More Obama Administration Civil Liberties Neglect

In New York, the cops are getting frisky with minorities (suspect classes under the equal protection clause):

From 2004 through 2009, in a policy that has gotten completely out of control, New York City police officers stopped people on the street and checked them out nearly three million times, frisking and otherwise humiliating many of them.

Upward of 90 percent of the people stopped are completely innocent of any wrongdoing. And yet the New York Police Department is compounding this intolerable indignity by compiling an enormous and permanent computerized database of these encounters between innocent New Yorkers and the police.

Not only are most of the people innocent, but a vast majority are either black or Hispanic. There is no defense for this policy. It’s a gruesome, racist practice that should offend all New Yorkers, and it should cease.

Police Department statistics show that 2,798,461 stops were made in that six-year period. In 2,467,150 of those instances, the people stopped had done nothing wrong. That’s 88.2 percent of all stops over six years. Black people were stopped during that period a staggering 1,444,559 times. Hispanics accounted for 843,817 of the stops and whites 287,218.
….
“They have been collecting the names and all sorts of other information about everybody who is stopped and frisked on the streets,” said Donna Lieberman, the executive director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, which is fighting the department’s stop-and-frisk policy and its compiling of data on people who are innocent. “This is a massive database of innocent, overwhelmingly black and Latino people,” she said.

Bob Herbert is right, it is “a gruesome, racist practice”. Thank god we have a Constitutional law scholar President, expert in civil rights and dedicated to protecting the liberties afforded by them. This is a perfect situation for the President’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board!

Oh, wait……..

When President Bush two years ago failed to name members to a federal board to monitor the protection of civil liberties, Democrats and activist groups were duly outraged, seeing it as one more example of his administration’s indifference to the subject.

But more than a year into a new presidency, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—created by Congress in 2007—remains as much a cipher under Barack Obama as it was under George W. Bush. The White House has yet to Read more

The FOUR OLC Opinions Retroactively Justifying Telecom Data Collection

Alright. I lied. I’m not going to post on why I think FBI went to the trouble of getting an OLC opinion that, apparently, opens a huge loophole in privacy protections from data collection until I first lay out all four OLC opinions that we know of that appear to be at least partly responses to Glenn Fine’s efforts to make FBI clean up this program. These are:

  • January 15, 2009: OLC says FBI only has to inform journalists that their data has been subpoenaed if the person approving the subpoena could be expected to know that the subpoena would collect reporters’ data, regardless of the intent of the person who prepared the subpoena
  • November 8, 2008: OLC says that ECPA normally bars the use of sneak-peek and hot number searches
  • January 16, 2009: OLC says that Acting DADs (and certain other acting officials) are authorized to sign NSLs
  • January 8, 2010: OLC says that ECPA allows the FBI to ask for and obtain certain call records on a voluntary basis from the providers, without legal process or a qualifying emergency

Note that of these, only the November 8, 2008 (which is, perhaps not incidentally, the one that restricted, rather than expanded, FBI conduct) has been released by OLC. And of course, two of the opinions appear to have been rushed through in the last days of the Bush Administration, possibly even by Steven Bradbury (though given the delays on approving Dawn Johnsen, fat lot of difference that made).

In this post, I want to show how these opinions appear to be responses to (at a minimum) Glenn Fine’s work, Though, as I said before, probably also to pressure about the warrantless wiretap program.

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Why Did FBI Need the Exigent Letters OLC Memo? (Background Post)

Yesterday, I did a post on what the DOJ IG Report on “Exigent Letters” revealed about the January 8, 2010 OLC opinion exploiting some kind of huge loophole in the Stored Communications Act. Today, I’m going to look at why–three and a half years after the abuse of exigent letters supposedly ended–Obama’s DOJ felt the need to get what DOJ Inspector General Glenn Fine appears to believe is a very dangerous opinion from OLC. After all, the FBI told Fine that “it does not intend to rely on” this opinion (or the interpretation of the law it gives). And, as I’ll explain at more length below, Fine seems reasonably satisfied with the FBI’s efforts to either legally justify or purge much of the data collected under the exigent letter program. So why go to the trouble of getting a new OLC opinion at this late date?

As background, the exigent letter program was a means by which the FBI got call data directly from AT&T, Verizon, and MCI without meeting legal guidelines for getting such information. The paperwork the FBI did give the telecoms was misleading because it claimed that the request was an emergency and it promised a grand jury subpoena to follow which usually never came. Eric Lichtblau reported that one aspect of this program–the community of interest analysis that AT&T provided, in which they would perform a six degrees of Osama bin Laden to find purported associates of terrorists–was a key aspect of Bush’s warrantless wiretap program. And since 2006 (perhaps because of the revelation of the warrantless wiretap program, but also, definitely, in response to Fine’s investigations of the practice), the telecoms and the FBI have tried to retroactively justify their practice. The OLC opinion appears to have been, at least partly, an attempt to invent a legal explanation that would finally do just that.

I made the following conclusions yesterday about what the OLC opinion did.

  • This OLC opinion may not relate exclusively to the use of exigent letters, not least because Inspector General Glenn Fine appears worried the FBI will use it prospectively, not just to retroactively rationalize abuses from the past.
  • Fine appears to suggest the FBI has misrepresented what it was doing with exigent letters in its request for an opinion to the OLC. This is at least the second time they have done so, Fine alleges, in their attempts to justify these practices. In this case, the dispute may pertain to whose phone records they were, what was included among them, and whether they pertained to an ongoing investigation.
  • My guess is that the OLC opinion addresses whether section 2701 of the Stored Communications Act allows electronic communication providers to voluntarily provide data to someone above and beyond the narrow statutory permission to do so in 2702 and 2709 of the Act. (Though see Julian Sanchez’ different take here.)
  • Whatever the loophole FBI is exploiting, it appears to be a use that would have no protections for First Amendment activity, no requirement that the data relate to authorized investigations, and no minimization or reporting requirements. That is, through its acquisition of this OLC opinion, the FBI appears to have opened up a giant, completely unlimited loophole to access phone data that it could use prospectively (though the FBI claims it doesn’t intend to). Much of Fine’s language here is an attempt to close this loophole.

In this post, I’m going to look at some background information that reinforces my argument that the OLC opinion may not relate exclusively to the exigent letters report (or what we see of it). In a follow-up post, I’ll look at some of the reasons why FBI may have felt the need to get this opinion.

The full Exigent Letters Report includes Top Secret intelligence information

Note that there are three versions of the Exigent Letters IG Report:

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has redacted (blacked out) from the public version of this report information that the FBI and the Intelligence Community considered to be classified. We have provided full versions of our classified reports–a Secret version and a Top Secret/Secure Compartmented Information (SCI) version–to the Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community, and Congressional committees. (PDF 14)

At the very least, this note tells us that there are two more layers to the Exigent Letters Report, even beyond the extensive redactions that appear in the sections on Community of Interest requests and journalists calls. And some of this information–the TS/SCI material–is highly classified.

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Why Did the FBI Need the Exigent Letters OLC Memo

Note: April 12, 2016: I accessed this today and because of some technical issues am not sure whether I published it back in 2010 or not. I’m republishing it dated to the day I wrote it in its apparently incomplete form.

I’ve been working on a series of posts on the January 8, 2010 OLC opinion referenced in the Exigent Letters IG Report. The report describes the FBI request and opinion this way:

[A]fter reviewing a draft of the OIG report the FBI asked the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for a legal opinion on this issue. 280 When making the request for an OLC opinion, the FBI stated that [three lines redacted]

The FBI presented the issue to the OLC as follows: “Whether Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies to call detail records associated [2.5 lines redacted]

On January 8, 2010, the OLC issued its opinion, concluding that the ECPA “would not forbid electronic communications service providers [three lines redacted]281 In short, the OLC agreed with the FBI that under certain circumstances [~2 words redacted] allows the FBI to ask for and obtain these records on a voluntary basis from the providers, without legal process or a qualifying emergency.

In this post, I looked more closely at the context of the reference in the IG report and drew these conclusions:

  • This OLC opinion may not relate exclusively to the use of exigent letters, not least because Inspector General Glenn Fine appears worried the FBI will use it prospectively, not just to retroactively rationalize abuses from the past.
  • Fine appears to suggest the FBI has misrepresented what it was doing with exigent letters in its request for an opinion to the OLC. This is at least the second time they have done so, Fine alleges, in their attempts to justify these practices. In this case, the dispute may pertain to whose phone records they were, what was included among them, and whether they pertained to an ongoing investigation.
  • My guess is that the OLC opinion addresses whether section 2701 of the Stored Communications Act allows electronic communication providers to voluntarily provide data to someone above and beyond the narrow statutory permission to do so in 2702 and 2709 of the Act. (Though see Julian Sanchez’ different take here.)
  • Whatever the loophole FBI is exploiting, it appears to be a use that would have no protections for First Amendment activity, no requirement that the data relate to authorized investigations, and no minimization or reporting requirements. That is, through its acquisition of this OLC opinion, the FBI appears to have opened up a giant, completely unlimited loophole to access phone data that it could use prospectively (though the FBI claims it doesn’t intend to). Much of Fine’s language here is an attempt to close this loophole.

In this post, I showed how OLC wrote at least four opinions at least partly in response to Fine’s reports on exigent letters; that suggests the January 8, 2010 opinion is just one of several opinions written in an attempt to retroactively clean up after abuses using telecommunication records. In a follow-up post, I suggested that FBI may have requested the January 8, 2010 OLC memo not just because of preliminary findings from the Exigent Letters report, but also in response to developments with (including, potentially, Glenn Fine’s classified IG report on) warrantless wiretapping.

But all of those posts are simply attempts to answer the question, why? Why did DOJ go to the trouble of getting a fourth (at least) OLC opinion to clean up after abuses committed over four years ago? What is the ongoing danger that required another OLC opinion to establish legal cover?

My three wildarsed guesses are:

  • To eliminate problems with poison fruit used in investigations and prosecutions
  • To help avoid legal suits

Eliminating poison fruit

The Exigent Letter OLC Opinion

Update: Bob Schacht asked for more context, so here goes. This IG Report was the third DOJ’s Inspector General, Glenn Fine, has done on the FBI’s use of National Security Letters and “exigent letters,” though this is the first to focus almost exclusively on exigent letters. In 2003, the FBI installed representatives of AT&T and (later) Verizon and MCI onsite, with computers hooked up to their respective companies’ databases. Rather than using a subpoena or a National Security Letter to get phone records from them (both of which would have required a higher level of review), the FBI basically gave them a boilerplate letters saying it was an emergency (thus the “exigent”) and could they please give the FBI the phone data; the FBI promised grand jury subpoenas to follow. Only, in many cases, these weren’t emergencies, they never sent the grand jury subpoenas, and many weren’t even associated with investigations into international terrorism. In other words, FBI massively abused this system to get phone data without necessary oversight. Fine has been pressing FBI to either establish some legal basis for getting this data or purging it from FBI databases for three years, and they have done that with some, but not all, of the data collected. But the FBI has tried about three different ways to bring this practice into conformity with legal guidelines, all unpersuasive to Fine. The OLC opinion is the most recent of these efforts.

I’ve been very slowly trudging through the DOJ IG Report on Exigent letters. My notes on it are here and a timeline of key dates is here. In this post, I’m going to look more closely at the content of passages in the IG Report referring to a January 8, 2010 OLC opinion relating in some way to telephone records. The OLC opinion was first reported by Ryan Singel in this post. Discussion of it starts on PDF page 276 of the report. In a follow-up post, I will contextualize this close reading with other material from the report.

What follows is the entire text of sections relating to the OLC opinion (in blockquote) interspersed with my comments. Because the footnotes provide the only context for many of the redacted paragraphs, I put them immediately after the paragraphs invoking them.

My preliminary conclusions on this are:

  • As I will explain at length later, this OLC opinion may not relate exclusively to the use of exigent letters, not least because Inspector General Glenn Fine appears worried the FBI will use it prospectively, not just to retroactively rationalize abuses from the past.
  • Fine appears to disagree whether the FBI has represented what it was doing with exigent letters honestly in its request for an opinion to the OLC. This is at least the second time they have done so, Fine alleges, in their attempts to justify these practices. In this case, the dispute may pertain to whose phone records they were, what was included among them, and whether they pertained to an ongoing investigation.
  • My guess is that the OLC opinion addresses whether section 2701 of the Stored Communications Act allows electronic communication providers to voluntarily provide data to someone above and beyond the narrow statutory permission to do so in 2702 and 2709 of the Act.
  • Whatever the loophole FBI is exploiting, it appears to be a use that would have no protections for First Amendment activity, no requirement that the data relate to open investigations, and no minimization or reporting requirements. That is, through its acquisition of this OLC opinion, the FBI appears to have opened up a giant, completely unlimited loophole to access phone data that it could use prospectively (though the FBI claims it doesn’t intend to). Much of Fine’s language here is an attempt to close this loophole.

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9th Circuit to Jeffrey White: Get Back to Work on EFF FOIA

The 9th Circuit wrote a really fascinating opinion in the EFF FOIA. The Circuit was dealing with three questions regarding EFF’s FOIA of the documents pertaining to telecom lobbying leading up to the passage of PAA and FAA. Those three questions are:

  • Whether FOIA Exemption 3 (protection of sources and methods) applies
  • Whether FOIA Exemption 6 (privacy) applies to contractors who lobby
  • Whether FOIA Exemption 5 (intra- and inter-agency communications) applies

While there’s a lot of nuance in this decision (and it’ll take a review of the actual Vaughn Indices to see what will definitely get released), the most exciting part of this ruling is the Circuit Court’s ruling that the government can’t protect the identities of the telecoms that lobbied for a Get Out of Jail Free Card, just because they needed one.

FOIA Exemption 3: Remand because EFF Was Confused

As to the question of whether the names of the telecoms should be protected as sources and methods and/or as a functional part of NSA, the Circuit didn’t decide. Rather, it argued there was confusion regarding whether or not EFF had ceded this issue, and as a result, District Court Judge White had not addressed the issue of whether this should be protected.

Under these statutes and Exemption 3, the government’s summary judgment brief argued, “ODNI and DOJ withheld information that could reveal whether any particular telecommunications carrier has assisted, or may in the future assist, the government with intelligence activities.” The government claimed disclosure “could deter telecommunications companies from assisting the government in the future,” and disclosure “provides our adversaries with valuable information about our intelligence sources, methods, and capabilities.”

[4] The government’s argument was predicated on the following inference: Revealing the identity of carriers and their agents working for a carrier liability shield would allow foreign intelligence agents to determine contours of NSA intelligence operations, sources, and methods. In other words, knowledge of which firms were and were not lobbying for liability protection could lead to inferences regarding the firms that participate in the surveillance program. EFF disputes the propriety of this inference. However, because the district court did not address Exemption 3 due to confusion in the parties’ summary judgment briefing, we remand for the district court to address these claims in the first instance.

This decision says nothing about whether White will rule in EFF’s favor or not. But heck, I’ll take that second bite at this apple.

FOIA Exemption 6: The Public has a Compelling Interest

This decision is, by far, the most interesting part of the opinion to me. Mind you, the Circuit was not determining whether or not contractors’ identities could be protected. Rather, it was determining whether lobbyists’ identities could be protected, even if it would be easy to assume those lobbyists were in fact contractors.

And the Circuit Court said that, whatever privacy protection the lobbyist-contractors might have, the public’s interest in knowing who was lobbying for legislation was more important.

We next consider “whether release of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person’s privacy.” Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 602. “[T]o determine whether a record is properly withheld, we must balance the privacy interest protected by the exemptions against the public interest in government openness that would be served by disclosure.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973.

The district court concluded “that there is some, although not a substantial, privacy interest in the withheld documents indicating the identities of the private individuals and entities who communicated with the ODNI and DOJ in connection with the FISA amendments.” It found, however, “that the public interest in an informed citizenry weighs in favor of disclosure” because “there is a strong public interest in disclosure of the identity of the individuals who contacted the government . . . to protect telecommunications companies from legal liability for their role in government surveillance activities.” We agree.

[snip]

[10] There is a clear public interest in public knowledge of the methods through which well-connected corporate lobbyists wield their influence. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties” merits disclosure. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773.

[11] With knowledge of the lobbyists’ identities, the public will be able to determine how the Executive Branch used advice from particular individuals and corporations in reaching its own policy decisions. Such information will allow the public to draw inferences comparing the various agents’ influence in relation to each other and compared to the agents’ or their corporate sponsors’ political activity and contributions to either the President or key members of Congress. In short, we find the public interest in “government openness that would be served by disclosure” of how the government makes decisions potentially shielding firms lobbying (and donating to campaigns) from nine-figure liabilities to be plainly important.

As a sop to the government–which was trying to hide all this information–the Circuit Court ruled that the government did not have to make the email addresses for the individuals involved public.

Big whoop. We won’t be able to email the executives who got their Get Out of Jail Free Card. I plan on emailing Ed Whitacre–former CEO of AT&T when they were doing this lobbying and currently CEO of GM–at his new GM email, anyway.

FOIA Exemption 5: The Government Cheated

In general, the Court found that White had too broadly claimed that the documents in question did not qualify for Exemption 5, agreeing that the government had shown that much of this was intra- or inter-agency communication. For those materials, the Court said the government would then have to go back and claim some privilege (such as deliberative privilege) to keep the documents hidden.

But the Court’s more general ruling was that White hadn’t looked closely enough at the Vaughn Index (and that he might have to look at the documents themselves). To justify that point, the Court cites this very amusing example.

Examining the Vaughn indices themselves shows the importance of engaging in the admittedly time-consuming analysis not performed here. Nearly all of the characterizations in the government-offered declarations comport with the descriptions in the Vaughn indices of inter-branch or intrabranch communications. Thus, for these emails, the district court should have more closely examined the documents to determine whether they were in fact inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters. Including them in a broad disclosure order was error under any standard.

In addition, in at least two instances (OLC Vaughn Index numbers 46 & 74), the plain language of the declaration seems to imply an intra-Executive Branch email when, in fact, the Vaughn Index makes clear the communications at issue were between the Executive Branch and telecommunications company representatives. This highlights the need for a fact specific inquiry under Exemption 5.

That is, to justify its ruling that Judge White needs to go back and look more closely at the Vaughn index and individual documents, the Court agrees that most of the documents are claimed to be intra- or inter-agency documents. But then points to an example where the government claimed emails between the Executive Branch and telecoms was intra- or inter-agency.

Busted.

Now, before any of these get released, I think the District Court will need to sort which exemptions were claimed for which documents. But the big takeaway, to me, is that the Circuit Court has ruled that the government can’t keep the identities of lobbyists hidden, even if those lobbyists were lobbying for telecoms that had helped the government break the law.

The SWIFT Battle Heats Up

Last year, I tracked European objections to continued US access to SWIFT data. In November, some Germans balked at pushing an agreement through before the new European government was put into place. In December I described the interim agreement put into place until the new government can negotiate a new one.

Only the EU parliament is none too happy that deal was put into place on the eve of the new government. (h/t cw)

A panel of European Union lawmakers urged the EU to scrap an agreement on transferring bank data to U.S. counter-terrorism investigators, risking a security gap weeks after an attempt to bomb a trans-Atlantic flight.The European Parliament’s civil-liberties committee said an accord under which the EU allows the U.S. Treasury Department to view records from the Swift global money-transfer system lacks adequate protection of personal data. The committee recommended today in Brussels that the full Parliament reject the agreement during a scheduled Feb. 11 vote.

Fighting terrorism “does not need to involve the endless erosion of civil liberties for whole swathes of innocent civilians,” said Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, a Dutch member steering the issue through the 27-nation Parliament.

In response, the US–which, under Obama, is supposed to be engaging more closely with our allies–has threatened to take its toys and go home.

The United States has warned that it may stop working with EU institutions on terrorist data exchange if the European Parliament next week blocks a bilateral deal on the issue.

“If the European parliament overturns the agreement, I am unsure whether Washington agencies would again decide to address this issue at EU level,” US ambassador to the EU William Kennard wrote in a letter sent to European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek, according to news agency AFP.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also called Buzek and EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton to voice Washington’s concern over the issue.

At issue is European demands that its citizens have some civil liberties protections (far more than Americans have over their own bank data) and the EU itself have some transparency into the process. But apparently the US wants its deal upheld, even after the underhanded way it pushed it through.

Imagine that!?!? Legislators who actually do something about others bypassing their prerogatives.

Google Boondoggle With No Such Agency

spy-who-loved-meEllen Nakashima has a startling, but I guess unsurprising, article in this morning’s Washington Post on internet giant Google’s new partnership with the NSA:

Under an agreement that is still being finalized, the National Security Agency would help Google analyze a major corporate espionage attack that the firm said originated in China and targeted its computer networks, according to cybersecurity experts familiar with the matter. The objective is to better defend Google — and its users — from future attack.

Google and the NSA declined to comment on the partnership. But sources with knowledge of the arrangement, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the alliance is being designed to allow the two organizations to share critical information without violating Google’s policies or laws that protect the privacy of Americans’ online communications. The sources said the deal does not mean the NSA will be viewing users’ searches or e-mail accounts or that Google will be sharing proprietary data.

The article indicates Google initiated the matter by approaching the NSA after the recent discovery of intrusive attacks by Chinese interests last month, which is interesting in light of the fact Google made a point of publicly stating in 2008 they had never cooperated with the NSA on the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

Nakashima also notes that NSA is also soliciting involvement of the FBI and Department of Homeland Security. You have to wonder exactly what the FBI and DHS are going to lend that NSA cannot if this is truly just technical advice, because neither agency is particularly known for its geeky brilliance with computers. You would have to wonder is this is not a step in the direction of the “cyber protection” program the government has been hinting at initiating for some time now.

More from Nakashima and the Post:

“As a general matter,” NSA spokeswoman Judi Emmel said, “as part of its information-assurance mission, NSA works with a broad range of commercial partners and research associates to ensure the availability of secure tailored solutions for Department of Defense and national security systems customers.”

Despite such precedent, Matthew Aid, an expert on the NSA, said Google’s global reach makes it unique.

“When you rise to the level of Google . . . you’re looking at a company that has taken great pride in its independence,” said Aid, author of “The Secret Sentry,” a history of the NSA. “I’m a little uncomfortable with Google cooperating this closely with the nation’s largest intelligence agency, even if it’s strictly for defensive purposes.”

Mr. Aid isn’t the only one a little uncomfortable with this new spirit of cooperation between the world’s most spooky governmental spy agency and the world’s most ubiquitous information technology and database company. And so the descent down the slippery slope picks up a little more speed.

(Image courtesy of SearchEngineWatch.com, a very nice resource by the way)

What Glenn Greenwald Said On American Terrorism Cowardice

Just go read it. Because every word Glenn Greenwald wrote in his post today, entitled Nostalgia for Bush/Cheney Radicalism, is the gospel truth. It is rare that you will see a post here just pointing you somewhere else because the other source says it all. This is one of those times. Here is a taste:

How much clearer evidence can there be of how warped and extremist we’ve become on these matters? The express policies of the right-wing Ronald Reagan — “applying the rule of law to terrorists”; delegitimizing Terrorists by treating them as “criminals”; and compelling the criminal prosecution of those who authorize torture — are now considered on the Leftist fringe. Merely advocating what Reagan explicitly adopted as his policy — “to use democracy’s most potent tool, the rule of law against” Terrorists — is now the exclusive province of civil liberties extremists. In those rare cases when Obama does what Reagan’s policy demanded in all instances and what even Bush did at times — namely, trials and due process for accused Terrorists — he is attacked as being “Soft on Terror” by Democrats and Republicans alike. And the mere notion that we should prosecute torturers (as Reagan bound the U.S. to do) — or even hold them accountable in ways short of criminal proceedings — is now the hallmark of a Far Leftist Purist. That’s how far we’ve fallen, how extremist our political consensus has become.

Now go read the rest and weep for your country.

Feingold, Durbin, and Wyden Demand the OLC Opinion on Exigent Letters

As I reported yesterday, the Dawn Johnsen-less OLC wrote an opinion on January 8 retroactively authorizing the FBI’s inappropriate use of the exigent letters to snoop on Americans’ telecomm records.

Now, Senators Feingold, Durbin, and Wyden, have demanded that opinion from Eric Holder. Of note, they tie their demand into DOJ IG Glenn Fine’s comment that DOJ should notify Congress of the opinion and this use of exigent letters so it can consider legislation on that count.

We write specifically because we believe the Department should immediately provide to Congress a copy of the January 8, 2010, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion that is referenced in the OIG report and that apparently interprets the FBI’s authority to obtain phone records. Although much of the information about the OLC opinion is redacted in the public version of the OIG report, the opinion appears to have important implications for the rights of Americans. The report states that “the OLC agreed with the FBI that under certain circumstances [REDACTED] allows the FBI to ask for and obtain these [phone] records on a voluntary basis from the providers, without legal process or a qualifying emergency.” (p. 264) It further states that “we believe the FBI’s potential use of [REDACTED] to obtain records has significant policy implications that need to be considered by the FBI, the Department, and the Congress.” (p. 265) And finally, it states that the OIG recommends “that the Department notify Congress of this issue and of the OLC opinion interpreting the scope of the FBI’s authority under it, so that Congress can consider [REDACTED] and the implications of its potential use.” (p. 268)

In light of the OIG’s recommendation, please provide Congress with the January 8 OLC opinion immediately.

Remember, as members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feingold and Durbin (and probably Senate Intelligence Committee member Wyden) have seen the unredacted report, including a description of the OLC’s agreement of the FBI’s use of the letters. And now they’re demanding the opinion itself.

Though, you’d think that, given Fine’s recommendation that DOJ “notify Congress … of the OLC opinion,” the Senate wouldn’t have had to ask.