Who Owns the UN’s Computer Systems?

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Via ThinkProgress, USA Today reports that the cheat sheet for Bush’s speech got placed on the UN website today.

Apparently, a marked-up draft of the president’s speech popped up onthe U.N.’s website as President Bush delivered his remarks this morningbefore the General Assembly, USA TODAY’s David Jackson reports. Thedraft included phonetic spellings of some names and countries, and thecellphone numbers for Bush speechwriters.

Press secretary Dana Perino downplayed the incident, and saidphonetic spellings are used to help interpreters. Asked if thepresident has trouble pronouncing some country’s names, Perino deemedit "an offensive question."

"There was an error made," Perino said, noting it was not a final draft.

"It was taken down and there’s nothing more to say about it."

Apparently, Bush spent his time with Sarkozy in Maine drunk or something, because the French President’s name is one of the ones included in Bush’s pronunciation guide.

  • Kyrgyzstan [KEYR-geez-stan]
  • Mauritania [moor-EH-tain-ee-a]
  • Harare [hah-RAR-ray]
  • Mugabe [moo-GAH-bee]
  • Sarkozy [sar-KO-zee]
  • Caracas [kah-RAH-kus]

Now, Dana Peroxide says it was a mistake. But I’m reminded of another little technical gaffe that Bush had once at the UN. In September 2002, after Powell and Blair (on one side) and Cheney and Rummy (on the other) had been arguing for a month over whether Bush should call for a UN resolution on Iraq or whether the US should just bypass the UN process altogether. In the end, Bush agreed to include a call for a new resolution. But mysteriously, when Bush read the speech from the teleprompter, that line had been removed. From Woodward’s Plan of Attack:

The Israeli Bombing Run in Syria

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Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright have the most comprehensive story, to date, on the mysterious bombing run Israel did in Syria on September 6. They confirm the story that had been floating around–that Israel’s target was a suspected nuclear site, supplied by North Korea. The story is interesting mostly for the exchange of intelligence it portrays. The Israelis first came with intelligence, yet Bush was chill to the attack.

Israel’s decision to attack Syria on Sept. 6, bombing a suspected nuclear site set up in apparent collaboration with North Korea, came after Israel shared intelligence with President Bush this summer indicating that North Korean nuclear personnel were in Syria, U.S. government sources said.

The Bush administration has not commented on the Israeli raid or theunderlying intelligence. Although the administration was deeplytroubled by Israel’s assertion that North Korea was assisting thenuclear ambitions of a country closely linked with Iran, sources said, the White Houseopted against an immediate response because of concerns it wouldundermine long-running negotiations aimed at persuading North Korea toabandon its nuclear program.

But then the US corroborated the Israeli intelligence, and the attack went forward.

Ultimately, however, the United States is believed to have providedIsrael with some corroboration of the original intelligence beforeIsrael proceeded with the raid, which hit the Syrian facility in thedead of night to minimize possible casualties, the sources said.

The article raises doubts about the quality of the Israeli intelligence (and who knows whether our intelligence–supposedly used to corroborate the Israeli intelligence–has gotten any better since the Iraq debacle).

The quality of the Israeli intelligence, the extent of North Koreanassistance and the seriousness of the Syrian effort are uncertain,raising the possibility that North Korea was merely unloading items itno longer needed.

Something’s still stinky about this raid. The creepy silence on all parts suggests there was some there there–but perhaps not what Israel claimed it was. I’m actually wondering whether it doesn’t involve a fifth player–perhaps China–that no one is talking about.

 

The NIE: Iraq to Split in Three States

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Okay, that’s not precisely the conclusion the new NIE in Iraq draws. But it is the logical outcome of the key judgments its gives. Here are some key points, taken totally out of the context of the report, but which are otherwise direct quotes:

  • The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up” security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions “bottom-up initiatives” could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.
  • Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.
  • The polarization of communities is most evident in Baghdad, where the Shia are a clear majority in more than half of all Read more →

DNI McConnell: Not Fighting Them Over There, So We Can Wiretap You Here

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This is our Director of National Intelligence, talking about the threat of Al Qaeda growing stronger in an area nominally controlled by our ally Pakistan:

After the 31st of May we were in extremis becausenow we have significantly less capability. And meantime, the community,before I came back, had been working on a National IntelligenceEstimate on terrorist threat to the homeland. And the key elements ofthe terrorist threat to the homeland, there were four key elements, aresilient determined adversary with senior leadership willing to diefor the cause, requiring a place to train and develop, think of it assafe haven, they had discovered that in the border area betweenPakistan and Afghanistan. Now the Pakistani government is pushing andpressing and attempting to do something about it, but by and large theyhave areas of safe haven. So leadership that can adapt, safe haven,intermediate leadership, these are think of them as trainers,facilitators, operational control guys. And the fourth part isrecruits. They have them, they’ve taken them. This area is referred toas the FATA, federally administered tribal areas, they have therecruits and now the objective is to get them into the United Statesfor mass casualties to conduct terrorist operations to achieve masscasualties. All of those four Read more →

Well, Of Course

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Holden asks:

They’re just thinking of this now?

U.S.military intelligence officials are urgently assessing how securePakistan’s nuclear weapons would be in the event President Gen. PervezMusharraf were replaced as the nation’s leader, CNN has learned.

Key questions in the assessment include who would control Pakistan’s nuclear weapons after a shift in power.

[snip]

The United States has full knowledge about the location of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, according to the U.S. assessment.

Butthe key questions, officials say, are what would happen and who wouldcontrol the weapons in the hours after any change in government in caseMusharraf were killed or overthrown.

Musharraf controls theloyalty of the commanders and senior officials in charge of the nuclearprogram, but those loyalties could shift at any point, officials say.

TheUnited States is not certain who might start controlling nuclear launchcodes and weapons if that shift in power were to happen.

There isalso a growing understanding according to the U.S. analysis thatMusharraf’s control over the military remains limited to certain topcommanders and units, raising worries about whether he can maintaincontrol over the long term.

Well, of course, Holden. They’ve been otherwise occupied. Up until the end of June, after all, they were very busy looking for Iraq’s WMDs.

Though, for a less snarky look at this issue, Arms Control Wonk discusses the difference between knowing where the nukes are and what will happen to them if anything should happen to Musharraf.

A Second Strategic Failure

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I’m more and more convinced this is Dick Cheney’s design. Failure in Afghanistan, which might lead to the collapse of Pakistan’s western-friendly government, which might lead to a regional war between Sunni and Shiite.

Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.

‘Theconsequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,’he said. ‘If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. Thesecurity problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I thinkyou could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off inwarlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end betweenSunni and Shia right across the Middle East.’

‘Mao Zedong used torefer to the First and Second World Wars as the European civil wars.You can have a regional civil war. That is what you might begin to see.It will be catastrophic for Nato. The damage done to Nato inAfghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia.That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybeeven damage the American security guarantee for Europe.’

What other logic is there–besides pure stupidity–for ignoring nuclear-armed and increasingly extremist Pakistan–while ratcheting up war against Iran? Wasn’t this whole Middle Eastern fuckup Read more →

The Guy Who Failed Points Fingers

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ThinkProgress had a piece the other day about Stephen Hadley visiting the Hill and blaming the military for the failure in Iraq.

Two weeks ago, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) shifted his position on Iraqin a speech on the Senate floor, where he called for a reduction of theU.S. military presence. After the speech, National Security AdviserStephen Hadley attempted to “calm Republican waters” over Iraq with avisit to the Hill, but his efforts “failed and appeared to some GOPlawmakers to be an effort to put the blame for Iraq War failures on the military.”

Stephen Hadley … Stephen Hadley. Isn’t he the guy who was supposed to be doing all the things the new Iraq War Czar has now been doing? As I recall, neither Hadley nor his former boss could hack that job.

So here we are again, 3 years later, trying to appoint someone inNational Security Council who can do what the National Security Advisoris supposed to do. Sure, this time it’s Stephen Hadley, and not hisformer boss, Condi, who is not up to the task. But the reason is thesame.

We taxpayers pay a National Security Advisor to make sure thatsomeone mediates the opinions and agendas of the many strong-willedpeople running Read more →

The Woman Left the Commission

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James Fallows repeats a fascinating story Gary Hart and Lee Hamilton told him about the Hart-Rudman Commission.

Early in 2001, the commission presented a report to the incoming G.W. Bush administration warning that terrorismwould be the nation’s greatest national security problem, and sayingthat unless the United States took proper protective measures aterrorist attack was likely within its borders. Neither the presidentnor the vice president nor any other senior official from the newadministration took time to meet with the commission members or hearabout their findings.

The commission had 14 members, split 7-7, Republican and Democrat,as is de rigeur for bodies of this type. Today Hart told me that in thefirst few meetings, commission members would go around the room andvolunteer their ideas about the nation’s greatest vulnerabilities, mosturgent needs, and so on.

At the first meeting, one Republican woman on the commission saidthat the overwhelming threat was from China. Sooner or later the U.S.would end up in a military showdown with the Chinese Communists. Therewas no avoiding it, and we would only make ourselves weaker by waiting.No one else spoke up in support.

The same thing happened at the second meeting — discussion fromother commissioners about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, anarchy offailed states, etc, and then Read more →

AQ Khan’s on the Loose

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Does it bother anyone that–at a time when Pakistan’s Interior Ministry is raising concerns about the Taliban taking over significant chunks of Pakistan, the father of Pakistan’s nuke program is on the loose? [Thanks to Mimikatz for the spelling correction.]

Authorities have eased the virtual house arrest imposed on A.Q. Khan,the disgraced scientist who sold Pakistan’s nuclear secrets to Iran,North Korea and Libya, officials said Monday.

[snip]

However, two senior government officials told the AP that therestrictions were eased several months ago and that Khan could now meetfriends and relatives either at his home or elsewhere in Pakistan.

"He is virtually a free citizen," said one of the officials, who is attached to the nuclear program.

It just seems to me that the conjunction of these two events–Al Qaeda’s state ally taking over Pakistan at the same time as Pakistan’s chief nuclear proliferator goes free–that would raise the concerns of the same people who brought us to war against Iraq because of Saddam’s phantom nukes and phantom ties to Al Qaeda.

But apparently Dick Cheney (and the non-experts he’s got in charge of our Pakistan policy) has it all under control, and we don’t have to worry about countries that could give Al Qaeda nukes anymore. Read more →

Replacing the Imperial Presidency in the Age of Global Warming

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I’d like to use the occasion of Al Gore’s op-ed in the NYT today to expand on something I said in my talk on Curbing the Imperial Presidency. In his book The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger argued that the Imperial Presidency derived from foreign policy:

The Imperial Presidency was essentially the creation of foreign policy. A combination of doctrines and emotions–belief in permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world–had brought about the unprecedented centralization of decisions over war and peace in the Presidency. With this there came an unprecedented exclusion of the rest of the executive branch, of Congress, of the press and of public opinion in general from these decisions.

We would only need to replace the word terrorism for communism to apply this paragraph today–to describe how the rationale of crisis and fear justified the dangerous consolidation of power under the Executive. At the close of my talk on the Imperial Presidency, I said,

Finally, we have to use the Administration’s botchedpropaganda against it. It is clear to most, now, that the invasion of Iraq hadnothing to do with an attempt to prevent the proliferation of WMD, a desire tospread democracy, or a fight against terrorism. We need to keep refuting thosewho want to claim this war is part of the war on terror. But we need to takethat a step further and talk about the real reason the Administration didinvade Iraq: to prop up America’s threatened hegemonic position using a grandstrategy that is not only outdated and immoral, but guaranteed to beineffective in an era of global warming and peak oil.