The NYT has one of the most stunning headlines of the day.
Losses at Afghan Bank Could Be $900 Million
The story tells a story of Afghanistan’s own “Too Big to Fail” problem that offers opaque descriptions of precisely what caused the problem, but waits until the 17th and 18th paragraph to explain the real problem with the bank.
Kabul Bank has extensive links to senior people in the Afghan  government. In addition to Mahmoud Karzai, other shareholders included  Haseen Fahim, the brother of the first vice president, and several  associates of the family from the north of Afghanistan. Afghan officials  said the bank poured millions into President Karzai’s election  campaign.
It is the loans and personal grants made by the bank to powerful people,  including government ministers, that could prove the most explosive,  Western and Afghan officials said. “If people who are thought to be  clean and who were held up as ‘good’ by Western countries suddenly are  caught with their fingers in the till, it will cause questions from  donors,” said a Western official in Kabul. “They will say, ‘Why are we  here?’ ”
I wondered why Dexter Filkins, who has done so much on Afghan corruption, focused on the missing money rather than the problem of corruption. But then I remembered–after I saw Alissa Rubin and James Risen on the byline–that Filkins moved to the New Yorker earlier this month.
As it turns out, Filkins has his own version of the story. The explanation of the same disappearing hundreds of millions Filkins offers in an article 3.5 times longer than the NYT’s already long 1800 words is that–as one of Filkins’ sources explains, the Afghan government is a “vertically integrated criminal enterprise.”
Much of the money disappeared (Filkins explicitly states what the NYT just suggests) in outright bribes to the key members of Hamid Karzai’s administration.
The evidence, according to American officials close to the inquiry [into the collapse of the Kabul Bank],  appears to implicate dozens of Afghan officials and businessmen, many of  them, like [Karzai’s finance minister and campaign treasurer, Omar] Zakhilwal, among Karzai’s closest advisers, with regulatory  responsibilities over the Afghan financial system. Among the others are  Afghans regarded by American officials as among the most capable in  Karzai’s government: Farouk Wardak, the Minister of Education; Yunus  Qanooni, the speaker of the Afghan parliament; and Haneef Atmar, the  former Minister of the Interior.
[snip]
“Just straight bribes,” a senior NATO officer said of the payments to Afghan officials.
Much of that bribe money–perhaps as much as $14 million–came in response to Hamid Karzai’s request for campaign donations and went to pay for his badly discredited 2009 re-election.
Now American officials say that Zakhilwal was one of dozens of Afghan  leaders and businessmen who, collectively, accepted tens of millions of  dollars in gifts and bribes—some sources say as much as a hundred  million dollars—from executives at Kabul Bank.
[snip]
According to several current and former Afghan officials, during the  2009 campaign Kabul Bank and Karzai’s reëlection machine became nearly  interchangeable. Afghans who served in Karzai’s government say the more  likely contribution from Kabul Bank was between eight and fourteen  million dollars—and that it kept on doling out money even after the  election, which Karzai finally won, in November, 2009. At the time,  election monitors declared that about a million ballots cast for Karzai  were fraudulent.
More troubling still is Filkins’ report that some of this money is being funneled to the Taliban.
At Kabul Bank, according to a Western official familiar with the  investigation, records show that Ruhullah, the head of a private  security company and an ally of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President’s half  brother, transferred money into accounts believed to be controlled by  the Taliban.
At the same time, Filkins explains here as he has in the past, this corruption is what drives Afghans to support the Taliban.
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