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Boxes and Burials in the CIA’s Torture Plans

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In this post, I’m going to test a hypothesis that OLC may not have included “cramped confinement” in its torture plans until it removed “mock burial.” If I’m right, it means after having been told OLC would not approve mock burial, OLC and CIA instead just renamed what they were doing as “cramped confinement” so as to get it past those in DOJ who were opposed to allowing the US to use mock burial in its torture program.

This is a weedy post even by my standards. But the key points are:

  • Many of the discussions about which techniques OLC was approving appear to have taken place orally, not in written form
  • The one written document we know exists–a JPRA Physical Pressures document–was an attempt made during the key three days of the Bybee Memo process to pretend that JPRA sanctioned waterboarding (at least) as it either already had been used or would be used on Abu Zubaydah, rather than as the Navy used it in training
  • The section on small box confinement also seems to have been created in response to this process, meaning it is possible that JPRA adjusted both the name and the description of the technique to provide JPRA sanction for mock burial as it had been done on AZ

The OPR Report’s list of torture techniques is neither the original nor the final list of planned torture techniques

The OPR Report includes a list of torture techniques Mitchell and Jessen proposed to use with Abu Zubaydah that includes both cramped confinement and mock burial, which seems to suggest that the CIA tried to get both approved at once. But the OPR Report provides absolutely no explanation for the source or the date of its list (on PDF 41) of the torture techniques. It says simply:

The CIA psychologists eventually proposed the following twelve EITs to be used in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah:

In addition to the use of the word “eventually” in this description, there’s further evidence this list is not the first incarnation of the torture techniques requested. That’s because this description of sleep deprivation…

Sleep deprivation: The subject is prevented from sleeping, not to exceed 11 days at a time;

Includes this footnote:

As initially proposed, sleep deprivation was to be induced by shackling the subject in a standing position, with his feet chained to a ring in the floor and his arms attached to a bar at head level, with very little room for movement.

Compare that with the description of sleep deprivation as it appears in the Bybee Two memo.

Sleep deprivation may be used. You have indicated that your purpose in using this technique is to reduce the individual’s ability to think on his feet and, through the discomfort associated with lack of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate. The effect of sleep deprivation will generally remit after one or two nights of uninterrupted sleep. You have informed us that your research has revealed that, in rare instances, some individuals who are already predisposed to psychological problems may experience abnormal reactions to sleep deprivation. Even in those cases, however, reactions abate after the individual is permitted to sleep. Moreover, personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene in the unlikely event of an abnormal reaction. You have orally informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep for more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept him awake for 72 hours, from which no mental or physical harm resulted. [my emphasis]

The description in the OPR Report for this torture technique, at least, matches what appears in the Bybee Two memo.

Also note the admission (which I had never noticed before) that CIA had already subjected AZ to sleep deprivation but don’t worry, AZ was A-Okay as a result.

you have previously kept him awake for 72 hours

Though their admission to 72 hour sessions of sleep deprivation doesn’t accord with AZ’s memory of his first several weeks in the black site, which describe being kept awake for weeks at a time (perhaps 11 days?), using the shackling technique that OLC would go on to eliminate from their description of sleep deprivation:

I was transferred to a chair where I was kept, shackled by hands and feet for what I think was the next 2 to 3 weeks.

[snip]

I could not sleep at all for the first two to three weeks. If I started to fall asleep one of the guards would come and spray water on my face.

From all this we can make several educated assumptions about the list included in the OPR Report. First, it includes the torture techniques as ultimately incorporated in the torture memos; this is not the list that CIA first brought to OLC. Moreover, we know that the description of sleep deprivation, at least, was watered down to hide the most appalling aspects of the technique that, even though they weren’t described, had already taken place.

Oh, and they were probably lying about the one detail they admitted to, how long they had subjected AZ to sleep deprivation.

But we already knew that.

That said, we know the OPR Report’s list isn’t the final list, either. The OPR Report list still shows, in unredacted form, diapering as a technique. We have no idea when or why that we eliminated from the list. And we know the redacted 12th technique is mock burial, which was eliminated some time after July 24, 2002, though we don’t know when, specifically, that happened. Note that the description of that 12th technique–mock burial–continues onto PDF page 43, so the description of it may include more detail on how it was eliminated from the list.

In other words, at best, this is an interim list. The list may simply reflect the final form that each torture technique request had before it was either incorporated into the Bybee Two memo or eliminated from the list.

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Ibn Sheikh al-Libi’s and Abu Zubaydah’s Coffins

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At Mary’s instigation, I went back to look at Ibn Sheikh al-Libi’s description of how he was shoved into a coffin-like box in Egypt. (Thanks to burnt for the searchable copy.)

According to al-Libi, the foreign government service [redacted] “stated that the next topic was al-Qa’ida’s connections with Iraq. … This was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.” Al-Libi indicated that his interrogators did not like his responses and then “placed him in a small box approximately 50cm x 50cm.” He claimed he was held in the box for approximately 17 hours. When he was let out of the box, alLibi claims that he was given a last opportunity to “tell the truth.” When al-Libi did not satisfy the interrogator, al-Libi claimed that “he was knocked over with an arm thrust across his chest and he fell on his back.” Al-Libi told CIA debriefers that he then “was punched for 15 minutes.”216

(U) Al-Libi told debriefers that “after the beating,” he was again asked about the connection with Iraq and this time he came up with a story that three al-Qa’ida members went to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons. Al-Libi said that he used the names of real individuals associated with al-Qa’ida so that he could remember the details of his fabricated story and make it more believable to the foreign intelligence service. Al-Libi noted that “this pleased his [foreign] interrogators, who directed that al-Libi be taken back to a big room, vice the 50 square centimeter box and given food.”217

That mock burial–and al-Libi’s subsequent lies about Iraqi ties with al Qaeda–happened sometime before February 22, 2002, when a DIA cable challenged the report.

This is the first report from Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi] in which he claims Iraq assisted al-Qa’ida’s CBRN efforts. However, he lacks specific details on the Iraqi’s involvement, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest. Saddam’s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control

Al-Libi was, you’ll recall, the onsite manager of the Khalden training camp, a camp that trained a range of Muslims, a policy that  put it at odds with Osama bin Laden, who wanted training to be limited to al Qaeda operatives.

Just over a month after al-Libi claimed, having been shoved in a coffin for almost a day, there were ties between al Qaeda and Iraq, the US captured al-Libi’s associate, Abu Zubaydah, who handled logistics for Khalden. Rather than send Abu Zubaydah off to the Egyptians, as the US had done with al-Libi, they instead sent Abu Zubaydah to a CIA run black site in Thailand.

And there, less than three months after the Egyptians shoved Ibn Sheikh al-Libi in a coffin overnight, James Mitchell threatened to do the same with Abu Zubaydah. Ali Soufan objected and told Mitchell doing so was torture. Soufan left the black site and alerted DOJ of what Mitchell had intended to do.

And then, some time later (Abu Zubaydah says it was about 3 months after his surgery, so perhaps mid-July) they did shove Abu Zubaydah in that coffin-like box. Read more →

Did DOJ “Lose” the Smoking Gun Torture Document?

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You know what I find surprisingly absent from the OPR Report?

Any discussion of how–just days after potentially receiving a document making clear that SERE techniques were torture and that torture was not effective–John Yoo still authorized the use of torture in US interrogations.

Here are the last two paragraphs of that document:

(U) Another important aspect of the debate over the use of torture is the consideration of its potential impact on the safety of U.S. personnel captured by current and future adversaries. The unintended consequence of a U.S. policy that provides for the torture of prisoners is that it could be used by our adversaries as justification for the torture of captured U.S. personnel. While this would have little impact on those regimes or organizations that already employ torture as a standard means of operating, it could serve as the critical impetus for those that are currently weighing the potential gains and risks associated with the torture of U.S. persons to accept torture as an acceptable option.

(U) CONCLUSION: The application of extreme physical and/or psychological duress (torture) has some serious operational deficits, most notably, the potential to result in unreliable information. This is not to say that the manipulation of the subject’s environment in an effort to dislocate their expectations and induce emotional responses is not effective. On the contrary, systematic manipulation ofthe subject’s environment is likely to result in a subject that can be exploited for intelligence information and other national strategic concerns. [my emphasis]

This document was written by JPRA–the people that administer the SERE program from which our torture program was purportedly reverse-engineered. It provides clear evidence that, on July 25, 2002, JPRA was aware of an ongoing debate over whether or not to use torture with prisoners in US custody. The document clearly states that torture leads to unreliable information. And the document calls these techniques “torture.”

You’d think, if there were proof Yoo had read it, that OPR would include some discussion of how JPRA’s expert opinion that this was torture should have affected Yoo’s own definition of torture (heck–JPRA’s language here would be more on point than the “organ failure” language that Yoo and Jennifer Koester used to define torture). You’d think, given the experts’ opinion that torture produced unreliable information, OPR would have challenged Yoo’s acceptance of the CIA’s claims that torture was the only way to get Abu Zubaydah to reveal the intelligence they claimed he had. You’d think OPR would ask Yoo why–given his reliance on the same JPRA experts to claim that waterboarding didn’t cause psychological harm–he chose to ignore this document from JPRA.

This document, in other words, ought to be a cornerstone of OPR’s analysis of Yoo’s failure to provide independent analysis and include all relevant information about what constituted torture. It ought to be used as proof that Yoo knew he was authorizing what the experts deemed to be torture.

If OPR had proof Yoo read this document, it would be the “smoking gun” that when he wrote the torture memo he knew he was deliberately authorizing torture.

But it’s not clear whether Yoo did read it. And it’s not clear that if he did, proof to that fact would still have been in OLC’s collection of torture documents by the time OPR got around to reviewing those documents.

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Michael Hayden Lied to SSCI on April 12, 2007

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The latest Ghost Detainee FOIA materials [long pdf] (for a general overview see this post) prove that Michael Hayden lied to the Senate on April 12, 2007.

One of the things included in this packet is a heavily redacted transcript of Hayden’s classified briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee (SSCI) on April 12, 2007. There’s a lot that is dubious in this briefing, but these five paragraphs are key:

While FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques, all of those involved were mindful that the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks were still at large and, according to available intelligence reportedly, were actively working to attack the US Homeland again. CIA also knew from its intelligence holdings that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information that could help us track down al-Qa’ida leaders and prevent attacks. As a result, CIA began to develop its own interrogation program, keeping in mind at all times that any new interrogation techniques must comply with US law and US international obligations under the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

A handful of techniques were developed for potential use; these techniques are effective, safe, and do not violate applicable US laws or treaty obligations. In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. As stated by the President in his speech on 6 September 2006, “It became clear that he (Abu Zubaydah) had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures … the procedures were tough, and thy were safe, and lawful, and necessary.”

Prior to using any new technique on Abu Zubaydah, CIA sought and obtained from the Department of Justice an opinion confirming that none of these new techniques violated US statutes prohibiting torture or US obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture.

As CIA’s efforts to implement these authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation procedures.

After the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa’ida. [my emphasis]

There’s plenty to dispute in this statement.We know FBI had success in gathering information from Abu Zubaydah. We know CIA turned out to be wrong about the purported troves of information Abu Zubaydah had. We know that Mitchell and Jessen had already been engaged to develop their torture program before CIA declared traditional interrogation to be unusable. We know OLC really didn’t consider whether CIA’s torture program violated CAT for the Bybee Memos.  It is indefensible to argue that Abu Zubaydah “became one of our most important sources of intelligence on al-Qa’ida” given that only 10 pieces of intelligence from Abu Zubaydah proved useful enough to appear in the 9/11 report.

By April 12, 2007, Michael Hayden had to have known that. But I can’t prove that.

It’s even harder to fathom that he didn’t know his assertion that “In August 2002, CIA began using these [torture] techniques” to be false. Or his claim that “prior to using any new technique on Abu Zubaydah, CIA sought and obtained … an opinion confirming that none of these new techniques violated [the law and treaty obligations].” After all, even if he didn’t review the cables and the FBI discussions making it clear that the torture started long before August 1, in February 2007, Hayden received the ICRC report making it clear that Abu Zubaydah’s torture began weeks, not months, after he was captured.

But who knows? Maybe CIA kept Hayden completely in the dark about the many falsehoods he was telling Congress. Maybe he really didn’t know that CIA tortured for a few months (reportedly, with the okay from the White House), and only then got the written approval from OLC.

But this assertion … this assertion we know Michael Hayden knew to be false.

As CIA’s efforts to implement these authorities got underway in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House, and the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation procedures.

That’s because the day before Hayden testified at the SSCI hearing, in a memo addressed to him entitled “Information for 12 April SSCI Hearing,” CIA laid out all the briefings they had done on torture and rendition. Read more →

Torturing Binyam Mohamed–Before Bybee Two

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A few of you have alerted me to this judgment from the Binyam Mohamed case in the UK. As a reminder, Mohamed has been trying to force the British government to release information about torture he suffered at the hands of Americans and Pakistanis. But the British government refuses to allow the information to be revealed publicly because–they say–it’ll threaten the relationship (and intelligence sharing) between the UK and US. Here Andy Worthington’s post on this ruling, and here’s Clive Stafford Smith’s.

The ruling suggests that Americans were using torture techniques on Binyam Mohamed in April and May 2002, before use of those techniques was given (dubious) legal sanction with the Bybee Two memo on August 1, 2002.

The ruling is sort of like a Russian egg, arguing that passages from one ruling explaining why passages from an earlier ruling should not be redacted themselves should not be redacted. It is basically an argument in favor of making four passages from an October judgment (these are four passages from ruling five–I’ll call them 4/5) publicly available. The Foreign Secretary David Miliband doesn’t want those passages to become available because doing so would reveal what was redacted from an earlier judgment (these are seven passages from ruling one–I’ll call them 7/1).

[The Foreign Secretary argues that] the four passages in the fifth judgment [4/5] indicate what is in the seven paragraphs redacted from the first judgment [7/1].

But the High Court argues that even if 7/1 should not be released (they don’t buy this, but use the assumption to make their argument), there is no reason 4/5 cannot be.

Now, the High Court appears to be using the Bybee Two memo (the one laying out the 10 techniques approved for use with Abu Zubaydah) as its basis for arguing that 4/5 can be released. They note that “the entire content” of 4/5 is in the public domain. The have already unredacted a passage in this ruling reading,

One of those memoranda dated 1 August 2002 [from Jay Bybee to John Rizzo] made clear that the techniques described were those employed against Mr. Zubdaydah.

And they note that one of the paragraphs redacted in 4/5 “is a verbatim quotation from the memoranda made public on 16 April 2009.” From this, we can assume that the content of that passage is an exact quotation from the Bybee Two memo.

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The Lead Up to Bybee

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I want to return back to the analysis of the OLC-related Vaughn Index from last week. I’d like to fill in the timeline leading up to the issuance of the Bybee Memos and identify as nearly as possible which documents were exchanged with CIA. The timeline is below, but for now, some observations:

  • There is nothing in the two-week process leading up to the release of the Bybee Memos that appears to contribute to the Bybee One memo–the one authorizing the program in the abstract. Rather, the two week process appears to consist of negotiations over the Bybee Two memo–the one authorizing waterboarding and other torture, as there are several documents exchanged during that period known to contribute to that memo.
  • Note the mix of faxed memos and memos with no apparent cover sheets (suggesting they may have been hand carried). Particularly given that the July 13 memo from Yoo to Rizzo is one of the ones without a cover sheet, I wonder whether the non-faxed letters were sent exclusively between Yoo and Rizzo, whereas the faxed documents were shared with Bybee and others at OLC (but that’s just a wildarsed guess).
  • Note the one memo–on July 19, 2002–which the CIA claims was written in anticipation of litigation. It’s interesting this one has that declaration whereas the others don’t.
  • CIA claims the Abu Zubaydah psychological profile was a draft. Is there a final somewhere? Or do they just call it a draft because they were not sure it made Abu Zubaydah look fit for torture yet?
  • There are still a lot of questions about which DOD documents were forwarded by CIA to the DoJ. It appears likely that the missing document is the first packet of information from JPRA, which is not that inflammatory (though I wonder if it described these techniques as torture?). It also appears that DOD or CIA took apart the July 26 memo from JPRA and sent it to DOJ in parts; that’s important because it appears they left off the 2-page JPRA document referring to these techniques as torture.

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How a Review Gets to Grand Jury in Five Days or Less

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Update: Several people have corrected me that contextually this paragraph refers to the torture tape investigation, not the torture investigation. I think it’s still a good sign, but may not yet reflect on the torture investigation.

Although I have publicly suggested that Holder’s selection of John Durham as Special Counsel to investigate torture sets an upper limit on the seniority of those who might be targeted (because you don’t want an AUSA indicting, say, the former Acting Counsel of CIA), I did hold out one hope that Durham’s selection was a good sign. After all, Durham has already been investigating why Jose Rodriguez and others destroyed a bunch of tapes portraying the abuse of Abu Zubaydah and Rahim al-Nashiri. We know Zubaydah’s torturers exceeded the limits of the Bybee Two memo when they waterboarded him. And we know al-Nashiri’s torturers threatened him with drills.

So there was the possibility that Holder’s selection of Durham effectively amounted to an expansion of Durham’s earlier mandate, from an investigation of the destruction of evidence of abuse to an investigation of the abuse itself.

Which is why I’m so interested in a passage that Jason Leopold pointed to in the Walter Pincus story reporting that CIA will pay for CIA officers’ legal fees (the article doesn’t really say whether CIA will pay for contractors’ legal fees).

In that investigation, Durham has asked agency contractors to give testimony before a grand jury in Alexandria next month, according to three sources familiar with the matter. It is not clear that the witnesses will testify. 

Durham has been officially investigating the torture itself (as opposed to the torture tape destruction) for just four days. And his mandate is–at least officially–just a review of the earlier cases. Yet he’s already scheduling testimony before the grand jury next month?

I’m no lawyer (but bmaz is, and he agrees with me, and he’s even a bigger skeptic than I am), but there is no way Durham would be scheduling testimony before a grand jury that didn’t significantly arise from his earlier mandate. So these contractors are–at a minimum–almost certainly tied to the abuse of al-Nashiri, and might be tied to the abuse of Abu Zubayahdah.

The torture apologists are wailing that there’s no reason to reopen investigations that–they claim–were already completed by DOJ. But it appears that one reason to do just that is that CIA destroyed evidence they knew to be abusive Read more →

Abu Zubaydah’s Psychological Profile

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One of the things we got in yesterday’s document dump is the psychological profile which John Yoo used to assert that Abu Zubaydah was fit to be tortured. There are four key details of it:

The Date

This document was faxed to John Yoo on July 25, 2002 at 5:04 PM (it was dated July 24), the day after OLC verbally authorized a number of the torture techniques used on Abu Zubaydah. But of course, they had already subjected him to two months of enhanced treatment–we know, for example, that they at least threatened to use the confinement box with him in May.

Which raises several questions. First, did they do any psychological profile before they first subjected him to sleep deprivation and isolation and confinement? Or did they just do one when OLC needed it to pretty  up the OLC opinion authorizing torture?

Also, how much of what it records is itself a reflection of this earlier torture? For example, when they cite Zubaydah admitting he lies,

He said, "I lie, lie, lie, lie, lie, lie, and lie."

Was he referring to something he did before he was captured–or after? Were they taking his retraction of things he said under coercion as proof that he was more generally a liar? (The context suggests it was before, but I’m not sure I buy that.)

No Apparent Mention of Abu Zubaydah’s Head Injury

There are two complete paragraphs redacted and significant other redactions here, so it may be they’ve redacted all discussion of whether a prior, serious head injury ought to preclude someone from torture. But in what is unredacted, there is no mention of his head injury. So, for example, the section on "Emotional/Mental Status/Coping Skills" starts with this claim:

Overall, subject’s background as revealed by self-report (including diaries and interview) does not indicate that he has a history of mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology. Indeed, his reported and known history indicates that he is remarkably resiliant and confident that he can overcome adversity. During the occasions that he experiences increased stress and/or low mood, he may become somewhat more withdrawn, melancholy, and reflective. However, the shift in mood will likely last a relatively short time. He denies and there is no evidence in his reported history of thought disorder or enduring mood or mental health problems.

Keep in mind, if this assessment was done in July, then the "somewhat more withdrawn" periods mentioned refer to his response to prior abuse!! We know that twice, after Mitchell took control of his interrogation and subjected him to abuse, he stopped talking. But this is how the failure of past abuse got translated into his profile for OLC.

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Intimidating the Defense Attorneys

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It was bad enough that the Bush Administration did away with attorney-client privilege via their warrantless wiretap program. Now the Obama Administration appears to be trying to intimidate lawyers defending Gitmo detainees by threatening them with prosecution for trying to ascertain the identities of those involved in abusing their clients.

The Justice Department recently questioned military defense attorneys at Guantanamo Bay about whether photographs of CIA personnel, including covert officers, were unlawfully provided to detainees charged with organizing the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, according to sources familiar with the investigation.

Investigators are looking into allegations that laws protecting classified information were breached when three lawyers showed their clients the photographs, the sources said. The lawyers were apparently attempting to identify CIA officers and contractors involved in the agency’s interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects in facilities outside the United States, where the agency employed harsh techniques.

If detainees at the U.S. military prison in Cuba are tried, either in federal court or by a military commission, defense lawyers are expected to attempt to call CIA personnel to testify.

This seems akin to me with the practice of refusing to tell defense attorneys what was done to their clients, including withholding Abu Zubaydah’s own diary.

But for a more informed take on what’s going on, check out this Bill Leonard post (remember, he used to head ISOO, the organization in charge of the federal security classification and after the AIPAC defendants won the right to call him to testify, the government case against the defendants fell apart). 

With the above as background, it is useful to look at the facts as reported in the WaPost article and assess exactly what the government is trying to do with the critical national security tool of classification. First of all, the classified nature of an intelligence officer’s cover is not sacrosanct. For example, earlier this year Andrew Warren was identified as the CIA Station Chief in Algeria when he was charged with drugging and sexually assaulting two women.

The ready disclosure by the government of Warren’s identity brings up an important provision of Executive Order 12958, as amended, which governs the classification of national security information and which is thus instrumental in investigating any alleged illegal disclosure of classified information. Section 1.7(a) of the order states that "In no case shall information be classified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law…". Read more →

CIA: A Different Kind of Derivative Trading

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This is going to be one of my really weedy posts, but if it’s any consolation, I went crazy while weeding (in the garden) yesterday and accidentally pulled up a huge tomatillo plant that was just about to bear tons of tomatillos. So I’m suffering from having gotten myself lost in the weeds right now.

Back in June, I did a close review of which documents from its index the CIA had described for ACLU in its Vaughn Index (Part One, Part Two) of documents pertaining to events described in the torture tapes. It appeared that the CIA had included fewer documents from May–the period when CIA was fighting with FBI over control of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation–than it did from later in its document series.

By comparing the total index with the Vaughn index, though, we can get a sense of what the CIA did include. For most of the series of cables reporting to and from the field, the CIA submitted fairly regular cables–every 10, 11, or 12 cables. From June 22, 2002 through August 20, 2002, they appear to have submitted every 10 document, like clockwork (in addition to the handwritten log dated August 4). (It’s impossible to exactly identify a pattern from after that because so many of the cables are the same length, though it is possible that it sticks pretty close to the every tenth cable pattern.)

But things in April–when the FBI and CIA were fighting over control of the interrogation and Abu Zubaydah was reportedly cooperating with the FBI–and May–when the small box was introduced at least two months before OLC approved its use–things are a bit more irregular. In April, for example, the CIA submitted documents 1, 12, 1922, 32, 42 or 43, and 53 (plus the handwritten log, which was document 3); that gives you gaps of 11, 7, 13, 10, 10, 10, 10, and 10 documents (not including the log in the series). In May, CIA submitted documents 64, 65, or 66, 77 or 78, 89 or 90, document 99, 110, 123, 134, 146, document 155 or 156, ad 165; while it’s harder to pin down the gaps, there is necessarily one 13-document gap early in the month, a 9-document gap between May 8 and 11,  another 13-document gap between May 14 and 17, a 12-document gap between May 20 and 24, and one 9-document gap between May 24 and 30. 

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