The REAL Worst Policy in the Bill
Ezra continues to claim that the worst employer incentive in MaxTax is the way it fines employers for not covering employees.
Max Baucus’s bill retains the noxious "free rider" provision on employers. Rather than a simple employer mandate that forces every employer over a certain size to provide health-care insurance or pay a small fee, the free rider approach penalizes employers $400 for hiring low-income workers who are eligible for subsidies.
[snip]
This isn’t just the worst policy in the bill. It’s one of the worst policy ideas I’ve ever seen. It creates a huge incentive to build a workforce that entirely excludes low-income workers.
Now before we get into whether this really is the worst incentive or not, let me correct something Ezra said. He said:
The employer doesn’t just pay $400 per low-income employee. He pays "$400 multiplied by the total number of employees at the firm (regardless of how many are receiving the state exchange credit)." The bill actually gives an example of how this works: Employer A has 100 employees and does not offer health-care coverage. Thirty of the employees receive subsidies on the exchange. Employer A doesn’t pay $400 x 30 employees, but $400 x 100 employees, for a total of $40,000.
But that’s not what the MaxTax does or says. Here’s what MaxTax says [update: Ezra has now amended his post to reflect this difference.]
The employer would pay the lesser of the flat dollar amount multiplied by the number of employees receiving a tax credit or a fee of $400 per employee paid on its total number of employees.
For example, Employer A, who does not offer health coverage, has 100 employees, 30 of whom receive a tax credit for enrolling in a state exchange offered plan. If the flat dollar amount set by the Secretary of HHS for that year is $3,000, Employer A should owe $90,000. Since the maximum amount an employer must pay per year is limited to $400 multiplied by the total number of employees (for Employer A, 100), however, Employer A must pay only $40,000 (the lesser of the $40,000 maximum and the $90,000 calculated fee). [my emphasis]
So Ezra’s (and Baucus’) hypothetical employer would pay just $40,000. But say Employer B had just 5 employees who were subsidized, out of the same 100 employee firm. Employer B would pay $15,000, which brings it closer to the costs an employer might incur trying to preferentially hire an employee who might already have health care.
Ezra’s point still holds–to a degree. Both employers have an incentive to avoid hiring low income workers for whom they might be fined.