Big Brother Works Both Sides of the Atlantic

I was rather surprised that there seemed to be more outrage Sunday about the UK’s announced plan to roll out the same ability to monitor everyone’s online activity that the US set up after 9/11 then over Eric Lichtblau’s report–based on the ACLU’s FOIA efforts–revealing that cops all over the country are using our smart phones to spy on us.

At least from the published reports, it sounds like the Brits want to be able to do through GCHQ what NSA and FBI have been doing with hoovered telecom records for years.

A new law – which may be announced in the forthcoming Queen’s Speech in May – would not allow GCHQ to access the content of emails, calls or messages without a warrant.

But it would enable intelligence officers to identify who an individual or group is in contact with, how often and for how long. They would also be able to see which websites someone had visited.

[snip]

“What this is talking about doing is not focusing on terrorists or criminals, it’s absolutely everybody’s emails, phone calls, web access…” he told the BBC.

“All that’s got to be recorded for two years and the government will be able to get at it with no by your leave from anybody.”

He said that until now anyone wishing to monitor communications had been required to gain permission from a magistrate.

Plus, such plans will likely face more of a hurdle in Parliament than such schemes to expand surveillance face in Congress.

Meanwhile, the materials collected from all over the country via ACLU’s state affiliates show that local police are using some of the same approaches–things like communities of interest–that our massive data collection supports.

And as ACLU’s summary makes clear that not just the Feds using Secret PATRIOT, but local cops, are using cell phones to track people with no warrants.

Most law enforcement agencies do not obtain a warrant to track cell phones, but some do, and the legal standards used vary widely. Some police departments protect privacy by obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause when tracking cell phones. For example, police in the County of Hawaii, Wichita, and Lexington, Ky. demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant when tracking cell phones. If these police departments can protect both public safety and privacy by meeting the warrant and probable cause requirements, then surely other agencies can as well.

Unfortunately, other departments do not always demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant when tracking cell phones. For example, police in Lincoln, Neb. obtain even GPS location data, which is more precise than cell tower location information, on telephones without demonstrating probable cause. Police in Wilson County, N.C. obtain historical cell tracking data where it is “relevant and material” to an ongoing investigation, a standard lower than probable cause.

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Did GAO Deem Secret PATRIOT a Waste of Time?

I noticed the same thing Charlie Savage did in this letter from Senators Wyden and Udall to Eric Holder complaining about the government’s secret interpretation of the PATRIOT Act. The Senators suggest that the secret program is not very useful.

We would also note that in recent months we have grown increasingly skeptical about the actual value of the “intelligence collection operation” discussed in the Justice Department’s recent court filing regarding the pending lawsuit. This has come as a surprise to us, as we were initially inclined to take the executive branch’s assertions about the importance of this “operation” at face value. We will provide more detail about this skepticism in a classified correspondence.

Their new-found skepticism about the program is rather interesting given that GAO recently completed a first-ever assessment of the FBI’s counterterrorism programs.

Thus, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had refused for years to submit to GAO oversight of its counterterrorism programs.  The Bureau contended that GAO had no authority to review the programs because they were funded through the intelligence budget.  Moreover, the FBI told Sen. Charles Grassley that the Office of Legal Counsel had ratified that position and supported its refusal to cooperate with GAO.

But that is now in the past.  The GAO recently completed a classified assessment of FBI counterterrorism programs with full cooperation from the FBI.  A public version of the report is expected to be released sometime in the spring.

I presume any GAO conclusions about the Secret PATRIOT program are just one factor contributing to Wyden and Udall’s skepticism. After all, Holder must know about the results of the GAO report by now, particularly if the document is being declassified (since that would require FBI’s involvement).

Nevertheless, it would be rather interesting if the long fight for real congressional oversight of intelligence programs led to increased skepticism about executive branch claims so quickly.

NSA Director Keith Alexander: The FBI Does the Domestic Collection

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Congressman Hank Johnson asked NSA Director Keith Alexander about James Bamford’s Wired article describing the data storage and analysis center in UT. Unfortunately, rather than ask Alexander about these activities–storage and analysis–Johnson asked Alexander about data collection. Here are excerpts of the exchange:

Johnson: Does NSA have the ability to identify Cheney bashers based on the content of their emails?

Alexander: No. Can I explain? NSA does not have the ability to do that in the United States. In the United States we would have to go through an FBI process–a warrant–to serve it to somebody to actually get it.

Johnson: But you do have the capability to do it?

Alexander: Not in the United States. We’re not authorized to collect nor do we have the equipment in the United States.

Johnson: “NSA’s signals intercepts include eavesdropping on domestic phone calls and inspection of domestic emails.” Is that true?

Alexander: No, not in that context. I think what he’s trying to raise is are we gathering all the information on the United States? No, that is not correct.

Johnson: What judicial consent is required for NSA to intercept communications and information involving American citizens?

Alexander: Within the United States, that would be the FBI lead.  If it was foreign actor in the United States the FBI would still have the lead and could work that with the NSA or other intelligence agencies as authorized. But to conduct that kind of collection in the United States it would have to go through a court order and a court would have to authorize it. We’re not authorized to do it nor do we do it.

Note that Alexander never denies that such capabilities exist. Rather, he says that FBI would intercept communications–with a court order–and FBI would search for certain content–with a warrant.

Also note, all of Alexander’s responses were in the present tense: he doesn’t say the NSA hasn’t done these things. Only that the NSA is not now authorized to do them and does not do them.

We know several things about the government’s collection in the US. First, the telecoms own the equipment–they’re the ones that do the intercepts, not FBI or NSA. Second, the FBI can and does get bulk data information from telecoms and other businesses using Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.

I will have more to say about this later–until then, read this post and this post as background.

There is a great deal of circumstantial information to suggest that after the 2004 hospital confrontation–which was in part a response to Congress prohibiting any DOD use of data mining on Americans–chunks of the illegal wiretap program came to be authorized under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which authorizes FBI data collection.

There’s nothing General Alexander said in this non-denial denial that would conflict with the notion that FBI collects data the telecoms intercept using Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.

The Secret PATRIOT FOIA

To cap off Sunshine week, there was a slew of FOIA news today. For now, I’m just going to look at the response the ACLU got on its request for “OLC legal opinions and memoranda concerning or interpreting Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.”

Josh Gerstein noted one interesting aspect of this response: the government has withheld two documents on Exemption 5–or deliberative privilege grounds. Now, the government usually claims deliberative privilege on these memos, arguing that the memos are just interpretation for whatever Executive Branch client who makes the final decision.

But this also suggests they may not be claiming these memos are classified.

Except the DOJ response does note they’ve referred one of two documents to OLC for further review.

… the Office of Information Policy has referred one document to OLC for direct response to ACLU. The document is the same as one of the two documents described above.

I wonder whether they have referred this document for full classification review.

And then there is DOJ’s all but admission that they’ve carved out the most sensitive documents on this topic–which we believe to be the use of phone GPS to get geolocation in the US. They say,

the ACLU has stipulated in ACLU v. FBI, 11 Civ. 7562 (S.D.N.Y.) that the request is limited to OLC legal opinions and memoranda concerning or interpreting Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.

As Gerstein notes, the documents that really explain Secret PATRIOT are FISA Court opinions.

It is possible is that the OLC documents in question are not the holy grail senators, the ACLU and the Times have been seeking, but some more mundane interpretations of Section 215. Wyden and Udall suggested in their letter that the key documents amounting to “secret law” are actually classified opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Any administration legal interpretations of those opinions may also not have come from OLC, but from lawyers at the FBI or elsewhere in the intelligence community. The government is withholding other documents in the FOIA litigation as classified.

Like I say, this is a nice cap to Sunshine week–yet more obfuscation.

The NYPD’s Surveillance of Muslims and Occupy Wall Street Converges

I started my morning reading with this AP Q&A on the significance of their series on the NYPD’s spying on Muslims. There are several things missing: why does the NYPD profile only businesses they believe to be owned by Muslims, and not the American chains at which recent immigrants also congregate? Why doesn’t the Q&A discuss how the NYPD-on-the-Hudson got close to, but missed the two most significant plots of recent years; what does that say about the efficacy of all this spying? And why doesn’t the Q&A discuss the many informants the NYPD has deployed?

That said, the AP does get to the core reason why the NYPD’s program abuses the First Amendment:

Bloomberg and his aides have not addressed, however, why police kept intelligence files on innocuous mosque sermons and plans for peaceful protests. They’ve not explained why police noted which restaurants served “devout” Muslims, why police maintained lists of Muslims who changed their names or why innocent people attending Friday prayer services were photographed and videotaped.

Those activities, many Muslims said, make them feel like they’re under scrutiny just because of their religion.

After reading that Q&A, I then read this NYT article, talking about how the NYPD’s intelligence division–the CIA-on-the-Hudson again–has preemptively arrested some Occupy Wall Street protestors before they engaged in protest.

On Nov. 17, Kira Moyer-Sims was near the Manhattan Bridge, buying coffee while three friends waited nearby in a car. More than a dozen blocks away, protesters gathered for an Occupy Wall Street “day of action,” which organizers had described as an attempt to block the streets around the New York Stock Exchange.

Then, Ms. Moyer-Sims said, about 30 police officers surrounded her and the people in the car.

All four were arrested, said Vik Pawar, a lawyer for Ms. Moyer-Sims and two of the others, and taken to a police facility in the East Village. He said officers strip-searched them and ignored their requests for a lawyer.

These are the same tactics–or worse–as used when the NYPD targeted Muslims planning a peaceful protest of cartoons deemed blasphemous. But most troubling is the last anecdote the NYT reports (which the NYT might have known to contextualize if they had been reporting on the NYPD spying on Muslims). In one case, they NYPD and the FBI are targeting an Occupy activist who, as someone who appears to have changed his name from his birth name, would have been targeted closely under the NYPD program. And they appear to be insinuating a tie with Islamic terrorism.

Mark Adams, a 32-year-old engineer from Virginia, said he was arrested in November at an Occupy Wall Street protest in Midtown and was questioned by a police detective and an agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who asked about his involvement with Occupy Wall Street, requested his e-mail address and inquired whether he had ever been to Yemen or met anyone connected to Al Qaeda.

Mr. Adams, a naturalized United States citizen who was born in Pakistan, said he was arrested during another protest in January and questioned by intelligence division detectives. In that instance, he said, the detectives asked him about specific names and addresses, asked about his work history, education and family, and questioned him about a trip he had made to Ireland.

Mr. Adams said he was disturbed that anyone would consider him a threat because of his ethnicity or political views. “It’s scary,” he said. [my emphasis]

As the AP reported last October, the NYPD conducts extensive checks and keeps records on those within the city who change their names from Arabic or Muslim-sounding names to something Americanized.

The NYPD monitors everyone in the city who changes his or her name, according to internal police documents and interviews. For those whose names sound Arabic or might be from Muslim countries, police run comprehensive background checks that include reviewing travel records, criminal histories, business licenses and immigration documents. Read more

Leak Prosecutions: Enforcing Secrecy Asymmetry Does Not Equate to Rule of Law

Matt Miller has a piece in the Daily Beast defending the Obama Administration’s prosecutions of leakers. Now, as Josh Gerstein notes, Miller makes his work easier by cherry-picking which cases to discuss; he doesn’t mention Thomas Drake, who was pretty clearly trying to expose waste and fraud (as well as the government’s choice to spend more money to provide less privacy protection). And he doesn’t mention Bradley Manning, who is alleged to have leaked at least some materials that expose war crimes and a lot more than expose abuse (though note, DOD, not DOJ, is prosecuting Manning).

But Miller’s argument suffers from a much bigger problem. He operates under the assumption that the sole crux of legitimacy arises from a distinction between whistleblower and leaker that he presents as absolute.

To start with, that distinction isn’t absolute (as Manning’s case makes clear). But even with John Kiriakou, whom Miller does discuss, it’s not absolute. Recall what Kiriakou was charged with: leaking the identity of a still covert officer involved in the torture program, being one of up to 23 people who leaked that Deuce Martinez–who was not covert–was involved in the torture program (though didn’t do the torture), and lying to the CIA Publication Review Board about the classification of a surveillance technique details of which have been readily available for decades (and which seems to be related to the Secret PATRIOT GPS application targeting American citizens in probable violation of the Fourth Amendment). In other words, two people involved in an illegal program and one technique that was probably improperly classified and since become another questionably legal executive branch spying technique.

But the entire investigation arose because defense attorneys with Top Secret clearance used the covert officer’s name in a still-sealed filing about the abuse their client had suffered at the hand of the US, possibly–though we don’t know–at the hand of the covert officer (because he is covert, the defense attorneys did not use the officer’s name or picture with their client).

Now, I have no way of knowing (nor does Miller) Kiriakou’s motive, and his case will probably end in a plea, meaning we’ll never get to learn it at trial. But the very genesis of the case–the defense attorneys’ attempts to learn who had tortured their clients so as to be able to adequately represent them–arises from the government’s failure to prosecute anyone for torture and its insistence on withholding arguably relevant information from legal teams, presumably in part to prevent them from attaining any redress for that torture in courts.

So regardless of Kiriakou’s motive, to argue for the legitimacy of his prosecution as events have transpired is to distract from the larger system in which the government uses secrecy to avoid legal consequences for its own crimes–regardless of what that does for justice.

And it’s not just with Gitmo detainees’ lawyers that the government has withheld information to prevent justice being done. It did that with al-Haramain, the Maher Arar suit, Jeppesen Dataplan–the list of times when the government has claimed something, even a widely known fact, is super duper secret just so it can’t be sued or prosecuted is getting quite long and tired. And, of course, it continues to do it with the Anwar al-Awlaki killing, preferring inconsistent claims of Glomar and state secrets to full accounting not just of Awlaki’s killing, but of the claims about Presidential power more generally.

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First They Came for Russ Feingold, Then They Came for CATO

As I’ve followed all the really interesting commentary on the Koch Brothers’ efforts to take over Cato (Dave Weigel, Jonathan Adler, Jane Mayer, Brad DeLong) I keep thinking back to this Adam Serwer post last year, pointing out one of the most anti-libertarian moves they made: dumping $25,000 to beat the biggest defender of civil liberties in the Senate.

Another way to put this is that the Kochs will happily put their money behind candidates who agree with their economic agenda but disagree with their social agenda. They will never put their money behind candidates of whom the reverse is true.

The best example of this I can think of is the Senate’s lost liberaltarian Russ Feingold. Feingold was the only senator to vote against the PATRIOT Act. He was one of the first senators to endorse marriage equality. He voted against the war in Iraq, against TARP and financial reform, and has consistently sought to rein in the surveillance state. He was, however, also one of the architects of campaign-finance reform along with John McCain and a supporter of the health-care bill and the stimulus.

When Feingold’s candidacy was in danger, the Koch’s poured their money into the coffers of Feingold’s opponent, Ron Johnson. According to the FEC, the Koch brothers each gave him individual contributions of $2,400, while KochPAC gave him $10,000. Charles Koch’s son Chase Koch gave Johnson $5,800, while David’s* wife Julia Koch gave another $2,400. An Elizabeth Koch from the same zip code in Wichita as Charles and Julia gave an additional $2,400. All in all, the Koch family gave Johnson more than $25,000 to send Russ Feingold home. What type of candidate were they supporting?

Johnson is anti-marriage equality, anti-choice, has no problem with open-ended military engagements and he supports the PATRIOT Act with some caveats, but only because “you have Barack Obama in power versus George Bush. I wasn’t overly concerned with George Bush in power.”

[snip]

In other words, faced with one candidate who shares their views on social issues and national security and another who shares their views on economic issues, the Kochs chose the latter.

Libertarianism, which was fostered to offer ideological cover for laissez faire capitalism, is now being actively replaced by its biggest patrons with a TeaParty ideology that has been co-opted over the last three years to offer populist cover for unrestrained capitalism.

So while I am fascinated by Corey Robin’s critique of Julian Sanchez’ presignation,

When the Kochs wield their money at Cato, that’s hegemony. But when they do it in Wisconsin, that’s democracy.

I think Robin’s comments on this year’s Ron Paul debate among the left is far more important.

Our problem—and again by “our” I mean a left that’s social democratic (or welfare state liberal or economically progressive or whatever the hell you want to call it) and anti-imperial—is that we don’t really have a vigorous national spokesperson for the issues of war and peace, an end to empire, a challenge to Israel, and so forth, that Paul has in fact been articulating.  The source of Paul’s positions on these issues are not the same as ours (again more reason not to give him our support).  But he is talking about these issues, often in surprisingly blunt and challenging terms. Would that we had someone on our side who could make the case against an American empire, or American supremacy, in such a pungent way.

This, it’s clear, is why people like Glenn Greenwald say that Paul’s voice needs to be heard.  Not, Greenwald makes clear, because he supports Paul, but because it is a terrible comment—a shanda for the left—that we don’t have anyone on our side of comparable visibility launching an attack on American imperialism and warfare. (Recalling what I said in the context of the death of Christopher Hitchens, I suspect this has something to do with our normalization and acceptance of war as a way of life.) In other words, we need to listen to Paul, not because he’s worthy of our support, and certainly not because the reasons that underlie his positions on foreign policy are ours, but because he reveals what’s not being said, or not being said enough, on our side.

[snip]

Ron Paul is unacceptable, and it’s unacceptable that we don’t have someone on the left who is raising the issues of imperialism, war and peace, and civil liberties in as visible and forceful a way.

Russ Feingold is gone from the Senate. As of last night, Dennis Kucinich will be gone
from the House next year. For what it’s worth, Ron Paul, too, will be gone from the House. In my own neighborhood, we hope Justin Amash, who hopes to assume Paul’s mantle, is gone from the House too.

There are other voices stepping up. But even Ron Wyden, who is a lonely voice criticizing the Obama Administration’s most egregious civil liberties abuses, offered somewhat tempered criticism of Attorney General Holder’s speech on Monday.

Attorney General Holder’s speech today is a welcome step in the right direction, but further steps need to be taken, and they need to be taken soon.

The government–both Republican and Democratic–has spent billions to create a climate of fear. It has succeeded in leading people to accept the assault on civil liberties without even questioning efficacy, much less constitutionality or abuse.

Meanwhile, even more money is being dumped into a reframed ideology of unrestrained capitalism, one with a populist face unembarrassed by its own inconsistency.

So I’ll go even further than Alex Pareene, who lists all the reasons we should care about the Koch takeover attempt on Cato. There is a case to be made for the Constitution and for executive restraint. We on the left need to get more effective at making it. Because the capitalist case is in the process of being bought out.

Ron Wyden Suggests Secret PATRIOT GPS Tracking May Be Illegal Under Jones

As I’ve suggested in my posts on US v Jones, the Justices seemed opposed to the kind of tracking we believe the government is doing under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Yet of the three opinions ruling the warrantless use of GPS tracking in the case improper, only Sonia Sotomayor spoke broadly enough to make it clear that the Secret PATRIOT application is unconstitutional.

Ron Wyden (who, remember, wrote a column on Jones’ application to Secret PATRIOT) used yesterday’s Threat Assessment hearing to try to get James Clapper to commit to whether US v Jones makes Secret PATRIOT illegal. (2:25)

Wyden: Director Clapper, as you know the Supreme Court ruled last week that it was unconstitutional for federal agents to attach a GPS tracking device to an individual’s car and monitor their movements 24/7 without a warrant. Because the Chair was being very gracious, I want to do this briefly. Can you tell me as of now what you believe this means for the intelligence community, number 1, and 2, would you be willing to commit this morning to giving me an unclassified response with respect to what you believe the law authorizes. This goes to the point that you and I have talked, Sir, about in the past, the question of secret law, I strongly feel that the laws and their interpretations must be public. And then of course the important work that all of you’re doing we very often have to keep that classified in order to protect secrets and the well-being of your capable staff. So just two parts, 1, what you think the law means as of now, and will you commit to giving me an unclassified answer on the point of what you believe the law actually authorizes.

Clapper: Sir, the judgment rendered was, as you stated, was in a law enforcement context. We are now examining, and the lawyers are, what are the potential implications for intelligence, you know, foreign or domestic. So, that reading is of great interest to us. And I’m sure we can share it with you. [looks around for confirmation] One more point I need to make, though. In all of this, we will–we have and will continue to abide by the Fourth Amendment.

Given Clapper’s quick invocation of the law enforcement context, I suspect the Intelligence Community’s lawyers are planning to use the language in Samuel Alito’s concurring opinion addressing “extraordinary offenses”…

We also need not consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might have been mounted using previously available techniques.

…To claim that their intelligence application–“foreign or domestic”–would still permit the tracking of innocent citizens using their cell phones.

In any case, if Clapper is good on his word (though note, he said he’d give this interpretation to Wyden, not release it publicly), the government may finally tip its hand regarding its cell phone tracking of Americans.

SCOTUS Unanimously Declares (Some) GPS Tracking a Search

Good news! The Fourth Amendment is not totally dead yet!

SCOTUS just handed down its decision in US v. Jones, which I wrote about here. And while there are three concurring opinions (the majority authored by Scalia and joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, a concurrence from Sotomayor, and another concurrence written by Alito and joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan), all upheld the Circuit Court decision throwing out evidence warrantless use of a GPS surveillance.

But the opinions are worth reading closely because–as I pointed out in my earlier post–they may indicate whether SCOTUS would find the Administration’s secret use of the PATRIOT Act to track people via the GPS in their cell phones to be legal (as well as other digital surveillance).

Scalia’s opinion focused on the way the government occupied property in this case, arguing that more recent decisions that have focused on reasonable expectations of privacy do not affect the original protection of the Fourth Amendment tied to property.

It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.

[snip]

Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation [expectation of privacy]. At bottom, we must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo, supra, at 34. As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates.

[snip]

What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against un- reasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted. The concurrence does not share that belief. It would apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation of-
privacy test, even when that eliminates rights that previously existed.

Alito’s concurrence, on the other hand, sees four problems with this approach, which boil down to the implications of Scalia’s logic being both too narrow and too broad. The first three are:

  • It would find non-trespassing long-term surveillance okay but short term trespass not (both one and two are versions of this)
  • Given different state property laws (particularly community property under marriage), it would have inconsistent results in different states

Alito’s fourth problem, though, is the key one: Scalia’s approach is not very helpful given how much surveillance is electronic.

Fourth, the Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked. For example, suppose that the officers in the present case had followed respondent by surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system that came with the car when it was purchased.

That said, having made a case that electronic surveillance can be just as inappropriate as physical trespass assisted surveillance, Alito goes onto make problematic squishy distinctions, suggesting our current expectations of privacy with regards to GPS tracking pivot on the length of time the surveillance continues. And he suggests we may be losing our expectation of privacy with respect to that tracking.

For example, when a user activates the GPS on such a phone, a provider is able to monitor the phone’s location and speed of movement and can then report back real-time traffic conditions after combining (“crowdsourcing”)
the speed of all such phones on any particular road.9 Similarly, phone-location-tracking services are offered as “social” tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other new devices will continue to shape the average person’s expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.

Most troubling, Alito suggests that for some “extraordinary offenses,” extended tracking might be okay.

We also need not consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of privacy. In such cases, long-term tracking might have been mounted using previously available techniques.

Both Alito and Scalia (who rightly mocks this carve out) seem unwilling to talk about what might be acceptable in counterterrorism surveillance.

In short, while Scalia crafts a fairly cautious opinion based on private property, Alito crafts one that could easily be chipped away as we all get used to our smart phones.

The two arch-conservative Republicans both defend the Fourth Amendment, though, but it’s unclear they’re read to talk about the big questions before us (and, presumably, before them in the near future). In at least one way, Alito even underestimates what the government is capable of, claiming it cannot

But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.

That’s likely a false assumption, particularly given the storage capacity our government is using to surveil us and the requirements on cell phone companies to store data.

Sotomayor, IMO, is the only one ready to articulate where all this is heading. She makes it clear that she sides with those that see a problem with electronic surveillance too.

I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.

[snip]

I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent“a too permeating police surveillance,”

And in a footnote, makes a broader claim about the current expectation of privacy than Alito makes.

Owners of GPS-equipped cars and smartphones do not contemplate that these devices will be used to enable covert surveillance of their movements.

Ultimately, the other Justices have not tipped their hand where they’ll come down on more generalized issues of cell phone based surveillance. Sotomayor’s opinion actually doesn’t go much further than Scalia claims to when he says they can return to Katz on such issues–but obviously none of the other Republicans joined her opinion. And all those who joined Alito’s opinion seem to be hiding behind the squishy definitions that will allow them to flip flop when the Administration invokes national security.

Update: This is a great post on what Jones means for the Fourth Amendment more generally.

The Home of the Free Got Foreclosed

On Wednesday’s Gitmo anniversary, Jonathan Turley had a WaPo column listing 10 reasons why the US was no longer the “land of the free.” I thoroughly endorse his list:

Assassination of US citizens

Indefinite detention

Arbitrary justice

Warrantless searches

Secret evidence

War crimes (impunity for torture)

Secret court

Immunity from judicial review

Continual monitoring of citizens

Extraordinary renditions

But I do think the list skews (not surprisingly, given that it was a GItmo anniversary piece) to ways the war on terror have circumscribed our civil rights and rule of law generally.

It’s worth noting that the same things have been happening domestically, with at best only a tangential tie to “security.” For example, where Turley describes renditions and indefinite detention, he might as well have included the immigration deportation system, which like the terrorism one operates with a great deal of arbitrariness, but which also rounds up more American citizens. Turley discusses surveillance generally, but we should note that some of that war on terror surveillance–National Security Letters and drones, for example–are being used increasingly in criminal law enforcement. Add in the increasing militarization of the police–some of which came directly from the drug war, some of which has been reapplied generally in the name of national security.

And then there’s the courts. Even putting the defunding of legal aid aside, even putting aside the broad push to force consumers and employees into privatized arbitration rather than courts, even our legal system itself is showing signs of failure. Most spectacularly, that failure shows in efforts to let banks steal homes so as to pass all the losses of the banks’ own failures onto homeowners.

Turley is right that the war on terror has chipped away at fundamental freedoms. But so has increased corporate power and related efforts to coerce the 99%.

It’s not just that Al Qaeda bombed the land of the brave; so, too, did America’s own corporations foreclose on the home of the free.