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The MalwareTech Poker Hand: Calling DOJ’s Bluff

With a full poker hand’s worth of filings on Friday, MalwareTech’s (AKA Marcus Hutchins) lawyers are finally revealing the main thrust of their defense. The five filings are:

  1. A motion for a bill of particulars, basically demanding that the government reveal what 10 computers Hutchins and his alleged co-conspirator conspired and intended to damage
  2. A motion to suppress the statements Hutchins made after he was arrested, requesting an evidentiary hearing, based on the fact that Hutchins was high and exhausted and didn’t know US law about Miranda warnings
  3. A motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing on three different grounds that,
    • The CFAA charges (one and six) don’t allege any intent to cause damage to a protected computer (because the malware in question steals data, but doesn’t damage affected computers)
    • The Wiretapping charges (two through five) don’t allege the use of a device as defined under the Wiretap Act, but instead show use of software
    • The sales-related charges (one, five, and six) conflate the sale of malware with the ultimate effect of it
  4. A motion to dismiss the indictment for improper extraterritorial application and venue, effectively because this case should never have been charged in the US, much less Milwaukee
  5. A motion to dismiss charges two and six based on suspected improper grand jury instruction failing to require intentionality

Effectively, these five motions (which are likely to meet with mixed success, but even where they’re likely to fail, will lay the groundwork for trial) work together to sustain an argument that Hutchins should never have been charged with these crimes in the US, and that FBI may have cheated a bit to get the incriminatory statements that might let them sustain the prosecution.

I laid out the general oddity of these charges here, and the background to the Miranda challenge and grand jury instructions here, here, and here.

Hutchins was high and tired, not drunk, for his one minute Miranda warning

While I don’t expect the Miranda challenge (item 2) to be effective on its face, I do expect it to serve as groundwork for a significant attempt to discredit Hutchin’s incriminatory statements at trial. This motion provides more detail about why his defense thinks it will be an effective tactic. It’s not just that Hutchins is a foreigner and couldn’t be expected to know how US Miranda works, or that the FBI only documented that they asked Hutchins if he had drinking alcohol four months after the arrest (as I laid out here). But as the motion notes, the FBI doesn’t claim to have asked whether he was exhausted or otherwise intoxicated.

According to an FBI memorandum, before “initiating a post arrest interview,” an agent asked Mr. Hutchins if he had been drinking that day, and he responded that he had not. That memorandum, written over four months after the arrest, then states that the agent asked Mr. Hutchins “if has [sic] in a good state of mind to speak to the FBI Hutchins agreed.” Mr. Hutchins did not understand it to be an inquiry as to whether he had used drugs or was exhausted.

The initial 302 of the interrogation records Hutchins telling the agents that he had been partying and not sleeping.

Mr. Hutchins discussed his partying while in Las Vegas, as well as his lack of sleep, during the interrogation.

The motion admits that he had been using drugs (of unspecified type) the night before.

As Mr. Hutchins sat in the airport lounge, he was not drinking, but he was exhausted from partying all week and staying up the night before until the wee hours. He had also used drugs.

Nevada legalized the recreational use of marijuana effective July 2017, so if he was still high during this interview, he might have been legally intoxicated under state (but not federal) law. And there’s not a lick of evidence that the FBI asked him about that.

After laying out that the FBI has no record of asking Hutchins whether he was sober (rather than just not drunk), the motion reveals that the FBI couldn’t decide at what time it gave Hutchins his Miranda warning.

An FBI Advice of Rights form sets forth Miranda warnings and reflects Mr. Hutchins’ signature. It is dated August 2, 2017, but the time it was completed includes two crossed out times, 11:08 a.m. and 2:08 p.m., and one uncrossed out time, 1:18 p.m. (which is one minute after the FBI log reflects Mr. Hutchins’ arrest, as noted above).

And as noted before, and reiterated here, the FBI didn’t record that part of his interview.

The motion notes that if the final, current record of the time of warning is correct, then the Miranda warning, including any discussion of how US law differs from British law, took place in the minute after he was whisked away from this gate.

Hutchins recently tweeted that he “slept the entire time I was in prison,” which while not accurate (he was neither in prison nor in real solitary), would otherwise corroborate the claim he was exhausted.

The government’s cobbled case on intentionality and computer law

Items 3 and 5, arguing the law is inappropriately applied and specifically not instructed correctly with regards to two charges, work together to argue that the government has cobbled together charges against Hutchins via misapplying both CFAA and Wiretap law, and in turn using conspiracy charges and misstating requisite intentionality to be able to get at Hutchins.

As I’ve noted, Hutchins’ lawyers have been arguing for some time that the government may not have properly instructed the grand jury on the intentionality required under charges 2 and 6. At a hearing in February, Magistrate Nancy Joseph showed some sympathy to this argument (though is still reviewing whether the defense should get the grand jury instructions). As I noted in that post, whereas the government once claimed it would easily fix this problem by getting a superseding indictment (possibly larding on new charges), they seem to have lost their enthusiasm for doing so.

It’s the combination of the rest of the legal challenge that I find more interesting. The challenge will interact with recent innovations in charging other foreign hackers, especially a bunch of Russians that will make DOJ especially defensive of this challenge. But the motions all cite Seventh Circuit precedent closely, so I’m not sure whether that matters.

Ultimately, this motion makes roughly the same arguments that Orin Kerr made as soon as the indictment came out. As he introduced his more thorough explanation in August,

This raises an interesting legal question: Is it a crime to create and sell malware?

The indictment asserts that Hutchins created the malware and an unnamed co-conspirator took the lead in selling it. The indictment charges a slew of different crimes for that: (1) conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; (2) three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 2512, which prohibits selling and advertising wiretapping devices; (3) a count of wiretapping; and (4) a count of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act through accomplice liability — basically, aiding and abetting a hacking crime.

Do the charges hold up? Just based on a first look at the case, my sense is that the government’s theory of the case is fairly aggressive. It will lead to some significant legal challenges. It’s hard to say, at this point, how those challenges will play out. The indictment is pretty bare-bones, and we don’t have all the facts or even what the government thinks are the facts. So while we can’t say that this indictment is clearly an overreach, we can say that the government is pushing the envelope in some ways and may or may not have the facts it needs to make its case. As always, we’ll have to stay tuned.

Kerr is not flaming hippie, so I assume that these arguments will be rather serious challenges for the government and I await the analysis of this challenge by more Fourth Amendment lawyers. But as he suggested back in August, Hutchins’ team may well be right that this indictment is an overreach.

DOJ still hasn’t explained why it charged Hutchins for a crime with no known US victims

While requests for Bill of Particulars (basically, a request for more details about what the government is claiming broke the law) are usually unsuccessful, this one does two interesting things. It asks the government for proof of damage, including proof of which ten computers got damaged.

Mr. Hutchins asks that the government be required to particularize the “damage” it intends to offer into evidence at trial in connection with the alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by the two defendants. Mr. Hutchins also asks that the government be required to particularize the “10 or more protected computers” to which it contends the defendants conspired and attempted to cause “damage.”

Whether the motion itself is successful or not, demanding proof that ten computers were damaged helps support the challenge to the two CFAA charges based on whether stealing credentials amounts to damage. It also lays the groundwork for the motion made explicitly in item 4 — that Hutchins should never have been charged in the US, much less Wisconsin.

As I laid out in this piece, it appears likely that charges against Hutchins arose out of back door searches done as part of the investigation into who “MalwareTech” was after he sinkholed WannaCry. For whatever reason (probably because the government thought Hutchins could inform on someone, possibly related to either WannaCry itself or Kelihos), the government decided to cobble together a case against Hutchins consisting — by all appearances — entirely of incidental collection so as to coerce him into a plea deal. When he got a team of very good lawyers and then bail, that put a lot more pressure on the appropriateness of the charges in the first place.

So now, eight months after Hutchins was arrested, we’re finally getting to that question of why the US government decided to charge him for a crime that even DOJ didn’t claim had significant US victims.

The motion starts by noting that Hutchins didn’t do most of the acts alleged, his co-defendant Tran (whom the government has shown little urgency in extraditing) did. But even for Tran’s acts (basically marketing and selling the malware), there’s no affirmative tie made to Wisconsin.

As part of the purported conspiracy, the indictment alleges that Mr. Hutchins created the Kronos software, described as “a particular type of malware that recorded and exfiltrated user credentials and personal identifying information from protected computers.” (Id. ¶¶ 3(e), 4(a).) It also alleges that Mr. Hutchins and his co-defendant later updated Kronos. (Id. ¶ 4(d).)

All other alleged overt acts in furtherance of the purported conspiracy pertain solely to Mr. Hutchins’ co-defendant. Per the indictment, the codefendant (1) used a video posted to YouTube to demonstrate how Kronos worked, (2) advertised Kronos on internet forums, (3) sold a version of Kronos, and (4) offered crypting services for Kronos. (Id. ¶¶ 4(b), (c), (e), (f), (g).)

Aside from a bare allegation that each offense was committed “in the state and Eastern District of Wisconsin and elsewhere,” the indictment does not describe any connection to this District.

While the government has long suggested that the case is in EDWI because an FBI agent located there bought a copy of Kronos, the motion suggests Hutchins’ team hasn’t even seen good evidence of that yet.

Here, the indictment reflects that Mr. Hutchins was on foreign soil, and any acts he performed occurred there. There is no indication that damage was caused in the Eastern District of Wisconsin—or, indeed, that any damage occurred at all. At best, a buyer was present in this District. But the buyer would then need to use Kronos to cause damage in the District for venue to lie. Nothing [i]n the indictment supports that conclusion.

The charging of two foreigners is all the more problematic on the four wiretapping charges, given that (unlike CFAA), Congress did not mean to apply it to foreigners.

There is evidence that Congress intended the CFAA—the legal basis of Counts One and Six—to have extraterritorial application. The CFAA prohibits certain conduct with respect to “protected computers,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B), and the legislative history shows that Congress crafted the definition of that term with foreign-based attackers in mind. S. Rep. 104-357, at 4-5 (1996).

The Wiretap Act—at issue in Counts Two through Five—is different, though. That law does not reflect a clear congressional mandate that it should apply extraterritorially. Accordingly, courts have repeatedly found that it “has no extraterritorial force.” Huff v. Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987)).

There is a great deal of precedent to establish venue based on where a federal agent bought something. Indeed, the main AlphaBay case against Alexandre Cazes consisted of that (remember that Kronos was ultimately sold on AlphaBay). But that case was based on the illegal sale of drugs and ATM skimmers, not software, which given the challenge to the CFAA and Wiretapping application here, might make the EDWI purchase of Kronos insufficient to justify venue here.

I’m not sure whether this motion will succeed or not. But one way or another, given that the defense appears to have seen no real basis for venue here, this motion may serve as critical groundwork for what appears to be a justifiable argument that this case should never have been charged in the US.

I keep waiting for DOJ to give up this case in the face of having to argue that the guy who sinkholed WannaCry should be prosecuted because he refused to accept a plea deal on charges with no known US victims. But they’re probably too stubborn to do that.

Update: Corrected Joseph’s name. h/t GM.

The Government Built Its Criminal Case against MalwareTech Off Incidental Collection

The government has responded to MalwareTech’s (Marcus Hutchins) demand for more evidence by refusing everything. Along the way, they reveal that the bulk of the case against Hutchins arises from him being incidentally collected off two other criminal suspects, Tran (his co-defendant) and Randy (an informant who provided testimony against him in conjunction with his own criminal exposure).

Twenty-somethings claiming they’re not drunk occifer

As for rebuttals of the points made in his demand, the government has two rebuttals as to the substance of Hutchins’ argument, versus the law. First, they claim that Hutchins told the FBI he wasn’t drunk when they arrested him, contrary to the claim made to support a demand for materials on the surveillance of him leading up to his arrest.

Before the interview started, Hutchins told agents that he was not under the influence of alcohol.

Apparently they made a separate 302 (of unknown date) to memorialize their claim he told them he wasn’t drunk.

In addition to those materials, the government recently disclosed an additional FBI 302 report memorializing the defendant’s statement that he was not under the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest,

The filing also reveals that there are,

two reports detailing limited surveillance of the defendant on July 26, 2017, and August 2, 2017.

Note, while August 2 is the day Hutchins left Las Vegas, the 26th was not the day he arrived; that was July 21. So they conducted surveillance of him on at least one day while he was in the US hanging out with other hackers at Black Hat, but won’t tell him if they conducted surveillance on the other days.

The government’s “intentional” fuckups may lead to superseding indictments

The government seems to cede Hutchins’ suggestion that it flubbed the language on “intention” versus “knowledge” on at least one and maybe a second charge against him.

Hutchins claims that the indictment is defective because Count Two of the indictment states that the defendant acted “knowingly” instead of “intentionally.” 3 Likewise, despite the fact that Count Six charges an attempt, Hutchins argues Count Six fails to allege that defendant “intentionally” attempted to cause damage to a protected computer.4 This, however is not an allegation of “error in the grand jury proceedings” under Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(v). It is an allegation of a defect in the indictment under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Thus, if Hutchins truly believes Counts Two and Six are facially defective, he can file a motion dismiss those counts under Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v).

3 Count Two appears to contain a drafting error because Counts Three and Four, which also allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2512, state that the defendant acted “intentionally” rather than “knowingly.” This further undermines Hutchins’ speculation that the grand jury was erroneously instructed.

4 According to Seventh Circuit jury instructions, an attempt means to take a substantial step towards committing the offense, with the “intent to commit the offense.” Therefore, because Count Six is charged as an attempt to violate section 1030, including the word “intentionally” before “attempted” would be unnecessary and redundant.

But they generously offer to fix that problem in a superseding indictment.

The government has already explained to the defense that it will likely seek a superseding indictment in this case. That superseding indictment would address any possible drafting errors noted by the defense.

Given that elsewhere they say the informant, Randy, who provided information against Hutchins, discussed “involvement in creating the Kronos banking Trojan, among other criminal conduct” [my emphasis] with him in online chats, they seem to be suggesting that if the defense makes too big a deal about this they’ll add charges against Hutchins.

Incidentally collected defendants get nothing

Perhaps most interesting, this filing demonstrates the degree to which Hutchins’ prosecution stems from his incidental collection in investigative efforts targeting Tran and Randy. In fact, precisely because he was incidentally collected and not personally targeted, the government claims it doesn’t have to provide affidavits that might explain how — and more importantly, why — they decided to arrest Hutchins.

For example, the government argues Hutchins can’t have the MLAT requests, which are used to ask other countries to provide information for a criminal prosecution. In this case, MLATs obtained  information on Tran, the guy who sold the Kronos malware Hutchins is alleged to have helped write. The government refuses to hand these over, in part, because they don’t get signed by FBI Agents, but instead get signed by lawyers.

Here, the defendant relies on Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) in seeking disclosure of MLATs and search warrant applications. But that Rule is inapplicable. With regard to MLATs, they are not signed or attested to by law enforcement agents. Instead, they are signed by an attorney representing the United States. Information received in response to an MLAT that is subject to disclosure under Rule 16 has been, and will continue to be, turned over to the defense in this case. Indeed, the defendant acknowledges that he has received materials responsive to an MLAT request. Doc. #44 at 17. The MLAT request itself, however, is not subject to production. In fact, MLAT requests (rather than the responsive materials) are explicitly excluded from production under Rule 16(a)(2).

Moreover, because the MLAT was targeted at Hutchins’ co-defendant, and not him, he doesn’t get it.

Moreover, the MLAT request submitted in this case related to Hutchins’s codefendant and not Hutchins. As noted above, the government has disclosed materials received in response to the MLAT, but the MLAT itself is not subject to production under Rule 16, Giglio, Brady, or § 3500.

There is one still undisclosed search warrant affidavit in the case. But because that was used to incriminate Randy, the informant, Hutchins won’t get that either.

With regard to search warrant materials, the government has explained to Hutchins that no search warrants were executed that focused on Hutchins’ activities. There was a search warrant executed in an unrelated case that revealed statements made by Hutchins to CS-1, and those statements were turned over in discovery under Rule 16. But, there is no authority supporting the production of that search warrant affidavit or other documents relating to that warrant. The warrant was executed at a residence in the United States and did not involve Hutchins’ property or privacy interests. The affidavit is not subject to disclosure under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 because it was made in connection with an unrelated investigation. Given the separation between this case and the other investigation, the government does not believe at this time that the affiant’s statements in the affidavit supporting that warrant “relate to the subject matter of the testimony” to be presented in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 3500.

The government seems pretty lackadaisical towards Hutchins’ co-defendant

The government’s unwillingness to turn over information on the other alleged criminals in this case is particularly interesting given how uninterested they seem in him. The filing reveals that someone working undercover for the FBI did have discussions with Tran about Kronos (again, this is malware that had no significant US victims in the form Hutchins is alleged to have been involved in it), and they collected postings on it off the Darkode forum.

In support of this request, Hutchins asserts that such items “must be material to preparing Mr. Hutchins’ defense” because the indictment alleges a conspiracy; that “the government may be withholding information that could exculpate Mr. Hutchins”; and that he has a right to “locate the codefendant.” Doc. #44 at 8-9. Because the government has disclosed information relating to the codefendant, and there is no authority supporting the defendant’s request for additional information, his motion to compel the production of this information should be denied.

Of note, Hutchins’ codefendant has not yet been arrested in connection with this case. And, the government has disclosed certain information relating to the codefendant to Hutchins. This includes (1) the codefendant’s name; (2) materials responsive to an MLAT request that included a redacted copy of the codefendant’s passport; (3) undercover chats between the codefendant and the FBI related to the marketing, sale, and distribution of Kronos; and (4) various Internet postings related to Kronos that are attributable to one of the aliases used by the codefendant, including on the now shuttered Darkode forum.

But the government hasn’t obtained any information about the other things Tran was selling on dark markets.

Hutchins’ speculation that “the government must be withholding substantial additional information in its possession,” including information that may show the codefendant acted independently of Hutchins, is not supported. Doc. #44 at 8. While it might be true that the codefendant was involved in criminal activity in addition to distributing Kronos with Hutchins, the government is not suppressing that information. It simply does not possess such information. If additional records in the government’s possession are identified and deemed material, the government will provide those records to the defendant.1

That suggests he’s not really the target here.

More interesting still, the government claims it hasn’t yet identified any records from its AlphaBay seizure pertaining this malware they claim is so important they’ve arrested the guy who stopped the WannaCry malware attack.

1 In his motion, Hutchins states that “the government likely has records of the codefendant’s activities on AlphaBay.” Doc. #44 at 9. The government is still pursing information from the AlphaBay marketplace, but it has not yet located any materials subject to disclosure.

It seems virtually impossible that they wouldn’t find information in the seized servers,  if it was, at all, a priority. Which seems to suggest the opposite — not finding anything — may be a priority.

By providing evidence that suggests the government simply isn’t all that interested in Tran (if, as his name suggests, he’s Vietnamese, he may be beyond any extradition treaty), the government dismisses the possibility that Hutchins or his friends could find Tran (not an unreasonable possibility, because that’s how hackers roll).

[Hutchins] told agents that he knew his codefendant only by various online aliases; his dealings with his codefendant were all online; and he has never met his codefendant in person or even seen a photograph of the codefendant. It therefore makes no sense for Hutchins to claim that, if provided the requested “materials and communications,” he will be able to locate the fugitive codefendant and obtain exculpatory information from that individual.

But along the way, this prevents Hutchins from arguing that this case is all trumped up to go after him, for some reason.

Hiding Randy and the carding charges he’s working off

More interesting, still, the government is going to some lengths to hide Randy, the informant they call CS-1 who provided information on Hutchins.

The list of what they have provided in discovery provides some outline of how they got to Randy.

In reality, the government has produced the following materials related to CS-1: (1) A redacted proffer letter between the government and CS-1; (2) undercover chats between a government cooperator and CS-1 regarding the sale of stolen credit card numbers; (3) chats between CS-1 and Hutchins regarding Hutchins’ involvement in creating the Kronos banking Trojan, among other criminal conduct; and (4) a redacted FBI 302 report (which Hutchins refers to in his motion) memorializing a FBI interview of CS-1 regarding Hutchins and others.

It seems that a third part (the “government cooperator,” who himself may be an informant working off criminal charges) provided the FBI chats showing discussions with Randy of carding activity. This led to the FBI to go after Randy. He, in turn, made a proffer to the government offering to cooperate, presumably in exchange for leniency in his own case. That led to an interview with the FBI where Randy provided information on Hutchins “and others.”

Note that the government doesn’t tell us when all this happened?

The government argues that Randy is a mere tipster who wasn’t (yet) being controlled by the FBI at the time, and so they won’t have to let Hutchins question Randy about these underlying circumstances unless they put Randy on the stand, even though they concede he might (as someone working off his own criminal exposure) might actually be a transactional witness.

CS-1’s position in this case is more of a like a “mere tipster” than a transactional confidential informant. Hutchins sent a copy of the Kronos malware to CS-1 in 2015, but CS-1 was not acting as an agent for the government at that time. If the government called CS-1 as a witness at trial, his/her primary role would be to testify about the third-party admissions Hutchins made during chats with CS-1. Even if the Court found CS-1 acted more like a transactional witness, that finding does not automatically justify disclosure of CS-1’s identity. United States v. McDowell, 687 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2012). The defendant would still need to establish that knowing CS-1’s identity is “relevant and helpful to his defense or is essential to a fair determination of a cause,” Wilburn, 581 F.3d at 623. Here, his request for disclosure of CS-1’s identity is based on speculation, which is insufficient. See Valles, 41 F.3d at 358 (“The confidential informant privilege ‘will not yield to permit a mere fishing expedition, nor upon bare speculation that the information may possibly prove useful.’” (quoting Dole, 870 F.2d at 373)).

The government argues that Hutchins is only speculating that learning who Randy is would be material to his defense, and uses that to argue that they don’t have to reveal Randy’s name so Hutchins can test whether it’s material to his defense.

The government generously agrees to give Hutchins Randy’s real name if they call him to testify, but then boast that Hutchins’ jail phone calls mitigate the need to put Randy on the stand.

Nonetheless, the government agrees to disclose CS-1’s identity to the defense if it determines that CS-1 will be a testifying witness at trial.2

2 To be sure, it might not be necessary to call CS-1 as a witness at trial because the defendant was shown the chats he had with CS-1 during his post-arrest interview and the defendant admitted that he was one of the parties in those conversations. Later, the defendant made phone call from jail in which he described the chats as “undeniable.” Therefore, the admissions Mr. Hutchins made to CS-1 are admissible non-hearsay statements, which Mr. Hutchins previously identified as accurate.

There are a slew of reasons Randy’s identity is of particular interest. Not least, that unknown entities engaged in serial credit card fraud to try to disrupt Hutchins’ defense fundraisers. As I’ve suggested, that means that entities engaged in probable criminal credit card fraud made a concerted effort to thwart Hutchins’ ability to mount the most robust defense.

Is the FBI even investigating who disrupted Hutchins’ defense fundraising efforts? Would they do so if it would hurt their case?

All of which leaves the distinct impression that the government isn’t all that interested in the two suspected criminals implicated in the case against him, but are very interested in ratcheting up the pressure on Hutchins himself.

And because they got to Hutchins via incidental collection — and not direct targeting — they might succeed in doing so.

 

EO 12333 Sharing Will Likely Expose Security Researchers Even More Via Back Door Searches

At Motherboard, I have piece arguing that the best way to try to understand the Marcus Hutchins (MalwareTech) case is not from what we see in his indictment for authoring code that appears in a piece of Kronos malware sold in 2015. Instead, we should consider why Hutchins would look different to the FBI in 2016 (when the government didn’t arrest him while he was in Las Vegas) and 2017 (when they did). In 2016, he’d look like a bit player in a minor dark market purchase made in 2015. In 2017, he might look like a guy who had his finger on the WannaCry malware, but also whose purported product, Kronos, had been incorporated into a really powerful bot he had long closely tracked, Kelihos.

Hutchins’ name shows up in chats obtained in an investigation in some other district. Just one alias for Hutchins—his widely known “MalwareTech”—is mentioned in the indictment. None of the four or more aliases Hutchins may have used, mostly while still a minor, was included in the indictment, as those aliases likely would have been if the case in chief relied upon evidence under that alias.

Presuming the government’s collection of both sets of chat logs predates the WannaCry outbreak, if the FBI searched on Hutchins after he sinkholed the ransomware, both sets of chat logs would come up. Indeed, so would any other chat logs or—for example—email communications collected under Section 702 from providers like Yahoo, Google, and Apple, business records from which are included in the discovery to be provided in Hutchins’ case in FBI’s possession at that time. Indeed, such data would come up even if they showed no evidence of guilt on the part of Hutchins, but which might interest or alarm FBI investigators.

There is another known investigation that might elicit real concern (or interest) at the FBI if Hutchins’s name showed up in its internal Google search: the investigation into the Kelihos botnet, for which the government obtained a Rule 41 hacking warrant in Alaska on April 10 and announced the indictment of Russian Pyotr Levashov in Connecticut on April 21. Eleven lines describing the investigation in the affidavit for the hacking warrant remain redacted. In both its announcement of his arrest and in the complaint against Levashov for operating the Kelihos botnet, the government describes the Kelihos botnet loading “a malicious Word document designed to infect the computer with the Kronos banking Trojan.”

Hutchins has tracked the Kelihos botnet for years—he even attributes his job to that effort. Before his arrest and for a period that extended after Levashov’s arrest, Hutchins ran a Kelihos tracker, though it has gone dead since his arrest. In other words, the government believes a later version of the malware it accuses Hutchins of having a hand in writing was, up until the months before the WannaCry outbreak—being deployed by a botnet he closely tracked.

There are a number of other online discussions Hutchins might have participated in that would come up in an FBI search (again, even putting aside more dated activity from when he was a teenager). Notably, the attack on two separate fundraisers for his legal defense by credit card fraudsters suggests that corner of the criminal world doesn’t want Hutchins to mount an aggressive defense.

All of which is to say that the FBI is seeing a picture of Hutchins that is vastly different than the public is seeing from either just the indictment and known facts about Kronos, or even open source investigations into Hutchins’ past activity online.

To understand why Hutchins was arrested in 2017 but not in 2016, I argue, you need to understand what a back door search conducted on him in May would look like in connection with the WannaCry malware, not what the Kronos malware looks like as a risk to the US (it’s not a big one).

I also note, however, that in addition to the things FBI admitted they searched on during their FBI Google searches — Customs and Border Protection data, foreign intelligence reports, FBI’s own case files, and FISA data (both traditional and 702) — there’s something new in that pot: data collected under EO 12333 shared under January’s new sharing procedures.

That data is likely to expose a lot more security researchers for behavior that looks incriminating. That’s because FBI is almost certainly prioritizing asking NSA to share criminal hacker forums — where security researchers may interact with people they’re trying to defend against in ways that can look suspicious if reviewed out of context. That’s true, first of all, because many of those forums (and other dark web sites) are overseas, and so are more accessible to NSA collection. The crimes those forums facilitate definitely impact US victims. But criminal hacking data — as distinct from hacking data tied to a group that the government has argued is sponsored by a nation-state — is also less available via Section 702 collection, which as far as we know still limits cybersecurity collection to the Foreign Government certificate.

If I were the FBI I would have used the new rules to obtain vast swaths of data sitting in NSA’s coffers to facilitate cybersecurity investigations.

So among the NSA-collected data we should expect FBI newly obtained in raw form in January is that from criminal hacking forums. Indeed, new dark web collection may have facilitated FBI’s rather impressive global bust of several dark web marketing sites this year. (The sharing also means FBI will no longer have to go the same lengths to launder such data it obtains targeting kiddie porn, which it appears to have done in the PlayPen case.)

As I think is clear, such data will be invaluable for FBI as it continues to fight online crime that operates internationally. But because back door searches happen out of context, at a time when the FBI may not really understand what it is looking at, it also risks exposing security researchers in new ways to FBI’s scrutiny.

 

The AlphaBay Jewish Community Center Bomb Threat of the Week Service

Back in April, the Department of Justice announced it had identified the perpetrator of at least some of the series of threats against targets that had terrified the Jewish community between January and March: Michael Ron David Kadar, an Israeli-American 18-year old, had allegedly placed at least 15 calls to different Jewish Community Centers and other targets this year. While it received less attention, DOJ also charged Kadar with swatting calls targeting secular schools in Georgia going back to August 2015.

The fact that Kadar, an Israeli Jew, was behind sowing terror throughout the Jewish community defied assumptions that the threats were motivated out of anti-Semitism. After all, why would a Jew seek to terrorize other Jews?

Except — as documents tweeted out by GWU’s Seamus Hughes yesterday make clear — the reality may be quite different.

Back in April, the FBI obtained a search warrant to search certain accounts on AlphaBay, the dark web marketplace taken down in July. It reveals that Israeli police seized a thumb drive in their search of Kadar’s room showing “THE ARCHIVE OF TARGETS.” Documents from the archive corresponded to the hoaxes launched against Jewish targets.

It then explains that an AlphaBay vendor working under the name Darknet_Legend — apparently run by Kadar — offered a “unique emailing service for all of you, I email bomb threats to schools on your request.” Emailed bomb threats cost $30 each, plus an extra $15 if you wanted to frame someone in particular for the hoax.

In June, a prosecutor asked the magistrate to unseal the earlier search warrant to facilitate the arrest of the person believed to have paid for at least one of the JCC bomb threats.

That ongoing investigation has identified a suspect believed to have ordered and paid for at least [sic] of the bomb threats made by Kadar. The FBI and local authorities in California intend to pursue criminal charges against the suspect. If they are successful in doing so, the local authorities may need this warrant and/or it may be producible in discovery.

On July 17, the magistrate unsealed that warrant.

While it’s not yet clear who the CA target was or what has happened to him or her since June, it appears that Kadar only carried out the threats, at $30 a pop, for someone else.

The Kronos Needle in the AlphaBay Haystack

To set up a future post (see my earlier posts here and here), I want to show how remarkable it is that the Feds decided to prosecute Marcus Hutchins, a guy who allegedly contributed code to a piece of malware sold in June 2015 for $2,000 on AlphaBay, out of all the illicit sales they might have chosen to prosecute in the month after taking the site down.

First, let’s look at the Alexandre Cazes indictment, sworn by a Fresno Grand Jury on June 1, 2017, 41 days before the Hutchins indictment. It lists the following illicitly sold goods.

  • Redacted month 2015, redacted vendor sells a false driver license to an undercover officer in CA
  • Redacted month 2015, redacted vendor sells an ATM skimmer to an undercover officer in CA
  • Redacted month 2015, redacted vendor sells an ATM skimmer to an undercover officer in CA
  • December 29, 2015, vendor CC4L sells marijuana to MG, an undercover officer, which is mailed from Merced to Buffalo
  • Redacted short month date 2016, redacted vendor sells marijuana to an undercover officer, which is mailed from Los Angeles to a redacted city
  • Redacted month 2016, redacted vendor sells a false driver license to an undercover officer in CA
  • Redacted month 2016, redacted vendor sells a false driver license to an undercover officer in CA
  • Redacted month 2016, redacted vendor sells a false driver license to an undercover officer in CA
  • May 16, 2016, vendor A51 sells heroin to an undercover officer, which is mailed from Brooklyn to Fresno
  • May 24, 2016, vendor A51 sells heroin to an undercover officer, which is mailed from Brooklyn to Fresno
  • October 20, 2016, vendor BSB sells heroin and fentanyl to an undercover officer, which is mailed from San Francisco to Fresno
  • Redacted (short month) date 2017, redacted vendor sells meth to an undercover officer, which is mailed between two CA cities

The sale of a piece of malware for $2,000 on June 11, 2015 would be earlier than most of those listed in the indictment that brought AlphaBay’s operator down. And while there are several ATM skimmers listed (a violation of 18 USC 1029) there is no malware listed (in two of Hutchins’ charges listed as violations of 18 USC 1030, the CFAA statute).

Now look at the overall numbers FBI boasted for AlphaBay when it announced its takedown on July 20, nine days after the indictment targeting Hutchins.

AlphaBay reported that it serviced more than 200,000 users and 40,000 vendors. Around the time of takedown, the site had more than 250,000 listings for illegal drugs and toxic chemicals, and more than 100,000 listings for stolen and fraudulent identification documents, counterfeit goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, firearms, and fraudulent services. By comparison, the Silk Road dark market—the largest such enterprise of its kind before it was shut down in 2013—had approximately 14,000 listings.

The operation to seize AlphaBay’s servers was led by the FBI and involved the cooperative efforts of law enforcement agencies in Thailand, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, along with the European law enforcement agency Europol.

“Conservatively, several hundred investigations across the globe were being conducted at the same time as a result of AlphaBay’s illegal activities,” Phirippidis said. “It really took an all-hands effort among law enforcement worldwide to deconflict and protect those ongoing investigations.”

Of the 40,000 vendors charged within a month of takedown, of the 250K drug listings and the 100K fraudulent services listings, the guy who sold Kronos once for $2,000 (whom Tom Fox-Brewster thinks might be a guy named VinnyK) — and by virtue of American conspiracy laws, Hutchins — were among the first 20 or so known to be charged for using AlphaBay.

Admittedly, we’re seeing EDCA’s sales in Cazes’ indictment because they had the lead on the overall takedown. Perhaps EDWI has 1,000 more malware buys it will get around to charging, as soon as its perpetrators decide to come to the US, as Hutchins did.

But put in this light, it looks even more remarkable how quickly they got around to arresting to the alleged co-conspirator of a guy who sold a piece of malware.