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Promontory Financial Group Describes a New “Risk-Based” Approach to Anti-Money Laundering

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In light of the recent Standard Chartered Bank flap, Saturday’s report that Deutsche Bank is under investigation for similar behavior, and today’s report that RBS (as well as two other banks, one of which is Sumitomo Mitsui) is as well, I want to look at an article on Anti-Money Laundering enforcement a Promontory Financial Group exec, Michael Dawson, published in American Banker just one week before NY’s Superintendent of Financial Services, Benjamin Lawsky, filed an order against SCB alone.

Around the same time Dawson was writing this, remember, his company was involved in a review of SCB’s laundering of Iranian funds that would show a tiny fraction of the total exposure that SCB would ultimately admit to. That is, Dawson’s comments probably provide a glimpse into what PFG was seeing not just in Citibank and Commerzbank enforcement actions, which he discusses, but also in SCB. And it might help to explain why other regulators were so intent on crafting an SCB settlement based on just $14 million in violations rather than $250 billion.

Dawson reports seeing a change in recent AML/BSA enforcement actions, away from a “rules-based approach” toward a “risk-based approach.” He suggests that regulators are demanding not a broad-based examination of the scope of AML violations, but instead more targeted information about who posed the biggest risk laundering money and what they were doing.

Instead of requiring expensive reviews of extended periods of time for a broad range of potential suspicious activity, the latest enforcement actions emphasize a risk-based approach to AML compliance, with several of the actions requiring a risk assessment or enhancements to an existing assessment.

[snip]

The level of specificity required is noteworthy and includes, among other things, detail on the volumes and types of transactions and services by country or geographic location as well as detail on the numbers of customers that typically pose higher BSA/AML risk. The actions also require a more holistic approach, requiring the results of the bank’s Customer Identification Program and Customer Due Diligence program to be integrated in the risk assessment. [my emphasis]

This sounds like the regulators are interested not in discovering how banks are complicit in money laundering, but rather using the banks to get details on key people who money launder and the tactics just those key people (terrorists, cartel kingpins, mean Iranians) use. (Note, I think something similar, but even more significant, happened last year when JPMC got busted for trading with Iran, but no one seems to remember that happened.)

After making these broad statements about the general direction of AML enforcement, Dawson distinguishes between what the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is requiring and what the Fed is. OCC has not only shortened the period which it requires banks to examine problematic behavior, but it has also permitted banks to conduct their own reviews (which seems to have Dawson worried about losing the business of providing such services for banks).

Where the OCC required lookbacks, it asked for risk-based, targeted reviews, rather than comprehensive look-backs that were sometimes found in earlier enforcement actions. The recent actions either specify a shorter look-back period than has been specified in the past or, in the case of the Citibank action, no explicitly specified period, subject to the ability of the regulator to expand the look-back depending on the results of the more limited period.

Also, the OCC actions allowed the institutions to conduct the review themselves and either do not explicitly mention an independent consultant or limit the role of the independent consultant to “supervising and certifying” the look-back.

The OCC, at least, doesn’t sound like it’s doing “smarter” enforcement, but rather doing lax enforcement. Remember, though, that OCC got a newly-confirmed Comptroller during this period, who talked aggressively at the recent Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing on HSBC’s egregious AML problems–though that talk partly echoed what Dawson has to say about “flexibility” and a “holistic” approach.

Meanwhile, according to Dawson, the Fed doesn’t seem to be offering quite as much flexibility. Dawson describes the Fed employing this new risk-based approach, but it is still requiring longer reviews (though not all that long, at 16 months) and outside consultants to complete the reviews.

The Fed, in its action against Commerzbank requiring a lookback, also showed some flexibility. Read more →

Jed Rakoff to SEC: Do you think I’m a tool?

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Judge Jed Rakoff has rejected the SEC’s proposed wrist slap of Citibank for selling mortgage-backed securities it knew to be of poor qualify.

Effectively, what he did was join this complaint with SEC’s complaint–filed at the same time as they filed the proposed Citi settlement–against a Citi employee, Brian Stoker, in which the SEC explicitly alleged that Citi knew what it was doing when it dealt shitty securities it intended to short. By doing so, Rakoff imposed the same trial process on this complaint as on Stoker. Effectively, he’s saying, “If you’re prepared to prove that Stoker knew what he was doing in selling shitty MBS, you’re prepared to prove that Citi did too.”

But the rest of his ruling focuses more generally on his demand that the SEC stop treating him–and federal judges generally–as tools of their efforts to cover over corporate crime. When he uses “tool” in this passage, I couldn’t help thinking he mean tool both literally, but also in the derogatory sense.

Without multiplying examples, it is clear that before a court may employ its injunctive and contempt powers in support of an administrative settlement, it is required, even after giving substantial deference to the views of the administrative agency, to be satisfied that it is not being used as a tool to enforce an agreement that is unfair, unreasonable, inadequate, or in contravention of the public interest. [my emphasis]

After showing that Citi changed its mind, once it became clear Rakoff would be judging the issue, about the standard for judicial review in such cases,

In its original Memorandum in support of the proposed Consent Judgment, filed before the case had been assigned to any judge, the S.E.C. expressly endorsed the standard of review set forth by this Court in its Bank of America decisions, i.e., “whether the proposed Consent Judgment … is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the publc interest.”

[snip]

In its most recent filing in this case, however, the S.E.C.
partly reverses its previous position and asserts that, while the Consent Judgment must still be shown to be fair, adequate, and reasonable, “the public interest … is not part of [the] applicable standard of judicial review.”

Rakoff then went on to argue that fact finding was necessary to serve the public interest, repeating his angry language about being used by the SEC.

Purely private parties can settle a case without ever agreeing on the facts, for all that is required is that a plaintiff dismiss his complaint. But when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the formidable judicial power of contempt,3 the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the court becomes a mere handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public
importance.

3 The Second Circuit has described the contempt power as “among the most formidable weapons in the court’s arsenal.”

At which point he really starts to vent.

An application of judicial power that does not rest on facts is worse than mindless, it is inherently dangerous. The injunctive power of the judiciary is not a free roving remedy to be invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the consent of the regulated. If its deployment does not rest on facts–cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials–it serves no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression.

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We’re All BCCI Now

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I’ve been saying for a while that when everything finally unravels, it will probably be revealed that Citibank has been playing the same function as BCCI–the bank that served as the means for organized crime, terrorists, and the CIA to launder money in the 80s–once did.

Maybe I wasn’t so far off (h/t Gitcheegumee):

Drugs money worth billions of dollars kept the financial system afloat at the height of the global crisis, the United Nations‘ drugs and crime tsar has told the Observer.

Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, said he has seen evidence that the proceeds of organised crime were “the only liquid investment capital” available to some banks on the brink of collapse last year. He said that a majority of the $352bn (£216bn) of drugs profits was absorbed into the economic system as a result.

This will raise questions about crime’s influence on the economic system at times of crisis. It will also prompt further examination of the banking sector as world leaders, including Barack Obama and Gordon Brown, call for new International Monetary Fund regulations. Speaking from his office in Vienna, Costa said evidence that illegal money was being absorbed into the financial system was first drawn to his attention by intelligence agencies and prosecutors around 18 months ago. “In many instances, the money from drugs was the only liquid investment capital. In the second half of 2008, liquidity was the banking system’s main problem and hence liquid capital became an important factor,” he said.

Some of the evidence put before his office indicated that gang money was used to save some banks from collapse when lending seized up, he said.

About those [Stress] Test Results

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Peterr had a great post this morning reading some troubling tea leaves at the bottom of Citi’s and Bank of America’s tea cups.

My, the little things you notice when you peruse the job listings at the FDIC website. There are a lot of them to scroll through, but a couple of them caught my eye.

[snip]

Further down the list of positions comes a posting for two Senior Large Financial Institution Specialists, one in the New York office and the other in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Hmmm . . . large institutions, New York and Charlotte?

Can you say "Citibank" and "B of A"? Sure you can.

Speaking of New York, they are also looking for a new Chief, Examination Support and Risk Analysis Section who would be based in either New York or DC. Again, from the major duties section of the posting, the first three are these:

Serves as technical advisor on a broad range of risk management issues particularly regarding the analysis and supervision of large, complex financial institutions.

Reviews and evaluates studies, reports, and proposals prepared by staff members, financial organizations and other government agencies as these relate to large, complex financial institutions.

Directs the monitoring and supervision of large, complex financial institutions to protect the deposit insurance fund.

I’d be getting a little nervous right about now, if I had a corner office at Citibank and saw these two job postings. And if I noticed that the FDIC is also looking for two more of those Senior Large Financial Institution Specialists in their DC office, I’d be getting more than a little nervous. (As if I didn’t already have some banking nightmares to deal with.)

All in all, it looks to me like somebody thinks the FDIC needs some senior folks to deal with eating Very Big Banks — and to judge by the closing dates on these job postings and this little teaser from the Wall Street Journal, they think they need them fast.

The teaser he linked to describes the problem of what to do with the results of the stress tests investigating–among others–BoA and Citi.

Top federal bank regulators plan to meet early this week to discuss how to analyze the results of stress tests being conducted on the country’s 19 largest banks, people familiar with the matter said.

Only, it seems like those bank regulators have decided to punt, at least until we get past earnings season.

Read more →

CEO’s Eating Their Own Toxic Products

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We’ve got competing CEOs on the all-Congress channel today, with the Peanut CEO in front of Commerce Committee and the Bank CEOs in front of Financial Services.

There will be some scuttlebutt from the Bank CEOs–as when a few of them admitted they’ve been raising credit card rates since they started sucking on the federal teat.

But the news coverage will open today with Stewart Parnell (CEO) and Sammy Lightsey (Plant Manager) of the Peanut Corporation of America.

Both of them came in, got sworn in, and repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment. Neither of these guys appear to be as bright as their Wall Street counterparts–I got the sense that Parnell, and especially Lightsey–were under very strict orders to say nothing beyond "On the advice of my counsel, I respectfully decline to answer your question based on the protection afforded me under the US Constitution" Lightsey, in particular, was struggling with all the legalese.

But the highlight of the hearing came when Congressman Greg Walden (R-OR) offered up a plastic bin wrapped with big yellow CAUTION ribbons–with Peanut Corporation peanut material inside. Walden asked Parnell and Lightsey if they would be willing to eat some of their own product right there, before the Sub-Committee.

"On the advice of counsel, I uh respectfully exercise my rights Fifth Amendment of the Constitution."

A simple yes or no might have sufficed.

In any case, there’s real irony with the competing CEOs show. The ones before the Financial Services Committee, after all, have done far broader damage than the Peanut Corporation–and their actions may well lead to many more deaths than the salmonella outbreak (which is not to minimize the grief of the families affected by the peanut outbreak). 

But no one is asking those CEOs–the bank CEOS–to eat their own toxic products.