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No Wonder the Administration Didn’t Want Buck McKeon’s New AUMF; Marty Lederman Already Gave Them One

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Glenn Greenwald has a typically provocative post on the news that Marty Lederman and David Barron wrote the authorization to kill Anwar al-Awlaki. He uses Dawn Johnsen’s comments on the way secret OLC memos create secret law that undermine democracy.

Obama’s original choice to head the OLC, Dawn Johnsen, repeatedly railed against this Bush practice of concealing OLC memos as “secret law,” writing that “the Bush Administration’s excessive reliance on ‘secret law’ threatens the effective functioning of American democracy” and “the withholding from Congress and the public of legal interpretations by the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) upsets the system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government.”  In her April, 2008 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, she was nothing short of scathing on the practice of concealing OLC memos. [Glenn’s emphasis]

From there, he notes that Lederman and Barron used the same justification–the AUMF–that John Yoo used to justify the detention without due process of Jose Padilla.

So the AUMF allowed the President to designate Awlaki an “enemy combatant” without a shred of due process, and then to act against him using the powers of war, because we are at war with an entity for which Awlaki had become a combatant.

There are many problems with that reasoning, but one in particular that deserves attention now is this: that was exactly the theory repeatedly offered by the Bush DOJ for far less draconian acts than assassinating a U.S. citizen, and it was one that the very same Marty Lederman categorically rejected.  As I’ve noted many times, one of the most controversial Bush/Cheney acts was its claimed power to detain U.S. citizen Jose Padilla without charges or due process — not to kill him, but merely detain him — on the theory that the AUMF authorized the President to designate him as an “enemy combatant” and treat him accordingly. [Glenn’s emphasis]

I’m not sure I buy this comparison. There are times when the US might legally wage war against one of its citizens, but because of its own secrecy, the Administration has simply not made the case that that is true in this case.

One of the big problems with Lederman and Barron’s interpretation of the AUMF, though–one Glenn doesn’t treat closely but which perfectly exemplifies Johnsen’s point–is the extension of the AUMF to apply to AQAP, an entity that simply didn’t exist when the AUMF authorized war against groups that had launched 9/11.

Other assertions about Mr. Awlaki included that he was a leader of [AQAP], which had become a “cobelligerent” with Al Qaeda, and he was pushing it to focus on trying to attack the United States again. The lawyers were also told that capturing him alive among hostile armed allies might not be feasible if and when he were located.

Based on those premises, the Justice Department concluded that Mr. Awlaki was covered by the authorization to use military force against Al Qaeda that Congress enacted shortly after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — meaning that he was a lawful target in the armed conflict unless some other legal prohibition trumped that authority.

One area where Lederman’s reported memo is particularly dangerous, IMO, is in the extension of the AUMF to groups clearly not included in the congressional authorization.

All the more so given events that have transpired since the memo was written in June 2010. One of the first things the new Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Buck McKeon, did after last year’s election was to call for a new AUMF. Notably, he wanted to include Yemen (and AQAP) in the new AUMF. The Administration was disinterested in that new AUMF, stating they believed already had the authority to do what they need to.

They claim to have that authority, of course, because Marty Lederman said they have it.

No wonder they discouraged a new AUMF! An open debate over the new terms of the AUMF might interpret AQAP more restrictively than Lederman did in secret, which might have challenged the OLC memo authorizing the Awlaki killing (yeah, I know, the chances of that are almost nonexistent).

Furthermore, I wonder whether the Administration told Congress they had already effectively legally expanded the AUMF? McKeon counterpart Carl Levin’s call for the Administration to release the memo makes me wonder whether he has seen it, and if not whether he knows the Administration legally expanded the AUMF by secret fiat.

Which is why Glenn’s point that the Administration avoided not just Article III oversight, during the ACLU/CCR suit, on this killing, but also Congressional oversight is so important. I don’t support McKeon’s effort to write a new AUMF. But it is undeniable that Congress proposed changing the law in such a way that would have given the Awlaki killing more–though probably not adequate–sanction. Rather than embracing the opportunity by working with Congress to formally extend the war to Yemen and AQAP, the Administration instead operated with the secret self-sanction Lederman had already given it.

The Administration chose not to avail itself of the opportunity to explain in the context of an Article III court why it had the authority to kill Awlaki. So, too, it chose not to avail itself of the opportunity to negotiate with Congress to give the Awlaki killing more (though not adequate) legal sanction. Instead, it used its own secret law-making power to do what the other two branches of government could have done with transparency and legitimacy.

Update: Meanwhile, McKeon is holding the Defense Authorization hostage to his bigotry.

Larry Thompson: From Rendering Maher Arar to Pushing Pop to Teaching Lawyers

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Oh is Mary going to love this.

As she has tirelessly reminded us over the years, Larry Thompson, the former Deputy Attorney General who signed off on Maher Arar’s rendition to Syria to be tortured, has spent the last 7 years at PepsiCo serving as their General Counsel.

But he’s got a new job: as a law professor at University of Georgia.

Now, it appears he’ll just be teaching corporate law and white collar crime and not–like John Yoo at Berkeley–constitutional law.

But it’s yet another example of a top Bush lawyer who, after abusing the rule of law while in government, is being rewarded with a job teaching the next generation of lawyers.

Here’s what the Center for Constitutional Rights had to say about the move (remember they’ve represented Arar):

The Center for Constitutional Rights is profoundly concerned at the news that the University of Georgia School of Law has hired former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson as a permanent member of its law school faculty.  Mr. Thompson played a prominent role in the extraordinary rendition of our client, Maher Arar, to Syria where he was tortured and detained for a year.  Mr. Arar’s case caused international outrage that led the Canadian government to launch a public inquiry, exonerate him of any wrongdoing, acknowledge their role in his treatment, and compensate him.  It would be shocking if the Law School were aware of Mr. Thompson’s role in this case and hired him nonetheless.  The notion that Mr. Thompson should be held out as a model for future law students when in fact he should be, at a bare minimum, investigated for his role in Mr. Arar’s rendition to torture is astonishing.  We call on the Law School to investigate and reconsider its appointment of Mr. Thompson accordingly.  Anything short of a full investigation into this matter would bring into question the integrity of The University of Georgia School of Law.

DOJ Points to David Passaro’s Trial as Proof We Investigate Torture, But It Actually Proves John Yoo Should Be Tried

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Update: Meanwhile, the Spanish judge threw out the case.

A SPANISH judge overnight dismissed a complaint filed against former top US officials over alleged torture at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Judge Eloy Velasco decided to throw out the case as he said the US justice system is competent to handle any such complaint.

The last time Spain considered investigating American torture, DOJ and Spain’s Chief Prosecutor Jose Zaragoza worked together to find a way for Spain to decline the case: shortly after Zaragoza told us that “if a proceeding regarding this matter were underway in the U.S., that would effectively bar proceedings in Spain,” Eric Holder asked John Durham to investigate torture. There’s no visible sign in the least, mind you, that Durham has investigated the crimes in his mandate (which includes, among other things, the use of death threats against Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri and the manslaughter of Gul Rahman in Afghan’s Salt Pit). But his investigation serves as a convenient diplomatic stunt to shield American torture from Spanish law.

DOJ attempts to stave off Spanish investigations by claiming we investigate torture

DOJ’s back in the diplomatic stunt business with a letter attempting to convince Spain to drop its investigations of the lawyers who authorized torture.

We understand from Judge Velasco’s request that a criminal complaint has been made by the Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners, claiming that the United States, as part of a strategy in its conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda and its affiliates, sanctioned a series of executive orders supported by legal memoranda drawn up by the above-listed persons and their legal counsel and advisors, authorizing interrogation techniques in violation of international conventions in force. We have also been advised that the complaint further alleges that U.S. government personnel used the memoranda as a legal basis to conduct interrogations using these illegal techniques upon persons suspected of acting in concert with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In the request, Judge Velasco seeks information indicating whether any U.S. authority has instituted investigations or proceedings in connection with the facts describes in the above-referenced complaint, and, if so, the specific authority (administrative or judicial) that has dealt or is dealing with such matters. The request further notes that if the facts are currently being investigated by U.S. authorities, that the referenced complaint will be sent to the United States in order that the facts reported therein may be investigated by the United States.

There’s a lot that is misleading about DOJ’s response letter. But one of its key strategies is badly fraudulent: the centrality of its focus on David Passaro’s conviction for assault. The letter boasts:

In 2003 [EW: it was 2004], the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal charges against Passaro, a CIA contractor accused of brutally assaulting a detainee in Afghanistan in 2003. The CIA described his conduct as “unlawful, reprehensible, and neither authorized nor condoned by the Agency.” The then Attorney General stated that “the United States will not tolerate criminal acts of brutality and violence against detainees….” And the U.S. Attorney noted that the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the United States is “[n]ot only vital to investigating and prosecuting terrorists, but also it is instrumental in protecting the civil liberties of those on U.S. military installations and diplomatic missions overseas, regardless of their nationality.” See press release at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr2004/June/04_crm_414.htm, a copy of which is annexed as Attachment A hereto. Following a jury trial, Passaro was convicted of felony assault. On August 10, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction, holding that a U.S. federal court has jurisdiction over the trial of an American citizen for committing assaults on the premised of U.S. military missions abroad. The full opinion of the court is annexed as Attachment B hereto. In February 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by Passaro. Passaro was sentenced to 8 years and 4 months in prison. [EW: his sentence was reduced to 80 months on appeal.]

But there’s a lot that’s wrong with this boast, aside from the error of date and the representation that Passaro’s ultimate sentence was 20 months longer than it ultimately was.

There were irregularities with Passaro’s trial

As I’ve described, Passaro was charged and convicted with assault that led to the death of a suspect Afghan insurgent, Ahmed Wali, at Asadabad firebase on June 21, 2003. There’s a lot that’s funky about Passaro’s case: The military prevented any autopsy on Wali, making it impossible for Passaro to refute arguments the government made about cause of death. There was a Special Forces person with access to Wali whose role was never explored at trial, and the two guards who had custody (and unsupervised access) to Wali during the period leading up to his death were magically assigned to duty in Alaska during Passaro’s trial, making them unavailable to be cross-examined during the trial.

But the central problem with Passaro’s conviction is that the government withheld all the evidence he asked for that would have shown that, even if his treatment of Wali did lead to his death, it had been officially sanctioned under the CIA’s detention policy. And that evidence goes straight to John Yoo’s role in sanctioning torture.

Passaro was denied directly responsive evidence that goes to heart of Yoo’s role in torture

Passaro attempted to use a public authority defense, basically arguing he had been ordered to use any force he used with Wali. In addition to asking for evidence on SERE training–indicating that Passaro knew well the CIA, with John Yoo’s sanction, had used SERE as the basis for its interrogation program–Passaro asked for (in part):

  • All memoranda from OLC on the capture, detention, and interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan
  • All memoranda from CIA’s Office of General Counsel on the capture, detention, and interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan
  • “[C]omplete contents of the rules of engagement for the CIA that address the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations or combatants operating in Afghanistan” including those categorized as “force protection targets”
  • “[A]ll written documents, photographs, video, and sound recordings that contain the methods employed in Afghanistan by members of CIA, DOD, or OGA for the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist organizations, or other combatants operating in Afghanistan, including policies and guidelines developed in early 2003 for use by Special Operations forces“
  • “[A]ll orders, directives, and/or authorizations by President George W. Bush; ex-CIA Director George J. Tenet; the CIA Director of Operations; and the head of CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Office of Military Affairs, or any other CIA component, that address the capture, detention, and/or interrogation of members of the Taliban, al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations or combatants operating in Afghanistan”
  • All information on Passaro’s training [my emphasis]

In response, the government gave Passaro an otherwise never-released guidance [see PDF 21] which the CIPA summary claimed was “an excerpt of guidance provided to the field on 03 December 2002 in support of ongoing CIA operations in Afghanistan and along the Pakistan border” which read,

When CIA officers are involved in interrogation of a detainee, the conduct of such interrogation should not encompass any significant physiological aspects (e.g., direct physical contacts, unusual mental distress, unusual physical restraints, or deliberate environmental deprivations)–beyond those reasonably required to ensure the safety and security of the detainee–without prior and specific headquarters guidance.

Note the date: December 3, 2002. But remember, Wali died on June 21, 2003. And in between the time that guidance was issued and the time when Wali died, CIA issued four more documents that were directly responsive to Passaro’s request but which the government didn’t turn over (and which weren’t released in this form until several weeks after the Appeals decision cited in DOJ’s letter):

  • CIA’s Guidelines on Confinement, dated January 28, 2003, signed by George Tenet (written after consultation with John Yoo)
  • CIA’s Guidelines on Interrogation, dated January 28, 2003, signed by George Tenet (written after consultation with John Yoo)
  • The Bullet Point document created by the CounterTerrorism Center with John Yoo’s involvement, delivered from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller to John Yoo on April 28, 2003
  • The Bullet Point document, described as a “final summary” sent from CTC to OLC’s Patrick Philbin on June 16, 2003

Between the Tenet Guidelines and the Bullet Points, a number of the actions for which Passaro was convicted were sanctioned by the CIA at the time Wali died.

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As Expected, Judge Bates Punts on Rule of Law

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I almost felt like I was reading Judge John Bates’ ruling on whether or not Valerie Plame could sue those who outed her when I read Judge Bates’ ruling dismissing the suit challenging the government’s ability to assassinate Anwar al-Awlaki with no due process.

He starts by admitting the importance of the issues at hand.

This is a unique and extraordinary case. Both the threshold and merits issues present fundamental questions of separation of powers involving the proper role of the courts in our constitutional structure. Leading Supreme Court decisions from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), through Justice Jackson’s celebrated concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), to the more recent cases dealing with Guantanamo detainees have been invoked to guide this Court’s deliberations. Vital considerations of national security and of military and foreign affairs (and hence potentially of state secrets) are at play.

Stark, and perplexing, questions readily come to mind, including the following: How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death? Can a U.S. citizen — himself or through another — use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization? How can the

courts, as plaintiff proposes, make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged threats to national security, determine the imminence of those threats, weigh the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military force against such threats is justified? When would it ever make sense for the United States to disclose in advance to the “target” of contemplated military action the precise standards under which it will take that military action? And how does the evolving AQAP relate to core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting AQAP (or its principals) under the September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force?

But then he punts entirely on standing grounds.

Although these threshold questions of jurisdiction may seem less significant than the questions posed by the merits of plaintiff’s claims, “[m]uch more than legal niceties are at stake here” — the “constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.”

[snip]

Because these questions of justiciability require dismissal of this case at the outset, the serious issues regarding the merits of the alleged authorization of the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen overseas must await another day or another (non-judicial) forum.

But just for good measure, Bates says he would rule in the government’s favor on state secrets, but doesn’t need to.

So, too, defendants have established that the three procedural requirements for invocation of the state secrets privilege — (1) a formal claim of privilege (2) by an appropriate department head (3) after personal consideration — have been satisfied here. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8; Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1080; Defs.’ Mem. at 48-50.[snip]

Under the circumstances, and particularly given both the extraordinary nature of this case and the other clear grounds for resolving it, the Court will not reach defendants’ state secrets privilege claim. That is consistent with the request of the Executive Branch and with the law, and plaintiff does not contest that approach. Indeed, given the nature of the state secrets assessment here based on careful judicial review of classified submissions to which neither plaintiff nor his counsel have access, there is little that plaintiff can offer with respect to this issue.17 But in any event, because plaintiff lacks standing and his claims are non-justiciable, and because the state secrets privilege should not be invoked “more often or extensively than necessary,” see Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1080, this Court will not reach defendants’ invocation of the state secrets privilege.

It was nice of Bates to save the Obama Administration the embarrassment of invoking state secrets to hide the logic for its tyranny.

All in all, a tremendous victory for unchecked executive powers!

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Government Trying to Fudge on Its Claim to Absolute Power

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I’m working on a post on the news that DOJ will not charge Jose Rodriguez for destroying the torture tapes. But that’s going to take a while (read the NYT on the news in the meantime).

In the meantime, though, I wanted to point to Adam Serwer’s summary of yesterday’s hearing on the Anwar al-Awlaki suit. The most amusing detail in Adam’s story is that the government only wants to rely on its invocation of State Secrets as a fallback position.

Letter explicitly asked Bates to dismiss the lawsuit on state-secrets grounds only as a last resort.

See?!? They have some shame about their abuse of executive power, even if they’re going to rely on it anyway.

The most important issue, IMO, pertains to standing–I have already suggested that Judge Bates might reject the suit for lack of standing, not least because it’s the easiest way to punt. Adam suggests that Bates was thoroughly uninterested in one of two potential ways to establish standing.

The ACLU/CCR contends they have standing under two criteria, “Next Friend” and “Third Party.” Meeting the standard under “Next Friend” requires the ACLU/CCR to show that the younger al-Awlaki would want to sue but can’t, while “Third Party” demands that the elder al-Awlaki show that he would “suffer a concrete, redressable injury” from the government’s actions. Although Ben Wittes, who was also there, would disagree with me, I think Bates was more sympathetic to “Next Friend” than he was to the “Third Party” question, as he warned the latter could lead to a flood of lawsuits based on government action, and an “unprincipled landscape” in which judges arbitrarily decide standing based on the plaintiffs they’re sympathetic to.

But perhaps the most dramatic part of the hearing appears to have been when Jameel Jaffer stood up and stated that this suit was about whether or not the President can order the assassination of a citizen with no review. I actually differ with Adam’s take on some of this.

There was an exchange at the end of arguments that, beyond the legalese, really crystallized what this case is about. Both sides had offered their final rebuttals, but ACLU attorney Jameel Jaffer stood again and stated that the lawsuit was really about whether the president possesses an “unreviewable authority to order the assassination of an American citizen.” It moved Bates to ask Letter if he wanted to respond.

[DOJ Attorney Douglas] Letter rose and called Jaffer’s statement “absurd” and “ridiculous” but what followed was less convincing. He pointed out that the AUMF limits the president to overseas operations, that al-Awlaki was part of an “officially designated” terrorist group who was “attempting to carry out operations” against Americans.The fact that al-Awlaki had just released a new video calling for Muslims to kill Americans probably weighed on reporters in the courtroom.

Only the first of Letter’s statements is beyond dispute. The other two concern unproven — but not necessarily inaccurate — assumptions of fact that go to the heart of the case: whether or not al-Awlaki is actually an “operational leader” of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or simply a vicious hatemonger who justifies and exhorts terrorism against Americans. The government is actually saying that its unilateral determination that the latter two assumptions are accurate that allow the government to deprive al-Awlaki of life without due process.

First, note that Letter’s claim that al-Awlaki was part of an “officially designated” terrorist group is a bunch of baloney. He is now part of that group, at least according to the unproven allegations of the government. But the State Department didn’t get around to designating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as such until several weeks after they had put al-Awlaki on the JSOC kill list (though he was not yet on the CIA kill list), so the suggestion that the President would only target someone formally designated a terrorist for assassination is a lie.

But the other claim–that the AUMF only covers operations overseas–is even sillier.

Consider: the government has not yet withdrawn the White Paper retroactively authorizing the illegal wiretap program under the AUMF. Thus, DOJ still supports claims that the AUMF authorized the President–any President–to conduct operations (in that case, military operations in the form of NSA wiretapping) in the United States.

Mind you, Tom Daschle has made it clear that Congress specifically refused to grant the President authority to operate in the United States. But so long as DOJ supports that White Paper, they stand by a public claim that the AUMF authorized the President to operate within the US.

So Jaffer is right: there’s nothing about Douglas Letter’s claims that rebut Jaffer’s argument that this is about whether the President can unilaterally assassinate an American citizen. As Adam has shown, simply asserting someone is a member of a terrorist organization does not make the assertion any less unilateral. And Letter’s claims that the AUMF does not authorize operations in the United States seems to ignore DOJ policy that supports just such a claim.

DC Court: National Security Requires Dismissal of Suit Brought by Families of Men “Suicided” at Gitmo

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Given that our President now holds that he has the authority to assassinate US Citizens with no due process–and he doesn’t have to explain that authority to any  court–it should be no surprise that the DC District Court has upheld its earlier decision dismissing the suit of a filed by the families of a bunch of men “suicided” at Gitmo. (I’m already 3 hours into my 15 hour transit from Holland to Holland, so I’m going to just quote from CCR’s press release; here’s one of Scott Horton’s articles on this to remind you of the background and the new evidence the plaintiffs submitted.)

Today, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed its decision to dismiss Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, a civil lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and co-counsel concerning the deaths of three Guantánamo prisoners in June 2006, despite newly-available evidence from soldiers stationed at the base at the time of the deaths that strongly suggest the men were killed at a black site at Guantánamo and a government cover-up of the true cause and circumstances of the deaths. The government reported the deaths as suicides.“No one can compensate me for the loss of my son; no one can bring him back to me,” said Talal Al-Zahrani, father of Yasser Al-Zahrani. “But the court’s refusal to hear my son’s case is devastating and deepens my family’s pain. The courts should be investigating my son’s death and holding those responsible accountable. President Obama should be defending human rights and the democratic values the U.S. preaches to the world, rather than going to court to defend the lies and gruesome crimes of the Bush administration.”

The case, filed on behalf of the families of two of the deceased, Yasser Al-Zahrani of Saudi Arabia and Salah Ali Abdullah Ahmed Al-Salami of Yemen, charged the government and 24 federal officials with responsibility for the men’s abuse, wrongful detention and ultimate deaths. Earlier this year, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case, holding that national security considerations prevented the court from hearing the families’ claims. Following the dismissal, the families filed a motion for reconsideration on the basis of the evidence from the soldiers, as reported by Scott Horton in Harper’s Magazine in January 2010, arguing that the new facts compelled the court to reopen the case.

While noting that “‘it is, as plaintiffs argue, ‘disturb[ing]’ that defendants allegedly ‘fought to keep secret virtually all information concerning the cause and circumstances of Al-Zahrani and Al-Salami’s deaths’ and that ‘details of an elaborate, high-level cover-up of likely homicide at a ‘black site’ at Guantanamo’ are now emerging,’” the court’s decision today held that national security considerations still bar it from considering the families’ claims, and that the defendants’ alleged involvement in the murder of Al-Zahrani and Al-Salami was still within the scope of their employment.

Obama, of course, would say that he had to support this cover up to protect the spooks in the field.

But consider the change we’ve made? The last Administration conducted cover-ups by claiming that it was in the job description of top employees to out CIA spies. Now, the President conducts cover-ups in the name of protecting CIA spies by holding that murder is within the job description of spooks and soldiers. Hope! Change!

(Thanks for all the advice on Scotch the other night–I hope to put that advice to good use.)

Obama Doesn’t Know Why the Fuck He’s Entitled to Kill Al-Awlaki, He Just Is, Damnit

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The most striking aspect of the government’s motion to dismiss the ACLU/CCR lawsuit challenging the use of targeted killing is that the government does not commit to the basis for its authority to kill an American citizen like Anwar al-Awlaki with no review.

This starts as soon as the filing tries to lay the ground work for unchecked authority under the AUMF. It doesn’t commit to whether Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is part of al Qaeda itself, or is instead just closely enough associated to count under the AUMF.

The United States has further determined that AQAP is an organized armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed armed attacks against the United States in the noninternational armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda that the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006).

[snip]

Furthermore, as noted above, the Executive Branch has determined that AQAP is an organized armed group that is either part of al-Qaeda or, alternatively, is an organized associated force, or cobelligerent, of al-Qaeda that has directed attacks against the United States in the noninternational armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda that the Supreme Court has recognized (see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628-31). [my emphasis]

Though note the gigantic slip here: the AUMF only declares war against those “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons” (when AQAP didn’t exist in its current form), not those who have attacked us since. This “either/or” statement only claims that AQAP is part of the same war, not that it had any role in 9/11, so it’s totally bogus in any case, even without the betrayal of their lack of confidence in both of these claims with the either/or construction.

Presumably to tie AQAP more closely to the AUMF, the government then notes that the Treasury declared AQAP a terrorist organization (not noting that that happened eight months after al-Awlaki was first targeted for assassination), which in turn relies upon a Presidential declaration issued roughly around the same time as the AUMF.

Based in part on this information, on July 16, 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued an order designating Anwar al-Aulaqi a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) for, inter alia, “acting for or on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) . . . and for providing financial, material or technological support for, or other services to or in support of, acts of terrorism[.]” Designation of ANWAR AL–AULAQI Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010).1

1 This designation was issued pursuant to the President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President issued Executive Order No. 13224 (“E.O. 13224”), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001), effective September 24, 2001, declaring a national emergency with respect to the “grave acts of terrorism . . . and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on United States nationals or the United States.” See E.O. 13224, Preamble. The Secretary of State previously designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 19, 2010, pursuant to her powers under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189. (See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm).

Gosh! That’s almost like AQAP was included in the AUMF back in 2001, the reliance on a declaration made just days after the AUMF itself.

Except it’s not. (And the argument itself presumes that anyone Timmeh Geithner wants to call a terrorist can be killed with no due process, whether or not they have a tie to Al Qaeda.)

You can tell DOJ’s lawyers recognize this to be a gaping hole in their argument, because they repeatedly claim–without providing any evidence–that they have been authorized by “the political branches” to use all means against the threat that Al-Awlaki is part of.

In particular, plaintiff’s requested relief would put at issue the lawfulness of the future use of force overseas that Executive officials might undertake at the direction of the President against a foreign organization as to which the political branches have authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force.

[snip]

More broadly, the Complaint seeks judicial oversight of the President’s power to use force overseas to protect the Nation from the threat of attacks by an organization against which the political branches have authorized the use of all necessary and appropriate force, in compliance with applicable domestic and international legal requirements, including the laws of war. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107 40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Joint Resolution of Congress signed by the President). [my emphasis]

Last I checked, only one political branch has the authority to declare war, Congress. Not multiple political branches. That the Administration has even invoked political branches, plural, for their authority to use force–basically arguing “we and that rump organization better known as Congress have authorized this, so there!”–demonstrates the audacity of their claim to self-authorize using unlimited power.

Presumably to reinforce the magic power of this strange invocation of the political branches, the filing then argues that judges aren’t equipped “to manage” the Executive Branch.

The Judiciary is simply not equipped to manage the President and his national security advisors in their discharge of these most critical and sensitive executive functions and prescribe ex ante whether, where, or in what circumstances such decisions would be lawful. Whatever the limits of the political question doctrine, this case is at its core.

Of course, that’s not what the suit asks the court to do at all. It asks the court to review the decisions of the Executive Branch, not least to see whether its actions comply with the terms which that other political branch–the one that actually has the authority to declare war–has laid out.

Review … manage.

What’s the difference if an American citizen’s life is at stake?

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But Who Has JSOC’s Back?

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Michael Hayden has another tired whine at CNN about Obama’s treatment of the torture program. The entire logic of the piece is predictably silly. It goes something like this:

  1. ACLU and CCR are suing the government for targeting American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki with no due process.
  2. According to Hayden, the targeting of Awlaki was “Authorized by the president, approved as legal, briefed to Congress.”
  3. According to unnamed legal scholars, the suit has little chance of success.
  4. But Obama’s DOJ released OLC memos on the torture program in response to an ACLU suit and investigated the torture of detainees that exceeded DOJ guidelines and therefore was illegal.
  5. This makes Hayden mad because it constitutes “exposing a previously authorized program for apparent political purposes.”
  6. Oh, and by the way, the UN rapporteur for extrajudicial killings also has a problem with targeted killings (and not just those of US citizens), though I’m not entirely sure what Hayden thinks Obama should do about that.

I guess this piece is supposed to be a warning to the White House–which has already assured CIA that it won’t be prosecuted for breaking the law on Obama’s orders–that it needs to make triple sure that none of those with the legal means to do so hold the CIA responsible for the illegal things it is doing. The whole thing would just make more sense if Hayden hadn’t personalized it so much (because, after all, he probably ought to be more concerned about a future President trying to distinguish herself from Obama’s abysmal record in this area). But I get it–Hayden lost some arguments with the Obama Administration and so this whole issue is very very personal.

And I wonder, really, does Hayden believe that Presidents really do have unlimited ability to make laws disappear? And if Hayden is so certain those unnamed legal scholars are correct about the legality of the assassination program and the poor chances the ACLU/CCR suit will succeed, then why complain? Or maybe, given the contortions that Obama’s DOJ is going through in contemplation of litigating the ACLU/CCR suit, Hayden’s confidence that the suit won’t succeed is merely bravado?

But the other amusing thing about this screed is its focus on the CIA. Hayden treats this as danger experienced primarily by the CIA.

The CIA is asked to do things no one else is asked — or even allowed — to do. And when CIA officers agree to do these things (after appropriate authorization, judgment with regard to lawfulness and congressional notification), they believe that they have a contract with their government, not a particular administration, that the government will have their back legally, ethically and politically.That belief was shattered by the Obama administration’s actions. Agency officers were shown that those guarantees have the half-life of one election cycle in the American political process. No wonder one astute observer of the agency likened it to a car bomb going off in the driveway at Langley.

But what about JSOC?

After all, Awlaki has been on JSOC’s kill list for longer than he has been on CIA’s. According to reporting, JSOC is as involved in the targeted killing program as CIA (as they were in the torture program). Why isn’t retired General Hayden worried about those killers?

Granted, there is a distinction. When civilians at the CIA target people for assassination, particularly those who pose no imminent threat, the claim that the killing is legal under the law of war is much weaker.

But for some reason, JSOC doesn’t have the need to trot out spokesmen to defend itself every third month, but CIA does.

Obama Administration Deliberates Whether to Tack to the Right of David Rivkin

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Go read this entire Charlie Savage article describing the deliberations within the Administration on how to respond to ACLU/CCR’s lawsuit challenging the government’s ability to target American citizens for assassination with no due process. The whole thing makes me want to cry about what our country has become (Congratulations Osama bin Laden! You’ve won!).

But it was this paragraph that really made me nauseous:

“I’m a huge fan of executive power, but if someone came up to you and said the government wants to target you and you can’t even talk about it in court to try to stop it, that’s too harsh even for me,” [David Rivkin] said.

Rivkin is, of course, the former Reagan and Poppy Bush official that Republicans like to roll out any time they need an absolute unquestioning supporter of unlimited executive power. His job is effectively to put legal lipstick on the power hungry pig that has grown out of 9/11.

But he refuses to endorse the legal approach Obama’s DOJ is reportedly considering: to try to get the Awlaki suit dismissed by invoking state secrets.

And it’s not just Rivkin being contrary for partisan reasons. He endorses another of the approaches the Administration is considering, just telling the judge to butt out because this is a matter of politics.

Mr. Rivkin said he favored a different argument: a declaration that in war who can be targeted — and where — is a “political question” for the executive branch to decide, not judges.

Yup, according to Savage’s report, a Democratic DOJ is actually contemplating arguing to a judge that during wartime, the President can choose to kill anyone he wants to anywhere he wants to.

If the President kills someone, they’re preparing to argue, it’s legal.

Which gives Savage another opportunity to rely on a right wing lawyer to point out just how crazy are the arguments the Obama DOJ is contemplating. In this case, former W Administration official Matthew Waxman notes that even if it were true that the President can choose to kill whoever he wants whereever he wants during war, we’re not at war with Yemen!

Inside the administration, that argument is also seen as attractive. But invoking it could give the court an opportunity to reject the idea that an armed conflict with Al Qaeda exists in Yemen, said Matthew Waxman, who was the Pentagon’s top detainee affairs official under the second President Bush.

“The more forcefully the administration urges a court to stay out because this is warfare, the more it puts itself in the uncomfortable position of arguing we’re at war even in Yemen,” he said. “The worst outcome would be if the court rules that the president is not authorized to wage war against Al Qaeda beyond combat zones like Afghanistan.”

Of course, no one seems to be contemplating actually litigating this case, actually allowing a judge to rule on whether it is legal to assassinate American citizens with no due process.

And these are the lawyers guarding our Constitution.

Eight Months after Putting Anwar al-Awlaki on Kill List, DOJ Considers Charges

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Back in January, Dana Priest first revealed that Anwar al-Awlaki was on a JSOC kill list and was being considered for a CIA kill list. Now, eight months later, DOJ is considering charging him.

The Obama administration is considering filing the first criminal charges against radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in case the CIA fails to kill him and he’s is captured alive in Yemen.

[snip]

Such charges, however, would come with political and intelligence-gathering risks. Counterterrorism officials regard al-Awlaki as a terrorist operative, not just a preacher, but they have revealed few specifics. Charging al-Awlaki with having direct involvement in terrorism could require the U.S. to reveal evidence gleaned from foreign wiretaps or confidential informants.

Now, it appears DOJ sources are throwing some baloney in with this news. For example, the claim that criminal charges might require the US to reveal evidence collected using wiretaps doesn’t sound all that awful, given that the contents of some of the wiretaps of al-Awlaki’s communications with Nidal Hasan have already been published. The government didn’t seem to have a problem leaking these intercepts earlier this year…

And the claim that they’re charging al-Awlaki just in case they happen to capture him alive rather than dead (opps!)? I’d suggest it probably has a lot more to do with the suit CCR and ACLU have taken against the government. I’m guessing that following shortly on formal charges, DOJ will tell the courts they can’t litigate the al-Awlaki suit because it pertains to an ongoing criminal investigation. Voila! No discovery in the lawsuit!!

Particularly given this detail:

If the Justice Department decides to charge al-Awlaki, it’s likely he would not be indicted. Rather, charges are more likely to take the form of an FBI complaint. That’s because an indicted suspect automatically gets the right to an attorney if he is captured, making it harder for authorities to question him.

In other words, this doesn’t appear to be an effort to finally use due process before targeting an American citizen with assassination. Rather, it seems to be more about closing off legal options to that American citizen.

Update: Here’s the joint ACLU/CCR statement on this:

Our organizations have long stated that if the government has evidence that Anwar Al-Aulaqi is involved in terrorist activity, it should present that evidence to a court – not authorize his execution without charge or trial. Now, months after the government announced its intent to kill Al-Aulaqi, it may finally bring charges against him. This would be a step in the right direction. The constitutional guarantee of due process relies on the critical distinction between allegations and evidence. If the reports that charges may be brought against Al-Aulaqi are true, the fact that it has taken the government this long – months after having announced his death sentence – suggests that, in this case, the government’s allegations were far ahead of its evidence.

While bringing charges against Al-Aulaqi based on credible evidence would be a step in the right direction, it would not mean that he could now be targeted for killing without trial. It is well established that the government cannot use extrajudicial killing to punish people for past acts, but only to prevent grave and imminent threats. A criminal charge for past crimes does not provide a license to kill.

We continue to believe that the courts must play a role in establishing legal standards for when the government can take the life of one of its own citizens without charge or trial. For that reason, we will continue with our litigation.”