December 27: The January 6 Committee’s Blind Spots

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The January 6 Committee Report is out.

As many people have pointed out, the report focuses on Donald Trump, telling the story about how he riled up a mob with The Big Lie and then did nothing as they launched a terrorist attack on the Capitol and those within in, especially Trump’s Vice President.

But even in telling a story about Donald Trump, the report has glaring blind spots. Some of those blind spots were created by the limits on the Committee’s investigative authorities, some were created by the Committee’s (perhaps resultant) limited understanding of the attack.

To demonstrate those blind spots, I wanted to show what the report includes in the body of the report about December 27 (some of these may be out of order and I need to clean it up, but this will be a useful demonstration). Here are things that happened on December 27, 2020:

  • Bernie Kerik publicly attacks Pat Toomey for opposing fraud (the Report ties this attacks to physical threats against officials opposed to Trump’s fraud)
  • Mark Meadows continues to pressure Georgia
  • Doug Mastriano speaks to Trump and feeds members of Congress bullshit
  • Trump attempts to get Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue to endorse his fraud message and — failing that — threatens to replace Rosen
  • With Trump’s blessing, Louie Gohmert files suit against Mike Pence
  • Trump pardons Stone and they talk about January 6
  • Trump gets more involved in planning January 6, which leads to a plan to have his supporters march on the Capitol and then a plan for him to march
  • The FBI creates a system to collect threats related to the “election certification” on January 6 by using a tag, “CERTUNREST

Some of these events (such as the Louie Gohmert lawsuit) were obviously in the work before December 27, but this provides a good read of where the parallel strands of the attack were on that particular day.

But given what we know, the far most important event of the day was the increased involvement by the White House in January 6. This was the moment the plans for January 6 started becoming a plan for a coup.

As you look at what gets included in the report, however, you get a sense of how little the Committee learned about how that happened.

In one section, the report notes that that’s the day Trump pardoned Roger Stone and — probably at the same face-to-face meeting at Mar-a-Lago — discussed plans for January 6, including a plan for Trump to speak.

In another section, the report notes that a former staffer named Justin Caporale was asked to get involved in planning the day and also that during a dinner with Jr and Kimberly Guilfoyle, Guilfoyle called Carolyn Wren and learned about the busses and other plans for the day. That’s what led to an increased White House focus on January 6. But because the Committee couldn’t get the comms from key participants, they can’t tell you how much planning happened or with whom.

The report doesn’t provide a timeline for how those three events happened: Stone, Caporale, Wren (indeed, this is one area where the report’s selectivity about when to include metadata for communications and when not to is infuriating, because we can’t even make that timeline now). We learn only that Wren texted Guilfoyle at 7:10PM. That obscurity is especially troubling, because Wren was in touch with people who were in touch with Stone, and the report actually relies on a story about Stone for part of its narrative about the Guilfoyle-Wren conversation. (The report’s discussion of the ties between Alex Jones, Wren, the militias, and Stone, is particularly weak; while that is no doubt a reflection of the limited tools the committee had to obtain materials from those who did not cooperate, the committee also eschewed primary sources that would have provided background that would be critical to that story.) It admits that non-cooperation from Meadows, Dan Scavino, and Caporale thwarted the Committee’s own efforts to build out this timeline. Elsewhere, it calls into question of the key witnesses involved, including both Max Miller and Tony Ornato, on whose its awareness of expanded planning relies.

We simply don’t know how it happened that the plans for January 6 began to focus much more on an attack on the Capitol.

We do know the FBI finally recognized it as a threat. We do know that members of Congress were overtly attacking the election (and Pence), in the form of the lawsuit against Pence.

And we know that the most important detail of the longest passage involving December 27 (as well as significant focus in the executive summary), of the discussions between Trump and top DOJ officials, involved the instruction, “Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.” He said that, though, on a day when people like Kerik were beginning to ratchet up the pressure, with implicit threats, against GOP members of Congress who would refuse to go along.

The report focuses far more on proving that Trump was pushing fraudulent claims than laying out how Trump’s plans turned to a coup.

All that work on the Big Lie is important (and accessible to a committee without the ability to serve warrants for content). It is largely a measure of the cooperation the committee got — from Jeffrey Rosen but not from Stone, access to Cassidy Hutchinson’s second-hand knowledge of these events because Caporale was limiting his own cooperation and Meadows and Scavino provided none.

But it should come with a focus on the blind spots that remain, which happen to be the blind spots about the people who could have coordinated Trump’s own plans with those of the armed mob.

Update: This, from the deposition of Robert Peede, describe the calls referred to in the report. Peede was with Trump in Mar-a-Lago at the time of these calls.

5:16PM: Robert Peede to Max Miller (10 minutes)

5:51PM Trump tweet

6:19PM: Peede to Miller (3 minutes)

6:22?PM: Miller to Justin Caporale (<10 minutes)

Miller to Peede (2 minutes)

Peede to Ornato (3 minutes)

7:10: Wren to Guilfoyle text

Bernie Kerik attacks a Member of Congress opposed to Trump’s fraud

On December 27th, Kerik suggested that Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) was “corrupt” and said that “for any Pennsylvania official to certify their vote, it’s malfeasance and criminal.”290 That was entirely consistent with Kerik’spast tweets about the election, one of which apparently called public officials “who betrayed” President Trump “spineless disloyal maggots.”291 It wasn’t just rhetoric, however, because, as described below, people showed-up outside certain officials’ home—sometimes menacingly—and, of course, showed up at the Capitol on January 6th.

[snip]

Mark Meadows pressures Georgia

Four days later, Meadows texted Deputy Secretary of State Fuchs, in which he asked, “[i]s there a way to speed up Fulton county signature verification in order to have results before Jan 6 if the trump campaign assist[s] financially.”242 Fuchs wrote in response that she “Will answer ASAP.”243

[snip]

Doug Mastriano feeds bullshit to Trump and others in Congress

Mastriano also sent emails indicating that he spoke with President Trump on December 27th, 28th, and 30th, along with files that President Trump had requested or that he had promised to him.267

[snip]

Trump attempts to get Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue to buy his fraud message and — failing that — threatens to replace Rosen

On December 27, 2020, President Trump called Acting Attorney General Rosen once again. At some point during the lengthy call, Rosen asked that Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue be conferenced in.116 According to Donoghue’s contemporaneous notes, Trump referenced three Republican politicians, all of whom had supported the President’s election lies and the“Stop the Steal” campaign.117 One was Representative Scott Perry. Another was Doug Mastriano, a State senator from Pennsylvania who would later beon the grounds of the U.S. Capitol during the January 6th attack.118 President Trump also referenced Representative Jim Jordan from Ohio, praising him as a “fighter.”119 Representatives Perry and Jordan had often teamed up to spread lies about the election. The two spoke at a “Stop the Steal” rally in front of the Pennsylvania State capitol in Harrisburg, just days after the November election.120 The pair also pressed their conspiratorial case during interviews with friendly media outlets.121

President Trump made a “stream of allegations” during the December 27th call.122 As reflected in his notes, Donoghue considered the call to be an“escalation of the earlier conversations,” with the President becoming more adamant that “we weren’t doing our job.”123 President Trump trafficked in “conspiracy theories” he had heard from others, and Donoghue sought to “make it clear to the President these allegations were simply not true.”124 Donoghue sought to “correct” President Trump “in a serial fashion as he moved from one theory to another.”125

The President returned to the discredited ASOG report, which former Attorney General Barr had already dismissed as complete nonsense. ASOG had claimed—based on no evidence—that the Dominion voting machines in Antrim County, Michigan had suffered from a 68 percent error rate. As noted above and in Chapter 1, that was not close to being true.

Bipartisan election officials in Antrim County completed a hand recount of all machine-processed ballots on December 17, 2020, which should have ended the lies about Dominion’s voting machines.126 The net difference between the machine count and the hand recount was only 12 out of 15,718total votes.127 The machines counted just one vote more for former Vice President Biden than was tallied during the hand recount.128 Donoghue informed the President that he “cannot and should not be relying on” ASOG’s claim, because it was “simply not true.”129 This did not stop the President from later repeating the debunked allegation multiple times, including during his January 6th speech at the Ellipse.130

Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked a “series” of other conspiracy theories offered by President Trump during the December 27th call as well. One story involved a truck driver “who claimed to have moved an entire tractor trailer of ballots from New York to Pennsylvania.”131 There was no truth to the story. The FBI “interviewed witnesses at the front end and the back end of” the truck’s transit route, “looked at loading manifests,” questioned the truck driver, and concluded that there were no ballots in the truck.132

President Trump then returned to the conspiracy theory about voting inDetroit. Former Attorney General Barr had already debunked the claim that a massive number of illegal votes had been dumped during the middle of the night, but the President would not let it go. President Trump alleged that someone “threw the poll watchers out,” and “you don’t even need to look at the illegal aliens voting—don’t need to. It’s so obvious.”133 The President complained that the “FBI will always say there’s nothing there,”because while the Special Agents (“the line guys”) supported him, the Bureau’s leadership supposedly did not.134 This was inconsistent with Donoghue’s view.135 But President Trump complained that he had “made some bad decisions on leadership” at the FBI.136

President Trump also “wanted to talk a great deal about Georgia, [and] the State Farm Arena video,” claiming it was “fraud staring you right in the face.”137 President Trump smeared Ruby Freeman, a Georgia election worker who was merely doing her job, as a “Huckster” and an “Election scammer.”138 President Trump said the “networks,” meaning the television networks, had “magnified the tape and saw them running them [ballots] through repeatedly.”139 The President repeated the lie that Democrats had “[c]losed the facility and then came back with hidden ballots under thet able.”140 He suggested that both Rosen and Donoghue “go to Fulton County and do a signature verification.” They would “see how illegal it is”and “find tens of thousands” of illegal ballots.141

President Trump “kept fixating” on the supposed suitcase in the video.142 But Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue debunked the President’s obsession. “There is no suitcase,” Donoghue made clear.143 Donoghue explained that the DOJ had looked at the video and interviewed multiple witnesses. The “suitcase” was an official lock box filled with genuine votes.144 And election workers simply did not scan ballots for former Vice President Biden multiple times.145 All of this was recorded by security cameras.146

In response to what President Trump was saying during the conversation, Rosen and Donoghue tried to make clear that the claims the President made weren’t supported by the evidence. “You guys must not be followingthe internet the way I do,” the President remarked.147 But President Trump was not finished peddling wild conspiracy theories.

The President pushed the claim that Pennsylvania had reported 205,000more votes than there were voters in the state.148 “We’ll look at whether we have more ballots in Pennsylvania than registered voters,” Acting AttorneyGeneral Rosen replied, according to Donoghue. They “[s]hould be able to check that out quickly.”149 But Rosen wanted President Trump to “understand that the DOJ can’t and won’t snap its fingers and change the outcome of the election. It doesn’t work that way.”150 “

I don’t expect you to do that,” President Trump responded. “Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.”151

Donoghue explained this “is an exact quote from the President.”152

“We have an obligation to tell people that this was an illegal, corrupt election,” President Trump told the DOJ team at another point in the call.153 President Trump insisted this was DOJ’s “obligation,” even though Rosenand Donoghue kept telling him there was no evidence of fraud sufficient tooverturn the outcome of the election. “We are doing our job,” Donoghue informed the President. “Much of the info you’re getting is false.”154

The call on December 27th was contentious for additional reasons. President Trump did not want to accept that the Department of Justice wasn ot an arm of his election campaign. He wanted to know why the Department did not assist in his campaign’s civil suits against States. There was asimple answer: There was no evidence to support the campaign’s claims of fraud.155

Donoghue and Rosen also “tried to explain to the President on this occasion and on several other occasions that the Justice Department has a very important, very specific, but very limited role in these elections.”156 The States “run their elections” and DOJ is not “quality control for the States.”157 DOJ has “a mission that relates to criminal conduct in relation tofederal elections” and also has “related civil rights responsibilities.”158 But DOJ cannot simply intervene to alter the outcome of an election or support a civil suit.159

When President Trump made these demands on December 27th, it wasalready crystal clear that the Department of Justice had found no evidence of systemic fraud.160 The Department simply had no reason to assert that the 2020 Presidential contest was “an illegal corrupt election.”161

“People tell me Jeff Clark is great” and that “I should put him in,” President Trump said on the call. “People want me to replace the DOJ leadership.”162 Donoghue responded “[S]ir, that’s fine, you should have the leadership you want, but understand, changing the leadership in the Department won’t change anything.”163

The President did not really care what facts had been uncovered by theDepartment of Justice. President Trump just wanted the Department to saythe election was corrupt, so he and the Republican Congressmen could exploit the statement in the days to come, including on January 6th. Andwhen Rosen and Donoghue resisted the President’s entreaties, he openly mused about replacing Rosen with someone who would do the President’s bidding. 4.8

CONGRESSMAN SCOTT PERRY CALLS DONOGHUE

Toward the end of the December 27th call, President Trump asked Donoghue for his cell number.164 Later that day, Representative Perry called Donoghue to press the President’s case.165

[snip]

Donoghue took notes during his conversation with Representative Perry and provided those notes to the Select Committee.169 The notes reflect that when Representative Perry called Donoghue on December 27th, Representative Perry explained that President Trump asked him to call and that he, Representative Perry, did not think DOJ had been doing its job on the election.170 Representative Perry brought up other, unrelated matters and argued that the “FBI doesn’t always do the right thing in all instances.”171 Representative Perry also brought up Jeff Clark. He said he liked him andthought that Clark “would do something about this,” meaning the electionfraud allegations.172

On the evening of December 27th, Representative Perry emailed Donoghue a set of documents alleging significant voting fraud had occurred inPennsylvania.173 One document asserted that election authorities had counted 205,000 more votes than had been cast.174 Representative Perry also shared this same claim on Twitter the following day.175 President Trump kept raising the same claim. Sometimes there was an alleged discrepancy of 205,000 votes, other times it was supposedly 250,000 votes.176 Either way, it was not true.

Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue forwarded Representative Perry’s email to Scott Brady, who was the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania at the time.177 As Brady soon discovered, there wasno discrepancy.178 President Trump’s supporters came up with the claim by comparing the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s website, which reportedthe total number of votes as 5.25 million, to a separate State election registry, which showed only 5 million votes cast.179 The problem was simple: Pennsylvania’s election site had not been updated.180 The totals for four counties had not yet been reported on the election site. Once those votes were counted on the site, the totals matched. This was simply not an example of fraud, as President Trump, Representative Perry and others would have it.

With Trump’s blessing, Louie Gohmert files suit against Mike Pence

One of President Trump’s congressional allies, Representative Louie Gohmert (R–TX), pushed a version of Eastman’s theory in the courts. OnDecember 27, 2020, Representative Gohmert and several of the Trump Campaign’s fake electors for the State of Arizona (including Republican Party Chair Kelli Ward) filed suit against Vice President Pence in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.67 As Ward explained to Marc Short in a phone call the day the suit was filed, President Trump was aware of the lawsuit and had signed off on it: “We wouldn’t have done that without the president telling us it was okay,” she told him.68

In the suit, the Plaintiffs alleged that there were “competing slates” of electors from five States.69 They asked the court to rule that portions of theElectoral Count Act of 1887 were unconstitutional and that “the TwelfthAmendment contains the exclusive dispute resolution mechanisms” for determining an objection raised by a Member of Congress to the electors submitted by any State.70 Essentially, Representative Gohmert was askingthe court to tell Vice President Pence that he was prohibited from followingthe procedures set forth in the Electoral Count Act. Much like Eastman’s theory, the Gohmert plaintiffs asserted that the Vice President has the “exclusive authority and sole discretion” to determine which electoral votes to count.71

Although the Gohmert suit was premised on the same theory Eastman advocated, Eastman did not agree with the decision to file suit. Eastman argued that filing a suit against the Vice President had “close[ ] to zero” chance of succeeding, and there was a “very high” risk that the court would issue an opinion stating that “Pence has no authority to reject the Bidencertified ballots.”72

Trump pardons Stone and they talk about January 6

In July 2020, President Trump granted Stone clemency after he was convicted of lying to Congress and other charges.243 Then, on December 23rd, President Trump pardoned Stone.244 Several days later, at a dinner onthe evening of December 27th, Stone thanked President Trump. In a post on Parler, Stone wrote that he “thanked President Trump in person tonight forpardoning me” and also recommended to the President that he “appoint a special counsel” to stop “those who are attempting to steal the 2020 election through voter fraud.” Stone also wrote that he wanted “to ensurethat Donald Trump continues as our president.”245 Finally, he added: “#StopTheSteal” and “#rogerstonedidnothingwrong.”246 The Select Committee has learned that Stone discussed the January 6th event with the President, likely at this same dinner on December 27th.247 The President told Stone he “was thinking of speaking.”248

Trump gets more involved in planning January 6

On the evening of December 27th, President Trump boosted the upcoming event on Twitter: “See you in Washington, DC, on January 6th. Don’t miss it. Information to follow!”415 The Select Committee learned that this tweet came after the White House spoke with a former Trump staffer, Justin Caporale, who was asked to help produce the Ellipse rally.416 That same evening, the President had dinner with Donald Trump, Jr., and his girlfriend Kimberly Guilfoyle,417 who spoke with rally organizer Caroline Wren during the meal.418 Wren also texted Guilfoyle talking points that described her ambitions for the event, saying that “buses of people are coming in from all over the country to support you. It’s going to be huge, we are also adding in programming the night of January 5th.”419

After Guilfoyle’s call with Wren, there was a series of calls among the senior White House staff,420 likely underscoring the seriousness of the White House’s interest in the event.

Within a few days, the White House began to take a more direct role incoordinating the rally at the Ellipse.421 In a December 29th text to Wren, Caporale wrote that after the President’s planned speech there “maybe [sic] a call to action to march to the [C]apitol and make noise.”422

This is the earliest indication uncovered by the Select Committee that the President planned to call on his supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol. But it wasn’t the last. On January 2nd, rally organizer Katrina Pierson informed Wren that President Trump’s Chief of Staff, Mark Meadows, had said the President was going to “call on everyone to march to the [C]apitol.”423

Inside the White House, the President’s intent was well-known. Cassidy Hutchinson, an aide to Meadows, recalled in her testimony that she overheard discussions to this effect toward the end of December or early January. One such discussion included an exchange between Meadows andRudolph Giuliani that occurred on January 2nd.424 Hutchinson understood that President Trump wanted to have a crowd at the Capitol in connection with what was happening inside—the certification of the electoral count.425 Hutchinson also recalled that President Trump’s allies in Congress were aware of the plan. During a call with members of the House FreedomCaucus, the idea of telling people to go to the Capitol was discussed as a way to encourage Congress to delay the electoral college certification and send it back to the States.426

On January 4th, WFAF’s Kylie Kremer informed Mike Lindell, the CEO of MyPillow and an ally of President Trump, that “POTUS is going to have us march there [the Supreme Court]/the Capitol” but emphasized that the plan“stays only between us.”427

The “Stop the Steal” coalition was aware of the President’s intent. OnJanuary 5th, Ali Alexander sent a text to a journalist saying: “Ellipse thenUS capitol [sic]. Trump is supposed to order us to the capitol [sic] at the endof his speech but we will see.”428

290. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 11:53 a.m. ET, available at https:// twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1343238609768501253. 291. Bernard B. Kerik (@BernardKerik), Twitter, Dec. 13, 2020 1:05 a.m. ET, available at https:// twitter.com/bernardkerik/status/1338001989846888448.

[snip]

242. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014152 (December 27, 2020 text message at 5:18 p.m. from Mark Meadows to Jordan Fuchs). 243. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014153 (December 27, 2020 text message at 5:20 p.m. from Jordan Fuchs to Mark Meadows).

[snip]

117. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events07282021-000735. 118. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events07282021-000735; Ryan Deto, “Sen. Mastriano and Former State Rep. Saccone among TrumpSupporters who Occupied U.S. Capitol,” Pittsburgh City Paper, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at https://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/sen-mastriano-and-former-state-rep-sacconeamong-trump-supporters-who-occupied-us-capitol/Content?oid=18690728; Erin Bamer, “Mastriano Defends Protest Appearance; Other GOP Lawmakers Say Little,” York Dispatch, (Jan. 7, 2021), available at https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/2021/01/07/ mastriano-at-no-point-did-he-storm-us-capitol/6579049002/. 119. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-50; see also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021- 000735.

120. Dan Geiter, “Rally to ‘Stop the Steal’ of the 2020 Election” PennLive, (Nov. 5, 2020) availableat https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/. 121. See, e.g., Scott Perry for Congress, “#StopTheSteal,” Facebook, November 6, 2020, available at https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=406418637058079. 122. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53.

123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 124. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 126. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-allpresidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result. 127. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-allpresidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result. 128. “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-allpresidential-election-votes-in-antrim-county-confirms-previously-certified-result. 129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of RichardPeter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwrittennotes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 130. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/january6th. 131. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of RichardPeter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60. 132. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of RichardPeter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwrittennotes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 133. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 134. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 55. 136. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 55-56; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 139. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 140. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 54; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).

141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000741 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60. 143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60. 144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61. 145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61. 146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61. 147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54, 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000737, HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCORPre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes fromRichard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58. Trump also mentioned the possibility of the DOJ saying the “election is corrupt or suspect or not reliable” during a public press conference. “We told him we were not going to do that,” Donoghue explained. Id. at p. 59.

153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739, HCORPre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes fromRichard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 61. 156. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 158. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 160. Donoghue testified before the Select Committee: “There were isolated instances of fraud. None of them came close to calling into question the outcome of the election in any individual state.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6thSelect. 161. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000740 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump). 162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62. 163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 62. 164. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 65. 165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-75. 166. Dan Gleiter, “Rally to ‘Stop the Steal’ of the 2020 Election,” Penn Live, (Nov. 5, 2020), available at https://www.pennlive.com/galleries/J3FJ24LCKVCT5OW3U2TJ6BV4RE/. 167. Letter from the Office of Rep. Lance Gooden and Signed by 26 other Members of Congress to the President of the United States, Dec. 9, 2020, available at https://www.politico.com/ f/?id=00000176-4701-d52c-ad7e-d7fdbfe50000.

168. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by U.S. Representative Mike Johnson and 125 other Members, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 155, Orig.), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/163550/ 20201211132250339_Texas%20v.%20Pennsylvania%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20126%20 Representatives%20–%20corrected.pdf. 169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). Donoghue’s handwritten notes from the call are dated Dec. 28, 2020, but he confirmed the call took place on Dec. 27. 170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). 171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). 172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000705, HCORPre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000706, (Dec. 27, 2020, handwritten notes). 173. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents06032021-000001 – HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-06032021-000018. 174. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents06032021-000008. 175. RepScottPerry (@RepScotPerry), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 6:01 p.m. ET, available at https:// twitter.com/RepScottPerry/status/1343693703664308225. 176. See Chapter 1. 177. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 74-75. 178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75-76. 179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 75-76.

[snip]

67. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1. 68. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 443. 69. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1. 70. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1. 71. Complaint, Gohmert et al. v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435, (No. 6:20-cv-0660), (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2020), ECF No. 1.

[snip]

244. Amita Kelly, Ryan Lucas, and Vanessa Romo, “Trump Pardons Roger Stone, Paul Manafort And Charles Kushner,” NPR, (Dec. 23, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/12/23/ 949820820/trump-pardons-roger-stone-paul-manafort-and-charles-kushner. 245. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336. 246. PatriotTakes[American flag] (@PatriotTakes), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020 3:50 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/patriottakes/status/1343479434376974336; See also Ali Dukakis, “Roger Stone Thanks President Trump for Pardon in Person,” ABC News, (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/roger-stone-president-trump-pardon-person/story?id= 74940512. 247. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kristin Davis, (August 2, 2022), p. 41; Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Kristin Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from Kristin Davis toChris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.). 248. Documents on file with Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kristin Davis Production), CTRL0000928609, p. 7 (December 30, 2020, text message from Kristin Davis to Chris Lippe at 6:05 p.m.).

[snip]

415. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com (archived). 416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2022), pp. 20-21. 417. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., (May 3, 2022), p.30; Anthony Man, “At Trump Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Roger Stone Thanks President for Pardon,” Orlando Sun Sentinel, (Dec. 28, 2020), available at https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/ elections/fl-ne-roger-stone-thanks-trump-pardon-20201228-2ejqzv6e7vhyvf26cxz6e6jysastory.html. 418. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Dec. 17, 2021). 419. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000444, pp. 1-3 (December 27, 2020, text message from Caroline Wren to Kimberly Guilfoyle at 7:10 p.m.). 420. As revealed in the phone records for the personal cell phones of Max Miller and Anthony Ornato. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Verizon Production, Dec. 17, 2021); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Production, Sep. 23, 2022). The Select Committee also subpoenaed the phone records for the personal cell phones of Robert Peede, Mark Meadows, Dan Scavino, and Justin Caporale. They each filed lawsuits to block the respective phone companies’ production of the phone records, which were still pending at the time of writing. Thus, there may have been additional relevant phone calls among or involving these four of which theSelect Committee is not aware. 421. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Max Miller, (Jan. 20, 2022), pp. 36-37. 422. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Justin Caporale, (Mar. 1, 2020), p. 44; Documents on file with the Select Committeeto Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0644 (December 29, 2020, text messages with Justin Caporale). 423. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Katrina Pierson, (Mar. 25, 2022), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_0181 (January 2nd email from Katrina Pierson to CarolineWren and Taylor Budowich). 424. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 32-33, 41; Select Committee toInvestigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 107-08, 135. 425. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 42.

426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 44-45, 47, 52-54; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 87. 427. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5447, p. 3 (January 4, 2021, text message from Kylie Kremer to Mike Lindell at 9:32 a.m.). 428. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ali Alexander Production), CTRL0000017718, p. 41 (January 5, 2021 text message with Liz Willis at 7:19 a.m.).

[snip]

41. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Informal Briefing by Steve Jensen, (Nov. 18, 2021). In an email sent by the FBI to the Select Committee on November 8, 2021, the FBI stated that on December 27, the FBI created a system to collect threats related to the “election certification” on January 6 by using a tag, “CERTUNREST.” Despite making multiple requests for the number of guardians that were tagged prior to January 6, the FBI did not provide a precise number. The FBI identified several dozen guardians opened in advance of January 6th that included a reference to January 6, Washington D.C., and either the U.S. Capitol or a specific threat of violence.

 

Where Is The J6 Committee Beef?

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From the Washington Post up all night desk:

Many close observers of the Jan. 6 committee are still looking for testimony transcripts, particularly with key White House advisers and campaign aides. Transcripts involving most of those names are still unreleased — and have been promised in the coming days. Many days of testimony by Trump aide Cassidy Hutchinson are not yet out, nor are transcripts for Trump’s family, lawyers and top campaign advisers. The committee talked to a remarkable number of people, and their exact words will be closely examined when the transcripts are released — including by Republicans looking for ammunition against the report.

Yeah, where are those?? It is Christmas weekend and they have released a whopping 34 of their supposed 1,000 or so transcripts. Why are they dribbling them out when their work is done? Have they given it all to the DOJ yet? My understanding is no, but cannot confirm that. DC, including DOJ, are going into holiday mode and this goofy Committee is still playing keep away. Why? What the hell are they doing? This is just ridiculous.

The J6C Transcripts: Patrick Byrne’s Conduit, Garrett Ziegler

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The other day, I noted that while I agree with Rayne that the January 6 Committee could use referrals to make important symbolic statements, the Committee’s referral, in practice, was weaker than it should have been to make that symbolic impact. That made bmaz’ earlier gripes about such a referral look more justified.

Similarly, the release of the first set of January 6 Committee transcripts last night show how right he has been that the Committee was remiss in not turning these over to DOJ sooner. Most of these transcripts are people who pled the Fifth and most you’re hearing about are the big name people like Mike Flynn and Roger Stone. But the first I read, from a Peter Navarro aide, Garrett Ziegler, hinted at just how valuable the J6C interviews will be, even of those who (like Ziegler) refused to cooperate.

Ziegler is most famous as the guy who let Sidney Powell, Mike Flynn, and Patrick Byrne into the White House for a famously confrontational meeting on December 18, 2020, which preceded Trump’s announcement of the January 6 riot. But Ziegler’s non-answers to J6C staffers serve as roadmap of the larger operation. He refused to answer questions about the following:

Ziegler was — is — a kid, totally unqualified for the role he had at the White House, which it sounds like he didn’t do anyway, instead at least partly working for Trump’s reelection on the taxpayer dime. But he was also totally wired into most aspects of the coup attempt.

His role in all this is interesting for several more reasons. First, it appears that Ziegler did not turn over the “path to victory” email in response to his January 6 subpoena, which means for all the times he invoked the Fifth, he might still have exposure to obstruction charges.

He is represented by John Kiyonaga — a lawyer who has represented key assault defendants in January 6, including former Special Forces guy Jeffrey McKellop. In fact, prosecutors are considering charging McKellop in January for violating the protective order covering evidence on January 6 by sending evidence from jail to others.

And Ziegler published a copy of both the “Hunter Biden” “laptop” and the diary stolen from Ashley Biden.

The Fourth Account: The Grand Jury Investigation into Jeffrey Clark and Others

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Last Friday, Beryl Howell unsealed two opinions regarding privilege team reviews in the grand jury investigation into attempts to overturn the 2020 election. The first order, dated June 27, 2022, pertains to 37 emails involving Scott Perry seized from two Gmail, one Microsoft, and John Eastman’s Chapman U email accounts involving:

  • A non-lawyer whose name remains redacted (probably 8 documents total)
  • Jeffrey Clark (19 documents total)
  • Ken Klukowski (7 documents total)
  • John Eastman 3 documents total)

The second order, dated September 27, 2022, pertains to a filter review of an outline for an auto-biography Clark was writing on October 11 and 14, 2021, which was auto-saved 331 times in Google Notes. Because Clark attempts to invoke both work product and attorney-client privilege over a document he initially labeled as not privileged, Howell calls Clark’s claims in that dispute “throwing spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks.”

The orders reveal bare outlines of the investigation.

It shows, first of all, what I laid out here: That the FBI obtains warrants for materials stored in the cloud that are accessible covertly before it gets warrants for things — like phones and homes — that it must seize overtly. In Clark’s case, the FBI first obtained his Outlook account and only later his Gmail account.

By May 26, the FBI had warrants for the cloud accounts of four people. But it took just a month to get a warrant for Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman’s phone.  Amazingly, it seems that the FBI used Scott Perry’s involvement in the investigation as a way to initially isolate information that should not be privileged. Most of the emails in the first order sound investigatively uninteresting, including things like nine copies of Clark sending Perry two versions of his resume or requests from Perry to give him a call; that provides a glimpse of the difficulties of an investigation, like this one, in which most of the suspected co-conspirators are lawyers.

The material covered by the second order sounds more interesting, as it gives Clark’s version of the January 3 confrontation where most of DOJ’s top officials and Trump’s top White House Counsel threatened to quit.

The second order explains that after an overt search takes place on a subject, then their own attorneys are brought into the filter process (as Clark’s attorney was in the second order).

The filter protocol was later amended with respect to Clark and others to provide for detailed procedures for disclosing certain material to any potential privilege holder after separate search warrant on Clark and others, and Clark’s residence were executed, alerting these persons to the government’s investigation.

This detail suggests there likely was an overt warrant served on Klukowski (otherwise the existence of the cloud warrant targeting him would not be unsealed). It suggests the fourth person, a non-lawyer, has not yet been formally alerted into the investigation into him or her.

It also likely provides background to what happened with Scott Perry. DOJ was already accessing his [email protected] email, at least those seized from the lawyers. He likely learned the full extent of prior warrants served on him in August, after DOJ seized his phone. And a more recent dispute over text messages reported by CNN may operate under a similar protocol, with his lawyer contesting access directly.

 

Timeline

May 26, 2022: Three separate hearings on filter protocol; Howell approves filter protocol for four email accounts

June 17, 2022: Filter team begins reviewing 130,000 documents

June 23, 2022: Jeffrey Clark home searched and phone seized; John Eastman phone seized

June 24, 2022: Warrant approved for Clark Gmail account

June 27, 2022: Howell authorizes sharing of Scott Perry emails; Warrant executed for Clark Gmail

July 12, 2022: Filter protocol covering devices seized from Clark’s residence

July 21, 2022: Howell approves filter protocol for Clark Gmail account

August 9, 2022: Scott Perry phone seized

August 17, 2022: Filter team notifies Clark of auto-biography dispute

August 25, 2022: Clark attorney Charles Burnham objects to sharing of auto-biography, claiming attorney work product

August 29, 2022: Filter team provides more substantive reply; Burnham responds, “We object”

September 8, 2022: Filter team moves to share a copy of motion with Clark’s lawyer and a memoir with investigative team

September 21, 2022: Supplemental response to Beryl Howell query

September 27, 2022: Howell approves sharing of memoir

September 28, 2022: Clark provided September 27 order

November 16: Howell issues minute order about unsealing opinions

December 15: Howell unseals two redacted orders

The Thinness of the January 6 Committee’s Obstruction Referral

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I’m back (in Ireland after a visit to the US)!

I just finished a detail read of the Executive Summary released by the January 6 Committee. See this Mastodon thread for my live read of it.

I’d like to address what it says about referrals.

In the big dispute between bmaz and Rayne about the value of referrals, I side, in principle, with Rayne. I have no problem with the Committee making criminal referrals, especially for people not named Donald Trump. Some of the most damning details in the report involve details about how Kayleigh McEnany, Ivanka, and Tony Ornato turned out to not recall things that their subordinates clearly remembered (Pat Cipollone probably falls into that same category but the Committee gave him a pass for it) and how what must be Cassidy Hutchinson’s original lawyer fucked her over — details that would support an obstruction of the investigation referral.

Here’s an example of the former:

While some in the meeting invoked executive privilege, or failed to recall the specifics, others told us what happened at that point. Sarah Matthews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, had urged her boss, Kayleigh McEnany, to have the President make a stronger statement. But she informed us that President Trump resisted using the word “peaceful” in his message:

[Q]: Ms. Matthews, Ms. McEnany told us she came right back to the press office after meeting with the President about this particular tweet. What did she tell you about what happened in that dining room?

[A]: When she got back, she told me that a tweet had been sent out. And I told her that I thought the tweet did not go far enough, that I thought there needed to be a call to action and he needed to condemn the violence. And we were in a room full of people, but people weren’t paying attention. And so, she looked directly at me and in a hushed tone shared with me that the President did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that tweet and that it took some convincing on their part, those who were in the room. And she said that there was a back and forth going over different phrases to find something that he was comfortable with. And it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the phrase ‘stay peaceful’ that he finally agreed to include it.”525

[snip]

Kayleigh McEnany was President Trump’s Press Secretary on January 6th. Her deposition was taken early in the investigation. McEnany seemed to acknowledge that President Trump: (1) should have instructed his violent supporters to leave the Capitol earlier than he ultimately did on January 6th; 710 (2) should have respected the rulings of the courts;711 and (3) was wrong to publicly allege that Dominion voting machines stole the election.712 But a segment of McEnany’s testimony seemed evasive, as if she was testifying from preprepared talking points. In multiple instances, McEnany’s testimony did not seem nearly as forthright as that of her press office staff, who testified about what McEnany said.

For example, McEnany disputed suggestions that President Trump was resistant to condemning the violence and urging the crowd at the Capitol to act peacefully when they crafted his tweet at 2:38 p.m. on January 6th. 713 Yet one of her deputies, Sarah Matthews, told the Select Committee that McEnany informed her otherwise: that McEnany and other advisors in the dining room with President Trump persuaded him to send the tweet, but that “… she said that he did not want to put that in and that they went through different phrasing of that, of the mention of peace, in order to get him to agree to include it, and that it was Ivanka Trump who came up with ‘stay peaceful’ and that he agreed to that phrasing to include in the tweet, but he was initially resistant to mentioning peace of any sort.”714 When the Select Committee asked “Did Ms. McEnany describe in any way how resistant the President was to including something about being peaceful,” Matthews answered: “Just that he didn’t want to include it, but they got him to agree on the phrasing ‘stay peaceful.’”715

The Committee invites the public to compare McEnany’s testimony with the testimony of Pat Cipollone, Sarah Matthews, Judd Deere, and others, [punctuation original]

It turns out the latter example — of the lawyer Trump originally provided for Cassidy Hutchinson directing her testimony — doesn’t need to be referred in this report. That’s because, the report makes clear, the Committee already shared those details with DOJ (or knew them to be shared under the guidance of Hutchinson’s new lawyer, Jody Hunt).

The Select Committee has also received a range of evidence suggesting specific efforts to obstruct the Committee’s investigation. Much of this evidence is already known by the Department of Justice and by other prosecutorial authorities. For example:

[snip]

  • The lawyer instructed the client about a particular issue that would cast a bad light on President Trump: “No, no, no, no, no. We don’t want to go there. We don’t want to talk about that.”;
  • The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share her testimony before the Committee with other lawyers representing other witnesses. The lawyer shared such information over the client’s objection;
  • The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share information regarding her testimony with at least one and possibly more than one member of the press. The lawyer shared the information with the press over her objection.
  • The lawyer did not disclose who was paying for the lawyers’ representation of the client, despite questions from the client seeking that information, and told her, “we’re not telling people where funding is coming from right now”;
  • The client was offered potential employment that would make her “financially very comfortable” as the date of her testimony approached by entities apparently linked to Donald Trump and his associates. Such offers were withdrawn or did not materialize as reports of the content of her testimony circulated. The client believed this was an effort to impact her testimony.

That’s a testament that, even with regards to crimes that victimized the investigation itself, DOJ already has the details to pursue prosecution. This is a symbolic referral, not a formal one, even for the crimes that the Committee would need to refer.

As to the more significant referrals, you’ve no doubt heard that the Committee referred four major crimes:

  • 18 USC 1512(c)(2): obstruction of the vote certification
  • 18 USC 371: conspiracy to defraud the US in the form of obstructing the certification of the election
  • 18 USC 371 and 18 USC 1001: conspiracy to present false statements — in the form of fake elector certifications — to the National Archives
  • 18 USC 2383: inciting, assisting, or aiding an insurrection

I don’t so much mind that the Committee made these referrals. But I think they did a poor job of things.

For example, they don’t even consider whether Trump is exposed for aiding and abetting the actual assaults, something that Judge Amit Mehta said is a plausible (civil) charge against Trump. Some of the Committee’s evidence, especially Trump’s foreknowledge that the mob he sent to the Capitol was armed, would very much support such a charge. If Trump were held accountable for something like the tasing of Michael Fanone it would clarify how directly his actions contributed to the actual violence.

I’m also mystified why the Committee referred the obstruction conspiracy under 371 without consideration of doing so under 1512(k), even as DOJ increasingly emphasizes the latter approach. If DOJ’s application of obstruction is upheld, then charging conspiracy on 1512 rather than 371 not only brings higher base level exposure (20 years as opposed to 5), but it also lays out enhancements for the use of violence. If this application of obstruction is upheld, by charging conspiracy under 1512(k), you have a ready way to hold Trump accountable for the physical threat to Mike Pence.

It’s in the way that the Committee referred the obstruction charge, however, I’m most disappointed. This referral matters, mostly, if it can be used by DOJ to bolster its own defense of the statute or by a sympathetic judge to write a compelling opinion.

And this referral is weak on several counts. First, even with evidence that Trump knew his mob was armed when he sent them to the Capitol, the referral does not incorporate emphasis that the David Carter opinion they rely on did: That Trump (and John Eastman) not only asked Mike Pence to do something illegal, but then used the mob as a tool to pressure Pence.

President Trump gave a speech to a large crowd on the Ellipse in which he warned, “[a]nd Mike Pence, I hope you’re going to stand up for the good of our Constitution and for the good of our country. And if you’re not, I’m going to be very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now.”217 President Trump ended his speech by galvanizing the crowd to join him in enacting the plan: “[L]et’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue” to give Vice President Pence and Congress “the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.”

The means by which Trump succeeded in obstructing the vote count was the mob, not just pressuring Pence. Indeed, the former was the part that succeeded beyond all expectations. The Committee referral here doesn’t account for the crowd at all (even though Greg Jacob explicitly tied the pressure on Mike Pence to riling up the crowd in real time). It just doesn’t conceive of how the mob played into the obstruction crime.

Second, there should be no doubt that President Trump knew that his actions were likely to “obstruct, influence or impede” that proceeding. Based on the evidence developed, President Trump was attempting to prevent or delay the counting of lawful certified Electoral College votes from multiple States.597 President Trump was directly and personally involved in this effort, personally pressuring Vice President Pence relentlessly as the Joint Session on January 6th approached.

[snip]

Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) for a criminal referral of President Trump based solely on his plan to get Vice President Pence to prevent certification of the election at the Joint Session of Congress. Those facts standing alone are sufficient. But such a charge under that statute can also be based on the plan to create and transmit to the Executive and Legislative branches fraudulent electoral slates, which were ultimately intended to facilitate an unlawful action by Vice President Pence –to refuse to count legitimate, certified electoral votes during Congress’s official January 6th proceeding.603 Additionally, evidence developed about the many other elements of President Trump’s plans to overturn the election, including soliciting State legislatures, State officials, and others to alter official electoral outcomes, provides further evidence that President Trump was attempting through multiple means to corruptly obstruct, impede or influence the counting of electoral votes on January 6th. This is also true of President Trump’s personal directive to the Department of Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.”604

A far more unfortunate weakness with this referral, though, is in the shoddy analysis of the “corrupt purpose” prong of the crime.

Third, President Trump acted with a “corrupt” purpose. Vice President Pence, Greg Jacob and others repeatedly told the President that the Vice President had no unilateral authority to prevent certification of the election.599 Indeed, in an email exchange during the violence of January 6th, Eastman admitted that President Trump had been “advised” that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count votes under the Electoral Count Act, but “once he gets something in his head, it’s hard to get him to change course.”600 In addition, President Trump knew that he had lost dozens of State and Federal lawsuits, and that the Justice Department, his campaign and his other advisors concluded that there was insufficient fraud to alter the outcome. President Trump also knew that no majority of any State legislature had taken or manifested any intention to take any official action that could change a State’s electoral college votes.601 But President Trump pushed forward anyway. As Judge Carter explained, “[b]ecause President Trump likely knew that the plan to disrupt the electoral count was wrongful, his mindset exceeds the threshold for acting ‘corruptly’ under § 1512(c).”602

600 Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Marc Jacob re: Pennsylvania letter). One judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in the course of concluding that Section 1512(c) is not void for vagueness, interpreted the “corruptly” element as meaning “contrary to law, statute, or established rule.” United States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d. 15-16, (D.D.C. 2021). As explained above, President Trump attempted to cause the Vice President to violate the Electoral Count Act, and even Dr. Eastman advised President Trump that the proposed course of action would violate the Act. We believe this satisfies the “corruptly” element of the offense under the Sandlin opinion.

This part of the January 6 Committee’s arguments has always been weak, but it is especially inexcusable given how much more clear the status of the application has gotten in ensuing months. The Committee knows that Carl Nichols has already rejected the application of the statute based on acceptance that the vote certification was an official proceeding, but holding that the obstruction must involve documents. But as they acknowledge in footnote 600, they also know the clear standards that Dabney Friedrich has adopted — that one means to find corrupt purpose is by pointing to otherwise illegal activity. And they should know that the DC Circuit is looking closely at corrupt purpose, and one of two Republicans on the existing panel, Justin Walker, entertained a theory of corrupt purpose tied to personal benefit. (Here’s the oral argument.)

This referral was the Committee’s opportunity to show that no matter how the DC Circuit rules, you can get to obstruction with Trump for two reasons.

First, because unlike the hundreds of mobsters charged with obstruction, Trump had a direct role in documentary obstruction. As the Committee lays out, he was personally involved in the fake elector plot that resulted in faked electoral certifications. So even if the outlier Nichols opinion were sustained, obstruction would still apply to Trump, because he oversaw (the Committee used that word) an effort to create fraudulent documents as evidence before Congress.

And given the focus of the DC Circuit on corrupt purpose (which may well result in a remand to Nichols for consideration of that standard, and then a follow-up appeal), the Committee would do well to lay out that Trump, alone among the hundreds of people who have been or will be charged with obstruction, meets a far more stringent standard for corrupt purpose, one that some defense attorneys and Republican appointees would like to adopt: that his goal in obstructing the vote certification was to obtain an unfair advantage.

Trump can be referred for obstruction not just because he gave Mike Pence an illegal order, but because he used a mob as a tool to try to force Pence to follow that order.

Trump can be referred for obstruction because even if Nichols’ opinion is upheld, Trump would still meet the standard Nichols adopted, an attempt to create false documentary evidence.

And Trump can be referred for obstruction not just because he knowingly engaged in other crimes, but because the reason he did all this was to obtain the most corrupt kind of benefit for himself: the ability to remain as President even after voters rejected him.

On the key issue of this referral, the Committee missed the opportunity to show how, by any standard under consideration, Trump corruptly tried to prevent Congress to certify the electoral victory of Trump’s opponent. He did so by committing other crimes. He did so by mobilizing a violent mob. He did so using fraudulent documents. And most importantly, he did so for personal benefit.

House January 6 Committee: Introductory Material to the Final Report

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[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

This is a working post and thread dedicated to the introductory material of the final report prepared by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.

Under the terms of its authorization, the House January 6 committee’s 18-month investigation into the attack on the U.S. Capitol must culminate in a report, specifically:

… issue a final report to the House containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in subsection (c) as it may deem necessary. …

The report is not yet complete; after it has been submitted the committee will disband within 30 days.

More content will follow here shortly.

~ ~ ~

Please take all unrelated content to one of the most recent threads related to Twitter.

Witnessing the Proud Boys

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As I laid out here, defense attorneys in the Proud Boy leaders case have recently claimed that the government is pressuring potential defense witnesses to dissuade them from testifying.

Proud Boy defense attorneys are alleging that prosecutors are pressuring their defense witnesses with threats of prosecution. One person about whom their making the claim — about MPD lieutenant Shane Lamond, who has been suspended since last February under investigation that he helped the Proud Boys — their complaints are not credible. About others — including a female witness who might either be journalist Amy Harris, who spent a lot of time with Tarrio after he was released and to whom he said a lot of obvious self-exonerating statements, or Eryka Gemma, the woman who gave Tarrio a plan about The Winter Palace — defense attorneys claim they can provide sworn statements that prosecutors interviewed a witness without her attorney present. (I don’t trust either side in this case, so we shall see what actually gets filed.)

That is, as with the Oath Keeper trial, defendants are claiming that prosecutors are making witnesses unavailable with threats of prosecution (and as with the Oath Keeper trial, only some of those claims are credible).

The original complaint was aired in Enrique Tarrio’s bid to get his indictment thrown out unless DOJ immunizes Lieutenant Shane Lamond, an MPD cop whom Tarrio would alert to Proud Boy plans in advance. Tarrio submitted an updated motion to dismiss after the contentious December 2 hearing where this was aired, in which he argued that because the discovery he got didn’t show evidence of Lamond committing a crime, the government’s recent warning to Lamond that he’s at risk for an obstruction charge must be no more than an attempt to dissuade him from testifying in Tarrio’s defense.

During the past two years, the investigation, including the production of millions of pages of discovery, countless phone records and data dumps, thousands of hours of videos, and imbedded CHS informants, there has been no clear evidence of Lamond engaging in any illegal activity. The government was informed by the defense months ago of their intention to call Lamond to testify. At no point was Lamond in danger of being prosecuted, until now. On the eve of trial, the government contacted counsel for Lamond and informed him that Lamond’s actions might be considered obstruction of justice into Tarrio’s investigation and he may be prosecuted. Waiting until now is a tactical decision by the government to prevent Tarrio from exercising his constitutional right to present a defense. Knowing that Lamond’s testimony would exonerate Tarrio at trial and depriving Tarrio of his constitutional right is impermissible.

Preventing Lamond from testifying by holding an ostensible continuing investigation over his head violates Tarrio’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process of witnesses who would testify in his defense. If the government declines to immunize Lt Lamond, then the indictment against Tarrio should be dismissed.

But even in Tarrio’s description of his contacts with Lamond, the exchange sounds as much like a cover story as anything else.

Tarrio informed Lamond of the Proud Boys January 6 plans; to wit: they would not be wearing colors to protect themselves from being attacked and stabbed by Antifa as they had been on two previous occasions; they planned to be present to watch Trump’s speech; Tarrio planned to speak at the rally; they planned to protest the results of the election, and later that night they planned to party with plenty of beer and babes.

The Proud Boys eschewed colors to blend in, not for protection. There’s no evidence they ever planned to attend Trump’s speech (indeed, their choice to skip it is one detail that undermines all their excuses).

This particular challenge is highly unlikely to work. Lamond was suspended in February (not coincidentally shortly after FBI fully exploited Tarrio’s phone and even before Tarrio himself was charged), which wouldn’t have happened without fairly damning evidence. And back when the suspension was first disclosed, Tarrio made light of the contacts.

But Tarrio also said that during marches, Lamond would tell him the location of counterdemonstrators. Tarrio said that was so his group could avoid conflict, though after one violent night of demonstrations, police accused the Proud Boys of roaming the city looking for and instigating fights, targeting people they believed identified as antifa, or antifascists.

“He was just a liaison officer for when we held rallies,” Tarrio said of Lamond. He denied their relationship extended beyond that and said he is not a confidential informant for anyone on the D.C. police force.

“They’re just trying to get anybody at this point,” Tarrio said of investigators. “I only told him, ‘We’re coming into town and we’re going to hold this protest.’ That’s as far as the relationship went.”

Tarrio has been pursuing this line of defense since August, with little traction. Nothing is new about this scrutiny of Lamond, so the claim DOJ only recently floated some legal jeopardy doesn’t hold up.

Nevertheless, there have been several additional filings explaining the basis for the claims that the government was trying to make defense witnesses unavailable. In response to prosecutors’ observation at the hearing that Nordean was making allegations without backup, for example, Nordean’s attorneys submitted a “notice” of witness intimidation that provided few new details (though did submit the 302 for that specific witness to Judge Tim Kelly).

On December 2, counsel added there was evidence that after one such witness informed the government that she did not agree with the government’s claim that Nordean and others had conspired to attack the Capitol or use violence on January 6, a government prosecutor only then announced—in the same November 2021 interview—that the witness would be prosecuted for an offense. Shortly thereafter, counsel continued, an agent called this witness to advise that the prosecutor’s charging threat was inflated. In response, AUSA Erik Kenerson stated in the December 2 hearing that the notion that the “[g]overnment has somehow pressured witnesses, threatened witnesses, gone to witnesses when they were represented by counsel without counsel present, all of that is just categorically false.” The government added, “there has been nothing that the Government — that — has done that would warrant putting John Does on a witness list.”

The filing provided an excuse to reveal the identity of and submit a declaration from the witness, Adrienna DiCioccio, which would otherwise be sealed. She described how, in a November 2021, she told FBI Agents and prosecutors that she didn’t think Nordean and others were planning for violence on January 5.

During this second interview, the agents and prosecutors asked for my recollections about the evening of January 5 in the Airbnb residence where Ethan and others were gathered. I do not recall the specific words I used, but I informed the interviewers generally that I disagreed with the suggestion that Ethan and the others in his group were planning violence or an attack on the Capitol on January 6. I generally informed the agents and prosecutors that, as someone involved in planning peaceful events with the Proud Boys in the past, I disagreed with their suggestion that Ethan and others in the Airbnb were planning violence the following day in D.C.

But as to the substance of Nordean’s complaint — that the government was trying to pressure her not to testify by hanging criminal prosecution over her head — even DiCioccio’s filing undermined that, to say nothing of details provided in the government’s response. Most importantly, a transcript excerpt from an earlier interview shows she was warned of potential criminal exposure in a September 2021 interview, before she provided the testimony that — Nordean claims — led prosecutors to raise the specter of prosecution.

Ms. DiCioccio was interviewed twice: once in September 2021, and once in November 2021. It is the second interview that Nordean references and that is largely the subject of Ms. DiCioccio’s declaration. The transcript of Ms. DiCioccio’s first interview, which was produced to the defense in June 2022, belies any claim that the government only informed her of her potential criminal liability after “she did not agree with the government’s claim that Nordean and others had conspired to attack the Capitol or use violence on January 6,” as Nordean contends. Id. The below quote is from page 202 of the transcript of the first interview:

MS. DiCIOCCIO: Okay, because you guys were mentioning, you know, earlier, the other person cooperated very well with everything. You know, turned themselves in. I know you guys have things to go over, but, what am I looking at, at the moment? Should I be really scared? Should I be –

[AUSA]2 : The investigation is ongoing. Decisions are still being made. I mean, there are criminal charges that are out there, potentially, and maybe even likely. But it all depends on what we’re looking at (indiscernible).

MS. DiCIOCCIO: Okay.

[AUSA]: Again, I would say, let’s keep the lines of communication open.

MS. DiCIOCCIO: Yeah.

[AUSA]: So that we can have those types of conversations when it’s time to pull those types of triggers.

MS. DiCIOCCIO: Okay.

In other words, Ms. DiCioccio was informed in September 2021, well before the interview during which Nordean claims she was threatened with charges for refusing to tell the government what it wanted to hear, that she “potentially, maybe even likely” faced criminal charges. This was not news to her: video evidence of her offense conduct captures her saying, “Are we all gonna get arrested?” as she entered the Capitol building. After the first interview, Ms. DiCioccio agreed to voluntarily meet with prosecutors and agents again in November. As noted above, Ms. DiCioccio’s declaration is inaccurate, and the government submits that the FD-302 submitted by counsel describes an unremarkable interaction between prosecutors, FBI agents, and a potential cooperating witness.

2 The AUSA who participated in this interview was not any government counsel of record in this case.

The government response also shows that, not only did Nordean’s attorneys not submit anything to substantiate the allegation that the government met with DiCioccio without her retained counsel present, they provided her with information on how to get one.

Ms. DiCioccio’s declaration does not substantiate Nordean’s inflammatory accusations. For example, contrary to counsel for Nordean’s representations at the December 2, 2022, hearing, Ms. DiCioccio does not assert in her declaration that she had counsel who was not present during the interview. See Dec. 2, 2022, Hr’g Tr. at 58; 579-1. Nor does she say, as defense counsel asserts, that she had an attorney at the time of the interview. The FD-302 instead memorialized that the prosecutor suggested Ms. DiCioccio seek counsel and went so far as to provide her with a form to help her obtain a court-appointed one. In other words, rather than seeking to circumvent Ms. DiCioccio’s access to counsel (as Nordean wrongly asserted), the government affirmatively facilitated it.

There’s nothing all that compelling about the fact that a witness who breached the Capitol might be at legal exposure herself. While snide, the government suggests that DiCioccio was just upset because of her own criminal exposure (criminal exposure that, over a year later, has yet to be charged).

It is not surprising that the subject of a criminal investigation may be upset after being questioned about her conduct that led to that investigation. But any unease on Ms. DiCioccio’s part was not caused by impropriety by the government. It was instead caused by her own criminal conduct on January 6, 2021, and the fact that she may have to reckon with that conduct.

And again, all this happened long before any talk of trial witnesses.

One part of Zach Rehl’s parallel complaint might have more merit though (or is, at a minimum, of some interest procedurally).

It was filed — as was Nordean’s “notice” — on December 9, a week after the contentious hearing. But that would also put it more than a week after Rehl co-traveler Isaiah Giddings’ plea deal, in which he described that he didn’t even know the vote certification was happening on January 6 but he followed Rehl along obediently. There were a number of things in Giddings’ statement of offense that implicate Rehl, including that Rehl believed “someone had to do something” about the purportedly stolen election and that Rehl tried to find some bear spray in the middle of the riot. But as Rehl attorney Carmen Hernandez notes in the filing, Giddings did not admit to a plan to obstruct the vote certification.

Despite an inordinately lengthy Statement of Offense for a misdemeanor and multiple mentions of Mr. Rehl, there is no assertion that Mr. Rehl had a plan to interfere with Congress by force or corruptly.

Much of the rest of Hernandez’ filing requests either that Kelly immunize Giddings’ two co-defendants, Brian Healion and Freedom Vy (whom she doesn’t name), or sever Rehl from his own co-defendants and delay trial until after Healion and Vy’s case is resolved, making them available as witnesses.

At this level, this is just tactical. DOJ seems to be delaying a bunch of the Proud Boy cases until after the Proud Boy leader trial, but for reasons that arise from managing a larger conspiracy. Healion and Vy are only differently situated from DiCioccio in that they’ve already been charged, but they’re both genuinely implicated themselves.

Of more interest is Hernandez’ complaint about Jeff Finley (again, she doesn’t name him), the last co-traveler with Rehl the day of the attack. As she describes, Finley pled guilty last April, but his July sentencing was continued until February, putting it, like the Philly area Rehl co-travelers, after the trial.

One of the witnesses noted above entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor on April 6, 2022.3 The statement of facts entered in the case shows that the witness does not implicate Mr. Rehl in any attempt to interfere with Congress by force or corruptly. Sentencing in the case was originally 4 scheduled for July 19, 2022. At the request of AUSA Jason McCullough, the July sentencing was vacated. Sentencing is now to be scheduled on February, 13, 2023 or a later date, after Mr. Rehl’s 5 trial is completed. Because a defendant retains a right to assert a claim to remain silent under the 6 Fifth Amendment until after sentencing isimposed, Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), that witness is now unavailable to Mr. Rehl. By delaying the sentencing of this witness until after Mr. Rehl’s trial has concluded, the government has placed that witness outside Mr. Rehl’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and has impeded Mr. Rehl’s right to present a complete defense.

As with Giddings’ statement of offense, Hernandez judges that Finley’s doesn’t support the charges against Rehl, though it does incriminate him. Plus, there is at least one additional Finley proffer that was provided to the Proud Boy leaders by last May. But given other discovery deadlines, Hernandez should know by now if such a proffer was expected to result in trial testimony (in which case, she would have no problem obtaining his testimony as a government witness).

This, too, is tactical (and an effort to preserve all this for appeal). But I find it curious that Finley also objected to testifying under subpoena.

Undersigned counsel has spoken to counsel for each of the three witnesses. All three have 2 indicated that if subpoenaed to testify, their clients would assert their Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent in light of the posture of their own cases. The delays that have made these witnesses unavailable are attributable to government conduct.

That doesn’t seem to accord with being a voluntary, cooperative witness for DOJ. It would suggest that he may still face vulnerability even in spite of his plea agreement, such as if DOJ discovered something he said in a proffer was not true.

The Proud Boys, far more even than the Oath Keepers, had ties to a great number of people who have their own exposure for January 6. And unlike the Oath Keepers, rather than flipping their way up to the leaders, DOJ seems to be starting with this leader conspiracy, with the likelihood of follow-on charges for others after the fact (in fact, Stewart Rhodes’ very good attorneys, James Bright and Phil Linder, just replaced John Pierce as Joe Biggs’ co-traveler Paul Rae’s defense attorneys). That’s an unusual way of prosecuting a complex conspiracy (though as I’ve written, the Proud Boy leaders may also be a necessary step before prosecuting those between them and Trump). But at least partly as a result, that means there are a great number of Proud Boys and associates out there, potentially friendly witnesses, but also defendants themselves.

And that, the Proud Boy leaders claim, amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of defense witnesses

Update: Here’s the government response to Rehl (it cites another complaint from Nordean). In the section on Finley, DOJ says sometimes the government finds inculpatory video after someone pleads guilty.

The government notes – without suggesting that this is true in Mr. Finley’s case – that the January 6 investigation is replete with instances where a defendant has entered a plea of guilty only to have the government or counsel identify additional instances of criminal conduct by the defendant through diligent review of videos. Thus for many defendants, even those who have been sentenced, it is possible that defense counsel may believe that their client continues to have a legitimate Fifth Amendment privilege.

Follow the Money: Merrick Garland Told You So

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My favorite thing about this CNN story providing new details on the Trump investigations that Jack Smith will oversee is the quote from TV lawyer Elie Honing, commenting about how much evidence Smith already had.

“Mueller was starting virtually from scratch, whereas Jack Smith is seemingly integrating on the fly into an active, fast-moving investigation,” said Elie Honig, a former federal prosecutor and senior CNN legal analyst.

Honig, of course, was long one of the worst kind of TV lawyers, who kept insisting there was no investigation into Trump because he hadn’t seen evidence of it (and he also because he hadn’t looked).

Effectively, this CNN article amounts to Honig admitting that he was wrong.

Among the details CNN provides are that there’s not just one prosecutor — Thomas Windom — on the Trump team, there are twenty.

A team of 20 prosecutors investigating January 6 and the effort to overturn the 2020 election are in the process of moving to work under Smith, according to multiple people familiar with the team.

Prosecutors on the Trump side of the January 6 investigation have had the green light to go after Trump for a year, not after Cassidy Hutchinson’s testimony as some liked to suggest.

[T]he other investigative team, looking at efforts to block the transfer of power from Trump to President Joe Biden after the 2020 election, had even a year ago been given the greenlight by the Justice Department to take a case all the way up to Trump, if the evidence leads them there, according to the sources.

CNN reveals an investigation into the finances of the attack, led by JP Cooney, that has also been going on at least a year.

Another top prosecutor, JP Cooney, the former head of public corruption in the DC US Attorney’s Office, is overseeing a significant financial probe that Smith will take on. The probe includes examining the possible misuse of political contributions, according to some of the sources. The DC US Attorney’s Office, before the special counsel’s arrival, had examined potential financial crimes related to the January 6 riot, including possible money laundering and the support of rioters’ hotel stays and bus trips to Washington ahead of January 6.

In recent months, however, the financial investigation has sought information about Trump’s post-election Save America PAC and other funding of people who assisted Trump, according to subpoenas viewed by CNN. The financial investigation picked up steam as DOJ investigators enlisted cooperators months after the 2021 riot, one of the sources said.

The thing is, we long had reason to know that there was a financial component to the investigation. Merrick Garland implied to Sheldon Whitehouse as much on October 28, 2021.

Garland: Senator, I’m very limited as to what I can say–

Whitehouse: I understand that.

Garland: –Because I have a criminal investigation going forward.

Whitehouse: Please tell me it has not been constrained only to be people in the Capitol.

Garland: The investigation is being conducted by the prosecutors in the US Attorney’s Office and by the FBI field office. We have not constrained them in any way.

Whitehouse: Great. And the old doctrine of “follow the money,” which is a well-established principle of prosecution, is alive and well?

Garland: It’s fair to say that all investigative techniques of which you’re familiar and some, maybe, that you’re not familiar with because they post-date your time are all being pursued in this matter.

He said so even more explicitly on January 5.

In circumstances like those of January 6th, a full accounting does not suddenly materialize. To ensure that all those criminally responsible are held accountable, we must collect the evidence.

We follow the physical evidence. We follow the digital evidence. We follow the money.

And now CNN reveals something else that TV lawyers were sure they’d know if it happened: “DOJ investigators enlisted cooperators months after the 2021 riot.”

Update: I’ve started to have some discussion about financial questions of interest, so thought I’d lay out some that likely have come up:

  • Nick Fuentes got a huge cryptocurrency donation just before the attack; did the donor (who killed himself) know that it’d be used to bring Nazis to the Capitol?
  • Patrick Byrne paid to fly some of the participants in the Big Lie and the December 12 rally from place to place; how closely was this tied to the overall plan to steal the election?
  • Alex Jones had a role in arranging Publix heir Julie Jenkins Fancelli’s funding for much of the rally. Did he do this with knowledge of plans to assault the Capitol?
  • A financial investigation into Sidney Powell has long been public. Even after that, she funded the defense of key witnesses. What were the legal circumstances of this money flow?
  • As the January 6 Committee made clear, Trump was raising money on promises of voting integrity long after he knew he had lost the election. Was that fraud, and did any money raised fraudulently go to pay for the attack on the Capitol?

The Rules Against Keeping Classified Documents in an Unsecure RV Parked alongside Jeremy Brown’s Home

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Several days into the trial of Oath Keeper Jeremy Brown, it continues to provide useful lessons for the case of that other disgruntled former Federal employee who took classified documents home to Florida with him.

In a motion in limine submitted yesterday, the government sought to preclude Brown from taking the stand and explaining why he took one of the classified documents he is accused of storing in his RV.

Count 10 charges the Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) in connection with his willful retention of the Classified Trip Report. The parties have agreed that in order to prove the Defendant guilty of this offense, the government must establish that (1) the Defendant possessed the Classified Trip Report without authorization, (2) the Classified Trip Report relates to the national defense, and (3) the Defendant willfully retained the Classified Trip Report and failed to deliver it to an officer of the United States entitled to receive it. See Dkt. 230-1 at 19 (joint jury instruction setting forth elements of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)).

Notably absent from these elements is any requirement that the Defendant intended to harm the United States. Nor does the government need to prove that the Defendant even knew or had reason to know that his conduct would harm the United States. Consequently, evidence of the Defendant’s motive, rationale, or justification for possessing the Classified Trip Report is irrelevant to the elements of this offense—unless he is contending that he was authorized to possess the Report (which he has never and cannot credibly argue).

Such evidence is also not relevant to establishing that the Defendant “willfully” retained the Classified Trip Report. The Defendant either acted willfully—i.e., he knew that his conduct was generally unlawful—or he did not. His reasons or motive for so acting are irrelevant. Here, the Defendant knew that the Trip Report was classified and he knew that it was against the rules to keep classified [sic] in an unsecure RV parked alongside his home. Indeed, he placed the classified markings on the document himself, and chose to include particularly sensitive information in the Report that could jeopardize U.S. national security. The Defendant’s subjective preference that some of the information in the document should have been at a different classification level – as pointed out to the jury during cross-examination of Special Agent Koundarakis – is similarly irrelevant. On these facts, the Defendant acted willfully. The Defendant’s subjective belief that he had good intentions, or his preferred classification level for the information in the document, is entirely immaterial to that analysis.

This is the kind of motive argument that many people accused of 18 USC 793(e) want to argue. Trump (or Kash Patel) himself has argued a form of it by arguing that he should have been able to take the documents about the Russian investigation to prove he was unfairly targeted.

In this case, the government is arguing that doing so (Brown already did so in opening arguments) amounts to jury nullification.

“[T]he potential for jury nullification is no basis for admitting otherwise irrelevant evidence.” Funchesi, 135 F.3d at 1409. The defendant does not have a due process right to present evidence “the only relevance of which is to inspire a jury to exercise its power of nullification.” Id. at 1408. Rather, “[j]ury nullification verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.” Id. at 1409.

If and when Brown’s fellow Floridian is ever charged with 793(e), I expect to see a much more extended version of this argument: That’s it’s okay to bring home classified documents and store them in your RV or leatherbound box of trophies because you had a good motive.

But there will be a whole bunch of precedent ruling such arguments about — possibly even from Brown’s own case! And since the 11th Circuit ruled that Trump isn’t special, I don’t expect any attempt to argue motive will work

A Counter Perspective: On the House January 6 Committee’s Impending Referrals

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[NB: it’s an absolute must to check this byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

We don’t all agree here at emptywheel all the time. Our reactions to the news about the House January 6 Committee’s intent to issue criminal referrals is one of those occasions.

You can read bmaz’s take at this link. If you’ve been reading the site’s comment threads since the first posts here about the January 6 Committee’s work, you already had a pretty good idea what bmaz’s sentiments have been as he’s been quite clear.

In essence bmaz found Tuesday’s news about the Committee’s expected criminal referrals

– attention seeking (“media whores,” “preening,” “infomercial”);
– the referrals an activity which “means absolutely nothing” because the Department of Justice will prosecute on their own.

One point of contention between us has been the nature of the Committee’s work. bmaz has called it political, referring to the committee negatively as a “political body” and the criminal referrals “useless and meaningless political gestures.”

Yes, it is political. That’s how governance happens, through politics.

From Merriam-Webster dictionary:

1 a: the art or science of government
b: the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing governmental policy
c: the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government

2: political actions, practices, or policies

3 a: political affairs or business
especially: competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership (as in a government)
b: political life especially as a principal activity or profession
c: political activities characterized by artful and often dishonest practices

From Cambridge Dictionary:

the activities of the government, members of law-making organizations, or people who try to influence the way a country is governed

From Macmillan Dictionary:

the activities and affairs involved in managing a state or a government

the profession devoted to governing and to political affairs

social relations involving intrigue to gain authority or power

the opinion you hold with respect to political questions

the study of government of states and other political units

In the simplest, bluntest terms, politics is how shit gets done by groups who are not all of the same mind at the same time. Governance in a democracy is politics, it is political activity.

Congress is inherently a political body, its activities are political, and the government it legislates to execute laws is a function of politics at work.

~ ~ ~

There is nothing wrong with politics except when it denies the rights of individuals to exist, stripping them of agency and autonomy for the purposes of an exercise in partisan ideology and/or autocratic power, and/or personal venality rather than to achieve the aims of our shared social contract, the Constitution.

It is particularly egregious when the persons aiding and abetting an attack on the Constitution are those who have not only participated in politics for the purposes of serving as an elected representative and then sworn an oath to defend the Constitution and its aims:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

What happened on January 6, 2021 at the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington D.C. was the furthest thing from a more perfect Union. The acts of thousands sought to undermine the domestic tranquility of millions to the personal benefit of one man.

This was not politics but its antithesis, an attempted smash-and-grab intended to deny liberty and justice obtained through political activities, by obstructing government operations in the transition and transfer of a democracy’s leadership.

~ ~ ~

The Constitution to Article I, Section 1 confers upon Congress “All legislative Powers” – this is the legitimization of a political body to effect the nation’s governance.

Congress’s Powers under Article I, Section 8 include:

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

as well as

To make Rules for the Government…

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;-And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

[bold mine]

Without exercising these powers Congress cannot assure its obligations under the Constitution are completed.

In the specific case of January 6, Congress was attacked in its own seat of power, its election-related proceedings obstructed by domestic terrorists engaged in seditious conspiracy. Americans died, both attackers and defenders. Public property was destroyed.

Response by law enforcement and other security forces like its militia — the National Guard — was not satisfactory leading up to and during the January 6 attack. The risk of domestic terror remained high even after that date.

The person who stood to benefit most from the terror and the obstruction wrought was the head of the executive branch, whose function as executive is subject to legislation and oversight by Congress. That same person may have abused his office to further his personal interests.

It is wholly natural to expect the House to investigate the terror attack on Congress’s offices and its proceedings; it’s part of Congress’s job.

The attack aimed to stop the activities essential to the republic. To that end the House established the January 6 Committee and the mission which the committee was to fulfill.

The mission included releasing a final report of findings to the public, with interim reports as necessary, with the ultimate goal specification of corrective measures to remedy failings and improve the security posture of the Capitol and the nation, without regard to the political party helming either house of Congress or the executive branch.

All of that is politics. All of that is political. That is the nature of government in a democracy.

~ ~ ~

With regard to the complaint the January 6 Committee acted like “media whores,” this site’s comments certainly didn’t reflect that.

The number of comments published every week about when the public would hear or see something from the Committee in the way of action whether subpoenas or hearings or reports or referrals could be annoying – as annoying and frustrating as the complaints about when the Department of Justice was going to do something, anything.

The number of tweets the Committee has published to date are 627, its press releases which may duplicate tweet content amount to less than 90 over 14 months time — hardly an attention seeking volume.

Marcy wrote a number of posts about the DOJ doing something right under everyone’s noses while pundits complained on television and in social media nothing was being done.

While the DOJ was crunching away on the largest investigation it has every conducted, the J6 Committee did likewise while trying to avoid further obstruction by members of Congress as well as persons who continued to support Trump and his Big Lie.

If anything the American public didn’t hear enough about what the Committee was doing. As of late October, the Committee had issued at least 100 subpoenas; the media reported in any detail only on the most intransigent subjects like former Trump advisor Steve Bannon.

If the Committee had been media whoring, we would have had every jot and tittle crammed in our faces daily and weekly about the subpoenas and consequent testimony – but we saw very little, save for nine hearings taking less than 40 hours time.

What we did see was distilled for a contemporary audience flooded with other media, an audience which wouldn’t have the patience to deal with thousands of hours of testimony and evidence.

It’s quite possible the opposite is true, that the Committee didn’t do enough to share its work in progress with media. Had it done more earlier to release testimony and evidence, perhaps the GOP would have had to counter these reports instead of sowing manufactured fear, uncertainty, and doubt about inflation and the economy’s direction during the mid-term elections.

Perhaps control of the House might not have gone to the GOP if the Committee had been more open about the partisan nature of the attack on the Capitol.

You can be certain had the shoe been on the other foot, with the GOP leading an investigation, it would have been another pointless circus like the Benghazi hearings which GOP congresspersons admitted were purely partisan stunts intended to suppress approval of Hillary Clinton ahead of the 2016 election.

The Benghazi hearings were politics without governance, not one passed bill as a result of all the hot air.

That 2015 committee’s work “means absolutely nothing” even seven years later, except as a cautionary tale about partisan hackery in lieu of governance.

~ ~ ~

Again, not all the team here at emptywheel will agree about the J6 Committee’s work, particularly the anticipated criminal referrals.

Marcy mentioned in comments,

… If it’s a referral on 1512 grounds for Trump, I’m not all that interested. If it’s a means to refer the witness tampering for specific witnesses that would not have been replicated before DOJ, by all means refer.

By “1512” she means Title 18 U.S. Code 1512 – Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant – I’m not certain which subsection(s) she means.

The Committee will likely refer whatever it found, though, without regard to the DOJ’s progress so far. (The Committee should not know much about the DOJ’s investigative efforts.)

If there is to be corrective action recommended and corresponding legislation drafted, submitted, debated, and passed, there must be a documented need for the change.

We should expect to see some duplication between J6 Committee and DOJ for this reason: they have different objectives.

Because of the Constitution’s Article I, Section 6 Rights and Disabilities, the Committee has more power and latitude to question and demand accountability of its own members within its own chambers, should its investigation have uncovered evidence of criminal behavior by congresspersons who supported Trump’s Big Lie efforts.

Further, the J6 Committee has an obligation to history and not just its legislative duties. It needs to document what crimes it found had been committed against it, the political body which acts as the representative of the people in its creation of laws to create a more perfect Union.

It’s not enough to report a crime has been committed against the people’s representatives. The people must demand with criminal referrals that the highest law enforcement body investigate and prosecute who attacked our democratic republic, even if DOJ has already begun this effort.

As Ben Franklin said in 1787 in response when asked what form of government the Constitution Convention had established: “A republic, if you can keep it.”

The J6 Committee’s “political gestures” are some of the means to do so.