And Since We’ve Been Talking about Contracting, Secrecy, and Spying…

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…In our discussion of Tim Shorrock’s Spies for Hire, it seems appropriate to post on the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the Cyber-Security Initiative.

As you’ll recall, the Bush Administration has been struggling for their entire term to address the fact that our cyber-infrastructure is woefully exposed to cyber-attacks. After a series of cyber-czars who either wouldn’t or couldn’t address this problem, back in January the Administration began to make some progress–not least, by taking the project out of Michael Chertoff’s hands. The SASC’s report notes that the Administration has made some progress, though it has three substantive complaints.

The committee applauds the administration for developing a serious, major initiative to begin to close the vulnerabilities in the government’s information networks and the nation’s critical infrastructure. The committee believes that the administration’s actions provide a foundation on which the next president can build.

However, the committee has multiple, significant issues with the administration’s specific proposals and with the overall approach to gaining congressional support for the initiative.

First, the SASC objects to the way the Administration has shielded what is supposed to be at least partly a deterrent program in so much secrecy that the program has lost its deterrence ability.

A chief concern is that virtually everything about the initiative is highly classified, and most of the information that is not classified is categorized as `For Official Use Only.’ These restrictions preclude public education, awareness, and debate about the policy and legal issues, real or imagined, that the initiative poses in the areas of privacy and civil liberties. Without such debate and awareness in such important and sensitive areas, it is likely that the initiative will make slow or modest progress. The committee strongly urges the administration to reconsider the necessity and wisdom of the blanket, indiscriminate classification levels established for the initiative.

The administration itself is starting a serious effort as part of the initiative to develop an information warfare deterrence strategy and declaratory doctrine, much as the superpowers did during the Cold War for nuclear conflict. It is difficult to conceive how the United States could promulgate a meaningful deterrence doctrine if every aspect of our capabilities and operational concepts is classified. In the era of superpower nuclear competition, while neither side disclosed weapons designs, everyone understood the effects of nuclear weapons, how they would be delivered, and the circumstances under which they would be used. Read more →

Preview: Book Salon on Spies for Hire

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shorrock.jpgI wanted to give you all a heads up to a mid-week book salon I’ll be hosting today at 3PM ET over at the mother ship: Tim Shorrock’s Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. I pushed to include Shorrock on the schedule because (as you’ll see in my post at 3) his book offers some key insights on FISA–and we seem to be gearing up for another FISA fight.

But there’s more than FISA that might interest you about the book (and about chatting with Shorrock). He gives the corporate back-story to:

  • Rick Renzi’s corruption
  • The domestic spying Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)
  • CACI, the company whose contractors directed the torture at Abu Ghraib
  • Total Information Awareness
  • The domestic satellite surveillance Chertoff wants to use with DHS

Shorrock wraps that background story in a discussion both of the ideology behind the privatization of our intelligence function:

…as we’ve seen, money and profits are not the sole motivators for the corporations and executives who populate the Intelligence Industrial Complex. Because so many top executives are former intelligence officers themselves, many of their companies are motivated by politics as well. For CACI’s CEO, Jack London, that translates into a desire to "disseminate vital intelligence" for the fight against "Islamofascists." For ManTech CEO George Pederson, it’s a yearning for his company to be "on the battlefield," whether in Iraq, South Korea, or the Philippines. For the senior vice presidents of the big prime contractors, Booz Allen Hamilton and Science Applications International Corporation, it involves power, either as a way to influence future policy or make changes in the way the Intelligence Community is organized.

And a discussion of the subservience of public to private interest in such an Intelligence-Industrial Complex.

In the past, [former NSA Director Kenneth] Minihan said, contractors "used to support military operations; now we participate [in them]. We’re inextricably tied to the success of their operations." This new situation, he argued, presents corporations with "interesting opportunities" to create technologies that governments can take advantage of, "with all the complexities that exist in merging the interests of the private and public sector in the intelligence apparatus."

Merging the interests of the private and public sector. That astonishing phrase, which is now the mantra of the intelligence contracting industry, suggests the creation of a new mode of capitalism that specifically serves theneeds of government and its "intelligence apparatus." Read more →

FISA: The Coming Battle

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As I am minding the store while mom is away tilting kilts, I was party to a group discussion among several notable powers that be in the blogosphere early this afternoon, and the various blogs, all of which you are intimately familiar with, will be rolling out over the next few days somewhat of a battle plan on FISA/immunity. Nothing particularly new or shocking really, just a reminder to folks of the stakes involved and where the pressure points are that we need to address.

I wish I could say that there is some new brilliant, sexy and effective tact that we have lit upon to wipe this all away; but that, alas, is not the case. It will be back to the grindstone of calling, faxing and otherwise communicating with the key representatives etc. One thing I think will be critical is to offer plenty of carrots, with gentle reminders of the sticks. As you will recall, we got a surprisingly good response, and result, from the House Democrats in the last go round. We want to build, grow and reinforce that effort and result. The gathering proximity of the election is a double edged sword however. It is a chance for us to remind them of how favorably we view the last effort, but it is clearly also another opportunity for the Bushies to roll out the fear/security card and threaten the weak, and weakly situated, elements (read mostly Blue Dogs) of the Democratic coalition. It is going to be critical for those of us that actually live in districts represented by one of these souls to work them hard.

I have some things that will divide most of my attention for a few hours; although I will check in periodically as I can. In the meantime, use this space to discuss anything you feel important, but please start putting all the collective talent together to suggest ways and means for fighting the next stage of the FISA battle. My post from yesterday morning pretty much gives the lay of the land as it is understood at this moment; there are no real new baseline facts since then. Thanks.

Jello Jay And Hoyer Slither Back Into The FISA Limelight

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Crikey, this is getting old. You may have seen by now that rumors of a new push on passage of FISA, and, of course, full retroactive immunity, are bubbling to the surface in the last 24 hours. Here is Jane. Here is Digby. Here is McJoan. From Jane at FDL:

According to the ACLU, there is rumor of a backroom deal being brokered by Jay Rockefeller on FISA that will include retroactive immunity. I’ve heard from several sources that Steny Hoyer is doing the dirty work on the House side, and some say it will be attached to the new supplemental.

A few more facts and circumstances are available now than were in the earlier stories. For one, we apparently see the "urgency lever" being pressed this time around (there always seems to be one in these plays, it’s a feature). From Alexander Bolton at The Hill:

The topic has reached a critical point because surveillance orders granted by the director of national intelligence and the attorney general under the authority of the Protect America Act begin to expire in August.

If Congress does not approve an overhaul of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by Memorial Day, intelligence community officials will have to prepare dozens of individual surveillance warrants, a cumbersome alternative to the broader wiretapping authority granted by the Protect America Act, say congressional officials familiar with the issue.

Maybe, but if so, then the situation is intentionally so from a designated plan by the Administration to have some of their programs start running out while they are still in office and can use the "urgency" to fuel their desperate push for immunity. The reason, if you will recall, is the little provision placed in the Protect America Act (PAA) allowing any surveillance order (i.e entire general program, not just individual warrants) existing at the sunset of the PAA, which occurred on February 17, 2008, to continue until expiration, which means that there was NO necessity that any program that the government wished to pursue expire anytime during the current Administration. I have reminded folks of this repeatedly, but here is a wonderful synopsis from Cindy Cohn of EFF:

The PAA provides that any currently ongoing surveillance continues until the "date of expiration of such order," even if PAA expires. "Orders" are what the PAA calls the demand for surveillance by the Attorney General or Director of National Intelligence (there’s no court involved). These surveillance orders can be Read more →

Syriana

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Aurora Borealis (ionization of the upper atmosphere)(While I have been trying to find a resolution to MI’s DNC delegation in the last few days, the Admin put on their nukes in Syria dog and pony show. Partly because I didn’t have the time to do the Syria presentation justice, and partly because Professor Foland–whom you know from his great comments–has a lot more expertise on this area than I, I asked him to do a post assessing the presentation. Thanks for the really informative post, Prof! -ew)

If there’s one thing I’ve learned over the course of this Administration, it’s that if Dana Perino one day announces that the sky is blue, I will be forced to assume that an alien invasion has commenced with the total ionization of Earth’s upper atmosphere.

With that in mind, there’s an awful lot of cognitive dissonance for me in analyzing the evidence on the raid (apparently named "Operation Orchard" by the Israelis) on a Syrian desert site (apparently named "Al-Kibar"). Having started my own blog motivated by "the incredible amount of lies & hyperbole on the Iran situation of early 2006", I don’t find it easy to accept anything this Administration puts forth as evidence. I’m having all this difficulty because the pictures they showed last Thursday are clearly pictures of a nuclear reactor.

In what follows, I will lay out the history of what we’ve known about Operation Orchard and al-Kibar, what the latest photographs show, and what questions we should probably be asking.

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CIA And Bushco Have A Rather Large Criminal Obstruction Problem: The Torture Tapes Come Home To Roost

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By now, the story of the CIA’s destruction of the "torture tapes" is well known. Although the problems with the CIA, and every other portion of the Bush Administration, maintaining custody and control of evidentiary video and audio tapes is literally almost a running bad joke, the capstone revelation came with a December 6, 2007 New York Times article by Mark Mazzetti. Mazzetti’s article detailed the willful destruction by the CIA of videotapes directly exhibiting the use by US Agents of "extreme interrogation techniques" on detainees Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.

To refresh your recollection of the entire sequence of events on the Torture Tapes, here is a remarkably complete timeline. For the instant consideration, the critical event is the evidence supplied to date by the Bush Administration, and most significantly the CIA, on their rationale for the destruction of the Zubaydah and al-Nashiri tapes. The initial statement of the position and defense of the CIA is contained in CIA Director Michael Hayden’s message to the body of his agency, which indicates:

…CIA videotaped interrogations, and destroyed the tapes in 2005. I understand that the Agency did so only after it was determined they were no longer of intelligence value and not relevant to any internal, legislative, or judicial inquiries–including the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.

The official position has been further refined by testimony of CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo and the pseudo-proffer of Jose Rodriquez via his attorney Bob Bennett. We also know that, at a minimum, four White House lawyers were involved in discussion of the proposed destruction of the tapes. The most recent evidence of the government’s position is contained in sworn statements by CIA officials made in mid-April in the Rashid Abdullah case, again positing nothing but good faith and lack of knowledge of any compelling reason to preserve the tapes.

However, yesterday, an insufficiently noticed page A-16 story by Dan Eggen in the Washington Post, appears to put the lie to the defenses the Administration has posited to date and raise serious issues in relation to intentional, malicious destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice. The Post article relates information gleaned from recent CIA/Administration filings in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed last June. From the Post:

The CIA concluded that criminal, administrative or civil investigations stemming from harsh interrogation tactics were "virtually inevitable," leading the agency to seek legal support from the Justice Department, according to a CIA official’s statement in court documents filed yesterday.

The CIA said it had identified more than 7,000 pages of classified Read more →

A Peek into the Torture Tape Investigation

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As the NYT and AP have reported, the CIA says none of its records were responsive to the Court order in the Hani Abdullah case.

A records search by the Central Intelligence Agency has found no evidence that the agency violated a judge’s order when, in 2005, it destroyed videotapes that showed harsh interrogations, the C.I.A. said in a court declaration this week.

Since the CIA is still reviewing its records, though, that declaration may or may not be conclusive.

But the CIA’s declaration is far more interesting for what it says about John Durham’s Torture Tape investigation than what it says about Hani Abdullah’s civil suit against George Bush. Comparing the two declarations submitted in response to Abdullah’s suit with an earlier declaration the CIA submitted in response to the ACLU’s FOIA suggests that John Durham may have reason to suspect that some records pertaining to the torture tapes were destroyed in the Office of Inspector General.

First of all, consider who wrote the two declarations submitted Wednesday by the CIA. First, there’s Robert Dietz, who conducted a general search of the CIA’s operational files. Here’s how Dietz describes his expertise in this matter:

I am the senior councilor to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I joined the CIA in Autumn of 2006. Although I am a lawyer by training, I am not serving in a legal capacity and I am not part of the Office of General Counsel. In my position, I report to the Director of the CIA and receive assignments from him. For example, I have chaired an Agency Accountability Board, and I have recently concluded a management review of the Office of the Inspector General. In December 2007, in connection with the public disclosure that the CIA had destroyed certain videotapes, the Director asked me to chair the so-called Tapes Coordination Group ("TCG"). This Group’s assignment is to respond to requests for information from Acting United States Attorney John Durham, specially appointed prosecutor investigating the destruction of the tapes, and similar requests by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Dietz is not a lifetime CIA employee. Rather, he appears to have come in when Michael Hayden took over as Director. That means he had nothing to do with the destruction of the torture tapes. But it also likely means he’s a Hayden loyalist, there to protect Hayden.

Most interesting, Dietz reveals he was in charge of the "management review of the Office of the Inspector General." I find that interesting, not least, because the spat between OIG and Hayden (or rather, and the rest of the CIA) relates to OIG’s report finding CIA’s interrogation methods constituted cruel and inhuman treatment.

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DOJ: Give Us More Powers Because We F*** Up So Often

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I don’t have time to do this EFF report justice–so just go read the whole thing. It traces the story of one of FBI’s misuses of National Security Letters–and the way in which Robert Mueller, having misused the NSLs, used the story to claim FBI needed more investigative powers. The short version is:

  • The FBI used a grand jury subpoena to get the educational records of an NC State Chemical Engineering student suspected of ties to the London subway bombers.
  • Then, someone in FBI HQ effectively said, "No, let’s use our fancy new toy, the National Security Letter, even though National Security Letters don’t apply to academic records!"
  • So the FBI returned the records, and then submitted a NSL.
  • NC State, which apparently has better lawyers than AT&T and Verizon, read the law and said, "Golly, you can’t use an NSL to get academic records!" So they denied the request
  • The FBI then gave up on the NSL, submitted a second grand jury subpoena, and voila! They got the records they had originally gotten with a grand jury subpoena.
  • Robert Mueller went before Congress and claimed that the NSL process had resulted in a two-day delay in getting the records, which justified giving FBI more investigative powers. You will not be surprised to learn that Mueller didn’t reveal the real details behind the request for records.
  • The FBI did not report this incident to the Intelligence Oversight Board as a potential violation of civil liberties until two years later, at a time when the IG was already investigating the incident.

As I said, it’s worth reading the entire EFF report, particularly its list of open questions about the incident.

But for now, I just wanted to point the the incident as yet another example (Mike McConnell’s false claim that the FISA process resulted in a delay on wiretaps on Iraqis who had kidnapped American soldiers and Michael Mukasey’s claim that FISA had prevented the FBI from learning that one of the 9/11 hijackers was communicating with a known Al Qaeda safe house are two others) where the government fucked up–and then used its own failure as an example to claim it needed more investigative powers.

It’s really a disturbing pattern. The Bush Administration apparently thinks it reasonable to argue, "we’re incompetent, so give us more ways to invade your privacy."

Conyers to Mukasey: So You Did Spin Shamelessly, Didn’t You?

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(Updated with selise’s YouTube showing Leahy confronting Mukasey on his misrepresentation.) 

I really really like this letter Conyers, Nadler, and Scott sent to Attorney General Mukasey on his claim that they could have prevented 9/11 if only FISA hadn’t been preventing them. In it, they basically nail DOJ on its non-responsive response to their earlier letter asking about Mukasey’s claim. If you recall, the prior letter basically gave Mukasey a few choices: either Mukasey completely misunderstands FISA, the Administration withheld information from the 9/11 Commission, or the Administration screwed up.

These include a public statement by you that appears to suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the federal government’s existing surveillance authority to combat terrorism, as well as possible malfeasance by the government prior to 9/11,

The underlying truth that DOJ won’t admit, of course, is that Mukasey misrepresented the incident in an attempt to make a case for FISA that doesn’t actually hold up.

In an apparent attempt to avoid admitting Mukasey has been spinning wildly, DOJ wrote a non-responsive response back–it turned the question into a general question about FISA legislation, rather than specific question about whether Mukasey misrepresented the facts.

We are writing about the April 10, 2008, letter from Brian Benczkowski in response to our letter of April 3, 2008, concerning disturbing recent revelations about apparent pre-9/11 failures and subsequent abuses of civil liberties by the Administration. While we appreciate the promptness of the April 10 letter, we are extremely concerned about its failure to address several of our specific inquiries.

[snip]

In addition, however, the April 10 letter does not respond to several of our requests. Our letter did not, as you characterize it, generally inquire “why FISA’s emergency provisions were not an adequate substitute for the authorities the Government has obtained under the Protect America Act.” Rather, our inquiry concerned the specific phone call about which you spoke. We asked whether the then-existing emergency provisions would have allowed interception of the specific call at issue, if indeed the foreign portion of the call was a known terrorist location. To the extent that your response set forth an argument for the PAA or the Administration’s preferred version of FISA reform, it was non-responsive to our request for information. Read more →

The Joint Inquiry and Mukasey’s Call

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Alright. Glenn has me intrigued by Michael Mukasey’s story about an intercept that–if it had been disseminated–might have prevented 9/11. So I’m going to flog it for a couple more posts. As a reminder, here’s the story that Mukasey has apparently heard, Zelikow doesn’t recognize, and Conyers has not heard.

And before 9/11, that’s the call that we didn’t know about. We knew that there has been a call from someplace that was known to be a safe house in Afghanistan and we knew that it came to the United States. We didn’t know precisely where it went.

As I pointed out in this comment, Mukasey tells a similar (thought not exactly the same) story in his and Mike McConnell’s letter to Harry Reid listing which FISA amendments would have incurred a veto threat (I think this story was also actually used in the debate in the Senate, though that’s going to have to wait for a later post).

The Joint Inquiry has learned that one of the future hijackers communicated with a known terrorist facility in the Middle East while he was living the United States. The Intelligence Community did not identify the domestic origin of those communications prior to September 11, 2001, so that additional FBI inevstigative efforts could be coordinated.

Before moving on, note the key difference here: Mukasey’s weepy story has the person in the US receiving a call from an Afghan safe house. The Joint Inquiry was told the US person called the known terrorist facility. That may have import as we move forward–but for now, just keep in mind that little discrepancy.

Also note the reference is somewhat vague. When did this intercept come in? Which hijacker did it involve? Did the Joint Inquiry see the intercept itself, or did they just "learn" about it, as the passage implies?

To see if I could clarify those issues, I decided to look at the Joint Inquiry to see precisely what it said about this intercept that could have prevented 9/11 (see page 36 of the PDF). From the context, it is clear the members and staffers from both intelligence committees–who conducted this inquiry–believed that the NSA had all the legal authority it needed to collect this intercept.

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