Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer’s Loaner AUSAs have replied to Jim Comey’s opposition to their demand to a filter protocol to access attorney-client communications with Dan Richman.

Just a reminder, perhaps for their benefit more than yours (because you’re all super smart and can read), a significant part of Comey’s challenge to their rush to get a filter protocol is that any review of this material violated the Fourth Amendment. He argued there were two problems with doing so. First, the warrants were super old, over five years old. And also, because prosecutors charged him with different crimes — 18 USC 1001 and 1505 — than those for which the original warrants were approved.

The Fourth Amendment plainly prohibits the government from doing exactly what it seeks to do here: the Arctic Haze warrants were obtained more than five years ago in a separate and now-closed criminal investigation and authorized the seizure of evidence of separate offenses. Yet the government seeks to turn those warrants into general warrants to continue to rummage through materials belonging to Mr. Comey’s lawyer in an effort to seize evidence of separate alleged crimes. The Court should not authorize the government to conduct an unlawful review.

A. Applicable Law

Courts have repeatedly held that the government must execute search warrants within a reasonable period of time, including with respect to electronic data. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, district courts “retain[] the authority to determine that prolonged retention of nonresponsive data by the government violated the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. ZelayaVeliz, 94 F.4th 321, 338 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).6 That authority derives from application of the general “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” standard. Id. And “[c]ourts have applied this reasonableness standard to suppress evidence when the government delayed unreasonably in sifting through social media warrant returns for relevant evidence.” Id. (citing United States v. Cawthorn, 682 F. Supp. 3d 449, 458–60 (D. Md. 2023)). In Cawthorn, for instance, the district court held that two years was “an ample amount of time to conduct the necessary review” of digital materials, and “[c]ontinued access to search through the data beyond what the Government ha[d] already identified as responsive in its report would be unreasonable.” 682 F. Supp. 3d at 459 n.7. See id. at n.8 (noting that the good faith exception does not apply “where the error was not with the warrant itself but, rather, the government’s execution of that warrant in the context of a search of electronic data”) (citation omitted).

It is similarly well-established that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, when law enforcement personnel obtain a warrant to search for a specific crime but later, for whatever reason, seek to broaden their scope to search for evidence of another crime, a new warrant is required.” United States v. Nasher-Alneam, 399 F. Supp. 3d 579, 592 (S.D. W. Va. 2019) (citing United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 516 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“The scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”) (cleaned up).

“Given the heightened potential for government abuse of stored electronic data, it is imperative that courts ensure that law enforcement scrupulously contain their searches to the scope of the search warrant which permitted the search in the first place. This is especially true where, as here, the illegal search was conducted at the behest of lawyers–the people in the best position to know what was allowed under the law.” Nasher-Alneam, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 595. A reasonable warrant thus “confine[s] the executing officers’ discretion by restricting them from rummaging through [digital] data in search of unrelated criminal activities.” Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th at 337 (citation omitted).

6 Mr. Comey reserves his right to move to suppress these warrants, to the extent the government continues to use them in this manner. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983) (a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment based on agents’ subsequent conduct); DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1985) (“an attorney’s clients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their client files”). Until the government answers the questions the defense has previously raised about these warrants, which to date have remained unanswered and which are detailed at the end of this submission, the defense will not be in a position to file an appropriately targeted suppression motion.

Lindsey’s Loaner AUSAs completely ignore this discussion about the Fourth Amendment, dismissing it with a little wave of their hands. How dare a defendant ask about things like the Fourth Amendment, when we’re trying to get to his texts with his attorney, they ask!

Defendant’s response does not address the underlying premise of a filter protocol. Instead, Defendant first jumps to the underlying search warrants and presumptively declares that the government is conducting an unconstitutional search. This is wrong. The government is not asking to look at the raw returns from prior search warrants. The government is simply asking for a judicially approved filter protocol as to a small and specific subset of evidence that was lawfully obtained consistent with the terms of a federal search warrant.

They excuse doing so because the crimes DOJ investigated from 2017 to 2021 (for which they told investigators in EDVA there was not sufficient evidence to charge either Comey or Dan Richman) are “consistent with” the crime under investigation here, that Comey authorized Richman to share information anonymously (while Richman was still at FBI).

In 2019 and 2020, the government obtained a series of search warrants during an ongoing investigation into violations of 18 U.S.C. §641 (Theft and Conversion of Stolen Government Property) and 18 U.S.C. §793 (Unlawful Gathering or Transmission of National Defense Information). In ways consistent with the current prosecution, the prior government investigation focused in part on the relationship and communication between the Defendant and Daniel Richman (“Richman”). [my emphasis]

That “consistent with” is the only excuse they gave for snooping in these communications in search of evidence for a different crime.

And that’s important because, in an attempt to poo poo Comey’s concern about the investigative team’s access attorney-client communications, they confess that the FBI has been snooping through this material.

The government has proceeded with an abundance of caution in reviewing lawfully obtained evidence from the 2019 and 2020 search warrants. While reviewing evidence that was previously filtered by the Defendant’s attorney, an FBI agent noted that some of the communications appeared to involve an attorney and client. At that time, a prophylactic decision was made to remove the FBI agent from the investigative team and pause any further review of the evidence from the 2019 and 2020 search warrants. This was orally communicated to the investigative team and communicated through written instruction (email) to the lead investigators.

This sequence of events is what the Defendant relies on to assume taint. The presumption is wrong. No members are of the investigative team have been tainted by attorney-client privileged material. However, when undersigned counsel joined the prosecutorial team, a decision was made for the quarantined evidence to remain that way to allow the Court to implement a filter protocol that completely removes any concern. The Defendant questions the government’s ability to safeguard privileged material. But the reality is that the government has proceeded with the utmost caution and respect for privileged material. [my emphasis]

Let’s lay this out in detail:

• “While reviewing evidence that was previously filtered by the Defendant’s attorney:” We have been accessing this material without a new warrant
• “[A]n FBI agent noted that some of the communications appeared to involve an attorney and client:” An FBI Agent we won’t otherwise identify discovered there were attorney-client communications in there
• “[A] prophylactic decision was made to remove the FBI agent from the investigative team:” a decision was made [by the FBI General Counsel, who we will not name] to preserve the general investigation remove this particular agent from this particular investigative team
• “This was orally communicated to the investigative team:” There’s no paper trail of the entire investigative team being told to stop
• “[A]nd communicated through written instruction (email) to the lead investigators:” only the lead investigators (who may include the FBI agent in question) got written notice, meaning everyone else is carrying on as they were
• “[W]hen undersigned counsel joined the prosecutorial team, a decision was made:” We don’t want to put our law licenses on the line, so instead we’re demanding a filter protocol without first getting a warrant

The initial reference to “quarantined evidence” (bolded above) must be in the page of this filing that is redacted. So it’s not clear whether it refers to just “five text threads identified” in Richman’s original privilege log. It doesn’t appear to be refer to the entire vat of materials from Richman, the one still accessible to some group of FBI Agents. And at least from the unredacted section, I see no explanation for what the attorney-client communication is, and whether Richman failed to identify it or whether it somehow escaped from that filter. Further, I see no explanation of whether that attorney-client communication remains accessible to investigators.

What I do know is that, in their bid to accelerate this process, Lindsey’s Loaner AUSAs claimed that Comey, “used current lead defense counsel [Patrick Fitzgerald] to improperly disclose classified information,” insinuating it was a crime for Jim Comey to release unclassified information about Donald Trump’s misconduct to the press. That is, they invoked crime-fraud exception pertaining to communications that — because they post-date the time Dan Richman left the FBI– are completely irrelevant to the charges at issue here, and because they were unclassified, were legal to share (albeit, per DOJ IG, a violation of FBI guidelines).

They insinuated it would be a crime to say true, unclassified things about Donald Trump, parroting the craziest theories of the fever conspiracists.

And that makes me very skeptical that these Loaner AUSAs have quarantined any of the problems at issue here.

Update: Reviewing this made me realize something. Prosecutors first started pressuring Comey for this filter protocol on October 10. They requested it even before providing discovery on October 13 (and attempted to delay discovery on most stuff for a week). Only after that did they confirm to Comey that Dan Richman is the one DOJ had charged him with lying about authorizing to share information 20 days earlier.

For a number of reasons, I’m not as convinced as others that right wing blowhard Mike Davis’ insinuation that a grand jury scheduled to be seated in Fort Pierce, FL, in January would serve the purpose of stitching together all his feverish conspiracy theories into a conspiracy against Trump’s rights case.

What if Mike Davis is telling the truth, for once?

But this post assumes that his comments do reflect inside knowledge.

That is, this post considers the likelihood that someone — Jack Eckenrode would be part of that team, possibly Deputy FBI Director Andrew Bailey, who was installed in September but has been unseen aside from comments on public corruption a few days ago — has a plan to pull together the investigative work done in various places, to present it to a grand jury in Trump’s current residence, under a theory that some group of meanies have been conspiring against Trump for a decade.

For example, the 302 reports of interviews tied to a WDVA investigation, conducted in attorneys’ offices, might be presented in January to the SDFL grand jury.

[A] host of former F.B.I. officials voluntarily sat for interviews, according to people familiar with the matter.

Witnesses in the case were questioned by a combination of civil lawyers — not criminal prosecutors — from the Western District of Virginia, as well as criminal prosecutors from the neighboring Eastern District of Virginia and F.B.I. agents. To reassure witnesses that they were not targets of the investigation, witnesses were allowed to be interviewed at their lawyers’ offices, rather than at government buildings.

The specious referral of John Brennan for lying? Sent to Florida as part of a claim it was a conspiracy to harm poor Donald Trump. Tulsi Gabbard’s inability to distinguish the DNC server from voting machines? Off to Florida, as if it were credible.

And, importantly, whatever material prosecutors obtained by using the frivolous EDVA Jim Comey prosecution as a pretext? Sent to Florida to be presented to a different grand jury in January to support a conspiracy indictment.

The attorney-client breach hints that the risk goes beyond this indictment

The need to assume that something like that is happening (wherever it might be located) is, I think, a better explanation for some of the motions Jim Comey filed than Ben Wittes’ theory that Comey is just stacking up ways to get this indictment dismissed.

It’s certainly possible that when Lindsey Halligan first rolled out one failed and one successful indictment, Comey and Patrick Fitzgerald thought this would be easy to defeat. This particular indictment, obtained by someone playacting as US Attorney, should be.

But almost immediately, the loaner AUSAs started trying to dick around, first trying to buy an extra week on discovery because Comey planned to submit two rounds of pretrial motions, then demanding that Comey have sharply limited access to the discovery.

More alarming still, on October 10, before handing over any discovery, prosecutors started pressuring Comey to adopt a filter protocol so they could access content seized from Dan Richman in 2020. When they submitted a request for such a filter team on October 13, they did not disclose — not publicly, at least — that the primary investigators on the team had already peeked at the privileged material. When they tried to accelerate that request for a filter team on October 19, they falsely claimed that Comey’s decision to share a memo about Donald Trump’s misconduct in 2017 implicated Fitzgerald in leaking classified information: “the defendant used current lead defense counsel to improperly disclose classified information.”

It’s not clear when prosecutors first told Comey that investigators had accessed his attorney-client privileged content, but the first time Comey’s team mentioned it (in redacted form) was in their response to that bid to accelerate the process of a filter team on October 20, almost a month after the indictment. Judge Nachmanoff’s order denying the government’s request to accelerate the process revealed some of what Comey had described under seal (making at least the first Comey filing a judicial record under Fourth Circuit law that someone could petition to liberate).

He also states that the underlying warrants were “obtained by prosecutors in a different district more than five years ago[,] in an investigation that closed without criminal charges[,] and [] authorized the seizure of evidence related to separate offenses that are not charged here.” Id. at 2. And, there is “reason to believe that the two principal FBI investigators may already have been tainted by exposure” to privileged information. Id. at 3.

When prosecutors filed that bid to accelerate getting access to Comey’s privileged communications, when they claimed that Fitzgerald committed a crime by receiving unclassified CYA memos documenting Trump’s misconduct from Comey (hinting that they want to access Comey’s privileged material by invoking a crime-fraud exception), it became clear this prosecution was just one prong of the larger witch hunt. And whenever it was that prosecutors first alerted Comey that they had snooped in his privileged communications, the claim that sharing unclassified memos documenting Trump’s misconduct was criminal was also the first hint that this “spill” was not an accident.

Indeed, the repeated invocation by the loaner prosecutors of Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) to suggest that a waiver of privilege here, in the EDVA case, would not waive privilege somewhere else (which is the opposite of how they’re treating material seized from Dan Richman — they’re treating his successful invocation of privilege five years ago as waiver here)…

Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) (providing that a court may “order that [a] privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court — in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”)

…. May be a confession in the opposite world of Trump’s DOJ that they’ve already gotten access via a claim of crime-fraud exception somewhere else and need a waiver here to introduce it at trial.

Someone helped themselves to this content (possibly with the assistance of a Trump-installed judge), and that someone seems to imagine it was a crime for Jim Comey to reveal Trump’s misconduct in 2017, an act that is not directly implicated in either the existing charges or the no-billed one but would be foundational to the fever dreams of a conspiracy against rights case.

The intersecting investigations

This is probably a good time to review all the investigations Republicans are drawing on here, which I’ve summarized in this table (I’m just including DOJ and DOJ IG investigations; there are also some Congressional investigations that generally were riddled with logical and evidentiary problems).

There are three Senate exchanges with Comey at issue in his prosecution.

First, there’s the questions Chuck Grassley asked on May 3, 2017 that Ted Cruz invoked when he asked the questions at issue in the indictment.

SEN. GRASSLEY: Director Comey, have you ever been an anonymous source in news reports about matters relating to the Trump investigation or the Clinton investigation?

MR. COMEY: Never.

SEN. GRASSLEY: Question two on [sic] relatively related, have you ever authorized someone else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in news reports about the Trump investigation or the Clinton investigation?

MR. COMEY: No.

By context, this was a general question (and as such it could include Item B in the table). Grassley probably imagined it included questions like, Did Comey (or anyone he authorized) leak details of his briefing to Trump about the Steele dossier? Did Comey (or anyone he authorized) leak details on the intercepts capturing Mike Flynn undermining sanctions? Did Comey (or anyone he authorized) leak details about the Clinton investigation, possibly including the Russian disinformation that led him to make the prosecutorial decision on it.

One thing Chuck Grassley’s question could not have referred to were the memos documenting Trump’s misconduct, Item D, because Comey only shared them with Dan Richman after Trump fired Comey on May 9, six days later. Even if Comey did authorize Richman to share them (he did, but the terms on which he did so are likely contested), he had not shared them yet, when he answered this question. Per the IG Report on this topic, Comey shared the memos first with Fitzgerald on May 14, 11 days after Grassley’s question, then shared just one memo with Richman on May 16, two days later, the NYT story on the memo came out that day, May 16.

Then there’s Andrew McCabe’s rebuttal of details about the Clinton Foundation, which was the explicit topic of Ted Cruz’ questions on September 30, 2020 and the alleged lie charged (but miscited) in the indictment.

SEN. CRUZ: On May 3, 2017 in this committee, Chairman Grassley asked you point blank “have you ever been an anonymous source in news reports about matters relating to the Trump investigation or the Clinton investigation?” You responded under oath “never.” He then asked you “have you ever authorized someone else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in news reports about the Trump investigation or the Clinton administration.” You responded again under oath, “no.” Now, as you know, Mr. McCabe, who works for you, has publicly and repeatedly stated that he leaked information to The Wall Street Journal and that you were directly aware of it and that you directly authorized it. Now, what Mr. McCabe is saying and what you testified to this committee cannot both be true; one or the other is false. Who’s telling the truth?

MR. COMEY: I can only speak to my testimony. I stand by what, the testimony you summarized that I gave in May of 2017.

SEN. CRUZ: So, your testimony is you’ve never authorized anyone to leak. And Mr. McCabe when if he says contrary is not telling the truth, is that correct?

MR. COMEY: Again, I’m not going to characterize Andy’s testimony, but mine is the same today. [my emphasis]

A footnote in Comey’s literal truth motion describes the agreed-upon scope of the September 30, 2020 hearing, which included neither the Clinton email nor the Clinton Foundation investigation, so Cruz’ question, to the extent it pertained to McCabe, was fundamentally out of scope for the hearing and therefore could not be claimed to be addressing material to the topics of the hearing.

1 Before the hearing, the committee agreed that it would be limited to four specific topics: (i) “Crossfire Hurricane,” (ii) the December 2019 Department of Justice Inspector General report’s “Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation,” (iii) the Carter Page FISA applications, and (iv) Christopher Steele’s source network and primary sub-source.

If this ever gets to trial there will be about fifty ways to prove that Comey’s answer to this question could not be material to what the Senate imagined it was doing.

But to use Cruz’ poorly worded questions to charge Comey, Halligan applied it to the Dan Richman stuff.

Since Halligan claims this about Hillary (which, again, was not material to the hearing), she must be applying it to Item B, the only one of these items known to include both Richman and Hillary, the SVR memos claiming that Loretta Lynch was helping Democrats deal with the Hillary investigation (and also claiming that Jim Comey was going to make the Hillary investigation right up until election day, which he in fact did).

Even then, there’s a problem for both known stories attributed to Richman. For the earlier one — the one that could be included in the scope of Grassley’s question and which is the most obvious story addressed in the indictment — Richman was not anonymous. Mike Schmidt quoted him three times in that story.

“Jim sees his role as apolitical and independent,” said Daniel C. Richman, a longtime confidant and friend of Mr. Comey’s. “The F.B.I. director, even as he reports to the attorney general, often has to stand apart from his boss.”

[snip]

Confidants like Mr. Richman say he was constrained by circumstance while “navigating waters in which every move has political consequences.”

[snip]

Mr. Richman sees no conflict, but rather “a consistent pattern of someone trying to act with independence and integrity, but within established channels.”

“His approach to the Russia investigation fits this pattern,” he added.

Richman was anonymous in the Comey memo story, but he was also no longer at the FBI when he shared it.

Finally, there’s the question Lindsey Graham asked on September 30, 2020, which was the subject of the failed charge in the no-billed indictment, Item C.

Lindsey: Do you recall getting an inquiry from the CI, excuse me, the intelligence community in September, 2016, about a concern that the Clinton campaign was going to create a scandal regarding Trump and Russia? Mr. Comey: I do not.

Senator Graham: You don’t remember getting a investigatory lead from the intelligence community, hang on a second … Let me find my document here.

Speaker 3: There it is.

Senator Graham: September the Seventh, 2016, the US intelligence officials forwarded an investigative referral to FBI Director James Comey and Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Peter Strzok regarding US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s approval of a plan concerning US presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering US elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server. You don’t remember getting that or being talk, that doesn’t …

Mr. Comey: That doesn’t ring any bells with me.

[snip]

Senator Graham: Did you have a duty to look at any allegations regarding Clinton in Russia?

Mr. Comey: I don’t know what you mean. Senator Graham: Well, you say you had a duty to look at allegations about the Trump campaign being involved with the Russians. You’ve got a letter now from Radcliffe saying that there was a, they intercepted information about an effort in July where Hillary Clinton approved an effort to link Trump to Russia or the mob. Did you have an investigation look and see if whether that was true?

Mr. Comey: I can’t answer that. I’ve read Mr. Radcliffe’s letter, which frankly I have trouble understanding.

This question was based off the redacted version of a CIA memo addressed to, but not provably sent to the FBI, in 2016. The redaction almost certainly hides critical details about the memo to say nothing of details that should have led everyone to realize they were based on an SVR fabrication. As such, Graham’s question asked Comey not about the memo as it would have been perceived if it actually were received by FBI in 2016 (something John Durham was never able to prove), but a memo that Kash Patel retconned after the fact. Even if FBI did receive the memo, Comey would not recognize it as Graham described it.

This, along with Comey’s decision to share his CYA memos, which led to the appointment of Robert Mueller as Special Counsel, are the crown jewels of the fevered conspiracy against rights conspiracy theory.

Right wingers claim to believe that the FBI had reason to know that Hillary wanted to frame Donald Trump in 2016, and so when “she” shared information with the FBI — the Steele dossier and the Alfa Bank anomalies, though Hillary didn’t share the Steele dossier and affirmatively did not authorize sharing the Alfa Bank anomalies — the FBI should not have investigated them (which, in the case of Alfa Bank, they barely did, because they assumed Hillary was trying to frame Trump!). Right wingers claim to believe that the Steele dossier was central to the investigation of Donald Trump and the claim that Russia wanted to help Trump get elected. And they claim to believe Comey broke the law by sharing his own CYA memo of Trump. None of that is true. But that’s now become an object of faith in the cult of Donald Trump. And that’s why this investigation into Comey is critical to any investigation going on somewhere else.

Lindsey Halligan did not, overtly, charge either one of those things — the inaccurately redacted reference to an SVR fabricated memo alleging a Clinton Plan or Richman’s anonymous sharing of the Comey memos with Mike Schmidt. But that is why the vague language in Count Two of the existing indictment — and the loaner AUSAs’ claim that sharing the memo was a crime — is such a problem.

On or about September 30,2020, in the Eastern District ofVirginia, the defendant, JAMES B. COMEY JR. did corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which an investigation was being had before the Senate Judiciary Committee by making false and misleading statements before that committee.

Halligan couldn’t get the jury to indict Comey for the Lindsey Graham question. But the Lindsey Graham question was material to the topic of the hearing, and central to the fever dream. So it’s possible she used the charged alleged lie about Andy McCabe that Halligan is already overtly applying to Dan Richman as a way to get the grand jury to approve an obstruction case that would feed the fever dream.

That is, referring back to my table above, it’s likely Halligan used an out-of-scope question about Item A to charge Item B so as to create a prosecution for Items C and D.

Comey’s motions are necessary to this case, but also serve to stave off more

All that makes clear why two of the motions Comey filed Thursday are necessary. One — a motion to dismiss based on literal truth — arises from the shoddiness of the questions Ted Cruz asked; it was the only one that Fitzgerald mentioned at the arraignment.

The two others — one asking to obtain grand jury transcripts and another asking for a Bill of Particulars — are necessary to pin down whether the charged lie (which by description should be Item B on the table, even though Richman was not anonymous in the story in question) are actually what she got a grand jury to indict, whether that is the basis for the obstruction charge, and whether what Halligan said in the grand jury matches what the loaner AUSAs (who took several days before they’d even tell Comey who the people referred to in the indictment were) imagine they’ll present to a jury at trial.

Here’s how Comey describes the possibility of head fakes at trial in the Bill of Particulars motion.

Count Two charges Mr. Comey with “making false and misleading statements” at a four-hour hearing in which he was questioned on topics ranging from the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation, to the investigation into Hillary Clinton’s alleged mishandling of classified information, to white supremacist activities in the United States. Under the indictment as written, the government could wait until trial to specifically allege that any one, or several, of Mr. Comey’s statements over a four-hour hearing forms the basis for its prosecution. The government could also wait until trial to select any topic of investigation covered at the hearing as the one Mr. Comey allegedly endeavored to obstruct, and unfairly surprise Mr. Comey.

And here’s how he raised it in his bid to get grand jury transcripts.

Disclosure of the grand jury materials is also required to ensure that the government does not seek to try Mr. Comey for alleged false or misleading statements that differ from those on which the grand jury was asked to indict. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962).

But there’s also the possibility that to pull off this trick — using an out-of-scope question about Item A to charge Item B — Halligan relied on privileged content.

When DOJ investigated Richman from 2019 to 2021 as the source for Mike Schmidt, they never found proof that Comey authorized him to share that information, details of the SVR content making false claims about the investigation into Hillary Clinton. But when DOJ IG investigated Comey in 2019 about his memos, he told them that he authorized Richman to share the memo about Trump.

May 14, 2017

Comey sends scanned copies of Memos 2, 4, 6, and 7 from his personal email account to the personal email account of one of his attorneys, Patrick Fitzgerald. Before sending, Comey redacts the second paragraph from Memo 7 involving foreign affairs because Comey deems it irrelevant. On May 17 Fitzgerald forwards these four Memos to Comey’s other attorneys, David Kelley and Richman.

May 16, 2017

Comey sends a digital photograph of Memo 4 (describing the meeting in which Comey wrote that President Trump made the statement about “letting Flynn go”) to Richman via text message from Comey’s personal phone. Comey asks Richman to share the contents, but not the Memo itself, with a specific reporter for The New York Times. Comey’s stated purpose is to cause the appointment of a Special Counsel to ensure that any tape recordings that may exist of his conversations with President Trump are not destroyed. Richman conveys the substance of Memo 4 to the reporter. The New York Times publishes an article entitled “Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation.”

So there are communications between Comey and Richman (and possibly Fitzgerald) from May 2017 authorizing him to share information with Mike Schmidt. They’re almost certainly in the batch of stuff Richman said was privileged in 2020.

And that’s the kind of thing that might lead a grand jury to believe that Comey authorized Richman’s earlier conversations with Schmidt. Neither would match the details of Cruz’ question. Richman was still at the FBI when he was the source for Item B, but not anonymous. Richman was anonymous when he was the source for Item D, but he was no longer at the FBI (in any case, Comey notes in his literal truth motion that Richman “was a Special Government Employee living fulltime in New York”). But you could see how grand jurors might get that confused. Or, you could see how someone already breaking every rule of legal ethics would wildly conflate all of that.

And that’s part of what Comey is pursuing with his bid to obtain the grand jury transcripts: he suggests that Special Agent Miles Starr may have accessed attorney-client information before presenting to the grand jury.

[T]he agent who served as a witness in the proceedings may have been exposed to Mr. Comey’s privileged communications with his attorneys and thus may have conveyed that information to the grand jury.

Redacted passages describe that that same day he likely presented to the grand jury, FBI Agent Miles Starr, “alerted the FBI Office of the General Counsel” something redacted “involving Mr. Comey and his attorneys,” which suggests — Comey argues — that Starr was apparently aware “of his potential exposure to privileged material” when serving “as a witness presenting evidence to the grand jury in this case.”  Which, in turn, supports Comey’s hypothesis that Starr used privileged information to get the indictment.

Third, the record suggests that an FBI agent who testified before the grand jury was potentially tainted by privileged communications between Mr. Comey and his attorneys, one of whom was likely Mr. Richman, yet the agent still proceeded to testify in front of the grand jury. There is thus a serious concern that the grand jury may have improperly relied on privileged information.

[snip]

That information apparently related to certain attorneys for Mr. Comey, including Mr. Richman. See id. Nevertheless, the agent testified before the grand jury that same day, and given the content of the resulting indictment, it is clear that his testimony must have referenced Mr. Comey’s interactions and communications with Mr. Richman. This created a high risk that privileged information was presented to the grand jury by a tainted case agent.

If that were true — if Starr relied on information obtained without a warrant specific to the crimes under investigation — then Comey would have a Fourth Amendment challenge to the entire thing.

Fighting a battle in December to win a fight in October

Comey has a clear need for more clarity about whether they’re going to pull a headfake. But one reason I suspect this is not the only reason to seek that clarity has to do with timing.

Consider this comment in his request for grand jury materials, which argues he needs the grand jury materials to adjudicate his vindictive prosecution motion (just a page and a half of which asks for discovery).

For similar reasons, disclosure of the grand jury materials is reasonably calculated to provide additional support for Mr. Comey’s argument that he would not have been prosecuted but for President Trump’s animus toward Mr. Comey, including because of his protected speech. See generally Mot. to Dismiss Indictment Based on Vindictive & Selective Prosecution, ECF No. 59. Objective evidence establishes that the President harbors such animus—he has spent the last eight years publicly attacking Mr. Comey’s speech and character and calling for Mr. Comey to be prosecuted. See id. at 4-8. The record also shows that President Trump “prevailed upon [Ms. Halligan] to bring the charges . . . such that [she] could be considered a ‘stalking horse.’” See id. at 21-22 (citing United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 2000)). In turn, the government’s manipulation of the prosecutorial process, including its repudiation of the views of every career prosecutor who assessed the case, makes clear that Mr. Comey would not have been prosecuted but for President Trump’s animus. Id. at 22-26.

Although dismissal of the indictment is warranted on the record as it stands, disclosure of the grand jury materials would bolster Mr. Comey’s arguments. Having served as his personal attorney and as a White House Official, Ms. Halligan has a close, longstanding relationship with President Trump. Id. at 11-12. And even though Ms. Halligan lacks prosecutorial experience, President Trump appointed her for the specific purpose of bringing this prosecution against Mr. Comey and other perceived political opponents. Id. at 23-24. Accordingly, there is a substantial risk that during her presentation to the grand jury, Ms. Halligan made statements that would support Mr. Comey’s motion to dismiss. Such “irregularities in the grand jury proceedings” would “create a basis for dismissal of the indictment” and thus warrant disclosure of the grand jury materials. Nguyen, 314 F. Supp. at 616 (citations omitted).

According to the current schedule, the hearing on this motion will be November 19. The request for grand jury transcripts won’t be fully briefed until one day later, and the hearing for it will take place after a Thankgiving break, on December 9.

This case could be — is likely to be, at least based on a disqualification of Lindsey Halligan — over by December 9.

Similarly, Comey asks for a Bill of Particulars to help wade through both the discovery he got and the stuff he did not get.

The discovery produced to date does not “fairly apprise [Mr. Comey] of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare a defense and avoid surprise at trial.” Sampson, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (cleaned up). The government produced voluminous discovery that includes some, but not all, documents from multiple different FBI investigations involving multiple districts.

[snip]

A bill of particulars can also be necessary to allow the defendant to request materials under, and the court to monitor the government’s compliance with, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. See United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that the scope of the government’s Brady obligations could be determined “once it has provided the bill of particulars”).

[snip]

Accordingly, without knowing whether, and how, Mr. Richman allegedly acted as an anonymous source, Mr. Comey cannot ascertain whether the government has fulfilled its obligations under Brady. See Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 26. For example, if the government contends that Mr. Richman acted as an anonymous source in the articles that were the subject of the “Arctic Haze” investigation, the defense would request that entire investigative file (which has not been produced), as well as information about all other individuals the government identified as possible sources of information (which has also not been produced). 5 Such materials would enable the defense to demonstrate—as government investigators previously found, see Mot. to Dismiss Indictment Based on Vindictive & Selective Prosecution, ECF No. 59 at 9-10—that there was insufficient evidence to believe that Mr. Richman was the source of that information. By contrast, if instead the government contends that Mr. Richman was authorized to act as a source in a different article, the defense could tailor both its Brady requests and trial defense accordingly. The defense should not be required to dig through tens of thousands of pages of incomplete discovery to guess at what it is defending against—only to be sandbagged by the government at trial.

Comey’s point about the Arctic Haze investigation is of particular note, given that DOJ chose only to pursue potential sources who would protect Comey, not those who would not, and Richman claimed that Mike Schmidt, who wrote that article with several other journalists, already knew a bunch about the SVR documents before asking him about it.

After discussing the status of investigative leads and resources available with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Department of Justice’s National Security Division (DOJ NSD), the FBI investigative team was directed to interview only those officials who might have had a motive to protect Comey. Therefore, the FBI only interviewed eight of these officials who consisted mainly of former FBI officials.

Given a delay in Fitzgerald getting clearance, a Bill of Particulars might help him make the case to unseal classified information he won’t delay until that time. But any Brady violations discovered after getting one, if this motion succeeds, would also come after this case might be over.

But what these filings may do — especially the grand jury one — is affect several things going on, starting this week.

As noted, Judge Cameron McGowen Currie has ordered the government to give her the transcripts from both grand juries by tomorrow.

The undersigned has been appointed to hear this motion and finds it necessary to determine the extent of the indictment signer’s involvement in the gra.nd jury proceedings. Accordingly, the Government is directed to submit, no later than Monday, November 3, 2025, at 5:00 pm, for in camera review, all documents relating to the indictment signer’s participation in the grand jury proceedings, along with complete grand jury transcripts.

It’s genuinely unclear why she needs them, but it’s possible that by laying out Comey’s concern about privileged material in the grand jury, that will affect Judge Currie’s review.

Comey noted that Currie had already asked for these transcripts (which Nachmanoff surely noticed, since she did so in his docket).

Indeed, Judge Currie has already ordered the government to produce for in camera review “all documents relating to the indictment signer’s participation in the grand jury proceedings, along with complete grand jury transcripts.” ECF No. 95. Mr. Comey has argued that if Ms. Halligan alone secured and signed the indictment, dismissal would be required because she was unlawfully appointed.

Comey will not prevail on his motion for the grand jury transcripts until after the vindictive prosecution motion is briefed. But there’s nothing to stop Nachmanoff from making the same request that Currie did, to receive the transcripts for in chambers review. Similarly, there’s nothing to prevent William Fitzpatrick, the Magistrate Judge who’ll hold a hearing on the privilege question this Wednesday, to do the same.

But there’s one other way to think about this. If this prosecution continues as scheduled (as noted, Comey just asked for a delay in the CIPA schedule until Fitzgerald is cleared, which makes that a very big if), then the trial would happen — to much media attention — one week before this grand jury is seated in January.

Prosecutors are currently trying to preserve asymmetry in knowledge, withholding parts of these investigative files and remaining coy about how they snuck a peek in his privileged communications.

But on top of the necessary information these motions would give him to prepare for trial, they also erode that asymmetry, in ways that may help defeat not just this prosecution, but the larger fever dream one.

Relevant links

DOJ IG Investigation into McCabe

DOJ IG Investigation into Hillary’s email and Classified Annex

DOJ IG Investigation into Comey’s Memos

Durham Report and Classified Annex

Redacted memo about “Clinton Plan”

Arctic Haze Investigation Documents

NYT, April 22, 2017: Comey Tried to Shield the F.B.I. From Politics. Then He Shaped an Election.

NYT, May 2016: Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation

Timeline

September 25: Indictment

September 29: Guidance from FBI OGC regarding those exposed to tainted information

October 8: Arraignment; Comey signs but government does not return discovery order

October 13: Government moves for a filter protocol

October 15: Government first informs Comey the false statements charge is about Dan Richman and Hillary Clinton

October 19: Request to accelerate privilege review

October 20:

• Motion to disqualify Lindsey Halligan
• Motion to dismiss for selective and vindictive prosecution
• Response to request to accelerate
• Order denying request to accelerate privilege review

October 27:

• Response to motion for filter protocol
• Fitzgerald gets a provisional clearance

October 28: Judge Cameron McGowan Currie orders prosecutors to submit: “all documents relating to the indictment signer’s participation in the grand jury proceedings, along with complete grand jury transcripts”

October 29:

• Judge Nachmanoff orders Magistrate Judge William Fitzpatrick to preside over filter review questions
• Classified material delivered to SCIF; Fitzgerald can access just one-third of material

October 30:

• Motion for Bill of Particulars
• Motion for disclosure of Grand Jury Proceedings
• Motion to dismiss for literal truth

November 2: Reply to motion for filter protocol

November 3:

• Responses to first motions due
• Grand jury transcripts due to Judge Currie

November 5: Filter review hearing before Magistrate Judge Fitzpatrick

November 10: Reply to first motions due

November 13:

• Responses to second motions due
• Motion hearing on motion to disqualify

November 19: Motions hearing for first motions

November 20: Reply to second motions due

December 4: Fitzgerald to be fully cleared, permitting his first full review of classified evidence

December 9: Motion hearing for second motions

December 18: Proposed new CIPA deadline

January 5: Jury trial

January 12: Fort Pierce grand jury convenes

Listen on spotify (transcripts available)

Listen on Apple (transcripts available)

I was disappointed, in the way we here in the peanut gallery sometimes are, that Tish James had to specifically rebut the silly things that Lindsey Halligan’s loaner AUSA, Roger Keller, claimed to try to excuse Lindsey’s stalking of Anna Bower.

Attorney General James’ original request asked Judge Jamal Walker to order the government to do three things:

1. Abstain from further extrajudicial statements like Lindsey’s Signal stalking of Bower
2. Follow rules and laws requiring prosecutors (and Federal employees generally) to retain their communications
3. Create and maintain a log of all contact between any government attorney or agent on this case and any member of the news media

As Lawfare’s excellent trial dispatch from Molly Roberts described, when initially presented with this question, loaner AUSA Keller — “a civil litigation lawyer by training,” Roberts helpfully noted — got hung up on a contact log tracking not just with the reporters Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer spoke to, but also with whom others (this is implicit, but let me make it more obvious) like Eagle Ed Martin did.

Keller responded to this request, that prosecutors follow the rules, by demanding that the defense follow the same rules … which is not how it works, both Abbe Lowell and Judge Walker reportedly responded.

The next motion invites a bit more controversy, or at least confusion. James also filed a motion prior to the arraignment asking the court to order the government to follow rules preventing disclosure of investigative and case materials, as well as to refrain from extrajudicial statements concerning the case to the press and public. This motion was prompted in part by an Oct. 20 article published inLawfare by my colleague, Senior Editor Anna Bower, detailing texts sent to her by Halligan in which Halligan criticizes Bower’s tweets about New York Times coverage of grand jury testimony in the case.

This violated, the filing says, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It argues that the exchange with Bower and the other instances of apparent disclosure it describes—including pre-indictment reports that prosecutors intended to bring charges—also violate various rules, regulations, and ethical obligations. The motion doesn’t ask for a finding to that effect, only for an order to prevent such conduct in the future.

The judge, mentioning only “a journalist” and “an article published,” notes these oddities of the filing. Anyone hoping for a television-ready showdown in which the defense demands the prosecution be held in contempt is quickly disappointed: Judge Walker has interpreted the filing correctly, confirms Lowell.

The judge determines that leaves the prosecution three options: oppose the motion in its entirety; don’t oppose it at all; or oppose the proposed relief. The Eastern District prosecutors would have to preserve all documents relevant to the trial (a litigation hold) as well as create a log of all contact between its attorneys or agents and the media. The litigation hold doesn’t bother Keller. But he expresses reservations about the log, mentioning that “the defendant is also active on the Internet.” Specifically, he takes issue with her tweeting that she is innocent.

The judge, understandably, appears perplexed. He remarks that it’s unclear what Keller is asking. And it is: A public tweet from James in which she says “I am not fearful, I am fearless” has little to do with contact between her attorneys and the media. The misunderstanding only becomes greater when Keller elaborates that any log requirement for the government should also be a requirement for the defendant, and should cover “statements of innocence before the press.”

Does he mean that James should have to keep a record of any proclamations of her intention to fight the charges against her? Or does he mean she shouldn’t be allowed to make them at all?

Keller seems to be suggesting that the restrictions on the defendant’s public speech should mirror those placed on the prosecution. But this is not how these things work. Prosecutors have unique obligations not placed on defendants, who have First Amendment rights to protest their innocence.

Judge Walker delicately instructs Keller—a civil litigation lawyer by training, as it turns out—to take some time to think about the matter and get back to him. Lowell, for his part, declares that the rules to which government lawyers are held aren’t the same ones that apply to a defendant.

“The court certainly understands the requirements,” responds the judge. It is a little less certain that the prosecutor does. [my emphasis]

Now, when I first read Roberts’ dispatch, I honestly thought Keller’s confusion stemmed from that detail, “a civil litigation lawyer by training.” He just doesn’t know what he’s doing.

But when I started writing an abandoned post on his response, I came to believe he — like Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer — is mostly performing for a one man audience. To understand why I think that, check out how loaner AUSA Keller spends a 17¶¶ response:

1. Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer and loaner AUSA Keller ask that Walker not impose unilateral requirements to preserve all communications and keep a log [my emphasis]
2. Background: a grand jury indicted the Defendant
3. Walker should not impose unilateral requirements to preserve all communications and keep a log and also, US v. Trump! (citing the DC Circuit opinion partly upholding the gag on Trump), because Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer had to protect her client [my emphasis]
4. Here’s a citation that’s totally inapt but which will allow me to argue Tish James has to shut her yap
5. If the government has to “preserve all communications with any media person” and also keep a log of those contacts, “the unstated threat that she – at some future point in time – may engage in a ‘gotcha’ game where she brings a sanctions motion” may “chill all Government/media interaction” [my bold, italics original]
6. “There is no Court-imposed requirement that the Government preserves the records,” but can you imagine if a log of all communications means “all communications”?
7. If we have to follow the rules, Tish James has to follow rules for prosecutors too (citing US v Trump again)
8. “Defendant’s right to a fair trial does not give [her] the right to insist upon the opposite of that right – that is a trial prejudiced in [her] favor,” citing US v. Trump again
9. Because she’s a lawyer, Attorney General James has to adhere to NY rules of professional conduct even if Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer refuses to adhere to any rules of professional conduct
10. After her arraignment, James said she “will not bow” and there have to be rules against that!
11. Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer covertly bullying a journalist on disappearing messages is nowhere near as bad as Tish James saying “I will not bow” on a telly that Donald Trump can see!
12. Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer was just protecting her client — which client I will decline to name — “from substantial undue prejudice”
13. Grand jury secrecy is no big deal
14. Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer didn’t explicitly reveal what went on in the grand jury
15. Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer was merely — and heroically — “protect[ing] her client from unfair prejudice resulting from reporting half-truths”
16. I’m going to distract from the way Bower caught Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer pretending “thousand(s)” of dollars was not just two thousand
17. You should tell Tish to shut her yap!

I admit, the first time I read this filing, I read in terms of obvious bullshit to rebut, like I imagine lawyers do.

But when you lay it out like this, paragraph by paragraph, the pressing question becomes whether these people — not just Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer, Donald Trump’s defense attorney, but also loaner AUSA Keller — think Donald Trump, and not the US of A, are their client, a client demanding that his minions ensure that Tish James doesn’t become a rock star because of this prosecution.

Because otherwise, why demand that Tish James bow down? Why cite US v. Trump so prominently?

James addressed both these questions. She asked, Who exactly do these people think their client is?

Third, the government’s assertion that Ms. Halligan was only trying to protect “her client” raises the question of who she believes “her client” to be. Her “client” is neither the President, nor the Attorney General, nor the Administration, nor even her Office. It is the United States, as the case caption makes clear, and “[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”2 The point remains true regardless of whether the outcome is the one that the government favors. “Justice is done” when its “citizens in the courts” receive a fair trial. And in any event, a defendant’s fair trial rights decidedly trump any so-called “unfair prejudice” to the government’s case from public reporting. Courts have held that extrajudicial statements and comments by attorneys may be restricted to protect a defendant’s fair trial rights and the integrity of judicial proceedings—which override any desire by government prosecutors to “attempt to protect [Ms. Halligan’s] client from unfair prejudice.” Opp. at 6. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991).

2 DOJ, Remarks as Delivered by Attorney General Merrick B. Garland, https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-deliversremarks-office-access-justices-gideon (Mar. 17, 2023).

The insistence that “fair trial rights decidedly trump any so-called ‘unfair prejudice’” is, I hope, an intentional double entendre.

James’ citation for the quote, “[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts,” is more subtle. The footnote cites this speech by Merrick Garland, a tribute to public defenders and defense attorneys generally, in which he emphasized the import of rule of law.

It reaffirmed that the law protects all of us – the poor as well as the rich, the powerless as well as the powerful.

In so doing, it reaffirmed this country’s commitment to the Rule of Law.

And trust in the Rule of Law is what holds American democracy together.

But the words, “[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts,” are not Garland’s words (though that was not the only speech where he used them). They were spoken by Willliam Taft’s Solicitor General, Frederick Lehmann, and they are inscribed on the building at DOJ. Judge Walker (a former AUSA) will presumably recognize that; Keller the loaner AUSA should: but Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer may see only a citation to Garland and worry about her boss — her client — again.

Then there’s James’s treatment of Keller the loaner AUSA’s inapt reliance on US v. Trump. She uses that to recall Trump’s misconduct as a defendant, something she knows well.

The government’s reliance on United States v. Trump, 88 F.4th 990 (D.C. Cir. 2023)—a case affirming a limited gag order placed on then-defendant Donald Trump in response to his public statements threatening witnesses, participants, and the judiciary during litigation—to defend Ms. Halligan’s interactions with the reporter is entirely misguided. Opp. at 3–4. Trump is relevant only to the extent that it proves the relative strength of a criminal defendant’s First Amendment rights and the extraordinary circumstances required to justify any burden on such rights. See id. (“[A] criminal defendant—who is presumed to be innocent—may very well have a greater constitutional claim than other trial participants to criticize and speak out against the prosecution and the criminal trial process that seek to take away his liberty.”). The Trump court set out facts justifying the order in vigorous detail, including a timeline of President Trump’s extensive attacks on witnesses, court officials, judges, law clerks, and other government personnel. See id. at 1010. It also catalogued the violent and threatening responses resulting from President Trump’s statements. See id. at 1011.

Even under those extraordinary circumstances, the court still found that “Mr. Trump [was] free to make statements criticizing the current administration, the Department of Justice, and the Special Counsel, as well as statements that this prosecution is politically motivated or that he [was] innocent of the charges against him.” Id. at 1028. Attorney General James’ speech, including following her initial appearance, cannot be reasonably compared to the statements that led to the United States v. Trump gag order, and regardless, would have been outside of its reach.

And James invoked Trump’s “almost weekly … disparaging comments against her” to suggest the government won’t win a war of the lesser wrong.

The comparison that the government now offers is to a public statement by a defendant who has faced almost weekly assertions by the President, or those carrying out his bidding, calling for her prosecution and conviction or making other disparaging comments against her. The government’s argument appears to be that “two wrongs don’t make a right.” But the defendant has not contravened the cited rules; the government has. The relief requested in the Motion is intended only to ensure that does not happen again and that, if it does, the government does not delete the evidence of its wrongdoing. That relief should be unobjectionable to the government.

The James prosecution is not functionally necessary for Donald Trump’s witch hunt — it is discrete punishment for someone who humiliated Donald Trump by treating him as a garden variety fraudster. That may be why Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer only got one loaner AUSA for this case, as compared to two overt ones for the Comey case (plus at least one more guy writing the filings), which is one part of the larger project. So maybe this is all about the posturing, an attempt to ensure that nothing about this prosecution backfires on the “client.”

But the focus on Trump — the need to respond to the totally inapt reliance on US v. Tump — distracted from something potentially more important.

Go back to bullet 5 again. Here’s that full quote:

Essentially, Defendant attempts to chill all Government/media interaction with the unstated threat that she – at some future point in time – may engage in a “gotcha” game where she brings a sanctions motion because the Government inadvertently failed to maintain a document or include a contact in its log.

This is an astonishing statement, one James addresses this way:

The opposition’s hyperbolic claim that the Motion seeks something like a gag order, Opp. at 3, fares no better. Government counsel and their agents have an ongoing obligation to refrain from certain types of extrajudicial statements and disclosures that may jeopardize a fair trial in this case. James Mot. at Sec. I. The defense is not asking the Court to “chill” all the government’s interaction with the media; it concedes that many statements that “a reasonable person would expect to be further disseminated by any means of public communications” are permissible.1 James Mot. at 9 (quoting Loc. Crim. R. 57.1(C)). Rather, the defense is seeking the Court’s assistance in assuring that the government adheres to the rules it has set for itself.

1 Another red herring, based on nothing in the Motion, is the government’s suggestion that Attorney General James is “attempt[ing] to chill all Government/media interaction” to later play “a ‘gotcha’ game” over the government’s failure to maintain a document or include a contact in its log. Opp. at 3. Following long-standing rules on extrajudicial statements is not “gotcha,” it is basic to the government’s obligation to protect fair trials.

These are prosecutors, wailing about being asked to retain documents! The government complains about being asked to preserve documents five times, plus the requirement that it maintain documents in its chill comment. And loaner AUSA Keller makes those complaints after having agreed to a litigation hold at the arraignment, something James notes in the first paragraph.

[A]s government counsel acknowledged at the October 24, 2025, initial appearance and arraignment, the government agreed to comply with the litigation hold request made in the Motion to prevent any further deletions and to preserve any other extrajudicial communications that may have been made.

Loaner AUSA Keller outright states that it would “chill” … something if prosecutors are asked to retain all their documents, something that normal prosecutors do as a matter of course, at least until a matter is concluded. This is like Trump demanding that he get to wipe every phone involved in this prosecution on a daily basis, after spending years misrepresenting what happened after Mueller team members left that team.

It’s not a “gotcha” if, as a prosecutor, you start deleting documents willy nilly. It is a real violation. It should be. Especially in a case like this one where the President accidentally issues orders on his social media site intended to be private. Is there a whole stash of Truth Social DMs about this case that have been deleted?

So I get the point of replying to the issues loaner AUSA Keller raised, including the inapt nod to the indignities that Donald Trump suffered after he got indicted and then threatened to kill witnesses (including the witness he almost got killed on January 6).

But that repeated complaint about merely retaining all your communications, particularly coming after already orally agreeing to do so, has me wondering if something much bigger than Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer’s stalking problem is going on.

Update: Judge Walker has issued the litigation hold but not required prosecutors to log their contact with journalists. He even extended his admonition on complying with Local Rules to James’ legal team as well as prosecutors.

The Court also ORDERS all counsel to comply with Local Rule 57.1, whichprohibits any “lawyer, law firm, or law enforcement personnel associated with the prosecution or defense” from making or authorizing4 certain extrajudicial statements, including offering “[a]ny opinion as to the accused’s guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case,” subject to their professional obligations. E.D. Va. Crim. R. 57.1(C)(6). Any “lawyer who is participating . . . in the . . . litigation of [this] matter” may also have an ethical duty to refrain from making extrajudicial statements that pose a risk of prejudicing the proceeding. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6 (2023).5

The footnotes to this passage decline to extend the local rules to Tish James herself, but does extend them to anything her attorneys advise her to say.

3 In its opposition to the motion, the government argues that the alleged statements regarding the grand jury proceedings do not “rise to the same level” as the defendant’s public statements proclaiming her innocence. ECF No. 30 at 5. The Court does not believe a comparison of the defendant’s public statements and the government’s interactions with the media does much to resolve any question presented here.

4 The parties do not discuss this point in their briefing, but the Court observes that the Local Rules’ prohibition on ‘authorizing’ extrajudicial statements would appear to apply to public statements a defendant might make with the advice of counsel—though Rule 57.1 binds only the lawyer, not the defendant.

5 The government argues that the defendant herself is subject to certain restrictions on her communication with the media because she is a “lawyer.” ECF No. 30 at 4 (quoting E.D. Va. Crim. R. 57.1(C)). But the Court finds that “lawyer” within the meaning of the Local Rules refers to a person practicing law in this district, not to any individual with a juris doctor degree or a bar license. Accordingly, this Order does not extend to the defendant’s speech as a defendant. But see supra n.2.

And he cites US v. Trump back at loaner AUSA Keller (making several copy and paste errors in the process) for the principle that defendants have more right to speak than the attorneys on the case.

At this stage of the litigation, the Court does not find that a restriction on the defendant’s own speech is necessary to ensure a fair trial for both sides. The Court certainly has the power to “control the speech and conduct even of defendants in criminal trials when necessary to protect the criminal justice process,” United States v. Trump, 88 F.4th 990, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. 539, 553–54 (1976)). But so far, the government has not demonstrated that the defendant’s speech has risen to the level that it must be dampened in spite of her First Amendment rights in order to preserve a just legal process. See id. at 1008 (recognizing that “a criminal defendant—who is presumed to be innocent—may very well have a greater constitutional claim than other trial participants to criticize and speak out against [t]he prosecution and the [criminal] trial process . . . .”).

One of the funniest part of Judge Walker’s opinion his how he refers to Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer’s unlawful role.

The motion criticizes alleged communications between a government attorney1and a member of the media via the encrypted messaging app Signal.

1 The status of the government attorney who made the alleged statements is the subject of a motion pending before the Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie. ECF No. 22. Thus, the Court will avoid referencing the role of the attorney in this case. Additionally, this Court generally does not refer to government attorneys by name. It will not depart from that practice here

I think the dispute between Lindsey Halligan’s loaner AUSAs and Jim Comey is a fight that has ramifications for Trump’s larger attempt to use DOJ to punish his enemies.

According to court filings, investigators from the case got access to Comey’s attorney-client information, possibly on September 25, the day Halligan obtained the indictment. Before they had given Comey a shred of discovery, they sent him a draft filter protocol on October 10. Then on October 13 — still before they had handed over discovery, which appears to have revealed they got no new warrant to access this old material — the loaner AUSAs asked Judge Nachmanoff to approve a filter protocol that would give the government the first chance to make privilege determinations. Abiding by local rules, Comey didn’t respond right away, leading prosecutors (on October 20) to ask the judge to hasten his consideration of the matter, even while accusing Patrick Fitzgerald of being part of a “leak” behind sharing unclassified information under Dan Richman’s name. Which is one of the things Comey patiently explained that same day: the loaner AUSAs were defaming Fitzgerald. After Nachmanoff denied the prosecutors’ bid to rush the issue, Comey laid out all the problems with this bid to get access to his privileged communications on Monday (which I wrote about here).

Among other things, he noted that prosecutors don’t appear to have gotten a warrant to review this material for this alleged crime — they’re still relying on warrants obtained in 2020 to investigate a leak of classified information.

Comey requested that, before he had to suppress this material, Judge Nachmanoff first require prosecutors to answer a bunch of questions, such as who already accessed the material and under what authority.

Nachmanoff didn’t do that.

Instead, he ordered Magistrate Judge William Fitzpatrick to deal with it; Fitzpatrick, in turn, set a hearing for next Friday.

At one level, that looks like a punt.

But in effect, it makes it exceedingly unlikely that prosecutors will get their filter protocol.

Nachmanoff cited a relevant precedent for this, in which lawyers (including Roger Stone prosecutor, Aaron Zelinsky and Joe Biden Special Counsel Robert Hur, because this year of my life necessarily requires revisiting every fucking case I’ve ever covered before) tried to do the filter review for a law firm, only to have the Fourth Circuit remand it for a magistrate judge do it.

This Court assesses the appropriate contours of a privilege filter protocol according to the guidelines set forth in In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Oct. 31, 2019). In In re Search Warrant, a Baltimore law firm challenged the government’s use of a Department of Justice filter team to inspect attorney-client privileged materials seized from that firm. Id. at 164. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the law firm’s motion to enjoin the filter team’s review of the seized material. Relevant to this case, the Fourth Circuit held that “a court is not entitled to delegate its judicial power and related functions to the executive branch, especially when the executive branch is an interested party in the pending dispute.” Id. at 176. The Fourth Circuit observed that, “[i]n addition to the separation of powers issues” that might arise, allowing members of the executive to conduct the filter, even if those members were trained lawyers, raised the possibility that “errors in privilege determinations” would result in “transmitting seized material to an investigation or prosecution team.” Id. at 177. It thus determined that the filter protocol “improperly delegated judicial functions to the Filter Team,” and that instead, “the magistrate judge (or an appointed special master) — rather than the Filter Team — must perform the privilege review of the seized materials[.]” Id. at 178, 181 (collecting cases).

Prosecutors had argued (in what might be their only reference to this, a directly relevant precedent) that informing Comey at the start mitigated the risk at the heart of the earlier case.

Further, the Proposed Protocol creates a process by which the putative privilege holders remain engaged and may assert a privilege over PPM, with any remaining disputes to be resolved by the Court. Indeed, the Proposed Protocol requires authorization from the potential privilege holder(s) or the Court before the Filter Team may disclose PPM to the Prosecution Team. Thus, this Protocol does not authorize the Government to adjudge whether specific material is privileged. Instead, the Protocol leaves adjudication of any unresolved privilege claims to the Court. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. Accordingly, unlike the concerns raised by In re Search Warrant, the Government has engaged the putative privilege holders from the onset and will continue to engage them and the Court, if necessary, as prescribed by the Protocol before disclosing any PPM. Cf. In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159, 176-178 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Oct. 31, 2019) (discussing concerns of delegating judicial functions to the executive branch where the magistrate judge authorized an ex parte filter review of a search warrant return of a law firm).

Without even mentioning this (specious) claim from the loaner AUSAs, Nachmanoff treated the entire privilege review as one the In re Search Warrant opinion defines as a judicial function. That, plus the Fourth’s citation to the 2018 treatment of Michael Cohen’s communications (when I said every fucking case I’ve ever covered, I meant all of them) signals Nachmanoff will surely insist Fitzpatrick or someone Fitzpatrick appoints conduct any review.

But Nachmanoff went further in his seeming punt. He also suggested that, even before Fitzpatrick conduct a review, he should first answer a number of questions — questions that largely track those Comey raised, including the questions (cited at page 12 here) he raised.

The Fourth Circuit further concluded that adversarial proceedings before the magistrate judge were needed prior to the authorization of a filter team and protocol. Id. at 179.

Similarly here, briefing on the government’s proposed filter protocol raises several legal questions that must be resolved before any protocol is authorized. These questions include, but are not limited to, whether the original warrants authorizing the seizure of the materials at issue are stale, whether those warrants authorize the seizure and review of these materials for the crimes at issue in this case, whether the lead case agents or prosecution team in this case have been exposed to privileged materials, and what the proper procedures are, if any, for review of the materials at issue. See ECF 71 at 1, 5, 6, 8–10, 12.

Which is to say, this is a punt, but a punt saying, “binding Fourth Circuit precedent says Comey is right.”

Update: Comey has submitted three additional pretrial motions. He asked to:

• Access grand jury proceedings.
• Get a Bill of Particulars.
• Throw out the indictment because Ted Cruz’ questioning sucked and also Comey told the truth (and also to submit the actual video showing the questioning).

In support of his efforts to Twitter Files the January 6 investigation, Chuck Grassley just released 179 subpoenas and a summary of them sent out between September 2022 and June 2023.

The release is definitely serving his purposes. One after another far right wing propagandist is screaming, Worse than Watergate!!!

But the may also be an absolute gold mine for people trying to reconstruct what Trump did in 2020, to say nothing of political oppo researchers and foreign hackers. The subpoenas provide a map of all the political organizations that were close to Trump in 2020 to 2021, organized by person; not all of these are public and certainly not in such a readily usable form. They list where people — including some people who are exceedingly important in Trump’s current administration — banked during the 2020 election (and if China hacks DOJ servers, it provides them a roadmap to find the actual bank account numbers).

Yet much of the general thrust of the subpoenas are not new. Indeed, many of them were reported in real time and laid out in an appendix of the J6C Report, which I wrote about here.

False advertising

As J6C laid out, Trump’s team decided to keep fundraising after he lost the election, purportedly in the guise of a recount and/or election integrity.

The claims made in the fundraising materials made knowably false claims — so much so that the RNC stopped running them. J6C did a number of interviews and served a number of subpoenas to find out more.

But they hit roadblocks. For example, the RNC succeeded in fighting a Salesforce-related subpoena to learn more about what a whistleblower told them about concerns raised internally.

The Trump Campaign knew that emails that the Approvals Group had blessed were being rejected by Iterable. However, the RNC continued to send millions of Trump Campaign emails through Salesforce, TMAGAC’s original email service provider, up until January 6th. Evidence uncovered bythe Select Committee shows that there were internal concerns at Salesforceregarding the content of the TMAGAC emails.

The Select Committee interviewed an individual (“J. Doe”) who worked at Salesforce during the post-election period during which TMAGAC was sending out the fundraising emails concerning false election fraud claims.147 Doe worked for Salesforce’s privacy and abuse management team, colloquially known as the abuse desk.148 An abuse desk is responsible for preventing fraud and abuse emanating from the provider’s user or subscriber network.

Doe indicated to the Select Committee that, as soon as early 2020, they recalled issues arising with the RNC’s use of Salesforce’s services and that a“deluge of abuse would’ve started in June-ish.”149 Doe noted that Salesforce received a high number of complaints regarding the RNC’s actions, which would have been primarily the fundraising efforts of TMAGAC.150 In the latter half of 2020, Doe noticed that the emails coming from the RNC’s account included more and more violent and inflammatory rhetoric in violation of Salesforce’s Master Service Agreement (“MSA”) with the RNC, which prohibited the use of violent content.151 Doe stated that, near the time of the election, they contacted senior individuals at Salesforce to highlight the “increasingly concerning” emails coming from the RNC’s account.152 Doe explained that senior individuals at Salesforce effectively ignored their emails about TMAGAC’s inflammatory emails 153 and Salesforce ignored the terms of the MSA and permitted the RNC to continue touse its account in this problematic manner.154 Doe said, “Salesforce very obviously didn’t care about anti-abuse.”155

There’s no evidence the RNC and Salesforce had the same success with this December 2022 subpoena.

That led to a series of even more interesting subpoenas sent in March 2023 to individuals who worked this side of things at the RNC.

The subpoenas asked for materials pertaining to fundraising in the name of election integrity after the election, and named some of the people involved.

B. Regardless of time period, all documents related to the “Election Defense Fund” or “Official Election Defense Fund” referenced in the fundraising emails sent out between November 3, 2020 and January 20, 2021.

C. For the time period of November 3, 2020 through January 20, 2021, all communications between or among or referencing you and one or more of the following individuals or entities:

1. Benjamin Angle;

2. Rudy Giuliani;

3. Jason Miller;

4. Andrew Surabian;

5. Donald Trump, Jr.;

6. Eric Trump;

7. Lara Trump;

The subpoenas asked, among other things, for details of advertising targeting Mike Pence.

D. For the time period of November 3, 2020 through January 20, 2021, all documents related to:

1. The use of Michael R. Pence’s name in fundraising, including but not limited to whether his name could or would continue to be used in fundraising;

2. Any individual indicating that they do not want to be, or no longer would be, a surrogate in fundraising emails; and/or

3. All joint fundraising efforts involving the RNC, all documents related to any changes as to what entities would participate in any fundraising campaign and/or how the funds raised would be divided among participating entities.

And asked for evidence that the RNC knew Trump was lying.

K. For the time period of November 3, 2020 through January 20, 2021, all documents related to any disagreement, whether as to tone or substance or anything else, the RNC or any of its employees, agents, or contractors had with any statement made by or on behalf of Donald J. Trump, anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign, anyone affiliated (formally or informally) with the White House, including, but not limited to statements made by Donald J. Trump, Eric Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., Lara Trump, Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and/or Jenna Ellis. L. All documents related to or referencing January 6, 2021, the Rally, and/or the subsequent march to and breach of the United States Capitol.

There may even be newly disclosed domains that people can track in this material.

Payoffs

J6C focused on another aspect of this fundraising, too: how Trump spent the money raised by lying to his rubes, partly by paying off those who had been loyal to him.

The Trump Campaign spent the money on President Trump, giving donations to his associates, and keeping it for himself in Save America. Hundreds of millions of dollars that were raised to go towards “election defense” and “fighting voter fraud” were not spent that way at all. To thecontrary, most of the funds remain unspent, and millions have been paid tocompanies that are known affiliates of President Trump, or payments to entities associated with former Trump administration officials. Since the election, former Trump officials who are still working for President Trump’s PACs, and are publicly receiving salaries as FEC-reported “payroll,” are also associated with these companies.

For example, from July 2021 to the present, Save America has been paying approximately $9,700 per month to Dan Scavino,171 a political adviser who served in the Trump administration as White House Deputy Chief of Staff.172 Save America was also paying $20,000 per month to an entity called Hudson Digital LLC. Hudson Digital LLC was registered in Delawaretwenty days after the attack on the Capitol, on January 26, 2021,173 and began receiving payments from Save America on the day it was registered.174 Hudson Digital LLC has received payments totaling over $420,000, all described as “Digital consulting.”175 No website or any other information or mention of Hudson Digital LLC could be found online.176 ThoughHudson Digital LLC is registered as a Delaware company, the FEC ScheduleB listing traces back to an address belonging to Dan and Catherine Scavino.177

Nick Luna, President Trump’s former personal assistant and “body man,” was being paid from April 2021 to December 2021 approximately $12,000 per month by Save America for “payroll.”178 The Make America Great Again PAC (MAGA PAC)—formerly the authorized committee of President Trump’s reelection campaign, Donald J. Trump for President—paid $20,000 per month to a limited liability corporation called Red State Partners LLC from April 2021 through October 2021, and Save America paidRed State Partners LLC $20,000 in February 2022.179 The company was registered in Delaware on March 11, 2021 180 and has received a total of $170,000.181 Though it is registered in Delaware, disclosures filed with the Federal Election Committee (FEC) list Red State Partners at an address inMiami, Florida, that is an address for Nick Luna and his wife, Cassidy Dumbauld.182

Further, Vince Haley, Taylor Swindle, and Ross Worthington are corporate officers of a company known as Pericles LLC.183 Haley is a former policy advisor to President Trump,184 Swindle is the Chief Financial Officer for Gingrich 360,185 and Ross Worthington is the former White House speechwriter 186 who wrote the speech President Trump delivered on the Ellipse on January 6th.187 Pericles LLC was registered on January 27, 2021,188 the day after Scavino’s Hudson Digital LLC, and, since then, has received payments from Save America totaling at least $352,700.189

There are corresponding subpoenas for much of this activity (indeed, it explains a great deal of the subpoenas).

But it could have been worse! Jack Smith appears not to have subpoenaed a suspect payment to Melania’s designer, “Herve Pierre Braillard,” one of the odd payments made out of this money.

Brad Parscale

There’s over a dozen subpoenas, dating to the period immediately following Jack Smith’s appointment, for information pertaining to Brad Parscale, which may address some of the financial shenanigans he was engaged in that became public in real time.

I’m not sure all of these were public before. They’re now all mapped out.

Closely (potentially directly) related to that series is a January 2023 subpoena asking for Know Your Customer information (that is, money laundering) from Paychex and ADP. The subpoena includes America First Legal Foundation which, AFLF people keep squealing about on Xitter, wasn’t founded until after January 6.

The theory behind some of this, as laid out by J6C, is that money was raised under one theory and shared with others. These two were the sole subpoenas pertaining to AFLF; there’s no evidence they did anything wrong. But now they’ve given cause to look more closely.

Joint Defense Agreements paid by political PACs

Particularly in the stolen documents case, we learned that Susie Wiles vetted people for their loyalty before paying for their defense.

Prosecutors sent out a series of subpoenas in March 2023 to Trump’s PACs asking for details (and retainer agreements) of law firms paid by political organizations that purported to serve Trump’s election.

A number of those law firms were public. But here’s the full list:

1. Abel Bean Law P.A.

2. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld

3. Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans

4. Brand Woodward Law

5. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft

6. Clark Hill PLC

7. Compass Legal Group

8. Compass Legal Services, Inc

9. Dhillon Law Group Inc

10. Earth & Water Law LLC

11. Elections, LLC

12. Greenberg Traurig

13. Jones Day

14. JPRowley Law PLLC

15. Kasowitz, Benson, Torress LLP

16. Marino, Tortorella & Boyle, P.C.

17. McGuireWoods LLP

18. Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsk

19. Neal & Harwell, PLC

20. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough

21. Parlatore Law Group, LLP

22. Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP

23. Statecraft PLLC

24. The Binnall Law Group

25. The Garber Group LLC

Some of these — like the law firm Stanley Brand shared with Stan Woodward — have long been central to the Trump investigation narrative. Others, though, are newly disclosed thanks to Chuck Grassley.

Previously unknown people

Right wingers are busy on Xitter pointing to individual subpoenas that, in the process, identify people not previously known to have had any role in January 6. For example, SJC Republicans pointed to this December 16, 2022 subpoena for Robert Gasaway, which appears to be the only one that asks for his contacts with DOJ, with Congress, or with the campaign. It is also one of just six that asked for any communications, “To, from, with, or involving any member of law enforcement relating to any allegation of fraud or lack of fraud in the 2020 Presidential Election,” which is another interesting request.

All of which is to say, there’s a whole lot of screaming over on Xitter about this.

But the people whose potential involvement in Trump’s attempt to cheat his donors is newly disclosed should be screaming at Chuck Grassley rather than what he disclosed. Because he really exposed a great deal of new information useful for researchers.

If it weren’t for a recent shift in DOJ’s prosecutorial focus, Jeanine Pirro’s wildly corrupt effort to suppress the larger criminal context of Tayler Taranto’s stalking of Barack Obama in 2023 would be no more than a garden variety authoritarian effort to rewrite history.

As ABC and Politico have written, two AUSAs who’ve been prosecuting Taranto, Carlos Valdivia and Samuel White, submitted a sentencing memo documenting how the Navy veteran with long-standing mental health issues first participated in January 6 and then, years later, drove his van containing guns and ammunition to stalk Kalorama, looking for Obama while ranting, “Gotta get the shot, stop at nothing to get the shot. This is where other people come to get the shot;”

The language in the memo about the January 6 attack and Taranto’s role in it attracted some press attention.

On January 6, 2021, thousands of people comprising a mob of rioters attacked the U.S. Capitol while a joint session of Congress met to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election. Taranto was accused of participating in the riot in Washington, D.C., by entering the U.S. Capitol Building. After the riot, Taranto returned to his home in the State of Washington, where he promoted conspiracy theories about the events of January 6, 2021.

And so Pirro (or someone at DOJ) did what all corrupt sycophants would do: put the two attorneys on leave for speaking the truth about Pirro’s liege.

Then, two of the AUSAs who bolloxed the Sydney Reid case, Jonathan Hornok and Travis Wolf, filed notices of appearance and submitted a new sentencing memo, asking for the same sentence. The description of January 6 as a riot, above, was removed (but not a quote of Taranto mentioning it).

More scandalously, the revised sentencing memo excised the description of how Taranto came to be stalking the former President, the passage in red, below: Because Donald Trump, as a private citizen, first doxed Obama.

The next day, on June 29, 2023, then-former President Donald Trump published on a social media platform the purported address of former President Barack Obama. Taranto re-posted the address on the same platform and thereafter started livestreaming from his van on his YouTube channel. Taranto broadcast footage of himself as he drove through the Kalorama neighborhood in Washington, D.C., claiming he was searching for “tunnels” he believed would provide him access to the private residences of certain high-profile individuals, including former President Obama. He parked his van, walked away from it, and approached a restricted area protected by the United States Secret Service. He walked through the nearby woods and stated, “Gotta get the shot, stop at nothing to get the shot.” [my emphasis]

As I said, if it weren’t for a recent shifted prosecutorial focus, criminalizing doxing partly as a way to criminalize otherwise peaceful protest against ICE and CBP, this kind of memory hole would be merely another instance of gross corruption and the human waste of professional careers destroyed because the aspiring dictator refuses to take accountability for his own actions.

But DOJ has recently arrested a number of people for doxing under 18 USC 119, a law that specifically protects law enforcement officers: first Gregory Curcio (who not only posted the address of an ICE lawyer, but invited others to swat her; his indictment included a domestic violence claim). Then Cynthia Raygoza, Ashleigh Brown, and Sandra Carmona Samane, who livestreamed from the house of an ICE officer they followed home.

Here’s how Bill Essayli, who regularly made shit up even before getting exposed for playing dress-up as a US Attorney the other day, said about the latter.

“Our brave federal agents put their lives on the line every day to keep our nation safe,” said Acting United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “The conduct of these defendants are deeply offensive to law enforcement officers and their families. If you threaten, dox, or harm in any manner one of our agents or employees, you will face prosecution and prison time.”

According to the indictment, on August 28, 2025, the defendants followed the victim – an ICE agent – from the Civic Center in downtown Los Angeles to his personal residence. The defendants livestreamed on their Instagram accounts their pursuit of the victim and provided directions as they followed the victim home, encouraging their viewers to share the livestream. Their Instagram accounts used to livestream the event were “ice_out_of_la,” “defendmesoamericanculture,” and “corn_maiden_design.”

Upon arriving at the victim’s personal residence, the defendants shouted to bystanders while livestreaming on Instagram that their “neighbor is ICE,” “la migra lives here,” and “ICE lives on your street and you should know.”

The defendants publicly disclosed on Instagram the victim’s home address and told viewers, “Come on down.”

Ashleigh Brown is the woman whose charges for being assaulted by an FPS officer were dismissed this week after defense attorneys discovered his criminal record. Unlike the Taranto case, there’s no claim the women did or would have been armed.

Mostly, they told this guy’s neighbors he was la migra, one of the men who kidnap workers from outside Home Depot.

Donald Trump’s doxing of Barack Obama was more consequential than what these three women did. Taranto was armed and, not least because of his mental health problems, dangerous.

Donald Trump’s own DOJ says the kind of doxing Donald Trump did should hold a five year sentencing in prison.

And DOJ just took ham-handed steps to pretend Trump didn’t do just that.

The loaner AUSA in the Tish James case, Roger Keller, has responded to Attorney General James’ request that they be ordered to follow the rules (he even authored his own document, unlike the Comey loaner AUSAs). I’ll come back to it but it is … inadequate to the task, though it cites liberally and faithlessly from the DC Circuit opinion upholding part of the gag on criminal defendant Donald Trump.

In any case, that may be far less important a development than the order that Judge Cameron McGowen Currie gave in both the James and Comey cases.

As happened with the other challenges to Trump’s unlawfully appointed US Attorneys, Currie (a senior judge from another District within the same Circuit) was appointed by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Albert Diaz to preside over the challenge to Lindsey Halligan’s appointment. While Comey included Halligan’s appointment paperwork in his challenge, James (who filed hers before she got any discovery) did not.

In any case, Currie wants more. She ordered DOJ to file, “all documents relating to the indictment signer’s participation in the grand jury proceedings, along with complete grand jury transcripts.”

The undersigned has been appointed to hear this motion and finds it necessary to determine the extent of the indictment signer’s involvement in the grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, the Government is directed to submit, no later than Monday, November 3, 2025, at 5:00 pm, for in camera review, all documents relating to the indictment signer’s participation in the grand jury proceedings, along with complete grand jury transcripts. In camera review is appropriate given the secrecy requirements applicable to grand jury proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).

Currie may need these simply to understand what the remedy would be if she ruled for Comey and James. As far as we know (and as news reports cited in both motions claim), unlike other challenges to Trump’s unlawful US Attorney appointments, Halligan was the only one present for the presentment, meaning if her appointment is unlawful, the indictments have to go away. Both Comey and James are arguing for dismissal with prejudice, though the argument is less compelling in James’ case (because unlike Comey, the statute of limitations did not expire). So Currie needs to understand how much of the case relies on Halligan’s presence.

Whatever Currie’s goal, reviewing these transcripts will likely to be exceedingly damning for Halligan, whom Currie refers to not as the “interim US Attorney” or even (as James referred to her) as the “purported interim US Attorney,” but as the “indictment signer.”

After all, they will show that Dan Richman gave testimony that debunked the very premise of the indictment against Comey; such a review may show that Halligan simply neglected to share that transcript with grand jurors. More damning still, it’ll reveal the testimony of James’ great-niece, Nakia Thompson, describing that she has paid almost nothing in rent since she lived in the home James bought for her in 2020, undercutting the entire claim that Attorney General James was intending to use the house as an investment property. It’ll reveal that Halligan got an Alexandria grand jury to indict James, bypassing those grand jurors in Norfolk who had heard Thompson’s testimony.

But Judge Currie may find something else Comey argued compelling: that because Halligan was not lawfully authorized to be US Attorney, Halligan’s mere presence in the grand jury was a violation of grand jury secrecy.

Here, Ms. Halligan’s unlawful appointment tainted the structural integrity of the grand jury process. Absent Ms. Halligan’s unlawful title, she would not have been able to enter the grand jury room, let alone present and sign an indictment. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow only “attorneys for the government” to be “present while the grand jury is in session,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1), and define such attorneys to include only “attorney[s] authorized by law to conduct” grand jury proceedings, Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Those rules implement the longstanding principle “that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings”—a principle that “is ‘as important for the protection of the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.’” United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (citations omitted). By limiting participation to government attorneys “authorized by law,” Rules 1 and 6 maintain the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding and reinforce that an unlawfully appointed attorney’s presentation to the grand jury undermines the structure of that proceeding. The fundamental error here thus allows a presumption that Mr. Comey was prejudiced, “and any inquiry into harmless error would [require] unguided speculation.” Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257.

Judge Currie may have very modest reasons for requesting these transcripts. But they will, almost inevitably, raise larger questions about both Halligan’s conduct, and that of the people who appointed her.

When the government first asked, on October 13, to use a filter review to access content seized from Dan Richman five years ago, it described that Jim Comey, “prefers to challenge the underlying search warrant first before any review takes place.”

But in his response yesterday, Comey didn’t do that.

Rather, after a heavily-redacted discussion of the problems with DOJ’s past and prospective access to the content, he proposed that Judge Michael Nachmanoff should deny the government’s filter request without prejudice, allowing DOJ to reconsider its bid for a filter protocol after they’ve first answered a set of questions.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the government’s motion to implement its proposed filter protocol without prejudice, and direct the government to disclose the following information to allow both the Court and the defense to assess the appropriateness of the protocol:

1. The legal authority for the contemplated review.

2. Whether any quarantined materials have been accessed by, shared with, or provided to the case team (and, if so, which materials were reviewed by which personnel on which day), and whether any such materials have been produced in discovery.

3. The protocol used during the prior filter review, including search parameters, segregation measures, privilege determinations, and associated logs or correspondence.

4. Whether the government intends to search raw returns or only the set already filtered in the prior review. See In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d 159, 181 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Oct. 31, 2019) (holding that “the magistrate judge erred” by approving a filter protocol “without first ascertaining” the materials to be reviewed).

5. Whether non-lawyers will conduct any portion of the Filter Review. See ECF No. 38-1 ¶ 2 n.2 (“The Filter Team is comprised of Two Assistant United States Attorneys, and their support staff”) (emphasis added); see In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d at 177 (criticizing the use of non-lawyers to designate documents as nonprivileged).

One might explain the reason why he’s doing this in one or two ways.

The first is a procedural reason. The warrants and original filter protocol themselves were probably reasonably sound for the purpose to which they were put: investigating whether Richman leaked classified information. The heavily redacted bit describes four different warrants and the loaner AUSAs’ original filing described content seized from “an image of a computer hard drive, an iCloud download, the backup of an iPhone, and the backup of an iPad.” There are five sealed exhibits to the filing (none cited in unredacted form), of which four are presumably the warrants and one may pertain to the original protocol, though there is something identified in footnote 4 that “was not produced,” not even after Comey’s team asked about it on October 23. While the seized material included a great deal of material, including material pertaining to Richman’s clients other than Comey and “sensitive and private materials belonging to his students,” the original filter protocol withheld, “private materials related to his students, as well as privileged materials, [from] the case team.”

But, contrary to the approach used with (for example) Michael Cohen as well as what we’ve been able to publicly review of warrants implicating Rudy Giuliani, in which prosecutors obtained new warrants every time the scope or target of an investigation changed, the government appears not to have obtained new warrants to search this material for a different crime, the alleged lie Comey told in 2020.

[I]t appears that the government has not obtained any search warrants in connection with the instant matter, including any warrant authorizing a search of the Arctic Haze materials for evidence of the two offenses with which Mr. Comey is charged.

Comey cites several precedents, one in the Fourth Circuit, that would require a new warrant.

He points to other reasons, too, why the government would need to obtain new warrants: because these warrants are not only stale, but they predate the alleged crime here, testimony from October 2020.

The government now proposes to use those warrants to search for evidence of different crimes that arose from a proceeding that occurred after USAO-DDC obtained the Arctic Haze warrants.

Comey also objects because some part of this was sealed by another court, which by date and location would probably have been an order from Beryl Howell when she was Chief Judge in DC.

The government has no lawful basis to review materials obtained more than five years ago, in a closed investigation that ended without any charges, pursuant to stale warrants for separate offenses, including materials that remain under seal by another court. [my emphasis]

Comey maintains that he can challenge the use of these warrants here.

The Fourth Amendment plainly prohibits the government from doing exactly what it seeks to do here: the Arctic Haze warrants were obtained more than five years ago in a separate and now-closed criminal investigation and authorized the seizure of evidence of separate offenses. Yet the government seeks to turn those warrants into general warrants to continue to rummage through materials belonging to Mr. Comey’s lawyer in an effort to seize evidence of separate alleged crimes. The Court should not authorize the government to conduct an unlawful review.

[snip]

Mr. Comey reserves his right to move to suppress these warrants, to the extent the government continues to use them in this manner. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983) (a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment based on agents’ subsequent conduct); DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1985) (“an attorney’s clients have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their client files”). Until the government answers the questions the defense has previously raised about these warrants, which to date have remained unanswered and which are detailed at the end of this submission, the defense will not be in a position to file an appropriately targeted suppression motion.

But even the language here notes at one problem: Normally you challenge a Fourth Amendment violation by suppressing evidence for use at trial. Here, Comey is trying to do more. He’s trying to prevent investigators from even accessing it. And so, instead, he’s asking the judge to force prosecutors to answer some basic questions in the guise of allowing him to suppress the warrants.

Until the government answers the questions the defense has previously raised about these warrants, which to date have remained unanswered and which are detailed at the end of this submission, the defense will not be in a position to file an appropriately targeted suppression motion.

Which brings us to the second possible reason for responding this way: question 2. Who already accessed privileged material, when did they do so, and has the government turned over that material in discovery? The answer to that question, especially, would force investigators to confess if they’ve already snuck a peek into what is in the privileged communication.

The “spill” that Comey suspects happened may have happened recently: on the day Lindsey Halligan obtained the indictment.

That footnote, marked in pink, cites the Criminal Case Cover Sheet, which, in spite of being labeled as “REDACTED,” is not, and so among other things, reveals the name of one of two FBI agents on the case, Miles Starr (the other being Jack Eckenrode, who investigated Scooter Libby but then left the team, and who joined John Durham in chasing Russian disinformation for four years).

I’ve redacted Starr’s phone number. You’re welcome, Miles.

But the Sheet also includes an error: it lists three counts, including the one, pertaining to Comey’s answer to Lindsey Graham’s question about a CIA referral (one that FBI may never have received) that Kash Patel and John Ratcliffe ret-conned into a “Clinton Plan” on which to hang the Durham investigation. That’s the one the grand jury no-billed.

While none of that explains when and how Starr and Eckenrode snuck a peek of privileged information, it might explain why.

Kash and Eckenrode are still chasing the theory behind the dropped charge, that Jim Comey purportedly knew Hillary Clinton had a plan (one fabricated by Russia and then embellished by Eckenrode and Durham to claim Hillary wanted to frame Trump) to emphasize Donald Trump’s ties with Russia. That’s the logic of the larger conspiracy theory that Eckenrode has been hired to chase. It was and remains Russian disinformation, but that didn’t stop Eckenrode the last time he tried this.

Indeed, because DC USAO obtained warrants in 2019 and 2020, there may be communications between Comey and his attorneys about the John Durham investigation, about Eckenrode’s past witch hunt, which would explain why Comey is so interested in the scope of proposed review, which the loaner AUSAs still haven’t told Comey.

Because Kash and Eckenrode are chasing that conspiracy theory, this is a much bigger issue than just the case before Nachmanoff. As I laid out in my post predicting that John Durham’s investigation was a preview of coming attractions (even before I knew that Kash had brought Eckenrode back!), Durham already played games to access attorney-client privileged material.

In response, Sussmann accused Durham of abusing the same grand jury process he abused with Benardo (abuse, ironically, that debunked Durham’s conspiracy theory).

First, the Special Counsel’s Motion is untimely. Despite knowing for months, and in some cases for at least a year, that the non-parties were withholding material as privileged, he chose to file this Motion barely a month before trial—long after the grand jury returned an Indictment and after Court-ordered discovery deadlines had come and gone.

Second, the Special Counsel’s Motion should have been brought before the Chief Judge of the District Court during the pendency of the grand jury investigation, as the rules of this District and precedent make clear.

Third, the Special Counsel has seemingly abused the grand jury in order to obtain the documents redacted for privilege that he now challenges. He has admitted to using grand jury subpoenas to obtain these documents for use at Mr. Sussmann’s trial, even though Mr. Sussmann had been indicted at the time he issued the grand jury subpoenas and even though the law flatly forbids prosecutors from using grand jury subpoenas to obtain trial discovery. The proper remedy for such abuse of the grand jury is suppression of the documents.

Fourth, the Special Counsel seeks documents that are irrelevant on their face. Such documents do not bear on the narrow charge in this case, and vitiating privilege for the purpose of admitting these irrelevant documents would materially impair Mr. Sussmann’s ability to prepare for his trial.

He also revealed that some of those privilege claims went back to August — that is, the weeks after Durham should have closed up shop.

Email from Andrew DeFilippis, Dep’t of Just., to Patrick Stokes, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, et al. (Aug. 9, 2021) (requesting a call to discuss privilege issues with a hope “to avoid filing motions with the Court”); Email from Andrew DeFilippis, Dep’t of Just., to Patrick Stokes, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, et al. (Aug. 14, 2021) (stating that the Special Counsel “wanted to give all parties involved the opportunity to weigh in before we . . . pursue particular legal process, or seek relief from the Court”). And since January— before the deadline to produce unclassified discovery had passed—the Special Counsel suggested that such a filing was imminent, telling the DNC, for example, that he was “contemplating a public court filing in the near term.” Email from Andrew DeFilippis, Dep’t of Just., to Shawn Crowley, Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP (Jan. 17, 2022). [my emphasis]

In a hearing on May 4, right before trial, Joffe’s lawyer revealed they had demanded Durham press a legal claim much earlier, in May 2021.

MR. TYRRELL: So if they wanted to challenge our assertion of privilege as to this limited universe of documents — again, which is separate from the other larger piece with regard to HFA — they should have done so months ago. I don’t know why they waited until now, Your Honor, but I want to be clear. I want to say without hesitation that it’s not because there was ever any discussion with us about resolving this issue without court intervention.

THE COURT: That was my question. Were you adamant a year ago?

MR. TYRRELL: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Were you adamant a year ago that —

MR. TYRRELL: Yes. We’ve been throughout. We were not willing to entertain resolution of this without court intervention.

THE COURT: Very well.

Ultimately, Cooper did bow to Durham’s demand, but prohibited them from using those documents at trial.

That didn’t prevent DeFilippis from attempting to use the privileged documents to perjury trap his one Fusion witness, the kind of perjury trap that might have provided a way to continue the madness indefinitely.

There must have been nothing interesting there: most of the Fusion documents were utterly irrelevant to the Sussmann charges, but could implicate the Danchenko ones, but Durham didn’t use them there, nor did he explain their content in his final report.

That effort involved, among other things, abusing the prosecutorial process to bypass rulings (such as the sealing order mentioned above) that Beryl Howell had already made, and using one criminal case, against Michael Sussmann, to obtain attorney-client privileged materials that would only be relevant in another criminal case, the Igor Danchenko case (or a larger conspiracy).

Particularly given the reticence of the loaner AUSAs to tell Comey what happened, whether they have warrants, who read what, this feels like an attempt to retroactively bless access that investigators already got. And the stakes are bigger than this one case. As Durham (and Eckenrode) did in 2022, this likely would primarily serve to feed their bigger conspiracy theory.

Plus, if Eckenrode is sneaking peeks at Comey’s privileged communications still in FBI custody, there’s nothing that would prevent him from doing the same with all the other people whose privileged communications have been seized during this years-long witch hunt.

And that’s why you ask these questions.

The high profile politicized prosecutions — of Jim Comey, Tish James, and John Bolton (and of LaMonica McIver if the press weren’t broken) — are really important tests of Trump’s attempt to turn DOJ into a weapon.

But the relatively anonymous cases — as often as not, defended by Federal Public Defenders — are just important a vindication of rule of law.

Today’s important victory goes to Ashleigh Brown. She was charged in conjunction with a confrontation with Federal Protective Services (not, NOT ICE or CBP) outside Roybal Federal Building in Los Angeles on August 2.

c. Approximately three [Federal Protective Services] Officers, including FPS Officer Z.C., walked out to remove REDONDO-ROSALES from the path of the government car. As the group of FPS officers approached REDONDO-ROSALES, he moved backwards away from the FPS officers in an apparent attempt to avoid being apprehended. Then, FPS Officer Z.C. approached REDONDO-ROSALES in an effort to detain him, and REDONDO-ROSALES intentionally struck Officer Z.C. in the face with his left hand (at the time, REDONDO-ROSALES had a tan, wide-brimmed hat in his left hand).

d. After FPS officers were able to detain REDONDORO-SALES, Officer Z.C. and approximately four other FPS officers began to escort REDONDO-ROSALES towards the Alameda Street Entrance.

e. As Officer Z.C. walked a few feet in front of the two FPS officers who were escorting REDONDO-ROSALES toward the Alameda Street Entrance, BROWN approached Officer Z.C. and stepped into Officer Z.C.’s path. Officer Z.C. continued past BROWN toward the Alameda Street Entrance, but as he did so, BROWN intentionally hit Officer Z.C. in his left side with her right arm.

The felony charge against Brown was reportedly no-billed by a jury. For whatever reason, Bill Essayli charged her with misdemeanor interference instead, only to succeed in getting her detained after she allegedly violated bail by following an ICE officer home, for which she and two others were charged with conspiracy to dox him.

Though in Brown’s response to a 404(b) notice attempting to present the doxing case to the “assault” jury, her lawyers claimed that, “R.H. got into his personal vehicle and drove to where Ms. Brown was parked. He stopped his vehicle in the driveway, blocking Ms. Brown’s vehicle from leaving.” That is, even on the case that did get indicted, the cop in question arguably instigated the confrontation.

There were a number of things that would have been interesting if this had gone to trial, including Brown’s sealed filings about why she had a claim of self defense, as well as her success, after submitting them, in getting an order to share DHS’ Use of Force guidelines.

But things got interesting today when Brown submitted a motion to disqualify the victim in this case, ZC, from testifying based on DOJ’s failure to tell the defense that he had a (misdemeanor) criminal record, most notably a conviction in a harassment involving physical contact charge just four years ago.

C. Defense Discovers Z.C.’s Criminal History

On October 23, 2025, while preparing for trial in this matter, defense counsel learned that Z.C. has criminal history that includes at least:

• Harassment – subjecting a person to physical contact, in violation of Pennsylvania Statute § 18.2709(a)(1), convicted on June 17, 2021;
• Disorderly conduct, in violation of Florida Statute § 509.143, arrested on August 31, 2014; and
• Driving under the influence, in violation of Florida Statute § 316193(1), convicted on November 4, 2013.

Exhibits H, I, filed under seal.

These records were obtained through independent defense investigation. Of note, the defense does not have access to law enforcement databases and thus cannot confirm whether this is Z.C.’s complete criminal history or whether there is additional relevant information about these or any other arrests or convictions.

D. Defense Contacts the USAO With Its Findings. The USAO States It Was Not Aware of Z.C.’s Assault History.

On October 26, 2025, after further research and internal discussion, defense counsel contacted government counsel regarding its findings. Government counsel requested a few hours to investigate and respond. Later that evening, the parties conferred by telephone. Government counsel indicated that it was not previously aware of Z.C.’s 2021 conviction for assault. The government had asked Z.C. about his prior convictions in interviews. The government was only aware of Z.C.’s 2014 arrest for disorderly conduct and his 2013 conviction for driving under the influence. In addition, government counsel stated that it had not conducted an independent Henthorn review of Z.C., but had relied on the word and responsiveness of another agency (FPS) to conduct a Henthorn review of Z.C.’s personnel file.

The judge in the case, Obama appointee Fernando Olguin, was not only interested in learning more about DOJ’s failure to disclose this detail, but also who, if anyone, knew about ZC’s criminal history, and if so, why they didn’t disclose it.

Having reviewed and considered all the briefing filed with respect to defendant’s Motion to Compel Production of Complete Personnel Files and Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Z.C., (Dkt. 83, “Motion”), the court concludes that it would benefit from full briefing on the issues presented in the Motion. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The government shall file its papers in opposition to the Motion by no later than Tuesday, October 28, 2025 at 5:00 p.m.

2. Together with its opposition, the government must submit a declaration signed by counsel for the government that sets forth the names and titles of the individuals who conducted the Henthorn and/or Brady reviews of the relevant personnel file materials, and the dates on which such reviews were conducted. Counsel for the government is cautioned that failure to provide such a declaration may lead to the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to the exclusion of evidence and/or witnesses.

Normally, when DOJ has decided they have to abandon false assault charges, they attempt to dismiss without prejudice.

Not so here. They’re filing to dismiss with prejudice.

The United States moves to dismiss its information with prejudice against defendant in the interests of justice under Federal Criminal Rule 48(a), and therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion. Defendant does not oppose dismissal and the parties agree all pending motions should be denied as moot.

Brown’s legal troubles are not done. The doxing case is a felony, and as a conspiracy case, DOJ has broader leeway for introducing evidence against Brown. She remains detained (based on her prior violation of bail) in that case.

But DOJ has been attempting to link these two cases, presumably as a way to salvage the initial assault case.

And even that tactic could now backfire.

US v Brown (assault) docket

US v. Raygoza (conspiracy to dox) docket