More Proposed Oversight from John Conyers
John Conyers has been busy. In addition to drafting bills to improve FISA and PATRIOT (more on that later), he has introduced three more bills that would improve Congressional Oversight of the Executive.
The Department of Justice Inspector General Authority Improvement Act of 2009
This Act will authorize the Department of Justice Inspector General to investigate attorney misconduct within the Department of Justice. Under current law, all allegations of wrongdoing by the Department of Justice attorneys are required to be investigated by the by the department’s Office of Professional Responsibility, rather than the Inspector General. In contrast with the statutorily independent Inspector General, the Office of Professional Responsibility is supervised by the Attorney General.
This limitation on authority does not exist for any other agency Inspector General. The Department of Justice Inspector General Authority Improvement Act of 2009 will make the authority of the Department of Justice Inspector General consistent with that of all other agencies and will prevent future abuses and politicization within the Department.
DOJ’s Inspector General, Glenn Fine, has been pushing for this authority for some time (and not just because it would give him more authority). It fixes two problems that exist right now–one, that lawyers in DOJ are not held legally responsible in the same way as others might be, because they escape IG oversight (and often benefit from quiet settlements on complaints handled by OPR). And, more importantly, the current situation (in which OPR–which reports to the Attorney General–conducts investigations of lawyers) makes it almost impossible to investigate the actions of the Attorney General or his close allies. Alberto Gonzales was able to put off investigations into the US Attorney scandal for some time this way.
The Inspector General Authority Improvement Act of 2009
This Act will provide the Inspectors General of the various agencies the authority to issue subpoenas for the testimony of former employees or contractors as part of certain investigations. Under current law, a critical witness can avoid being interviewed by an Inspector General, and thus seriously impede an investigation, by simply resigning from the agency.
The bill contains important limitations on an Inspector General’s subpoena power in order to prevent abuse or damage to ongoing investigations. Most prominently, an Inspector General cannot issue a subpoena if the Department of Justice concludes in a particular case that the taking of a deposition would interfere with civil or criminal litigation.
Again, this seems like a response to the Bush scandals–not least the way some of the culprits in the US Attorney scandal refused to cooperate with Glenn Fine (or the way John Ashcroft has refused cooperation with all torture and illegal wiretapping IG investigations).
The Disclosure of Presidential Declassification of Intelligence Information Act of 2009
The bill will require the President to inform, within 15 days, the relevant congressional committees whenever intelligence has been declassified. The bill also expresses the Sense of Congress that additional notice should be provided to the Director of National Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States, and the heads of the applicable elements of the intelligence community.
I will follow up on this one to see what the logic behind it is. But for the moment, I’m going to call it the Valerie Plame Insta-Declassification Bill. After all, if Dick Cheney George Bush had been required to reveal whether he had insta-declassified her identity within 15 days, it would have made it very clear whether Cheney’s order to Libby to leak it was nominally legal or whether Cheney and Libby violated the IIPA. But this law would have also made it harder for Bush to warmonger on Iraq, since every time they insta-declassified info to leak to Judy Judy Judy, they would have had to admit that fact.
Frankly, I expect both Republicans, the Administration, and some Democrats to balk at this bill. But we might have fun in the interim.
I’ll give Conyers (and you EW :D) credit on this one, but I’m still not buying the “drafting bills to improve FISA and PATRIOT”.
One notable flaw to Conyer’s Department of Justice Inspector General Authority Improvement Act of 2009 is the ability to cross organizational boundaries.
I’m not particularly talking about a DOJ IG being able to investigate the CIA’s Office of General Counsel (though I do believe that is important as well), but specifically the inability of any IG, including the DOJ IG, to investigate and compel the testimony of folks in the EOP and OVP.
As sadly as it became inarguably apparent with the Bush/Cheney Administration, by having Executive branch criminals in charge of the Nation’s criminal justice system, criminal justice itself is subverted.
What’s needed is a truly independent DOJ that does not report to the White House.
I know, in my dreams. :D
I’m working on a longer analysis of the two FISA and PATRIOT bills. But I think you’re mistaking “improving” FISA with “making FISA good.” Even if just the bulk collection part would pass (it won’t–not a chance in hell), it’d be an improvement. Is it enough? No. But one of your complaints is that FISA, as written in 2000, wasn’t all that great either.
There is a real good argument that FISA, as written from the get go, was unconstitutional. We are pretty far past that intellectual discussion by now, but just sayin…..
Yeah, that’s kind of the point to my response to MD–that his big objection is to FISA, as it existed even before Addington blew it up.
To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, we have already established what it is, we are just haggling over the price it is going to cost us at this point.
You’re not alone in your dreams. Many of us share them.
Yeah, I’m letting my bad mood today (must be the weather :) ) affect my better judgment.
And btw, EFF is also applauding the HJC’s FISA and Patriot bill updates.
Their one caveat that tickles my funnybone, is that like you, they say:
I will hold my breath. :)
That ought to put fear in the Big Brother machine….
Look. These are tools. The PATRIOT revision is a reasonably powerful one, bc the Senate needs the House to pass PATRIOT too, and there’s a deadline. So we’re basically seeing a replay of last year’s FISA fight.
Frankly, given the way the SJC folded, I predict we’ll do worse than we did last year (plus, now we’re giving these extraordinary powers to a Dem President so a bunch of chumps don’t much care). But we should be able to make some improvements and–I hope–to dig free more information about the data mining they’re doing.
As for the FISA bill, not a chance it gets past Steny, as I’ve said. Still, this is one of the most liberal committees in Congress (we even got rid of Artur Davis from it, who would have led the conservaDems in caving to Obama’s Admin (now it’ll probably be led by Debbie Wasserman Schultz or Adam SChiff, but neither has the credibility Davis had on these issues, particularly not DWS). And it seems like they’re ready to aggravate Obama some.
To balk at the Bill will make anyone look bad.
Tracking a list of the balkers would be fun.
On a related note: Judge rules FBI can continue to gag recipient [an ISP] of National Security Letter
Dammit.
More.
Conyers has another issue to deal with, Jay Bybee, who has gotten a pass from the 9th Court of Appeals and a complaint that was pending.
Meaning that since he wrote the Torture Memos before he got his lifetime appointment to the Bench that it has no bearing.
It is now up to Conyers to start impeachment hearings.
Bybee did not “get a pass”; Kozinski interpreted the jurisdiction of the judicial canons he was considering the matter under and determined that the offending conduct did not fall within said jurisdiction. that is NOT giving a pass, that is following the law.
ot anyone see this on the evening news between the balloon family coverage
FBI nabs scientist on espionage charges
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1256037270829&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Balk?!? The only reason that bill MIGHT make it TO committee is because Conyers is chairman. :-)
But I don’t think it will provide us much amusement. We already know with reasonable accuracy who will want to kill it and at this stage it can be done quietly. It might make it out of committee (never underestimate Conyers) but I doubt the leadership will ever find the time to schedule debate.
Conyers knows the above. Thus, I have to suspect that this is a request for the opening of talks with ObamaCo over something that Conyers wants and is willing to trade for dropping the proposed oversight.
And I’m with bmaz @13, the 9th ruled correctly. If we want Bybee out, it’s going to have to come via the senate.
Boxturtle (Why is it that whenever I see the phrase “government oversight” I translate it to “adult supervision”?)
I’d agree with the observation that some objections are objections to FISA as it was (which I have done from time to time, since I think that parts of it are unconstitutional and Congress has merely set up a procedural system under which it is almost impossible to challenge some of the unconstitutional activities that thrive in its moister recesses)
But on the *collect all foreign to foreign without any national security probable cause* that they seem in their press release to be advocating (and that is something that has been advocated before) I think they do go beyond FISA. When FISA was drafted, it was in response to the Sup Ct rulings that warrantless surveillance of US citizens wasn’t Constitutional, but which used language about the fact that the Ct wasn’t taking a position on warrantless wiretaps of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers (i.e., not taking a position on whether there was any role of the judiciary in authorizing or not the actions of the Executive to spy on foreign powers and their agents). And the original definitions of “agents of foreign powers’ were drafted in that diplomacy/nation based spying contexts.
Now despite that, NSA had always pretty much taken the position that wave based communications that it could intercept without tapping per se were all up for grabs. However, as may have begun to happen under Clinton (with a Latina American intercepts program) and expanded under Bush, the moved that concept (which was based on a legal theory that wave based communications that anyone could pick up were not all that private) to all the non-wave communications too.
And so in the debate over FISA eavesdropping all kinds of references began cropping up about the Executive “already having” the “right” to engage in warrantless search and seizure of ALL overseas communications, foreign power status notwithstanding.
This isn’t all that different than the SWIFT fiasco, where the US took the position that it was ENTITLED, on a mere say so by the Exec branch and without any judicial review or oversight or Congressional review or oversight. The problem for those guys who pooh pooh “international law” is that the SWIFT organizations had that foreign financial information because they – operated in foreign countries. Which means foreign countries have some input on what they are supposed to do to protect financial privacy under those foreign countries standards.
I’m not a foreign communications law expert or even hat wearing novice, but in the SWIFT setting it looked as if the Administration tried to meet the obligations of foreign law by having McConnell’s Booze “audit” their process. That was specifically found to not be good enough by the European body that reviewed the thing (I think it was a privacy court?? can’t remember and wasn’t familiar with the concept) So, if I’m Canadian, or German, or French, etc. and a multinational telecom is operating in my country and is maybe providing services to me, I’m going to be wondering a bit about what my Canadian or German or French government is going to say about the Americans passing a LAW that says my telecom is supposed to turn over all my communications with my friends and family and employer to them – even though there is no reason to believe that I am involved in terrorism or serving as an agent of government. If I’m a business, I’m even more concerned that an unlimited, “unfettered” group of Exec branch employees can run amok collecting confidential business communications – or even just setting up major identity theft programs on the side (since when you run a department meant to violate human rights and civil liberties – surprise surprise, now and then you hire criminally oriented people).
I have to scratch my head over both a) the concept that somehow in our limited grant of governing powers in the US Constitution we authorized the use of government powers to engage in mass surveillance of all the peoples of the world and b) that Congress is going to statutorily require telecoms to hand over all foreign to foreign communications without regard to national privacy laws of the countries in which those telecoms are operating. IIRC, the basic approach in the SWIFT review were laws that authorized hand over of a financial communications internationally IF there was a judicial order from the courts of the requesting country. Booze and ‘berto weren’t deemed to meet those requirements of being a court.
And in this country, under out constitution, warrants are only supposed to issue from the courts based on criminal probable cause. That’s why old FISA pretty much backed the FISA court out of review of warrantless surveillance by the Executive branch on foreign powers – that was deemed to be something the Exec was doing within its separate powers to defend national security and engage in foreign diplomacy. Our courts don’t really, under the Constitution, have the ability to direct or have oversight over foreign diplomacy and foreign powers interactions. So we couldn’t Constitutionally have a court issuing warrants for “all foreign to foreign” communications, on an unfettered basis.
That’s why under old FISA what were supposed to be the carve out of solely foreign power to foreign power (or agents thereof) communications were done – not through FISCt – through an AG only request. And Congress supposedly exercised oversight by requiring reports from the AG on those warrantless activities. Reports – with no consequences to the AG for fibs and ommissions. There’s oversight for you.
So now the carve out of AG only authorized (and not AG even, but all kinds of underlings and not even confined to the DOJ as originators) intercepts is going to go from foreign power to foreign power; to “everybody and everything, unless we know for a fact that one part of the communication involves a US citizen in the US, and even then it’s ok and the AG can figure out what to do with those intercepts” That doesn’t just leave me cold on the US/Constitutional front, it makes me wonder why no one even mentions the legal duties or constraints of telecoms in foreign countries. I cannot believe that there are none.
Heh. My prediction in comment number one on the PATRIOT act thread came through in less than 48 hours. See my number 38 there for the latest terrist scare to be used to fight any reform of the PATRIOT act or FISA.
In the bigger picture, am I the only one who thinks that the way Congressional committees are so 18th century they almost inadvertantly exacerbate the fragmentation and disjunctions between our laws, and our policies?
In one sense, I’m not sure what the Patriot Act can restore as long as banks and corporations can keep sending money to tax havens for laundering…
Without somehow linking the insta-declassification in the national security sector to insta-legal changes in the financial structure (via Treasury rules, or Commerce procedures), I don’t see how even these proposed changes can make all that much difference.
Sorry to sound pessimistic, but I simply don’t see these proposed changes linking up to the financial processes and money laundering activities that seem to be undermining the stated policy goals of say… Dept of State.
Perhaps it was this week’s news that hedge funder Raj Rajaratnam, arrested based on evidence obtained by wiretaps, was helping fund the Tamil Tigers that has me pessimistic that these piecemeal fixes are actually going to be all that effective.
You can fix DoJ, but if they have no ability to investigate Commerce, or Treasury changes (and yes, I’m thinking TARP) what’s the point over the long term?
Lithuanian President Announces Investigation into CIA Secret Prison
Investigation a result of ABC News.com report on CIA ‘Black Site’ in Lithuanian Capitol
Link.
OT: I’m off to read Jason Leopold’s latest: Judge rules defense to get Abu Zubaydah’s diary of torture.
A much shorter, but kind of non-sequitor, comment. Basically, the Constitutional provision for “oversight” of Executive branch searches and seizures is interposing the judiciary to make an independent determination of probable cause. Congress is trying, over and over, with FISA and in other areas, to circument this Constitutional approach and interpose a system of letting the Executive do anything, but then make “reports” to Congress and operate under some “rules” provided by Congress, but rules with no consequences for violations and no means of forcing disclosures to Congress if there are states secrets invocations or “executive privilege” invocations.
It doesn’t work – no amount of interposing a largely ceremonial Congressional committee as a “reviewer” (without power to prevent or punish) of Executive activities can effectively replace the Constitutional scheme of “oversight” that REQUIRES PRIOR JUDICIAL review and approval. It’s like saying let’s have the Executive decide what laws it wants and then the Judiciary can appoint an oversight committee to get reports from the Executive on how it is enforcing the laws it decided it wanted, and that way everyone can just skip Congress being involved in the legislative process at all The courts are supposed to be the oversight branch for Executive search and seizure – not Congressional committes getting reports from IGs who operate under classified review and exec privilege stritures, and who are Exec employees despite their supposed duty to report to Congress.
OT – From the ACLU:
Government’s letter to District Court regarding processing of records related to destroyed videotapes (10/19/2009) (2 page PDF)
The latest CIA letter has to do with the CIA’s response to Judge Hellerstein’s April 20, 2009 “paragraph 4” order regarding their production of CIA documents that relate to the CIA’s destruction of the torture videotapes.
In summary, while the CIA had found a number of documents that aren’t “covered by any exemptions that may be asserted by the CIA”, they’re still not going to turn them over because they would “interfere with Special Prosecutor John Durham’s ongoing criminal investigation into the destruction of the videotapes.” (My Bold)
Interesting that it is still “ongoing”, but I still am standing by my bet with EW that no indictments get handed down, and hence, no convictions.
It was for a nickle, right EW? :D
Notice in that letter that when they are talking about the investigations exemption, they are talking about Durham himself making the representations directly to the court. Not affidativits from Bradbury and Breuer et al. Compare and contrast with the Dick Cheney documents, where no one in the investigative chain makes the claim on behalf of the documents – not the Special Prosecutor there nor the supposed overseer of that Spec Pros (Margolis).
Shocking!
I hadn’t thought of that. Is Durham’s behavior the norm or Margolis?
I am still inclined to think (hope?) that timing is everything, and that sometime after the State of the Union message next January, Durham will find the way clear to indict a few people (who happen to be Republicans). After all, next summer, with elections only a few months away, would be a good time to remind the voting public about the corruption of the Republican brand.
Oh, but I am *not* suggesting [slaps hand over mouth] that a prosecutorial discussion will be influenced by political considerations. Perish the thought! Just because our president was schooled in Chicago politics….
Um, what was the question again?
Bob in AZ
Prosecutors seek delay in Guantanamo case (Noor Muhammed).