215 days before Jonathan Ross shot Renee Good dead after Good’s wife, Becca, engaged in First Amendment protected taunting of Ross, HSI Special Agent Ryan Ribner rushed through a gate at at a Los Angeles garment factory and — along with ICE Officer Carey Crook — assaulted SEIU CA President David Huerta, targeting Huerta rather than several other people who were more directly blocking a van, the purported crime in question.

Huerta argued in a motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds submitted last week, days before Good’s killing,  that Ribner and Crook did not arrest Huerta for obstructing a Federal officer, which is what got charged after DOJ abandoned a claim that Huerta had conspired to impede officers, much less the assault that they contemplated charging initially, but because Huerta had engaged in that First Amendment protected taunting.

It may well be that Ribner lied when he claimed he didn’t learn Huerta was a powerful union leader until after he assaulted him. Months later, the undercover officer working the crowd, Jeremy Crossen, admitted people in the crowd referred to Huerta as a union “member,” though that didn’t appear in either the texts that got shared with Huerta in discovery — which described the institutional affiliation of others — or a countersurveillance report he wrote weeks after the assault, where he included the research he had done after the fact for everyone but the state president of one of the most powerful unions in the state, the guy who got assaulted.

But if Huerta wasn’t targeted because he’s a powerful Democrat (in Ribner’s report there’s a weird claim that the agent guarding Huerta in the hospital only “feigned” interest when Mayor Karen Bass showed up to Huerta’s hospital room), then the record shows little else beyond speech.

According to videos turned over in discovery, Ribner started predicting Huerta would go to jail based solely off taunting, mostly about their masks.

Mr. Huerta asked them, “How are you keeping us safe?” Agent Ribner’s response was: “You are gonna go to jail. You are not impeding us. You are not impeding us. You’re going to jail, [unintelligible from 0:00:09–00:11] and you’re going to jail.” Id. at 0:00:01–00:12. Mr. Huerta then repeatedly asked him, “What are you doing?” and told him, “I can’t hear you through your fuckin’ mask,” and pointed at Agent Ribner. Id. at 0:00:14–00:17. Agent Ribner can be heard replying: “You’re gonna go to jail, you’re going to jail.” Id. at 0:00:17. For the next few minutes, Mr. Huerta continued to protest in front of the gate, including conversing with Agent Ribner, Officer Crook, and other officers, including, according to agents’ after-the-fact reports, “aggressively”4 asking the officers to identify themselves, stating “What are you going to do… Where’s your fucking badge number… What’s your fucking name?” Ex. B at 9. He also allegedly stated: “You’re not police! You’re not fucking police! You’re not keeping me safe!”

Indeed, Ribner’s own report describes himself predicting that Huerta and others would obstruct them, so he instructed his colleagues to be prepared to make arrests.

Later, HUERTA approached the gate and began yelling and about wanting to see agents’ faces. At times HUERTA was putting his arms through the fence as he yelled, and on at least one occasion he pointed as well. HUERTA stated, “Your boss” [believed to be referring to President Trump] wants things “made in America”. HUERTA went on and said that the things were manufactured inside of Ambiance. HUERTA appeared to be aggressive and angry by his voice, demeanor, and facial features. At some point HUERTA walked up to the gate and asked either about the purpose or legit impact of agents’ duties. SSA Ribner asked HUERTA the purpose of what he was doing [regarding being belligerent with law enforcement]. HUERTA made a comment that he lived in the community and /or cared about the community. SSA Ribner advised HUERTA that “we” [agents] also live in the community. SSA Ribner made the comment to HUERTA in the hopes of obtaining HUERTA’s compliance by advising HUERTA that law enforcement agents are just like him and care about the community and are also part of the demographic of the southern California area.

[snip]

STRONG, and LENEHAN would highly likely block or impede law enforcement vehicles, cause damage to USG property, or commit a battery against agents as they attempt to depart. SSA Ribner informed the DEA agents that if anyone in the crowd impedes, blocks, or physically batters an agent that arrests would be made. [my emphasis]

“He pointed as well”!!! And from that (and perhaps in his view that Huerta was Hispanic? — though several other people present looked more obviously Hispanic), Ribner concluded Huerta was aggressive.

Even though a vehicle had already entered the gate Ribner stood behind without major obstruction, Ribner predicted that a white detainee van that pulled up shortly after the conflict with Huerta occurred, while the gate was still closed, would incite some response. Huerta was on the public sidewalk in front of the gate, though several other people were more directly in front of the van’s path. But when the gate did open, at which point Huerta was to the side of the van, Crook and Ribner rushed Huerta and pushed him down.

That’s when Ribner conducted a brutal arrest, even applying pepper spray to his hand and smothering Huerta’s face with it, because — he claimed after Huerta sought hospital treatment for a head injury — Ribner did not want Huerta to hit his head on the curb he was driving it into.

SSA Ribner decided to deploy a chemical agent (pepper spray) on HUERTA due to HUERTA actively resisting arrest, the angered crowd, and HUERTA’s safety as his head was near a cement curb and SSA Ribner didn’t want him suffering an injury. Due to the concern of over spraying the chemical agent with others nearby (SDDO C and the crowd) or spraying HUERTA directly in the eyes, SSA Ribner decided to spray a small amount of the chemical agent in his hand and place his hand near the upper nose area of HUERTA’s face. HUERTA began to make noises and say that he couldn’t breathe.

Huerta’s head got slammed, and Huerta sought immediate hospital care. In his arrest report — again, written after he learned Huerta had a brain injury — Ribner describes feeling no lump on Huerta’s head but said he did so to help Huerta to clean the pepper spray that Ribner’s post hoc reports claim he specifically avoided getting in his eyes out of Huerta’s eyes.

Agent’s Note: During the arrest encounter SSA Ribner never personally observed HUERTA strike his head on the ground. Additionally, when SSA Ribner was decontaminating HUERTA, he placed his hands on the back of HUERTA’s head to help move his head back to place water in his eyes and face area. SSA Ribner never felt any bumps or cuts on the back of HUERTA’s head. Additionally, SSA Ribner didn’t observe any physical bumps or cuts on HUERTA’s head.

As so often has happened after DHS assaults and hurts someone, that night make-believe US Attorney Bill Essayli accused Huerta of assault.

And sometime later, Ribner was in a meeting with Todd Blanche, and Essayli promised Blanche this would go to trial in September or October.

GS Ribner stated he spoke with United States Attorney Bill Essayli about this case and others, such as the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) and Special Agent in Charge Eddie Wang. During the briefing, USA Essayli told the DAG that “this case is going to trial in September or October

As you can tell from Ribner’s attempt to build in deniability for the head injury, Ribner obviously tried to reverse-engineer his actions, to provide some excuse for the assault.

As I noted at the time, when Ribner wrote the arrest affidavit back in June, he absurdly claimed that Huerta intimidated him because he banged on the gate.

“Banged on a gate” and “pointed as well”!?!?! No wonder they asked to detain Huerta pretrial.

Ribner’s initial arrest report (the same report where he denied knowledge of a head injury, which he wrote almost two weeks after the arrest) is full of things — including some alleged assaults by protesters, but also including exchanges like the local San Diegans who, days before the Huerta assault, shouted “shame” until ICE abandoned their effort to raid a local restaurant — that Ribner cited to explain why he implanted an undercover agent at the scene to seek out a vast conspiracy Ribner was sure existed.

Mostly, though, I suspect it was the shame.

Huerta was lucky. Because he’s an American citizen, he couldn’t be shunted off to a GEO prison and refused access to his attorneys, which is what make-believe US Attorney Essayli did to prevent Carlitos Ricardo Parias from unpacking the problems with the claims of assault against him. Because — unlike Renee Good — Huerta survived, DOJ had to try to invent a criminal case out of Ribner’s own actions.

But, it appears that by August, after several delays in attempting to indict Huerta, the whole charade started falling apart. Ribner’s report (which, on top of the obvious retconning of his actions, did not match the documented timeline in a few other areas) and the absence of any crime was bad enough. But the witness stories didn’t match, even though there’s good reason to believe they were coordinated after the fact. In addition to claiming he noticed Huerta arrive in real time rather than after Ribner called him out, Crossen described Huerta push back, something not captured in video (and which Crossen may not have been able to see from where he stood). Carey Crook (the guy who first pushed Huerta), falsely claimed Huerta had splayed himself across the van in an X, and similarly invented a claim that Ribner had sprayed Huerta, rather than smother his face in pepper spray. The driver of the van, Brian Gonzales, didn’t remember seeing Huerta in a first interview, but in a follow-up the day before he would start a new permanent job at CBP, he did, though he disputed Crook’s claim that Huerta had splayed across the van grill.

Crossen explained that his video didn’t capture Huerta in front of the van because he started filming just after that. He said he did all this on his personal phone because his government phone wasn’t working that day (in addition to the motion to dismiss, Huerta is also demanding the Cellebrite metadata for the texts extracted from the personal phones both Ribner and Crossen used that day). He admitted that Ribner gave instructions on how to write up his countersurveillance report, but didn’t tell him what to say.

Ribner’s was the last interview from this period when DOJ was stalling the case, a week before a new case opening date possibly focused on Ribner. When asked to describe his actions, as problems with the arrest must have become evident, Ribner explained simply that the peaceful protesters were “vicious, horrible people.”

GS Ribner stated HUERTA and other protesters are “vicious, horrible people”.[In reference to a still photo of video 2774 at 0:03], GS Ribner identified HUERTA. He recalled telling HUERTA, “You better not block the cars”. He stated that HUERTA was not in the way of vehicles or personnel at this point.

Stephen Miller has told all Trump supporters, especially those who work at DHS, that people who support immigration are vicious, horrible people. And he gave them rules of engagement that invited assaults like this, assaults they simply bury in often-failed attempts to criminalize the victim.

It’s surprising it took seven months before someone Stephen Miller has defined as a vicious horrible person got killed.

Timeline

June 6: Arrest

9:00 AM: HSI task force officer (and Inglewood cop) Jeremy Crossen arrives under cover

9:20: Agents start executing search

9:57: Crossen interacts with Asian woman

10:26: Crossen interacts w/Hispanic protestor, claims he is monitoring the police

10:33: Crossen texts Ribner

11:07: Crossen sees pick-up without plates whose Hispanic driver films

11:19: Crossen describes a Hispanic woman with a neck gaiter; his report provides background on a Kids of Immigrants sweatshirt she wears; start time of alleged criminal conduct

11:25: A sedan enters the gate; after an agent instructs those filming it to step away, they do; Crossen texts Ribner,

 

11:31: A Hispanic woman whom Crossen IDs by name shows up, makes phone calls

11:36: Crossen describes a white woman by name, describes that she masked as the crowd grew

11:37: Crossen describes the Hispanic leader of ACCE Action, Council Member Jose Delgado, show up, make calls

11:49: Crossen claims he sees Huerta walk up

11:51: A white woman from Tenants Union starts yelling obscenities

11:53: Ribner instructs Crossen to focus on Huerta

11:54: Huerta and others sit in front of the gate

12:01 PM: Ribner leaves the property and assaults Huerta [note his report timeline goes haywire in here]

12:00-12:09: Crossen texts Ribner

12:15: Crossen claims van arrives (his description describe others who were in front of the van, then says Huerta also was)

12:15: Ribner calls 911 (claiming this is about pepper spray)

12:18: Crossen describes a scrimmage line

12:20-12:40: Discussions about Huerta’s attempt to call his attorney

12:30: LAFD responds; Huerta asks to be brought to the hospital; Crossen describes LAFD arrival this way:

At approximately 12:28 p.m., TFO Crossen observed a Los Angeles City Fire truck with activated emergency lights and loud audible siren, attempting to gain entry to the business, still being blocked by protestors, to render aid for HUERTA, inside the business, who had been exposed to OC Spray, during his arrest.

12:40: Ribner reports arrest to CACD US Attorney office

12:42: Ribner tells Crossen his government phone is out of battery, asks him to use his personal phone

12:47: Ribner admits he used pepper spray

1:05: Ribner speaks to USAO again

1:30: Huerta taken to hospital w/agent in car

2:45: Ribner asks Crossen for pictures of Huerta

Unmarked time: Mayor Bass shows up to hospital room; they ask her to leave (and she does)

9:12: Crossen sends last clip from videos to Ribner (the discovery turned over provides nowhere near the “4 hours” or “100 videos” that Crossen told Ribner, five hours earlier, that he had taken (though the defense did not include all the texts in their exhibit)

9:36: Ribner obtains warrant for Huerta’s phone

10:30: Huerta attorney turns over the phone

June 8: Huerta charged with felony conspiracy

June 9: Case opened

June 17: Date created for one photo provided in discovery

June 19: Initial incident report; Ribner would later (in his September 10 interview) admit he wrote the report from memory and simply did not “recall that he told HUERTA, ‘You are not impeding’. He does not know why he did not include that statement in his report and agrees that his statement could sound exculpatory.”

June 23: Countersurveillance report from Crossen

July 2: Second set of discovery

July 17: Third set of discovery

July 28: Fourth set of discovery (including agent texts)

August 20: USAO interviews Brian Gonzalez, who drove the van allegedly blocked

August 27: USAO interviews Carey Crook; he told AUSAs that, contrary to Ribner’s claim, Huerta did not assault him

August 27: USAO interviews Crossen

September 9: USAO reinterviews Gonzalez; he says he does not remember Huerta straddling the van, as Crooks claimed

September 10: USAO interviews Ribner

September 11: Gonzalez starts at a new job at CBP

September 17: Later case opening date, possibly focusing on the lying agents

October 17: Huerta charged with misdemeanor

November 5: Huerta’s attorneys ask AUSA to identify the obstructive conduct

December 19: AUSA finally provides vague description of conduct

A part of the video Jonathan Ross — the ICE agent who shot and killed Renee Good — took of the shooting has gotten little attention.

Before Renee’s wife Becca taunts Ross, “You want to come at us? You want to come at us? I say you go get some lunch, big boy,” and after she notes the plate of the vehicle would still be the same when ICE visits them later that day, Becca identifies herself as a US citizen and a “former fucking veteran, disabled veteran.”

If Becca is, indeed, a veteran, it would mean one veteran shot the spouse of another in a neighborhood of Minneapolis, where both lived.

Ross deployed with the Indiana National Guard to Iraq as a machine gunner.

Deployed to Iraq as a member of the Indiana National Guard from November 2004 to November 2005, Specialist Ross of the 138th Signal Battalion earned the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Good Conduct Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Medal and the Iraq Campaign Medal among others, according to the guard.

During his time in Iraq, Ross was a machine gunner on a combat logistical patrol team, court documents show.

Renee’s second husband and the father of her six year old son, Tim Macklin, was an Air Force veteran.

This not only was a conflict between authoritarianism and tolerance, but it appears to have been a conflict between American veterans.

That’s worthwhile background to this WaPo story, which catalogs which agencies shrunk in the first year of the Trump Administration and which have ballooned. The article shows that the Veterans Administration lost the most employees (the largest number through attrition), over 50,000 people.

That includes around 3,000 nurses (3% of the total) and 2,000 claims examiners (10% of the total).

Meanwhile, DHS ballooned in size, adding more than 6,000 ICE goons (reflecting a 30% increase) and almost 1,000 CBP officers.

Ross is not one of these new hires; he worked at CBP for eight years and has been working at ICE for ten years.

Republicans — and because this was done via Trump management, DOGE, and the Big Ugly Bill, with virtually no input from Democrats — took service away from veterans and instead hired a bunch of people to invade blue states instead.

Republicans — Stephen Miller — decided snatching grannies was more important than providing veterans medical care.

The American Prospect has been closely following the staffing woes at the VA — which is basically a bid to privatize much of it, including this recent story explaining why new staffing cuts will endanger mental heath care not just for veterans, but for the entire country.

In late November, a mental health leader at a major VA medical center learned about a directive issued to the 18 Veterans Health Administration (VHA) regional offices, known as VISNs (Veterans Integrated Service Networks). Department of Veterans Affairs’ leaders in Washington were imposing lower caps on employee positions nationwide. Directors of local VA medical centers and clinics had a month to decide which vacant positions to eliminate, and which job offers to rescind. None of these identified positions would be filled because they would be swept from organizational charts entirely. At his facility, 60 percent of the unfilled positions would be lost, including 23 in mental health.

“The past nine months have been very challenging,” the mental health leader told the Prospect. “But this is really going to impact patient care.” He also worried about the effect of cuts on the VA’s critical teaching mission. “The VA trains 50 percent of psychologists in the country,” he said. “Now, we may not have enough staff to supervise trainees.” In the midst of a national mental health professional shortage, reducing VA training capacity ultimately impacts access to mental health care for both veterans and nonveterans alike.

Again, Donald Trump is taking services away from veterans, and then hiring them to invade blue cities as if they were Fallujah.

The results were all too predictable.

No one could have anticipated . . . 

The United States has urged its citizens to leave Venezuela immediately amid reports that armed paramilitaries are trying to track down US citizens, one week after the capture of the South American country’s president, Nicolás Maduro.

In a security alert sent out on Saturday, the state department said there were reports of armed members of pro-regime militias, known as colectivos, setting up roadblocks and searching vehicles for evidence that the occupants were US citizens or supporters of the country.

“US citizens in Venezuela should remain vigilant and exercise caution when traveling by road,” the alert added, urging citizens to depart immediately now that some international flights from Venezuela have restarted.

You don’t say.

The US closed its embassy in Venezuela back in 2019, so it’s not like this kind of warning is entirely new. But this ought to be a flashing red light and blaring siren to all who think that after the abduction of Maduro, everything is just peachy-keen for American oil companies to send hundreds of civilian employees into the country to start extracting oil.

I await Trump’s triumphant visit to Venezuela to receive the accolades of a grateful Central American nation.

 

 

Listen on Spotify (transcripts available)

Listen on Apple (transcripts available)

Update: We’re going to do some house cleaning around here, with a refresh of the site in the next bit. One thing I’m trying to do is put up resource pages on particular topics, which will be available from the front page. You’ve seen me do this with the Hunter Biden and Jim Comey cases, as well as DOGE debunkings. Some will be more formal, some will serve to capture links and try to understand what we’re seeing.

Have a look!

Trump Corruption

Stephen Miller resources

Immigration resources

Remember how I predicted that the inclusion, based on very thin allegations including Tren de Aragua’s leader, Hector Rusthenenford Guerrero Flores, in Nicolás Maduro’s superseding indictment, that Stephen Miller would use the probable cause finding to renew his bid for Alien Enemies Act deportations?

The Tren de Aragua is likewise thin. In the 2020 indictment, two FARC leaders were included as co-conspirators, but that reflected a sustained relationship with Maduro as laid out in the overt acts. The TdA inclusion here relies on a similar move, including its leader, Hector Ruthsenford Guerrero Flores as a co-conspirator. But his inclusion relies on two overt acts that don’t involve Maduro: Guerrero’s actual trafficking with someone not alleged to be part of this conspiracy, and comments made in a Venezuelan prison in 2019. (These may be the comments that US intelligence services have deemed to be unreliable.)

f. Between approximately 2006 and 2008, HECTOR RUSTHENFORD GUERRERO FLORES, a/k/a “Nifio Guerrero,” the defendant, worked with one of the largest drug traffickers in Venezuela, Walid Makled. Members of the Venezuelan regime helped protect Makled’s cocaine shipments that were transported from San Fernando de Apure, Venezuela, to Valencia, Venezuela, and were then sent by plane from the Valencia international airport to Mexico and other locations in Central America for eventual distribution to the United States. Between in or about 2008 and in or about 2009, GUERRERO FLORES also provided another major Venezuelan drug trafficker with protection for cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, including by providing armed men who carried, among other automatic weapons, AK47s, MP5s, and AR-15s, as well as grenades. At times, GUERRERO FLORES personally accompanied large cocaine loads as they were guarded by the teams of armed men, en route to airports or airstrips for transport north and eventual distribution to the United States. GUERRERO FLORES was paid a fee per kilogram of cocaine transported or received and he sometimes received an interest in portions of these massive cocaine shipments in lieu of payment. The traffickers that GUERRERO FLORES worked with moved thousands of kilograms per shipment, multiple times per month, resulting in the distribution of hundreds of tons of cocaine to the United States. In or about 2009, Makled was charged with narcotics offenses in this District and is a fugitive.

[snip]

o. In or about 2019, TdA’s leader, GUERRERO FLORES, discussed drug trafficking with an individual he understood to be working with the Venezuelan regime. Over multiple calls, GUERRERO FLORES offered to provide escort services for drug loads, explaining that GUERRERO FLORES and TdA had control of the coastlines of Venezuela’s Aragua State. GUERRERO FLORES, speaking from TdA’s base of operations in Tocor6n Prison, explained that TdA could handle the logistics of every aspect of the drug trade, including the use of storage compartments that GUERRERO FLORES called “cradles” located on a beach in Aragua State. In doing so, GUERRERO FLORES confirmed TdA’s ability to protect over one ton of cocaine.

That is, neither is TdA necessary to substantiate the narco-trafficking charges, which are well-substantiated based on protection of FARC, nor is the substance of TdA’s inclusion all that convincing.

At all.

But no doubt Stephen Miller will use this — a grand jury finding probable cause tying TdA to Maduro — to attempt to renew his Alien Enemies Act deportations.

They’re so fucking predictable. (This is the appeal of one of the AEA cases to the Fifth Circuit.)

Appellees respectfully submit this letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) to advise the Court of an indictment against co-conspirators Nicholas Maduro, the leader of Tren De Aragua (“TdA”) Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, and several of Maduro’s family members and high-ranking officials. Ex. A. Among other charges, Maduro and his high-ranking officials are alleged to have “worked directly with” several “narco-terrorist organizations” to funnel deadly drugs into the United States, including “TdA, which controls a criminal network able to assist with the transportation of cocaine within Venezuela and on the Venezuelan coast.” Id. ¶¶ 20, 24.

The indictment reinforces the Proclamation’s findings that the Maduro Regime and TdA have formed a “hybrid criminal state” directed by the Regime. This significant development further refutes Petitioners’ argument that the Government no longer treats TdA as entwined with the Maduro Regime. Indeed, in announcing the apprehension and indictment of Maduro, the President made clear that Maduro has “waged a ceaseless campaign of violence, terror, and subversion against the United States of America, threatening not only our people, but the stability of the entire region.” Ex. B at 8:07-8:27. In particular, “Maduro sent savage and murderous gangs, including the bloodthirsty prison gang, Tren de Aragua, to terrorize American communities nationwide” through murder and taking “over apartment complexes.” Id. at 8:27-9:24. The President emphasized that “Tren de Aragua… [was] sent by Maduro to terrorize our people,” providing examples of Americans victimized by their terror campaign. Id. at 11:41-12:51. These new developments underscore the Maduro Regime’s control over TdA and TdA’s violent invasion or predatory incursion on American soil. As a result, it is even clearer that the President’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act was part of a high-level national security mission that exists outside the realm of judicial interference.

Mind you, ACLU’s Lee Gelernt makes mincemeat of this ploy in response.

The government’s January 5 letter contends that Maduro’s indictment shows that he and TdA were intertwined. But the indictment’s allegations cannot erase the administration’s own repeated assertions that the United States was in a non-international armed conflict with TdA to justify its boat strikes—not a conflict with a “foreign nation or government” as required by the AEA. Pet’rs’ En Banc Br. 8, 31–41. At a minimum, the conflicting assertions undermine the request for deference.

Moreover, the indictment confirms that, even in the government’s view, Maduro’s alleged actions were not military, but rather criminal offenses properly handled through the justice system. Indeed, the administration stated that the Venezuelan operation was a “law enforcement” operation. Appellees’ 28(j) Letter, Ex. B at 38:58–39:57.

The government also fails to address why the Proclamation’s assertions are not fatally undermined by Maduro’s ouster given that the Proclamation specifically says that “Maduro” and the “Maduro regime”—not Venezuela as a “foreign nation”—direct TdA. While the Proclamation’s assertions never justified the claim that Maduro directed TdA (a claim refuted by 17 of 18 national security agencies1 ), there is now no longer anything to defer to given that Maduro is in a U.S. jail. Indeed, President Trump himself has declared that Maduro’s capture means that “[t]here will no longer be threats” to Americans from Venezuela or TdA. Id. at 11:41– 12:24.

Finally, the indictment undercuts the Proclamation’s factual assertion that “Cártel de los Soles” is a “narcoterrorism enterprise” central to enlisting TdA to send drugs as a “weapon” against the United States. The indictment now describes Cártel de los Soles as simply a loose “patronage system” that is part of “a culture of corruption” for elites’ personal enrichment—not a cartel at all. Appellees’ 28(j) Letter, Ex. A at 8; see Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Drops Claim That Venezuela’s ‘Cartel de los Soles’ Is an Actual Group, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/05/us/trump-venezueladrug-cartel-de-los-soles.html.

And that was yesterday. That same day, the Senate passed Tim Kaine’s War Powers Resolution prohibiting Trump from invading further without approval from Congress, with Todd Young, Lisa Murkowski, Susan Collins, Rand Paul, and Josh Hawley’s support.

While not yet binding (and as Trump noted in his squealed response, Lindsey Graham is going to try to reverse this, and the House would have to pass it too), the WPR will make it harder for even the Fifth Circuit to sustain Trump’s claims that this is an invasion.

Nevertheless, it didn’t stop Kristi Noem to use TdA as her excuse for the second DHS shooting this week, this of two people in Oregon.

It’s all just lies on top of lies, and until Appellate judges start calling Trump’s team on it, entire lives will be upended or ended based on the lies Stephen Miller invents in his feverish nightmares of power.

Remember the term “sanewashing,” which Parker Malloy used to describe how the press minimizes Trump’s ramblings to describe them as something reasonable to people who don’t see them personally?

Four years ago, in an article for Media Matters for America, I warned that journalists were sanitizing Donald Trump’s incoherent ramblings to make them more palatable for the average voter. The general practice went like this: The press would take something Trump said or did—for instance, using a visit to the Centers for Disease Control to ask about Fox News’s ratings, insult then–Washington Governor Jay Inslee, rant about his attempt to extort Ukraine into digging up dirt on Joe Biden, and downplay the rising number of Covid-19 cases in the U.S.—and write them up as The New York Times did: “Trump Says ‘People Have to Remain Calm’ Amid Coronavirus Outbreak.” This had the effect of making it seem like Trump’s words and actions seemed cogent and sensible for the vast majority of Americans who didn’t happen to watch his rant live.

[snip]

This “sanewashing” of Trump’s statements isn’t just poor journalism; it’s a form of misinformation that poses a threat to democracy. By continually reframing Trump’s incoherent and often dangerous rhetoric as conventional political discourse, major news outlets are failing in their duty to inform the public and are instead providing cover for increasingly erratic behavior from a former—and potentially future—president.

The consequences of this journalistic malpractice extend far beyond misleading headlines. By laundering Trump’s words in this fashion, the media is actively participating in the erosion of our shared reality.

These three paragraphs about why Donald Trump wants to take over Greenland when the US already has a base there, the rights to establish more bases, the ability to mine its minerals really exist in NYT’s third milking of their interview with Donald Trump:

“Ownership is very important,” Mr. Trump said as he discussed, with a real estate mogul’s eye, the landmass of Greenland — three times the size of Texas but with a population of less than 60,000. He seemed to dismiss the value of having Greenland under the control of a close NATO ally.

When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

The conversation made clear that in Mr. Trump’s view, sovereignty and national borders are less important than the singular role the United States plays as the protector of the West.

First of all, NYT interjected that “real estate mogul’s” comment; I assure you, Trump is not going to start building hotels in Greenland.

But more … uh … insane still, after Trump describes contemplating blowing up the alliance that has been the centerpiece of American national security since World War II out of a psychological need to own other people and other countries, nothing more, the NYT describes it to be a comment about Trump’s imagination that he is “the protector of the West.”

You’re both fucking insane! Donald Trump, for contemplating making the US and Europe less safe because of his own psychological inadequacies that drive him to covet big empty spaces on a map, and the NYT for describing it as the exact opposite of what it is, not Donald Trump needing to tend to Donald Trump’s increasing fragile psyche, but instead as something that protects the West rather than destroys the very concept of it.

This is how access journalism works. You give an outlet that spent the entirety of the Biden Administration bitching that they didn’t get any sitdown interviews with the President two hours to watch the President ramble incoherently, and in return for that access — the latest of a series of stories screaming, look at us!! Donald Trump takes our calls and tells us nothing!! — you describe the most dangerous kind of malignant Narcissism as the opposite of what it is.

The headline and opening paragraphs of a 1,400-word story basically reporting that Trump had sat for the interview Joe Biden had denied the NYT (okay, they didn’t mention the latter bit) focus on Trump’s plan to run Venezuela’s oil industry indefinitely.

Trump Says U.S. Oversight of Venezuela Could Last for Years

President Trump said on Wednesday evening that he expected the United States would be running Venezuela and extracting oil from its huge reserves for years, and insisted that the interim government of the country — all former loyalists to the now-imprisoned Nicolás Maduro — is “giving us everything that we feel is necessary.”

“Only time will tell,” he said, when asked how long the administration will demand direct oversight of the South American nation, with the hovering threat of American military action from an armada just off shore.

“We will rebuild it in a very profitable way,” Mr. Trump said during a nearly two-hour interview. “We’re going to be using oil, and we’re going to be taking oil. We’re getting oil prices down, and we’re going to be giving money to Venezuela, which they desperately need.”

[snip]

During the wide-ranging interview with The New York Times, Mr. Trump did not give a precise time range for how long the United States would remain Venezuela’s political overlord. Would it be three months? Six months? A year? Longer?

“I would say much longer,” the president replied.

That he said that is surely news. And while I assume David Sanger will do a follow-up story that might explain this, NYT did not here.

The headline gives Trump something he badly needs — false assurances to oil companies that have been disabusing Trump of his insane notions that oil will pay for a Venezuela invasion that the US would stick around to make investments worthwhile.

But it doesn’t get into all the problems with Trump’s rapidly moving attempt to turn this into a win: even with that much longer security guarantee, it’s not at all clear this will work.

It started 10 days before the invasion, when Trump told oil companies they had to invest now to get reimbursed for nationalizations in the past.

Administration officials have told oil executives in recent weeks that if they want compensation for their rigs, pipelines and other seized property, then they must be prepared to go back into Venezuela now and invest heavily in reviving its shattered petroleum industry, two people familiar with the administration’s outreach told POLITICO on Saturday. The outlook for Venezuela’s shattered oil infrastructure is one of the major questions following the U.S. military action that captured leader Nicolás Maduro.

But people in the industry said the administration’s message has left them still leery about the difficulty of rebuilding decayed oil fields in a country where it’s not even clear who will lead the country for the foreseeable future.

“They’re saying, ‘you gotta go in if you want to play and get reimbursed,’” said one industry official familiar with the conversations.

The offer has been on the table for the last 10 days, the person said. “But the infrastructure currently there is so dilapidated that no one at these companies can adequately assess what is needed to make it operable.”

Apparently, Trump didn’t heed these warnings, and in the aftermath of the invasion he has made grandiose promises that oil would pay for the invasion.

To be fair, his first announcement — that “the Interim Authorities in Venezuela” had agreed to give the United States (or perhaps Trump personally)  between 30 and 50 MILLION Barrels of High Quality, Sanctioned Oil” which would “be sold at its Market Price, and that money will be controlled by me, as President of the United States of America, to ensure it is used to benefit the people of Venezuela and the United States!” may well be an effort to pay for the costs of the invasion.

It’s not at all clear a $2 billion payment would even do that.

DOD has been conducting periodic murderboat strikes every several days, each of which surely costs millions of dollars.

One hellfire missile, for example, typically costs about $150,000, and reaper drones cost around $3,500 per hour to fly. An F-35 costs around $40,000 per hour to fly. The cost per flight hour of an AC-130J gunship is not public but its predecessor, the AC-130U, which was phased out in 2019, cost over $40,000 per hour to fly.

The Gerald Ford has been in the Caribbean since November 16, which works out to be about $424 million (though there were already ships there). One of the $50 million Chinooks used in the attack was badly damaged. Similarly, the Delta Force lead was seriously injured, so taxpayers are paying his recovery and possibly his retirement. There were 150 aircraft used in the attack.

It was a tremendously successful attack.

It wasn’t cheap.

But within days of promising that oil would pay for his new colony, outlets started reporting that taxpayers might have to subsidize that effort.

Donald Trump has suggested US taxpayers could reimburse energy companies for repairing Venezuelan infrastructure for extracting and shipping oil.

Trump acknowledged that “a lot of money” would need to be spent to increase oil production in Venezuela after US forces ousted its leader, Nicolás Maduro, but suggested his government could pay oil companies to do the work.

“A tremendous amount of money will have to be spent and the oil companies will spend it, and then they’ll get reimbursed by us or through revenue,” the president said.

The reasons why are clear: even assuming Venezuela remains stable long enough to develop investments (the promise Trump is floating to the NYT), the cost of refining Venezuelan oil is just too high, particularly given current prices.

The energy-intensive upgrading process also increases the carbon footprint of these heavy grades, which could push up costs further if more governments start taxing emissions or raising existing levies.

Breakeven costs for key grades in the Orinoco belt already average more than $80 a barrel, according to estimates by consultancy Wood Mackenzie. That places Venezuelan oil at the higher end of the global cost scale for new production. By comparison, heavy oil produced in Canada has an average breakeven cost of around $55 a barrel.

Exxon’s breakeven target for its global oil production by 2030 is $30 a barrel, driven by low-cost fields in Guyana and the U.S. Permian shale basin. Chevron has a similar target, while Conoco has a long-term plan to generate free cash flow even if oil prices fall to $35 a barrel. Oil , currently trades at around $60.

While energy boards have increasingly supported greater exploration in recent years, they are insisting that this be done with spending discipline in mind in the face of rising global supplies and uncertainty over the energy transition.

Here’s a table from Bloomberg that shows that Venezuela, even ignoring the potential instability, is just not a competitive investment.

The rest of the article explains what better alternatives the majors are investing in.

Trump seems not to understand this math (or he’s engaged in another con job), because he keeps bragging about the price of oil coming down which … yeah, that’s the point. That’s precisely why imagining you’re going to have willful takers for your offer to invest in expensive-to-refine Venezuelan oil at today’s prices is a pipe dream.

Thus the bribes … er, subsidies, that American taxpayers will end up paying. On top of any deployment, taxpayers will bribe oil companies.

So it doesn’t make sense for the oil companies.

But it also doesn’t make sense for Venezuelans, because the first thing Trump’s backers will demand is that Venezuela pay off years of debt.

Analysts estimate Venezuela now owes $150-$170 billion and JP Morgan calculates that $102 billion of that is in the form of bonds, while bilateral debt to China totals $13-$15 billion.
Venezuela has not reported debt figures for around a decade and state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has in the meantime struck complex oil-backed debt deals with China.

Despite Washington’s ousting of Maduro, the main hurdles to a debt restructuring remain in place.

U.S. sanctions — including against Venezuela’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez – mean that even sitting down for creditor talks could breach U.S. Treasury Department curbs.

[snip]

“The U.S. administration has an interest in moving the restructuring forward, because without that restructuring, these oil companies will not be participating and will not be investing anything,” said Ed Al-Hussainy of Columbia Threadneedle Investments, which has Venezuelan bond exposure.

“The possibility of a U.S. government financial line of credit or a guarantee or a backstop of some sort is going to be music to the ears of investors,” the portfolio manager added.

Lee Robinson, founder of Altana Wealth which also holds Venezuelan bonds, said there was enough at stake for the U.S. itself to put a loan in place to kickstart Venezuela’s recovery.
JP Morgan said a recognition of Rodriguez’s new government by the Trump administration would open many questions.

“Should the Fund be bypassed in favour of a faster-track, oil-based bilateral program, we could be going down the road of a faster-track, less orthodox bond restructuring than what we have seen in the years since the pandemic and the advent of the Common Framework,” JP Morgan said.

Sounds like the taxpayers will be on the hook for the debt restructuring, just like the bailout to keep “libertarian” Javier Milei in office.

Moe Tkacik has written a bunch on the extraction involved here, as in this November story on Juan Guaidó’s role in it, during the last time Trump tried to milk Venezuela, making it easier for Paul Singer to acquire CITGO.

On January 23, 2019, when Guaidó proclaimed himself the “interim president” of an incredulous Venezuela, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the Trump administration would recognize Guaidó as the Bolivarian Republic’s genuine leader, and unveiled a suite of tough new sanctions on PDVSA, pitched as a bid to force Maduro to step down. The whole thing seemed like a joke, a throwback to the days when our foreign-policy establishment insisted a drug-trafficking warlord on an island of six million was the “real” leader of the world’s most populous country—though at least most Chinese knew who Chiang Kai-shek was when he fled to Taiwan in 1949 to preside over what the United Nations insisted on calling the “Republic of China.” Only the Miami Herald noted an unusual provision of the new arrangement, explained by then-Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, who told the newspaper “that if Guaidó succeeds in forming a government, the money” from international sales of Venezuelan oil that he was freezing under the new sanctions regime “would go to him.” On Twitter, Guaidó promised this new arrangement would “prevent the looting from continuing.”

[snip]

Venezuela, PDVSA, and Citgo were legally separate entities. But in mid-February, Guaidó named entirely new slates of board members to PDVSA, its U.S. holding company, and Citgo, a move Rodríguez knew would strengthen Crystallex’s case. That same week, the glass manufacturer Owens-Illinois, which had been awarded a half-billion-dollar arbitration judgment over two Coke bottle factories Chávez had expropriated in 2010, sued Citgo on the basis that it was an “alter ego” of the state. Owens-Illinois had expert witness assistance from none other than José Ignacio Hernández, whom Guaidó had just named the attorney general of the shadow government.

That is, Trump proposes to fix the problem he, in significant part, caused in his first term.

Plus, until you fix Venezuela’s corruption problem — which Trump has pointedly declined to do in retaining Delcy Rodríguez, partly because he’s relying on Maduro’s suppression regime to offer stability to oil companies, partly because he affirmatively loves corruption — then the Venezuelan people aren’t going to see anything, even while Trump is attempting to oust China’s slightly more favorable float.

And all this is happening on a time frame — big investments and risks on the front end, very long timetable for returns to anyone — that I imagine China is taking some solace about being surprised, if it was surprised, by looking at how Trump’s obsession with becoming a petro-autocrat leaves it untouched to dominate renewables for the foreseeable future, renewables that will continue to put pressure on oil prices in a way that Trump seems not to understand.

And all that assumes Trump, or Dalcy Rodríguez, can ensure stability, something for which there’s no evidence. All that assumes that no one decides to make a target of the resources Trump has put in the middle of an increasingly volatile Caribbean.

Trump is literally making up Colonialism 2.0 on the fly. And the serially bankrupt businessman appears to be doing funny math at every turn.

So yeah, Trump is making expansive claims to the NYT. But they are part of an elaborate con job to prevent this Venezuela adventure from backfiring in a spectacular way.

I started my day intending to write about the details surrounding SEIU California President David Heurta’s assault in June revealed in a motion to dismiss and a motion to compel discovery filed yesterday. And I’ve been meaning to do a post on what much coverage of the dismissal of the case against Carlitos Ricardo Parias, a TikToker ICE shot on October 21, has not said: Basically DOJ avoided giving Parias due process by stashing him in a GEO detention facility and preventing his criminal defense attorneys any access, effectively escaping accountability for the shooting that way.

But later in the day, a DHS officer shot and killed an ICE observer, Renee Good, in Minneapolis. Both the Star Tribune and MPR have a running threads of developments.

Here’s a tracker of all the people ICE have shot, including a guy in San Diego shot after he shot his own gun to celebrate the New Year only to have an off-duty ICE officer kill him.

And so instead I’m going to float a suspicion I’ve been nursing.

In Greg Bovino’s deposition for the Chicago Book Club lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel Locke Bowman asked whether Kristi Noem gave him direction on the use of force. She does not.

Q Do you report to Secretary Noem to receive direction as to the use of force in the course of Operation Midway Blitz?

A Are you asking if — if she gives me driection —

Q Yes, sir.

A –to use of force?

Q Yes. If she gives you direction as to how and when to employ force?

A No.

But when Bowman asked Bovino if he had spoken to Stephen Miller about use of force, the DOJ lawyer, Sarmad Khojasteh, instructed him not to answer.

Q All right. How about Mr. Miller, have you spoken with Mr. Miller on the subject of employment of force and the issues of crowd control that you were facing in Operation Midway Blitz?

Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the extent that it — doing so would implicate executive privilege.

Q Okay. So there has been an invocation of privilege, and you are not answering the question based on that invocation, correct, sir?

A That’s correct.

Q I will ask the same question generally. Other than the two individuals I have mentioned, have you spoken with any of your superiors in the executive branch with respect to the issue of crowd control and the application of force in the course of Operation Midway Blitz?

Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. Lacks foundation. Vague as to superiors in the executive branch.

Q I’ll stand on the question. Could you answer, please?

A Sir, could you be more specific, please?

Q In what respect?

A Who in the executive branch?

Q I’m asking anyone in the executive branch.

Mr. Khojasteh: Then I’m — if you’re going to be that vague about it, Counsel, I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the — that to the extent that doing so would reveal executive communications.

Q All right. Without revealing executive communications, and my question didn’t ask for the revelation of communications, can you answer, please?

A Based on the advice of my lawyer, no.

Q I’m not sure — was there an instruction not to answer as to the last question that I propounded?

Mr. Khojasteh: I’m not even sure I understood the last question you propounded.

Q Well, so there was no instruction?

Mr. Khojasteh: Well, I think — I thought it was the same question that I had —

Q Okay.

Mr. Khojasteh: — given the instructions.

Bovino: That’s what I thought. That’s the way I thought.

Q. Okay. All right. So is it true, with respect to the application of force and crowd control, that you take your orders from the executive branch, whether that’s President Trump or Secretary Noem?

Mr. Khojasteh: Object to form. Lacks foundation. Asked and answered.

Bovino: Can you repeat that, please?

Q Yes. Is it true, with respect to the application of force and the matter of crowd control during the course of Operation Midway Blitz, that you take your orders from the executive branch, whether that’s President Trump or Secretary Noem?

Mr. Khojasteh: I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the extent that doing so would reveal communications between he and the President.

Q I didn’t ask to reveal communications. I asked if what I just read is a true statement.

Mr. Khojasteh: Yeah, but embedded in your question is the substance of the communication you’re asking, right?

Q This calls for a yes or no. Can you answer it, yes or no?

Mr. Khojasteh: I’m going to instruct you not to answer as with — as it relates to communications with President Trump or anyone in the White House.

Bowman also noted that in a TV appearance, Bovino said he took his instructions from the Executive Branch, whether Trump or Kristi Noem.

The implication is fairly clear: That Stephen Miller is the one instructing him on use of force.

Greg Bovino was present for today’s shooting.

In the wake of the shooting, Tricia McLaughlin, Kristi Noem, Stephen Miller, and Donald Trump all have told vicious lies about the shooting; their lies aren’t even consistent with each other, much less the video.

The shooting comes in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling that Trump can’t deploy the National Guard to cities unless he has first resorted to active duty troops.

It’s time to ask whether Stephen Miller ordered Greg Bovino to shoot those who document DHS’ invasions.

Laura Jedeed wonders whether Trump is testing out a new kind of colonialism, where you basically issued orders to the corrupt illegitimate authorities, rather than installing the opposition.

Trump and Rubio’s talking points combine into a message intended not for the people of America, but for the heads of state in Cuba, Columbia, [sic] and worldwide. The message itself is simple, elegant, and ugly: do exactly what we say or America will destroy you—not your country, or your economy, or your people, but you, personally. This strategy doesn’t just let America “run” Venezuela. It allows this administration to “run” any country unable to attack us on our home turf: extract their resources, dictate their domestic policy, force their leaders to resign. All by credibly threatening extreme personal violence against any head of state who pushes back.

Credit where credit is due: it’s an entirely new approach to colonialism. Here’s how it’s worked since Britain perfected the art: you invade the country, then place the opposition party in power. That party requires your support to maintain control (if they had enough force to do it themselves they’d already be in charge). In exchange for military backup, their leader will do anything you ask.

Trump, on the other hand, has endorsed Maduro’s Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez, allegedly because the opposition party “doesn’t have the support within, or the respect within the country.” This assertion is aggressive nonsense. Opposition party weakness is a feature, not a bug, for the reasons stated above. It’s also patently untrue in this case. Election monitors from several countries agree that candidate Edmundo González Urrutia beat Maduro in a landslide two years ago by as much as 51 percent. Trump and his allies know this—they’ve used Maduro’s election theft to justify invasion. It’s kind of perfect: the party doesn’t have the power to gain power by themselves, but they’re popular enough to minimize the danger of revolt. It’s the dream situation—so why isn’t the Trump administration going for it?

Most people seem to think Trump’s endorsement of the unpopular and hostile Rodríguez stems from bitterness towards María Corina Machado, the opposition party leader who received the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump wanted so badly last year. Machado seems to think so too; she’s offered to give the prize to Trump and spent ten minutes abasing herself before the Peace President on Hannity yesterday. It won’t help. Trump is petty to the core, it’s true, but Stephen Miller and the other ghouls actually running this country would never set the entire colonial playbook on fire just to appease some old queen’s ego.

The real reason, I suspect, is this: leaving Rodríguez in charge is the only move that does not require a full-scale invasion.

Unlike Machado, Rodríguez possesses a military and police force capable of holding Venezuela together. Under the old model, that force would have threatened our hegemony, but under Colonialism 2.0, she has a strong incentive to do exactly as she’s told regardless; she is, after all, one surgical strike away from losing her freedom or possibly her life. As long as she doesn’t call Trump’s bluff or get coup’d herself, it’s foolproof.

[snip]

And the administration was right: Rodríguez is already rolling over. “We consider it a priority to move towards a balanced and respectful relationship between the US and Venezuela,” she wrote on Telegram late Sunday. “We extend an invitation to the US government to work together on an agenda for cooperation that is aimed towards shared development.” So far, so good.

That’s certainly what Trump is trying to do.

But it’s wildly premature to assess whether it’ll work.

Before I explain how it may backfire, let me observe that this plan is precisely the same plan Trump (Stephen Miller, really) is attempting with the US.

What Trump plans for Colombia is little different than what he succeeded in doing with Columbia University: Make demands on the elected leader, extract tribute, change the rules to benefit the authoritarian state. Whether it will work long term has yet to be seen, but the lesson of New College in Florida shows where things may head in the medium term: with dramatically increased costs and noticeably decreased utility. Once DeSantis is out of power, the effort is likely to be abandoned, turning New College into a bigger shell than it is already is. Columbia might take longer to collapse, unless Stephen Miller doubles down on his demands.

Now consider what makes Venezuela (or Colombia) different from Columbia, starting with the guns, guns which might come from at least three different places.

First, there are Russia, China, and some other Venezuelan patron states that are under assault as well. Trump has ordered Venezuela to expel them, stop doing business with them, and sell oil only to the US.

The Trump administration has told Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez that the regime must meet the White House’s demands before being allowed to pump more oil, according to three people familiar with the administration’s plan.

First, the country must kick out China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and sever economic ties, the sources said. Second, Venezuela must agree to partner exclusively with the U.S. on oil production and favor America when selling heavy crude oil, they added.

According to one person, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in a private briefing on Monday that he believes the U.S. can force Venezuela’s hand because its existing oil tankers are full. Rubio also told lawmakers that the U.S. estimates that Caracas has only a couple of weeks before it will become financially insolvent without the sale of its oil reserves.

As we speak, the Trump Administration is carrying out a replay of the OJ White Bronco chase, but with an empty oil tanker headed for Russia.

Russia has sent a submarine and other naval assets to escort an empty, rusting oil tanker that has become a new flashpoint in U.S.-Russia relations, according to a U.S. official.

The tanker, formerly known as the Bella 1, has been trying to evade the U.S. blockade of sanctioned oil tankers near Venezuela for more than two weeks. The vessel failed to dock in Venezuela and load with oil. Although the ship is empty, the U.S. Coast Guard has pursued it into the Atlantic in a bid to crack down on a fleet of tankers that ferry illicit oil around the world, including black-market oil sold by Russia.

The vessel’s crew repelled an effort by the U.S. to board the vessel in December and steamed into the Atlantic. As the Coast Guard followed it, the crew sloppily painted a Russian flag on its side, changed its name to the Marinera and switched its registration to Russia.

Russia has been concerned by U.S. seizures of tankers that ferry its illicit oil around the world and power its economy, and it has made the unusual move of allowing the tanker to register in Russia without an inspection or other formalities, experts say.

Update: The US has now seized the tanker.

Will this lead to some kind of direct conflict? I have no fucking clue and neither do you, because both Trump and Putin are fucking nuts. If Trump were rational, he’d retaliate not with direct confrontation in the North Sea, but by arming Ukraine and giving them the green light to up its attacks on Russia, but he’s not rational. Russia’s economy is actually close to collapse, and it wouldn’t take much to get it there. Russia, of course, has other means it might use to retaliate against Trump.

We shall see.

China is another matter though. China not only is rational, but China kicked the shit out of Trump in his last attempt to demand obeisance, the tariffs. Trump thought he could achieve with tariffs what he is trying to achieve with Venezuela: obeisance and personal tribute. Not only have all the tariffs harmed the US, spiking small business bankruptcies and inflation (and in the process making Trump’s political support far weaker), but China used its near-monopoly on rare earths and ability to replace US soybeans to bring Trump to his knees instead.

In fact, the Venezuelan coup might be partly a response to China’s success at wielding the rare earth weapon. While there’s much I disagree with in it, this post argues the Venezuela invasion was not about oil, but about the rare earth China currently extracts.

Investigative reporting documented Chinese buyers operating directly at mining sites in Bolívar state. The Venezuelan government established official collection centers in Los Pijiguaos and Morichalito in 2023 specifically for cassiterite, coltan, nickel, rhodium, and titanium. The Maduro regime designated these as strategic resources for commercialization, meaning state control over extraction and export, with Chinese buyers integrated into official operations from the start.

The supply chain from Venezuelan mines to Chinese refineries operates through both formal and informal channels, with Chinese buyers exercising operational control at the extraction source. Minerals extracted in the Orinoco Arc move by river and air transport to Colombian border towns, then to Bogotá for smelting into refined bars. These materials are relabeled under incorrect tariff codes, transforming raw ore into processed ferro-tantalum or other classifications that obscure origin. Final export occurs through Colombian ports at Santa Marta and Buenaventura, destined for Chinese processing facilities.

Once Venezuelan minerals blend with Colombian or Brazilian ore in these intermediary steps, tracing origin becomes effectively impossible. This laundering mechanism allows Venezuelan minerals to enter legitimate global supply chains, including those feeding US defense contractors. The result is Pentagon weapons systems potentially incorporating materials extracted under Chinese buyer supervision in Venezuelan territory, then processed in Chinese refineries controlled by Beijing.

Chinese buyers do not operate at arm’s length through market transactions. They coordinate directly at the mining sites with both Colombian guerrilla groups (ELN, FARC dissidents) who control physical security and Venezuelan state security (SEBIN) who facilitate transport using official government vehicles. One miner described seeing Chinese operatives and ELN commanders “eating together, buying material together, and getting off the helicopter together.” This is not commercial activity. This is integrated operational control where Chinese buyers work directly with armed groups and state officials to extract strategic minerals.

Trump doesn’t need — indeed, the oil companies probably don’t want — Venezuela’s oil, at least not in the short term.

He does need rare earth deposits (which is also the stated purpose of usurping Greenlands).

It took us some months to understand how China responded to Trump’s threat of tariffs. It took less time to recognize China’s advance preparation for them (based on Trump’s trade war from the first term).

A lot of the coverage of the coup views it as a profound humiliation for China, not least because China’s Latin American envoy met with Nicolás Maduro the day before the coup. That didn’t stop China (and Russia and Iran) from attending Rodríguez’ signing in, so there’s a distinct possibility they’re in at least as close coordination with Rodríguez right now as Marco Rubio.

But the most belligerent thing — the thing people expect — is that China will take Taiwan, as it was practicing to do even as Trump had a fifth of deployed assets in the Caribbean preparing to invade.

With all the attention on Venezuela, there has been too little attention on vacuums created with this extended deployment off the coast of Venezuela (the most immediate of which is probably in the Middle East). But it is clear that Trump keeps launching little wars with resources most of Congress believes should be used to counter China’s expansionary plans.

But as China showed with the tariffs, they likely have ways to respond that are less direct and at least as devastating.

But China and Russia aren’t the only ones who have guns here.

So does, just as one example, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who has been indicted in SDNY alongside Maduro since 2020. Reuters describes that the US already threatened Cabello.

In the meantime, they have communicated to Cabello via intermediaries that if he is defiant, he could face a similar fate to Maduro, the authoritarian leader captured in a U.S. raid on Saturday and whisked away to New York to face prosecution on “narco-terrorism” charges, or could see his life in danger, the source said.

But taking out Cabello could be risky, possibly motivating pro-government motorcycle groups, known as colectivos, to take to the streets, unleashing the chaos Washington wants to avoid. Their reaction may depend on whether they feel protected by other officials, however.

In one of her first decisions as acting president, Rodríguez appointed General Gustavo González López as new head of the Presidential Honor Guard and the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM), state TV said late on Tuesday.

González López, who has been sanctioned by the U.S. and EU along with at least half a dozen other high-ranking officials for rights violations and corruption, served as Venezuela’s intelligence director until mid-2024, when he was replaced by Maduro in a reshuffle of his cabinet and security team.

Later that year, he began working with Rodríguez as head of strategic affairs and control at state oil company PDVSA.

González López was considered close to Cabello, but it was not immediately clear whether his appointment was a gesture of support from Rodríguez to the man considered the strongman of the ruling party, or, on the contrary, a sign of a rift.

The officer replaces General Javier Marcano, whose performance came under scrutiny after Maduro’s capture, according to analysts.

One thing I’ve seen no coverage of is why the US thinks Rodríguez will be secure within Venezuela now that Trump killed the 40 Cubans who were protecting Maduro. And the militias via which Cabello exercises some of his repression could carry out a deniable kind of violence.

But Cabello isn’t even the only one with guns in question. The purported purpose of this operation is about stopping drug trafficking. But unless Trump is doing what every other caudillo does — manage the trade while extracting tribute — there will, eventually, be a counter response from the cartels, which don’t take kindly to losing their markets and have the ability to exercise violence both on site — in Venezuela — but also closer to home, including in the United States. Stephen Miller has so much of US law enforcement snatching workers at Home Depot that certain kinds of crime are likely far easier to pull off. Update: About which the NYT has another story today.

Finally, there are the Venezuelan people. Maduro only remained in power with a great deal of repression, and Trump is tinkering with that system of repression. Meanwhile, Trump’s plans to expel much of the Chinese may exacerbate already dire economic conditions for Venezuelans, because Trump won’t subsidize soft power in the way China has been willing to (to say nothing of the expulsion of Cubans who were providing medical care). Where Stephen Miller’s authoritarianism has failed most dramatically in the US is the way the counter reaction to his goons has revitalized civil society in cities that stand up to the goons. And there’s already a practiced opposition in Venezuela that, as in the US, dramatically outnumbers the goons in charge.

It’s only day four. We have no fucking idea how this will turn out. While Delta Force and the CIA performed spectacularly, there’s really just a handful of people in charge, and most — like Stephen Miller, who thinks of Venezuela as an island surrounded by a US armada and therefore is likely forgetting about a porous border with Colombia — are utterly ignorant about Venezuela and childish about power.

Columbia University was easy to subjugate, because no one had guns. But even there it only happened by damaging the host. There are a lot of people with guns with an interest in Venezuela.

It’s just as likely, in my opinion, that this precipitates World War III as that it succeeds in Venezuela much less produces the treasure Trump is demanding.

Update: CEO of the Human Rights Foundation, Venezuelan Thor Halvorssen, predicts Delcy Rodríguez’ quick demise.

Reports indicate the Trump administration has struck a deal with Delcy Rodríguez, Mr. Maduro’s iron-fisted vice president, positioning her as a transitional leader. She has, it seems, convinced U.S. officials that she can dismantle the Maduro dictatorship, which would have to include demobilizing the armed militias, disbanding the dreaded secret police and ending the regime’s drug empire. But this is a fantasy. Ms. Rodríguez will fail spectacularly, leading to the final unraveling.

Venezuela isn’t like Mexico, where a state coexists uneasily with cartels. Here, the cartel is the state. Factions—enriched generals, intelligence chiefs and narco-traffickers—won’t surrender power in a Washington-brokered deal. Ms. Rodríguez herself faces insurmountable obstacles, beginning with her utter lack of legitimacy. Never elected vice president, she has less authority than Mr. Maduro, the usurper who appointed her.

I think he wildly overestimates the extent that Trump would even permit any lapse in repression.

Update: Meanwhile on Xitter, I take this as confession that Stephen Miller knows fuckall about the oil market, especially the discount at which Venezuelan oil must be sold and the price at which it is worth drilling.

Paul Krugman’s column today is on how Trump’s oil math doesn’t add up.

[W]hatever it is we’re doing in Venezuela isn’t really a war for oil. It is, instead, a war for oil fantasies. The vast wealth Trump imagines is waiting there to be taken doesn’t exist.

Update: WSJ goes into more depth about the challenges Cabello may pose to Trump’s plans.

Fond of swinging a spiked club while spouting conspiracy theories on his hourslong weekly show on state television called “Bringing Down the Hammer,” now on its 556th episode, Cabello is hard to predict.

Cabello, a 62-year-old whose official title is minister of interior, justice and peace, has so far signaled unity, taking part in Rodriguez’s swearing-in ceremony on Monday, where various factions of Venezuela’s ruling socialist party were present.

But that night, Cabello was toting a rifle and riling up black-uniformed security forces before they patrolled Caracas to prevent citizens from protesting.

“Doubting is treason!” he said, before telling the armed group, “Now, off to battle in the streets for victory.”

Under a state of emergency that the government declared after Maduro’s capture, security forces were ordered to hunt down U.S. sympathizers, according to the Official Gazette, where the Venezuelan government publishes new laws and decrees. Residents in the capital reported new roadblocks around the city where armed, masked men checked the phones of ordinary Venezuelans for antigovernment messages.

Update: This offers a good explanation of all the people with guns who would make things difficult even if Delcy Rodríguez did want to cooperate with the US.

Update, January 9: This analysis lays out the difficulties of Delcy Rodriguez’ position better than I did.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure.

The word “subpoena” appears 84 times in the Jack Smith deposition (see my more general post describing how Jim Jordan tried to bury his own cowardice disclosed in Smith’s deposition here):

• Subpoenas to Jack Smith (by any party): 7
• Subpoenas for GOP toll records (questions by GOPers): 55
• Subpoenas for GOP toll records (questions by Dems): 2
• Other subpoenas for GOP witnesses (questions by GOPers): 1
• Subpoenas from the stolen documents investigation (asked by Dems): 19

As that tally makes clear, the vast majority of those references came during the GOP time, focused on the subpoenas for 10 members of Congress, one of two fake scandals that Chuck Grassley created in advance of Smith’s testimony.

There were no questions — zero — about the other scandal Chuck Grassley created, that Jack Smith had subpoenaed (Grassley falsely claimed) records, mostly financial, for 430 “targets”. Even Chuck Grassley, in a December 8 post laying out the “oversight” he plans to do in 2026, barely mentioned those subpoenas.

The closest the House GOP came in last month’s Smith deposition was this question about claims that right wingers were debanked (as if being an insurrectionist were not reason enough for a bank to cut ties with someone):

Q Where they’re basically told by their bank that they need to go find a different bank. And there is a long list of, you know, Trump allied, you know, officials that were subpoenaed for the grand jury, that were, you know, brought into your investigation that claim they had been debanked and that Capital One told them to go find a different bank and numerous other banks.

Do you know anything about that?

A No, I do not.

Q Okay. So your office didn’t have any communications with banks urging a bank to separate from any of their customers?

A I have no knowledge of that.

Q Are you aware of that allegations, or is this the first you’re hearing of it?

A I’m trying to think. I didn’t know what the term meant when you first said it, so, I mean, in the scheme of the world, have I heard of the word debanking? Maybe. But if you’d asked me to define it when you first said it, I don’t think I could have.

Q Okay. But have you — so you haven’t heard that allegation that some of the folks in President Trump’s inner circle have complained that they, you know, were kicked out of their bank?

As a result, the GOP did not invite (and Democrats did not think to invite) Jack Smith to explain a slew of subpoenas he sent out, subpoenas that constituted new prongs of the investigation and expanded prongs of work done in 2021 about finances.

As I laid out here, those subpoenas clearly addressed known prongs of the investigation into how Trump raised tons of money based on false claims and later funneled the money to people who had remained loyal through the attack on democracy.

Five pages — which appear to match the title of the document, Arctic Frost Bank Record Subpoenas — show subpoena returns with dates long after the date of the summary, going through a subpoena pertaining to Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman to Fidelity completed on July 6, 2023. [Note: The release of this document exposes the banks of dozens of Trump associates, a fairly alarming privacy violation.]

The five pages of subpoenas focus on several topics, largely the following:

• J6 $
• Wire fraud
• Misappropriation
• Payments to lawyers
• Bogus investigations
• Obstruction
• Credit reports

Most of this traces several prongs of investigation that were publicly reported at the time — largely picking up efforts of the January 6 Committee — showing that Trump raised money in the guise of election integrity, but then paid it to people like Brad Parscale or Dan Scavino.

Based on dates, this appears to be a key focus of Jack Smith once he was appointed

After squawking loudly (and to a significant extent, inaccurately) about the subpoenas, after doxing great swaths of the Republican Party, congressional Republicans decided they didn’t want to talk about the lucrative grift Trump took them for, in which Republican faithful paid Trump to lie.

As a result, the closest the full day deposition came to explaining how Trump abused the faith of his supporters was this exchange.

Q So did you develop evidence that President Trump, you know, was responsible for the violence at the Capitol on January 6th?

A So our view of the evidence was that he caused it and that he exploited it and 8 that it was foreseeable to him.

Q But you don’t have any evidence that he instructed people to crash the Capitol,  do you?

A As I said, our evidence is that he in the weeks leading up to January 6th created  a level of distrust. He used that level of distrust to get people to believe fraud claims that weren’t true. He made false statements to State legislatures, to his supporters in all sorts of contexts and was aware in the days leading up to January 6th that his supporters were angry when he invited them and then he directed them to the Capitol. Now, once they were at the Capitol and once the attack on the Capitol happened, he refused to stop it. He instead issued a tweet that without question in my mind endangered the life of his own Vice President. And when the violence was going on, he had to be pushed repeatedly by his staff members to do anything to quell it.

And then even afterwards he directed co-conspirators to make calls to Members of Congress, people who had were his political allies, to further delay the proceedings.

Trump deliberately stoked distrust to get his supporters to attack democracy.

January 6 was a violent insurrection. Never forget that.

But it was also an enormous fraud on the Republican Party.