Did DOJ Intervene in Yemen’s Efforts to Try the Guy We Said They Wouldn’t Try?

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In my last post, I asked whether State’s effort to lure Anwar al-Awlaki into the Embassy in Sanaa was an effort to check the box on DOJ’s targeting rules asserting that the US could not capture Awlaki.

Did not come to Embassy in response to obviously bogus letter sent to known address in Sanaa from State? Impossible to capture then!

In this post, I want to look at some interesting chatter in the Awlaki documents from the previous year.

The two documents pertaining to revoking Awlaki’s passport–the cable itself and the email referring to the high side request for it–have document numbers ending in 3993 and 3992, respectively. Presumably, that means they were in Elizabeth Perry Bender’s (from whose hard copies these Consular Affair documents come) file together.

The next document in the series–ending in 3994–is a string of emails regarding Yemen’s decision to charge Awlaki in absentia the previous December (see pages 76 to 83).

The thread starts with Peter Leary, the trial attorney in DOJ’s Civil Division in charge of the ACLU/CCR suit on Awlaki, who sends a November 2, 2010 AP article and a link to a CNN article on Yemen charging Awlaki to other members of that team; he sends it the day the article comes out. It’s not clear how the article got forwarded to State (as no one from State is listed on the non-blind copies), but two days later the legal staff of Consular Affairs sends the article to the Yemen desk officer with a question for the Embassy. The exchange continues for a while; after 19 days the emails start getting appended with a Sensitive but Unclassified marker and start to include FBI personnel stationed in Yemen, including FBI’s Legal Attaché there, Rod Swanson, who seems to resolve the thread on December 4, a month after it started, at which point the thread was forwarded to the State employee whose hard copies show up in this FOIA request.

A note about the timing: Yemen’s charges against Awlaki were filed on November 2, 2010. Thus, they came just days after the alleged toner cartridge bomb plot revealed (like the one earlier this year) by a Saudi infiltrator. But the charges had nothing to do with that plot. Instead, they pertained to the October 6 shooting of the French employee of an Austrian oil company working in Yemen. The witness implicating Awlaki said he had been tortured.

The prosecutor in Tuesday’s trial said Assem, a guard at the French engineering firm SPIE, had acknowledged that he received Internet messages from al-Awlaki inciting him to kill foreigners with whom he was working.

Assem, who appeared at Tuesday’s hearing wearing a blue prison overall, told interrogators that al-Awlaki convinced him that foreigners are “occupiers,” and sent him audiotapes with sermons justifying the killing of foreigners when he hesitated, according to the prosecutor.

On the date of the attack at SPIE, Assem followed a French manager and shot him dead in his office, then looked for other foreigners to kill, al-Saneaa said. Assem also shot at a British man, wounding him in the foot, the prosecutor added.

Assem denied all the charges and said he was tortured and forced to give false confessions

So the email thread appears to gone from DOJ’s team hiding the government’s targeting of Awlaki, to Consular Affairs, to the FBI guys presumably actively investigating the toner cartridge plot.

But the email thread also comes days before the November 8 hearing on the ACLU Awlaki suit (though when the Yemeni desk officer noted that the non-coincidental weekend timing meant she couldn’t get an answer until the day of the hearing, the Consular Legal person had no problem with it).

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Is This What the Government Considers Inability to Capture Awlaki?

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I’m going to have two posts on the Anwar al-Awlaki documents liberated by Judicial Watch.

On March 24, 2011, State sent the Embassy in Sanaa a cable (see pages 63-64) asking them to courier Awlaki a letter at a Sanaa address telling him there’s an important letter for him at the Embassy he must pick up in person.

Post is to hold and retain the revocation letter and send a separate letter to Mr. Aulaqi informing him that there is an important letter for him at post regarding his U.S. passport. Mr. Aulaqi will need to appear in person and at that time post will then serve him with the revocation letter. The language for the letter informing Mr. Aulaqi to appear at post regarding his passport is below. Post should not mention that the letter waiting for Mr. Aulaqi is a revocation letter.

2. The Department’s action is based upon determination by the Secretary that Mr. Aulaqi’s activities abroad are causing and/or likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.

3. The department has been informed that Anwar Nasser Aulaqi is currently located at Rabat St., Sanaa, Yemen.

4. The language for the letter asking Mr. Aulaqi to appear at post may not be modified without the approval of the Office of Legal Affairs.

5. Post should coordinate delivery of this letter by courier or other acceptable method for ensuring delivery. Post should create a memorandum of record specifically stating the date upon which delivery of the letter was made. Post should also obtain a confirmation of receipt. Please provide a copy of the memorandum and confirmation of receipt to the Director of the Office of Legal Affairs via secure email.

[snip]

7. Below is the language that must be used in the letter requesting Mr. Aulaqi to appear at post:

This letter is to advise you that the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen, has an important letter regarding your U.S. passport. This letter must be picked up in person at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa.

Now, we know there’s actually more to this request. Page 60 shows a March 29 reply to a “high side” (that is, sent on the classified email system) request for the cable, with the cable attached.

Which is why Victoria Nuland’s response to questions about this the other day is so interesting. While she says the sole reason State sent the letter was to call him to the Embassy to tell them they were going to revoke his passport, she also says they would have offered him a one-time passport to fly to the US to face charges.

MS. NULAND: I’m not going to entertain the notion that we would be calling him to the Embassy for that purpose, Matt. We were calling him to the Embassy for one purpose alone, which was to revoke his passport and to advise him that if he was prepared to travel back to the United States, where he would have faced prosecution, we would give him a one-way passport back to the United States. He chose not to answer —

QUESTION: Probably smart of him.

MS. NULAND: — our request for him to come to the Embassy. [my emphasis]

So this request was about revocation and a generous offer for a one-time passport to face prosecution in the US (thus the secrecy about the purpose of the appearance in the first place), but the letter to get him to show up at the Embassy included no mention of that prosecution?

And, um, prosecution? On what charges? Are we to understand from Nuland’s comment that the government has–or at least had, in March 2011, before they attempted to take him with a drone strike two more times that year, a sealed indictment against Awlaki?

Part of the purported process the US uses to decide it can kill Americans with no due process is to claim that they could not capture the American. I wonder whether this charade–carried just as CIA was taking a more active role in drone strikes in Yemen, whih would ultimately lead to Awlaki’s killing six months later–is what the lawyers rubber stamping killing American citizens consider an attempt to “capture” someone?

Good Thing John Brennan Didn’t Have to Follow His “Rule Book” When He Killed Adnan al-Qadhi

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The other day, I suggested that the “rule book” John Brennan reportedly rushed to finish in case Mitt won but apparently backed off since may have been an effort to refute Michael Hayden’s criticisms of Obama’s counterterrorism strategy. Hayden has suggested that by using drones rather than torture, the Obama Administration has embraced a more ethically problematic approach.

I was just speculating, of course, that the “rule book” was nothing more than a show for the benefit of Hayden, to try to pretend the drone program wasn’t as ad hoc as it looks and as Hayden has suggested.

Yet I find it interesting that less than a day after Mitt Romney didn’t win the election, Brennan’s drone program took out a Yemeni who–by local accounts, at least–could have easily have been captured.

American counterterrorism officials have painted drone strikes as a tool of last resort, utilized only when targets represent an imminent threat and are nearly impossible to take out by other means. But people in Beit al Ahmar say it’s hard to argue that [Adnan al-]Qadhi’s capture would have been out of the question. He’d already been arrested, and released, before, in 2008 after an attack on the American Embassy. And Beit al Ahmar, nine miles outside Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, is no isolated enclave – it’s the birthplace of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and home to much of the military’s leadership.

Sitting less than an hour’s drive from the capital, residents here say Qadhi could have been captured easily.

[snip]

Few here dispute Qadhi’s open sympathy toward AQAP. After all, the target’s house, modest compared to nearby fortress-like compounds, sticks out because of a mural on one side that shows al Qaida’s signature black flag.

But his relatives and associates say there’s more nuance to Qadhi’s story. While he was labeled as a local leader of AQAP after his death, as recently as last winter he’d participated on a team that mediated between the government and AQAP-linked militants who’d seized control of the central town of Rada.

Back in April–the last time Drone Assassination Czar John Brennan was making a big show of the purported order of his drone program–here’s some of what he said about who the US targeted with drones.

Even if it is lawful to pursue a specific member of al-Qaida, we ask ourselves whether that individual’s activities rise to a certain threshold for action, and whether taking action will, in fact, enhance our security. For example, when considering lethal force we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. interests.  This is absolutely critical, and it goes to the very essence of why we take this kind of exceptional action.

[snip]

I am not referring to some hypothetical threat, the mere possibility that a member of al-Qaida might try to attack us at some point in the future.  A significant threat might be posed by an individual who is an operational leader of al-Qaida or one of its associated forces.  Or perhaps the individual is himself an operative, in the midst of actually training for or planning to carry out attacks against U.S. persons and interests.

[snip]

In addition, our unqualified preference is to only undertake lethal force when we believe that capturing the individual is not feasible. [my emphasis]

Of course, I’ve suggested that the entire speech was bullshit, just an attempt to prepare an intent-based defense in case Brennan ever got in trouble for killing so many illegitimate targets.

But the case of Adnan al-Qadhi appears to show that John Brennan can’t even follow the rules he has claimed publicly he follows.

And that bit about whether or not a particular drone strike would enhance our security?

Here’s what al-Qadhi’s villagers–who up until this strike were peaceful–have to say about the strike.

In the center of the village, a farmer named Abduljaber Saber held forth on the strike with his neighbors, calling the attack a violation of the rule of law, casting it as an example of “American hypocrisy.”

His neighbor, Mohamed Abdulwali, took a break from repairing a water canister to chime in: “Any action has a reaction. Any violence will breed violence.”

John Brennan, the priest-like assassination czar, doesn’t seem to be following his own rules.

Is the Drone “Rule Book” an Effort to Force Kill-Not-Capture?

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After reading the response to Scott Shane’s article on the drone rule book, I wanted to add a few thoughts.

First, much of the treatment of the article treated the description of the rule book itself as news. It’s not. Greg Miller discussed the effort in an article last month.

White House counterterrorism adviser John O. Brennan is seeking to codify the administration’s approach to generating capture/kill lists, part of a broader effort to guide future administrations through the counterterrorism

The news in the Shane article is that the effort to codify the drone program accelerated–and now has lost urgency–because of the possibility that someone like Cofer Black rather than John Brennan would be running the drone program in a Romney Administration.

Facing the possibility that President Obama might not win a second term, his administration accelerated work in the weeks before the election to develop explicit rules for the targeted killing of terrorists by unmanned drones, so that a new president would inherit clear standards and procedures, according to two administration officials.

The matter may have lost some urgency after Nov. 6. But with more than 300 drone strikes and some 2,500 people killed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the military since Mr. Obama first took office, the administration is still pushing to make the rules formal and resolve internal uncertainty and disagreement about exactly when lethal action is justified.

That’s why I’m not sure we should assume that Obama ever intended the rules as limits on what Mitt’s Administration might do.

There are at least two other possibilities.

While it’s unclear whether this rule book effort is just part of or is the same thing as the disposition matrix also described in Miller’s article, that article does make it fairly clear the codification effort strives to make the drone program more permanent, even to streamline it (and to centralize it under oversight-free White House personnel rather than the Joint Chiefs).

Targeted killing is now so routine that the Obama administration has spent much of the past year codifying and streamlining the processes that sustain it.

This year, the White House scrapped a system in which the Pentagon and the National Security Council had overlapping roles in scrutinizing the names being added to U.S. target lists.

Now the system functions like a funnel, starting with input from half a dozen agencies and narrowing through layers of review until proposed revisions are laid on Brennan’s desk, and subsequently presented to the president.
[snip]
For an administration that is the first to embrace targeted killing on a wide scale, officials seem confident that they have devised an approach that is so bureaucratically, legally and morally sound that future administrations will follow suit. [my emphasis]

That is, the rush to implement the rule book may have been an effort to ensure the program’s permanence, to force Mitt to keep it.

And while there’s no doubt he would have (as Miller pointed out in his article), consider the alternative. Mitt’s Administration likely would have included the architect of the torture program, Cofer Black, and a former CIA Director, Michael Hayden, who has repeatedly called for retaining the torture program.

The effort to institutionalize the drone program may have been a bid to sustain the kill-not-capture preference of the Obama Administration (though the “disposition matrix” appears to have been an effort to invent some alternatives for live capture that Obama hasn’t much used). Though any effort to dictate choices to the dangerously creative Black, I suspect, would have been futile.

There’s one other related possibility.

Hayden, in particular, has been vocal about what the choice to end torture has purportedly brought about: precisely that kill-not-capture choice. Even while defending torture, Hayden has been fairly aggressive in noting how much killing the Obama approach has entailed.

Might it be, then, that the effort to draft a set of “rules” for drone killing was really an effort to make the program look more rational and measured than it has been in practice, to put the best spin on it before another bureaucrats from another party got fully briefed on it?

As Shane notes, Obama’s folks still haven’t decided when and how they use drone killing.

Mr. Obama and his advisers are still debating whether remote-control killing should be a measure of last resort against imminent threats to the United States, or a more flexible tool, available to help allied governments attack their enemies or to prevent militants from controlling territory.

So even four years in, the program is in fact an ad hoc mess, even if the Administration claims it is not.

And there are a number of killings or targetings that occurred under the Obama Administration–the incidents where “allies” gave us bad targeting data so we would kill their political rivals, the signature strikes that killed civilians, and even the targeting of Americans whom the intelligence community believed were not yet operational–that might be embarrassing if further details were leaked by the incoming Administration.

These awkward targetings are almost certainly precisely the reason the Administration refuses to make more information about its targeting program public: because they prove the program was never as orderly or legally sound as the Administration publicly claims. So the “rule book,” purporting to show the reasoned deliberations behind these screw-ups, might be one way to spin them as reasoned (and legal). I have suggested that some of the public statements about the drone program might have served as legal cover if ever anyone thought to prosecute Administration officials for killing civilians. Perhaps this “rule book” was designed to do the same?

Thus far, most of the treatment of the “rule book” has presumed it was meant to be prescriptive, and it might well have been. But it’s also possible the “rule book” was meant to be (falsely) descriptive, an effort to spin the program just as a group of potential critics got read into the program.

Update: Matthew Aid’s take on this seems to support my suspicions: this “rule book” is about the eventual review of this program.

A State Department official who recently left his post for a better paying job in the private sector admitted that there is deep concern at State and Justice that sooner or later, a court in the U.S. or in The Hague will issue a ruling on the question of the legality of these missions, which many in Washington fear will go against the U.S. government position that these strikes are legal.

White House Attempts Again To Do In Secret What Requires Transparency, Law

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For the last year, the Administration has been grasping at ways to give its drone program the semblance of legal and moral justification. It started a year ago with a debate in the Situation Room over how to provide transparency on the drone program without hurting the Administration’s legal stance refusing transparency.

The calls for transparency in discussing the Awlaki strike were batted away at first. But behind the scenes, several prominent lawyers in the national-security bureaucracy began lobbying their colleagues and superiors for some degree of disclosure. Among them were Jeh C. Johnson, the Defense Department general counsel, and Harold Hongju Koh, the State Department legal adviser. The national-security “principals” quickly divided into camps. The CIA and other elements of the intelligence community were opposed to any disclosures that could lift the veil of secrecy from a covert program. Others, notably the Justice and State departments, argued that the killing of an American citizen without trial, while justified in rare cases, was so extraordinary it demanded a higher level of public explanation.

[snip]

The issue came to a head at a Situation Room meeting in November. At lower-level interagency meetings, Obama officials had already begun moving toward a compromise. [snip]

Another senior official expressing caution about the plan was Kathryn Ruemmler, the White House counsel. She cautioned that the disclosures could weaken the government’s stance in pending litigation. 

[snip]

It came down to what Denis McDonough, the deputy national-security adviser, cheekily called the “half Monty” versus the “full Monty,” after the British movie about a male striptease act. In the end, the principals settled on the half Monty. As the State Department’s Koh continued to push for the maximum amount of disclosure, McDonough began referring to that position as “the full Harold.”

It continued through a series of high level speeches early this year. The centerpiece of that series featured the Attorney General celebrating our values, the Constitution, and rule of law, then noting the importance of judicial oversight (though in the case of surveillance, not killing), but finally rejecting all those things when it comes to killing American citizens.

But just as surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values.  Even when under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution – and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law and our founding ideals.   Not only is this the right thing to do – history has shown that it is also the most effective approach we can take in combating those who seek to do us harm.

[snip]

We must – and will continue to – use the intelligence-gathering capabilities that Congress has provided to collect information that can save and protect American lives.   At the same time, these tools must be subject to appropriate checks and balances – including oversight by Congress and the courts, as well as within the Executive Branch – to protect the privacy and civil rights of innocent individuals.

[snip]

Any decision to use lethal force against a United States citizen – even one intent on murdering Americans and who has become an operational leader of al-Qaeda in a foreign land – is among the gravest that government leaders can face.   The American people can be – and deserve to be – assured that actions taken in their defense are consistent with their values and their laws.   So, although I cannot discuss or confirm any particular program or operation, I believe it is important to explain these legal principles publicly.

[snip]

Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces.   This is simply not accurate.   “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security.   The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process. [my emphasis]

These themes appeared again in an Obama interview with CNN in September. The President insisted that the best way to reduce the terrorist threat is to live up to our values.

Our most powerful tool over the long term to reduce the terrorist threat is to live up to our values and to be able to shape public opinion not just here but around the world that senseless violence is not a way to resolve political differences. And so it’s very important for the President and for the entire culture of our national security team to continually ask tough questions about, are we doing the right thing? Are we abiding by rule of law? Are we abiding by due process? And then set up structures and institutional checks so that you avoid any kind of slippery slope into a place where we’re not being true to who we are. [my emphasis]

As I noted at that time, Obama’s Administration has rejected the best tool for ensuring we live by our laws and values: court review.

Having started by saying that drones are just a tool, he ends up by saying that we will vanquish terrorism by upholding our values–rule of law and due process.

And then the Constitution Professor President describes “set[ting] up structures and institutional checks” to make sure that we deliver rule of law and due process.

This, from the guy whose Administration refused to litigate a suit from Anwar al-Awlaki’s father to make sure it was upholding the standards Obama claimed in this interview in Awlaki’s case.

This, from the guy whose Administration has claimed state secrets to make sure no court can review the claims of people who have been rendered or tortured or illegally wiretapped.

This, from the guy who wouldn’t do the politically difficult things to have Khalid Sheikh Mohammed tried–and surely, convicted–before a civilian court in NYC.

He’s looking for structures and institutional checks to make sure we don’t go down that slippery slope where we forget rule of law. And yet his Administration has repeatedly avoided the one mandated by the Constitution: courts.

In October we learned that the Administration had charged the Moral Rectitude Assassination Czar to set up structures to make sure the program didn’t go haywire if Obama’s assassination czars were replaced by Mitt’s.

That effort continues, Scott Shane reports today, though with slightly less urgency now that we know John Brennan (or his replacement) will be targeting the drones rather than Cofer Black.

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David Petraeus’ Response to Climate Change: MOAR DRONZ!

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When I saw DHS is acquiring more drones this morning, I joked that the policy response of government agencies when they fail at their core function is to ask for more drones.

Pretty sure there’s direct correlation bet size of NatSec departments [sic] failures at core job–HUMINT, safety–& desire for drones–CIA, DHS.

CIA has another massive HUMINT failure. Response? Moar dronz! DHS fusion centers proven to be huge wastes. Response? Moar dronz!

After @kade_ellis got into the fun, I pushed the idea, suggesting our country would respond to bank looting and climate change with a demand for more drones, too.

Banks looting the country? MOAR DRONZ! Impending climate catastrophe? MOAR DRONZ!

I swear, when I made that joke, I had not yet read how the CIA closed its climate change center because David Petraeus thought it more important to hunt terrorists with drones.

The center was designed as a small unit of senior specialists focused on the impact that environmental changes could have on political, economic and social factors in countries of concern to the United States. The analysts probed questions such as, under what scenarios might a massive drought cause large-scale migration, and when might a government’s failure to respond to a devastating flood open the door for terrorist groups to win over the local populace?

Analysts at the center worked to develop warning software that combined regional climate projections with political and demographic information, and held climate war games looking at what might happen in extreme scenarios, such as if rapid glacial melt caused the ocean’s major currents to shut down.

The center didn’t focus on the science behind climate change but instead relied on data from other government agencies as well as recommendations — including ones in a report released just over a week ago — from the National Academy of Sciences (Greenwire, Nov. 9).

But congressional Republicans skeptical of the science behind climate change sought to block the center’s funding shortly after it was launched. Those efforts failed, but sources say the center received little internal support after Panetta left the CIA in 2011 to take the top job at the Defense Department. Under his successor, David Petraeus, the agency was highly focused on terrorism, specifically targeted killings using armed drones. [my emphasis]

The diddling Director, it seems, thought taking out an American teenager with a drone was more important than responding to a crisis that is already leading to migration and increased credibility for terrorist groups.

But it’s not just the diddling Director. The CIA’s statement on the closure says instead of focusing on climate change, the CIA is focusing on energy.

CIA spokesman Todd Ebitz confirmed the change.

“The CIA for several years has studied the national security implications of climate change,” Ebitz said in a statement to Greenwire. “This work is now performed by a dedicated team in an office that looks at a variety of economic and energy security issues affecting the United States.”

This parallels, as it happens, Obama’s changing emphasis on gas production for energy security reasons, and only secondarily for climate change ones.

It seems our national security establishment–from the man who would turn back the oceans to the diddling Director–are more interested in replacing the Saudis as the petro-state than really preventing climate disaster in the not-too-distant future.

And if that emphasis should continue to destabilize the increasingly climate-wracked world?

MOAR DRONZ!

First a Leak (or Rumor) about Secret Bilateral Peace Talks, Then a Leak about a Drone-Plane Standoff

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CNN is reporting that two Iranian jets shot at–but did not hit–a Predator drone flying in what their report says is international airspace (though see Max Fisher and Steve Hynd on the location).

Two Iranian Su-25 fighter jets fired on an unarmed U.S. Air Force Predator drone in the Persian Gulf last week, CNN has learned.

[snip]The drone’s still and video cameras captured the incident showing two SU-25s approaching the Predator and firing its onboard guns.

The Iranian pilots continued to fire shots that went beneath the Predator but were never successful in hitting it, according to the officials.

After a month straight of unauthorized leaks pertaining the Benghazi without a peep in response from anyone in the Administration, DOD’s Press Secretary has already labeled this story an unauthorized leak.

This comes less than 10 days after a report–which both sides dispute–of planned (or potentially started) bilateral discussions between Iran and the US. (Not to mention the stories that Bibi tried to provoke an Iranian attack at some censored time in 2010.)

The warning shots over disputed territory is, of course, a non-story that CNN’s unauthorized leakers are trying to turn into one.

And that, it seems, is the desperation with which some people are trying to prevent peace from breaking out.

Administration Continues Apparent Policy of Harassing Pakistani Drone Critics

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Yesterday, US officials detained and questioned former cricket star turned politician and drone critic Imran Khan in Canada before allowing him to travel on to New York.

Khan told his followers on Twitter on Friday that he was detained and interrogated about his views on drones.

A State Department official confirmed Khan had been briefly detained, but said the Pakistani politician was later released to travel the United States. “The issue was resolved and Mr. Khan is welcome in the United States,” said the official.

[snip]

Khan, who led a protest march to northern Pakistan earlier this month to protest U.S. drone strikes, sent a message about the incident on Twitter on Friday, vowing to continue opposing the deadly attacks. “Nothing will change my stance,” he said.

“I was taken off from plane and interrogated by U.S. Immigration in Canada on my views on drones. My stance is known. Drone attacks must stop,” Khan tweeted on Friday afternoon.

This is not an isolated example of harassment. This is at least the third time this year that the US has delayed or denied entry to the US for Pakistani drone critics.

In April, the government stalled on giving Shahzad Akbar, a lawyer suing the US for its drone strikes, a visa to speak at an anti-drone conference.

If you want to see how President Obama’s drone war efficiently turns America’s friends into adversaries, meet Pakistani attorney Shahzad Akbar. After getting his legal education in the United Kingdom, Akbar returned to his native Islamabad to practice the kind of corporate and public accountability law that the U.S. says its hopes to encourage in Pakistan. He worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development on trade issues. While prosecuting a Pakistan consular officer who was selling visas, he coordinated his case with the FBI.

Then came the Obama administration’s escalation of the drone war. Now Akbar is a full-time critic of the U.S. government who was repeatedly denied a visa to visit Washington. After a spate of news articles, Akbar was granted permission to travel to Washington this weekend, where he warned Americans about the consequences of a remote control war where no U.S. lives are lost and Pakistani civilian casualties are routinely downplayed.

And in May, the government refused a visa to Muhammad Danish Qasim, preventing him from traveling to Seattle to accept an award for a film he made

In particular, “the film identifies the problems faced by families who have become victims of drone missiles, and it unearths the line of action which terrorist groups adopt to use victimised families for their vested interests.” In other words, it depicts the tragedy of civilian deaths, and documents how those deaths are then successfully exploited by actual Terrorists for recruitment purposes.

We can’t have the U.S. public learning about any of that. In April, Qasim was selected as the winner of the Audience Award for Best International Film at the 2012 National Film Festival For Talented Youth, held annually in Seattle, Washington. Qasim, however, along with his co-producers, were prevented from traveling to the U.S. to accept their award and showcase their film because their request for a visa to travel to the U.S. was denied. The Tribune reported: “Despite being chosen for the award, the filmmakers were unable to attend the award ceremony as their visa applications were rejected twice.

This is becoming a pattern in which the US harasses any Pakistanis who might speak out against drones in this country.

Why is the government so afraid of Pakistanis explaining to Americans what the drone attacks look like from a Pakistani perspective?

The Moral Rectitude Assassination Czar

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[youtube]7MwB2znBZ1g[/youtube]

Back in April and May, when John Brennan seized control of the drone targeting process purportedly in the interest of “showing the American public that al-Qaida targets are chosen only after painstaking and exhaustive debate,” an extensive NYT article—providing a picture of drone targeting as done before Brennan had consolidated control of it–described Brennan in religious terms. Among other descriptions offered of the guy in charge of drone assassinations, Harold Koh described him as a priest.

“If John Brennan is the last guy in the room with the president, I’m comfortable, because Brennan is a person of genuine moral rectitude,” Mr. Koh said. “It’s as though you had a priest with extremely strong moral values who was suddenly charged with leading a war.”

That same formulation–moral rectitude–shows up in Karen DeYoung’s profile of John Brennan today.

Some White House aides describe him as a nearly priest-like presence in their midst, with a moral depth leavened by a dry, Irish wit.

One CIA colleague, former general counsel John Rizzo, recalled his rectitude surfacing in unexpected ways. Brennan once questioned Rizzo’s use of the “BCC” function in the agency’s e-mail system to send a blind copy of a message to a third party without the primary recipient’s knowledge.

“He wasn’t joking,” Rizzo said. “He regarded that as underhanded.”

That’s not all that surprising. After all, DeYoung may have talked to Koh for this article, or “moral rectitude” may just be a well rehearsed line inside the White House.

Having anyone question Rizzo’s ethics, however, is no evidence of moral rectitude.

Indeed, the article–and the last set of similar articles–suggests Brennan does not exercise the moral rectitude the anonymous White House sources claim. Last time around, after all, the articles told how Brennan shut down signature strikes and war in Yemen. But by the time the articles came out, he had approved them.

This time around, the article notes Brennan’s belief CIA shouldn’t be in the paramilitary business, but approved such activities operating out of Djibouti. He is about to approve more drones because Petraeus wants them rather than fixing our HUMINT weaknesses. Similarly, Brennan’s moral rectitude on Mali involvement has faded.

It’s in light of this false myth of Brennan’s moral rectitude that I want to look more closely at the most remarked lines of this story.

In them, an anonymous Administration official seemingly shows regret for the killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki (as I noted at the time, the big profiles in May both were utterly silent about Abdulrahman).

Two administration officials said that CIA drones were responsible for two of the most controversial attacks in Yemen in 2011 — one that killed American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent figure in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and a second a few days later that killed his 16-year-old son, also an American citizen. One of the officials called the second attack “an outrageous mistake. . . . They were going after the guy sitting next to him.”

Note, last year, Greg Miller reported JSOC carried out the Abdulrahman strike.

On Sept. 30, Awlaki was killed in a missile strike carried out by the CIA under Title 50 authorities — which govern covert intelligence operations — even though officials said it was initially unclear whether an agency or JSOC drone had delivered the fatal blow. A second U.S. citizen, an al-Qaeda propagandist who had lived in North Carolina, was among those killed.

The execution was nearly flawless, officials said. Nevertheless, when a similar strike was conducted just two weeks later, the entire protocol had changed. The second attack, which killed Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, was carried out by JSOC under Title 10 authorities that apply to the use of military force.

The detail matters, because ongoing FOIAs for information on Abdulrahman’s death face a higher bar if CIA carried out the attack than if JSOC did (Brennan’s laughable claim to want DOD to carry out these strikes so they will be transparent is another of the instances in the story where his moral rectitude proves infinitely flexible).

But it’s the statement itself–“an outrageous mistake. . . . They were going after the guy sitting next to him”–that I find even more laughable. Partly it’s word choice. Who says “outrageous mistake”? Normally, you’d expect someone to say “horrible mistake,” because if it’s a “mistake” then there’s no intent or poor judgment to get outraged about (unless the targeting here, overseen by Brennan personally, was particularly incompetent–but that’s the kind of thing these Kill List articles assure us could never happen).

Besides, according to the rules exposed in the last set of Kill List articles, Abdulrahman qualifies as a legitimate target. He’s a military aged male. Therefore, according to the rules of targeting, hitting him wasn’t a mistake at all. He was a militant considered an acceptable target by the moral rectitude Assassination Czar.

And all that’s before you consider that every other American killed by drones–Kamal Derwish, who purportedly died as “collateral damage” in the Abu Ali al-Harithi strike; Anwar al-Awlaki, who was first missed on December 24, 2009 in a strike purportedly targeting someone else, WikiLeaks evidence to the contrary notwithstanding (at a time when the Intelligence Community didn’t consider Awlaki operational); and Samir Khan, who died as collateral damage in the Awlaki strike–were or were going to be collateral damage at one point. That’s a lot of collaterally damaged inconvenient Americans.

Do people at the White House regret that they keep getting questions about the dead American teenager? Do they regret the almost nonexistent political fallout that has resulted? Do they feel a tinge of guilt that their rules make killing a teenager legal? Perhaps.

But the performance of morality in the Abdulrahman statement–like the moral rectitude rehearsed once again in a John Brennan article–is unconvincing.

Nashiri Asks for the Targeting Package on the OTHER USS Cole Mastermind

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Things just got interesting in the pre-trial hearing for Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri in Gitmo. According to Charlie Savage and Carol Rosenberg, he has asked for the targeting package used to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi in Yemen in November 2002.

While I have no confidence he’ll get the package, he has very good reason to demand it. Here’s what I wrote about the al-Harithi killing two and half years ago.

I find it rather interesting that that 2002 assassination was rationalized in the name of killing al-Harithi, accused of organizing the USS Cole bombing. That strike happened not long after the US started torturing a guy–Rahim al-Nashiri–whom we’re about to try in military commission for organizing the USS Cole bombing. [10/24/12: Correction, we actually started torturing Nashiri in earnest 13 days later] (And remember, al-Nashiri had been in custody in Dubai for a month by the time the US took custody.) Who was the mastermind of the Cole bombing, then? al-Harithi, who doesn’t even merit a mention in the 9/11 Commission report (though reports from when he was killed said he was among the 12 most senior al Qaeda figures), or al-Nashiri, who does, and is about to be tried for it? Note, too, that the Bush Administration did not announce it had custody of al-Nashiri until several weeks laterin November.

Now compare al-Harithi, with his loosely accused role in the Cole, with Kamal Derwish, whom the US accused of recruiting a number of Lackawanna youth into al Qaeda. Not only was Derwish accused of being an ongoing threat–the standard purportedly used to put Americans on kill lists now. But he was accused of training Americans in al Qaeda. Which is not all that different than what the government is accusing al-Awlaki of now.

And note, too, that Priest and maybe Miller [ed. changed per MD’s comment] both now report that the CIA knew Derwish was in the car when they targeted (they say) al-Harithi. When Miller first reported this in 2002, he didn’t mention Derwish’s presence (nor did Pincus). When Priest broke the story of Derwish’s presence in the car, she stated it was unclear whether CIA knew he was there or not.

It was unclear whether the CIA operatives who fired the missile from hundreds of miles away knew that an American citizen was among their targets. It also was unclear whether that would have made any difference.

I guess I’m suggesting that, first of all, it would seem unnecessary to kill a guy for planning the Cole bombing if you knew you had the guy who–you say–planned the Cole bombing in custody. But that claiming a tie between him and the Cole bombing might provide the excuse to target a car carrying your real target, Derwish.

Basically, one of two things is likely true: al-Harithi is the mastermind of the Cole strike, and we knew that before we started torturing Nashiri, in the name of his role as the USS Cole mastermind, in earnest. Or, Nashiri is the real mastermind of the Cole bombing, in which case the al-Harithi story was probably a cover story so we could kill an American citizen, Kamal Derwish, with no due process.

I suspect the second is true (though Nashiri has also asked for the FBI investigative file on the attack; it’s rather stunning he hasn’t gotten it yet–maybe this is the reason he’s being inappropriately tried in a military commission?). In which case this is a kind of graymail, the knowledge that the US can’t turn over the targeting package for al-Harithi because it would show Derwish was the real target.

In any case, it was an interesting legal move.