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Judge Dale Ho Upends Emil Bove’s Weaponization

As predicted, yesterday Judge Dale Ho dismissed the indictment against Eric Adams with prejudice, meaning the Trump Administration can’t charge Adams anew if he fails to do their bidding on immigration.

In his opinion explaining his decision, Ho engaged in a great deal of legal analysis, but ultimately it came down to this: even though DOJ’s explanations for the request to dismiss the indictment don’t hold up, because there’s no way to continue prosecuting Adams, Ho would end up having to dismiss the case in 70 days anyway on Speedy Trial grounds.

Thus, whatever teeth the public interest inquiry might have under Rule 48(a), denying dismissal as contrary to the public interest would be futile as a practical matter where, as here, the Motion was filed by DOJ itself. See id.; Nederlandsche, 453 F. Supp. at 463. While the Court could deny the Motion, allow seventy days to pass, and then dismiss the case on Speedy Trial Act grounds, it is hard to see what good that would accomplish.

Ho finds, for a bunch of reasons (including precisely the appearance of impropriety that DOJ claimed motivated their abandonment of the prosecution) to dismiss with prejudice, so the case is not hanging over Adams’ head. And so, having decided to dismiss with prejudice, Ho does so now rather than later (though he doesn’t say it, he does so with enough time that NYC voters can hold Adams accountable for this stinky deal).

[G]iven that seventy days from the date of this Opinion would take us uncomfortably close to the June 24, 2025 New York City mayoral primary election,60 the Court concludes that, if dismissal is inevitable, the public interest weighs in favor of its happening now rather than later.

In the process, Ho dismisses all the arguments DOJ made to justify the request.

First, he dismisses one of two reasons given for the dismissal — the appearance of impropriety — as a pretext. Ho cites his own opinion rejecting the claim when Mayor Adams’ team made it earlier.

45 To the extent that Mayor Adams argues that he has been prejudiced from extrajudicial statements about the case, see Adams Br. at 19-20, the Court has rejected two prior motions under Rule 6 raising these issues. See First Rule 6 Order; Second Rule 6 Order. Moreover, the Government itself has, until the filing of the Rule 48(a) Motion, denied that Mayor Adams has suffered any prejudice from any pretrial publicity throughout this litigation. For example, in response to Mayor Adams’s First Rule 6 Motion, the Government observed that there was no evidence that news articles about the investigation into his alleged illegal activity “put pressure on senior Justice Department officials to approve the indictment,” induced any grand jury witness to testify, or affected the grand jury’s decision to indict the Mayor. Gov’t First Sanctions Opp’n at 21-23. The Government also argued that Mayor Adams “ha[d] not established reason to believe that a future trial jury w[ould] be prejudiced by the news coverage of this case.” Id. at 23. The existence of such prejudice is typically uncovered through voir dire, which obviously has not happened here (nor will it). See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (“When a trial court determines that media coverage has the potential for unfair prejudice, it is obligated to canvass the jury to find out if they have learned of the potentially prejudicial publicity and, if necessary, voir dire the jury to ascertain how much they know of the distracting publicity and what effect, if any, it has had on that juror’s ability to decide the case fairly.”).

But Ho also repeatedly adopts the word “pretext,” the one Hagan Scotten used to describe that excuse in his resignation letter.

As to Emil Bove’s claim that the indictment was hindering Adams’ ability to govern, Ho uses the public appearance Adams made to show that he was able to help the Administration in spite of the indictment.

The dispute here, however, seems to be more about how to interpret the facts than what the facts are. In a February 3, 2025 letter to DOJ (which they filed on the docket without prompting from the Court), Mayor Adams’s counsel asserted that the Mayor’s “independent abilities to exercise his powers have also been complicated by his indictment.” See Letter from Adams’s Counsel to DOJ. Specifically, they noted that [the Mayor’s] powers allow him to take actions such as preventing the Office of the Corporation Counsel from litigating challenges to immigration enforcement, preventing appointed city employees from taking public stances against enforcement efforts, reopening the ICE office on Rikers Island, and directing the NYPD to supply manpower to assist federal immigration agents. Id. Mayor Adams’s counsel did not explain how the Mayor’s exercise of these powers had been “complicated” by this case. Instead, they provided a list of discrete policy options that the Mayor could choose to exercise. And then, three days after DOJ issued the February 10 Decisional Memo directing SDNY to move to dismiss the Indictment (and one day before the Rule 48(a) Motion was ultimately filed), Mayor Adams decided to take one of these official acts, announcing that “he would issue an executive order allowing federal immigration authorities into the Rikers Island jail complex.” Br. of Amicus Curiae State Democracy Defenders Fund et al. at 5, ECF No. 152-2; see also ECF No. 150-4 at 152 (news article stating that “New York City Mayor Eric Adams said Thursday he will use his executive powers to allow federal immigration authorities back into the city’s sprawling Rikers Island jail complex, marking a substantial shift in the city’s sanctuary policies that prevent it from enforcing immigration law”). It seems that the Indictment was not, in fact, a barrier to that particular policy decision.

From that, Ho laid out how this creates the appearance of a quid pro quo.

The parties deny that Mayor Adams’s Rikers Island decision—which appears to be contrary to New York City Code53—reflects a quid pro quo. The record contains no contemporaneous notes of what was actually said during the January 31 meeting at DOJ,54 but counsel for Mayor Adams have represented in a letter to the Court that “we never said or suggested to anyone . . . that Mayor Adams would do X in exchange for Y, and no one said or suggested to us that they would do Y in exchange for X,” adding: “We are prepared to confirm these points under oath in sworn declarations.” See Def.’s Feb. 18, 2025 Letter at 2. The Court appreciates counsel’s willingness to supplement the record and facilitate further inquiry by the Court beyond the materials that they have affirmatively submitted without solicitation. E.g., Letter from Adams’s Counsel to DOJ.

But the Court finds that additional factual investigation—even if permissible—is unnecessary at this time. Whether anyone expressly incanted the precise words that they “would do X in exchange for Y” is not dispositive. As the Second Circuit has explained, “[a]n explicit quid pro quo . . . need not be expressly stated but may be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions.” United States v. Benjamin, 95 F.4th 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

No. 24-142, 2024 WL 5112284 (Dec. 16, 2024); see also Benjamin, 95 F.4th at 68 (noting that while a “quid pro quo must be clear and unambiguous, there is no reason why it cannot be implied from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions.”); cf. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”). The Court need not and does not make any conclusive findings as to whether there was an explicit bargain here.55 It is sufficient to note that the facts, as put into the record by Mayor Adams’s legal team, do not support the notion that continuing this case will impede the Mayor’s ongoing immigration enforcement efforts—they instead suggest that dismissal of the case will facilitate future efforts by the Mayor, in alignment with the administration’s policy preferences

53 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 9-131(h)(2) (“Federal immigration authorities shall not be permitted to maintain an office or quarters on land over which the department exercises jurisdiction, for the purpose of investigating possible violations of civil immigration law; provided, however, that the mayor may, by executive order, authorize federal immigration authorities to maintain an office or quarters on such land for purposes unrelated to the enforcement of civil immigration laws.”).

54 As noted above, the Sassoon Letter states one of her colleagues took contemporaneous notes but that those notes were confiscated at the end of the meeting. Sassoon Letter at 3 n.1. The February 13 Bove Letter in response references these events as well. See Feb. 13 Bove Letter at 3 n.3.

55 If such factual findings were necessary to the Court’s decision, additional evidentiary proceedings could then be appropriate.

The footnotes here are — as footnotes usually are — the sweet spot. Ho notes that Adams agreed not just to cooperate with Trump’s immigration enforcement, but to do so in defiance of New York City law.

And then he effectively says, if you don’t like my judgement that there is at least the appearance of a quid pro quo, we can reopen the evidentiary proceedings, in part by examining the notes that you seized from an AUSA on the case.

Judge Ho dismisses much of Bove’s effort to impugn Danielle Sassoon and Scotten by pointing out that it is irrelevant to the issue before him. DOJ said they were only relying on the two reasons to dismiss the indictment: the pretextual claim of appearance of impropriety that Ho had already rejected, and the infringement on Adams’ ability to do his work that Ho described as a quid pro quo. So they can’t, after the fact, attempt to manufacture real bias by posting communications from the prosecutors out of context.

In any case, Ho was unimpressed with Bove’s attempt to smear the prosecutors, finding it unexceptional, for example, that one of Scotten’s friends thought he would make a good judge.

Finally, the parties raise related issues in their briefs that do not appear in DOJ’s Rule 48(a) Motion. For reasons explained below, a court cannot properly grant a Rule 48(a) motion on the basis of rationales that were not raised in the motion. But even considering these additional points on the merits, the Court finds them either inapposite or unsupported by the record. For example, DOJ attaches various exhibits to its brief consisting of communications involving the former prosecution team and asserts that they show “troubling conduct” at USAO-SDNY. DOJ Br. at 1. But these communications were not public until DOJ sought to rely on them; as a matter of logic, they could not have affected “appearances” in this case. Moreover, the notion that DOJ sought dismissal because of improper conduct by the USAO-SDNY prosecution team is belied by the February 10 Decisional Memo itself, which makes clear that DOJ, in reaching its decision, “in no way call[ed] into question the integrity and efforts of the line prosecutors responsible for the case.” February 10 Decisional Memo at 1. At any rate, the Court has reviewed these communications carefully and finds that they do not show any improper motives or violations of ethics canons or the Justice Manual by the USAO-SDNY prosecution team or by former U.S. Attorney Sassoon.49

49 The Justice Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution state, in relevant part, that “the attorney for the government should commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (1) the prosecution would serve no substantial federal interest; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.220 (2023). There is nothing in the USAO-SDNY communications indicating a violation of these principles. For example, one communication indicates that a friend of AUSA Scotten believed that he would make a good federal judge. See ECF No. 175-4. The Court has reviewed this communication and finds that it shows nothing noteworthy, only that AUSA Scotten was focused on his current job “first,” rather than on any possible future opportunities. Id. Another communication—an email circulating a draft letter to the Court—refers to the Williams op-ed as a “scandal,” ECF No. 175-3, but the use of that informal shorthand in an email does not suggest that any of the individual AUSAs on the case, or the U.S. Attorney at the time, had any inappropriate motives or otherwise violated Justice Department policy or guidelines for purposes of its Rule 48(a) Motion, disclaimed any reliance on the suggestion of improper purposes in this prosecution.

Plus, there’s no way these could substantiate the appearance of impropriety claim justify dismissing the case, because Bove only made them public after the fact.

Similarly, Ho rejected Bove’s belated claims that there was something problematic with the case itself — and in a footnote, insinuates that Pam Bondi and Chad Mizelle were the ones engaged in misconduct by sharing their opinions about the strength of the case in violation of local rules.

The Rule 48(a) Motion does not allude to the possibility of other reasons for dismissal beyond the two set forth on its face. See Rule 48(a) Mot. ¶¶ 5-6. To the contrary, the Motion suggests that there are none. See id. at 3 (seeking dismissal “[b]ased on the foregoing” reasons). At the February 19 conference, DOJ confirmed that there were no other bases asserted in the Motion. See Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 22:18-22 (confirming that the Court’s “understanding that the motion contains no statement about the government’s views regarding the strength of the case in terms of the facts or the legal theory” is “correct”); id. at 22:18-25 (stating that “[t]here are two” bases for the Motion, neither of which concerned the merits). While counsel for DOJ stated “I do have other concerns” about the case, he disclaimed reliance on them for purposes of the Rule 48(a) Motion, explaining that the Government is “not asking the court to rely on any” reasons for dismissal beyond what is stated in the Motion itself. Id. at 22:5-13. And DOJ’s February 10 Decisional Memo is unequivocal in this regard, stating that “[t]he Justice Department has reached this conclusion without assessing the strength of the evidence or the legal theories on which the case is based, which are issues on which we defer to the U.S. Attorney’s Office at this time.” Feb. 10 Decisional Memo at 1 (emphasis added). It was only in response to this Court’s Order requesting further briefing on several questions, none of which concerned the reasons for the Motion, that DOJ raised this additional ground for dismissal.57

57 To be sure, in his February 13 letter to U.S. Attorney Sassoon, Acting DAG Bove stated that he has “many other concerns about this case,” which he described as turning on “factual and legal theories that are, at best, extremely aggressive.” Feb. 13 Letter at 7. Mayor Adams also points to a statement by the Attorney General that the case was “incredibly weak,” and has previously referenced similar statements to the same effect by the DOJ Chief of Staff. See Adams Br. at 6; Def.’s Feb. 21, 2025 Letter at 1. Assuming these concerns were well founded, they still do not contradict the February 10 Decisional Memo’s statement that DOJ reached its determination regarding dismissal without assessing the strength of the case. Separately, the Court notes that the statements referenced by Mayor Adams appear to violate Local Criminal Rule 23.1, which prohibits extrajudicial statements regarding an “opinion . . . in connection with pending or imminent criminal litigation . . . if there is a substantial likelihood that the dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.” S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. L. Crim. R. 23.1(a). The Rule provides that “[a]ny opinion as to . . . the merits of the case” “presumptively involve[s] a substantial likelihood that their public dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice within the meaning of this rule.” Id. at 23.1(d)(7). [my emphasis]

I noted the problems with Mizelle and Bondi’s interventions at the time.

You can’t retcon the reasons for dismissing the case, Judge Ho says, because it would undermine the political accountability that is one purpose for judicial involvement in a Rule 48(a) motion.

None of this is meant to suggest that it would be wholly impermissible for the government to have, in addition to valid reasons that are expressly stated, other unstated reasons for dropping a prosecution. But if the reasons actually articulated in a Rule 48(a) motion itself are insufficient, and dismissal can be justified only by resort to other grounds, then the omission of those other reasons misleads the court and the public, undermining political accountability. Under such circumstances, it would flout Rule 48(a)’s requirement of leave of court to grant a motion based on belatedly offered rationales. See Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 620 (“Rule 48(a)’s requirement of judicial leave . . . contemplates exposure of the reasons for dismissal.”). Here, DOJ has affirmatively asked the Court to rely on the reasons in its Rule 48(a) Motion and has argued that these reasons are a sufficient basis for granting the Motion. See Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 22:5-17. The Court therefore cannot permit DOJ to rely on a post hoc rationale not stated in the Motion itself. “[W]hen so much is at stake, . . . the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.” Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1909. For these reasons, the Court cannot consider DOJ’s belated merits-based arguments in adjudicating this motion. [my emphasis]

In the last pages of the opinion Ho does a number of things that may have application outside of this case. He adopts Sassoon’s point that the comparison of the Adams case to the Viktor Bout case is inapt. More importantly, the Bout case was a quid pro quo. It doesn’t help Bove claim this wasn’t a quid pro quo, it does the opposite.

First, it is odd that DOJ would analogize its decision to dismiss Mayor Adams’s indictment—which it vehemently denies is a quid pro quo—to a prisoner exchange that was explicitly a quid pro quo. Moreover, it is inapt to compare an exchange negotiated between two sovereign nations, neither of which is beholden to the laws of the other, to the Government’s decision to dismiss the indictment of an elected public official who is subject to local, state, and federal laws.

The unprecedented nature of DOJ’s rationale is particularly concerning given its view that its decision is “virtually unreviewable” because it “invocates concerns about executive power that go right to the core of Article II of the Constitution.” Feb. 19 Conf. Tr. at 23:20-24. If that is correct, DOJ’s position has rather broad implications, to put it mildly. For instance, DOJ endorsed the view that the government can apply this rationale to virtually any public official with immigration-related responsibilities—ranging from a local police commissioner to the governor of a border state—and determine that they are essentially immune from criminal liability. See id. at 32:22-34:8.

Where I’m most intrigued, Ho likens what DOJ is doing here — using the threat of prosecution to coerce states — to Congressional attempts to do the same.

Threatening federal indictment to compel compliance with federal regulatory objectives by a state or local official also raises significant federalism concerns. It is well established that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). Although this prohibition has typically been applied to acts of Congress, the principles that underpin it—namely, federalism and political accountability—would similarly preclude an attempt by the federal executive branch to coerce a state or local official into implementing federal policy objectives. 58

See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-16.110 (2020) (cautioning that “[p]lea bargains with defendants who are elected public officers can present issues of federalism . . . when they require the public officer defendant to take action that affects his or her tenure in office”). Here, the fact that, after DOJ made the decision to seek dismissal of his case, Mayor Adams decided to issue an executive order in alignment with current “federal immigration initiatives and policies,” Rule 48(a) Mot. ¶ 6, but in apparent conflict with New York City law, see N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 9-131(h)(2), is troubling to say the least. It suggests that the federal government is using the pendency of a federal indictment to override the City’s laws in favor of its own policy goals.

58 That prohibition applies even where state or local officials consent to federal compulsion, because “[t]he interests of public officials . . . may not coincide with the Constitution’s intergovernmental allocation of authority.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992). “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States . . . as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States.” Id.

But this is what Trump is doing left and right: Threatening states, cities, and private entities to try to get compliance with Trump’s orders. And while federalism would only apply this holding to government entities, Trump has already retaliated against New York’s other elected leaders for personal grievances. Pam Bondi has even threatened criminal prosecution in the immigration context.

So don’t be surprised if you see this opinion cited down the road.

Emil Bove attempted to force through his corrupt deal quietly, with pretextual excuses for doing so. When that failed, he turned to retaliation against at least Sassoon and Scotten. Whatever else this opinion does — no matter how unsatisfying it is that Adams will escape accountability, and it is — Ho used this opinion to lay out judicial record that Bove’s claims are bullshit.

Ho can’t stop Bove’s corrupt deal. But this opinion may forestall follow-on weaponization of this case.

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Trump’s Legal Blackballing Effort Selectively Protects Jones Day

I’m working on a post on the Administration’s efforts to blackball law firms with ties to Trump’s imagined enemies.

As I’ll show, the effort builds on Trump’s Orwellian “Weaponization” effort; the two fact sheets involved in this effort (Perkins CoiePaul Weiss) repeat Trump’s false claim that 51 spooks claimed Hunter Biden’s laptop “was part of a Russian disinformation campaign.” Each fact sheet then airs some personal grievances of Trump’s.

Then, Section 1 the Executive Orders (Perkins Coie; Paul Weiss) summarize that grievance. Based on that grievance, the order does the following:

Section 1: Purpose (airing of grievance)

Section 2: Security Clearance Review (in effect, suspension of any clearances held by firm attorneys)

Section 3: Contracting (stripping of federal contracts)

Section 4: Racial discrimination (accusing the firms of racial discrimination)

Section 5: Personnel (prohibiting the hiring of lawyers from targeted firms and prohibiting access to government facilities)

Most of scheme (and even more of DOJ Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle’s attempt to defend it in a hearing before Beryl Howell last week) rests on a national security claim, in turn built off the Section 2 Security Clearance order.

But a big part of it attempts to enforce Trump’s federal segregation efforts in private law firms. For each, the grievance section accuses the firm of “discriminat[ing] against its own attorneys and staff.”

In addition to undermining democratic elections, the integrity of our courts, and honest law enforcement, Perkins Coie racially discriminates against its own attorneys and staff, and against applicants. Perkins Coie publicly announced percentage quotas in 2019 for hiring and promotion on the basis of race and other categories prohibited by civil rights laws. It proudly excluded applicants on the basis of race for its fellowships, and it maintained these discriminatory practices until applicants harmed by them finally sued to enforce change.

My Administration is committed to ending discrimination under “diversity, equity, and inclusion” policies and ensuring that Federal benefits support the laws and policies of the United States, including those laws and policies promoting our national security and respecting the democratic process. Those who engage in blatant race-based and sex-based discrimination, including quotas, but purposefully hide the nature of such discrimination through deceiving language, have engaged in a serious violation of the public trust. Their disrespect for the bedrock principle of equality represents good cause to conclude that they neither have access to our Nation’s secrets nor be deemed responsible stewards of any Federal funds.

Section 4 of the Perkins Coie order (which the Paul Weiss order incorporates), reads:

Sec. 4. Racial Discrimination. (a) The Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall review the practices of representative large, influential, or industry leading law firms for consistency with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including whether large law firms: reserve certain positions, such as summer associate spots, for individuals of preferred races; promote individuals on a discriminatory basis; permit client access on a discriminatory basis; or provide access to events, trainings, or travel on a discriminatory basis

(b) The Attorney General, in coordination with the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and in consultation with State Attorneys General as appropriate, shall investigate the practices of large law firms as described in subsection (a) of this section who do business with Federal entities for compliance with race-based and sex-based non-discrimination laws and take any additional actions the Attorney General deems appropriate in light of the evidence uncovered.

In other words, Donald J. Trump has blackballed two law firms in significant part because they aim for diversity in their hiring practices.

Which led me to check the website for Jones Day, still the counterpart to what Perkins Coie used to be for Democrats, the law firm serving the Republican party.

And lo and behold, the Jones Day website looks like Federal government sites did until inauguration day.

Jones Day has a page celebrating its diversity firsts.

They have a page listing affinity groups the likes of which Trump has eliminated from Federal government.

And there are several other pages, including a 1L conference focused on diversity.

The documentation targeting Perkins Coie and Paul Weiss also target the firms for their pro bono work — the former for representing some trans service members challenging the DOD ban, and the latter because Jeannie Rhee represented DC in a lawsuit against January 6 culprits that DC recently dismissed with prejudice (in fact, there were three other Paul Weiss attorneys on the case, as well as a bunch from Dechart, but Rhee was the only one identified, even indirectly, in the backup to the blackballing attempt).

Laudably, Jones Day also does a great deal of pro bono work. It has a page boasting of its pro bono work including — among other things — “representing migrant minors and mothers with their children, many of whom were detained by the U.S. government after fleeing life-threatening, gender-based gang violence in their home countries.”

Jones Day and Our Pro Bono Culture

Ukraine

Immigration – The Border Project

Combatting Human Trafficking

Constitutional Policing and Civil Justice Reform, Standing Together

Advancing the Rule of Law in Africa

Hate Crimes Task Force

American Hospital Association (AHA) & Jones Day Human Trafficking Interview

Obviously, all of this is laudable! These firms are so powerful, it’s important that they remain accessible and give back.

But even the law firm to which Trump has remained loyal — a law firm at which Mizelle himself once worked as of counsel, a lawfirm whence Trump’s Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Division as well as several top Civil Division lawyers came — engages in the same kind of laudable practices for which Trump is blackballing Perkins Coie and Paul Weiss. (Curiously, none of the Jones Day Civil Division personnel were at the Perkins Coie hearing last week.)

Update: EEOC sent out letters demanding info on DEI practices from 20 firms not named Jones Day.

The law firms that received letters from Acting Chair Lucas include:

  1. A & O Shearman
  2. Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
  3. Cooley LLP
  4. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
  5. Goodwin Procter LLP
  6. Hogan Lovells LLP
  7. Kirkland & Ellis LLP
  8. Latham & Watkins LLP
  9. McDermott Will & Emery
  10. Milbank LLP
  11. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
  12. Morrison & Foerster LLP
  13. Perkins Coie
  14. Reed Smith
  15. Ropes & Gray LLP
  16. Sidley Austin LLP
  17. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
  18. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
  19. White & Case LLP
  20. WilmerHale

Covington security clearance order

Perkins Coie blackball order

Perkins Coie Fact Sheet

Paul Weiss blackball order

Paul Weiss Fact Sheet

Weaponization

Hunter Biden laptop order

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Chad Mizelle’s Appearance of Impropriety

Something funny happened before the hearing in the Emil Bove’s motion to dismiss Eric Adams’ case today (after a long exchange, Judge Dale Ho did not rule on the motion itself).

Pam Bondi’s Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle posted a very long thread on Xitter falsely pretending that this case was only about the single bribery charge against Adams. He focused closely on the way John Roberts’ court has rolled back bribery statutes.

For too long the DOJ has lost its way.

Prosecutorial misconduct and political agendas will no longer be tolerated.

The case against Mayor Adams was just one in a long history of past DOJ actions that represent grave errors of judgement.

This DOJ is going back to basics.

Prosecuting the mayor of America’s largest city raises unique concerns.

I want to focus on one aspect: The legal theories underpinning SDNY’s case and the particularly expansive reading of public corruption law adopted by the prosecutors in this action.

To win a bribery conviction against a public official, DOJ must show some official act in exchange for benefits — a quid pro quo. What is the official act alleged in this indictment?

Well, the main event took place before Adams was even Mayor.

In September 2021, when Adams was a candidate for office, [1] a person associated with the Turkish government allegedly asked Adams to help ensure the swift opening of a new Turkish consulate in NY in advance of a visit from Turkey’s leader.

So here is a key question: How do these facts as alleged in the indictment stack up against the case law? Let’s start with a history lesson.

EVERY TIME DOJ has pursued expansive theories of public corruption, the Department has been rebuked by the Supreme Court. Put simply, DOJ’s track record of public corruption cases at the Supreme Court is abysmal.

In 2024, DOJ lost 6-3 in Snyder v. US, where SCOTUS overturned the conviction of an Indiana mayor who was convicted of federal bribery in connection with supposedly illegal gratuities. The Court rejected DOJ’s theory that accepting gratuities constituted quid pro quo bribery.

The year before, in 2023, DOJ unanimously lost two cases in the Supreme Court—both brought by prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.

In Ciminelli v. United States, The Supreme Court unanimously tossed the wire fraud conviction in connection with former Governor Andrew Cuomo’s “Buffalo Billion” initiative, calling DOJ’s theory of criminal liability “invalid.”

And in Percoco v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the government’s theory about when private citizens can be liable for honest-services fraud in a case involving Governor Cuomo’s former executive secretary.

By the way, both Ciminelli and Percoco were decided on the same day, May 11, 2023. What a stunning rebuke to the US Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York — Losing 18-0 in a single day.

Then there is Kelly v. United States from 2020, unanimously overturning the conviction of New Jersey officials involved in the so-called “Bridgegate” matter by, again, faulting the government for defining federal fraud too broadly.

Before then, SCOTUS unanimously repudiated the United States’ prosecution of Gov. Bob McDonnell in 2016, again faulting DOJ’s expansive theories of bribery. SCOTUS in Skilling v. United States in 2010 similarly rejected DOJ’s theory of honest-services fraud as overly broad.

And finally, when DOJ prosecuted Senator Ted Stevens for failing to report gifts, DOJ ended up having to dismiss the indictment even after obtaining a conviction, because prosecutors egregiously failed to disclose material evidence to the defense.

Clearly, this history and case law underscores the legal risks associated with prosecuting Mayor Adams. DOJ could win a bribery conviction against a public official only by showing some official act in exchange for benefits.

The alleged official act in the indictment, however, took place before Adams was mayor. And one of the main benefits that the Mayor allegedly received was campaign contributions. [2] But all successful politicians, no matter the party, receive campaign contributions.

In the Adams case, SDNY was rolling the dice. And given the DOJ’s abysmal history of losing at the Supreme Court, the odds were against the DOJ. Even the district judge said at a recent hearing that there was “some force” to Adams’s challenges to the gov’ts central legal theory.

The government must tread particularly carefully before classifying contributions a crime given the First Amendment implications of such a theory.

Additionally, the amount of resources it takes to bring a prosecution like this is incredible — thousands and thousands of man hours. Those resources could better be used arresting violent criminals to keep New York safe or prosecuting gang and cartel members.

Given the history, DOJ had to decide—among other issues—whether to keep going down a road that the Supreme Court has viewed with skepticism on numerous occasions. Dismissing the prosecution was absolutely the right call. END.

• • •

Mizelle is not wrong, at all, about the Roberts’ court’s disinterest in public corruption. They are, at least some of them, aficionados of it!

But along the way, Mizelle addressed only the bribery charge — the sole charge that Adams’ lawyers moved to dismiss.

Even there, Mizelle was playing loose with the record. The quote (from Judge Ho’s opinion rejecting the challenge) that Adams’ argument has “some force” only applies to one of two theories of bribery adopted by SDNY.

Mayor Adams takes particular issue with the Government’s first theory, arguing that— even leaving aside Snyder—being “influenced in connection with the City of New York’s regulation of the Turkish House” is simply too general or vague to constitute the requisite quo for bribery under § 666. Def. Reply Br. at 6–7; see also Def. Br. at 11. He contends that the words “business,” “transaction,” and “series of transactions” in § 666 refer to “specific and concrete governmental actions, not abstract or general objectives.” Def. Br. at 10. He further argues that to the extent the word “business” could be read broadly, it should not be—because that would render the terms “transaction” and “series of transactions” superfluous. Id. Adams seeks, in effect, to imbue the quo element of § 666 with a degree of specificity that, even if not identical to McDonnell’s “official act,” embodies a “core requirement [that] would be the same: . . . a specific and formal exercise of governmental power.” Def. Br. at 10.

Mayor Adams’s arguments on this point have some force.

Judge Ho didn’t say the same about the theory that Adams paid off Türkiye’s favors by helping them get into their new consulate.

Separately, regardless of whether the “regulation” of the Turkish House is specific enough to form the requisite quo at the indictment stage, there is no real dispute that the issuance of a TCO is a specific and formal exercise of governmental power

Furthermore, Mizelle claimed at [1] that Adams was just a candidate. While Adams was not yet Mayor (though he had won the Democratic primary) he was Borough President when he sent some texts to get the FDNY to approve the building. As Judge Ho noted in his opinion, whether Adams used his authority as Borough President to deliver a quo to Türkiye was a matter for a jury to decide.

Mayor Adams makes a separate but related argument that, even if formal authority is unnecessary, a pressure theory still requires that a defendant “us[e] his official position to exert pressure on another official.” McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). Adams contends that the Indictment fails to allege that any pressure he exerted on the FDNY stemmed from his official position as Brooklyn Borough President. See Def. Br. at 19. Rather, he argues, “the government is effectively claiming that Adams used his potential future position as Mayor to exert pressure on officials.” Id.

But the Indictment alleges that, “as Brooklyn Borough President, [Adams] met with members of the FDNY from time to time,” Ind. ¶ 38a, and the Government argues that it will prove at trial that it was Adams’s position as Brooklyn Borough President that “[got] him in the room, as it were, with the fire commissioner” in order to exert pressure regarding the TCO. Tr. at 33; see also id. at 34 (arguing that the jury could conclude that “the defendant was using his official position as Brooklyn Borough president to let him reach out [to] the fire commissioner on city business with the mayor, that’s what got him a room”). Ultimately, whether or not Adams used his official position as Brooklyn Borough President to exert pressure on the FDNY is a factual question for a jury to resolve.

So even on the bribery count, Mizelle was playing loose with the record.

But then he dismissed the other allegations in the indictment — which, again, Adams’ lawyers didn’t challenge as a matter of law — which include wire fraud, soliciting straw donors, and accepting illegal campaign contributions from foreigners, as mere campaign donations.

Pam Bondi’s Chief of Staff treated gifts from foreign powers as if they’re totally legal.

Noted.

That far, anyway, Chad Mizelle’s little screed looked thoroughly dishonest. But I didn’t doubt his — and by extension, DOJ’s — opposition to the enforcement of bribery statutes.

But at 2:37 ET, shortly after I was reading the rant Mizelle posted at 12:42, I was alerted to this development: an information setting up a one count guilty plea by former DC official Dana McDaniel, in a scheme that is almost certainly related the charges filed against former DC Council Member Trayon White last September. The information was signed by Acting DC US Attorney Ed Martin, one of Pam Bondi’s trusted operatives.

Pam Bondi’s DOJ doesn’t have a categorical opposition to bribery charges, it turns out.

Only bribery charges against those from whom they want something in exchange.

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