Earlier today, Jim Comey filed his opposition to the loaner AUSAs’ bid to do a quickie filter team to access materials that — the context makes clear — were seized in the investigation of Dan Richman back in 2019.

Key parts of that opposition were redacted under Sensitive labels applied to discovery, such as this passage describing concerns about the “continue[d]” review of material seized from Richman.

But in his order denying the loaner AUSA bid to accelerate this filter team, Judge Michael Nachmanoff described the main gist of the concern: The two main FBI investigators already peeked at the discussions among lawyers representing Comey back in 2019, including Dan Richman and Patrick Fitzgerald.

He also states that the underlying warrants were “obtained by prosecutors in a different district more than five years ago[,] in an investigation that closed without criminal charges[,] and [] authorized the seizure of evidence related to separate offenses that are not charged here.” Id. at 2. And, there is “reason to believe that the two principal FBI investigators may already have been tainted by exposure” to privileged information. Id. at 3.

Remember, the lead investigator is reportedly Jack Eckenrode, who knows Fitzgerald from way back, from the Libby case. He’s the same investigator who participated in John Durham’s ploy to breach privilege during the Michael Sussmann case in hopes of using that privileged information elsewhere.

The unethical dickishness makes much more sense now.

When the government first raised the privilege protocol with the defense, on October 10 and 11, the defense asked for an opportunity to review the underlying warrants at issue to determine whether Mr. Comey would agree to the protocol. The government refused to provide the warrants before filing its motion for a filter protocol, and did not produce the warrants until late in the evening of October 13, 2025.

They appear to be pushing for this filter review — a filter review entirely excluding Comey, a filter review unlike any of the ones Trump’s attorneys were subjected to — to bulldoze through the possibility they already snuck a peek, and took investigative steps based on that.

Most of this post lays out Jim Comey’s vindictive and selective prosecution challenge. It is very tidy, providing little we didn’t already know.

Aside from the confirmation that Lindsey Halligan was appointed under 28 USC 546, that’s generally true of Comey’s motion to dismiss because of Halligan’s unlawful appointment, as well.

But it feels different, because it’s a bid to win before the far right Supreme Court.

That starts with the memo that Sammy Alito wrote in 1986 — a memo conservative lawyer Ed Whelan has highlighted in his commentary against such an appointment. Back then, Sammy interpreted 28 USC 546 as prohibiting making serial Interim US Attorney Appointments, as Trump did in EDVA to install Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer.

Just three days after Congress enacted the 1986 law, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the DOJ issued a memorandum, authored by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General Samuel Alito, interpreting the provision in precisely the same manner as Mr. Comey here. See Definition of Vacancy for the Purpose of Interim Appointment of United States Attorneys pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 546, as amended, Office of Legal Counsel (Nov. 13, 1986), https://perma.cc/SD5Q7CPH. Specifically, OLC concluded that while a “vacancy exists when the 120-day period expires under the amended section 546 and the President has either not made an appointment or the appointment has not been confirmed,” “it does not follow that the Attorney General may make another appointment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 546(a) after the expiration of the 120-day period.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added)

There’s the dickish comment from Bill Essayli, whose own appointment is being challenged in Los Angeles (before a Hawaiian judge).

Nor is the government’s gambit limited to this case. In several cases throughout the country, the government has sought to end run Congress’s framework in Section 541 and 546 before being rebuffed by courts. See Giraud, 2025 WL 2416737, at *1, *8 (detailing the Executive Branch’s perpetuation of “Alina Habba’s appointment to act as the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey through a novel series of legal and personnel moves” and concluding that she “was not lawfully acting as the United States Attorney in any capacity” 120 days after the Attorney General first invoked her power under Section 546(a)); United States v. Garcia, et al, No. 25-cr-227, 2025 WL 2784640, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2025) (“The Nevada judges did not have an opportunity to exercise [Section 546(d)] power because, on the 119th day of Ms. Chattah’s term, the government purported to switch her appointment to the [Federal Vacancies Reform Act] and its longer term of service.”). In fact, when one interim U.S. Attorney was asked whether his term was “up at the end of this month” given subsection (c)(2)’s 120-day limit, he responded that “we’ve got some tricks up our sleeves.”15 This Court should reject the government’s machinations here.

15 See The Glenn Beck Program: Bill Essayli, at 44:14 (Jul. 22, 2025), http://bit.ly/4nc6yck.

But the real high point comes in the challenge under the Appointments Clause, where a team including Michael Dreeben cites liberally from Trump v. US and US v. Trump to argue that one of Trump’s defense attorneys from his stolen documents case was unlawfully appointed under the very same logic Aileen Cannon used to throw out that case.

B. Ms. Halligan’s Appointment Also Violates The Appointments Clause

As explained above, the Appointments Clause allows Congress to “by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The requirement that Congress participate in the appointment of inferior officers—either through Senate confirmation or through specifying an appointment procedure “by Law”—reflects the Framers’ concerns about the Executive Branch’s “manipulation of official appointments.” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (citations omitted).

Here, Congress vested the appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys “by Law” in a “Head of Department[]”—the Attorney General—as well as in “the Courts of Law”—district courts. In so doing, Congress established a finely tuned statutory scheme for such appointments. See supra at 8-9. Because the Attorney General appointed Ms. Halligan in violation of that scheme, Ms. Halligan’s appointment as an inferior officer is not authorized “by Law.” And the “head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments, but in all that is incident thereto.” United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886). The Attorney General’s appointment of Ms. Halligan thus violates not only Section 546, but also the Appointments Clause. See Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 644-45 (2024) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted); United States v. Trump, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2024).

[snip]

In light of these principles, the Supreme Court has invalidated judgments issued or reviewed by an improperly appointed adjudicator. In Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995), for instance, the Supreme Court “reversed” the court-martial conviction of a defendant after he successfully challenged the appointment of the intermediate appellate judges who reviewed his case. Id. at 188. Likewise, in Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018), the Court set aside an agency adjudication “tainted with an appointments violation,” making clear that a decision of an improperly appointed official cannot stand. Id. at 251.

Similarly, in United States v. Trump, 740 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (S.D. Fla. 2024), the court applied these principles when dismissing an indictment on Appointments Clause grounds because of a defect in the appointment of the prosecutor who secured the charges. The court concluded that “[b]ecause Special Counsel Smith’s exercise of prosecutorial power has not been authorized by law,” there was “no way forward aside from dismissal of the Superseding Indictment.” Id. at 1302. Indeed, the government there did not even “propose an alternative course.” Id. The court reasoned that “[i]nvalidation follows directly from the government actor’s lack of authority to take the challenged action in the first place.” Id. at 1302-03.

That is, a team with a lawyer from Jack Smith’s team is citing Aileen Cannon’s disastrous opinion in Trump’s stolen documents case for the principle that for a lawyer to do what Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer did, she needs to be Senate approved.

Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer should know that (as should Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche). After all, she was part of that “successful” defense team.

This is not to endorse this view. It is to say that if the sentiment behind Aileen Cannon’s dismissal of Trump’s stolen documents prosecution holds — if Clarence Thomas really wants to go there — than Halligan’s appointment, and all the work she did, must be thrown out, just as Jack Smith’s was.

The other vindictive and selective prosecution argument — that Donald Trump cannot simply appoint a US Attorney to take out his enemies is right on the facts but inapt on the legal precedents. But this one is designed to corner the right wingers on the Supreme Court.

And if that happens, this motion to dismiss goes further than the other — it puts Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer in an awkward spot. Because if she was not authorized by law to go before the grand jury, she violated grand jury secrecy rules.

Here, Ms. Halligan’s unlawful appointment tainted the structural integrity of the grand jury process. Absent Ms. Halligan’s unlawful title, she would not have been able to enter the grand jury room, let alone present and sign an indictment. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow only “attorneys for the government” to be “present while the grand jury is in session,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1), and define such attorneys to include only “attorney[s] authorized by law to conduct” grand jury proceedings, Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Those rules implement the longstanding principle “that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings”—a principle that “is ‘as important for the protection of the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.’” United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (citations omitted). By limiting participation to government attorneys “authorized by law,” Rules 1 and 6 maintain the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding and reinforce that an unlawfully appointed attorney’s presentation to the grand jury underminesthe structure of that proceeding. The fundamental error here thus allows a presumption that Mr. Comey was prejudiced, “and any inquiry into harmless error would [require] unguided speculation.” Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257.

Which is weird, because she was trying to lecture Anna Bower about relying on NYT reporting from witnesses … who are allowed to share their testimony before the grand jury.

This is the easier way to throw out this prosecution. It’s the same interpretation of the law that already got Alina Habba and Sigal Chattah disqualified from cases that won’t, however, sink the entire case.

But if that does happen, Lindsey may be in a bit more trouble for even pretending to be a government prosecutor.

Along with his motions to dismiss because Lindsey Halligan was unlawfully appointed and for vindictive and selective prosecution, Jim Comey included a 60-page filing of all the mean things Donald Trump has said about him, dating from May 2, 2017 to September 27, 2025.

With very few examples, there’s very little that wasn’t already public:

• Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer’s appointment, showing that she was appointed under 28 USC 546, which Ed Whelan has argued is unlawful.
• A footnote describing that, “On October 15, 2025, the government confirmed to the defense that Person 1 refers to Hillary Clinton and Person 3 refers to Daniel Richman.”

There’s nothing (besides the appointment) hinting at what Comey received in discovery.

Curse you, Pat Fitzgerald!!!

That has the advantage of allowing Comey to submit everything in unredacted fashion (his response to the loaner prosecutors’ bid to breach his privilege did have key redactions). It likely also had the advantage of being mostly written by the time of the arraignment.

There are some interesting legal details, however, which also telegraph what Comey will file if these two, closely linked motions fail. One paragraph describes the way Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer misrepresented what he said to Ted Cruz five years ago, which the filing notes will become a motion to dismiss because what he said was literally true (the basis on which Judge Anthony Trenga dismissed one of five counts against Igor Danchenko).

The indictment misstates the exchange between Senator Cruz and Mr. Comey. Senator Cruz asked Mr. Comey to affirm or deny prior testimony that he authorized “someone else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in news reports about . . . the Clinton Administration.” But Hillary Clinton was not elected, and Senator Grassley’s original questioning in 2017 related to the “Clinton investigation.” See FBI Oversight Transcript at 5, Exhibit B. The indictment nonetheless mischaracterizes Mr. Comey as stating that he “had not ‘authorized someone else at the FBI to be an anonymous source in news reports’ regarding an FBI investigation concerning PERSON 1,” ECF No. 1 at 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the indictment replaces Senator Cruz’s reference to the “Clinton Administration” with a reference to “PERSON 1” (Hillary Clinton) and misleadingly attributes statements to Mr. Comey that he did not in fact make during his September 30, 2020, testimony. 8

Further, the indictment omits Senator Cruz’s words that explicitly narrow the focus of his questions to Mr. McCabe and misleadingly implies that the questioning related to Mr. Richman. In fact, Mr. Comey’s September 2020 exchange with Senator Cruz made no reference whatsoever to Mr. Richman, who ultimately appears in the indictment as PERSON 3. Instead, the context of the exchange confirms that Senator Cruz was asking about leaks by Mr. McCabe—indeed, Senator Cruz asked Mr. Comey whether he or Mr. McCabe was “telling the truth.” In other words, the indictment presents an inaccurate description of the testimony at the heart of this case.

8 Mr. Comey expects to move to dismiss Count One based on a defense of literal truth. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).

Another describes that, because Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer was unlawfully appointed, she had no business being in the grand jury.

To start, the government has flagrantly violated due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment by prosecuting Mr. Comey based on his protected speech and based on personal animus. Those acts alone satisfy the first factor. And there is more: The government effectuated the prosecution through a separate and independent willful violation—an unlawful appointment of a White House aide as interim U.S. Attorney.11 The government’s conduct is antithetical to fundamental constitutional principles and serves no legitimate governmental end.

11 The government also violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allow only “attorneys for the government” to be “present while the grand jury is in session,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1), and define such attorneys to include only “attorney[s] authorized by law to conduct” grand jury proceedings, Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Those rules implement the longstanding principle that grand jury proceedings must remain secret and thus reinforce that the unlawful appointment of Ms. Halligan tainted the structure of the grand jury proceeding. See United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983).

This is how the two motions work in tandem. The aberrant procedures used to install Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer is itself proof of vindictiveness.

The other interesting arguments address why this should be dismissed with prejudice — most notably (given the loaner prosecutors’ games with privileged communications) because if Judge Nachmanoff does not, they’ll try again in the next six months.

Finally, dismissal with prejudice is warranted because any other remedy would put Mr. Comey “at a greater disadvantage than [he] would have faced had the government” not violated the Constitution. Id. at 1043. In fact, dismissing the indictment without prejudice would reward the government for its last-minute installation of Ms. Halligan as interim U.S. Attorney and consequent manipulation of the statute of limitations. As noted, the statute of limitations on Mr. Comey’s purported offenses was set to expire just ten days after Ms. Halligan’s unlawful appointment. Had the Attorney General not appointed Ms. Halligan at the eleventh hour, there is no reason to believe that the indictment would have been filed within the limitations period. That timing is significant not only because it allowed the government to bring this prosecution, but also because the government will likely argue that the filing of the indictment tolls the limitations period under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. And if this Court were to dismiss without prejudice, the government will likely argue that it has six months from the date of dismissal to file a new indictment. See id.12 The government would thus be in a better position than it would have been but for its constitutional violations. And Mr. Comey is in a worse position because he faces criminal prosecution, rather than experiencing the repose of an expired limitations period.

12 Mr. Comey disputes that reading of Section 3288. But for present purposes, the important point is that the government can at least argue that Section 3288 allows it to file a new indictment if this case is dismissed without prejudice—thus prolonging this deeply flawed case.

There’s very little fucking around here.

There’s no hint whether and if so how much of the earlier documents (like the declination decisions by Bill Barr and John Durham or even the 302s from those prosecutors) prosecutors even gave Comey in discovery.

We don’t even get to hear about Kash Patel’s well-documented malice!

We might have to wait to see that for Maurene Comey’s lawsuit.

A filing in the Jim Comey case bearing the name of Lindsey Halligan claims that it is very important to disclose conflicts as early as possible.

1 “[Bo]th the Sixth Amendment and the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct invite, indeed compel, prosecutors to alert a trial court to a defense attorney’s potential or actual conflict.” United States v. Cortez, 205 F. Supp. 3d 768, 775 (E.D. Va. 2016) (emphasis added) (Ellis, J.); see also United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1155 (4th Cir. 1997) (Wilkinson, C.J.) (noting that a district court “has an obligation to foresee problems over representation that might arise at trial and head them off beforehand”).

Only, the filing is not disclosing conflicts that Halligan, the Trump personal defense attorney turned unlawfully appointed US Attorney who didn’t identify her client at the arraignment, might have.

Rather, in a bid to accelerate consideration of the loaner prosecutors’ filter request (which I wrote about here), it insinuates that Pat Fitzgerald has a possible conflict on this case. As it describes, some of the communications that (it all but confirms) Dan Richman designated as privileged back in 2019 include Fitzgerald.

Relevant to this motion, the attorney has informed the government that the quarantined evidence contains communications between the defendant and several attorneys. The current lead defense counsel appears to be a party to some of these communications.

To turn that into a potential conflict, the loaner prosecutors (and probably also James Hayes, who again shows as the author of the document, but who has not filed a notice of appearance in the case) wildly misrepresent the DOJ IG Report on Jim Comey’s retention of the memos he wrote memorializing his conversations with Trump.

[T]he defendant used current lead defense counsel to improperly disclose classified information.2

2 See U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Report of Investigation of Former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey’s Disclosure of Sensitive Investigative Information and Handling of Certain Memoranda, Oversight and Review Division Report 19-02, (August 2019), (located at https://web.archive.org/web/20250818022240/https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/o1902.pdf, last accessed October 19, 2025).

(They provide a Wayback Machine link, because Trump killed the DOJ IG site in his bid to kill the main Inspector General organization.)

While the IG Report describes that Comey sent Fitzgerald four of the memos — which Comey believed to be unclassified — he sent the memo that Richman shared for this NYT story separately, meaning the report does not substantiate the claim that Fitzgerald was in the loop on that story.

May 14, 2017

Comey sends scanned copies of Memos 2, 4, 6, and 7 from his personal email account to the personal email account of one of his attorneys, Patrick Fitzgerald. Before sending, Comey redacts the second paragraph from Memo 7 involving foreign affairs because Comey deems it irrelevant. On May 17 Fitzgerald forwards these four Memos to Comey’s other attorneys, David Kelley and Richman.

May 16, 2017

Comey sends a digital photograph of Memo 4 (describing the meeting in which Comey wrote that President Trump made the statement about “letting Flynn go”) to Richman via text message from Comey’s personal phone. Comey asks Richman to share the contents, but not the Memo itself, with a specific reporter for The New York Times. Comey’s stated purpose is to cause the appointment of a Special Counsel to ensure that any tape recordings that may exist of his conversations with President Trump are not destroyed. Richman conveys the substance of Memo 4 to the reporter. The New York Times publishes an article entitled “Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation.”

[snip]

As described in this section, on May 14, 2017, Comey transmitted copies of Memos 2, 4, and 6, and a partially redacted copy of Memo 7 to Fitzgerald, who was one of Comey’s personal attorneys. Comey told the OIG he thought of these Memos as his “recollection recorded,” like a diary or personal notes. Comey also said he believed “there’s nothing classified in here,” and so he thought he could share them with his personal attorneys.

And even using the FBI classification review of the memos he shared rather than Comey’s own review (he was an Original Classification Authority), he shared just six words, classified “Confidential” with his attorneys, and Richman didn’t share that information with Mike Schmidt.

FBI conducts a classification review of Comey’s Memos. The FBI determines that Comey correctly classified Memo 1 (which Comey did not share with anyone outside the FBI); that Memos 4, 5, and 6 are unclassified but “FOUO”; and that portions of Memos 2, 3, and 7 are classified, as follows:

Memo 2: Six words from a statement by President Trump comparing the relative importance of returning telephone calls from three countries, one of which the Memo notes the President mentioned twice, are classified as “CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN.” Comey did not redact this information before sharing Memo 2 with his attorneys.

Memo 3: Information about sources, methods, investigative activity, and foreign relations is classified as “SECRET//NOFORN.” Comey did not share Memo 3 with anyone outside the FBI.

Memo 7: An assessment of a foreign leader by President Trump and discussion of foreign relations is classified as “CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN.” Comey redacted this paragraph before he sent Memo 7 to his attorneys.

As Comey’s response notes, in a subsequent FOIA, a judge determined just one word was Confidential.

6 The portion of the memorandum the review team determined should be classified as “Confidential” concerned the President’s reference to then National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s questionable judgment in not having notified the President sooner of a call from the leader of a particular country. (Report at 44). In that context, President Trump compared certain countries to a smaller country and the upclassification treated the name of a smaller country as classified for fear of offending that country. (Id. at 44-45). Mr. Comey’s reaction to the upclassification was: “Are you guys kidding me?” (Id. at 47). A federal court in unrelated litigation brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) ultimately rejected all but one of the subsequent classifications. (Id. at 3 n.4; 47 n.78; 58 n.100 (citing Cable News Network, Inc., v. FBI, 384 F. Supp. 3d 19, 25-26, 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2019))). The classification of the memorandum has been addressed in subsequent litigation and the single word that remains “CONFIDENTIAL” is the name of a single country.

That is, even Richman didn’t release classified information here. There’s even less to suggest Fitzgerald did.

The loaner prosecutors (and James Hayes) just made that up. Which is what Comey noted in a response.

[T]he government’s effort to defame lead defense counsel provides no basis to grant the motion.

[snip]

[T]here is no good faith basis for attributing criminal conduct to either Mr. Comey or his lead defense counsel. Similarly, there is no good faith basis to claim a “conflict” between Mr. Comey and his counsel, much less a basis to move to disqualify lead defense counsel.

Their goal in doing so is now clear: They want to get details of what Richman said while representing Comey after Richman had left and Comey was fired from the FBIm a time period that is irrelevant to charges pertaining to what Richman did as an FBI employee.

And to do that, they’re treating the Comey Memos as akin to some kind of grand insurance fraud (the common crime behind the precedent they’re invoking to conduct a highly invasive privilege review), when it was quite legitimately something you would do — sharing your own memorialization of sensitive events — with a lawyer. Which is probably why, per the original filing, Comey plans to challenge the warrant to get to that material.

Their filing is at least disingenuous about something else. They claim they need Judge Nachmanoff to make a decision about this quickly so that they can meet their trial deadlines.

Prompt implementation of the filter protocol is necessary in this case so the current trial milestones are maintained and met. This has been a point of emphasis from the Court. This desire is also shared by the government.

Here, the potentially protected material could contain exculpatory or inculpatory evidence relevant to the defense and the government. Currently, the government is not aware of the contents of the potentially protected material. As a party to some of the communications contained in the potentially protected material, the defense necessarily has awareness.

But this bid for a filter team already necessarily disrupts the trial deadlines.

As I pointed out here, the current schedule — especially the “the fastest CIPA process you have ever seen in your lives” that Judge Nachmanoff ordered at the arraignment — presumes that Fitzgerald will get clearance quickly.

The schedule proposed by the parties assumes that attorney Patrick Fitzgerald receives his security clearance, or interim clearance, within a reasonable time, and that all the classified materials to be reviewed are made available to the defense within a reasonable time.

You don’t agree to that CIPA schedule and then decide you want to kick Fitzgerald off the case. At that point, you’re effectively fucking with Comey’s Speedy Trial right. If you, as prosecutors, are compelled to identify conflicts, you’re compelled to do so before you build an entire trial schedule around there not being one.

And you especially don’t get to do that when this material has been in DOJ custody since 2019.

If there were reason to believe the discussions that Comey memorialized about Trump’s attempt to kill the Russian investigation included evidence of a crime, Bill Barr would have pursued it back in 2020. He didn’t.

And yet now the loaner prosecutors want to delay Comey’s trial so they can make a mad bid to get material that was clearly privileged.

I was going to write about how important today’s filing in Illinois’ challenge to Trump’s invasion is.

Thankfully, Steve Vladeck did that so I don’t have to.

As for why it’s this application that presents the Court with a make-or-break moment, it’s worth reflecting on what it would mean if the full Court grants the Trump administration’s request.

First, and immediately, it will mean that the Trump administration is allowed to deploy troops onto the streets of Chicago (and Broadview) to effectively militarize the enforcement of our immigration laws. Although the application to the Supreme Court is replete with references to protecting federal property, the federal government doesn’t need the authorities that are currently blocked to do that; it can use regular troops, almost certainly without invoking 10 U.S.C. § 12406 or any other statute. (This is the “protective” power.) The power the Trump administration is seeking here is much broader—and would almost certainly mean that federalized National Guard troops would start accompanying ICE officers on immigration raids and other operations—even if they’re not making the arrests themselves. That would be a … dramatic … escalation relative to where we are today.

[snip]

Third, and most importantly, it would allow the federal government to obtain emergency relief based upon either (1) a limitless view of what it means to be “unable to execute the laws of the United States”; or (2) an incredibly one-sided factual narrative that was expressly rejected by the district judge, and that the unanimous court of appeals panel refused to disturb. The justices aren’t factfinders, and absent some “clear” reason to believe that the lower courts erred in discrediting the Trump administration’s factual claims (when, in fact, there are lots of reasons to believe that the district court was right), to grant relief in the face of those findings is to not just show stunning disrespect to both the lower courts and the appropriate standard of review; it’s to send the message that the facts just don’t matter—so long as five or more justices personally believe whatever the federal government is telling them.

That would be a big enough problem in other contexts (I’ve already written about the casual relationship Justice Kavanaugh’s Vasquez Perdomo concurrence has with the facts), but it would be utterly catastrophic here. After all, armed with a grant of emergency relief on this application, what is to stop the Trump administration from making comparably inflated and/or invented claims about the situations on the ground in other American cities as a pretextual basis for deploying troops? And what’s to stop it from making those claims not (just) tomorrow, but next November—on the eve of the midterm elections?

Having outsourced that gloomy contemplation to him, I want to point to several things that might lead SCOTUS to exercise some sanity.

First, Vladeck cited from Judge April Perry’s ruling on the lack of credibility of the affiants that the Administration submitted. But he didn’t note the paragraph following the general credibility assessment, in which Judge Perry described how the government threatened to invade the courthouse itself.

Finally, the Court notes its concern about a third declaration submitted by Defendants, in which the declarant asserted that the FPS “requested federalized National Guard personnel to support protection of the Federal District Court on Friday, October 10, 2025.” Doc. 62-3. This purported fact was incendiary and seized upon by both parties at oral argument. It was also inaccurate, as the Court noted on the record. To their credit, Defendants have since submitted a corrected declaration, and the affiant has declared that they did not make the error willfully. Doc. 65-1. All of the parties have been moving quickly to compile factual records and legal arguments, and mistakes in such a context are inevitable. That said, Defendants only presented declarations from three affiants with first-hand knowledge of events in Illinois. And, as described above, all three contain unreliable information. [links added]

Over the weekend, in response to a question about the Insurrection Act, Trump noted that one benefit (to him) of invoking it would be to shut down the courts.

This is not just a threat to the sovereignty of states. It is, explicitly, a threat to the coequal status of the courts, up to and including SCOTUS. That may make them view this threat differently.

And Trump hasn’t helped his credibility since then.

Perhaps most spectacularly, the details regarding a number of “Kavanaugh stops” have come out since Judge Perry ruled for Chicago, not least the case of a teenaged girl who was violently detained in Hoffman Estates.

A teen in Hoffman Estates was thrown to the ground by what appeared to be a federal agent this past weekend, and the teen and two of her friends were detained for hours before they were released.

Her parents spoke out Monday after they say their daughter, 18-year-old Evelyn, is still shaken from the experience.

Evelyn’s parents said her boyfriend got a call that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were in his neighborhood. They went to warn people who live there and recorded the officers. This led to a violent arrest, in which the U.S. Department of Homeland Security said it did not take part.

Video from the Friday incident shows sirens and undercover law enforcement cars flooding the Hoffman Estates neighborhood where the arrest happened.

The video shows Evelyn getting pulled out of the passenger seat. She is then thrown to the ground, all while saying she is not resisting arrest, as the officer handcuffed her and appeared to put a knee on her back.

[snip]

In a post on X, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin commented on Evelyn’s arrest video, saying, “Imagine being so desperate to demonize law enforcement you post a video from a burglary arrest Chicago police made over a year ago. This isn’t even ICE.”

Hoffman Estates police, however, said ICE was in the area on Friday.

Her treatment not only debunks Justice Kavanaugh’s claim that the impact of racial profiling on US citizens is minimal, but it exposes Tricia McLaughlin as a fabricator.

Meanwhile, even as Trump is claiming a rebellion in Chicago, as many as 250,000 people showed up for the No Kings protest in Chicago on Saturday. While there were clashes at Broadview, where the ICE facility is, I’ve seen no reports of disturbances at the protest itself. Chicago can rightly point to the peaceful protest as a counter to the inflated claims from the government.

Then there’s Trump’s childish tantrums this weekend.

Chicago is arguing that Trump is invading not for any reason tied to law enforcement, but out of animus. It’s hard to imagine any more succinct expression of such animus than Trump’s shit post responding to the protests.

And finally, the fiasco at Camp Pendleton — where Trump whined after Gavin Newsom shut down the freeway during Trump’s live ammunition display at the base, only to be vindicated when shrapnel from the event hit JD Vance’s motorcade.

Vladeck is right: If SCOTUS grants Trump relief here, it will be far worse than any of their earlier shadow docket interventions. Let’s hope that Trump’s weekend tantrums will finally convince the court that he can no longer be indulged.

I was going to write a piece anticipating the showdown at SCOTUS over Stephen Miller’s invasion of Chicago, which may well determine the future of democracy in the US.

But as I was contemplating all the lies that Miller and his henchman have been caught telling in Chicago and Portland, two other stories came out that highlight how bad Miller is at execution. Both pertain to his effort, built on a edifice of lies, to rationalize a war in Venezuela based off a largely manufactured claim that Tren de Aragua is “invading the US” on behalf of Nicolás Maduro.

Chronologically, WaPo provides new details about the quid pro quo behind Marco Rubio’s deal to send planeloads of Venezuelans to a concentration camp in El Salvador: The US would have to send the people who had cooperated with DOJ to expose Nayib Bukele’s ties to MS-13, a gang that Trump purported to treat as a terrorist organization.

In the days before the Trump administration deported hundreds of Venezuelan immigrants to a notorious prison in El Salvador, the president of that country demanded something for himself: the return of nine MS-13 gang leaders in U.S. custody.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in a March 13 phone call with Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, promised the request would be fulfilled, according to officials familiar with the conversation. But there was one obstacle: Some of the MS-13 members Bukele wanted were “informants” under the protection of the U.S. government, Rubio told him.

To deport them to El Salvador, Attorney General Pam Bondi would need to terminate the Justice Department’s arrangements with those men, Rubio said. He assured Bukele that Bondi would complete that process and Washington would hand over the MS-13 leaders.

[snip]

The deal would give Bukele possession of individuals who threatened to expose the alleged deals his government made with MS-13 to help achieve El Salvador’s historic drop in violence, officials said. For the Salvadoran president, a return of the informants was viewed as critical to preserving his tough-on-crime reputation. It was also a key step in hindering an ongoing U.S. investigation into his government’s relationship with MS-13, a gang famous for displays of excessive violence in the United States and elsewhere.

We’ve known from earlier reporting that Bukele’s ask was top level MS-13 members in US custody. We didn’t know they were informing against Bukele.

Note that this reported conversation with Bukele on March 13 was two days before the invocation of the Alien Enemies Act and three before the men — most guilty of nothing more than sporting less incriminating tattoos than the Secretary of Defense — got shipped away in a rush.

One of the many things that remains unexplained about the story is the reason for the rush — the rush to get an agreement, the rush to put men on planes.

Even given the rush (and the narrowly averted government shutdown), that’s when things started falling apart, when the ACLU got notice of the deportations, got an order from James Boasberg enjoining the deportations, and so set Erez Reuveni on a path that would get him fired. Not long after, one of the Salvadorans that Rubio intended to deal to Bukele, Vladimir Arévalo Chávez (who is mentioned in the WaPo story, started challenging the dismissal of his case and subsequent deportation, ultimately leading Judge Joan Azrack to order parts of the docket unsealed.

Then there are the murderboats in the Caribbean — a series of wildly illegal strikes lacking any recognizable legal justification. The murderboats appear to be an attempt to draw Nicolás Maduro into a war — though the Atlantic describes the underlying motivation as something far more craven, little more than an attempt to “paint immigrants as a dangerous menace.”

Then there are the senior officials who see Venezuela as a means to project a tough-guy, defender-of-the-homeland image. Stephen Miller views the air strikes as an opportunity to paint immigrants as a dangerous menace, according to one of the White House officials. Vice President J. D. Vance, though often inclined toward isolationism, has pushed the necessity of defending U.S. borders. And Hegseth, who prefers to be known as the war secretary, is seeking a means of projecting military strength in a region where Defense Department planners hope to reassert American primacy.

Donald Trump’s top aides have all decided to murder people in cold blood as a propaganda stunt.

Even before the most powerful military in the history of the world failed to fully execute its murderboat mission days ago, there were cracks in Miller’s murderboat propaganda campaign — not just the increasing demands for some kind of credible legal explanation, but also the resignation of SouthCom Commander Alvin Holsey. And even before all that, it became clear that Miller’s murderboat targets were not what he claimed they were: Venezuelans bringing fentanyl to the United States. The boats were too small. That’s not how fentanyl is trafficked to the US, most importantly, they weren’t all Venezuelans. Two were Trinis. Weeks ago, Colombian President Gustavo Petro started complaining that Colombians were being targeted.

And then the most powerful military in the history of the world failed its mission, operating in uncontested waters, to completely destroy a submersible it claims was shipping drugs to the United States.

The most powerful military in the history of the world failed to destroy a boat and as a result two very awkward targets — neither Venezuelan — survived.

And now, because of the slovenly execution of Miller’s attempt to gin up a war with Venezuela, Petro and Trump are ratcheting up a war of words over the earlier targeting of what Petro claims was a fishing boat in distress inside Colombian waters.

The slovenliness is so ingrained that the people writing Trump’s tweets can’t even spell Colombia properly.

Stephen Miller is incredibly powerful and so fascistic that Trump even hesitates to describe his ambition.

But he is also downright slovenly.

Stephen Miller is attempting to start a war to rationalize his domestic war. And he can’t even be fucked to dot his I-s and cross his T-s.

Update: We have always been at war against Eastasia.

The U.S. military has killed three men and destroyed another boat it suspected of running drugs in the Caribbean Sea, this one alleged to have been affiliated with a Colombian insurgency group, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on Sunday.

It was the seventh boat known to have been attacked since early September as part of the Trump administration’s use of the military to kill people suspected of smuggling drugs as if they were enemy soldiers in a war, rather than arresting them as criminals. The latest strike took place on Friday, and Mr. Hegseth said in a social media post on Sunday that it had targeted a vessel associated with the National Liberation Army, a Colombian rebel group known as the E.L.N.

When I told my taxi driver I was in Dublin to go to a No Kings rally at the American Embassy, we had quite the chat. He came from a big Republican family, he explained, before he went on to catalogue how many of his relatives had been shot during the Easter Rising in 1916 and at which of the locations we were driving by.

No Kings rings a bit different here in Dublin.

According to the organizer, we had about 400 people — 100 more than they had in the summer — representing almost every state. Some of us live here, some just showed up to protest in the middle of vacations of varying lengths.

We were right on a main road, with lots of people honking in solidarity.

We had maybe 6 frogs, one dancing dinosaur, and one chicken over the course of the protest, including a frog from Portland.

There were Epstein signs and LGBTQ flags and one Good Trouble sign and some fancy artwork.

The signs that really got me were held by kids, like these siblings who scolded, “Masked warrantless ICE agents are not American” and demanded, “stop holding back my future.”

Another sign read, in Irish, “Freedom for Palestine, Freedom for America.”

I’m used to seeing the Gaelige used to support Palestine. I had not seen the US lumped in alongside before.

I posted a few more pictures in this thread.

Over a century after Ireland itself declared No Kings once and for all, this was safe and easy. May your No Kings rally today be as safe!

Tell us about it in the thread.

Donald Trump’s weaponization of government against his adversaries is a catastrophic assault on rule of law.

But in those efforts, he continues to do things that may backfire. I’ve noted repeatedly how poorly he chooses the political martyrs he creates. Just the other day, for example, Tish James got rock star treatment when she introduced and endorsed Zohran Mamdani.

In addition, Trump is conducting his vengeance tour in such a ham-handed fashion that that one after another after another after another after another after another after another prosecutor quit or resigned to much notice. Each will be available as witness to the politicization of DOJ.

Aside from LaMonica McIver (whose arrest the chattering class seem to have forgotten), Trump bolloxed the timing — the sequencing of his attacks — as well.

He indicted the well-lawyered Jim Comey, thus far the shoddiest case, first, and did so in EDVA’s rocket docket. That means that those who follow will benefit from the work — and possibly even precedents — Comey obtains. By the time Attorney General James is arraigned on October 24, for example, both Comey’s motion to disqualify Lindsey Halligan and his motion for selective and vindictive prosecution will be public.

And yesterday, with Trump’s commutation of George Santos’ prison sentence, he botched the timing again.

Trump’s clemency has already featured in motions for selective and vindictive prosecution. Both McIver and Sean Dunn (the sandwich guy) have invoked the Jan6ers that Trump pardoned as people who viciously assaulted cops but were freed. But in McIver’s case, as I laid out here, the government claimed — partly by placing an auto-pen in Trump’s hand — that prosecutors who dismissed the pending cases were left with no discretion after Trump issued his order.

McIver’s claim faces a threshold, insurmountable defect: the January 6 Defendants cannot be considered similarly situated because they all were pardoned. As a consequence, their ongoing prosecutions had to be dismissed without regard to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and they could not be prosecuted for January 6th related crimes thereafter. Because a similarly situated individual is someone that “could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which [the defendant was] charged, but were not prosecuted,” and the January 6 Defendants on their face do not meet those basic criteria, McIver’s motion must fail. See Hedaithy, 392 F.3d at 607 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470); see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469.

But in Tish James’ case, the guy most responsible for her charges — the guy who has been literally stalking her in a dirty old man trench coat — also happens to be the guy who exercised discretion in the commutation of George Santos. Indeed, Eagle Ed Martin, who in addition to serving as Trump’s weaponization czar, also serves as Pardon Attorney, boasted of his role in the commutation.

To be sure, the kinds of fraud with which Eagle Ed charged Tish James are different than the kinds to which Santos pled guilty. Eagle Ed and Lindsey the Insurance Lawyer are effectively attempting to criminalize James’ generosity, her provision of a $137,000 home to her great niece. Even if she did what is alleged (and all the evidence suggests she did not), any benefit to James herself would be less than $19,000.

Meanwhile, Santos defrauded identified victims — some of them vulnerable seniors — of almost $375,000, along with $200,000 in ill-gotten gains himself. The victims include:

• The Republican Party (which matched funds Santos hadn’t earned)
• Donors whose credit cards he defrauded
• Redstone Strategies investors
• New York State’s Unemployment Insurance
• Congress

Whereas Trump claims that the fraud for which James prosecuted him had no victims, because the banks ultimately got paid back (true of the loans James obtained as well), Santos’ crimes had a number of real victims, victims who have not yet been made whole.

And Donald Trump made no secret why he sprung Santos from prison: in crafting a false comparison with Richard Blumenthal, Trump declared that, “at least Santos had the Courage, Conviction, and Intelligence to ALWAYS VOTE REPUBLICAN!”

Alleged Democratic fraudsters get charges whereas far more dangerous Republican fraudsters win a Get Out of Jail Free card. It couldn’t be more clear.

It’s certainly possible that, if James used Santos as a comparator (along with other Republicans, like Ken Paxton, who haven’t been charged), DOJ would claim Trump may not have known about the various kinds of financial fraud Santos engaged in.

But if he doesn’t know that, it’s the fault of the Pardon Attorney.

The guy in the dirty old man trench coat, who has been stalking New York’s Attorney General all the while.

DOJ might claim that they can’t share any details of Santos’ commutation.

Too late!

In DOJ’s response to McIver, they already exhibited a willingness to share details of the treatment of specific pardons.

10 On September 2, 2025, the undersigned Assistant U.S. Attorneys spoke with the Deputy Pardon Attorney from the Office of the Pardon Attorney who confirmed that: (i) the January 6 Defendants with then-pending cases received pardons under the Pardon and were eligible to receive certificates of pardon, and (ii) that any January 6 Defendant was still considered pardoned even if a certificate of pardon was not requested. Additionally, the Deputy Pardon Attorney provided examples of certificates of pardon issued for January 6 Defendants with previously pending cases who requested a certificate.

I’m sure it seemed very clever, putting Eagle Ed in charge of both hunting Trump’s enemies and freeing his friends. But in this particular case it might get tricky.

At the very same time Eagle Ed was stalking Tish James up and down the Eastern Seaboard, desperately trying to find some crime to charge her with, he was also busy finding a way to free a much bigger, confessed fraudster from prison.

On Nicole’s podcast today, I said that many of the criminal issues that will arise from Trump’s politicization of DOJ won’t be all that controversial at SCOTUS (and SCOTUS is least awful on criminal justice issues). But I said one area would likely break new ground: selective and vindictive prosecution.

Jim Comey’s prosecution — and that of everyone else Trump is pursuing — fits poorly in the existing precedents for selective and vindictive prosecution, even while they clearly are vindictive.

Plus, I noted, that Trump’s penchant for yapping about legal cases even as DOJ attempts to protect him from liability in them conflicts with the language of Trump v. USA that — recklessly — puts the President in a prosecutorial function.

And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693; see United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.’” (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. As we have explained, the President’s power to remove “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed” may not be regulated by Congress or reviewed by the courts. Myers, 272 U. S., at 106, 176; see supra, at 8. The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Either Trump is properly in a prosecutorial role, in which case he needs to be at the center of these cases (and interventions like the Eric Adams bribery case), exposed to discovery. Or, his interventions are improper.

The current state of affairs, where DOJ claims the President is immune from discovery, permitted to speak endlessly about criminal cases, yet order up criminal prosecutions, is fundamentally inconsistent with rule of law.

Which is why I’m interested in four people Comey has added to his defense team (while also getting permission to submit a 45-page selective and vindictive prosecution brief, 15 pages extra).

Comey has added:

• Elias Kim, a Cooley Associate with an appellate focus
• Ephraim McDowell, a Cooley Partner focused on appellate issues
• Rebekah Donaleski, a Cooley Partner who, while at SDNY, was on the Lev Parnas/Rudy Giuliani team, including the Special Master process that exploited all of Rudy’s phones
• Michael Dreeben, one of the best SCOTUS litigators out there, who worked on both the Mueller and Jack Smith teams

Donaleski is interesting enough, not least given the loaner AUSA bid to play games with filter teams. Plus, she would have overlapped with Maurene Comey at SDNY (and with some of Jim Comey’s old pals when she first got there, probably).

But the others, especially Dreeben, signal that Comey is going into this with a plan and the expectation that he will have to argue this case before SCOTUS.

This team is a signal that Comey intends to reverse some of the damage done by Trump v. USA.

Listen on spotify (transcripts available)

Listen on Apple (transcripts available)

Link to Tim Miller interviewing Robby Roadsteamer

Link to ICE officer being an asshole to cops