Khadr’s Confession and the Lies We Tell

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Omar Khadr’s confession makes me sad. Sad that we insisted on prosecuting a child soldier for defending himself. But also sad for the lies we included in his plea deal to prop up the government’s dubious stories about Khadr and detainees generally.

For example, can anyone explain to me how Khadr could be an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent under the Military Commissions Act in 2000 (the first action of Khadr’s referenced in the document) when the MCA was first signed in 2006 and we’ve changed even the category since that time?

Omar Khadr is an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent, as defined by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA). Omar Khadr is, and has been at all times relevant to these proceedings, a person subject to trial by military commission under Section 948c of the MCA.

Then there’s the Afghan deaths the government included in this confession to add to the conspiracy charges, which Daphne Eviatar has written about here.

But the one that bugs me the most is this claim, which includes the assertion that Derunta and Khaldan were al Qaeda camps.

While in Afghanistan, Ahmed Khadr and members of his family, including Omar Khadr, visited many al Qaeda training camps, to include the al Farook camp (where al Qaeda trained in small-arms, map-reading, orientation, explosives, and other training), the Derunta camp (where al Qaeda trained members in explosives and poisons), and the Khaldan camp (where al Qaeda trained members in light weapons, explosives, poisons, sabotage, target selection, urban warfare, and assassination tactics). Omar Khadr knew that these camps were operated by and associated with al Qaeda. Khadr provided U.S. officials with significant details regarding the operation of the training camps, including the fact that his father was responsible for providing financing for these camps, other al Qaeda sponsored camps, and other sponsored activities.

Now, presumably the government did this because the training it is suggested that Khadr got at Farooq–small arms and map reading–is the kind of thing you get a boy scout camp. They had to tie Derunta and Khaldan to al Qaeda to make Khadr’s training seem more militaristic, perhaps. But I can’t help but wonder whether they’ve also crafted this to serve as one piece of “evidence”–confirmation from the son of the financier–to use against other detainees who trained as mujahadeen, but not al Qaeda mujahadeen.

The government is just writing its own novel about Gitmo detainees and the war on terror now. But hey! At least they won’t have to go through the motions of trying a child soldier in a war court.

For more on this confession, see Michelle Shephard, who notes,

Khadr has made history as the first child soldier to be convicted for war crimes and the only captive the Pentagon has prosecuted for murder in the battlefield death of a U.S. service member in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

Eric Holder’s Defense of Ashcroft to Defend the Material Witness Statute

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The NYT has a worthwhile editorial lambasting the Obama DOJ’s pursuit of SCOTUS review in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, which will probably result in expanded immunity for government officials that abuse the law so as to abuse the rights of Americans. The editorial focuses closely on the way in which DOJ’s defense of absolute immunity amounts to a defense of using the material witness law as an improper basis for detention.

Prosecutorial immunity is intended to let prosecutors enforce the law without fear of being held personally liable. Protecting that legitimate aim did not require the administration to defend the indefensible. In forcefully defending the material witness statute on grounds that curtailing it would severely limit its usefulness, it is defending the law as a basis for detention. That leaves the disturbing impression that the administration is trying to preserve the option of abusing the statute again.

In other words, NYT argues that DOJ’s SCOTUS appeal in this case is as much about preserving the improper use of the material witness statute–to hold a person under the material witness statute so you can conduct an investigation into him–as it is about the immunity per se.

Of course it is.

After all, this is what Eric Holder (along with Janet Reno and two others) had to say about the material witness statute in 2004.

Even when there is insufficient evidence to charge a citizen with a crime, the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, permits the detention of a person whose testimony is “material in a criminal proceeding” if “it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” This statute is an effective counter-terrorism tool for several reasons. Because a grand jury investigation is a “criminal proceeding” for purposes of this statute, see United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 49-64 (2d Cir. 2003); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 939-41 (9th Cir. 1971), and because of the broad scope of grand jury investigations, see supra p. 11, the government can detain a suspected terrorist as a material witness before it has evidence sufficient to support a criminal arrest or indictment.

The government can obtain a material witness warrant with relative ease. For a grand jury witness, the required showing can be made by a good faith statement by a prosecutor or investigating agent that the witness has information material to the grand jury. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943; Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 65-66. Nor would establishing that a suspected terrorist poses a flight risk be an onerous task. See 349 F.3d at 69 (bail denied in part because witness failed to come forward with material testimony concerning terrorist attack). [my emphasis]

Mind you, in its Cert Petition, the government doesn’t admit that the material statute really was used in al-Kidd’s case to hold him even though the government had insufficient evidence to do so.

First, respondent claimed that, in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, petitioner implemented a policy of using the material witness statute as a pretextual tool to investigate and detain terrorism suspects whom the government lacked probable cause to charge criminally. Respondent alleged that he was arrested as a result of this alleged policy, which he contended violated the Fourth Amendment. [my emphasis]

So even though a document–signed by the current Attorney General at a time when al-Kidd was still subject to restricted movement–boasts about how easy it is to use of the material witness statute to hold people without sufficient evidence to do so, DOJ calls this use of the material witness statute “alleged.”

I guess if they admitted this was an intentional policy, it’d be harder to get SCOTUS to wink at its use going forward.

Update: harpie’s right. This is an editorial, not an op-ed.

Omar Khadr Pleads Guilty

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As you may have heard on Twitter, Omar Khadr has plead guilty to all charges against him.

Omar Khadr, the only Canadian, only child soldier and only Guantanamo Bay detainee charged with battlefield homicide in the killing a U.S. soldier, pleaded guilty to all terrorism and murder charges on Monday.

“Yes” said Mr. Khadr, when Army Col Patrick Parrish, the military judge asked him if he understood what he was doing.

[snip]

“You should only do this if you truly believe it is in your best interests,” Col. Parrish told Mr. Khadr.

“ Yes,” he replied again, his voice clear and direct in the hushed courtroom.

As part of his plea, apparently, Khadr will make a public confession to the terrorism and murder charges against him.

We have now, officially, made self defense terrorism.

Update: Carol Rosenberg describes the deal: one more year in Gitmo and then 7 more in Canada.

His 9 a.m. plea spared him a risk of life in prison, had he been convicted at trial to charges ranging from murder to conspiracy.

Instead, under a deal sealed through an exchange of diplomatic notes on Saturday, according to a government official, the United States will support a plan to transfer him to Canada at age 25 to serve the last seven years of an eight-year sentence.

The government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper has not pledged to receive Khadr even if Washington invokes the prisoner transfer treaty between the United States and Canada.

Who Arrested and Interrogated Hussein Abebe?

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Mary and I both noted the suggestion in Judge Lewis Kaplan’s summary opinion refusing to let Hussein Abebe testify against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani that Abebe himself was coerced to testify.

Kaplan’s complete ruling provides more details. At the very least, Kaplan’s opinion points to an entire day of Abebe’s  interrogation–the day on which he first confessed to having provided Ghailani the explosives for the embassy bombing–about which the government is withholding evidence. The unredacted portions of the ruling note that this means the people interrogating Abebe may well have used details from Ghailani’s own interrogation to convince Abebe to confess, which would exacerbate the poisoned fruit aspect of Abebe’s confession. And while Kaplan doesn’t say it in any of the unredacted portions, there is also the possibility that Abebe himself was abused on that day of his interrogation.

But just as interesting is the question of who conducted that interrogation. While the government and the Tanzanian national police claim members of the TNP were present, Kaplan found the TNP weren’t in charge the interrogation. So what entity was conducting this potentially coercive interrogation?

Abebe confessed to selling Ghailani explosives in a vaguely-described August 2006 interrogation

Let’s start with the chronology.

Late July or early August 2006: Abebe receives call from “Mr. Mazoa” instructing him to meet with some unnamed people in Dar es Salaam on the 13th.

August 12: Valentine Mlowola, then Senior Superintendent of the TNP, first briefed about impending Abebe arrest.

August 13: Two men (whose names and affiliations are redacted) get into Abebe’s taxi in Arusha and direct him to the police station. They meet Mlowola there, and apparently all four take a cab to Kilamanjaro Airport and then fly to Zanzibar and from there drive to a location which Abebe described as looking like a hotel.

August 14: Abebe meets a Sadek Majid, whom Abebe knows from Arusha. Tanzanians interrogate him with no Americans present; he does not confess to having sold Ghailani the explosives on that first day.

August 15: Tanzanians interrogate him, again with no Americans present. He confesses to selling Ghailani the explosives.

August 16: Four FBI agents arrive. They Mirandize Abebe, then conduct three interrogation sessions, during which he presumably repeats his description of selling Ghailani the explosives.

August 17: The FBI agents conduct one more interrogation session, then leave.

August 19: Tanzanians fly Abebe to Dar es Salaam and hold him in jail for four additional days.

August 24: Tanzanians release Abebe on a bond accusing him of conspiring to murder and terrorist acts.

Now, much of the narrative describing this chronology–including all but a few sentences describing Abebe’s interrogation by Tanzanians–is redacted. But several things are clear.

The Tanzanian Police did not have the lead on Abebe’s interrogation

First, while the TNP were involved in Abebe’s arrest, they were really only brought in as an afterthought. Kaplan writes:

Mlowola was drawn in only on August 12, primarily because it was thought helpful to have the TNP involved in making the arrest.

Since the TNP were only brought in on August 12, we can be sure that the man who called Abebe two weeks earlier and introduced himself as “Mr. Mazoa” was honest when he indicated that he no longer worked with the TNP.

In late July or early August, roughly two weeks before his arrest, Abebe received a phone call from a man who identified himself as Mr. Mazoa. Mazoa told him that Abebe did no know him, but that he was a well-known person who used to work at the police station in Arusha.

He then instructed Abebe to travel to Dar es Salaam because “there are some people who would like to talk to you [there] on the 13th.” When Abebe asked who wanted to speak with him in Dar es Salaam, Mazoa said, “you’ll know them when you come.” Abebe responded taht he could not afford to travel to Arusha, at which point Mazoa suggested that he take out a loan to pay the travel costs and that Abebe later would be reimbursed.

So someone, no longer employed by the TNP, calls Abebe and tells him to take a loan out to travel to Dar es Salaam. When he doesn’t do that, on the 13th two guys get in his cab, take him to the police station (which appears to be the first time when the TNP get involved) and from there fly him to an interrogation location.

TNP officers were present at the interrogation

Though at least one TNP officer was present for at least part of the interrogation: Mlowola. Kaplan notes that Abebe and Mlowola’s testimony conflicts on this point.

According to Mlowola, he was the lead questioner and there was only one interrogation session involving Tanzanians alone. Abebe, on the other hand, said he was questioned by the Tanzanians alone for two full days and that Mlowola was not present during either of those sessions.

Kaplan resolves this conflict this way:

Having considered all the evidence, the Court finds that Abebe was interrogated by the Tanzanians alone through August 14 and 15, [redacted] that Mlowola was present for at least part of it, and that the testimony of both Mlowola and Abebe as to Mlowola’s role and presence was inaccurate in material respects. Abebe was wrong in saying that Mlowola was not there at all and falsely described Abebe’s own state of mind and motives. Mlowola was mistaken concerning his role in the questioning and the number of sessions.

Kaplan also repeatedly refers to notes taken by a TNP officer (as I’ll discuss further below). That would imply that at least one more member of the TNP, in addition to Mlowola, was present. Yet since the government did not submit those notes as evidence (or have that officer testify), that may not be reliable.

No Americans were “present” at the key interrogation

As I said above, Kaplan’s unredacted narrative states that no Americans were present for the first two days of Abebe’s interrogation, though he footnotes that statement and the footnote (which appears to be two lines long) is entirely redacted. Later, Kaplan notes,

Whether by design or otherwise, there were no Americans whose presence could be compelled by an American court in the room.

I find that entire construction fascinating. Is Kaplan qualifying “Americans” with “whose presence could be compelled” to suggest there were Americans there whose presence couldn’t be compelled (such as CIA officers)? Or is he distinguishing between Americans “in the room” and Americans who might be observing but not present? If so, all of that is left unsaid. This sentence is followed by a redacted sentence, so Kaplan may have said more about this that got redacted.

In any case, the FBI remarkably swoops in on the day after Abebe confesses, and proceeds to get a Mirandized version of Abebe’s earlier confession. As if they had been waiting just outside the door for the moment when he confessed so as to get a version that would be admissible in a US court.

Read more →

Judge Kaplan: Government Couldn’t Use Abebe as Witness in Military Commission, Either

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I’m going to have a longer post about some curious details revealed in Judge Lewis Kaplan’s order refusing the government request to have Hussein Abebe testify against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani. But I wanted to point to a footnote in which Kaplan anticipated the critics now claiming that if Ghailani had been tried in a military commission, the government could have called Abebe as a witness (thanks to twolf for help with this file).

It is very far from clear that Abebe’s testimony would be admissible if Ghailani were being tried by military commission, even without regard to the question whether the Fifth Amendment would invalidate any more forgiving provisions of the rules of evidence otherwise applicable in such a proceeding.

Military commissions are governed by the Military Commissions Act, 10 USC 948a et seq. (the “MCA”). Evidence in such proceedings is governed by the Military Commission Rules of Evidence (“MCRE”). U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2010 ed.).

MCA 948r(a) and MCRE 304 preclude or restrict the use of “statements obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,” and evidence derived threrefrom, and could require exclusion of Abebe’s testimony. Even if they did not, the Constitution might do so, even in a military commission proceeding.

Those crazy Article III judges pointing to inconveniences like the Constitution again!

US Military Reneges on al-Qosi’s Plea Agreement

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When Ibrahim al-Qosi agreed to a plea deal with the government, the original deal was that he’d spend a secret two year sentence (rather than the 14 year sentence announced to the public) in communal quarters. At the last minute, the judge in the case learned there’s no way to do that at Gitmo, though she did recommend that he serve his time in communal quarters.

Well, guess what? After 60 days since then of living communally, the military has moved him to isolation, having not found a way to accommodate the Convening Authority’s recommendations.

The convicted Osama bin Laden’s former cook who pleaded guilty to material support to terrorism was moved from a communal living camp in Guantanamo to live in isolation, in disregard for recommendations of the Military Commission’s Convening Authority and to his plea deal, sources told Al Arabiya.

[snip]

“As has been the practice with previous detainees convicted by a Military Commission and serving punitive sentences, al-Qosi is no longer housed with detainees held solely as a function of the law of war,” said Pentagon spokeswoman Maj. Tanya Bradsher.

[snip]

Al-Qosi was left in camp 4 as a result of a 60-day sentence deferment period that expired on Sunday and that was requested by the Convening Authority and in anticipation of a possible review of Pentagon rules

Moving al-Qosi does not directly breach the plea agreement but undermines recommendations of the Convening Authority requiring communal living for Al-Qosi.

Al-Arabiya’s Muna Shikaki notes that this will make it a lot harder for the Administration to craft any more plea deals. Why plead if it means conditions will get worse and if you can’t really trust the terms of the deal?

But I’m just as curious what this means for al-Qosi’s Double Secret sentence: the two years versus the fourteen years. Al-Qosi has no leverage over the government at this point. If they’re not going to make an effort to keep him in communal quarters, what kind of guarantee does he have they’ll let him go in two years?

Kaplan’s Decision Not Just about Coercion of Ghailani, but Also of Abebe

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The usual suspects are out wailing that Judge Lewis Kaplan’s order, excluding the testimony of Hussein Abebe from Ahmed Ghailani’s trial, proves civilian courts don’t work for terrorism. Glenn rounds up more of the whiners and notes that you really can’t complain about Kaplan’s decision and still claim to believe in rule of law.

I wanted to add just one detail to the discussion bmaz offered yesterday (and thanks to him and Mary for watching the likker cabinet while I was away).

Kaplan rejected Abebe’s testimony not just because of the CIA’s coercion of Ghailani, but also because of possible coercion of Abebe himself.

Mary noted Kaplan’s suggestion that the witnesses put forth by the government either did not include all the witnesses who should have testified that Abebe would testify voluntarily, or weren’t themselves credible. Here’s what Kaplan said:

On the basis of that record – including importantly its assessment of the credibility of the only witnesses called to testify who actually were present when Abebe was persuaded to confess his role, to implicate Ghailani, and to cooperate with authorities – it now finds and concludes that the government has failed to prove that Abebe’s testimony is sufficiently attenuated from Ghailani’s coerced statements to permit its receipt in evidence.

And here’s what Mary wrote about it:

It makes it sound as if the issue isn’t just how attentuated the evidence from the coercion, but also how credible the witnesses. The “only witnesses called to testify who were actually present” – for some reason this makes me wonder if the court was aware that there were clearly other witnesses present when Abebe was being “persuaded” and they were purposefully not being provided to testify? And it makes you wonder about the persuasion. Being persuaded and being questioned have some different feel to the underlying words.

Kaplan’s earlier order dismissing the government’s other justifications for calling Abebe as a witness indicates the source of his skepticism–at least as it was before later hearings on the question [note, the earlier filing redacted Abebe’s name, though I’ve put it in where it contextually must be the redacted word].

It is entirely possible that [Abebe] if he were to appear, would be a willing witness. But the burden of proof on the attenuation claim [in which the government relies on Abebe’s willingness to testify to claim it had little to do with Ghailani’s coerced testimony] is on the government. It has submitted no affidavit from [Abebe]. Moreover, there is evidence that arguably undermines the government’s claim. The circumstances of [Abebe’s] initial questioning, at least to the extent that the Court has been made aware of them, perhaps suggest that he is not simply a public spirited citizen who “has come forward [to] offer evidence entirely of [his] own volition.” He was arrested by Tanzania, flew to a distant location, held there for days, and questioned by Tanzanian police before the FBI questioned him. Indeed, he told the Tanzanian authorities at the time of his arrest “that he knew this day would come–that he had been waiting eight years for the authorities to locate him.” The record discloses nothing about what happened while he was in Tanzanian custody, and it is sketchy even about what took place after the FBI arrived. We know only that [Abebe] was released after he was questioned by the FBI and promised to appear as a witness in this case.

The suggestion, of course, is that Abebe may have himself been subject to physical coercion, and at the very least he was only freed after agreeing to testify in Ghailani’s trial, which doesn’t make him a very voluntary witness. Kaplan’s references to the credibility (or not) of the witnesses who testified as well as his suggestion that not everyone involved in Abebe’s interrogation did testify probably suggest he suspects that those other law enforcement officers involved (I’m guessing there has to be at least one Tanzanian official and one US official who didn’t testify) would not be able to testify that Abebe’s testimony was voluntary.

Mind you, for the usual suspects, piling coercion on top of coercion doesn’t much make a difference. And it seems that the government has at least one other witness who knew (perhaps identified through Ghailani’s torture) that a Hussein–who appears to be Abebe–was involved in the plot.

But it sure seems that the problem is not just that they tortured Ghailani and now want to use his testimony under torture to help convict him, but that they may have continued to coerce witnesses–in unknown ways–to get a conviction for Ghailani.

Key Prosecution Witness Excluded Over Torture In New York Terror Trial

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Last Friday, I reminded the clueless media, and thus mostly uninformed public, there was a critical terror trial going on right in their midst in New York City, and doing so quietly and competently as was claimed was impossible by howlers such as Liz and Dick Cheney, Guiliani, Lindsey Graham and the right wing noise machine. The case is US v. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, and as I explained, although jury selection was well under way, there was a brief delay imposed by the trial judge, SDNY Judge Lewis Kaplan, until today so he could contemplate a motion to exclude a critical prosecution witness argued by the defense on the grounds the putative testimony was the product of torture and coercion.

The decision by Judge Kaplan was just issued and, in somewhat of a shock, he has ordered the witness, Hussein Abebe, excluded. From Bloomberg News:

A judge barred the U.S. from calling as a witness a Tanzanian miner who admits supplying explosives to Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged al-Qaeda terrorist charged with the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa.

U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan, in New York, denied a request by federal prosecutors to allow Hussein Abebe to testify that he sold five crates of dynamite to Ghailani before the blast. Abebe, whom prosecutors called a “giant” witness in their case, would provide a first-hand account of Ghailani’s role in the attacks, the government said.

Kaplan ruled that Abebe’s testimony is too closely tied to coerced statements made by Ghailani while he was in CIA custody and must be excluded from the trial. The ruling, made public today, will delay the trial’s start until Oct. 12 to give the government time to decide whether to appeal.

“The court has not reached this conclusion lightly,” Kaplan wrote. “It is acutely aware of the perilous nature of the world in which we live. But the Constitution is the rock upon which our nation rests. We must follow it not only when it is convenient, but when fear and danger beckon in a different direction.”

This is a critical ruling and, while it should not be this way, a refreshingly positive one for the health and sanctity of the Constitution and federal Article III courts. Hats off to Judge Kaplan, for while the legal basis seems quite clear on its face, the blowback pressure from the government and boogity boogity terrorism howlers described above (not to mention the Old Gluehorse McCain) will be intense. Here is the critical language from Kaplan’s order:

Abebe was identified and located as a close and direct result of statements made by Ghailani while he was held by the CIA. The government has Read more →

First Gitmo Habeas Case Makes Way To SCOTUS

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In March of this year, Marcy reported about a Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) petition to the Supreme Court on behalf of Guantanamo Lawyer Thomas Wilner and cited the CCR press release:

Last night, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) asked the Supreme Court to take up its warrantless surveillance case, Wilner v. National Security Agency (NSA). CCR and co-counsel argue that the Executive Branch must disclose whether or not it has records related to the wiretapping of privileged attorney-client conversations without a warrant. Lawyers for the Guantánamo detainees fit the officially acknowledged profile of those subject to surveillance under the former administration’s program, and the Executive Branch has argued in the past that it has a right to target them.

Yesterday, the petition for cert on behalf of Tom Wilner was denied on the Court’s traditional First Monday announcements.

But the story will not end there for Tom Wilner in this nascent Supreme Court term, in a move that will prove ultimately much more significant than the somewhat weak FOIA case CCR was pursuing, Wilner has petitioned for cert on the Habeas case of his client Fawzi al-Odah. This will be a critical test to see how the Supremes are going to deal with the progeny of their decision in Boumediene v. Bush.

From Andy Worthington:

Last week, two years and three months after the US Supreme Court granted the prisoners held at Guantánamo constitutionally guaranteed habeas corpus rights in Boumediene v. Bush, Fawzi al-Odah, a Kuwaiti prisoner held for nearly nine years, became the first prisoner to appeal to the Supreme Court “to protest federal court interpretations of detainees’ right to contest their detention,” as AFP described it.

Over the last two years, the prisoners have won 38 out of the 55 cases in which the District Court judges in Washington D.C. have made a ruling, but al-Odah is one of the 17 whose appeals have been denied. As I reported when he lost his petition in August 2009:

….

Although the burden of proof is on the government in the habeas cases, the “preponderance of evidence” standard is considerably lower than in criminal cases, for example, where a case must be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Circuit Court dismissed al-Odah’s complaint “under binding precedent in this circuit,” and also dismissed his complaint about the use of hearsay evidence, pointing out that the use of hearsay evidence had been approved by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the 2004 case that approved the detention of prisoners under the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the legislation passed by Congress the week after the 9/11 attacks, which authorized (and still authorizes) the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001” (or those who harbored them).

….

In his petition to the Supreme Court, al-Odah argues that the courts have “applied a burden of proof lower than any ever approved by this Court in a case involving prolonged imprisonment, allowing the government to justify indefinite detention by a mere preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence.” He also argues that “both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have … allowed the indiscriminate admission of hearsay, denying the detainees any meaningful opportunity to test the reliability of statements made against them.”

Here is the official Petition for Certiorari in al-Odah. al-Odah will be an important bellwether to see if the Court accepts cert and, if so, what they do with the case.

Terror Trials In New York!!!

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I am going to make this shorter than I originally planned on when I started it earlier today, because I have some Trash to take out. But, as Bob Schacht pointed out, not that anybody would know it, but there has been a terror trial going on all week in a real live Article III courtroom in the heart of Manhattan. Exactly like all the Republicans with vapors and trembling Democrats said could not be safely done.

Jury selection started Wednesday September 29th and today the trial in chief, expected to start Monday, was tentatively postponed until next Wednesday pending determination of admissibility of evidence and testimony from an important prosecution witness, Hussein Abebe. From Bloomberg:

The federal judge presiding over the trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian charged with taking part in the bombing of two American embassies in Africa, delayed the case by two days until Oct. 6.

U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan in New York today granted a prosecution request to postpone the trial, for which jury selection started Sept. 29. Kaplan said he may grant a delay if he rules a key prosecution witness, Hussein Abebe, can’t testify. The adjournment would give the government time to appeal that ruling before the trial.

……

Prosecutors want to call Abebe, 46, a Tanzanian who is former miner, to testify that he sold five crates of dynamite to Ghailani before the blast. He would provide a first-hand account of Ghailani’s role in the attacks, the government says.

Abebe, who hasn’t been charged, is a “giant” witness, according to prosecutors. The judge said earlier he may not decide until after opening arguments whether the jury should hear Abebe’s testimony.

…..

Ghailani’s lawyers argue that Abebe’s testimony should be excluded because the government learned of his involvement through a coercive interrogation of Ghailani by the CIA. Abebe also was coerced into cooperating with authorities, according to the defense attorneys, led by Peter Quijano and Steve Zissou.

Motions in limine and other evidentiary motions are always at issue in big criminal trials and brief delays and provision for interlocutory appeals are certainly common. So, what you see here is another criminal trial. Ho hum and yawn. Certainly not the unholy hell Baby Dick Cheney, Rudy 9/11 and the other cowering fearmongers predicted is it? The attached video from Human Rights First sums it up perfectly. Here is Human Rights First’s press release on the issue:

Despite repeated warnings that trying Guantanamo detainees in New York would result in chaos, mayhem, kidnappings, astronomical security costs, a police take-over of Lower Manhattan, snarled traffic, street closures, and “utter, unmitigated disaster,” New Yorkers interviewed by Human Rights First are going about their daily business within blocks of the federal terrorism trial of a former Guantanamo detainee.

In an exclusive video released today, the group reveals that many New Yorkers are not only failing to fear, they do not even realize that accused terrorist Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani’s trial is underway. Some, despite the urgent warnings from those trying to “Keep America Safe,” even expressed pride that the prosecution was happening in New York City.

“We have trials like that here all of the time,” one woman observed as Human Rights First correspondent Reagan Kuhn interviewed her near the federal courthouse in Foley Square.

Despite the best efforts of Liz Cheney, Deborah Burlingame, Rudy Guiliani, and Karl Rove to spread panic, many naïve New Yorkers seemed completely uninformed about the chaos that was supposed to reign. Some even observed that “everything seems pretty normal,” “I haven’t noticed anything,” and “I’m sure everybody knows what they are doing.”

As the Ghailani trial proceeds this week and in the weeks ahead, Human Rights First will continue to monitor New Yorkers’ failure to fear federal prosecution of this case. It will also continue to send representatives to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where military commission proceedings are set to commence next month. For those keeping score, U.S. federal courts have convicted more than 400 terrorists. Military commissions have secured only four convictions.

They have been holding terrorism trials of the highest order for years in New York City. SDNY is where the Blind Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman was tried for the first World Trade Center Attack. There is not a better secured and more appropriate place in america to try the 9/11 terrorism suspects. That is what we do in America, and what we do as Americans. Giving in to the fear and bed wetting of the Cheneys, Rudy Guiliani, Lindsey Graham, Lieberman and others of their ilk is giving up on our principles and giving in to the terrorists themselves. Besides, NYC is always a target of terrorists and would be even if Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other four 9/11 suspects were tried in Gitmo.

Put the trials where the crimes happened and deal with it.