How Keith Gartenlaub Turned Child Porn into Foreign Intelligence

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As I mentioned in this post on FISA and the space-time continuum, I’m going to be focusing closely on the FISA implications of Keith Gartenlaub’s child porn prosecution.

Gartenlaub was a Boeing engineer in 2013 when the FBI started investigating him for sharing information with China (see this and this story for background). He was suspected, in significant part, because of relationships and communications tied to his wife, who is a naturalized Chinese-American and whose family appears well-connected in China. The case is interesting for the way the government used both FISA and criminal searches to prosecute him for a non-national security related crime.

The case is currently being appealed to the 9th Circuit; it will be heard on December 4. His defense is challenging several things about his conviction, including that there was insufficient evidence to deem him an Agent of a Foreign Power (and therefore to obtain the ability to conduct a broader search than might be permitted under a criminal warrant), as well as that there was insufficient evidence offered at trial that he knowingly possessed the 9-year old child porn on which his conviction rests. I think there’s some merit to the latter claim, but I’m going to bracket it for my discussion, both because I think the FISA issues would remain important even if the government’s case on the child porn charge were far stronger than it is, and because I think the government may be sitting on potentially inculpatory evidence.

In this post, I’m going to show that it is almost certain that the government changed FISA minimization procedures to facilitate using FISA to prosecute him for child porn.

Timeline

The public timeline around the case looks like this (and as I said, I believe the government is hiding some bits):

Around January 28, 2013: Agent Wesley Harris reads article that leads him to start searching for Chinese spies at Boeing

February 7, 8, and 22, 2013: Harris interviews Gartenlaub

June 18, 2013: Agent Harris obtains search warrant for Gartenlaub and his wife, Tess Yi’s, Google and Yahoo accounts

Unknown date: Harris obtains a FISA order

January 29, 2014: Using FISA physical search order, FBI searches Gartenlaub’s home, images three hard drives

June 3, 2014: Harris sends files to National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which confirms some files display known victims

August 22, 2014: Criminal search warrant obtained for Gartenlaub’s premises

August 27, 2014: FBI searches Gartenlaub’s properties, seizing computers used as evidence in trial, arrests him

August 29, 2014: Government reportedly says it will dismiss charges if Gartenlaub will cooperate on spying

October 23, 2014: Grand jury indicts

December 10, 2015: Guilty verdict

FBI used a criminal search warrant to obtain evidence, then obtained a FISA order

As you can see from the timeline, the government first obtained a criminal search warrant for access to Gartenlaub and his wife’s email accounts (Gartenlaub also got an 1806 notice, meaning they used a FISA wiretap on him at some point). Only after that did they execute a FISA physical search order to search his house and image his computers. Which means — unless they had a FISA order and a criminal warrant simultaneously — they had already convinced a judge it was likely Gartenlaub’s emails would provide evidence he was “remov[ing ] information, including export controlled technical data, from Boeing’s computer networks to China.” In his affidavit, Agent Harris cited violations of the Arms Export Control Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Then, after probably months of reviewing emails later, having already shown probable cause that could have enabled them to get a search warrant to search Gartenlaub’s computer for those specific crimes — that is, proof that he had exploited his network access at Boeing in order to obtain data he could share with his wife’s Chinese associates — the government then went to FISA and convinced a judge they had probable cause Gartenlaub (or perhaps his wife) was acting as an agent of a foreign power for what are assumed to be the same underlying activities.

The government insists it still had adequate evidence Gartenlaub or his wife was an agent of a foreign power under FISA

The government’s response to Gartenlaub’s appeal predictably redacts much of the discussion to support its claim that it had sufficient probable cause, after months of reading his emails, to claim he or his wife was an agent of China. But the structure of it — with an unredacted paragraph addressing weaknesses with the criminal affidavit, followed by a redacted passage of unknown length, as well as a redacted footnote modifying the idea that the criminal affidavit “merely ‘recycled’ details that were found in the Harris affidavit” (see page 38-39) — suggests they raised evidence beyond what got included in the criminal affidavit. That’s surely true; it presumably explains what was so interesting about Yi’s family and associates in China as to sustain suspicion that they would be soliciting Boeing technology.

In any case, in a filing in which the government admits that “the [District] court expressed ‘some personal questions regarding the propriety of the FISA court proceeding even though that certainly seems to be legally authorized’,” the government pushed the Ninth Circuit to adopt a deferential standard on probable cause for FISA orders, in which only clear error can overturn the probable cause standard.

The Court has not previously articulated the standard of review applicable to an underlying finding of probable cause in a FISA case. In the analogous context of search warrants, this Court gives “great deference” to an issuing magistrate judge’s findings of probable cause, reviewing such findings only for “clear error.” Krupa, 658 F.3d at 1177; United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). “In borderline cases, preference will be accorded to warrants and to the decision of the magistrate issuing it.” United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1990). The same standard applies to this Court’s review of the findings in Title III wiretap applications. United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2002).

Consistent with these standards and with FISA itself, the Second and Fifth Circuits have held that the “established standard of judicial review applicable to FISA warrants is deferential,” particularly given that “FISA warrant applications are subject to ‘minimal scrutiny by the courts,’ both upon initial presentation and subsequent challenge.” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2010); accord United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 567 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that representations and certifications in FISA application should be “presumed valid”). Other courts, reviewing district court orders de novo, have not discussed what deference applies to the FISC. See, e.g., Demeisi, 424 F.3d at 578; Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 553-54.

The government submits that the appropriate standard should be deferential. Consistent with findings of probable cause in other cases, the Court should review only for “clear error,” giving “great deference” to the initial conclusion that a FISA application established probable cause.

And, of course, the government argues that even if it didn’t meet the standards required under FISA, it still operated in good faith.

By using a FISA rather than a criminal search warrant, the FBI had more leeway to search for unrelated items

Nevertheless, having read Gartenlaub’s email for months and presumably having had the opportunity to obtain a warrant to search his computers for those specific crimes, the government instead obtained a FISA order that allowed the FBI to search his devices far more broadly, opening up decades old files named with sexually explicit names in the guise of finding intelligence on stealing Boeing’s secrets. Here’s how Gartenlaub’s lawyers describe the search in his appeal, a description the government largely endorses in their response:

The FISC can only authorize the government to search for and seize “foreign intelligence information.” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1822(b), 1823(a)(6)(A), 1824(a)(4). The order authorizing the January 2014 search of Gartenlaub’s home and computers presumably complied with this restriction. “Foreign intelligence information” (defined at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(e) and 1821(1)) does not include child pornography. Nonetheless, as detailed in the government’s application for the August 2014 search warrant, the agents imaged Gartenlaub’s computers in their entirety, reviewed every file, and–upon discovering that some of the files contained possible child pornography–subjected those and related files to detailed scrutiny, including sending them to the National Center for Exploited Children for analysis. ER248-56, 262-68. In an effort to establish that Gartenlaub had downloaded the child pornography, the agents also examined and analyzed a number of other files on the computers, none of which had anything to do with “foreign intelligence information.” ER255-62, 268-70.

As far as the record shows, the agents conducted this detailed, far-ranging analysis without obtaining any court authorization beyond the initial FISC order. In other words, after encountering suspected child pornography files, the agents did not stop their search and seek a warrant authorizing them to open and review those files and other potentially related files. Instead, they opened, examined, and analyzed the suspected child pornography files and a number of other files having nothing to do with foreign intelligence information. They then incorporated the results of that analysis into the August 2014 search warrant application. ER248- 49. That application, in turn, produced the warrant that gave the agents authority to search for and seize the very materials that they had already seized and searched under the purported authority of the January 2014 FISC order.

How did agents authorized to search for “foreign intelligence information” end up opening, examining, and analyzing suspected child pornography files and a number of other files that had nothing to do with the only authorized object of the search? The agents apparently relied on the following argument: To determine whether Gartenlaub’s computers contained foreign intelligence information, it was necessary to open and review every file; after all, a foreign spy might cleverly conceal such information in .jpg files with sex-themed names or in other non-obvious locations. And after opening the files, the child pornography and other information was in “plain view” and thus could be lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment.

As a result of these broad standards, and of Gartenlaub’s habit of retaining disk drives from computers he no longer owned, the FBI found files dating back to 2005, from a computer Gartenlaub no longer owned.

Upon finding that those files included apparent child porn, the FBI sent them off to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which confirmed some of the images included known victims. Almost two months later, FBI conducted further (criminal) searches, and arrested Gartenlaub for child porn.

In December 2015, Gartenlaub was found guilty on two counts of child porn, though one count was vacated by the judge after the verdict.

FBI changed standard minimization procedures to permit sharing with NCMEC

The timeline above is what would have been available to Gartenlaub’s defense team.

But in 2015 and 2017, two new details were added to the timeline.

First, on April 11, 2017, two months after Gartenlaub submitted his opening brief in the appeal on February 8, the government released an August 11, 2014 opinion approving the sharing of FISA-obtained data with NCMEC.

Congress established NCMEC in 1984 as a non-governmental organization and it is funded through grants administered by the Department of Justice. One of its purposes is to assist law enforcement in identifying victims of child pornography and other sexual crimes. Indeed, Congress has mandated Department of Justice coordination with NCMEC on these and related issues. See Mot. at 5-8. Furthermore, this Court has approved modifications to these SMPs in individual cases to permit the Government to disseminate information to NCMEC. See Docket Nos. [redacted]. Because of its unique role as a non-governmental organization with a law enforcement function, and because it will be receiving what reasonably appears to be evidence of specific types of crimes for law enforcement purposes, the Government’s amendment to the SMPs comply with FISA under Section 180l(h)(3).1

As noted, in the past the FISC had approved sharing FISA-collected data with NCMEC on a case-by-case basis. But in 2014, in the weeks while  it prepared to arrest Gartenlaub on child porn charges tied to a search that only found the child porn because it used the broader FISA search standard, the government finally made NCMEC sharing part of the standard minimization procedures.

Even on top of this coincidental timing, there are reasons to suspect DOJ codified the NCMEC sharing because of Gartenlaub’s case. For example, in the government’s response there’s a passage that clearly addresses how NCMEC got involved in the case that bridges the discussion of use of child porn evidence discovered in plain view in the criminal context and the discussion of its use here.

Non-FISA precedents also foreclose defendant’s claims. Analyzing a Rule 41 search warrant, this Court has held that using child pornography inadvertently discovered during a lawful search is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 889-90 (ruling that “the pornographic material [the agent] inadvertently discovered while searching for the documents enumerated in the warrant [related to document identification fraud] was properly used as a basis for the third warrant authorizing the search for child pornography”);

[additional precedents excluded]

[CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REMOVED] With the benefit of NCMEC’s assistance, the government then sought and obtained the August 2014 search warrants, authorizing the search of defendant’s residence and storage units for child pornography. (CR 73; GER 901-53). The fruits of this warrant were then used in defendant’s prosecution. The use of information discovered during the prior lawful January 2014 search in the subsequent search warrant application was proper. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 890.

The redacted discussion must include not only a description of how NCMEC was permitted to get involved, but in the approval approving this as part of the minimization procedures, which (after all) are designed to protect Americans under the Fourth Amendment.

Of particular interest, the government argued that one of the precedents Gartenlaub cited was not binding generally, and especially not binding on the FISC.

The concurring opinion in CDT, upon which defendant relies, does not aid him. That concurrence is not “binding circuit precedent” or a “constitutional requirement,” much less one binding on the FISC. Schesso, 730 F.3d at 1049 (the “search protocol” set forth in the CDT concurrence is not “binding circuit precedent,” not a[] constitutional requirement[],” and provides “no clear-cut rule”); see CDT, 621 F.3d at 1178 (observing that “[d]istrict and magistrate judges must exercise their independent judgment in every case”); Nessland, 601 Fed. Appx. at 576 (holding that “no special protocol was required” for a computer search). Defendant thus cannot demonstrate any error relating to any FISC-authorized search.

The FISC had, by the time of the search relying on the FISA-obtained child porn as evidence, already approved the use of child porn obtained in a FISA search. So the government could say the CDT case was not binding precedent, because it already had a precedent in hand from the FISC. Of course, it didn’t tell Gartenlaub that.

Of course, that’s not proof that the government codified the NCMEC sharing just for the Gartenlaub case. But there’s a lot of circumstantial evidence that that’s what happened.

The government still has not formally noticed this change to Gartenlaub

As I noted above, the government released the FISC order approving the change in the standard minimization procedures too late to be of use for Gartenlaub’s opening brief. That’s a point EFF and ACLU made in their worthwhile amicus submitted in the appeal.

For example, in this case, the government apparently refused to disclose the relevant FBI minimization procedures to Gartenlaub’s counsel even though other versions of those minimization procedures are publicly available. See Standard Minimization Procedures for FBI Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search Conducted Under FISA (2008). 8

We can debate whether the standard approval for NCMEC sharing is a good thing or whether it invites abuse, offering the FBI an opportunity to use more expansive searches to “find” evidence of child porn that it can then use as leverage in a foreign intelligence context (which I’ll return to). I suspect it is wiser to approve such sharing on a case-by-case basis, as had been the case before Gartenlaub.

But from this point forward, I would assume the FBI will routinely use this provision as an excuse to conduct particularly thorough searches for child porn, on the logic that obtaining any would provide great leverage against an intelligence target.

The timing of the approval of NCMEC sharing under Section 702

I have said repeatedly, I think the government is withholding some details.

One reason I think that is because of another remarkable coincidence of timing.

As I first reported here, the first notice that the government had approved the sharing with NCMEC in standard minimization procedures came in September 2015, when the government released the 2014 Thomas Hogan Section 702 opinion that approved such sharing under Section 702. The opinion relied on the earlier approval (by Rosemary Collyer), but redacted all reference to the timing and context of it, as well as a footnote relating to it.

I find the timing of both the release and the opinion itself to be of immense interest.

First, the government had no problem releasing this opinion back in 2015, while Gartenlaub was still awaiting trial (though it waited until almost two months after the District judge in his case, Christina Snyder, rejected his FISA challenge on August 6, 2015). So it was fine revealing to potential intelligence targets that it had standardized the approval of using FISA information to pursue child porn cases, just not revealing the dates that might have made it useful for Gartenlaub.

I’m even more interested in the timing of the order: August 26. The day before the FBI got its complaint approved and arrested Gartenlaub.

The FBI had long ago submitted FISA information to NCMEC. But it waited until both the standard minimization procedures for traditional FISA and for Section 702 had approved the sharing of data with NCMEC before they arrested Gartenlaub.

That’s one of several pieces of data that suggests they may have used Section 702 against Gartenlaub, on top of the other mix of criminal and FISA authorizations.

To be continued.

Updated timeline

Around January 28, 2013: Agent Wesley Harris reads article that leads him to start searching for Chinese spies at Boeing

February 7, 8, and 22, 2013: Harris interviews Gartenlaub

June 18, 2013: Agent Harris obtains search warrant for Gartenlaub and his wife, Tess Yi’s, Google and Yahoo accounts

Unknown date: Harris obtains a FISA order

January 29, 2014: FBI searches Gartenlaub’s home, images three hard drives

June 3, 2014: Harris sends files to National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which confirms some files display known victims

August 11, 2014: Rosemary Collyer approves NCMEC sharing for traditional FISA standard minimization procedures

August 22, 2014: Search warrant obtained for Gartenlaub’s premises

August 26, 2014: Thomas Hogan approves NCMEC sharing for FISA 702

August 27, 2014: FBI searches Gartenlaub’s properties, seizing computers used as evidence in trial, arrests him

August 29, 2014: Government reportedly says it will dismiss charges if Gartenlaub will cooperate on spying

October 23, 2014: Grand jury indicts

August 6, 2015: Christina Snyder rejects Gartenlaub FISA challenge

September 29, 2015: ODNI releases 702 NCMEC sharing opinion

December 10, 2015: Guilty verdict

February 8, 2017: Gartenlaub submits opening brief

April 11, 2017: Government releases traditional FISA NCMEC sharing opinion

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

FISA and the Space-Time Continuum

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I’m going to do a series of FISA posts on both the Keith Gartenlaub case (he was convicted on child porn charges after the FBI found old images on his computers during a FISA search) and the reported Paul Manafort FISA orders.

But first I want to explain FISA and the space-time continuum.

The space part is easy: the FISA Amendments Act slightly changed the geographical rules on what authority the government could use to target various kinds of people. It legalized the government’s practice of collecting on foreigners from facilities in the United States under Section 702. And it also required a judge’s approval for any spying on Americans overseas. While FAA envisioned two kinds of authorities for spying overseas — 703 (collection in the US on an American overseas, as in calling up Google for someone’s email box) and 704/705(b) (collection overseas on an American overseas, which is using all methods covered by EO 12333, including hacking them and collecting off switches), in practice just the latter authority is used. Effectively, then, the change just codified the domestic collection on foreigners, while requiring a court order for the same EO 12333 collection that had already been going on.

The time part is trickier.

The short version is that FISA imposes some restrictions on whether you can collect data at rest to obtain data from outside the period of a FISA order. Thus, if you’re not supposed to collect on someone when they’re in the US (whether that person is a US person or a foreigner), there are classified restrictions about whether you can collect stored data from that period.

None of these rules are (as far as I’m aware) public, but there are rules for all the various laws. In other words, you’re not supposed to be able to collect GMail on a foreigner while they’re in the US, but you’re also not supposed to be able to cheat and just get the same Gmail as soon as they leave the country.

This is even more complex for Americans. Domestically, there are two kinds of collection: 1805, which is the collection of data in motion — an old fashioned wiretap, and 1824, which is called a “physical search” order. The government likes to hide the fact that the collection of data at rest is accomplished with an 1824 physical search order, not 1805. So an 1824 order might be used to search a closet, or it might be used to image someone’s hard drive. Most often, 1805 and 1824 get combined, but not always (the FISC released a breakdown for these last year).

Of course (as the Gartenlaub case will show), if you image someone’s hard drive, you’re going to get data from well before the time they’ve been under a FISA order, quite possibly even from before you’ve owned your computer.

Then there’s travel overseas. If an American on whom there’s already an 1805 and/or 1824 order travels overseas, the Attorney General can automatically approve a 705(b) order for him (effectively replicating the old EO 12333 authority). But that collection is only supposed to cover the period when the person is overseas, and only for the period when they’ve had a FISA order against them. Using the kind of hacking they use overseas is going to get data in motion and stored communications and a whole lot more, meaning they may well get stuff sitting on the computer someone brings with them (yet another reason to bring travel laptops and phones overseas). And apparently, they only turn off an implant when a FISA order expires; they don’t entirely remove the implant. In addition, given the bulk collection the NSA conducts overseas, it would be child’s play (and from descriptions of violations, appears to have included) going back and accessing data that was collected in motion that had in the interim been sitting in NSA’s coffers.

Effectively, once someone leaves the country the NSA has access to time machines to collect data from the past, though there are supposed to be limits on doing this.

The FISA problems last year arose, first and foremost, from NSA collecting on Americans overseas outside the window of the orders covering them, which was a persistent problem that the NSA just never got around to fixing. That’s bad enough. But when you consider a 705(b) order only covers the period when an American normally targeted domestically is overseas, collecting outside the span of the order means you’re probably also using foreign collection to collect (including by hacking) in the US.

Which is all a way of saying that discussions of FISA almost always focus on the geographical limitations: Is someone inside the US or outside? Foreigner or American?

But because of the differing rules on data in motion and data at rest — and because of the truly awesome methods used as soon as someone goes overseas — there are actually a lot of ways that NSA can get around the legal limitations based on space by playing with the limitations on time.

Again, there are rules (which are not public) that are supposed to prevent this kind of thing from going on. But it does seem to be a problem NSA has long struggled with, even at the times it appeared to be operating in good faith rather than manipulating the space-time continuum to get what they want where they can get it.

How the FISC Takes Notice of Magistrate Decisions and DOJ Tries to Hide That

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Since it’s fashionable to debate whether the FISA Court is a rubber stamp or not, I wanted to point to this document, released to EFF under FOIA yesterday. Is is an August 7, 2006 order from Colleen Kollar-Kotelly for additional briefing on whether the government can retain the Post Cut Through Dialed Digits collected as part of a pen register. In this release, the government has redacted the date. We know the date — and the general circumstances of the request — from documents released in 2014 and another earlier EFF FOIA. I covered it here.

During this period, on August 7, 2006, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered briefing in docket PRTT 06-102 on how FBI was fulfilling its obligation, apparently under the 2002 DOJ directive FBI maintained did not apply to FISA, not to affirmatively use PCTDD for any investigative purpose.  PDF 39-40

Judge Kotelly has ordered the FBI to submit a report no later than September 25 (2006). This report must contain:

(1) an explanation of how the FBI is implementing its obligation to make no affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, except in a rare case in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury or harm to the National Security, addressing in particular: a) whether post-cut-through digits obtained via FISA pen register surveillance are uploaded into TA, Proton, IDW, EDMS, TED, or any other FBI system; and b) if so what procedures are in place to ensure that no affirmative investigative use is made of postcut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, including whether such procedures mandate that this information be deleted from the relevant system.

(2) an explanation of what procedures are in place to ensure that the Court is notified, as required pursuant to the Courts Order in the above captioned matter, whenever the government decides to make affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security.

At the time, at least some of FBI’s lawyers believed that for FISA Pen Registers, FBI retained all the PCTDD. PDF 38

When DSC 3000 is used for a FISA collection, doesn’t the DCS 3000 pass all to the [redacted](DSC 5000) including the PCTDD–in other words for FISAs the DCS3000 does NOT use the default of not recoding [sic] the PCTTD???? [sic]

This report — dated September 25, 2006 — appears to be the report Kollar-Kotelly requested. It implores her not to follow [redacted], which appears to is a reference the EDNY court Texas decision.

That report is followed by this one — which was submitted on November 1, 2006 — which appears to propose new procedures to convince her to permit the FBI to continue to collect and retain PCTDD.

This new document, the briefing order, adds almost nothing to the discussion.

Except for this: it reveals that FISC — not DOJ — raised Stephen Smith’s opinion.

This is why I defend the FISC against claims it’s a rubber stamp. It has, on at least some occasions, done the work an adversary would normally do. And for at least 3 years, DOJ has tried to hide that FISC had to do so here.

Note what has happened in the interim? The government didn’t release this in FOIA in 2013-2014, though it was responsive to those earlier FOIA requests.

It did, however, release it now.

In the interim, DOJ gamed the new FISCR fast-track process, so as to be able to get an appellate decision approving the broader retention that Kollar-Kotelly first questioned back in 2006. Now, with that FISCR decision in pocket, DOJ has all of a sudden decided this order is no longer too classified to release (even while it still hides the timing of it).

The FISC is not perfect. But when weighing whether the FISC or DOJ (saddled, perhaps, with incomplete disclosure from NSA) has more often resulted in questionable decisions, I would almost always blame DOJ and NSA over the FISC.

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

The NSA’s 5-Page Entirely Redacted Definition of Metadata

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In my post on Rosemary Collyer’s shitty upstream 702 opinion, I noted that the only known (but entirely redacted) discussions of what constituted metadata were part of the 2004 and 2010 authorizations for the Internet dragnet.

The documents liberated by Charlie Savage (starting at PDF 184) reveal the topic was actually discussed during the resolution of the 2011 upstream fight. In response to a Bates question to “fully describe what constitutes ‘metadata'” that can be extracted from Internet transactions, the government defined the term in a footnote that is substantially redacted.

That discussion is followed by five entirely redacted pages describing the three (also entirely redacted) categories of metadata.

So I apologize to the government for suggesting they’ve never defined the difference between content and metadata in the context of upstream content collection (the discussion probably closely follows the Internet dragnet discussion, which Bates had had with the government roughly 18 months earlier; that discussion allowed some dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information that counted as content but didn’t convey the message of the communication to be treated as metadata).

That said, what the fuck are you thinking?!?!?

I mean, first of all, Congress is about to reauthorize 702, possibly trying to codify the prohibition on about searches. But most of Congress won’t go through the trouble to read this five page definition, much less consult with technical experts to understand if the definition is meaningful and how any draft bill would interact with this language. So it’s unclear how closely tested this has been.

As noted, even by the 2010 discussion, it was clear Bates was creating a middle ground for stuff that was technically content but which served a DRAS function — probably something akin to Steve Bellovin et al’s definition of architectural content. Given the way NSA asked to and did nuke the existing PRTT data at precisely this time (though without letting the Inspector General review their destruction of intake data) it’s highly likely they were violating those limits, at least through the processing stage. But legally, using this definition of metadata would all of a sudden be kosher, because the metadata would have been collected under a content standard, so the distinction of it being metadata would matter primarily for the privacy considerations (not least because Americans’ metadata collected off this upstream collection could and can be disseminated with a much lower standard than the one in place in the Internet dragnet, and can be disseminated for non-terrorism purposes), not legal ones. In other words, by collecting its domestic metadata using a content collection statute, the legal distinction between metadata and content would no longer matter, after 7 years of mattering.

Except now it does.

If the NSA’s five page definition of metadata includes stuff that is legally content, then the promise to avoid “about” collection is probably bogus, because it’d incorporate these definitions of metadata and thereby permit using metadata that actually counts as content as a selector.

Which is probably also why the government is so keen to avoid a prohibition on about searches — because what they’re doing, even today, amounts legally to about collection.

I’ll have to put some thought to the privacy implications of this (I suspect this explains the utility of upstream collection for cybersecurity purposes).

But if I’m right, there’s no way this should be classified, at least not entirely classified, not if the government has claimed to have gotten out of the business of searching for selectors in content.

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

The NSA’s Purge Obfuscations

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One thing that the 2011 702 documents Charlie Savage liberated make clear is that the government is (and was) obtaining more domestic communications — but purging them — than it wants to let on (and the numbers have surely gotten worse since 2011).

In a hearing on September 7, 2011, the first question that John Bates asked (starting at PDF 35) about the sampling the NSA had done is how many communications had been purged before the agency started counting its sample, a sample that included both PRISM and upstream collection. As Bates noted, it would be one thing if the NSA were purging half its collection and then counting than if it only had to purge a small amount.

During this exchange, the government was careful to limit their discussion of purged communications to upstream MCT related collection.

When the government responded (starting at PDF 117), it provided numbers for just what had gotten purged from upstream collection.

I’m not entirely sure their claim that none of this purged information was “upstream” collection — as opposed to MCT collection — is correct (as a post on the violations will explore). But they make it clear: the 18,446 purged communications were just Internet upstream. For every upstream  record purged because the target had roamed into the US, there might be correlated telephony collection that would get purged — some of the most commonly discussed purged communications. It might also include PRISM production that would have to get purged (if, for example, the target continued to use GMail while in the US). In addition, there might be targets discovered to be (perhaps by reading that PRISM production) Americans. So the 18,446 is just a portion of what got purged — but the government pointedly avoided telling Bates how much of the other kind there was.

Of the upstream Internet collection in 2011, .1% was getting purged.

The purge numbers for telephony and PRISM would not be the same as for upstream. The telephony numbers might be far far higher, given public reporting from the period. The NSA was working off some overcollection that was limited to upstream during this period, which would lead to more upstream communications being purged. But the rules on domestic collection of PRISM communications are different than they are for upstream.

In any case, the government’s careful dodge of providing Bates the full purge number suggests the telephony and PRISM purge numbers might be substantial, too. But we don’t get that number.

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

The Reclassification of Details on the 2011 Upstream Fight

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As I noted in this post, Charlie Savage recently liberated more details on the resolution of the 2011 upstream 702 problems.

With respect to some details, however, the newly liberated documents represent a reclassification of details that were made public when the October 3, 2011 John Bates opinion was released in 2013. The government has provided entirely classified documents that are probably the early exchanges on the problem, including language that was unclassified in Bates’ 2011 opinion. In addition, the government has redacted dates that were also made public in Bates’ opinion.

I laid out both the timeline and the language cited from those early exchanges in this post. As I noted in this post, that timeline makes it clear that at the same time John Bates was asking NSA to assess the impact of upstream collection on US persons by sampling real NSA collection, Ron Wyden and Mark Udall were asking for the same thing.

I’ve laid out the combined timeline below. What it — and the newly released documents — show is just how brazen James Clapper’s refusal to provide real numbers to Wyden and Udall was. Not only did their request exactly coincide with the government’s request for more time so they could get more data — the count of US persons — to Bates (though Clapper’s record quick response delivered his refusal before Bates got his first real numbers). But the 48-hour turnaround on analysis of SCTs in September shows how quickly NSA can get rough estimates of US person data when they need to.

There are more alarming things the reclassification of these details suggests, which I’ll address in a follow-up. But for now, know that in 2011, the Intelligence Community refused to treat Congress with the same respect due a co-equal branch of government as it was treating Bates (and that’s the deep background to James Clapper’s 2013 “not wittingly” response).

April 2011, unknown date: Wyden and Udall ask for estimate of US person collection verbally

 

April 19, 2011: Notice of two upstream overcollection violations [see PDF 144]

April 20, 2011: One recertification submission

April 22, 2011: Two more recertification submissions

May 2, 2011: Clarification letter first admits MCT problem

May 5, 2011: Government asks for extension until July 22, 2011

May 9, 2011: Court grants extension, issues briefing order

June 1, 2011: Government submits response to briefing order

June 17, 2011: Court presents follow-up questions

June 28, 2011: Government response to follow-up questions

July 8, 2011: Court (John Bates) meets with senior DOJ people, tells them he has serious concerns

July 14, 2011: Government files another extension; court grants extension to September 20, 2011

July 14, 2011: Wyden and Udall send letter to James Clapper asking (among other things):

  • In a December 2007 Statement of Administration Policy on the FISA Amendments Act, the Office of Management and Budget said that it would “likely be impossible” to count the number of people located in the United States whose communications were reviewed by the government pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act. Is this still the case? If so, is it possible to estimate this number with any accuracy?
  • Have any apparently law-abiding Americans had their communications collected by the government pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act?

July 26, 2011: Clapper responds to Wyden and Udall, refusing to give numbers or describe compliance incidents

August 16, 2011: Government files supplement, presenting results of “manual review of statistically representative sample” for 6 months

August 22, 2011: Meeting between Court and government

August 30, 2011: Government makes another submission

September 7, 2011: Court has hearing

September 9, 2011: Government files additional submission, submitting results of analysis of SCTs completed in just 48 hours

[Photo: National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD via Wikimedia]

A Better Example of Article III FISA Oversight: Reaz Qadir Khan

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As debate over reauthorization of Section 702 heats up, both those in favor of reform and those asking for straight reauthorization are making their cases. As part of that, I wrote a summary of the most persistent NSA (and FBI) violations of FISA for Demand Progress, called “Institutional Lack of Candor.” I did a piece for Motherboard based off the report, which also looks at how Rosermary Collyer did not use the leverage of FISA’s exclusivity clause to force NSA to purge improperly accessed data this year.

Meanwhile, NSA’s General Counsel, Glenn Gerstell, just did a speech at University of Texas laying out what he claimed is the judicial oversight over Section 702. There’s one line I find particularly interesting:

Among other things, Section 702 also enables collection of information on foreign weapons proliferators and informs our cybersecurity efforts.

Here, Gerstell appears to be laying out the three known certificates (counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and foreign government). But I wonder whether the “among other things” points to a new certificate, or to the more amorphous uses of the foreign government cert.

As for Gerstell’s argument that there’s sufficient judicial oversight, I find it laughable in several key points.

For example, here’s how Gerstell describes the amicus provision included with USA Freedom Act.

The FISC is entitled to call upon the assistance of amici when evaluating a novel or significant interpretation of the law or when it requires outside technical expertise. This amicus provision, which was added to FISA as part of the USA FREEDOM Act amendments in 2015, enables the court to draw upon additional expertise and outside perspectives when evaluating a proposed surveillance activity, thus ensuring that the FISC’s oversight remains both robust and knowledgeable. The court has designated a pool of experts in national security to serve as amicus curiae at the court’s request. Amici are specifically instructed to provide to the court “legal arguments that advance the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties,” “information related to intelligence collection or communications technology,” or any other legal arguments relevant to the issue before the court.

The FISC’s amicus provisions are more than a mere statutory wink and nod to strong judicial oversight. The court has in fact called upon its amici to assist in evaluating Section 702 activities. In 2015, the FISC appointed an amicus to analyze what the court felt were two novel or significant interpretations of law that arose as part of its review of the government’s annual application for 702 certifications. The first issue involved whether queries of 702 collection that are designed to return information concerning U.S. persons are consistent with statutory and constitutional requirements. The second question involved whether there were any statutory or constitutional concerns about preserving information collected under Section 702 for litigation purposes that would otherwise be subject to destruction under the government’s minimization procedures. On both issues, the FISC carefully considered the views of the amicus, ultimately concluding that both of the proposed procedures were reasonably tailored to protect the privacy of U.S. persons and thus permissible under both the FISA statute and the constitution. [my emphasis]

Gerstell speaks of the amicus provision as newly permitting — “entitled,” “enabled” — the FISC to consult with others. Yet the FISC always had the ability to call amici (in fact it did ask for outside help in the In Re Sealed Case provision and in a few issues in the wake of the Snowden leaks). What was new with the USAF amicus is an affirmative requirement to either use an amicus or explain why it chose not to in any matters that present a “novel or significant interpretation of the law.”

Authorization.–A court established under subsection (a) or (b), consistent with the requirement of subsection (c) and any other statutory requirement that the court act expeditiously or within a stated time–

(A) shall appoint an individual who has been designated under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration of any application for an order or review that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate; and

(B) may appoint an individual or organization to serve as amicus curiae, including to provide technical expertise, in any instance as such court deems appropriate or, upon motion, permit an individual or organization leave to file an amicus curiae brief.

It’s true that USAF permits the FISC to decide what counts as new, but in those cases, the law does require one or another action, not simply permit it.

Which is why it’s so funny that Gerstell harps on the inclusion of Amy Jeffress in the 2015 recertification process. Note his silence on the 2016 process, which addressed an issue that (as both my reports above make clear) is far more problematic than the ones Jeffress weighed in on? Collyer simply blew off the USAF requirement, and didn’t get the technical help she apparently badly needed. As I noted, she sort of threw up her hands and claimed there were simply no people with the technical expertise and clearance available to help.

I suspect the Intelligence Community — and possibly even the law enforcement community — will live to regret Collyer’s obstinance about asking for help, if for no other reason than we’re likely to see legal challenges because of the way she authorized back door searches on content she knows to include domestic communications.

Gerstell then goes on to hail Mohamed Mohamud’s challenge to 702 as an example of worthwhile Title III court oversight of the program.

In certain circumstances, challenges to surveillance programs can be brought in other federal courts across the country. One recent court case is particularly illustrative of the review of Section 702 outside of the FISC, and here is how it commenced:

A few years ago, a young man named Mohamed Mohamud was studying engineering at Oregon State University. He had emigrated to the U.S. from Somalia with his family when he was only three, and he later became a naturalized U.S. citizen. He grew up around Portland, Oregon, enjoying many typical American pursuits like music and the Los Angeles Lakers. In 2008, however, he was involved in an incident at Heathrow Airport in London during which he believed he was racially profiled by airport security. This incident set Mohamud on a path toward radicalization. He began reading jihadist literature and corresponding with other Al-Qaeda supporters. In 2010, he was arrested and indicted for his involvement in a plot to bomb the Christmas Tree Lighting Ceremony in Portland, which was scheduled to take place the day after Thanksgiving. He was eventually found guilty of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.

After the verdict but before his sentencing, the government provided Mohamud with a supplemental notice that it had offered into evidence or otherwise used or disclosed during the proceedings information derived from Section 702 collection. After receiving this notice, Mohamud petitioned the court for a new trial, arguing that any 702-derived information should be suppressed because, among other reasons, he claimed that Section 702 violated the Fourth Amendment. The federal district court considered Mohamud’s claims before ultimately holding that 702 was constitutional. In so holding, the court found that 702 surveillance does not trigger the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because any collection of U.S. person information occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible 702 acquisitions occurs only incidentally and, even if it did trigger the warrant requirement, a foreign intelligence exception applies. The court also found that “the government’s compelling interest in protecting national security outweighed the intrusion of Section 702 surveillance on an individual’s privacy,” so the 702 collection at issue in that case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Mohamud appealed the district court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit, where the Circuit Court again looked at the constitutionality of the 702 collection at issue, with particular scrutiny on incidental collection. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government’s surveillance in this case was consistent with constitutional and statutory requirements; even if Mohamud had a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in any incidentally-collected communications, the government’s searches were held to be reasonable. [my emphasis]

Look carefully at what Gerstell has argued: he uses a case where DOJ introduced evidence derived from 702, but gave the legally required notice only after the entire trial was over! That is, he’s pointing to a case where DOJ broke the law as proof of how well judicial oversight works.

And that’s important because DOJ has stopped giving 702 notice again (and has never given notice in a non-terrorism case, even though it surely has used derivative information in those cases as well). Without that notice, no defendant will be able to challenge 702 in the designated manner.

Which is why I would point to a different case for what criminal court oversight of SIGINT should look like: that of Reaz Qadir Khan (whose own case was closely linked to that of Mohamud).

At first, Khan tried to force the judge in his case, Michael Mosman, to recuse because he was serving as a FISA judge at the time. Mosman stayed.

Khan then asked for notice from the government for every piece of evidence obtained by the defense, laying out the possible authorities. Things started getting squirrelly at that point, as I summarized here.

Last year, I described the effort by the Reaz Qadir Khan’s lawyers to make the government list all the surveillance it had used to catch him (which, significantly, would either be targeted off a dead man or go back to the period during with the government used Stellar Wind). In October the government wrote a letter dodging most notice. Earlier this year, Judge Michael Mosman (who happens to also be a FISA judge) deferred the notice issues until late in the CIPA process. Earlier this month, Khan plead guilty to accessory to material support for terrorism after the fact.

What I suspect happened is that Mosman, who knows more about FISA than almost all District judges because he was (and still is) serving on the court, recognized that the government had surveillance that deserved some kind of judicial scrutiny (in this case, it probably involved Stellar Wind collection, but also likely included other authorities). So he agreed to deal with it in CIPA.

And just weeks later, Khan got a plea deal.

That’s the way it should work: for a judge to be able to look at surveillance and figure out if something isn’t exactly right or, for exotic interpretations of the law that don’t pass a smell test, and in those cases provide some means for review. Here, the government appears to have gotten uninterested in subjecting its evidence for review and, as is built into CIPA, ended up making a deal instead.

Of course, that rare exception points to one of the problems with FISC.

Gerstell claims that a court that until the Snowden leaks had no Democratic appointees on it boasts a “diversity of backgrounds.”

Recognizing the importance of judicial accountability for foreign intelligence surveillance under FISA, Congress designed a specialized court authorized to operate in secret – the FISC – to encourage rigorous oversight of activities conducted under FISA. Even its structure is deliberately assembled to serve that purpose. FISC judges are selected by the Chief Justice to serve for up to seven years, on staggered terms, which guarantees continuity and subject matter expertise on critical issues. In addition, the FISC is required by statute to be composed of judges drawn from at least seven of the U.S. judicial circuits. This statutory makeup ensures that the FISC includes judges from a diversity of backgrounds and geographic regions, rather than a court that might tend toward unanimity of thought or particular judicial sympathies.

That’s poppycock. The judges tend to be conservative. Importantly, the presiding judges are always from the DC district, not even just the DC neighborhood, such as MD or EDVA.

And remarkably, almost none of the judges on the FISC have presided over terrorism cases (Mosman is from OR, which because of a mosque that the FBI has basically lived in since 9/11, has had more than its share of terrorism cases). Which means the men and women sitting in Prettyman overseeing FISA often have little to no experience on how that data might affect an American’s right to a fair trial two years down the road.

I, like Gerstell, contest the claim that the FISC is generally a rubber stamp. But I do believe it should include more of the judges who actually oversee the trials that may result, because that experience would vastly improve understanding of the import of the review. At the very least, it should include the judges from EDVA who oversee the cases that go through the CIA-Pentagon District, which also includes a great many of the country’s espionage cases.

And most of all, the practice of having one judge, always from DC, review programmatic spying programs by herself should stop. While it is absolutely the case that judges have often shown great diligence, when a judge doesn’t show adequate diligence — as I believe Collyer did not this year — it may create problems that will persist for years.

The FISC is not a rubber stamp. But neither is the judicial oversight of 702 the consistently diligent oversight Gerstell claims.

USA Freedom Act Scofflaw Rosemary Collyer Claims She Can’t Find a Tech Expert

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I say this a lot: for a privacy person, I’m actually pretty willing to defend the work of the so-called rubber stamp FISA Court. I’ve reported on some areas — such as location data — where FISC does or at least use to — require a higher standard of legal process than criminal courts. And I’ve described the diligent efforts various judges — Reggie Walton, especially, but also Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, Thomas Hogan and John Bates — have made to get NSA to follow the law. That doesn’t mean the court is the way the US should oversee programmatic spying, but it does a better job than usually given credit for.

Not so Rosemary Collyer, whom I predicted would be an awful presiding judge before she got the position. That prediction was proven right in this year’s shitty 702 reauthorization. I laid out at more length here how in that opinion, Collyer failed to use the levers Bates had created for the court to ensure the NSA follows the law.

But on top of failing to use the tools her predecessors put in place to ensure that FISA (and her court) remains the exclusive means to conduct domestic foreign intelligence surveillance, Collyer did something even more trouble. She failed to consult an amicus — or explain why she didn’t need to — in the process of approving back door searches to be used with collection she knew to include domestic communications. By failing to do that, I have argued, she broke the law, failing to fulfill the requirements of amicus review or explanation mandated by the USA Freedom Act.

I laid all that out here, too, in a post reporting on the request from a bunch of Senators that FISC appoint a technical amicus. As I noted, if Collyer isn’t going to consult amici, then having a tech amicus available isn’t going to help (and had she consulted the most obvious amicus earlier this year, Marc Zwillinger, he likely would have raised the import of the technical questions she seemed not to understand).

I didn’t realize it but Collyer responded late last month. (h/t Cryptome) She made a remarkably lame excuse for not appointing any tech amici.

We are now actively seeking technical experts who can also act as amici curiae. However, it has not proved to be a simple matter to find appropriate technical expertise. In considering technical advisors we must assess their abilities and qualifications, including their eligibility for security clearances and willingness to abide by attendant obligations regarding reporting of foreign contacts and pre-publication review (which is concerning to some potential candidates). As a result, we expect the process of finding a pool of appropriate technical amici to take some time to complete. Nonetheless, please be assured that this matter is very much on our minds and the court is engaged in continuing outreach.

As I pointed out in my first post on this, Steve Bellovin — who had been selected (and I believe cleared) to serve as technical advisor to PCLOB would be available given the effective demise of that body. Bellovin co-authored an important paper on precisely the issue Collyer dodged in her upstream opinion: where metadata ends and content begins in a packet.

So I’m pretty unsympathetic with Collyer’s claims the FISC simply can’t find appropriate technical experts, or couldn’t here.

Of course, had she not broken the law — had she at least appointed an amicus for April’s opinion — one of them might have offered up Bellovin’s name or a number of other cleared experts.

So it’s nice she’s paying lip service to the kind of technical expertise that might have helped her avoid the problems in this year’s 702 reauthorization.

But given her other actions, it’s hard to believe it is anything but lip service.

Facebook Doesn’t Need a Probable Cause Search Warrant to Turn Over Ad Data to Robert Mueller

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People are shooting off their baby cannons in excitement with the news that Facebook turned over information to Robert Mueller that they didn’t turn over to Congress. The excitement comes, apparently, from the perception that if Mueller got more stuff than Congress, he must have gotten a probable cause search warrant, something implied — but not at all stated affirmatively — in this WSJ article.

Facebook Inc.  has handed over to special counsel Robert Mueller detailed records about the Russian ad purchases on its platform that go beyond what it shared with Congress last week, according to people familiar with the matter.

The information Facebook shared with Mr. Mueller included copies of the ads and details about the accounts that bought them and the targeting criteria they used, the people familiar with the matter said. Facebook policy dictates that it would only turn over “the stored contents of any account,” including messages and location information, in response to a search warrant, some of them said.

A search warrant from Mr. Mueller would mean the special counsel now has a powerful tool in his arsenal to probe the details of how social media was used as part of a campaign of Russian meddling in the U.S. presidential election. Facebook hasn’t shared the same information with Congress in part because of concerns about disrupting the Mueller probe, and possibly running afoul of U.S. privacy laws, people familiar with the matter said.

CNN similarly asserts that Mueller would need a warrant, without actually reporting any confirmation from Facebook that that’s what has happened.

Facebook gave Mueller and his team copies of ads and related information it discovered on its site linked to a Russian troll farm, as well as detailed information about the accounts that bought the ads and the way the ads were targeted at American Facebook users, a source with knowledge of the matter told CNN.

The disclosure, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, may give Mueller’s office a fuller picture of who was behind the ad buys and how the ads may have influenced voter sentiment during the 2016 election.

Facebook did not give copies of the ads to members of the Senate and House intelligence committees when it met with them last week on the grounds that doing so would violate their privacy policy, sources with knowledge of the briefings said. Facebook’s policy states that, in accordance with the federal Stored Communications Act, it can only turn over the stored contents of an account in response to a search warrant.

“We continue to work with the appropriate investigative authorities,” Facebook said in a statement to CNN.

Even in the criminal context, it’s not at all clear Mueller would need a probable cause search warrant. Here’s what WSJ and CNN said Facebook gave Mueller:

  • Copies of ads (which according to some reports, Facebook showed, but did not leave, with Congress)
  • Details about the accounts that bought them
  • Targeting criteria used to buy them

Both WSJ and CNN take from these details that Facebook treats these things — which are what the Internet Research Association and other fake subscribers included in their communications conducting an advertising transaction with Facebook — as “stored contents of an account” or “messages and location information.”

Given that these are communications with Facebook, not with the fake subscribers’ fake friends, it’s not at all clear that’s this would count as content. Here’s what Facebook gets asked for (and presumably delivers) in response to a 2703(d) order on an average real American, like Reality Winner.

A. The following information about the customers or subscribers of the Account:
1. Names (including subscriber names, user names, and screen names);
2. Addresses (including mailing addresses, residential addresses, business addresses, and e-mail addresses);
3. Local and long distance telephone connection records;
4. Records of session times and durations, and the temporarily assigned network addresses (such as Intemet Protocol (“IP”) addresses) associated with those sessions;
5. Length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
6. Telephone or instrument numbers (including MAC addresses);
7. Other subscriber numbers or identities (including temporarily assigned network addresses and registration Intemet Protocol (“IP”) addresses (including carrier grade natting addresses or ports)); and
8. Means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records.

B. All records and other information (not including the contents of communications) relating to the Account, including:
1. Records of user activity for each connection made to or from the Account, including log files; messaging logs; the date, time, length, and method of connections; data transfer volume; user names; and source and destination Intemet Protocol addresses;
2. Information about each communication sent or received by tbe Account, including tbe date and time of the communication, the method of communication, and the source and destination of the communication (such as source and destination email addresses, IP addresses, and telephone numbers). Records of any accounts registered with the same email address, phone number(s), method(s) of payment, or IP address as either of the accounts listed in Part I; and
3. Records of any accounts that are linked to either of the accounts listed in Part I by machine cookies (meaning all Facebook/Instagram user IDs that logged into any Facebook/Instagram account by the same machine as either of the accounts in Part I).

What would “all records and other information” relating to the account entail for an ad purchaser? After all, the fake account is not posting the ad, Facebook is. The fake account is using Facebook targeting criteria — again, communicating with Facebook, not its fake friends.

And if this is how Mueller got the Facebook data, it would be available with approval from a grand jury (and we know he’s got several grand juries lying around), with a relevance — not a probable cause — standard.

And that’s only if you’re talking criminal context. WSJ and CNN refer to Facebook’s privacy policy, which for legal reasons doesn’t cite all the ways they turn over data. In assuming that Mueller had to use a search warrant, both outlets are ignoring another obvious authority: Section 702.

We’re talking accounts believed (by both Facebook and the government) to be run by the Internet Research Association. The Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian tampering states, even in the unclassified version, that they believe IRA has ties to Russian intelligence.

  • The likely financier of the so-called Internet Research Agency of professional trolls located in Saint Petersburg is a close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence.

But even without that, we’re talking a foreign corporation engaging in activity that everyone involved agrees has foreign intelligence value, with most people claiming that they knowingly took part in an intelligence influence operation run by Russian spooks.

That’s solidly in the realm of what gets tasked, all the time, under Section 702’s Foreign Government certificate. Hell, using 702, Mueller could get the contents of the messages sent by the fake accounts to their fake friends, as well as anything else private in their accounts (and a whole lot more).

And the standard for 702 is not probable cause, it is foreigner (including foreign corporation) located overseas of foreign intelligence purpose.

I know everyone badly wants to assume Mueller has indictments in his back pocket, and so therefore are seeing criminal probable cause where there may be none (and where none is required). But both of these articles make certain assumptions about how Facebook treats ad transactions and, making those assumptions, rule out the 2703(d) order. And both of these articles are ignoring the availability of everything in IRA’s accounts — content or no — under Section 702.

Update: I believe these misleading leaks are coming from Congress, rather than from Facebook or Mueller. Note, for example, this WSJ explanation for why Facebook gave Mueller more than they gave Congress:

Facebook hasn’t shared the same information with Congress in part because of concerns about disrupting the Mueller probe, and possibly running afoul of U.S. privacy laws, people familiar with the matter said.

The concern about disrupting the Mueller probe would not be Facebook’s. It’d be Mueller and Congress’.

With that in mind, consider this article, from Bloomberg, which I also found sketchy. It claims that Mueller’s investigation has a “red-hot” focus on social media.

Russia’s effort to influence U.S. voters through Facebook and other social media is a “red-hot” focus of special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into the 2016 election and possible links to President Donald Trump’s associates, according to U.S. officials familiar with the matter.

Mueller’s team of prosecutors and FBI agents is zeroing in on how Russia spread fake and damaging information through social media and are seeking additional evidence from companies like Facebook and Twitter about what happened on their networks, said one of the officials, who asked not to be identified discussing the ongoing investigation.

It relies on two US officials, a common moniker for members of Congress or their staffers. And the article goes on to quote both Richard Burr and Mark Warner.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr, a North Carolina Republican, said Tuesday that it’s “probably more a question of when” than if there will be a hearing with Facebook officials as part of his panel’s probe. Mark Warner, the committee’s top Democrat and a former telecommunications company founder, said Facebook’s revelation appears to be “the tip of the iceberg. I think there’s going to be much more.”

“This is the Wild, Wild West,” Warner said.

Warner has made no secret, for weeks, he wants more focus on the social media side of this. But Burr, here, seems to be reflecting the same considerations he does elsewhere: timing, which for him has been driven by ensuring the committee collects enough evidence to prepare before speaking to witnesses, and deference to Mueller’s investigation.

But consider the rest of the article, which suggests that Mueller’s investigation is going full steam after social media.

That’s pretty hard to square with the fact that Twitter hadn’t even considered doing a report until Facebook delivered theirs, which was provided voluntarily. And Google has done nothing yet, in spite of concerns about Russians exploiting YouTube.

Twitter Inc. is also expected to speak to congressional investigators in the coming weeks about Russian activity on its platform, said Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee last week. A spokeswoman for Twitter declined to comment on whether the company had received any warrants or handed anything over related to possible Russian ad buys.

Alphabet Inc.’s Google unit said in a statement, “We’re always monitoring for abuse or violations of our policies and we’ve seen no evidence this type of ad campaign was run on our platforms.” A person familiar with the matter said the company hasn’t been called to testify on the topic.

In other words, if Mueller is interested in social media, that interest is no longer than 10 days old, and did not drive Facebook’s reporting (though Mueller would have intelligence from the intelligence community, on top of whatever Facebook provided).

I think Warner wants Burr’s agreement to subpoena these providers now, which would permit SSCI to obtain the same stuff Mueller did. And if, in an effort to apply that pressure, Warner or his minions are telling journalists that Mueller got more because he used legal process, it would leave it to journalists to interpret what kind of (legally gagged, probably) process Mueller used. Which might result in precisely the kind of story we got: journalists reporting it involved a warrant based on their interpretation of how Facebook treats ad purchases.

Coats v. Wyden, the Orwellian Reclassification Edition

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Back on June 7, Ron Wyden asked a question similar to the one he asked James Clapper in 2013: “Can the government use FISA 702 to collect communications it knows are entirely domestic?” As Clapper did 4 years before ,Coats denied that it could. “Not to my knowledge. It would be against the law.”

The claim was particularly problematic, given that less than two months earlier, Coats had signed a Section 702 certificate that admitted that the NSA would acquire entirely domestic communications via upstream collection.

When I asked ODNI about Coats’ comment, they responded by citing FISA.

Section 702(b)(4) plainly states we “may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States.” The DNI interpreted Senator Wyden’s question to ask about this provision and answered accordingly.

On June 15, Wyden — as he had in 2013 — insisted that Coats answer the question he asked, not the one that made for easy public assurances.

That was not my question. Please provide a public response to my question, as asked at the June 7, 2017 hearing.

After Wyden asked a few more times — again, as happened in 2013 — Coats provided a classified response on July 24. On September 1, however, Coats wrote Wyden stating that,

After consulting with the relevant intelligence agencies, I concluded that releasing the information you are asking to be made public would cause serious damage to national security. To that end, I provided you a comprehensive classified response to your question on July 24.

[snip]

While I recognize your goal of an unclassified response, given the need to include classified information to fully address your question, the classified response provided on July 24 stands as our response on this matter.”

Wyden is … unsatisfied … with this response.

It is hard to view Director Coats’ behavior as anything other than an effort to keep Americans in the dark about government surveillance. I asked him a simple, yes-or-no question: Can the government use FISA Act Section 702 to collect communications it knows are entirely domestic?

What happened was almost Orwellian. I asked a question in an open hearing. No one objected to the question at the time. Director Coats answered the question. His answer was not classified. Then, after the fact, his press office told reporters, in effect, Director Coats was answering a different question.

I have asked Director Coats repeatedly to answer the question I actually asked. But now he claims answering the question would be classified, and do serious damage to national security.

The refusal of the DNI to answer this simple yes-no question should set off alarms. How can Congress reauthorize this surveillance when the administration is playing games with basic questions about this program?

This is on top of the administration’s recent refusal even to estimate how many Americans’ communications are swept up under this program.

The Trump administration appears to have calculated that hiding from Americans basic information relevant to their privacy is the easiest way to renew this expansive surveillance authority. The executive branch is rejecting a fundamental principle of oversight by refusing to answer a direct question, and saying that Americans don’t deserve to know when and how the government watches them.

Significantly, in the midst of this back-and-forth about targeting, Wyden and Coats were engaged in a parallel back-and-forth about counting how many US persons are impacted by Section 702. In a letter sent to Coats on August 3, Wyden suggested that it might be easier for NSA to count how many people located in the US are affected by Section 702.

First, whatever challenges there may be arriving at an estimate of U.S. persons whose communications have been collected under Section 702, those challenges may not apply equally to persons located in the United States. I believe that the impact of Section 702 on persons inside the United States would constitute a “relevant metric,” and that your conclusion that an estimate can and should be revisited on that basis.

So effectively, Coats is willing to say publicly that the NSA can’t knowingly target entirely domestic communications, but it does knowingly collect entirely domestic communications. But he’s unwilling to explain how or why it continues to do so in the wake of ending “about” collection.

And in the middle of Coats’ non-admission, Wyden challenged him to come up with a count of how many people in America are affected by Section 702, which would presumably include those incidentally collected because they were communicated with a target, but also these entirely domestic communications that Coats admits exist but won’t explain.

I’ll try to explain in a follow-up what I think this is about.