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What If You Had a Military Summit Defending the Future of Democracy and No One Gave a Damn?

If you read the dead tree NYT this morning, you might be forgiven for thinking that Joe Biden was isolated from America’s NATO allies.

That’s because the front page put a big picture of Biden’s NATO appearance next to an article describing Biden as isolated within his own party. That story described President Biden’s press conference marking the end of the NATO summit this way:

He faced a new test on Thursday night in a news conference following the NATO summit in Washington. In an early stumble before it even got underway, Mr. Biden flubbed his introduction of President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, saying: “Ladies and gentlemen, President Putin.” He quickly caught himself.

During the news conference, he referred to “Vice President Trump” when he meant Vice President Kamala Harris, a mistake that former President Donald J. Trump immediately mocked on social media.

But Mr. Biden showed a command of the issues on foreign policy, although he spoke slowly and meandered at times. Lawmakers and aides in Congress said it was a strong enough performance to keep the dam from breaking with mass calls for Mr. Biden to step aside, but with enough missteps to prolong the anxiety on Capitol Hill.

There was no description of the summit itself at all in the article. Nor was there a story on the summit anywhere on the dead tree front page.

That “Biden isolated” story didn’t even make the top of digital front page (at least for me), which looked this way this morning:

At that point, the top news included:

  • A story from Peter Baker acknowledging Biden’s command of foreign policy, sandwiched between a description of his flubs and a super helpful explanation of how, “every momentary flub, every verbal miscue, even if quickly corrected, now takes on outsize importance, ricocheting across the internet in viral video clips”
  • Zolan Kanno-Youngs cataloging five takeaways, in which is command of foreign policy was third:
    • He said he is not leaving
    • He got off to a rough start
    • He showed a command of foreign policy
    • He struggled to articulate why he is the best person to defeat Mr. Trump
    • He offered a strong defense of Kamala Harris
  • A Nicholas Nehamas story that, when written, focused exclusively on those (like Jim Himes) who called for Biden to drop out
  • A piece on how Joe Biden lost Hollywood
  • One of the many stories that described Biden’s polling on Kamala Harris’ strength against Trump was “quiet” (though the ridiculous claim that this was quiet has now been relegated to a subhead)
  • A purported fact check of Biden’s press conference that claimed Biden’s observation, “He’s already told Putin — and I quote — do whatever the hell you want,” needed context

The fact check said nothing about Biden’s claim, in response to a question from AFP journalist Danny Kemp, that world leaders credited Biden for bringing NATO together.

 

I’m sure you actually could find a world leader who was unimpressed with Biden’s summit — like Viktor Orbán, who scurried from the conference to plan capitulation to Putin at Mar-a-Lago. But no one wanted to talk about that — about Biden’s efforts to stave off authoritarianism, about Biden’s efforts to reverse Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, about Biden’s efforts to save the idea of democracy, about the substance of the summit. So it didn’t merit a fact check either.

There’s a horse race to be run. And there’s absolutely no place for actual policy outcomes when there’s a horse race to be had!

When I first started writing this story, I had to look way down here at the bottom of the NYT page to find any report that was, substantially, about the NATO Summit at all.

The story has been promoted, placed in a section on Trump, not Biden, though still the fourth horizontal section on the page.

The story, from David Sanger, also focused on the press conference and noted Biden’s flubs. But it also described how Trump congratulated Putin’s genius after Russia invaded Ukraine.

[T]he session also served as a platform for him to show a command of foreign policy, including describing in detail the decisions he has made over three and a half years that have been punctuated by wars in Ukraine and Gaza.

He took credit for warning the Europeans of an impending invasion of Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022, and for preparing NATO to provide arms and intelligence as soon as war broke out. And he used the moment to remind American voters that Mr. Trump’s first reaction to the invasion was to praise President Vladimir V. Putin.

“Here’s what he said,” Mr. Biden added, his voice dripping with sarcasm: “‘It was genius. It was wonderful.’”

The biting comparison, with its suggestion that Mr. Trump admires only brute force and is in Mr. Putin’s pocket, was the kind of attack on his opponent that Mr. Biden’s supporters were hoping for in the debate between the two men two weeks ago but never heard.

Further down in that story, starting at ¶18 of a 23¶¶ story, Sanger described the news of the summit: that NATO was going to try to disrupt the relationship between China and Russia.

But it was on the question of Russia’s rapidly expanding relationship with China — and its alignment with North Korea and Iran, two other arms suppliers to Russia — that Mr. Biden broke the most new ground.

Until the news conference, he had never conceded that the United States was seeking to disrupt the relationship between the two countries, just as President Richard M. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, did a half-century ago, by surprising the world with a diplomatic opening to Beijing.

He declined to discuss details of the strategy in public, but went on to say that “you’ll see that some of our European friends are going to be curtailing their investment in Russia — I mean, excuse me, in China, as long as China continues to have this indirect help to Russia.”

That was a significant reversal. Two years ago, Mr. Biden expressed doubts that the two countries, with their centuries of enmity and border disputes, could ever get along.

By the time the NATO leaders gathered this week for the 75th anniversary of the alliance, however, they were denouncing China as “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and hinting that European nations might restrict their economic interchanges with Beijing.

China “cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation,” the summit’s declaration says, wording that was pressed by Mr. Biden’s aides.

So to find actual news of Biden’s NATO summit, you needed to scroll down the NYT to find the Sanger article, then scroll down in that article to find the news: that NATO is attempting to disrupt a growing alliance of authoritarian countries challenging democracy.

I’m genuinely not sure how NYT (and other outlets, who offered similar coverage) understand the world, wherein the fate of Joe Biden on a minute-to-minute basis can be divorced from the fate of democracy, globally. You have to have democracy before you can have horse races.

Yes, in an op-ed yesterday, NYT included Trump’s disdain for democracy and fondness for “strongmen” among the reasons he’s unfit to lead.

Mr. Trump has demonstrated contempt for these American ideals. He admires autocrats, from Viktor Orban to Vladimir Putin to Kim Jong-un. He believes in the strongman model of power — a leader who makes things happen by demanding it, compelling agreement through force of will or personality. In reality, a strongman rules through fear and the unprincipled use of political might for self-serving ends, imposing poorly conceived policies that smother innovation, entrepreneurship, ideas and hope.

But NYT did not mention that Trump not only admires these thugs, he is allied with them against democracy.

Yes, it matters that Democrats beat Trump in November. It matters that Democrats have a candidate with the stamina to do that.

But the bigger picture matters, too. And Biden’s success at marshalling democratic powers in alliance is one of the reasons he believes he has demonstrated his fitness to remain President.

His efforts to defend democracy are not news, apparently.

NYTimes Launders Its Own Agency

After having scolded the President that he “should leave the race” that Democratic primary voters elected him to run.

And having ordered the Democratic Party to “speak the [NYT’s] plain truth to Biden,

And having ignored Trump’s own actions in the meanwhile (for example, NYT has no report yet on Viktor Orbán’s latest shenanigans, and they’ve only just reported on Trump’s attempts to disavow Project 2025, which they put in a both-sides frame and don’t cite NYT’s long focus on his Project 2025 aligned plans; Update, 10:09AM ET: NYT has now posted a cursory 7¶¶ 3-byline piece on Orbán.), NYT has now weighed in against Trump.

At least in its headline, the NYT doesn’t scold Trump. It doesn’t order the GOP to do anything.

It observes.

Once you click through to their actual op-ed, however, NYT does something else.

It launders agency it has been exercising all over its front page.

“The Democrats are rightly engaged in their own debate,” the paper that has supplanted every other kind of news to frame that debate says.

“The debate is so intense,” NYT says, not because reporters have engaged in conspiracy theorizing, lied, and (as Nancy Pelosi said of NYT’s overreading of her attempt to be subtle, “ma[d]e stories up.”

After which, NYT has relabled as “analysis” and done significant massaging of their story — though not without labeling Biden “defiant” again.

No.

The debate is so intense because, NYT says, “a compelling Democratic alternative is the only thing that will prevent [Trump’s] return to power.”

Which is to suggest that Joe Biden’s historic success  — the policy stuff that, at NYT, always takes the backseat to Biden’s age — is not compelling at all.

Meanwhile, rather than bossing the Republican Party around like NYT did Democrats, NYT wrings its journalistic hands: “It is a national tragedy that the Republicans have failed to have a similar debate,” like the one NYT has forced down Democrats’ throats.

Rather than scolding about what Trump “should” do or ordering what Republicans “must” do, NYT simply “urges” voters here.

This is the op-ed page. It’s where NYT is supposed to exercise the omniscient narrator they’ve sicced on a non-stop flood of Joe Biden stories.

But it would be really nice if elsewhere, off the op-ed page, NYT would focus on reporting, including on the guy they claim is unfit to lead.

The Lie David Sanger Told to Sustain NYT’s Non-Stop Campaign against Joe Biden

Predictably, the NYT treated President Biden’s speech to kick off NATO’s 75th Anniversary as if Biden merely invented the date and the event and maybe even NATO itself to cover up a shoddy debate performance. In addition to the subhead that nonsensically complained there was, “no mention of President Biden’s political peril,” in his speech, in this 25-paragraph story, NYT made this a story about Biden’s campaign by:

  • ¶1: Asserting Biden was trying to bolster the alliance and his campaign.
  • ¶2: Describing Biden’s “strong voice, with few errors.”
  • ¶4: Claiming the delivery of Biden’s speech “may have mattered as much as his words.”
  • ¶5: Falsely claiming that the “faltering” of Biden’s campaign “created a test for the alliance that it did not anticipate.”
  • ¶6: Adopting the passive voice to project its obsession with Biden’s delivery onto NATO’s leaders: “Mr. Biden made no mention of his political troubles, but he could not have escaped the fact that every word was being scrutinized for signs of faltering.”
  • ¶7: Declaring that, “By all measures, he passed the test,” but then caveating that judgement by explaining what teleprompters are.
  • ¶8: Quoting Biden’s comments to George Stephanopoulos about his role in leading NATO.
  • ¶9: Mentioning Biden’s attempt to draw a contrast with Trump and derisively adding, “the man he swears he can still beat in November.”
  • ¶10: Describing Biden’s goal for the contrast.
  • ¶13: Explaining that, “Mr. Biden’s own aides concede that no matter how well the president performs [at NATO] he cannot make Americans unsee his debate performance.”
  • ¶14: Falsely claiming that “confidence in its core member” was in doubt only because of Biden’s debate performance, and not Trump generally.

Compare that wildly partisan approach with the WaPo, which said only, “the summit is a moment of intense scrutiny as he faces pressure over his readiness to serve another four years,” in ¶12 out of 43 paragraphs (though WaPo has since added a story comparable to NYT’s, complete with claims of “defian[ce]”).

To sustain this fairytale — that the NATO summit exists merely as a measure of Biden’s ability to recover from his debate — David Sanger and Lara Jakes lie.

As noted, in ¶5, they claim that no one was worried about whether NATO could sustain its support for Ukraine until Biden’s campaign “faltered.”

The faltering of Mr. Biden’s campaign has also created a test for the alliance that it did not anticipate: whether it can credibly maintain the momentum it has built in supporting Ukraine and serving as a bulwark against further aggression when confidence in its most important player has never been more fragile. [my emphasis]

That is a lie. And one way we can be sure it is a lie — and that David Sanger knows it is a lie — is because a guy name David Sanger wrote this article, in February, which the NYT printed on A1 of the newspaper.

The February article not only describes that even before Trump suggested he would let Putin invade NATO countries, European leaders were already discussing what would happen if Trump withdrew from NATO. And that article explicitly contrasts Trump’s threats to abandon the alliance with Biden’s vocal support of it.

Long before Donald J. Trump threatened over the weekend that he was willing to let Russia “do whatever the hell they want” against NATO allies that do not contribute sufficiently to collective defense, European leaders were quietly discussing how they might prepare for a world in which America removes itself as the centerpiece of the 75-year-old alliance.

Even allowing for the usual bombast of one of his campaign rallies, where he made his declaration on Saturday, Mr. Trump may now force Europe’s debate into a far more public phase.

So far the discussion in the European media has focused on whether the former president, if returned to office, would pull the United States out of NATO.

But the larger implication of his statement is that he might invite President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to pick off a NATO nation, as a warning and a lesson to the 30 or so others about heeding Mr. Trump’s demands.

His statement stunned many in Europe, especially after three years in which President Biden, attempting to restore the confidence in the alliance lost during Mr. Trump’s four years in office, has repeatedly said that the United States would “defend every inch of NATO territory.” [my emphasis]

Now, five months after setting up that stark contrast, David Sanger suggests that when Biden made the contrast himself in his NATO speech, it was just politics.

They were largely complimentary as Mr. Biden talked about America’s and the West’s “sacred obligation” to come to the aid of free nations and democracies under attack. He was clearly drawing a contrast with former President Donald J. Trump, the man he swears he can still beat in November. To drive home the difference between Mr. Trump’s Republican Party and the party of decades past, Mr. Biden quoted former President Ronald Reagan: “If you are threatened, we are threatened. If you’re not at peace, we cannot be at peace.”

Mr. Biden’s goal was clear: to establish Mr. Trump, with his “America First” approach and threats to withdraw the United States from the alliance, as a threat not only to NATO nations but also to his own country.

Even as Trump — in the debate that NYT deems such a disaster for Biden — described speaking to Putin about his invasion of Ukraine in advance ..,

When Putin saw that, he said, you know what? I think we’re going to go in and maybe take my – this was his dream. I talked to him about it, his dream.

David Sanger now ignores his past reporting about the very real threat that Trump posed and still poses to NATO and American security, and rewrites that into a fairytale about Biden’s age.

This election was always going to be at least close. As Sanger himself reported months ago, European allies have been anticipating the significance of a second Trump term for months.

Yet now, because the NYT is so determined to make Biden’s electoral chances the cause for everything, Trump’s own preferences get a pass and are now caused by Biden’s plight.

The cause for NATO’s concerns is Trump. Not Biden’s campaign. And once upon a time, NYT reported it that way.

The Bankrupt Attribution of WannaCry

I’ve been puzzling through this briefing, purportedly attributing the WannaCry hack to North Korea, which followed last night’s Axis of CyberEvil op-ed (here’s the text). The presser was … perhaps even more puzzling than the Axis of CyberEvil op-ed.

Unlike the op-ed, Homeland Security Czar Tom Bossert provided hints about how the government came to attribute this attack.

Bossert makes much of the fact that the Five Eyes plus Japan all agree on this.

We do so with evidence, and we do so with partners.

Other governments and private companies agree.  The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan have seen our analysis, and they join us in denouncing North Korea for WannaCry.

He also points to the Microsoft and (unnamed — because it’d be downright awkward to name Kaspersky in the same briefing where you attack them as a cybersecurity target) security consultant attributions from months ago.

Commercial partners have also acted.  Microsoft traced the attack to cyber affiliates of the North Korean government, and others in the security community have contributed their analysis.

Here are the specific things he says about how the US, independent of Microsoft and villains like Kaspersky, made an attribution.

What we did was, rely on — and some of it I can’t share, unfortunately — technical links to previously identified North Korean cyber tools, tradecraft, operational infrastructure.  We had to examine a lot.  And we had to put it together in a way that allowed us to make a confident attribution.

[snip]

[I]t’s a little tradecraft, to get to your second question.  It’s hard to find that smoking gun, but what we’ve done here is combined a series of behaviors.  We’ve got analysts all over the world, but also deep and experienced analysts within our intelligence community that looked at not only the operational infrastructure, but also the tradecraft and the routine and the behaviors that we’ve seen demonstrated in past attacks.  And so you have to apply some gumshoe work here, not just some code analysis.

Nevertheless, Bossert alludes to people launching this attack from “keyboards all over the world,” but says because these “intermediaries … had carried out those types of attacks on behalf of the North Korean government in the past,” they were confident in the attribution.

People operating keyboards all over the world on behalf of a North Korean actor can be launching from places that are not in North Korea.  And so that’s one of the challenges behind cyber attribution.

[snip]

[T]here were actors on their behalf, intermediaries, carrying out this attack, and that they had carried out those types of attacks on behalf of the North Korean government in the past.  And that was one of the tradecraft routines that allowed us to reach that conclusion.

Taking credit for stuff the private sector did

In his prewritten statement, Bossert provides on explanation for the timing of all this. One of the reasons the US is attributing the WannaCry attack now — aside from the need to gin up war with North Korea — is that Facebook and Microsoft, “acting on their own initiative last week,” took action last week against North Korean targets.

We applaud our corporate partners, Microsoft and Facebook especially, for acting on their own initiative last week without any direction by the U.S. government or coordination to disrupt the activities of North Korean hackers.  Microsoft acted before the attack in ways that spared many U.S. targets.

Last week, Microsoft and Facebook and other major tech companies acted to disable a number of North Korean cyber exploits and disrupt their operations as the North Koreans were still infecting computers across the globe.  They shut down accounts the North Korean regime hackers used to launch attacks and patched systems.

Yet even while acknowledging that Microsoft and Facebook are busy keeping the US safe, he demands that the private sector … keep us safe.

We call today — I call today, and the President calls today, on the private sector to increase its accountability in the cyber realm by taking actions that deny North Korea and the bad actors the ability to launch reckless and disruptive cyber acts.

Golly how do you think the US avoided damage from the attack based on US tools so well?

Then Bossert invites Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications at DHS Jeanette Manfra to explain not how the US attributed this attack (the ostensible point of this presser), but how the US magically avoided getting slammed — by an attack based on US tools — as badly as other countries did.

By midafternoon, I had all of the major Internet service providers either on the phone or on our watch floor sharing information with us about what they were seeing globally and in the United States.  We partnered with the Department of Health and Human Services to reach out to hospitals across the country to offer assistance.  We engaged with federal CIOs across our government to ensure that our systems were not vulnerable.  I asked for assistance from our partners in the IT and cybersecurity industry.  And by 9:00 p.m. that night, I had over 30 companies represented on calls, many of whom offered us analytical assistance throughout the weekend.

By working closely with these companies and the FBI throughout that night, we were able to issue a technical alert, publicly, that would assist defenders with defeating this malware.  We stayed on alert all weekend but were largely able to escape the impacts here in this country that other countries experienced.

Managing to avoid getting slammed by an attack that the US had far more warning of (because it would have recognized and had 96 days to prepare) is proof, Manfra argues, of our preparation to respond to attacks we didn’t write the exploit for.

[T]he WannaCry attack demonstrated our national capability to effectively operate and respond.

Ix-Nay on the AdowBrokers-Shay

Which brings us to the dramatic climax of this entire presser, where Tom Bossert plays dumb about the fact that his this attack exploited an NSA exploit. In his first attempt to deflect this question, Bossert tried to distinguish between vulnerabilities and the exploits NSA wrote for them.

Q    Had they not been able to take advantage of the vulnerabilities that got published in the Shadow Brokers website, do you think that would have made a significant difference in their ability to carry out the attack?

MR. BOSSERT:  Yeah.  So I think what Dave is alluding to here is that vulnerabilities exist in software.  They’re not — almost never designed on purpose.  Software producers are making a product, and they’re selling it for a purpose.

Pretending a vulnerability is the same thing as an exploit, Bossert pointed to the (more visible but still largely the same) Vulnerabilities Exploit Process Trump has instituted.

When we find vulnerabilities, the United States government, we generally identify them and tell the companies so they can patch them.

In this particular case, I’m fairly proud of that process, so I’d like to elaborate.  Under this President’s leadership and under the leadership of Rob Joyce, who’s serving as my deputy now and the cybersecurity coordinator, we have led the most transparent Vulnerabilities Equities Process in the world.

Hey, by the way, why isn’t Rob Joyce at this presser so the person in government best able to protect against cyber attacks can answer questions?

Oh, never mind–let’s continue with this VEP thing.

And what that means is the United States government finds vulnerabilities in software, routinely, and then, at a rate of almost 90 percent, reveals those.  They could be useful tools for us to then exploit for our own national security benefit.  But instead, what we choose to do is share those back with the companies so that they can patch and increase the collective defense of the country.  It’s not fair for us to keep those exploits while people sit vulnerable to those totalitarian regimes that are going to bring harm to them.

So, in this particular case, I’m proud of the VEP program.  And I’d go one step deeper for you:  Those vulnerabilities that we do keep, we keep for very specific purposes so that we can increase our national security.  And we use them for very specific purposes only tailored to our perceived threats.  I think that they’re used very carefully.  They need to be protected in such a way that we don’t leak them out and so that bad people can get them.  That has happened, unfortunately, in the past.

Hell! Let’s go for broke. Let’s turn the risk that someone can steal our toys and set off a global worm into the promise that we’ll warn people they’ve been hacked.

But one level even deeper.  When we do use those vulnerabilities to develop exploits for the purpose of national security for the classified work that we do, we sometimes find evidence of bad behavior.  Sometimes it allows us to attribute bad actions.  Other times it allows us to privately call — and we’re doing this on a regular basis, and we’re doing it better and in a more routine fashion as this administration advances — we’re able to call targets that aren’t subject to big rollouts.  We’re able to call companies, and we’re able to say to them, “We believe that you’ve been hacked.  You need to take immediate action.”  It works well; we need to get better at doing that.  And I think that allows us to save a lot of time and money.

We’re not yet broke yet, though! When Bossert again gets asked whether WannaCry was based off a US tool, he tried to argue the only tool involved was the final WannaCry one, not than the underlying NSA exploit.

Q    So you talked about the 90 percent of times when you guys share information back with companies rather than exploit those vulnerabilities.  Was this one of the 10 percent that you guys had held onto?

MR. BOSSERT:  So I think there’s a case to be made for the tool that was used here being cobbled together from a number of different sources.  But the vulnerability that was exploited — the exploit developed by the culpable party here — is the tool, the bad tool.

This soon descends into full-on Sergeant Schultz.

I don’t know what they got and where they got it, but they certainly had a number of things cobbled together in a pretty complicated, intentional tool meant to cause harm that they didn’t entirely create themselves.

MalwareTech took a risk doing what he always does [er, did, before the US government kidnapped him] with malware?

Then there’s weird bit — one of those Bossert moments (like when he said WannaCry was spread by phishing) that makes me think he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. When asked if this North Korean attribution changed the government’s intent to prosecute MalwareTech (Marcus Hutchins), Bossert dodged that tricksy question (the answer is, yes, the prosecution is still on track to go to trial next year) but then claimed that Hutchins “took a risk” doing something he has repeatedly said he always does when responding to malware.

I can’t comment on the ongoing criminal prosecution or judicial proceedings there.  But I will note that, to some degree, we got lucky.  In a lot of ways, in the United States we were well-prepared.  So it wasn’t luck — it was preparation, it was partnership with private companies, and so forth.  But we also had a programmer that was sophisticated, that noticed a glitch in the malware, a kill-switch, and then acted to kill it.  He took a risk, it worked, and it caused a lot of benefit.  So we’ll give him that.  Next time, we’re not going to get so lucky.

After dodging the issue of why the government is prosecuting the guy whose “luck” Bossert acknowledges saved the world, he has the gall to say — in the very next breath!! — we need to do the kind of information sharing that Hutchins’ prosecution disincents.

So what we’re calling on here today is an increased partnership, an increased rapidity in routine speed of sharing information so that we can prevent patient zero from being patient 150.

Whatever you do, don’t follow the lack of money

All that was bad enough. But then things really went off the rail when a journalist asked about what one of the poorest countries on earth — a country with a severe exchangeable currency shortage — did with the money obtained in this ransomware attack.

Q    Tom, the purpose of ransomware is to raise money.  So do you have a sense now of exactly how much money the North Koreans raised as a result of this?  And do you have any idea what they did with the money?  Did it go to fund the nuclear program?  Did it go just to the regime for its own benefit?  Or where did that money go?

MR. BOSSERT:  Yeah, it’s interesting.  There’s two conundrums here.  First, we don’t really know how much money they raised, but they didn’t seem to architect it in the way that a smart ransomware architect would do.  They didn’t want to get a lot of money out of this.  If they did, they would have opened computers if you paid.  Once word got out that paying didn’t unlock your computer, the payment stopped.

And so I think that, in this case, this was a reckless attack and it was meant to cause havoc and destruction.  The money was an ancillary side benefit.  I don’t think they got a lot of it.

Wow. A couple things here. First, of one of the poorest countries in the world, Bossert said with a straight face: “They didn’t want to get a lot of money out of this.”

He has to do that, because he has just said that, “They’ve got some smart programmers.” So he has to treat the attack, as implemented, as the attack that the perpetrators wanted. That apparently doesn’t mean he feels bound to offer some explanation for why North Korea would forgo the money that their smart programmers could have earned. Because he never offers that, without which you have zero credible attribution.

Still nuttier, at one level it cannot be true that “we don’t know how much money they raised.” Later in his presser he claims, “cryptocurrency might be difficult to track” and suggests the government only learned about how little they were making because, “targets seem to have reported to us, by and large, that they mostly didn’t pay. … So we were able to track the behavior of the targets in that case.”

Um. No. It was very public! We watched WannaCry’s perps collect $144,000 via the @Actual_ransom account, and we watched the account be cashed out in the immediate wake of the aforementioned MalwareTech arrest (as Hutchins noted, making it look like he had absconded with his Bitcoin rather than gotten arrested by the FBI).  That, too, is a detail that Bossert would have needed to address for this to be a marginally credible press conference.

But wait! There’s more! We also know that as soon as WannaCry’s perps publicly cashed out, Shapeshift blacklisted all its known accounts, making it impossible for WannaCry to launder the money, and adding still more transparency to the process. Which means Bossert should know well the answer to the question “how much did North Korea (or whatever perp) make off this?” is, zero. None. Because their money got cut off in the laundering process. (For some reason, Bossert gave Shapeshift zero credit here, which raises further questions I might return to at a later date.) Either attribution includes details about this process or … it’s not credible.

Bossert’s backflips to pretend Trump isn’t treating North Korea differently than Russia

Now, all this is before you get into the gymnastics Bossert performed to pretend that Trump isn’t treating North Korea — against whom this attribution will serve as justification for war — differently than Russia. After being asked about it, Bossert claimed,

President Trump not only continued the national emergency for cybersecurity, but he did so himself and sanctioned the Russians involved in the hacks of last year.

His effort to conflate last year’s hack-related sanctions with the sanctions imposed by Congress but not fully implemented looked really pathetic.

Q    Have all the sanctions been implemented?

MR. BOSSERT:  This was — yeah, this was the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.  President Trump continued that national emergency, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to deal with the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”

Pivoting to one of the most important private companies

Immediately after which, perhaps in an act of desperation, Bossert pivoted to Kaspersky, one of the most important security firms in unpacking WannaCry and therefore utterly central to any claim the answer to cyberattacks is to share between the private and public sector. Bossert said this to defend the claim that the Trump administration is taking Russian threats seriously.

Now, look, in addition, if that’s not making people comfortable, this year we acted to remove Kaspersky from all of our federal networks.  We did so because having a company that can report back information to the Russian government constituted a risk unacceptable to our federal networks.

And then — in the same press conference where Bossert hailed cooperation, including with private security firms like Kaspersky, he boasted about how “in the spirit of cooperation” the US has gotten “providers, sellers, retail stores” to ban one of the firms that was critical in analyzing and minimizing the WannaCry impact.

In the spirit of cooperation, which is the second pillar of our strategy — accountability being one, cooperation being the second — we’ve had providers, sellers, retail stores follow suit.  And we’ve had other private companies and other foreign governments also follow suit with that action.

In case you’re counting, he has boasted about cooperation in the same breath as speaking of both MalwareTech and Kaspersky.

Whatever. From this we’re supposed to conclude we should go to war against North Korea and their non-NK keyboarders the world over and  that the way to defend ourselves against them is to simultaneously demand “cooperation” even while treating two of the most important entities who minimized the threat of WannaCry as outlaws.

The Special Sanger Cyber Unicorn: Iran Warmonger Edition

I noted earlier that the reporting on the US not imposing cybersanctions on China appears to have credulously served its purpose in creating a narrative that may have helped create the environment for some kind of deal with China.

NYT’s David Sanger did his own version of that story which deserves special focus because it is so full of nonsense — and nonsense that targets Iran, not China.

Sanger starts his tale by quoting something President Obama said at Fort Meade over the weekend out of context. In response to a question about the direction of cybersecurity in the next 5-10 years, Obama spoke generally about both state and non-state actors.

Q Good afternoon, Mr. President. You alluded to in your opening remarks the threat that cyber currently is. And there’s been a lot of talk within the DOD and cyber community of the possibility of a separate branch of the military dedicated to cyber. I was wondering where you see cyber in the next five to ten years.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it’s a great question. We initiated Cyber Command, anticipating that this is going to be a new theater for potential conflict. And what we’ve seen by both state and non-state actors is the increasing sophistication of hacking, the ability to penetrate systems that we previously thought would be secure. And it is moving fast. So, offense is moving a lot faster than defense.

Part of this has to do with the way the Internet was originally designed. It was not designed with the expectation that there would end up being three or four or five billion people doing commercial transactions, et cetera. It was thought this was just going to be an academic network to share papers and formulas and whatnot. And so the architecture of the Internet makes it very difficult to defend consistently.

We continue to be the best in the world at understanding and working within cyber. But other countries have caught up. The Russians are good. The Chinese are good. The Iranians are good. And you’ve got non-state hackers who are excellent. And unlike traditional conflicts and aggression, oftentimes we don’t have a return address. If somebody hacks into a system and goes after critical infrastructure, for example, or penetrates our financial systems, we can’t necessarily trace it directly to that state or that actor. That makes it more difficult as well. [my emphasis]

Sanger excised all reference to “excellent” non-state hackers, and instead made this a comment about hacking by state actors.

“Offense is moving a lot faster than defense,” Mr. Obama told troops on Friday at Fort Meade, Md., home of the National Security Agency and the United States Cyber Command. “The Russians are good. The Chinese are good. The Iranians are good.” The problem, he said, was that despite improvements in tracking down the sources of attacks, “we can’t necessarily trace it directly to that state,” making it hard to strike back.

Sanger then took this comment very specifically directed at the upcoming Xi visit and China,

And this is something that we’re just at the infancy of.  Ultimately, one of the solutions we’re going to have to come up with is to craft agreements among at least state actors about what’s acceptable and what’s not.  And so, for example, I’m going to be getting a visit from President Xi of China, a state visit here coming up in a couple of weeks.  We’ve made very clear to the Chinese that there are certain practices that they’re engaging in that we know are emanating from China and are not acceptable.  And we can choose to make this an area of competition — which I guarantee you we’ll win if we have to — or, alternatively, we can come to an agreement in which we say, this isn’t helping anybody; let’s instead try to have some basic rules of the road in terms of how we operate.

And suggested it was directed at other states more generally.

Then he issued a warning: “There comes a point at which we consider this a core national security threat.” If China and other nations cannot figure out the boundaries of what is acceptable, “we can choose to make this an area of competition, which I guarantee you we’ll win if we have to.”

Sanger then spends six paragraphs talking about how hard a time Obama is having “deterring” cyberattacks even while reporting that China and the US have forged some kind of deal that would establish norms that are different than deterrence but might diminish attacks. He also, rather curiously, talks (again) about “unprecedented” theft of personal information in the OPM hack that we need to deter — even though James Clapper has repeatedly said publicly that we do the same thing (and by some measures, on a much bigger scale).

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Amano, Sanger Still Trying to Disrupt P5+1 Deal With Iran

Monday is the deadline set by the P5+1 group of nations and Iran for achieving a final agreement on steps to assure the world that Iran’s nuclear program is only aimed at the civilian uses of producing electricity and providing isotopes for medical use. With that deadline rapidly approaching, those who take a more hawkish view toward Iran and wish to see no agreement are doing their best to disrupt the negotiations as they enter the home stretch to an agreement or another extension of the interim agreement, which is nearing a year under which Iran has met all of its obligations.

A primary tool used by those who prefer war with Iran over diplomacy is Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Keeping right on schedule, Amano has interjected himself into the story on the final stage P5+1 talks (in which IAEA has no role) and one of his chief transcribers, Fredrik Dahl of Reuters, has fulfilled his usual role of providing an outlet for those wishing to disrupt a deal. Today’s emission from Amano [Note: During the time that this post was being written, Reuters changed the Fredrik Dahl piece that is being referenced. Here is an upload of the version of the story as it appeared with an 8:09 am Eastern time stamp. Usually, Reuters just sends new stories out with new url’s, but the url under which the 8:09 version loaded for me now loads a 10:09 story by different reporters discussing a likely extension of negotiations to March.]:

Iran has yet to explain suspected atomic bomb research to the U.N. nuclear agency, its head said on Thursday, just four days before a deadline for a comprehensive deal between Iran and six world powers to end the 12-year-old controversy.

After nearly a year of difficult diplomacy, Washington is pushing for agreement on at least the outline of a future accord and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will attend talks with Iran, France, Germany, Britain, Russia and China on Friday.

But Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, made clear it was far from satisfied, saying it was not in a position to provide “credible assurance” Iran had no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

It comes as no surprise that Amano would try to disrupt the talks at such a critical juncture. Recall that he replaced Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammad elBaradei in 2009. Amano laid low for a while, but in 2011 came out swinging against Iran. By moving in such a politically motivated way, I noted at that time that Amano was doing huge damage to the credibility of the IAEA after its terrific work under elBaradei.

Amano was carefully chosen and groomed for his role at IAEA.

Wikileaks documents revealed in 2010 showed how Amano assured US “diplomats” that he would be solidly in the US camp when it came to pursuing charges against Iran’s nuclear program:

Amano reminded [the] ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77 [the developing countries group], which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.

More candidly, Amano noted the importance of maintaining a certain “constructive ambiguity” about his plans, at least until he took over for DG ElBaradei in December.

And what of these “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear work that Amano is holding against Iran? They are based on a total fabrication known as the laptop of death. Further, IAEA is not structured or staffed in a way for it to be the appropriate vehicle for determining whether work in Iran is weapons-related. It is, however, built for monitoring and accounting for enrichment of uranium, where it has found Iran to divert no material from its declared nuclear power plant fuel cycle.

Amano is far from alone in his campaign to disrupt the talks. Recall that a couple of weeks ago, David Sanger took to the front page of the New York Times to plant the erroneous idea the Iran was nearing an agreement to outsource its enrichment of uranium to Russia. The Times never noted nor corrected the error, which, conveniently for Sanger and other opponents of a deal, could give hardliners in Iran another opening for opposing any deal.

Sanger returned to the front page of the Times on Monday to gleefully list the forces he sees arrayed against any deal with Iran. Remarkably, Sanger did at least make an offhand correction to his earlier error (but of course there still is no note or change on the original erroneous report). He only does this, though, while also describing how he thinks Russia could undermine the breakthrough in which they have played a huge role:

Perhaps the most complex political player is Russia. It has remained a key element of the negotiating team, despite its confrontations with the West over Ukraine. It has been a central player in negotiating what may prove the key to a deal: a plan for Iran to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russian territory for conversion into fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

But Russian officials may want an extension of the talks that keeps any real agreement in limbo — and thus keeps Iranian oil off the market, so that it cannot further depress falling prices.

So, yes, Sanger finally admits the deal would be for Russia to convert low enriched uranium to fuel rods, not to do the enrichment itself, but only while also cheering on what he sees as a path for Russia keep Iranian oil off international markets.

Missing from Sanger’s list of forces lined up against a deal with Iran are those working behind the scenes in the US intelligence and “diplomatic” communities. Those forces gave state secrets to United Against Nuclear Iran to be used in false allegations against a Greek shipping firm providing goods to Iran that were not subject to sanctions. We still don’t know what that information was nor how UANI came into its possession because the Justice Department has intervened to quash disclosure in the lawsuit resulting from the false allegations.

As we enter what is slated to be the final weekend of the negotiations, the stakes are clear. Barack Obama has gladly jumped on board with most neocon dreams of open war in many of their target nations. Iran remains a huge prize for them, but so far Obama has shown remarkable resolve in pushing for an agreement that could avert a catastrophic war that would make the current ones look only like small skirmishes. I’m hoping for the best this weekend, but I also worry about what opponents of the negotiations may have in store for their final move.

Glaring Front Page Error by David Sanger, New York Times as Iran Nuclear Negotiations Near Deadline

See the update below, as of about 2:45 pm, the Times has changed the wording of the erroneous paragraph without adding a note of the correction. Oops. I got off on the wrong paragraph when I checked back. See the comment from Tony Papert below.

For someone who has written on a range of technical issues for many years, the error committed last night by David Sanger could not be worse nor come at a worse time for the important events he is attempting to cover. In an article put up last night on the New York Times website and apparently carried on page A1 of today’s print edition, Sanger and the Times have garbled a key point at the heart of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations as they near the critical November 24 deadline for achieving a full agreement on the heels of last year’s interim agreement.

The article ostensibly was to announce a major breakthrough in the negotiations, although Gareth Porter had worked out the details of the progress last week. Here is what Porter deduced:

The key to the new approach is Iran’s willingness to send both its existing stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) as well as newly enriched uranium to Russia for conversion into fuel for power plants for an agreed period of years.

In the first official indication of the new turn in the negotiations, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Marzieh Afkham acknowledged in a briefing for the Iranian press Oct. 22 that new proposals combining a limit on centrifuges and the transfer of Iran’s LEU stockpile to Russia were under discussion in the nuclear negotiations.

The briefing was translated by BBC’s monitoring service but not reported in the Western press.

Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, who heads the U.S. delegation to the talks, has not referred publicly to the compromise approach, but she appeared to be hinting at it when she said on Oct. 25 that the two sides had “made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable.”

As Porter goes on to explain, such an arrangement would allow Iran to maintain a large number of centrifuges continuing to enrich uranium, but because there would be no stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU), the “breakout time” (time required to highly enrich enough uranium for a nuclear weapon) would remain at about a year. By having Russia convert the LEU to fuel rods for Iran’s nuclear power plant, that LEU would be removed from any easy pathway to a weapon. This would provide Iran the “win” of maintaining its present level of around 10,000 operational centrifuges but give the P5+1 its goal of a longer breakout time. The key here is that unlike a proposal in 2005 where Russia would take over enrichment for Iran, this new proposal would allow Iran to continue its enrichment program while shipping virtually all of of its LEU to Russia for conversion to fuel rods.

Sanger appears to start off on the right track with his article:

Iran has tentatively agreed to ship much of its huge stockpile of uranium to Russia if it reaches a broader nuclear deal with the West, according to officials and diplomats involved in the negotiations, potentially a major breakthrough in talks that have until now been deadlocked.

Under the proposed agreement, the Russians would convert the uranium into specialized fuel rods for the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran’s only commercial reactor. Once the uranium is converted into fuel rods, it is extremely difficult to use them to make a nuclear weapon. That could go a long way toward alleviating Western concerns about Iran’s stockpile, though the agreement would not cut off every pathway that Tehran could take to obtain a nuclear weapon.

But about halfway through the article, Sanger displays a shocking ignorance of the real points of recent negotiations and somehow comes to the conclusion that Russia would be taking over enrichment for Iran rather than converting LEU into fuel rods:

For Russia, the incentives for a deal are both financial and political. It would be paid handsomely for enriching Iran’s uranium, continuing the monopoly it has in providing the Iranians with a commercial reactor, and putting it in a good position to build the new nuclear power reactors that Iran has said it intends to construct in the future. And it also places President Vladimir V. Putin at the center of negotiations that may well determine the future of the Middle East, a position he is eager to occupy.

Somehow, Sanger and his New York Times editors and fact-checkers are stuck in 2005, suggesting that Iran would negotiate away its entire enrichment program. Such a drastic move would never be contemplated by Iran today and we are left to wonder whether this language found its way into the Times article through mere incompetence or more nefarious motives meant to disrupt any possible deal by providing false information to hardliners in Iran.

At the time of this writing (just before 9 am on November 4), the Times still has not added any correction or clarification to the article, despite the error being pointed out on Twitter just after 10:30 pm last night (be sure to read the ensuing Twitter conversation where Laura Rozen and Cheryl Rofer work out the nature of the error).

Update: And now, around 2:45 in the afternoon, I see that the Times has changed the erroneous paragraph. So far, I don’t see a note that a correction has been made. Here is the edited paragraph:

Russia’s calculus is also complex. It stands to gain financially from the deal, but it also has an incentive to see the nuclear standoff between Iran and the rest of the world continue, because an embargo keeps Iranian oil off the market. With oil prices falling, a flood of exports from Iran could further depress prices.

Will they ever get around to adding a note? I’ll keep an eye out. Well dang, this is embarrassing. I went to the wrong paragraph when I looked back. The article is still unchanged. Thanks to Tony Papert in comments for catching my bone-headedness.

Warrick Selectively Edits Amano Remarks to CFR

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dfr8NQXmYKM[/youtube]

Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA,  appeared on the record yesterday at the Council on Foreign Relations. He presented a very brief statement and then the bulk of his time was spent in a wide-ranging question and answer session. The lineup of questioners included Barbara Slavin leading off, David Sanger near the middle and Gareth Porter getting in just before questioning was brought to a close.

Joby Warrick took advantage of Slavin’s question to present Iran in the worst possible light:

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Yukiya Amano said the nuclear watchdog would try again next week to visit the Parchin military base, a sprawling complex where Iran is thought to have conducted tests on high-precision explosives used to detonate a nuclear bomb.

Iran has repeatedly refused to let IAEA inspectors visit the base, on the outskirts of Tehran. Instead, in the months since the agency requested access, satellite photos have revealed what appears to be extensive cleanup work around the building where tests are alleged to have occurred.

“We are concerned that our capacity to verify would have been severely undermined,” Amano told a gathering of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. He noted Iran’s “extensive” cleanup effort at the site, which has included demolishing buildings and stripping away topsoil.

“We cannot say for sure that we would be able find something,” Amano said.

Notice the careful way in which Warrick has excerpted parts of what Amano said and inserted his own spin into the statements. If you listen carefully to what Amano says in response to Slavin’s question around the 27 minute mark of the video, you will see that Amano never characterizes the activities by Iran as sanitizing the site (as said in Warrick’s headline) or even that it was cleanup work, as Warrick says in the body of the article. Amano does mention removal of soil, demolition of buildings and extensive use of water, but maintains that access to the site is necessary in order to have a clear understanding of both past and current activities there.

Amano sits in a a position of high tension. He must deal with the Wikileaks disclosures showing that he is much more aligned with the US than his predecessor, Mohamed ElBaradei. Perhaps helping him to navigate this delicate position, the host of the CFR event, George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, provided some background comments and posed questions to Amano aimed at allowing Amano to voice his overall goal of resolving issues diplomatically. Despite this claim by Amano that his goal is diplomatic solutions, he must deal with the fact that the issues his organization has been raising are cited (often in an embellished way, as Warrick does above) as grounds for an attack on Iran. Perkovich also used these comments as a way to provide an endorsement of sorts for a second term for Amano.

One of the better questions posed by Perkovich related to whether it is possible to come to agreement with Iran regarding boundaries for future activities while leaving unresolved questions about what may have taken place in the past. Read more

The House Judiciary Committee Preens in Full Ignorance at Leaks Hearing

The headline that has come out of yesterday’s House Judiciary Committee hearing on leaks is that the Committee may subpoena people. As US News correctly reports, one push for subpoenas came from a John Conyers ploy trying to call Republican members’ bluff; he basically asked how they could be sure who leaked the stories in question and if they were they should just subpoena those people to testify to the committee.

It’s a testament to the thin knowledge of these stories that none of the Republicans responded, “John Brennan.” But then, even if they had, the committee would quickly get into trouble trying to subpoena Brennan as National Security Advisors (and Deputy NSAs) have traditionally been excused from Congressional subpoena for deliberation reasons, a tradition reinforced by Bush’s approach with Condi Rice.

Ah well. I’m sure we’re going to have some amusing theater of Jim Sensenbrenner trying to force Conyers to come up with some names now.

The other big push for subpoenas, though, came from Trey Gowdy. Partly because he wanted to create an excuse to call a Special Prosecutor and partly because, just because, he was most interested in subpoenaing some journalists. And in spite of the way that former Assistant Attorney General Ken Wainstein patiently explained why there are good, national security, reasons why DOJ is hesitant to subpoena journalists, Gowdy wouldn’t let up.

But what concerned me more is that no one–not a single person on the House committee that oversees DOJ–explained that DOJ doesn’t need to subpoena journalists to find out who they’ve been talking to. They’ve given themselves the authority to get journalist call records in national security cases without Attorney General approval.

That’s a detail every member of the committee should know, particularly if they’re going to hold hearings about whether DOJ can adequately investigate leaks. And while I expect Trey Gowdy to be ignorant, it seems they all are ignorant of this detail.

There was another display of ignorance I find troubling for a different reason. Dan Lungren suggested that he learned of what we’re doing with StuxNet from David Sanger’s reports. He rightly noted that–as the Chair of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity–he ought to learn these things from the government, not the NYT. And while his ignorance of StuxNet’s escape may be due to the timing of his ascension to the Subcommittee Chair (most members of the Gang of Four, except Dianne Feinstein, would not have gotten briefed on early stages of StuxNet, when someone should have told the government what a boneheaded plan it was), the Subcommittee still should be aware that our own recklessness has made us vulnerable in dangerous new ways.

Perhaps the most telling detail of the hearing, though, came from retired Colonel Kenneth Allard. He was brought on, I guess, to label what we did with StuxNet an act of war (without, of course, considering whether that is the problem rather than the exposure that both Republican and Democratic Administrations are engaging in illegal war without telling anyone). In his comments, he went so far as to say that “What Mr. Sanger did is equivalent of having KGB operation run against White House.”

Someone had to accuse the journalists of being enemy spies.

But Allard’s statement reveals where all this comes from: personal pique against the NYT for coverage they’ve done on him. Not only did he complain that David Sanger’s publisher didn’t give the New York Journal of Books, for which he writes reviews, an advance copy, but also that the NYT reported on the scam the Pentagon set up to give select Generals and Colonels inside information to spin favorably on TV.

Third, I have personally experienced what it feels like when the NYT deliberately distorts national security information, even to the point of plagiarism. On April 20, 2008, the NYT published an inflammatory expose: “Behind Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand” by David Barstow. The Times’ article charged that over 70 retired officers, including me, had misused our positions while serving as military analysts with the broadcast and cable TV networks. Read more

StuxNet: Covert Op-Exposing Code In, Covert Op-Exposing Code Out

In this interview between David Sanger and Jake Tapper, Sanger makes a striking claim: that he doesn’t know who leaked StuxNet.

I’ll tell you a deep secret. Who leaked the fact? Whoever it was who programmed this thing and made a mistake in it in 2010 so that the bug made it out of the Natanz nuclear plant, got replicated around the world so the entire world could go see this code and figure out that there was some kind of cyberattack underway. I have no idea who that person was. It wasn’t a person, it wasn’t a person, it was a technological error.

At one level, Sanger is just making the point I made here: the age of cyberwar may erode even very disciplined Administration attempts to cloak their covert operations in secrecy. Once StuxNet got out, it didn’t take Administration (or Israeli) sources leaking to expose the program.

But I’m amused that Sanger claims he doesn’t know who leaked the information because he doesn’t know who committed the “technological error” that allowed the code to escape Natanz. I find it particularly amusing given that Dianne Feinstein recently suggested Sanger misled her about what he would publish (while not denying she might call for jailing journalists who report such secrets).

What you have are very sophisticated journalists. David Sanger is one of the best. I spoke–he came into my office, he saw me, we’ve worked together at the Aspen Strategy Institute. He assured me that what he was publishing he had worked out with various agencies and he didn’t believe that anything was revealed that wasn’t known already. Well, I read the NY Times article and my heart dropped because he wove a tapestry which has an impact that’s beyond any single one thing. And he’s very good at what he does and he spent a year figuring it all out.

Sanger claims, now that DiFi attacked him, he doesn’t know who made this “technological error.”

But that’s not what he said in his article, as I noted here. His article clearly reported two sources–one of them a quote from Joe Biden–blaming the Israelis.

An error in the code, they said, had led it to spread to an engineer’s computer when it was hooked up to the centrifuges. When the engineer left Natanz and connected the computer to the Internet, the American- and Israeli-made bug failed to recognize that its environment had changed. It began replicating itself all around the world. Suddenly, the code was exposed, though its intent would not be clear, at least to ordinary computer users.

“We think there was a modification done by the Israelis,” one of the briefers told the president, “and we don’t know if we were part of that activity.”

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