graphic by mopupduty.com

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Well well well. who couldda knowd?? Acute prosecutorial foul play has ended the big Roger Clemens perjury trial at it’s gestation. From ESPN:

The judge presiding over Roger Clemens’ perjury trial declared a mistrial over inadmissible evidence shown to jurors.

U.S. District Judge Reggie Walton said Clemens could not be assured a fair trial after prosecutors showed jurors evidence against his orders in the second day of testimony.

He will hear a motion on whether a new trial would be considered double jeopardy.

Whooo boy, Judge Walton must have been a little upset. Why yes, yes, he was:

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“I don’t see how I un-ring the bell,” he said

Walton interrupted the prosecution’s playing of a video from Clemens’ 2008 testimony before Congress and had the jury removed from the courtroom. Clemens is accused of lying during that testimony when he said he never used performance-enhancing drugs during his 24-season career in the major leagues.

One of the chief pieces of evidence against Clemens is testimony from his former teammate and close friend, Andy Pettitte, who says Clemens told him in 1999 or 2000 that he used human growth hormone. Clemens has said that Pettitte misheard him. Pettitte also says he told his wife, Laura, about the conversation the same day it happened.

Prosecutors had wanted to call Laura Pettitte as a witness to back up her husband’s account, but Walton had said he wasn’t inclined to have her testify since she didn’t speak directly to Clemens.

Walton was angered that in the video prosecutors showed the jury, Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Md., referred to Pettitte’s conversation with his wife.

“I think that a first-year law student would know that you can’t bolster the credibility of one witness with clearly inadmissible evidence,” Walton said.

Well, yes, Reggie Walton is exactly right. It was not only an inappropriate attempt at backdoor admission of what was, at the time, hearsay but, much, much, more importantly flew directly in the face of a direct and specific previous order of the court on this EXACT issue. You just do not do that, and if you do you cannot whine when the court spanks your ass. You got said ass whuppin the old fashioned way, you earned it.

So, now the germane question is where do we go from here; i.e. what about a new trial. Well, that depends on a fair amount of pretty complicated things that are not going to be self evident to those not more than intimately experienced in the nuances of technical trial law are going to understand. I will get into that in detail, and discuss the legal implications and situation, when the pleadings are filed. Judge Walton has scheduled a Sept. 2 hearing on whether to hold a new trial, or dismiss the case permanently due to double jeopardy. clemens’ defense team will have until July 29 to file the motion to dismiss with prejudice and the prosecution has until Aug. 2 to respond.

A lot of judges would have tried to paper over this bogosity by the prosecution. Reggie Walton is PISSED. He may well say they are done based on double jeopardy. Those are gonna be fun briefs, and a very interesting oral argument.

One further thing, despite the incredibly short tenure of this jury trial – literally really in the first day of evidentiary presentation – today’s antics were NOT the first instance of prosecutorial misconduct. Oh no, the government was acting maliciously and unethically from the get go in the opening statements.

[Judge Walton] said it was the second time that prosecutors had gone against his orders — the other being an incident that happened during opening arguments Wednesday when assistant U.S. attorney Steven Durham said that Pettite and two other of Clemens’ New York teammates, Chuck Knoblauch and Mike Stanton, had used human growth hormone.

Walton said in pre-trial hearings that such testimony could lead jurors to consider Clemens guilty by association. Clemens’ defense attorney objected when Durham made the statement and Walton told jurors to disregard Durham’s comments about other players.

Yes, boy howdy, that is precisely right.

I think that the Laura Pettite bit, coupled with the improper attempt at prohibited guilt by association in the openings makes a fast pattern to malicious prosecution. If Reggie wants, he can dismiss and ground it upon both mistrial and sanction for malicious.

I’ve been telling people for years that it was NOT just former IRS goon come FDA stoolie agent Jeff Novitsky (although it all starts with him) that was malfeasant in the BALCO cases, including the Mitchell report kerfuffle, it was the AUSAs too.

This mendaciousness is just bogus and deplorable. Congratulations to Judge Reggie Walton for fingering it for what it is. Now dismiss this bunk forever please.

Republicans are big fans of projection. When they’re neck-deep in conflicts of interest, they like to hide it by accusing Democrats of such conflicts. When they leak stuff, they accuse Democrats. When they mismanage stuff, they accuse Democrats.

And yesterday, Darrell Issa got caught doing just that.

A year ago, on July 27, 2010, Issa accused the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of partisanship, largely because Democrats passed the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill before the FCIC reported its conclusions. Of particular note, Issa claimed Democrats on the FCIC were letting partisan ties direct their work.

Yet, as a report released by Elijah Cummings yesterday makes clear, the Republicans were the ones being directed by outside influences–both by their own partisan considerations, as well as two possible lobbyists. The report found that:

• Immediately after Republicans took the House last November, some Republicans on the Committee started tailoring their contributions to make sure they would serve the goal of setting up a repeal of Dodd-Frank. Of particular note, Commissioner Peter Wallison started sending emails warning, “It’s very important, I think, that what we say in our separate statements not undermine the ability of the new House GOP to modify or repeal Dodd-Frank.”
• Wallison (who is a fellow of AEI) also tailored his contributions–including his separate statement–largely to parrot the discredited theories of AEI fellow (and former Fannie Mae official) Edward Pinto. Pinto argued that the entire crash was caused by HUD’s affordable housing policy. Wallison’s mindless insistence on advancing Pinto’s theory got so bad that the special assistant to Republican FCIC Vice Chairman, Bill Thomas, suggested, “I can’t tell re: who is the leader and who is the follower. If Peter is really a parrot for Pinto, he’s putting a lot of faith in the guy.” Not only did Wallison serve Parrot’s propaganda, though: he also shared confidential documents made available to the FCIC, violating its ethics standards.
• Thomas himself consulted with–and shared confidential information with–someone outside the Commission: the CEO of a political consulting firm, Alex Brill (he’s also a fellow at AEI). At one level, Brill seems to have been offering Thomas political advice. But it also appears Brill may have been trying to cushion the damage done by the FCIC to Citibank’s reputation.

Now, Cummings released this report partly because Issa refused to call Thomas and Wallison as witnesses in his inquiry into problems with the FCIC. And the release of the report seems to have convinced Issa to indefinitely postpone the investigation into the FCIC.

Good–this is precisely the kind of thing I was thinking of when I suggested we needed someone like Cummings to babysit Issa.

But it also seems like a good time to turn this into a much bigger attack.

As Cummings’ FCIC report makes clear, what Wallison and Thomas appear to have done is unethically misuse funds appropriated by Congress. While it’s not entirely clear who the ultimate beneficiaries of their ethical lapses are–aside from, vaguely, the banksters, both men were collaborating improperly with AEI fellows. More clearly, both men appear to have violated their ethical obligations–a set of rules–to try to make sure banksters didn’t have to follow any rules passed under Dodd-Frank.

Issa is teeing off today, again, against Elizabeth Warren. I do hope Cummings finds ample opportunity to remind Issa that it’s clear he’s doing the bidding not of transparency or oversight or the American people, but rather a number of corrupt banksters trying to avoid playing by the rules.

The ACLU has just FOIAed the CIA and Director of National Intelligence for any information on Juan Cole. It asks for,

e-mails, letters, faxes, or other correspondence, memoranda, contemporaneous notes of meetings or phone calls, reports or any other material relating to the gathering, collecting, copying, collating, generating or other use of information and material regarding Professor Cole,

The FOIA is addressed to CIA, Director of National Intelligence, and DOJ.

Now, far be it for me to tell ACLU how to FOIA–after all, they’re the best in the business at wringing embarrassing documents out of the government.

But they might want to FOIA DOD, too.

You see, there’s something that has been haunting me about this description from James Risen’s story on this.

According to Mr. Carle, Mr. Low returned from a White House meeting one day and inquired who Juan Cole was, making clear that he wanted Mr. Carle to gather information on him. Mr. Carle recalled his boss saying, “The White House wants to get him.”“ ‘What do you think we might know about him, or could find out that could discredit him?’ ” Mr. Low continued, according to Mr. Carle.

Mr. Carle said that he warned that it would be illegal to spy on Americans and refused to get involved, but that Mr. Low seemed to ignore him.

That first request elicited, Carle told Amy Goodman, four paragraphs of information, one of which included derogatory information.

GLENN CARLE: Yes, that’s correct. I was—the following day, I came to work and was asked to represent my office at the senior staff meeting, which is routine. And I did. And it was also routine that I take a memorandum of some sort up to the front office, I believe, for the White House. And I thought that I should know what I was doing for the morning, and I read the memo, and it was a memo on Professor Cole with four paragraphs, as I recall, only one of which was about inappropriate personal information. The other three struck me as innocuous. I don’t remember specifically what they said, but one of the four.

Now maybe it’s Carle’s reference, also in the Democracy Now interview, to the Plame outing. But I can’t help but think of how the White House got people across the national security community to reveal that Plame worked for the CIA: They kept asking for information on Wilson’s trip, long after they had already gotten the information they purportedly needed. So, for example, the day after John Hannah briefed Cheney on the trip, Cheney asked someone at CIA for more information on the trip, using incorrect information that would need corrected (I suspect this request was made at a Deputies Committee meeting at the White House, and I think Libby is the one who formally made the request). Then, two days later and almost certainly after Cheney had been briefed personally by (he says) George Tenet as well as (records show) John McLaughlin, and almost certainly after Libby had gotten information from Marc Grossman on Plame’s work at the CIA, Cheney and Libby called the CIA from a meeting with Cathie Martin, to ask for information they already knew. That call was ultimately how Martin learned, from Bill Harlow, that Plame worked for the CIA.

You see, the White House kept asking for the same information they already knew so they could try to get the CIA to share that information in a way they could use it. Of course, along the way, they increased the circle of people who knew that information, which is one of the things that led to the leak of Plame’s identity.

Now, this may not be what is happening here: an attempt to get CIA to take note of information about Cole the White House believed was derogatory.

But it would be worth checking to see whether likely co-participants in a meeting with National Intelligence Council’s David Low or CIA’s Deputy Director for intelligence, John A. Kringen also got similar requests–not least because DOD, with its CIPA program, would likely have been less squeamish about digging up dirt on Cole.

In any case, given the way the government responds to FOIAs, we’ll probably learn more about this in 5 years or so.

In its statement of Administration policy on HR 2055–which funds military construction–the Administration expressed concern that the Senate had cut $100 million funding for two projects in Bahrain.

The Administration is worried, you see, that such cuts would signal that we do not “stand by its allies.”

The Administration is concerned about the reduction in funding for military construction projects in Bahrain as well as those associated with the relocation of United States Marines to Guam. Deferring or eliminating these projects could signal that the U.S. does not stand by its allies or its agreements such as the realignment of forces from Okinawa to Guam.

Because it’s very important to “stand by” our allies, I guess, when the abuse their own people.

Across the pond–in the investigation of British complicity with the torture of Binyam Mohamed and others–the Supreme Court has told the government it can’t present secret evidence.

The supreme court has outlawed the use of secret evidence in court by the intelligence services to conceal allegations that detainees were tortured.

The decision will be seen as a significant victory for open justice, but the panel of nine judges pointed out that parliament could change the law to permit such “closed material procedures” in future.

The appeal was brought by lawyers for MI5 seeking to overturn an earlier appeal court ruling that prevented the service from suppressing accusations British suspects had been ill-treated at Guantánamo Bay and other foreign holding centres.

And here in the land where such secrets have become the norm, Apuzzo and Goldman reveal one of the reasons why DOJ is taking a closer look at Manadel al-Jamadi’s death: because the CIA guy in charge of an unofficial interrogation program in Iraq went beyond clear directions from HQ.

Steve Stormoen, who is now retired from the CIA, supervised an unofficial program in which the CIA imprisoned and interrogated men without entering their names in the Army’s books.

The so-called “ghosting” program was unsanctioned by CIA headquarters. In fact, in early 2003, CIA lawyers expressly prohibited the agency from running its own interrogations, current and former intelligence officials said. The lawyers said agency officers could be present during military interrogations and add their expertise but, under the laws of war, the military must always have the lead.

This detail is interesting for another reason. The AP notes that Stormoen asked to use torture tactics.

Tactics such as waterboarding and sleep deprivation, which the CIA used in other overseas prisons, were prohibited at Abu Ghraib without prior approval. In videoconferences with headquarters, Stormoen and other officers in Iraq repeatedly asked for permission to use harsher techniques, but that permission was never granted, one former senior intelligence official recalled.

This would have put Stormoen in Iraq asking to use things like waterboarding not long after someone in OVP suggested waterboarding a different detainee, Muhammed Khudayr al-Dulaymi.

At the end of April 2003, not long after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. forces captured an Iraqi who Bush White House officials suspected might provide information of a relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime. Muhammed Khudayr al-Dulaymi was the head of the M-14 section of Mukhabarat, one of Saddam’s secret police organizations. His responsibilities included chemical weapons and contacts with terrorist groups.

[snip]

Duelfer says he heard from “some in Washington at very senior levels (not in the CIA),” who thought Khudayr’s interrogation had been “too gentle” and suggested another route, one that they believed has proven effective elsewhere. “They asked if enhanced measures, such as waterboarding, should be used,” Duelfer writes. “The executive authorities addressing those measures made clear that such techniques could legally be applied only to terrorism cases, and our debriefings were not as yet terrorism-related. The debriefings were just debriefings, even for this creature.”

Duelfer will not disclose who in Washington had proposed the use of waterboarding, saying only: “The language I can use is what has been cleared.” In fact, two senior U.S. intelligence officials at the time tell The Daily Beast that the suggestion to waterboard came from the Office of Vice President Cheney.

Now, I have always imagined that Cheney tried to order up military interrogators to waterboard Khudayr; OVP wasn’t exactly getting along with the CIA in 2003. But you do have to wonder why Stormoen ignored HQ’s directions on torture.

A detainee in what Jeremy Scahill describes as “a secret prison buried in the basement of Somalia’s National Security Agency (NSA) headquarters, where prisoners suspected of being Shabab members or of having links to the group are held”–one with key US involvement–describes his internment this way.

I have been here for one year, seven months. I have been interrogated so many times. Interrogated by Somali men and white men. Every day. New faces show up. They have nothing on me. I have never seen a lawyer, never seen an outsider. Only other prisoners, interrogators, guards. Here there is no court or tribunal.

Scahill’s entire article, describing our counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, is of course a must read, particularly given questions raised by the Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame indictment.

But given my non-debate with Benjamin Wittes about drones and sovereignty (though these programs go far beyond drone strikes), I wanted to point to Scahill’s description of the arrangement the US has with Somalia in this.

According to well-connected Somali sources, the CIA is reluctant to deal directly with Somali political leaders, who are regarded by US officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Instead, the United States has Somali intelligence agents on its payroll. Somali sources with knowledge of the program described the agents as lining up to receive $200 monthly cash payments from Americans. “They support us in a big way financially,” says the senior Somali intelligence official. “They are the largest [funder] by far.”

[snip]

It is unclear how much control, if any, Somalia’s internationally recognized president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has over this counterterrorism force or if he is even fully briefed on its operations. The CIA personnel and other US intelligence agents “do not bother to be in touch with the political leadership of the country. And that says a lot about the intentions,” says Aynte. “Essentially, the CIA seems to be operating, doing the foreign policy of the United States. You should have had State Department people doing foreign policy, but the CIA seems to be doing it across the country.”

While the Somali officials interviewed for this story said the CIA is the lead US agency coordinating the Mogadishu counterterrorism program, they also indicated that US military intelligence agents are at times involved. When asked if they are from JSOC or the Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior Somali intelligence official responded, “We don’t know. They don’t tell us.”

Not only is the bulk of our relationship with Somalia going through these intelligence channels to intelligence channels. But it also relies on African Union forces.

The [defense bill authorizing increased counterterrorism support in Somalia], however, did not authorize additional funding for Somalia’s military, as the country’s leaders have repeatedly asked. Instead, the aid package would dramatically increase US arming and financing of AMISOM’s forces, particularly from Uganda and Burundi, as well as the militaries of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia.

I understand that Somalia is one of the most challenging places to work, given the absence of any viable state (save, perhaps, al-Shabaab). But our direct–and secret–control of other territories is worth thinking seriously about.

It is with very mixed feelings that I announce emptywheel will be leaving Firedoglake at the end of this week.

About six years ago, I started blogging on the abuse of power. At first it was the CIA Leak case. Then it was torture. And warrantless wiretapping. And now drones and Gitmo and corruption and the withering rule of law. With things like auto bailouts and healthcare interspersed along the way.

I’ve been doing this a long time, and never took the time to take a step back to figure out how best to do this work. And while I’ve been privileged to have had the opportunity to do so, six years of manic blogging wears on you. Particularly when that blogging has mostly chronicled a long string of bad news about the rule of law and our Constitution.

It’s time for me to take that step back, and to change the way I work to make sure I can continue to keep it up over what looks to be a long term slog. A key part of that step back will be stepping away from the manic, reactive rhythm I’ve established here at Firedoglake.

So sometime on Friday, emptywheel will move to its own server at a different URL (obviously, I’ll let everyone know the new details).

At emptywheel’s new home, I will continue doing what I’m doing. I’ll be covering civil liberties and abuse of power and the way that ties into our crashing economy. I will no doubt continue to write, a lot. I will continue to do the really weedy work I’ve always done. But I plan to change the way I work–with a focus on also producing longer, more finished articles and possibly another book project. And bmaz will be coming along to contribute as he has for so long. (Yes, there will be Trash Talk!)

Meanwhile, FDL will still have superb civil liberties coverage. Later today, Jane will announce more details, but I can say Kevin Gosztola, who has already been doing great work at MyFDL, and who I consider to be one of the most exciting new voices on this beat, will pick up much of the load.

Look for more details–and a lot of thanks–in a few days.

So the WaPo did a 1200-word profile on Eric Cantor’s central role in debt ceiling negotiations. And somehow they never get around to mentioning that Cantor has a bet placed against US Treasuries.

Eric Cantor, the Republican Whip in the House of Representatives, bought up to $15,000 in shares of ProShares Trust Ultrashort 20+ Year Treasury ETF last December, according to his 2009 financial disclosure statement. The exchange-traded fund takes a short position in long-dated government bonds. In effect, it is a bet against U.S. government bonds—and perhaps on inflation in the future.

You’d think that’d be the sort of thing worth mentioning.

This is going to make it more difficult for us to declare victory and withdraw from Afghanistan.

Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Kandahar provincial council chief, was killed during a gathering, said provincial governor Tooryalai Wesa. He did not know a motive.

While the governor initially said a friend killed Karzai, his spokesman later clarified that the death was at the hands of a guard.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the shooting, saying that the guard accused of shooting him was working for them.

There are reports saying the guard had a grudge, and was not working for the Taliban; whether or not that’s spin, though, it highlights the lack of security in the country. In any case, for all AWK’s corruption, he was a key figure in Hamid Karzai’s exercise of power. (Not to mention the CIA’s past monetary support of AWK.)

Scott Horton’s revelation that the detainee described as “CAPTUS” in Glenn Carle’s book, The Interrogator, is an Afghan named Pacha Wazir reveals something else: in spite of the fact that Carle realized the CIA had been mistaken about Wazir’s ties to al Qaeda sometime in 2002, Wazir was not released from US custody until February 24, 2010.

We held Wazir for over seven years after the time Carle first figured out the CIA had made a mistake.

Of particular concern, however, are the decisions the government made to prevent Wazir from getting any kind of review of his detention.

Rather than move Wazir from the Salt Pit to Gitmo–where he would have received a Combatant Status Review Tribunal–he was instead moved to Bagram in 2003 or 2004. At Bagram–as John Bates summarized in his opinion regarding habeas petitions for three other Bagram detainees–the review was much less stringent.

The initial “enemy combatant” determination is made “in the field.” Tennison Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. For detainees at Bagram, the initial determination is reviewed within 75 days, and then every six months thereafter.19 Id. ¶ 13. The reviewing body is the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board (“UECRB”), a panel of three commissioned officers. The UECRB reviews “all relevant information reasonably available,” and detainees have the opportunity to make a written statement.20 Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The UECRB then makes a recommendation by majority vote to the Commanding General as to the detainee’s status. Id. ¶ 13. There is no recourse to a neutral decision-maker.

Respondents concede, as they must, that the process used for status determinations at Bagram is less comprehensive than the CSRT process used for the Guantanamo detainees. Tr. at 53. Focusing the inquiry on the flaws Boumediene identified in the CSRT process, the UECRB process is plainly less sophisticated and more error-prone. Unlike a CSRT, where a petitioner has access to a “personal representative,” Bagram detainees represent themselves. Obvious obstacles, including language and cultural differences, obstruct effective self-representation by petitioners such as these. Detainees cannot even speak for themselves; they are only permitted to submit a written statement. But in submitting that statement, detainees do not know what evidence the United States relies upon to justify an “enemy combatant” designation — so they lack a meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence. Respondents’ far-reaching and everchanging definition of enemy combatant, coupled with the uncertain evidentiary standards, further undercut the reliability of the UECRB review. And, unlike the CSRT process, Bagram detainees receive no review beyond the UECRB itself.

In September 2006, Wazir did file a habeas petition–his suit was ultimately consolidated with the three Bagram detainees whose DC Circuit habeas denial remains the relevant decision denying Bagram detainees habeas. But Wazir’s petition was denied in spite of the fact that a former Bagram detainee revealed that Wazir had been told some time in June or July 2008 there was no evidence against him.

About four months ago, in June or July of this year, one of the investigators in Bagram told Haji Wazir that there was no incriminating evidence against him.

More troubling, Wazir’s petition was denied on jurisdictional grounds because he’s an Afghan citizen. Yet even before that decision, Afghan prosecutors determined on June 26, 2008 that coalition forces had no evidence of collaboration with al Qaeda, so Wazir should be freed.

In the documents from coalition forces, it has been mentioned that evidence, physical supporting material and pictures do not exist to prove the accusations, he has not been arrested in a face to face battle, has not performed any terrorism related actions, polygraph tests show that there are no evidence of deception.

Based on the requirements of his job and business he has performed currency exchange activities in all parts and corners of the world legally to earn his livelihood.

Therefore, the commission believe that there are no documents in his file that would support the allegations against this person and he has already spent more than five years in prison. Thus, it is considered appropriate if the suspect is released from prison, introduced to National Independent Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and a report be delivered to the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, several weeks after the Afghan determination that coalition forces had no evidence against Wazir, a DOD UECRB determined that he was an unlawful enemy combatant.

Petitioner Wazir is a detainee at BTIF. See id. ¶ 19. DoD’s records reflect that he was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, and was determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant both when he was first brought under DoD custody and in subsequent reviews. See id. ¶ 20. The UECRB’s most recent reevaluation of his status was on July 17, 2008. Id. Following that review, his status as an unlawful enemy combatants was reaffirmed. Id.

So ultimately, John Bates denied his petition on jurisdictional grounds to prevent tensions between the US and Afghans. But the US recertified Wazir as an unlawful enemy combatant even after the Afghans had determined there was no evidence to support such a designation.

Now, there’s a lot else that’s funky about the government’s treatment of Wazir. For example, they claimed he had been arrested November 13, 2003 in Karachi, even while it was clear he had been arrested a year earlier in Dubai. Then, the US sent paperwork transferring custody of Wazir to an Afghan prison, but did not transfer Wazir himself (and then went on to to reaffirm his enemy combatant status).

But ultimately, there’s also the question of why they left someone of such purported import in Afghanistan, rather than Gitmo. And while the government insists they don’t make detention decisions to avoid giving detainees access to habeas, the three other detainees whose habeas petitions were denied recently submitted new evidence, including two WikiLeaks documents disproving a government claim that it had never moved detainees from Gitmo to Bagram. Of particular note is the detainee who–according to an Afghan War Log cable–was transferred from Gitmo to Bagram on January 18, 2009, just two days before Obama would become President.

Of course, even if they had granted jurisdiction for Wazir to file a habeas peittion, two key pieces of evidence had already been disappeared: the two cables Carle wrote in late 2002 or early 2003 documenting that Wazir was not the al Qaeda banker the CIA had made him out to be.

For much of the time the CIA was fighting with Glenn Carle over how much detail he could write about Wazir, Wazir was stuck in Bagram, having already been cleared for release by the Afghans yet still–in spite of the lack of evidence–claimed to be an enemy combatant by the US.

That’s the kind of injustice our refusal to offer habeas corpus to Bagram detainees permits.