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Stan Woodward Reportedly Concedes a Duty of Loyalty But Doesn’t Want His Name Used at Trial

In this post, I pointed out what all the coverage of the Garcia hearing last week missed: The prior briefing had been about whether to hold a Garcia hearing. It wasn’t about what to include in the briefing, which should all stem from ethical conflict rules.

On Monday, Judge Aileen Cannon (while blaming the Special Counsel’s Office) ordered that briefing.

In SCO’s submission in response, they clearly laid out not just that they had established the reason why Stan Woodward couldn’t cross-examine a former client, but that they had laid that out from their initial briefing — over two months ago, they observe — on the Garcia hearing: it arises from the Bar rules in both Florida and DC.

As the Government stated in its initial motion for a Garcia hearing, filed more than two months ago, “[a]n attorney’s cross-examination of a current or former client presents a conflict of interest.” ECF No. 97, at 6. Nor can Mr. Woodward otherwise seek to discredit Trump Employee 4 at trial, including in closing arguments.

And this time around they did what they should have been prepared to do at last week’s hearing: Cite 11th Circuit precedent.

Under the Florida ethics rules, “attorneys generally owe duties of confidentiality and loyalty to former clients.” Med. & Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. v. Oppenheim, 981 F.3d 983, 990 (11th Cir. 2020); see Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.9. These duties both come into play when, as here, a former client testifies at trial against a current client in a substantially related matter. During cross-examination, the attorney might “improperly” use the prior client’s confidential information or, alternatively, hold back from “intense probing” to avoid using those confidences. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994). When the subject matters of the representations are substantially related, “the court will irrebutably presume that relevant confidential information was disclosed during the former period of representation.” Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 859 (11th Cir. 1999). And given the duty of loyalty, a lawyer cross-examining a client, including a former client, faces “an impossible choice: [the attorney] can either vigorously cross-examine the client-turned-witness and thereby violate his duty of loyalty to the client on the witness stand, or he can temper his cross-examination and risk violating his duty of loyalty to the client on trial.” United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323 & n.17 (11th Cir. 2003). [my emphasis]

In its filing, SCO accuses Woodward of denying his ethical obligations to a former client at the contentious hearing last week, then lays out Florida precedent establishing it.

At the hearing on October 12, 2023, Mr. Woodward disputed that he had a duty of loyalty to his former clients, referring to “my hypothetical duty of loyalty to a former client, which again we dispute that duty even exists.” 10/12/2023 Hearing Tr. at 19. Similarly, when the Government conferred with Mr. Woodward in connection with this filing on October 17, 2023, Mr. Woodward continued to question whether he owes an ongoing duty of loyalty to Trump Employee 4. There is no basis for dispute: “a duty of loyalty exists apart and distinct from the duty to maintain client confidences.” United States v. Culp, 934 F. Supp. 394, 398 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Indeed, although Mr. Woodward and Mr. Irving have agreed to have another attorney conduct the cross-examination of their clients, courts frequently disqualify attorneys even where the attorneys propose that another attorney will conduct the cross-examination of a former client. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, No. 12-CR-20157, 2013 WL 5741834, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2013); Delorme, 2009 WL 33836, at *7; United States v. Miranda, 936 F. Supp. 945, 952 (S.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Perez, 694 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Consistent with these authorities, Mr. Woodward acknowledged today that his ethical obligations to Trump Employee 4 and Witness 1 may constrain his ability to discredit those clients at trial, including during closing arguments. [my emphasis]

Importantly, the full context — at the hearing — of Woodward’s suggestion that he does not owe Taveras any duty of loyalty pertained to moving to strike Taveras’ testimony.

I am not certainly prepared to advise Mr. Nauta if he is prepared to proceed with a trial in which he doesn’t know what role his principal choice of counsel can play because, again, in the case law cited by the Government this isn’t limited to summation. The Government used summation as an example, but would I also be precluded from filing a motion to strike Trump Employee 4’s testimony because that potentially implicates his credibility, or my hypothetical duty of loyalty to a former client, which again we dispute that that duty actually exists. [my emphasis]

Those citations SCO provided of instances where courts have disqualified attorneys entirely may be why — at least per SCO’s representation, though we shall see whether he actually says that in his own filing — Woodward conceded he may not be able to close on Taveras. He still seems committed to remaining in this impossible position, largely incapable of defending Nauta against a key charge.

But Woodard is still dug in on one topic: About whether his name can be used in conjunction with Taveras’ testimony.

It is all but certain that Trump Employee 4’s testimony before the grand jury (while represented by Mr. Woodward) and his subsequent retraction and disavowal of that testimony will be subjects of cross-examination and redirect. The questioning may also encompass the fact that Trump Employee 4 was represented by Mr. Woodward at the time of his grand jury testimony, that Mr. Woodward’s legal fees were paid by a PAC controlled by defendant Donald J. Trump, and that Trump Employee 4 procured new counsel and quickly retracted his prior grand jury testimony. All of these facts will be relevant to Trump Employee 4’s testimony and may come out at trial.1

1 When the Government conferred with Mr. Woodward in connection with this filing, he asserted that his name should not come up during examination of Trump Employee 4, but he agreed that the other information referenced above could be relevant. [my emphasis]

I suspect SCO was trying to avoid making all this plain. I also suspect they pulled a great many punches (though that may have arisen from page limits). According to earlier filings, SCO warned Woodward about this conflict in early 2023, and he did nothing about it.

Woodward will file his response today as well. I expect it to be quite contentious.

Stan Woodward Contemplating His Former Client Might “Become Unavailable” for Testimony

Last week, Judge Aileen Cannon had the much delayed Garcia vote to make sure that Trump’s co-defendants, Walt Nauta and Carlos De Oliveira, had knowingly waived any conflicts their attorneys had. The reporting on the hearing all focused on the scolding Cannon gave the Special Counsel’s Office, because they had brought up a possible risk — that Stan Woodward would impugn Yuscil Taveras during closing arguments — they hadn’t previously briefed.

I do want to admonish the Government for, frankly, wasting the Court’s time because, had you brought up these issues in an appropriate way, we could have done this without circling the wagons and creating confusion that was unnecessary. So, I am disappointed in that.

Immediately after the hearing, journalists presented conflicting stories about the hearing, some reporting that biggest flashpoint was an assertion by the government that Stan Woodward should be categorically excluded from cross-examining his former client Yuscil Taveras at trial, and others reporting the problem to be that SCO’s David Harbach suggested that Woodward should also be prevented from maligning the man he used to represent in closing arguments.

None of the coverage I saw got something very basic right: what the past briefing had been about.

The past briefing was about whether to have a Garcia hearing. It wasn’t about what to include in a Garcia hearing.

David Harbach, arguing for Special Counsel, even pointed that out in the morning session.

MR. HARBACH: Specifically it is our view that a lawyer who suffers under a conflict, that — in that situation the lawyer is precluded from — by his duty of loyalty to his [former] client, from arguing to the jury that his former client lacks credibility or attacking his former client’s character.

And those obligations flow from the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his or her former client, and do not turn on whether specific confidential information was provided to the lawyer that might or might not facilitate better or worse cross-examination of the witness.

THE COURT: All right. So, did you make this argument about sort of weaker arguments to juries in your papers?

MR. HARBACH: Not in our papers suggesting that we needed to have a hearing because that wasn’t necessary for the Court’s obligation to conduct this hearing.

Harbach pointed out — rather meekly — that previously they had only been arguing that Cannon needed to hold a hearing. She never asked what to include in it.

Don’t believe me? Here’s the tell: After the hearing, Judge Cannon ordered just that briefing.

On or before October 17, 2023, the parties shall meaningfully confer to further clarify the nature, scope, and potential manifestations of the conflicts alleged by the OSC regarding Stanley Woodward’s former representation of Trump Employee 4 and current representation of Witness 1. 1 This conferral should include a comprehensive discussion of the ways in which the OSC believes that Mr. Woodward’s former representation of Trump Employee 4 and current representation of Witness 1 could adversely affect Mr. Woodward’s performance so as to render his assistance of Defendant Nauta ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment.2 The OSC shall disclose to defense counsel all legal authorities in support of its position so that Mr. Woodward may adequately advise Defendant Nauta prior to the continued Garcia hearing.

Sure, she blamed Jack Smith’s team, pretending they brought up new stuff. They did! But they did so only because she had never considered the full scope of the conflict.

She still isn’t. She views the conflict exclusively in terms of Nauta’s rights; she’s ignoring Yuscil Taveras’ right to have his past attorney-client privilege respected.

None of the discussion at the hearing addressed the obligations under the Florida Bar, which SCO included in their original motion.

The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar reflect these concerns, providing that, absent informed consent, a lawyer “must not represent a client” if “there is a substantial risk” that the representation “will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client” or “a former client.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.7(a).4 Informed consent requires, among other things, that “each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.7(b)(4). The Rules further provide that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter must not” either “represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent” or “use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would permit or require with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.9(a)-(b). The commentary to the Rule explains that “information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client without the former client’s consent.” Fla. Bar R. Prof’l Conduct 4-1.9 commentary. [my emphasis]

And because journalists were so focused on Cannon blaming prosecutors, forgetting that she has already blamed prosecutors for her own fuck-ups and manufactured problems, they missed two specific things that Woodward said.

First, as ABC noted, Woodward was angriest that he might be be prevented from cross-examining Taveras. As part of his argument, he suggested he didn’t have to address that eventuality because Taveras — still a Trump employee — might instead “become[] unavailable.”

MR. HARBACH: So, that is why we think in this case it is crystal clear that Mr. Nauta should be advised and should be well aware of the possibility, likelihood, eventuality, however your Honor would like to put it, that his lawyer would not be able to cross-examine Trump Employee 4 at trial. That much seems clear, and we don’t, frankly, understand how Mr. Woodward could think that he could cross-examine Mr. — Trump Employee 4 under these circumstances. We are at a loss.

[snip]

MR. WOODWARD: To presume that I am incapable of cross-examining him is a presumption that is unnecessary because, contrary to the Government’s position, we don’t know that he will testify in this trial. There is the potential that the Court could preclude him from testifying. There is the potential that he becomes unavailable.

Woodward’s solution to a conflict is to contemplate that Taveras might become unavailable for testimony. Woodward did this even while arguing that SCO was asking both too early and too late for a conflicts hearing.

Plus, most coverage missed Stanley Woodward’s past claims.

It is absolutely bullshit that cross-examination didn’t come up. In Woodward’s sur-reply, his last bid to prevent this conflict hearing, he stated that of course cross-examination wouldn’t be a problem, because another attorney (Sasha Dadan) was available.

11 The Special Counsel’s Office cites particularly inapt conflict cases which reveal the lack of a sound basis to request the hearing that the Office now seeks. See United States v. Braun, No. 19-80030-CR, 2019 WL 1893113, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2019) (hearing as to, ”two defense attorneys from [the same firm, jointly] representing two defendants in this case[.]”); United States v. Schneider, 322 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1296-97 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (addressing representation of two co-defendants, where counsel represented first defendant in his role as a cooperating government witness, and then thereafter newly took on representation of the second defendant, the target of the cooperation, while still representing the first cooperating defendant). The case at bar – involving limited former representation, no ongoing joint representation, no indication of conflict resulting from the representation itself, no indication of attorney-client privileged information at issue, and no occasion for cross-examination by the counsel in question (as other counsel is available for same) – is entirely incompatible with these cases and demonstrates the insubstantiality of the Special Counsel’s Office’s present use of a conflict rationale. [my emphasis]

I wrote about Woodward’s comments in a post called, “Stan Woodward Thinks Aileen Cannon Is an Easy Mark.”

We will get SCO’s brief later today about the scope of what Cannon should be asking, with Woodward’s due tomorrow, and the follow-up hearing Friday.

But things are going to get testy. In her order, Cannon finally copped onto how testy they might get. She envisioned the possibility of considering a disqualification motion after the Garcia hearing.

2 To date, the OSC has not moved the Court to disqualify Mr. Woodward as counsel or to impose remedial measures on Mr. Woodward’s ability to perform as counsel for Defendant Nauta [ECF No. 97 p. 9]. Any consideration of disqualification or imposition of other remedial measures will be addressed following the Garcia hearing as part of the Court’s decision to accept or decline any proffered waiver.

Taveras has not waived privilege. It’s not clear how, under Florida Bar rules, Woodward can comment about the conflicting testimony Taveras gave while represented by the DC attorney.

Hillary’s Revenge: Trump Promised Voters He Would Protect Classified Information

According to NBC news, Jack Smith prosecutor David Harbach, not Jay Bratt, was at the Miami courthouse on Thursday as a grand jury indicted the former President.

That was a surprise to me. While Harbach has post-DOJ ties to Jack Smith from the Hague, at DOJ, he was primarily a corruption prosecutor.

A seasoned trial lawyer, Harbach has tried more than 35 cases to verdict in federal and state courts. He has also conducted some of the nation’s highest profile public corruption trials, including cases against former U.S. Senator John Edwards and former Virginia Governor Robert F. McDonnell.

Harbach was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 2005 to 2010, and for four years beginning in 2015, Harbach was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia. In 2016, he was appointed Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney and Criminal Supervisor of the Richmond Division office, overseeing 21 prosecutors.

From 2014 to 2015, Harbach served on detail as Special Counsel to FBI Director James Comey. Before his work with the FBI, Harbach served as a Trial Attorney in the DOJ Criminal Division’s Public Integrity Section, earning the Deputy Chief title after two years.

By all appearances, Smith had a corruption prosecutor present the Trump indictment to the jury, not DOJ’s head of counterintelligence Jay Bratt.

I didn’t even know Harbach was working this case! I thought he was working the January 6 case. I thought he was working on holding Trump accountable for defrauding a bunch of MAGA supporters, claiming they were paying for election integrity when instead it all went to paying staffers at his post-election office (including Walt Nauta).

Perhaps Bratt flew back to DC after attending the grand jury appearance for Taylor Budowich on Wednesday to deal with Stan Woodward’s accusations of ethical abuse. Perhaps Smith figured that, until that allegation is resolved, someone else should have their name on the official documents.

But Harbach’s apparent role in presenting the indictment is one of the things that made me look at two of my favorite passages differently. There’s this passage, which I call “Hillary’s Revenge.” It collects five of the instances in 2016 where Trump distinguished himself from Hillary Clinton by boasting of his purported concern for classified information.

22. As a candidate for President of the United States, TRUMP made the following public statements, among others, about classified information:

a. On August 18, 2016, TRUMP stated, “In my administration I’m going to enforce all laws concerning the protection of classified information. No one will be above the law.”

b. On September 6, 2016, TRUMP stated, “We also need to fight this battle by collecting intelligence and then protecting, protecting our classified secrets. . . . We can’t have someone in the Oval Office who doesn’t understand the meaning of the word confidential or classified.”

c. On September 7, 2016, TRUMP stated, “[O]ne of the first things we must do is to enforce all classification rules and to enforce all laws relating to the handling of classified information.”

d. On September 19, 2016, TRUMP stated, “We also need the best protection of classified information.”

e. On November 3, 2016, TRUMP stated, “Service members here in North Carolina have risked their lives to acquire classified intelligence to protect our country.”

Andrew Kaczynski put together all the instances of it.

In an Espionage Act indictment, this paragraph serves the function of demonstrating Trump’s awareness of the importance of classified information.

Then there’s this passage, which I call “Brennan’s Revenge.” It’s a statement that Trump issued to justify stripping John Brennan of his security clearance in 2018.

23. As President of the United States, on July 26, 2018, TRUMP issued the following statement about classified information:

As the head of the executive branch and Commander in Chief, I have a unique, Constitutional responsibility to protect the Nation’s classified information, including by controlling access to it. . . . More broadly, the issue of [a former executive branch official’s] security clearance raises larger questions about the practice of former officials maintaining access to our Nation’s most sensitive secrets long after their time in Government has ended. Such access is particularly inappropriate when former officials have transitioned into highly partisan positions and seek to use real or perceived access to sensitive information to validate their political attacks. Any access granted to our Nation’s secrets should be in furtherance of national, not personal, interests.

The circumstances around the statement are fascinating. Trump started publicly considering stripping security clearances after Rand Paul, fresh off a trip as a back channel to Putin, pitched it to Trump with two other unnamed people on July 23. Trump announced it on August 15, but then Brennan threatened to sue as obvious retaliation. The next year, NYT reported that Trump never did file the paperwork to strip the clearance.

Still, at least on first appearances, that background is not why this paragraph is in the indictment. Rather, it shows Trump’s awareness that you can’t take your privileged access to “our Nation’s secrets” with you after you leave.

But, presented by a public integrity prosecutor rather than a counterintelligence one, that last bit may prove to be the most important. Read that way, this paragraph is a declaration by the Commander in Chief that one cannot use classified information in furtherance of personal interests. That kind of declaration by the Commander in Chief has a certain kind of force.

And presented by a public integrity prosecutor rather than a counterintelligence one, the Hillary’s Revenge paragraph reads like someone engaged in fraud, getting elected on a promise he will use the office to protect classified information, only to use it, instead, to steal classified information.

Let me suggest the Mar-a-Lago indictment might actually be a public corruption indictment wrapped up inside an Espionage Act indictment.

To be sure: there’s little discussion in this indictment of why Trump stole these documents. Significantly, what is in there happened as uncharged conduct in Bedminster. There’s the meeting at which Trump used a stolen Iran document to badmouth Mark Milley.

34. Upon greeting the writer, publisher, and his two staff members, TRUMP stated, “Look what I found, this was [the Senior Military Official’s] plan of attack, read it and just show . . . it’s interesting.” Later in the interview, TRUMP engaged in the following exchange:

TRUMP: Well, with [the Senior Military Official]—uh, let me see that, I’ll show you an example. He said that I wanted to attack [Country A]. Isn’t it amazing? I have a big pile of papers, this thing just came up. Look. This was him. They presented me this—this is off the record, but—they presented me this. This was him. This was the Defense Department and him.

WRITER: Wow.

TRUMP: We looked at some. This was him. This wasn’t done by me, this was him. All sorts of stuff—pages long, look.

STAFFER: Mm.

TRUMP: Wait a minute, let’s see here.

STAFFER: [Laughter] Yeah.

TRUMP: I just found, isn’t that amazing? This totally wins my case, you know.

STAFFER: Mm-hm.

TRUMP: Except it is like, highly confidential.

STAFFER: Yeah. [Laughter]

TRUMP: Secret. This is secret information. Look, look at this. You attack, and—

Robert Costa had a really fascinating thread on the background to this, a description of an ongoing obsession with Milley.

This is precisely the kind of conduct of which Trump accused Brennan, the use of secrets he learned while he had access to secrets to suggest (falsely in this case) to have dirt on one of his political adversaries.

Then there’s the instance where Trump showed one of his PAC representatives a classified map and claimed that some ongoing conflict was not going very well, presumably to suggest that Joe Biden wasn’t doing as well as Trump had.

In August or September 2021, when he was no longer president, TRUMP met in his office at The Bedminster Club with a representative of his political action committee (the “PAC Representative”). During the meeting, TRUMP commented that an ongoing military operation in Country B was not going well. TRUMP showed the PAC Representative a classified map of Country B and told the PAC Representative that he should not be showing the map to the PAC Representative and to not get too close. The PAC Representative did not have a security clearance or any need-to-know classified information about the military operation.

Still, all the conduct describing Trump putting classified information to personal use happened in Bedminster, where two sets of classified documents went, never to be seen again.

Indeed, that’s one part of the existing indictment that surprised me: I had expected Smith would charge the document showing that Trump compiled one confidential and one secret document into a larger one including messages from a pollster, a faith leader, and a book author. The FBI found that document in a drawer in Trump’s desk at Mar-a-Lago.

I similarly expected Smith might charge the Presidential schedules that Chamberlain Harris loaded onto her laptop. Again, another instance of documents that were comparatively less sensitive, which Trump put to use for his PAC.

But maybe all this will show up in some other place. After all, one of the last things that Jay Bratt did before indicting was that Budowich interview, in which the head of Trump’s current PAC described the foreknowledge that he and others had early last year that Trump wasn’t turning over all the documents.

I proposed that this indictment might be understood as a public integrity indictment wrapped up inside an Espionage Act indictment.

But I don’t rule out we’ll see an Espionage Act indictment wrapped up inside a public integrity indictment.

Update: Over on Twitter, Yale HillBillionaire JD Vance points out why it is so important for a political candidate to be honest about whether they intend to uphold classification or intend to steal documents in bulk. I’m really grateful that Vance has laid out why Trump engaged in fraud here.