The UndieBomber’s Interrogators Asked Him about Anwar al-Awlaki’s Death Just after He Was Put on Kill List

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At least by October 4, 2011, UndieBomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had been told that Anwar al-Awlaki had been killed. During jury selection that day, he yelled out “Anwar is alive,” as he had previously yelled out “Osama’s alive” at a hearing in September.

A week later, Abdulmutallab tried to plead guilty, and the following day, on October 12, he somewhat surprisingly did so (though of course he had tried to plead guilty a year earlier when he fired his court appointed lawyers, so maybe it shouldn’t have been such a surprise after all).

I find it interesting that Abdulmutallab knew Awlaki was dead when he plead guilty because Abdulmutallab’s interrogators appear to have tried to goad him into revealing more by discussing the death of Awlaki … before it happened.

In his memo on why Abdulmutallab represents an ongoing danger, Dr. Simon Perry lists the Abdulmutallab interrogations he relied on. The dates track what we know about Abdulmutallab’s interrogation: he confessed on Christmas Day 2009 (apparently implicating an Abu Tarak, which may be an alias for Anwar al-Awlaki). Then he clammed up for several weeks, until the FBI got Abdulmutallab’s family members to fly to MI to convince him to cooperate, which he started doing on January 29, 2010. Perry describes interrogations happening almost every day for 11 days (taking a break on Monday, February 1 and the following weekend, February 6 and 7), followed by seven more interrogations in February. Perry’s list suggests there was a break until April–though he does cite a March 15 interrogation (see footnote 54) that doesn’t appear in his list. In April, there were three interrogations: on April 8, 16, and 30. Altogether, Perry says he referred to reports from 18 or 19 interrogations, depending on whether there was one on March 15.

Perry’s memo therefore provides a really general overview of the interrogations Abdulmutallab had (though we can’t be entirely sure that these include all his interrogations). We can’t really draw conclusions about what the government learned from him when, since Perry’s focus is limited to Abdulmutallab’s radicalization and desire for martyrdom rather than specific information about Awlaki. And, as I noted here, Perry rather bizarrely doesn’t date the interrogation when Abdulmutallab admitted that Awlaki was the person originally named as Abu Tarak who ordered him to attack the US, so we can’t learn from Perry’s memo when Abdulmutallab clearly implicated Awlaki as Awlaki in the plot.

But there are two fascinating details of Abdulmutallab’s interrogation revealed by the following passage of Perry’s memo (remember, Perry uses the acronym UFAM for Abdulmutallab).

Yet we can learn that the rewards of martyrdom play a significant part for UFAM since when he talks about Aulaqi’s martyrdom he stresses that he believes that if Aulaqi were to be killed, he would be entitled to a martyrs reward. UFAM explains (again not in the context of his own martyrdom) that there are different degrees of reward for martyrdom. [interrogation from April 16, 2010] For example UFAM believes that if the accusations against Aulaqi were true (allegations of solicitation of prostitution) Aulaqi could repent for these sins and his commitment to Jihad would outweigh such transgressions. He adds that people are not perfect and that they make mistakes. [interrogations from February 15, 19, 2010]

I’ll start with the second detail first. On February 15 and 19, 2010–Abdulmutallab’s 12th and 14th interrogations of 18 or 19 Perry reviewed, so fairly late in the interrogation process–his interrogators were challenging Awlaki’s sanctity based on his prior busts for soliciting prostitutes. Interrogators presumably told Abdulmutallab about the two times Awlaki had been busted in the 1990s while living in San Diego.

The probe of the 9/11 attacks soon led Washington FBI agents back to San Diego, where they found that al-Awlaki had twice been busted for soliciting prostitutes in 1996 and 1997 but had avoided jail time. Al-Awlaki has previously described these charges as “bogus.” But FBI agents hoped al-Awlaki might cooperate with the 9/11 probe if they could nab him on similar charges in Virginia. FBI sources say agents observed the imam allegedly taking Washington-area prostitutes into Virginia and contemplated using a federal statute usually reserved for nabbing pimps who transport prostitutes across state lines.

And it would make sense that interrogators would raise Awlaki’s past with prostitutes. It appears that Abdulmutallab’s interrogators were trying to get him to reveal more information–lose faith in Al Qaeda so he would reveal more–based on what a hypocrite his religious mentor was.

Not that it appears to have worked. Abdulmutallab just forgave Awlaki in the same way many religious conservatives dismiss their own leaders’ hypocrisy in this country.

The other reference is even more interesting. On April 16, 2010, the second-to-last interrogation of those Perry reviewed, Abdulmutallab’s interrogators asked him about Awlaki’s martyrdom. Or, to use the secular term, they talked about Awlaki’s death. Read more →

Why Has the Government Story about Who Ordered the UndieBomber to Attack the US Changed?

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The government has told two or three slightly different stories about who directed and inspired Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s UndieBomber plot. The stories are all reconcilable (I’m not suggesting nefarious intent). But the differences in the three stories are worth noting, not least because the government killed Anwar al-Awlaki based on a claim he was the director of external operations of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, reportedly based in significant part on a claim that he directed Abdulmutallab’s plot.

In October, prosecutor Jonathan Tukel said that an Al Qaeda member with whom Abdulmutallab stayed in Sana, Yemen named Abu Tarak ordered the UndieBomber to attack a US airline over US airspace. Today, they say Awlaki gave that order. [See update below for what I think is an explanation.]

Update: There’s a totally different explanation. Abu Tarak is an alias for Awlaki. Thus, while Abdulmutallab seemed to be hiding Awlaki’s identity in that first interrogation, that initial story is consistent with his later story (which is presumably why the government was happy just using the initial interrogation).

Al-Awlaki had significant influence–but so did Abu-Tarak and others

The most balanced of the three stories submitted by the government came in a memo, released today, from an expert on martyrdom, Dr. Simon Perry, basically laying out why Abdulmutallab, who hoped for martyrdom, is so dangerous (I’ll leave to others to assess the validity of Perry’s science; it’s not relevant to this post).

In a section describing who inspired Abdulmutallab to extremism, Perry makes the central inspirational importance of Anwar al-Awlaki to Abdulmutallab clear–going back to 2005–but describes the following as other influences:

  • Fundamentalist Islamists
  • Abu Tarak and three other visitors who visited daily while Abdulmutallab stayed with Abu Tarak in Sana leading up to his attack
  • Uthmann (?)
  • A Jihadist who preached in England
  • Other fighters in Yemen
  • A man from Al Qaeda he met in Yemen

Here’s the passage. (Note, Perry uses the acronym UFAM for Abdulmutallab; I’ve taken out the footnotes here for ease of reading, but they’re all to interrogations between Christmas 2009 to February 5, 2010.)

Manipulated by fundamentalists, such as Aulaqi and his internet lectures, UFAM claims that the main motivation for conducting the martyrdom mission included his interpretation of Koranic verses and his regularly attendance at prayers, where he met and interacted with Fundamentalist Islamists. UFAM was familiar with all of Aulaqi’s lectures, and they were an important motivator which led UFAM to decide to participate in Jihad. He began listening to the lectures in 2005 and reading Aulaqi’s writings, which motivated him to accept martyrdom as a possibility. Aulaqi was not the only influential fundamentalist in UFAM’s life. While residing at Abu Tarak’s residence in Sana, Yemen he was mainly confined to his residence and discouraged from any communication with the outside world (phone, email). During this period, UFAM spoke regularly with Abu Tarak and three other individuals who visited him daily, speaking with them about Jihad and martyrdom. UFAM discussed the concept of Jihad also with Uthmann who supported Mujahidin worldwide already from 2005. He was deeply influenced by a Jihadist who preached in England and elsewhere and used to meet with him intensively (as often as 3 times a week). UFAM associated with Aulaqi who frequently spoke of Jihad and interacted with other fighters, and while in Yemen, he met with a man from Al Qaeda who further deepened his conviction. [my emphasis]

Now, it’s not Perry’s job to describe the operation itself, so I’ll take nothing from his silence on who directed it. He makes it very clear Awlaki counselled Abdulmutallab on the appropriateness of martyrdom.

And Perry does say that Awlaki told Abdulmutallab he should prepare a martyrdom video in anticipation of a plane operation; Abdulmutallab made the video on December 2 or 3 (this passage is sourced to Interrogations on January 29 and February 9, 2010).

UFAM himself participated in this practice of preparing a martyrs’ video after he was told by Aulaqi that he would bring down a plane and that he should prepare a video. UFAM spent time thinking about his martyr’s video. Approximately on the 2nd or 3rd of Dec. 2009, UFAM made a martyr’s video with the help of two video technicians who brought the equipment. They brought a black flag with Islamic writing for the background as well as clothing and other props. It took them approximately 2 or 3 days to complete the video.

And the target was chosen, according to Perry, by Awlaki. But oddly, he did not source that assertion to any of Abdulmutallab’s interrogations.

He was prepared to fulfill his mission of Jihad against whatever enemy was identified by Aulaqi. UFAM did not choose the target or the mission, it was chosen for him. [Perry did not source this statement. Instead, in a footnote he points out his unsourced statement contradicted a comment Abdulmutallab made at his sentencing, in which the defendant said he was motivated by hate for the US.]

Awlaki chose the target

In the narrative released today (based, according to the government filing, on conversations of unknown date during which Abdulmutallab’s original court-appointed lawyers were trying to negotiate a plea bargain that never happened), Awlaki instructed Abdulmutallab to make a martyrdom video.

Awlaki told defendant that he would create a martyrdom video that would be used after the defendant’s attack. Awlaki arranged for a professional film crew to film the video. Awlaki assisted defendant in writing his martyrdom statement, and it was filmed over a period of two to three days.

Thus far, the government’s narrative matches Perry’s. But the government narrative provides more details about how Awlaki gave Abdulmutallab the final instructions about how to carry out the attack.

Although Awlaki gave defendant operational flexibility, Awlaki instructed defendant that the only requirements were that the attack be on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over U.S. soil. Beyond that, Awlaki gave defendant discretion to choose the flight and date. Awlaki instructed defendant not to fly directly from Yemen to Europe, as that could attract suspicion. [my emphasis]

Abu Tarak chose the target

That’s funny, because back when prosecutors gave their opening argument on October 11, just 12 days after the government killed Awlaki in a drone strike, they told a different story. In that version, Awlaki provided the inspiration for Abdulmutallab.

So [Abdulmutallab] had the opportunity to do anything he wanted with his life. But instead he began listening to tapes of someone named Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical preacher, and he became committed to jihad, and he left graduate school and he went to Yemen. He wanted jihad and he sought it out and he found it.

That’s it–the sole mention of Awlaki in the case the government was willing to defend in court.

But a guy named Abu Tarak–the guy, according to Perry, with whom Abdulmutallab stayed in Sana, Yemen–gave Abdulmutallab the instructions.

So what else did the defendant say to the FBI? He said that he sought out and found al-Qaeda. He said that he was introduced at a mosque to someone he called Abu-Tarak, an al-Qaeda member. He told the FBI that he and Abu-Tarak spoke daily about jihad and martyrdom and supported al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. And martyrdom is, of course, a suicide operation where the person is engaged in jihad, and they carry out an operation, sometimes called suicide bombing, sometimes called martyrdom bombing, where the person intends to kill and to himself die in the act of doing it, and they usually think that they will end up in heaven as a result of doing that.

And the defendant said that he and Abu-Tarak spoke daily about ways to attack the United States. Daily.

And then in late November of 2009, remember, this interview is taking place on December 25th so he’s talking about a month or so earlier, Abu-Tarak suggested to the defendant that he become involved in a plane attack against the United States aircraft. And the defendant agreed to do that. And the plan was that the bomb would be concealed in the defendant’s underwear, and Abu-Tarak gave him training in detonating the bomb. And the way the bomb would work is that the defendant would inject liquid into a powder with a syringe and that would cause the explosion.

And Abu-Tarak told the defendant that the bomb would not be detected by airport security anywhere in the world. And he said that the bomb maker was a Saudi Arabian individual, and in fact, the defendant told the FBI that he met the bomb maker, he met the Saudi Arabian bomb maker while he was in Yemen. And Abu-Tarak told him that the plane would crash and it would kill everybody on board.

And Abu-Tarak gave him the direction.

Remember, I said there were only three parts to the plan, he had to blow up a plane, it had to be a U.S. airliner and it had to take place over U.S. soil. Abu-Tarak reported that way, make sure it’s a U.S. aircraft, make sure it takes place over the United States.

Read more →

Government Finally Releases Narrative of Anwar al-Awlaki’s Role in UndieBombing Plot

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As part of its sentencing memo asking for multiple counts of life imprisonment against Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the government has finally officially laid out how it claims Anwar al-Awlaki was involved in Abdulmutallab’s plot. I’ve included the entirety of the account below the rule.

I agree with Evan Perez. Now that they’ve made this narrative available, surely they can make the OLC memo authorizing Awlaki’s death available (note, the narrative says only that Awlaki and Samir Khan died, not that we killed them).

One more thing I’m interested in. I assume that Abdulmutallab, in this response to this filing, will object if he finds any of this inaccurate (so I assume it is accurate). He appears to have objected to this narrative in the presentencing report (and therefore, here), but he doesn’t say they were inaccurate.

Defendant states that the objected-to paragraphs contain “information obtained during plea negotiations in this matter and can not at this stage be used against him, for sentencing purposes.”

But given certain vague aspects of the narrative, I’m wondering how much corroborating evidence they have (particularly since several of the people mentioned in it are dead–and even Ibrahim al-Asiri, the bombmaker, was rumored to be). For example, the initial communication with Awlaki would involve data evidence. Did they get that after the fact? Or were they tracing it in real time and missed that too? Some of it might depend on other witnesses who have since returned to Saudi Arabia. And I wonder if the government has tracked down (for example) the unnamed middle man who put Abdulmutallab in touch with Awlaki? We know they have physical proof of Asiri’s involvement. What other evidence is out there?

Anyway, it’s high time the government release this information officially. And now that it’s released, they should do more and release the OLC memo.

In August 2009, defendant left Dubai, where he had been taking graduate classes, and traveled to Yemen. For several years, defendant had been following the online teachings of Anwar Awlaki, and he went to Yemen to try to meet him in order to discuss the possibility of becoming involved in jihad. Defendant by that time had become committed in his own mind to carrying out an act of jihad, and was contemplating “martyrdom;” i.e., a suicide operation in which he and others would be killed.

Once in Yemen, defendant visited mosques and asked people he met if they knew how he could meet Awlaki. Eventually, defendant made contact with an individual who in turn made Awlaki aware of defendant’s desire to meet him. Read more →

If Ron Wyden Hasn’t Seen Awlaki Memo, There Has Been Inadequate Oversight

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As MadDog noted and Ellen Nakashima reported, Ron Wyden is getting cranky that DOJ won’t even show him–a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee–the OLC memo authorizing the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.

There’s one basic thing the letter makes clear (that Nakashima doesn’t emphasize). Ron Wyden, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has still not seen the legal justification for killing Anwar al-Awlaki, four months after Awlaki was killed.

So, as you will remember, I called you in April 2011 and asked you to ensure that the secret Justice Department opinions that apparently outline the official interpretation of this lethal authority were provided to Congress.  The Justice Department provided me with some relevant information in May 2011, and I mistakenly believed that this meant that you had agreed to my request.  Nine months later, however, the Justice Department still has not fully complied with my original request, and it is increasingly clear that it has no intention of doing so.

Simply put, this situation is unacceptable.  For the executive branch to claim that intelligence agencies have the authority to knowingly kill American citizens (subject to publicly unspecified limitations) while at the same time refusing to provide Congress with any and all legal opinions that delineate the executive branch’s understanding of this authority represents an indefensible assertion of executive prerogative, and I expected better from the Obama Administration.

So Wyden asked for the legal justification before Awlaki was killed, at a time when he could have exercised oversight over the killing, and got “some relevant information” but not the legal justification he asked for. And DOJ has not given him the legal justification since.

We know the Gang of Four had some kind of review over the killing, because all four made comments after his death in support. But there should be no justification for keeping such information at the Gang of Four level at this point–Awlaki is good and dead, the covert operation to kill him achieved its objective and is not all that covert now that the guy who oversaw the operation has talked about it on TV.

And yet these are the questions that Wyden still has about the killing:

Some of these questions include: ‘how much evidence does the President need to decide that a particular American is part of a terrorist group?’, ‘does the President have to provide individual Americans with an opportunity to surrender before using lethal force against them?’, ‘is the President’s authority to kill Americans based on authorization from Congress or his own authority as Commander-in-Chief?’, ‘can the President order intelligence agencies to kill an American who is inside the United States?’, and ‘what other limitations or boundaries apply to this authority?’.

If even the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have not been permitted to review the Administration’s legal justification for the targeted killing of an American citizen, then the oversight over the op is even more inadequate than we knew. The Administration has really been operating on the principle that it can go off and kill American citizens without even having the elected representatives designated to oversee their actions fully review such killings.

Administration Complains that Others Are Bringing Transparency It Refuses To on Its Drone Strikes

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In a quote for a WaPo story on the Administration’s credibility problems on its Afghanistan claims, a senior Administration official complained that their Afghan plans got leaked before they wanted them to.

There are people at every piece of this — the Taliban, Islamabad, Kabul and Washington” — who object to or are trying to influence elements of the emerging strategy, a senior administration official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to talk more candidly. “They use leaking as a tool.”

Leaking as a tool, even by those in power in DC! Imagine that!?!?

Meanwhile, in the NYT article on the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s report on the way Obama’s drone strikes have targeted rescuers and funeral attendees, another senior Administration official launches this cowardly anonymous attack.

A senior American counterterrorism official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, questioned the report’s findings, saying “targeting decisions are the product of intensive intelligence collection and observation.” The official added: “One must wonder why an effort that has so carefully gone after terrorists who plot to kill civilians has been subjected to so much misinformation. Let’s be under no illusions — there are a number of elements who would like nothing more than to malign these efforts and help Al Qaeda succeed.”

Mind you, that anonymous coward doesn’t actually dispute anything in the BIJ report. Instead, he or she just questions the motives of aiming to bring transparency to our drone program, insinuating that doing the hard work of counting the innocent victims of the drone strikes equates to sympathizing with al Qaeda.

Read more →

The Administration’s Many Excuses for Hiding Its Targeted Killing Memo

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Remember this article? It describes the debate within the Administration over how readily and extensively to acknowledge the US killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. As it describes, the debate was at least preliminarily resolved at a Situation Room meeting in November.

The issue came to a head at a Situation Room meeting in November. At lower-level interagency meetings, Obama officials had already begun moving toward a compromise. David Petraeus, the new CIA director whose agency had been wary of too much disclosure, came out in support of revealing the legal reasoning behind the Awlaki killing so long as the case was not explicitly discussed. Petraeus, according to administration officials, was backed up by James Clapper, the director of national intelligence. (The CIA declined to comment.) The State Department, meanwhile, continued to push for fuller disclosure. One senior Obama official who continued to raise questions about the wisdom of coming out publicly at all was Janet Napolitano, the Homeland Security director. She argued that the calls for transparency had quieted down, as one participant characterized her view, so why poke the hornet’s nest? Another senior official expressing caution about the plan was Kathryn Ruemmler, the White House counsel. She cautioned that the disclosures could weaken the government’s stance in pending litigation. The New York Times has filed a lawsuit against the Obama administration under the Freedom of Information Act seeking the release of the Justice Department legal opinion in the Awlaki case. (The department has declined to provide the documents requested.)

It came down to what Denis McDonough, the deputy national-security adviser, cheekily called the “half Monty” versus the “full Monty,” after the British movie about a male striptease act. In the end, the principals settled on the half Monty. As the State Department’s Koh continued to push for the maximum amount of disclosure, McDonough began referring to that position as “the full Harold.”

Note especially the stance of Kathryn Ruemmler, the White House Counsel, who argued that any disclosures on the Awlaki killing “could weaken the government’s stance in pending litigation.”

That is, Ruemmler argued the Administration couldn’t voluntarily provide information about Awlaki’s killing, because it might mean it would have to involuntarily give that information up pursuant to a lawsuit over that information. Huh?

Since November, both the NYT (on December 20, 2011) and the ACLU (yesterday) have sued to get the Awlaki memo under FOIA (the ACLU is also suing to get the underlying evidence, including that relating to Samir Khan and Awlaki’s son Abdulrahman).

So I wanted to compare the different responses different agencies gave the NYT and ACLU around the same time that many top Administration officials were advocating for some kind of transparency even while the White House Counsel was arguing that doing so might lead to transparency. Here’s how the government responded to these FOIAs when (I’ve not noted the ACLU appeals, but all were appealed before the subequent follow-up):

Around June 2010: OLC completes Awlaki memo

June 11, 2010: NYT’s Scott Shane FOIAs DOJ OLC for memos on targeted killings

October 7, 2011: NYT’s Charlie Savage FOIAs OLC for memos on targeting killings

October 19, 2011: ACLU FOIAs Anwar al-Awlaki OLC memo, underlying evidence supporting it, and information relating to Samir Khan and Abdullah al-Awalaki

October 27, 2011: OLC denies both NYT requests under FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5), and, in response to Shane’s request, also notes that with regards to other agencies, “neither confirms nor denies the existence of the documents” in the request

October 27, 2011: DOJ Office of Information Policy grants ACLU’s request for expedited processing but determines the request fell within “unusual circumstances” so it could not meet the statutory deadline

October 31, 2011: DOD denies ACLU’s request for expedited processing and also claimed “unusual circumstances”

November 2011, unknown date: Situation Room meeting at which Principals decide to pursue a “half monty” strategy of limited release of information on Awlaki

November 4, 2011: NYT appeals its denial

November 7, 2011: USSOCOM denies ACLU’s request for expedited processing and determined the request fell within “unusual circumstances”

November 14, 2011: OLC denies ACLU’s request under FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5)

November 17, 2011: CIA denies ACLU’s FOIA “pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)” and claims that the “fact of the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified”

Read more →

Dianne Feinstein Complains about Executive Branch Blabbing

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In her statement at the beginning of the Threat Intelligence Assessment hearing today, Dianne Feinstein complained that the Executive Branch continues to blab about things that are supposed to be secret (this starts around 11:00).

I’d also like to say that once again this committee has been put in a difficult position of trying to avoid any mention of classified matters when various parts of the executive branch may be doing somewhat the opposite. I ask members to be careful in their questions and statements and to remember that public discussion of some intelligence programs and assets can lead to them being compromised.

On the particular issue of drone strikes, I will only say that I was cleared to say in our joint hearing with the House Intelligence Committee last September “And there’s no issue that receives more attention and oversight from this Committee than the United States Counterterrorism efforts going on along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These efforts are extremely precise and carefully executed and are the most effective tools we have. Non-combatant casualties are kept to an absolute minimum.”

Given the timing, given her references to both assets and programs, and given her comments about the drone strikes on the Pakistani border, I assume she’s complaining about Leon Panetta’s blabbing to 60 Minutes the other night. (Plus, DiFi and Panetta have had their difficulties in the past.)

You see? It’s not just me that is fed up with this double standard on secrecy.

Update: Josh Gerstein talked to DiFi after the hearing, and she made it clear she was not criticizing the President.

Feinstein insisted after Tuesday’s hearing that her remarks were not aimed at Obama.

“I was not criticizing the president.  I was reminding the committee about protecting classified information,” she said in a statement e-mailed to POLITICO. She did not elaborate on what “parts of the executive branch” she was referring to in her public comments earlier in the day. A spokesman had no immediate response to a request for clarification.

Did John Brennan’s Leak Hypocrisy Catch Up to Him?

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In his interview with Jason Leopold in May 2010, Jon Kiriakou explained how his book got approved by the CIA Publication Review Board. He describes someone who–given the mention of the transition team and the seniority at CIA–must be John Brennan, advising him to wait to resubmit his book until after the Obama Administration cleaned out the CIA.

Kiriakou: I called a very senior CIA officer, former CIA officer, who was very quietly supportive of me.

Leopold: Can you identify that person?

Kiriakou: I can’t, unfortunately. But he said, ‘I’m on the Obama transition team. We’re going to win this election next week. And we’re going to be making wholesale changes over there. Everybody’s gonna go. So make your changes and don’t resubmit until I tell you to.’ A week later Obama wins. About six weeks pass, Director Hayden resigns. Several people a layer or two, three layers beneath him also resign, My friend calls me back and says ‘resubmit it.’ This is immediately after Panetta is named Director. I resubmitted it. A week later, I got a one page letter saying ‘the book is cleared in its entirety.’

So not only was this guy who appears identical to John Brennan “quietly supportive
of Kiriakou,” but this John Brennan lookalike also played a key role in getting Kiriakou’s book approved.

Which is mighty interesting, because John Brennan was also centrally involved in this investigation, particularly in the hiring of Pat Fitzgerald in March 2010 to respond to CIA’s demand for IIPA charges.

According to the officials, the dispute centered on discussions for a interagency memorandum that was to be used in briefing President Obama and senior administration officials on the photographs found in Cuba.

Justice officials did not share the CIA’s security concerns about the risks posed to CIA interrogators and opposed language on the matter that was contained in the draft memorandum. The memo was being prepared for White House National Security Council aide John Brennan, who was to use it to brief the president.

The CIA insisted on keeping its language describing the case and wanted the memorandum sent forward in that form.

That resulted in the meeting and ultimately to Mr. Vieira withdrawing from the probe.

Now, I’m not suggesting that Kiriakou was targeted just to get back at John Brennan.

But I am saying that it is–at the very least–ironic that a world class leak hypocrite would be supportive of the guy who got nabbed in this investigation.

On the one hand, after all, Brennan had an antagonistic role with at least one of the whistleblowers the Obama Administration has targeted.

Yet, at the same time, he’s a noted leaker himself, such as for the breathless account of the Osama bin Laden targeting, and, more recently, providing on the record details that the Administration had declared a state secret.

The CIA got their IIPA charge. I’m not sure whether Kiriakou is the guy everyone thought they’d get.

Despite Metaphysical Impossibility, US Government Repeatedly Attempts Retroactive Classification

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On Friday, I noted that the New York Times had dutifully repeated information from military sources who had provided them with a “classified” report (pdf) on how cultural differences between NATO troops and Afghan troops are resulting in increasingly frequent killings of coalition troops by coalition-trained Afghan troops.  On Friday morning, the Times put up a correction, noting that the Wall Street Journal had published an article about the May 12, 2011 report on June 17, 2011.

I mentioned in my Friday post that the Wall Street Journal article included a link to what was said to be a copy of the report, but that the link was now dead. It is quite curious that the Journal article would have that link, as the opening sentence mentions that the report is classified. In comments on the post, Marcy Wheeler posed the question of whether the study “was intentionally buried after the WSJ story? Maybe that’s what NYT’s claim that it is classified is about?” So, in other words, was the study retroactively classified because of the Wall Street Journal article?

With only a little searching after reading both the New York Times and Wall Street Journal articles, I found what appeared to be a complete copy (pdf) of the same report (or at least a copy with the same title and number of pages), clearly stamped “UNCLASSIFIED” at the top and bottom of each page. Several hours after my post was published, the Times added a second correction to their story:

The article also referred incompletely to the military study’s secrecy. While it was classified, as the article reported, it was first distributed in early May 2011 as unclassified and was later changed to classified. (The Times learned after publication that a version of the study has remained accessible on the Internet.)

So it turns out that Marcy’s hunch was correct. The report initially was published as unclassified and then later classified, in a clear case of retroactive classification. There is perhaps just a hair of wiggle room in the Times’ statement that “a version of the study has remained accessible on the internet”, providing for the remote possibility that there are differences between the “classified” version provided to the times and the complete version on the internet, but that seems highly unlikely. The copy on the internet is almost certainly a copy from the time period when the study clearly was unclassified.

This sequence of events also is confirmed somewhat in the Wall Street Journal article itself: Read more →

If the Only News Is Good News and There Is No News …?

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Tara McKelvey, the woman who wrote one of the most detailed stories on drone targeting (which has subsequently gotten John Rizzo into some trouble), has a CJR piece on the problems of reporting on drones. The whole thing is worth reading, but I want to take a number of quotes McKelvey includes out of order, starting with David Ignatius, noting the Administration’s flexibility in secrecy rules.

Ignatius, of the Post, explained that Obama administration officials are sometimes willing to discuss drone operations in an attempt to promote the White House’s counterterrorism strategy. In February 2010, for instance, Ignatius was able to write a detailed account of the escalation of drone strikes because officials were eager to demonstrate that Obama was more aggressive in his pursuit of al Qaeda than Bush was.

“These rules about covert activities can be bent when it becomes politically advantageous,” Ignatius said. “When it suits them, you get quite a detailed readout.”

That’s a sentiment Jonathan Landay echoes.

Journalists know that finding non-official sources is crucial in covering the drone war, especially under the tight-lipped Obama administration. “The only time I’m allowed to talk to senior staff or the nsc is for stories that make the administration look good,” McClatchy’s Landay said.

In other words, an experienced journalist reputed to be a mouthpiece, and an experienced journalists known for bucking the Administration propaganda leading up to the Iraq War. Both in agreement that the Administration won’t tell you anything unless it puts the Administration and its drone program in the best light.

Which is why I love this bit, which McKelvey puts right after a discussion about the clouded legality of the program.

A spokesman for the White House National Security Council, who spoke only on condition he not be named, rebuffed questions about why the administration refuses to speak with reporters on the record about the program. “You’re going to have a lot of people on the outside, and they all love to talk,” he said. “We can’t do that.” And, the official added, if outsiders are talking about the drone war, “that means they don’t know very much.”

This NSC spokesperson may or may not be Tommy Vietor, who is, after all, the NSC spokesperson.

For McKelvey, this Tommy Vietor sound-alike basically claims he cannot comment. Both Ignatius (who ought to know) and Landay make it clear they would have comment if there were good news to share.

Which further adds to the evidence that where they refuse to give us evidence–as they have with Anwar al-Awlaki’s assassination–it’s because they have no good news to give.