And Since We’ve Been Talking about Contracting, Secrecy, and Spying…
…In our discussion of Tim Shorrock’s Spies for Hire, it seems appropriate to post on the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the Cyber-Security Initiative.
As you’ll recall, the Bush Administration has been struggling for their entire term to address the fact that our cyber-infrastructure is woefully exposed to cyber-attacks. After a series of cyber-czars who either wouldn’t or couldn’t address this problem, back in January the Administration began to make some progress–not least, by taking the project out of Michael Chertoff’s hands. The SASC’s report notes that the Administration has made some progress, though it has three substantive complaints.
The committee applauds the administration for developing a serious, major initiative to begin to close the vulnerabilities in the government’s information networks and the nation’s critical infrastructure. The committee believes that the administration’s actions provide a foundation on which the next president can build.
However, the committee has multiple, significant issues with the administration’s specific proposals and with the overall approach to gaining congressional support for the initiative.
First, the SASC objects to the way the Administration has shielded what is supposed to be at least partly a deterrent program in so much secrecy that the program has lost its deterrence ability.
A chief concern is that virtually everything about the initiative is highly classified, and most of the information that is not classified is categorized as `For Official Use Only.’ These restrictions preclude public education, awareness, and debate about the policy and legal issues, real or imagined, that the initiative poses in the areas of privacy and civil liberties. Without such debate and awareness in such important and sensitive areas, it is likely that the initiative will make slow or modest progress. The committee strongly urges the administration to reconsider the necessity and wisdom of the blanket, indiscriminate classification levels established for the initiative.
The administration itself is starting a serious effort as part of the initiative to develop an information warfare deterrence strategy and declaratory doctrine, much as the superpowers did during the Cold War for nuclear conflict. It is difficult to conceive how the United States could promulgate a meaningful deterrence doctrine if every aspect of our capabilities and operational concepts is classified. In the era of superpower nuclear competition, while neither side disclosed weapons designs, everyone understood the effects of nuclear weapons, how they would be delivered, and the circumstances under which they would be used. Read more →