails.

Best as I can tell, these are:

2007 Justice Department memo: The OLC memo Spencer was the first to report. From his Windy report:

As a result, according to the former senior intelligence official, after Bush issued the order, the CIA again asked the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to review the techniques listed in the revised interrogation program in order to determine their legality, just as the Office of Legal Counsel had done in 2002 and 2005, after previous periods of challenge to the post-9/11 interrogation program.

2006 Justice Department memos: The SSCI Narrative describes these to be interpretations of the DTA and the Hamdan decision.

In June 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applied to the conflict with Al-Qa’ida, contrary to the position previously adopted by the President. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that detainees “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,” and prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” and “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.” At the time of the Hamdan decision, the War Crimes Act defined the term “war crime” to include “a violation of Common Article 3.”

In August 2006, OLC issued two documents considering the legality of the conditions of confinement in CIA facilities. One of the documents was an opinion interpreting the Detainee Treatment Act; the other document was a letter interpreting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as enforced by the War Crimes Act. These documents included consideration of U.S. constitutional law and the legal decisions of international tribunals and other countries.

Cheney’s documents: Reporting elsewhere suggests this will include more than just the two documents Cheney requested, but a few others. Read more →

CIA’s Blackwater Circular Firing Squad

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While we wait for Jeremy Scahill’s piece on this today (which will surely tell a more complete story than the NYT and WaPo‘s spook reporters did), I want to follow up on the two posts I did yesterday, obviously based on leaks and counter-leaks, to sort out what we know of the plans to use Blackwater as the US assassination squad. There are two parts to the story: first, that CIA invented an assassination program shortly after 9/11. And then, that CIA gave a contract to Blackwater for the program in 2004. Here are the dates we know of.

2001: Presidential finding allowing assassinations of al Qaeda, assassination squads set up

2002: CIA sets up contract for Blackwater to "provide security" for CIA’s Afghan station

2002: Dick Cheney tells CIA not to brief Congress on assassination plans

2002: Cofer Black ousted from CTC

2004: CIA terminates program, then gives contract to Blackwater to do assassination squads

September, 2004: Buzzy Krongard resigns as CIA’s Executive Director (replaced by Dusty Foggo)

February 2005: Cofer Black becomes Vice Chairman of Blackwater

Fall 2007: Krongard joins Blackwater advisory board

September 2007: Nisour Square massacre

June 23, 2009: Panetta learns of active assassination squad program, cancels it

June 24, 2009: Panetta briefs Congress

Now, a couple of points about this. The stories coming out today want to focus on 2004, when Blackwater supposedly got the contract to do this. If so, then what did Cheney order CIA not to tell Congress about in 2002? It may be that they’re using the term "contract" loosely to hide an earlier arrangement, given that they admit to NYT there was never really a contract.

Officials said the C.I.A. did not have a formal contract with Blackwater for this program but instead had individual agreements with top company officials, including the founder, Erik D. Prince, a politically connected former member of the Navy Seals and the heir to a family fortune. 

I guess if you’re doing all this without contracts, it makes it a lot easier for it to take four months before the Director of the CIA learns about it. But isn’t that one of the nightmares we’ve all been waiting for, as we outsource our intelligence? That the privatized spooks will take over and continue programs without telling the political appointees? Hell, that the privatized spooks will continue to work for the last guy who was President and not the current one?

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Did I Say the Daily Beast Story Was BS?

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Because it was. They were trying to hide the fact that the company of their former ExecDir, Buzzy Krongard and Blackwater, is the gimmick behind the CIA’s assassination program.

The Central Intelligence Agency in 2004 hired outside contractors from the private security contractor Blackwater USA as part of a secret program to locate and assassinate top operatives of Al Qaeda, according to current and former government officials. 

Executives from Blackwater, which has generated controversy because of its aggressive tactics in Iraq, helped the spy agency with planning, training and surveillance. The C.I.A. spent several million dollars on the program, which did not capture or kill any terrorist suspects.

The fact that the C.I.A. used an outside company for the program was a major reason that Leon E. Panetta, the new C.I.A. director, became alarmed and called an emergency meeting to tell Congress that the agency had withheld details of the program for seven years, the officials said.

Only of course they didn’t mention Buzzy Krongard, not once, in the whole article. Didn’t mention that he left the CIA before he got this contract. (He was probably contracted by Dusty Foggo, but whatever.)

If I had to guess, I’d say the Dems are closing ranks around Panetta. 

I don’t love Panetta–he has humiliated himself thus far. But hey, if those trying to reform the Company join with Panetta and push him, we might make some progress.

The Crazy Man Above the Garage

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cheney-wheelchair.thumbnail.pngSorry for being so late on this, but I wanted to come back to this bizarre Barton Gellman article on Cheney. Amidst news including 1) Cheney took notes, exactly none of which were introduced at trial and, 2) Cheney apologists like John Hannah are out giving interviews, Gellman provides the following weird two paragraphs, which provide the great drama of the story.

The depths of Cheney’s distress about another close friend, his former chief of staff and alter ego I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, have only recently become clear. Bush refused a pardon after Libby’s felony convictions in 2007 for perjury and obstruction of an investigation of the leak of a clandestine CIA officer’s identity. Cheney tried mightily to prevent Libby’s fall, scrawling in a note made public at trial that he would not let anyone "sacrifice the guy that was asked to stick his neck in the meat grinder." Cheney never explained the allusion, but grand jury transcripts — and independent counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald — suggested that Libby’s false statements aimed above all to protect the vice president.

Last month, an account in Time magazine, based on close access to Bush’s personal lawyer and White House counsel, described Cheney’s desperate end-of-term efforts to change Bush’s mind about a pardon. Cheney, who has spent a professional lifetime ignoring unflattering stories, issued a quietly furious reply. In the most explicit terms, he accused Bush of abandoning "an innocent man" who had served the president with honor and then become the "victim of a severe miscarriage of justice." Cheney now says privately that his memoir, expected to be published in spring 2011, will describe their heated arguments in full.

 This bit–which is what stuck in my craw–deserves some really close unpacking.

Cheney tried mightily to prevent Libby’s fall, scrawling in a note made public at trial that he would not let anyone "sacrifice the guy that was asked to stick his neck in the meat grinder." Cheney never explained the allusion, but grand jury transcripts — and independent counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald — suggested that Libby’s false statements aimed above all to protect the vice president. 

Now, Gellman is ostensibly talking about Cheney’s efforts to get Bush to pardon Libby, actions that started in 2007 (and which, at the earliest, he might have first contemplated in 2005, when Judy Miller testified to the grand jury). Read more →

Honoring Service Rather than Trumping Up War

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Seven years ago, Dick Cheney addressed the Veterans of Foreign War national convention (George Bush was otherwise occupied in Crawford, clearing brush). In a speech he did not have vetted by the Intelligence Community (as was normal), Cheney made the claims about Iraq having nukes that served as a foundation for the Iraq War campaign rolled out just a few weeks later (remember, you don’t introduce a new product in August).

The case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of our country, requires a candid appraisal of the facts. After his defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam agreed under to U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 to cease all development of weapons of mass destruction. He agreed to end his nuclear weapons program. He agreed to destroy his chemical and his biological weapons. He further agreed to admit U.N. inspection teams into his country to ensure that he was in fact complying with these terms.

In the past decade, Saddam has systematically broken each of these agreements. The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago. These are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam can hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond.

On the nuclear question, many of you will recall that Saddam’s nuclear ambitions suffered a severe setback in 1981 when the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor. They suffered another major blow in Desert Storm and its aftermath.

But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we’ve gotten this from the firsthand testimony of defectors — including Saddam’s own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam’s direction. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.

Today, Obama is the one addressing the VFW. While he’s describing his stance in Iraq and Afghanistan, he is, at the same time, repeating his promise to America’s service men and women.

That is why I have made this pledge to our armed forces: I will only send you into harm’s way when it is absolutely necessary. Read more →

Does Lanny Breuer Have a Conflict in the Cheney Interview FOIA Case?

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Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer’s background has been a key topic of discussion in CREW’s lawsuit to force DOJ to release Dick Cheney’s interview with Patrick Fitzgerald. The problem is, DOJ forgot to reveal that Breuer had represented one of the people involved with issues directly related to Cheney’s interview.

DOJ needed an expert on investigations of White House officials–so they got Breuer

During a hearing on whether or not DOJ should release Dick Cheney’s interview with Patrick Fitzgerald back in June, Judge Emmet Sullivan suggested that DOJ ought to have someone with actual experience in investigations of high level White House officials make their argument that releasing Cheney’s interview would make such investigations more difficult in the future.

MR. SMITH: In this case I don’t see — the law enforcement issue here is very unique and it’s very different than I think in Sussman and in most other cases. It’s an interest, it’s basically a chilling interest that if the Vice-President’s interview is released, that could have a chilling effect on future senior leadership.

THE COURT: Says who?

MR. SMITH: Says the Attorney General Mukasy [sic], that was his conclusion.

THE COURT: He didn’t file a declaration. Mr. Bradbury filed a declaration. He didn’t base it upon any experience, he didn’t base it upon anything. He didn’t articulate the bases for his declaration. Other than he was designated to follow declaration. So it wasn’t Mr. Mukasy [sic] who filed the declaration which arguably could have carried great weight. If the chief law enforcement officer says based on my experience and experience of others in law enforcement, it could have but that’s not the case here. Bradbury was a political appointee. I don’t know what his experience was. He was appointed to, maybe he was appointed to file this declaration. I don’t know what else he did. He’s no longer there at OLC. And essentially the government in footnote says I should defer to his declaration.

This is not a deferential review. I want to be clear I’m not suggesting that the Attorney General should sign a declaration. I’m not ordering, certainly not ordering him to do anything, but I’m just saying in response to what you just said arguably it could have carried greater weight for such a declaration to come from a law enforcement official based upon his or her experiences with respect to this chilling effect. Otherwise, it’s just an assumption this man makes based upon nothing he can point to. [my emphasis]

So rather than have the discredited Steven Bradbury submit this declaration, DOJ got Breuer to do so. After Breuer submitted a statement arguing that release of Cheney’s interview will present some new disincentive for high level White House officials in the future to cooperate that thirty years of routine release don’t already present, CREW questioned what basis Breuer had to make that claim.

The only experience plaintiff is aware of Mr. Breuer having with law enforcement investigations involving the White House is his tenure as special counsel to President Clinton during the Independent Counsel’s “Whitewater” investigation. Read more →